

VOL. II.

AUGUST, 1885.

No. 8.

THE PLATONIST.

An Exponent of Philosophic Truth.

EDITED BY

THOS. M. JOHNSON.

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*How charming is Divine Philosophy!
Not harsh nor crabbed, as dull fools suppose;
But musical as Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.*



OSCEOLA, MO.

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The Platonist.

“Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the Human Intellect and Heart.”

Esoteric Christianity is identical with True Philosophy.

VOL. II.

OSCEOLA, MO., AUGUST, 1885.

No. 8.

From Lib. III. Met. XI. of Boethius De Consolatione Philosophice.

TRANSLATED BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Reprinted from his Miscellanies in Prose and Verse.

Who'er to deep research inclin'd,
Desires the truth itself to find,
And from the clouds of Errour free
Its bright and sacred light would see,
Let him with mind profound reflect,
And all his scatter'd thoughts collect,
His vain external search give o'er
And view his soul's immortal store,
Since truth dispersing Errour's night
Will then outshine the solar light.
For tho' dull body in her folds
The soul in bonds lethargic holds,
Yet still some vivid rays remain
Indignant of her dark domain.
The sparks of truth in dormant state
The wings of learning suscite,
Or whence spontaneously arise
To every question fit replies,
Unless deep merg'd in mind profound,
The principle of truth, was found?
And thus if Plato's muse sings true,
To learn is mem'ry to renew.

But I cannot recite, even thus rudely, laws of the intellect, without remembering that lofty and sequestered class who have been its prophets and oracles, the high priesthood of the pure reason, the *Trismegisti*, the expounders of the principles of thought from age to age. When, at long intervals, we turn over their abstruse pages, wonderful seems the calm and grand air of these great spiritual lords, who have walked in the world,—these of the old religion,—dwelling in a worship which makes the sanctities of Christianity look *parvenues* and popular; for “persuasion is in soul, but necessity is in intellect.” This band of grandees, Hermes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, Plotinus, Olympiodorus, Proclus, Synesius, and the rest, have somewhat so vast in their logic, so primary in their thinking, that it seems antecedent to all the ordinary distinctions of rhetoric and literature, and to be at once poetry, and music, and dancing, and astronomy, and mathematics. I am present at the sowing of the seed of the world. With a geometry of sunbeams, the soul lays the foundations of nature. The truth and grandure of their thought is found by its scope and applicability, for it commands the entire schedule and inventory of things for its illustration. But what marks its elevation, and has even a comic look to us, is the innocent serenity with which these babe-like Jupiters sit in their clouds, and from age to age prattle to each other, and to no contemporary. Well assured that their speech is intelligible, and the most natural thing in the world, they add thesis to thesis, without a moment's heed of the universal astonishment of the human race below, who do not comprehend their

plainest argument; nor do they ever relent so much as to insert a popular or explaining sentence; nor testify the least displeasure or petulance at the dulness of their amazed auditory. The angels are so enamored of the language that is spoken in heaven, that they will not distort their lips with the hissing and unmusical dialects of men, but speak their own, whether there be any who understand it or not.—*Ralph Waldo Emerson.*

LIFE OF PLOTINOS:

OR THE LIFE OF PLOTINOS AND THE ARRANGEMENT OF HIS BOOKS.

BY PORPHYRIOS.

Translated from the original Greek.

XX. In relating the facts set forth in the two previous chapters I was somewhat prolix, as I desired to show the opinion of Plotinos held by the greatest critic of our age—one who examined and criticized the works of nearly all the writers of his time. At first, deceived by the ignorant aspersions of others, Longinos regarded Plotinos with contempt.

He thought that the works which he had received from Amelios were incorrect through the fault of the transcribers,—because he was unacquainted with the usual diction of our philosopher. For if any the books in the possession of Amelios were accurate, since they were transcribed from the manuscripts of Plotinos himself.

Moreover, it is worth while to adduce what Longinos said in one of his works about Plotinos, Amelios and the other philosophers of his time, in order to fully show what this most celebrated and acute critic thought of them. The book referred to was written against Plotinos and Gentilianos Amelios, and is entitled “On the End.” The preface is as follows: “Many philosophers have flourished in our age, O Markellos, especially in the time of our youth. The present generation, to say the least, has but few. But when we were youths many noted philosophers lived, all of whom we chanced to see, since from our childhood we traveled through numerous countries with our parents. Indeed, wherever we sojourned amidst the inhabitants of the various lands and cities, we mingled with those who excelled in virtue and wisdom.

Of these philosophers, some committed their thoughts to writing for the sake of posterity; others were content to orally impart their wisdom to their disciples. In the first class, of the Platonists there were Euklides, Demokritos, and Proklinos who lived near Troy. Also Plotinos, and Gentilianos Amelios the friend of Plotinos

who now live and lecture at Rome. Of the stoics were Themistokles and Phoibion, and Annios and Medios who lived until lately. And finally, of the Peripatetics there was Heliodoros the Alexandrian.

In the second class, of the Platonists were Ammonios [Sakkas] and Origenes, with whom we associated for a long time—philosophers who far surpassed their contemporaries. Then there were the successors of the Athenian school, Theodotos and Eubulos. Some of these have written works, as Origenes a book on Dæmons; Eubulos, Commentaries on the Philebos and Gorgias, and on the Objections of Aristoteles to the Republic. These works are of small importance compared with their oral teachings, and were not written systematically, nor with the intent to explain their dogmas.

Moreover, of the Stoics were Herminos and Lysimachos, and Athenaios and Musonios who lectured in the city (Athens). Of the Peripatetics were Ammonios and Ptolemaios, both accomplished in all the learning of the age, especially Ammonios, for no one approached him in a knowledge of the arts and sciences.

These last wrote no philosophic treatises but merely poems and set orations, which I do not think they desire to be preserved for the inspection of posterity. I presume they do not wish to be known to men of after ages by such works alone; and they neglected to transmit their thoughts in more worthy writings.

Of these philosophers, therefore, who were authors, some produced nothing more than a collection and transcription of the remains of the Ancients, as Euklides, Demokritos, and Proklinos; others recalling particular relations from ancient histories compose books of these materials, as Annios, Medios, and Phoibion. Phoibion was noted more for the elegance of his style than the depth and value of his ideas. Heliodoros may also be classified with these writers; for he was content to reproduce what is contained in the writings of the Ancients, without adding any philosophical expositions.

Plotinos and Gentilianos Amelios are replete with a copiousness of propositions, which they studiously discuss, and have seriously chosen the employment of writing, using a mode of contemplation peculiarly their own. And Plotinos indeed, as it seems, has more perspicuously explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles than his predecessors. For the writings of Numenios, Kronios, Moderatos, and Thrasyllus, are not to be compared as regards accuracy with the books of Plotinos on the same subjects. Amelios pursued the investigations of Plotinos; he adopted many of his dogmas, but differed from him in the prolixity of his demonstrations, and the diffusiveness of his style.

And the writings of these men alone do I deem worthy of particular consideration. For why should any one think it necessary to examine the writings of the others in place of the original works which they copied, especially since they added nothing of their own; they not only extracted the essential parts of their books but even the method of argumentation, and did not trouble themselves to collect better material [which could have been had]. I adopted this method in some of my writings, as when I answered Gentilianos Amelios on the

Platonic idea of Justice, and criticized the book of Plotinos on Ideas. For our common friend, Basileus (Porphyrios) of Tyre, who wrote many things according to the conceptions of Plotinos, and preferred his instruction and manner of life to ours,—endeavored to demonstrate in a certain book that the opinion of Plotinos on ideas was better than ours. This book we think that we refuted, and proved to him that his recantation [of erroneous notions about the dogmas of Plotinos] was not wisely made.

We have criticized many opinions of these philosophers, as for instance in our "Letter to Amelios," which is almost equivalent to a book in length. This was written in answer to an epistle which Amelios wrote to us from Rome, and which is entitled "On the Character of the Philosophy of Plotinos." As regards the title of our treatise we were content with the simple inscription: "Letter to Amelios."

XXI. In the above quotations, therefore, Longinos acknowledges that Plotinos and Amelios far surpassed all the philosophers of their age by the multitude of propositions and questions discussed, and by the mode of contemplation peculiar to themselves; that Plotinos did not appropriate the dogmas of Numenios, but that his own were more ancient than those of the latter; and that he followed the dogmas of the Pythagoreans [and Platon]. Moreover, that the works of Numenios, Kronios, Moderatos, and Thrasyllus were inferior in accuracy to those of Plotinos on the same subjects. When Longinos stated that Amelios pursued the investigations of Plotinos but was prolix and verbose in his expositions, and therefore his style differed from that of his master,—he also refers to me the intimate friend of Plotinos in this connection: "Our common friend, Basileus (Porphyrios) of Tyre, who has written many things in the manner of Plotinos." These words indicate that he perceived that I had avoided the verbosity of Amelios, and imitated the Plotinian style.

It suffices [for the purpose of showing the estimation in which Plotinos was held] to have cited the judgment of this illustrious man, the first critic of his age, on the merits of our philosopher. If I had been able to visit him, at the time he wrote for me, he would never have attempted the [so-called] refutation of the dogmas of Plotinos, which he composed before he had sufficiently investigated his system.*

XXII. But why should I speak about the oak and the rock, (to adopt an Hesiodic phrase)?† For if it is necessary to use the testimony of the wise [in respect to the transcendent merits of Plotinos], who is wiser than a Divinity? Than a Divinity who truly said of himself:

"The sands' amount, the measures of the Sea
Tho' vast the number, are well known to me.
I know the thoughts within the dumb conceal'd,
And words I hear by language unreveal'd."

This is Apollon, the same Divinity who proclaimed Sokrates to be the wisest of men, who being asked by

*Longinos did something very common in these days of superficiality and rash judgments, *i. e.*, he refuted dogmas before he had comprehended them!

† *i. e.* Why should I cite the letter of Longinos, when I can adduce the oracle of Apollon?

Amelios whither the soul of Plotinos had migrated, responded as follows:

To strains immortal full of heav'nly fire,
My harp I tune well strung with vocal wire;
Dear to Divinity a friend I praise,
Who claims those notes a God alone can raise.
For him a God in verse mellifluous sings,
And beats with golden rod the warbling strings.
Be present Muses, and with general voice
And all the powers of harmony rejoice;
Let all the measures of your art be try'd
In rapt'rous sounds, as when Akhilles dy'd.
When Homer's melody the band inspired,
And God-like furies every bosom fir'd.
And lo! the sacred choir of Muses join,
And in one general hymn their notes combine.
I Phoebos in the midst, to whom belong
The sacred pow'rs of verse, begin the song.
Genius sublime! Once bound in mortal ties,
A daemon now and more than mortals wise.
Fre'd from those members that with deadly weight
And stormy whirl enchain'd thy soul of late;*
O'er Life's rough ocean thou hast gain'd that shore,
Where storms molest and change impairs no more;†
And struggling thro' its deeps with vig'rous mind,
Pass'd the dark stream, and left base souls behind.
Plac'd where no darkness ever can obscure,
Where nothing enters sensual and impure;
Where shines eternal God's unclouded ray,
And gilds the realms of intellectual day.
Oft merg'd in matter, by strong leaps you try'd
To bound aloft, and cast its folds aside;
To shun the bitter stream of sanguine life,
Its whirls of sorrow, and its storms of strife.
While in the middle of its boist'rous waves
Thy soul robust, the deep's deaf tumult braves;
Oft beaming from the Gods thy piercing sight
Beheld in paths oblique a sacred light:
Whence rapt from sense with energy divine,
Before thine eyes immortal splendors shine:
Whose plenteous rays in darkness most profound,
Thy steps directed and illumin'd round.
Nor was the vision like the dreams of sleep,
But seen while vigilant you brave the deep;
While from your eyes you shake the gloom of night,
The glorious prospects burst upon your sight;
Prospects beheld but rarely by the wise,
Tho' men divine and fav'rites of the skies.
But now set free from the lethargic folds,
By which th' indignant soul dark matter holds;
The natal bonds deserted, now you soar,
And rank with daemon forms, a man no more.
In that blest realm where love and friendship reign,
And pleasures ever dwell unmixed with pain;
Where streams ambrosial in immortal course
Irriguous flow, from deity their source.
No dark'ning clouds those happy skies assail,
And the calm aether knows no stormy gale.
Supremely blest thy lofty soul abides,
Where Minos and his brother judge presides;
Just Aeakos and Plato the divine,
And fair Pythag'ras there exalted shine;
With other souls who form the general choir
Of love immortal, and of pure desire;
And who one common station are assign'd
With genii of the most exalted kind.
Thrice happy thou! who, life's long labors past,
With holy daemons dost reside at last;
From body loosen'd and from cares at rest,
Thy life most stable, and divine thy feast.
Now ev'ry Muse who for Plotinos sings,
Here cease with me to tune the vocal strings;
For thus my golden harp, with art divine,
Has told—Plotinos! endless bliss is thine.

XXIII. According to this oracle, therefore, Plotinos was worthy and mild, gentle and endearing, and such

* The soul by its union with the body becomes subject to destiny, but regains its freedom when it has emancipated itself from the influences of this material sphere. It can do this, even while it is still *nominally* in the body.

† The life of Plotinos was in many respects similar to that of Odysseus, whose struggles and vicissitudes are graphically described by Homeros.

as we truly found him to be. It also asserts that he was vigilant, that he had a puresoul, and that he was always tending to Divinity, which he most ardently loved. Likewise that he endeavored with all his might to emerge from the bitter waters of this sanguine life. Thus to this divine man, when he had frequently raised himself by his [anagogic] conceptions to the FIRST DEITY who is beyond intellect, and had faithfully pursued the paths described by Platon in his Symposium, there came the vision of the SUPREME DIVINITY, who has neither form nor idea but is superior to intellect and every intelligible,—to whom also I say that I once approached and was united when I was sixty-eight years old. The mark therefore at which all his endeavors aimed appeared to Plotinos to be near. For the end and scope with him consisted in approximating and being united to the Divinity who is above all things. And he four times attained this end while I was with him, and this by an ineffable energy and not in capacity. The oracle also adds, that while Plotinos was wandering on the sea of life the deities frequently directed him into the right path, by benignantly extending to him abundant rays of divine light; so that he may be said to have written his works from the contemplation and intuition of Divinity. But by a vigilant internal and external contemplation, he is said by the oracle to have seen many beautiful spectacles, which no other philosopher has easily beheld. For merely human contemplation may indeed have various degrees of excellence, but when compared with divine knowledge—though it may be elegant and pleasing—yet cannot reach a depth such as can only be penetrated by the [divine assistance] of the Deities.

Hitherto the oracle has shown what were the energies of Plotinos, and what he obtained, while enveloped in body. But after his liberation from body it declares that he reached the divine society, where friendship, pure desire, joy and love, suspended from Deity, perpetually reign. Moreover, it also says that the sons of God, Minos, Rhadamanthos, and Aiakos, are the judges of souls; and that Plotinos departed to these,—not for the purpose of receiving their decisions of his conduct, but to enjoy their society. With these judges other Gods of the most exalted kind associate. It further says that Platon and Pythagoras likewise reside here, together with such other souls as stably form the choir of immortal love; and that the most blessed daemons have here fixed their abode. And lastly the oracle adds, that the life of this divine society is ever flourishing and full of joy, and possesses perpetual felicity through the beneficent communications of the Divinities.*

*The human mind, though immersed at first in matter, as well as that of every other animal here below, can emerge from it; and, by exerting its native power, can act without the assistance of the body, which it is so far from needing in these operations, that it is incumbered and obstructed by it. By this power it transports itself, as it were into that ideal world which every man who believes in God must believe to be the archetype of this material world; and in this way may be said to converse with those eternal forms of things in the Divine Mind, of which all things we see here are but shadows. And not only does our mind thus open to itself a new world but, by the study of its own nature, it discovers *mind* itself, and rises as near as it is possible for us, under this load of flesh, to that Supreme Mind, the author of nature, and everything in nature, whether ideal or material. By studies of this kind we attain, in some degree, to what we conceive to be the divine,

XXIV. And such is the life of Plotinos as narated by me. Since he entrusted to me the arrangement and revision of his books, I promised him while living, and also announced to others, that I would do this work. In the first place I did not deem it right to dispose his writings without system, chronologically, as they were published: I imitated Apollodoros the Athenian and Andronikos the Peripatetic; one of whom collected the works of Epikharmos, the comic writer, into ten volumes, and the other distributed the works of Aristoteles into systematic treatises, classifying together the writings which relate to the same subject. Thus I, delighting in perfect numbers, divided the books of Plotinos into six enneads of nine books each. I distributed to each ennead the books which discuss the same general subject; allotting to the first class those which treat of questions that, compared with others, are of inferior importance.

The first ennead contains the writings which treat of Ethics. They are:

1. What man is, and what Animal is.
2. On the Virtues.
3. On Dialectic.
4. On Happiness.
5. Whether Felicity consists in an extension of time.
6. On the Beautiful.
7. On the First Good, and other Goods.
8. Whence evils originate.
9. On the rational exit from the present life.

Such are the works contained in the first ennead. They discuss ethical problems.

In the second ennead are included the works which treat of nature: of the world, and those things which are comprehended in it. They are:

1. On the World.
2. On the Circular Motion of the Heavens.
3. Whether the stars effect anything.
4. On the two matters.
5. On that which is in capacity, and that which is in energy.
6. On Quality and Form.
7. On Total Mixture.
8. Why things seen at a distance appear to be small.
9. Against the Gnostics.

The third ennead contains works which also relate to the world, and various speculations about it. They are:

1. On Fate.
2. On Providence, first book.
3. On Providence, second book.

the chief perfection of mind, the ability to employ itself within itself, without the least dependence upon, or connection with, anything external. Nor is it possible to say, how far the human mind, by being constantly employed in such meditations, and abstracted almost entirely from the body, so disposed by a proper diet and manner of life as not to obstruct its operations, may go in this ascent toward *divinity*.

Plotinos was, I think, the greatest philosopher of later times, and a genius truly *divine*. Nor do I think that ever there was a mind, merely human, of more sublime speculation, or more abstracted from *matter*, than his was. Porphyry, his scholar, who writes his life, says that while he was with him, he, Plotinos, was four times raised above humanity, and united by an energy ineffable to the Divinity that is above all. And he says, that he himself was once exalted in the same manner when he was sixty-eight years of age. This I know will be laughed at by our modern philosophers(?); but, as Hamlet says in the play, 'there are more things in heaven and earth than ur philosophy dreams of.'—*Lord Monbodo*.

4. On the Daemon allotted to each of us.
5. On Love.
6. On the Impassivity of Immaterial Natures.
7. On Eternity and Time.
8. On Nature, Contemplation, and The One.
9. Various Considerations.

These three enneads we arranged in one class. In the third ennead we placed the work "On the Daemon allotted to each of us," because the subject is discussed from the universal standpoint, and the problems which relate to the conditions proper for the generation of man are examined. The work "On Nature, Contemplation, and The One," was assigned to this ennead by reason of its title.

The fourth ennead comprehends the writings which treat of the Soul. They are:

1. On the Essence of the Soul, first book.
2. On the Essence of the Soul, second book.
3. On Doubts relative to the Soul, first book.
4. On Doubts relative to the Soul, second book.
5. On Doubts relative to the Soul, third book.
6. On Sense and Memory.
7. On the Immortality of the Soul.
8. On the Descent of the Soul into bodies.
9. Whether all souls are one?

The fourth ennead contains all the hypotheses about the soul.

The fifth ennead embraces the works which treat of Intuitive Reason (*Noûs*). Each treatise discusses the Principle superior to Intuitive Reason, the connection of the Intuitive Reason with Soul, and Ideas. They are:

1. On the Three Archial Hypostases.
2. On the Generation and Order of things inferior to The First.
3. On Gnostic Hypostases, and that which is beyond them.
4. How things inferior to The First proceed from The First, and on The One.
5. That Intelligibles are not external to Intuitive Reason, and on The Good.
6. That the nature beyond being is not intellective, and what that is which is primarily, and also that which is secondarily, intellective.
7. Whether there are Ideas of Particulars.
8. On Intelligible Beauty.
9. On Intellect, Ideas, and Being.

The fourth and fifth enneads we arranged in one class; the sixth and last ennead was allotted another class. The writings of Plotinos were distributed into three general divisions: The first has three enneads, the second two, and the third one.

The sixth ennead has the following treatises:

1. On the Genera of Being, first book.
2. On the Genera of Being, second book.
3. On the Genera of Being, third book.
4. On True Being, demonstrating that it is everywhere one and the same whole.
5. On True Being, demonstrating that it is everywhere one and the same whole.
6. On Numbers.

7. How the Multitude of Ideas subsists, and on The Good.

8. On the Free-will and Volition of The One.

9. On the Good or The One.

We thus distributed the fifty-four books into six enneads. We have added commentaries on some of them, not in any particular order however, for the sake of our friends who desired certain points to be elucidated. We have also made summaries of all the books except the one on the Beautiful, which was lacking at the time the other works were published. And finally we drew up not only summaries for each book but also arguments for each, which are numbered similarly with the summaries. And now to conclude, we have endeavored to give each of the works of Plotinos a careful examination, and to correct all faults of punctuation and diction. If we aimed at anything else, the work itself will indicate it.

THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated from the original Greek.

(Continued from page 188, Vol. I.)

PROPOSITION XCVII.

In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.

For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which they are arranged in that series. For either all things partake of similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous can never take place in things in which there is order, connection, and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore, which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader, and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude [suspended from the leading cause].

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no where.

For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted to participate of it,

rules over all secondary beings, and is present to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations. But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures inferior to itself. For if was alone every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being nothing pertaining to subordinate natures. But it would not be in all things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects, by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order, therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and at the same time no where.

And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus it would be divulged and separate from itself, if one part of it was every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; for that which imparts is every where.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series is unbegotten.

For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity, according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.* But if it is inferior to other things, and proceeds from them, it does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates, it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant of other things.

* Hence, as all things proceed from the ineffable, that which is imparticipable proceeds also from it, yet not as from a cause, but as from that which is better than cause. The procession, therefore, of the imparticipable from the ineffable is ἀρρητος εμφανσις, an ineffable evolution into light.

PROPOSITION C.

Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle of all things.

For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred to *the one*; because all of them are analogous to *the one*. So far therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same through an analogy to *the one*, so far a reduction of them to *the one* is effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are from *the one*, no one of these is a principle. But so far as each is imparticipable, so far each is a principle. Hence, being the principles of certain things, they are suspended from the principle of all things. For that is the principle of all things of which all things participate. All things however alone entirely participate of the first; but of other things not all, but certain things participate. Hence also that [i. e. the ineffable] is simply the first, but other things are firsts with reference to a certain thing, but simply are not firsts.

PROPOSITION CI.

Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things, that participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to intellect.

For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures, and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however, that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of intelligence necessarily *is*; but not vice versa. For many beings neither live, nor emergize intellectually. But life is the second. For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life, but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number, and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the second, and intellect the third.

PROPOSITION CII.

All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consists of bound and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident that the first being also im-

parts to all things bound, and at the same time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also imparts to all things the motion, which it possesses in itself. For life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic nature.

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and intellection; and in intellect, being and life. But in intellect indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in the second, the first is according to participation, but the third, according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are according to participation;—this being the case, life and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since, however, each thing is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause (for cause pertains to other things, i. e. to effects) nor according to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it participates,)—hence in being there is truly life and intellection, essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause. Each of these, however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.

PROPOSITION CIV.

Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its energy eternal.

For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not participate of it according to energy. In this case, however, that which is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time, will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.

PROPOSITION CV.

Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but that which always participates of life, participates also of being, and that which always lives, always is,—hence, every thing immortal is perpetual.

But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist always;—if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.

PROPOSITION CVI.

The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains therefore, that the medium is the former of these.

PROPOSITION CVII.

Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and the same time being and generation.

For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and generation.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from being which is prior to the eternal.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series.

For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is partial to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature is similar to a whole of the same series, through a

communion of peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as through similars to that which is similar. For the one is similar as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior series is dissimilar in both these respects.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Every partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul.

For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing.

PROPOSITION CX.

Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the natures which are proximately established in the superior series, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

For because such things as are first are allied to those in a superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole series;—this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive proximately the participations of superior natures; while others being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their principles, are deprived of a power of this kind.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects alone. And of every psychical series, some things are intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to

be suspended from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect in it, and sufficient to be con-nascent with superior natures: Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of participable intellect, but such only as are most intellectual. Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of demonstration in all things.

PROPOSITION CXII.

Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the natures prior to them.

For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude to the natures placed above them, and through the connexion and coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of subsistence as are the natures prior to them.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Every divine number is unical.

For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. *the one*, just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is evident that a divine number is unical, since *the one* is God. But this follows, since *the one* and *the good* are the same. For *the good* and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing, and after which all things aspire, is God. And also that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But this is good. If therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude is unical. But that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is the leader of an appropriate multitude which is similar, and allied to the cause.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God.

For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and connatural with *the one* and *the good*, the Gods are self-perfect unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity it is a God. For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied to *the one*, and the self-perfect to *the good*, so likewise according to both these the self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on account of the mutation of the peculiarity.

PROPOSITION CXV.

Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual.

For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being,

life, or intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of the series of the first, so far as a God each will be superessential. But that the first God is superessential,* is evident. For essence is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something else besides *the one*, and will participate of unity, but will not be *the one itself*; or he is one of these. But

* That the principle of all things is something beyond intellect and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient Pythagoreans, as well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the following citations will abundantly evince.

And in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most ancient Pythagorean, On the Principles of things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82 and in which the following extraordinary passage occurs: *ὡς ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶμεν τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰν τε εἶτω τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κινητικὸν καὶ ἀσπαστὸν δυνάμει. τὸ δὲ τοιούτου οὐ μόνον εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω τι κρεβδόν. νόω δὲ κρεβδόν εἶναι, σπερονόμοιζομεν θεὸν φανερόν.*—i. e. "So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; *that which is [the subject] of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power.* With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, but that it should be something better than intellect. But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate god." It must here however be observed, that by the word *god* we are not only to understand the first cause, but every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianos in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause *νοῦ παντός καὶ οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ κρεβδίαι υπερεχει*—"surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and dignity." Again, according to the same Syrianos, p. 103, b. we are informed "that the Pythagoreans called god the one; as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianos, p. 104, in which place *πρακταρί* is erroneously substituted for *Κλίνι*. "That which is *the one*, and the measure of all things (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (*μόνον*), possessing absolute dominion (*κυριώδεις*), and himself manifesting himself (*αὐτὸ το αὐτὸ δηλοῦν*)." This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaos: who, as Syrianos informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*. For (says he) "Philolaos asserts that the deity established *bound* and *infinite*: by bound indeed exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied to *the one*; but by infinity a nature subjected to *bound*. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archainetos (*Ἀρχαίνετος*) denominates a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaos, is the principle of all things." To all these respectable authorities for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricos himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us "that the Pythagoreans placed *the one* as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning *the one*, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photios and others: such as *ἀλαμπία, σκοτωδία, ἀμιξία, βιαρόβροσ υποχθονίον, Ἀπολλων, &c.* viz. *obscurity, or without illumination, darkness, without mixture, a subterranean profundity. Apollo, &c.* For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called *obscurity, darkness, and a subterranean profundity*: but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated

if indeed he is essence, he will be indigent of *the one*. It is, however, impossible that *the good*, and *the first* should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of that which it is primarily to the whole series [of which it is the leader], every divine number is superessential; since every principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be superessential. For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the monads of essences.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

Every deity except *the one* is participable.

For that *the one* is imparticipable is evident, since if it were participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are prior to beings, and

without mixture, and *Apollo*; since *Apollo* signifies a privation of multitude. "For (says Plotinos) the Pythagoreans denominated the first God *Apollo*, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many." Ennead. 5, lib. 5 To which we may add, that the epithets *darkness* and *obscurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of a *thrice unknown darkness*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damaskios, (περι αρχων) in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his *Theogony* he says:

ἠτοιμὲν πρῶτιστᾶ Χάος γενεῖ',—

That is, "*Chaos was the first thing which was generated*"—and consequently there must be some cause prior to *Chaos*, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod, *γενετο* is translated *fruit*, as if the poet had said that *Chaos was the first of all things*; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, *γενετο* was considered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was simply*. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. "There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are generated.—And this is especially the case with the followers of Hesiod"—εἰσὶ γὰρ τινεὶ οἱ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγεννητὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα γιγνεσθαι.—μαλίστᾳ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his treatise *Adversus Mathematicos*, p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. For (says he) when Epicurus was yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod, "Chaos of all things was the first produc'd," from what *Chaos* was generated, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers.—To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth of things." κομίδη γὰρ μείρακιόσκος ὦν, ἤρετο τὸν ἐπαναγιγνώσκοντα αὐτῷ Γραμματιστὴν (ἠτοιμὲν πρῶτιστᾶ Χάος γενεῖ') ἐκ τίνος τὸ χάος ἐγενετο, εἰπερ πρῶτον ἐγενετο. τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἐργὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσοφῶν τοίνυν ἐφήσεν ὁ Ἐπικούρος, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδίστεον ἔδτιν, εἰπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀληθειαν ἰσάβιν.

Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: "Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings *Chaos* was first generated. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that all things are generated, except the first. It is, however, evident that those theologians, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the procession of things from their causes; on which account all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten. For Hesiod also, when he says that *Chaos* was first generated, insinuates that there was something prior to *Chaos*, from which *Chaos* was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation." (De Cælo, p. 147.)

of beings themselves. But that the other unities are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from *the one*? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be *the one itself*, but the other *one* and *not one*. This *non-one* also, if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be *one* alone. But if it is a certain other hypostasis besides *the one*, in this case *the one* will be participated by the *non-one*. And that will be a self-perfect one, which conjoins the non-one with *the one*. So that again God will be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one will subsist in the participation of *the one*. Every unity, therefore, which subsists after *the one* is participable, and every God is participable.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

Every God is the measure of beings.

For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are bounded through *the one*. But that which is one being [or being characterized by *the one*] measuring and terminating the natures with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of *the one* by participation.

But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is, by so much the less is it indefinite, and without measure. Every multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities.

PROPOSITION CXVIII.

Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and superessentially.

For if everything subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either according to cause, or according to *hyparxis*, or according to participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number, nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things will subsist in them either according to *hyparxis*, or according to cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner appropriate to their own union. For every thing which is the leader of secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate, in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the Gods unically and superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary and manifold order from the Gods.

For if the first God is *the one* and *the good*, and so far

he is *the one* he is also *the good*, and so far as *the good*, *the one*, if this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of *the one*, and the form of *the good*, according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of *the good*, and the form of *the one*, since the first is *the one* and *the good*. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses.

As, therefore, *the one* of the Gods is superessential, so likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than *the one*. For each of them is not any thing else than *the good*, but is good alone; as neither is each any thing else than *the one*, but is one alone.

PROPOSITION CXX.

Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize providentially through the participation of them. But providence is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary natures. And whence will that be derived which subsists according to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But providence (*προνοια*), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to intellect (*ενεργεια εστι προ νου*). The Gods, therefore, from being Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all things with the goodness which is prior to intellect.

PROPOSITION CXXI.

Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all things, divine natures fill all things with, and subjects all things to, themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of power, and predominates according to nature.

The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connas-

cent with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the boundaries of all knowledge presubstist uniformly in the Gods. For through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things, all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being intellectual, nor much less being a certain knowledge posterior to intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this knowledge is occult and uniform [or has the form of *the one*]. Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of the Gods. For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is best. But this is goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it. And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are primarily good.

IAMBlichOS: ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION BY ALEXANDER WILDER

PART IV.

I. Come, then, let us review the opposing opinions, what they are and what reason there is for them. Indeed, if we should let ourselves go on a little more at length in regard to certain things, as though speaking by particular authority and at our own convenience, it will behoove you to wait eagerly and be patient. For with the Supreme Sciences it is necessary that there shall be great diligence established and scrutiny made with rigorous accuracy for a long period of time, if you will know abstract things (*ἀβρα*) perfectly. You therefore, according to the present plan, are to put forth the questions at issue which constitute the topics for discussion; and I will in my turn give you the explanation.

CONCERNING THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY PRAYERS.

You say then: "It perplexes me very much to understand how superior beings may be commanded like inferiors, in these invocations." I will tell you in reply the entire difference that is worth a notice in regard to the beings invoked; from which explanation the distinction will become intelligible to you of what may be and what may not be, in regard to which you enquire.

FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE GODS AND SPIRITUAL BEINGS.*

The gods, the beings superior to us, by a willing of things excellent, and by an unreserved affluence of benefits, kindly bestow upon the worthy the things which are suitable, compassionating the labors of the holy men, and loving their children, nurslings and pupils. The intermediary races are guardians of judgment. They advise what it is proper to do, and what it is well to desist from. They help to just actions, but hinder the unjust; and they cause many of those who endeavor to despoil others unjustly, or to ill-treat or destroy some one, to undergo the very like things which they are purposing to accomplish upon the others. There is likewise, however, a certain other irrational and disorderly race of spiritual beings present, that was allotted a single faculty in the series by the distribution of functions to each which has been ordered among the several parts. As therefore the function of the sword is to cut, and to do nothing else than this, so also that of the spirits that are distributed every where according to the differentiating necessity of the region of Nature, one class distributes and the other brings together the things which come into existence. This is recognised from the phenomena. The caves of Charon,† so called, emit a cer-

*It is apparent that the beings here denominated gods belong to the order elsewhere styled *dæmons*. Proklos in his *Commentary* upon the *Alkibiades* I. describes three orders: 1, those more highly spiritual; 2, those more apparently rational, and 3, the crafty, irrational, more closely affiliated to matter. It was supposed that the *dæmons* of Sokrates and Plotinos were of the second of these.—A. W.

†The Charoneian caves are mentioned by Plotinos, ii. 93. They were named from Charon the supposed ferryman of disembodied souls across the river Styx in the Underworld, and emitted a sulphurous vapor, sometimes destructive to life. Such caves were found in Italy not far from Putcoli, also in the vicinity of the river Maiandros. They were supposed to lead into the realm of Hades.—A. W.

tain spirit or vapor from their recesses, which is capable of destroying every thing indiscriminately which happens to come into contact with it. So therefore certain invisible spirits are allotted each with a different faculty which alone it is by its nature capable of employing as has been ordered. If anyone who undertakes the celebration of the Sacred Rites in the proper order shall totally change them in another direction, and perform something contrary to the custom, then there will be personal harm to him who made ill use of the oracle. This, indeed, is another turn of the discourse.

SPIRITS THAT ARE COMMANDED IN MYSTIC RITES.

II. What it is now proposed to examine into, we sometimes behold actually taking place. It happens in regard to spirits that employ no rational faculty of their own, not having any first principle of judgment, that they are commanded. This is not at all unreasonable. Our understanding having the natural power to reason and decide, in regard to what things are, comprehending many of the powers of life in itself, is in the habit of commanding the irrational, and those that are perfected or initiated by a single act. It calls upon them therefore as superior powers, because it is endeavoring to draw from the whole universe that surrounds us the things which perfect us entirely in respect to those matters which remain among divisible things. It commands them however as inferiors, because frequently certain parts of things in the universe are more pure and perfect than things which pertain to the whole universe; as for example, if the one is spiritual, and the other wholly soulless or physical. Then that principle which is the less extended is superior in authority to the one which stretches out more amply, although it may be surpassed by the latter in the magnitude and completeness of its dominion.

There is likewise another reason for these peculiar facts, namely: There is a double character to the whole divine performance. The former introduced as by human beings, maintains our natural rank in the universe; but the latter, being corroborated by divine symbols, and through being allied to superior beings, and led harmoniously after their beautiful order which is fully able to invest it with the character of gods, is exalted on high. In accordance with this difference, the sacerdotal officiator very properly invokes the powers of the universe as superior beings, insomuch as it is a man who invokes; and again he commands them, seeing that he is by means of the arcane symbols, after a manner clothed with the sacred investiture of divinity.

THE PROPER DISTINCTIONS IN THE MYSTIC RITES.

III. By way of resolving the doubts more certainly, we think it well, when making the invocations, to leave out the supplications which appear to be made as to human beings, and likewise the imperative expressions which are uttered with great earnestness while performing the rites. For if the communion of a joint love and an indissoluble binding together into unity, constitute the entire sacred initiation, there will be nothing of human operations so called wrought in with

it, to the end that it may be truly divine and transcending every rite known and participated in by men. Nor may the invocation be the same as when we bring to us things at a distance; nor the supplication such a would be addressed to beings separate and apart, as we entrust one in respect to others. But the energy of the divine fire shining forth usually of itself, self-hidden and self-acting, is active alike through all things, as well those that communicate as those that are able to receive it.

The explanation now made is therefore a much better one, which does not suggest that divine operations are accomplished by means of contrary or different natures, as procreation is usually effected, but on the other hand that every such operation is done aright through sameness, oneness and agreement. If therefore we make distinction in the rites between the invoker and the invoked, the commander and the commanded, the superior and the inferior, we shall somehow change the contrariety of nature incident to created beings to the blessed unoriginated conditions of the divine beings. If therefore as is right to do we take no account of all these matters as being earth-born; but concede that which is common and simple, as being more precious to the beings who are superior to the diversified condition of these things here, the first suggestion in regard to these questions will be at once confuted, so that there will not be a single reasonable point of controversy left in regard to them.

THE KARMA, OR RESULT OF ACTIONS IN FORMER EXISTENCE.

IV. What shall we say then in regard to the enquiry next following this one: "Why they who are invoked demand the worshippers to be just, they themselves not refusing to do injustice, when they are entreated to do it?" In reply to this I answer that I am uncertain in regard to what is meant by acting justly, as the standard may not appear the same to us in regard to the matter as to the gods. On the one hand we as if we were looking at that which is in the smallest compass regard things present, the life that now is, what it is, and how it comes into objective existence. But the beings superior to us know the whole life of the soul, and all its former lives; and if they bring some retribution by reason of the supplication of those who pray to them, they do not inflict it beyond what is right. On the other hand, they aim at the sins impressed on the soul in former lives; which human beings not being conscious of, deem it unjust to encounter the unhappy vicissitudes they suffer.

CONCERNING OFFENSES COMMITTED IN FORMER TERMS OF EXISTENCE.

V. The many, therefore, are accustomed as by a common voice to utter this same doubt in regard to Providence: certain individuals, who done no previous wrong, suffer evil undeservedly. It is not possible here to set forth clearly what the soul is, what its entire life has been, how great were its transgressions in former lives, and whether it is suffering these things now in connection with what it did in a former existence. Many wrong things likewise escape human knowl-

edge, but are well known to the gods, since there is not the same view of right put forth for them as for human beings. On the other hand, men define righteousness to be the proper moral freedom of the soul, and the regulation of merit according to established laws, and the prevailing constitution of civil government. But the gods, let me tell you, look away from such matters to the whole order of the universe and to the actual relation of souls to the gods, and give their decision of what is right. Hence the decision in regard to upright actions is rendered after one manner by divine beings, but in a different one with us. Nor may I wonder at this, since we are not capable, in most matters, of the highest and most perfect judgment possessed by the superior beings. But what hinders judgment from being rendered to every thing by itself in a much superior manner by the gods in connection with the whole family of souls? For if the same common nature existing in souls, both when they are in bodies and when they are out of bodies, produces in them an intimate alliance to the life and common order of the universe, the necessity exists that the satisfaction of justice shall be demanded to the uttermost. Above all should this be done when the magnitude of the wrongs done by the one soul in previous terms of existence surpasses the fullest extent of one infliction of the penalty consequent upon offenses.

If, however, any one would add other explanations, by which he seeks to make plain in a different way the maintaining of justice by the gods, other than as it is known to us, there may result from them a *mode* for us in regard to the subject under consideration. For me, however, the rules alone which have already been laid down are sufficient for the purpose of setting forth the whole class of intelligences and the comprehending of every thing relating to the healing influence in the punishments.

THE GODS VINDICATED AS SOLELY GOOD.

VI. Let us, therefore, if you will, in order that we may from our abundance decide the contest against the objection that is now under discussion, grant the contrary of what has been represented: that wrong things have been done in the performance of invocations. It is manifest at once that no one may accuse the gods of these ill performances. The good are authors of benefits; and the gods are good from their inherent essence. They, therefore, do nothing wrong. One must therefore seek elsewhere for the sources of things occurring out of harmony.

Although, however, we are not able to find these, it is not right to give up the true notion in regard to the gods. Nor is it proper to reject notions which are perfectly clear in respect to divine beings, because of controversy as to whether these things occur, and how they occur. It is much better to acknowledge the feebleness of our own powers to understand how wrong things are done, than to acquiesce in any impossible falsehood in respect to the gods. All the Hellenes and other peoples hold the contrary opinion truly in regard to these things. Such therefore is the truth of the matter.

THE CAUSATION OF EVIL.

VII. It is necessary, however, to add an explanation of the causes of the occasional existence of evils, how numerous and of what kind they are. Their form is not simple, but being diversified, it leads the production of innumerable shades of evils. For if we spoke truly, just now, in regard to phantoms or eidola and evil daemons, assuming the presence of Gods and good daemons, a certain malignant tribe, in regard to which this kind of opposite character usually happens, thereupon often appears somehow to rush in without number. They demand the worshipper to be just, because they assume to be of the race of gods; but they are servants to unrighteousness, because they are essentially wicked. Let there be the same definition, therefore, in respect to false and true, and good and evil. As therefore in the oracles we ascribe the true things to the gods alone, but when we perceive falsehood uttered in them, this is ranked in another class of causation, that of dæmons; so, also, in regard to things right and wrong, the excellent and just alone are to be reckoned to the gods and good dæmons, while the dæmons who are wicked by nature do what is wrong and base. That which agrees and is consistent with itself in all respects, and always keeps by itself, belongs to the superior orders; but that which is self-contradictory, discordant, and never the same, is characteristic of dæmonian disagreements, in regard to which it is by no means wonderful if conflicts exist. On the very contrary, it would be more to be wondered at, if this should not be the case.

PARTIAL EVIL UNIVERSAL GOOD.

VIII. Setting out from another hypothesis, we hold that the corporeal parts of the universe are neither idle nor without power; but so far as they differ from our conditions in perfection, excellence and magnitude, by so much we declare the greater power that is present with them. They likewise are capable of different things by themselves, and perform certain different operations. But they can effect much more with each other. Indeed there is a certain productive activity of various kinds extending from the whole into the parts, either sympathetic by reason of similarity of powers, or by the affinity of the active to the receptive nature. If then by corporeal necessities there happen certain evil and deadly things in respect to the parts, they are salutary and beneficial as to the whole and the harmony of the universe, but they induce a necessary decay in the parts, either from not being able to conduct the operations of the whole or secondly, from a commingling and combination of their own weakness, or in the third place, from the want of harmony of the parts with each other.

THE WHOLE SUFFERS NOT FROM INJURY OF PARTS.

IX. Next after the body of the universe the many other beings come into existence by its productive power. The concurring of things that are similar, and the opposing of those that are unlike, are the origin of no small number. Moreover, the union of the many into one, the Living Principle of the universe, and the cosmic powers, however many and of whatever kind

they may be, are, (speaking in simple terms,) as one kind in regard to the great whole (*ὅλων*), and another when becoming complete in regard to the individual parts, by reason of the weakness which is characteristic of divided parts. Thus Attraction (*φιλία*), Love (*ἔρως*), and Repulsion, (*νεῖκος*)* which are as energies in the universe become passive conditions in those that participate in them according to their distinctive allotment. Taking precedence in forms and pure principles in the general order of all things, they take on a certain material privation and unsightliness in respect to each of them. They are united mutually in respect to the totalities, and separated in respect to the parts. So, therefore, differentiated natures which are allotted a share therein with matter, degenerate in respect of every thing excellent, perfect and entire. Some of the parts pine away in order that all that are firmly compacted according to nature may be preserved. Sometimes, also, the individual parts are afflicted and weighed down, while the wholes remain insensible to any annoyance of this character.

THE DIVINITY NOT THE CAUSE OF EVILS.

X. †Let us bring together the conclusions which result from these discussions. If any who make the invocations at the Rites make use of physical or corporeal powers of the universe, there will take place a gift of energy, involuntary and without harm. It is the individual employing the gift improperly who perverts it to adverse and worthless purposes. It is operated sympathetically through its resemblance to passive conditions; and he wrenches it purposely away from the right to things evil and base. He also causes the things farthest apart to work together according to the sole established order of the universe; yet if anyone perceiving this, should improperly endeavor to draw certain parts of the universe to diverse parts, these will not be the causes of that mischief, but on the other hand, it will be the temerity of human beings and the infraction of order in the universe that perverts the things that are good and legitimate. So then it is not the gods that do the things, esteemed to be wicked, but the races and bodies descending from them. Nor do these as it is supposed, give way to disorder of themselves; but instead they send forth their peculiar emanations to those existing around the earth for the safety of all. They who receive these gifts transform them by their own commingling and alienation, and transfer what was given for another purpose to things of different character.

From all these things therefore, it has been shown that the Divine Nature is not a cause of evils and wrongs.

*This is the doctrine of Empedokles the Sicilian philosopher. He thought that the Supreme Being, who is wholly and perfectly intellectual Mind is the source from which all things else are derived, and represents the universe as a sphere and union of all into one, being bound together by *φιλία* or attraction. The opposite principal of repulsion gave certain of these many things a tendency to separate, while the counteracting influence of attraction operating on them as they became differentiated, thus caused them to take the forms of organic life. The Eros or Supreme Love, inspired and directed both the others; and thus the creation was evolved.—A. W.

†The doctrine here inculcated is also taught by Plotinos, *Ennead* I. v. iv. 40, 41, 42.

SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED TO AN UGLY QUESTION.

XI. You ask and at the same time start a difficulty with this enquiry: "They will give no heed to the person invoking them that is not pure of sexual contamination;* but they are not reluctant to lead chance individuals into unlawful concubinage." There is a clear solution from what has been already said; whether these things take place outside of laws but according to another category and order superior to laws; or whether things of this sort happen according to order and attraction in the universe, but according to some sympathetic cheatery in particular respects; or whether the bestowment of the good gift graciously imparted is prevented by those who receive it to contrary ends.

THE TARO.

The Taro is a series of leaves or an unbound book coming down to us across the ages from a primitive epoch. The name is merely a disguising transportation of the Latin word, Rota, or Wheel. We shall presently see in what respects the name of Wheel is applicable to it.

By ordinary men, whose reasoning powers are ruled,—rather should we say, are thrown into disuse, warped, or even obliterated by the mists of prejudice, the extreme antiquity of this book would be sufficient to cause them to consider it merely as a venerable toy played with in the infancy of the world, and not to be seriously considered in this highly enlightened nineteenth century. The true occultist, divesting himself of every prejudice, as of a garment which would impede him in the race he has to run, investigates all things, old or new, purporting to appertain to the Occult Sciences, however absurd, uninviting or difficult they may at first sight appear. We only care to invite the attention of such as these to the subject of the Taro.

To get a precise idea of its import, we must first know something of the remote period in which it was invented. In this short paper we cannot pretend to give sufficient proofs of what we advance. Were we to do so, we should require to displace Plato altogether from this journal. We can only indicate the path, and leave the student to trace out for himself whether or not it leads him to the goal he would reach.

This so-called primitive epoch was in reality a time of the greatest intellectual activity in a race of men who had for many generations been in the ascending scale of civilization, scientific culture, and attainment of knowledge. This race had gradually discovered that to gain knowledge by the external senses only, as even the lower animals do, was a very slow process, and that the life of man was too short to enable him, however great his natural genius might be, to achieve more than a very limited and uncertain result having only some remote relationship to the great truths of the universe. What led them to avail themselves of the joint use of the male attribute of reason and the female attribute of intuition is beyond our limits to enter upon.

*Many commentators regard this passage as corrupt. Some writers are of opinion that the clause was originally: "Just as he will be polluted by touching the bed of a parturient woman or a corpse." See Leviticus, XII. 2; Baruch, VI. 29; but the last sentence of this Part seems to warrant the present rendering.—A. W.

This process was then called inspiration, and those who practised it were called *munis* or inspired men. By way of illustration of our meaning we may mention what is known to mathematicians as a matter of history. About 300 B. C., there lived in India one Arya Bhatta, who has the credit of being the inventor of algebra. He was one of the first of the uninspired philosophers, when the race had entered on the descending scale. Before him was a whole series of *munis* or inspired men. They had invented mathematics and algebra. Arya Bhatta, only, in all probability, collected, and put in some kind of form, a small portion of the discoveries of generations of *munis*, as their knowledge was fast dying out, and so got the credit of having invented algebra. This Arya Bhatta also knew the diameter of the earth, or squaring of the circle, to within a few decimal places, and we know no more now. The *munis* had, at their culminating point, penetrated all the mysteries of creation and mathematics followed as a natural consequence. The orbits of the sun, moon and planets, were to them familiar knowledge. The mysteries of polar motion and its dependent "procession of the equinoxes," with the vast changes it had made in the course of ages in the earth's cycles and seasons were all fathomed and esoterically symbolized by them, which symbols remain to this day. Not only had they arrived at an intuition of the mechanism of the macrocosm or great world, but also that of the microcosm or smaller world of man, and the intimate analogy, mutual relationship and interdependence of the two.

It was from the very sublimity of their knowledge of this interdependence that they conceived the idea of the rota or wheel, i. e. the sun, moon and planets moving in their orbits, on wheels within wheels, expressing the cosmogony and continuance of creation, and symbolising it in such a form that the microcosm could, by using it according to nature's laws, discover his own relation to it in his daily life, beginning at any point of time, and tracing it backward or forward from that time. They knew that nothing whatever happens by chance, and that if, under certain conditions, man's imagination and will are concentrated upon any subject he wishes to know, what may appear as a fortuitous disposition of the leaves of the Taro, becomes to the seer an open book in which he may read an answer to the question seriously occupying his mind. The leaves or cards are placed in the form of a circle, which consists of four trines. $4 \times 3 = 12$, or the 12 signs of the zodiac, or 12 houses of heaven. In the center are placed the four modes of conceiving creative unity or the four aces. These bear a relation to the four trines, and they must be considered in relation to the subject proposed and to each other. The colours also of the aces and the trines correspond. There are seventy-eight cards, of which twenty-one are keys or seven trines. There are really twenty-two, but the additional one is 0 or zero and not counted as it represents the primordial chaos. Wherefore it is 7×3 plus 1. The cards having been placed according to the rules around this zodiacal circle, the apparently fortuitous collocation of them is in reality a movement analogous to planetary motion, inasmuch as it proceeds from the will or word of the microcosm. As the learned P.

Christian says, "The science of will, the beginning of all wisdom and source of all power, is contained in twenty-two *Arcana*, or symbolical hieroglyphs, of which each attribute veils a sense, and of which the whole composes an *absolute Doctrine*, which is summed up in the memory by its correspondence with the letters of the sacred language and with the numbers which appertain to those letters. Each *letter* and each *number*, as they are contemplated, or as the word utters them, expresses a reality of the *divine world*, the *intellectual world*, and the *physical world*. Each *arcanum*, made visible and tangible by one of these pictures, is a formula of the law and of a human activity in its relation with the spiritual forces and the material forces the combination of which produces the phenomena of life." The student will therefore perceive that it is an astrological system. In fact, the science of astrology is a part of the Taro, and was taken from it, in all probability, and is therefore not so perfect as the system of which it forms only a portion.

It is a well known saying in India that an Astrologer without clairvoyance is like a wife without a husband. So it is with the Taro. In order to use it with complete success, the artist must have attained to lucidity. It is also said that this lucidity comes with daily Taro contemplation with a mind earnestly concentrated on a particular subject.

How far empyreal intelligences intervene to help the earnest student who presents to this work a pure mind in a pure body, we do not enter upon here. As to these planetary intelligences, see Cornelius Agrippa! The presumption is that they are the adjutants, whether in the Taro, in Astrology, or in the use of the Magic Mirror.

We have said there are 78 cards, of which 22 are keys but these are only the exoteric keys. It is known to adepts that there should be 22 esoteric keys, which would make the total number up to 100. We have not ourselves yet seen these 22 esoteric keys, and we know of no one possessing them. On this point, an earnest English neophyte, who has attained to a considerable degree of lucidity, suggests that when the artist has arrived at a certain stage of perfection, these supernal intelligences themselves furnish the 22 esoteric keys, or impress their symbolic signature on 22 blank cards prepared by the student. On this point, we presume not to speak positively. If it be so, it would account for the Esoteric Keys not being seen, as, no doubt, the possessor of them would be constrained to carefully guard them from every eye but his own. We only throw this out as a suggestion to the student.

"*Corruptio optimorum pessima*" is an ancient saying, and it applies especially to the Taro. As the Aryan race degenerated and fell away from their primeval purity, so did their very knowledge become an evil to them. The misuse of the Taro for mere worldly purposes soon led to the loss of the knowledge of its true use, and it became a mere fortune-telling instrument. Even in this its degenerate use, so true is its mechanism to the powers of nature, that enough of truth can be told by it to sustain the faith of oriental nations in its thaumaturgic efficiency. All nations have had or have a Taro. Even the Gypsies, who were an oriental Pariah

race, brought a Taro with them when they first appeared in Europe. Hence, their fortune-telling proclivities. With them, it has become mere trickery and fraud, though, formerly at least, some of their women were clairvoyantes, and able to tell enough to astonish those who sought to learn the future of them. It was brought by the Moors through Spain to Italy, and it is still in daily use there with the full number of 78 cards, but only as a harmless game called Tarocchi. The wily priesthood there, took good care it should be nothing else. The ordinary pack of 52 playing cards is simply a modification and perversion of it. Even in this its mutilated and imperfect condition, in many villages even in England, there are still elderly women who by it do foretell, accurately enough, small events about to happen in the lives of simple village folk. These small predictions are of vast importance to them. The only explanation of this is, that these women by constantly contemplating the cards and concentrating their attention on a certain class of subjects do become clairvoyantes sufficiently to foresee some small events, aided by what remains in this imperfect Taro, of what may be called its once divine origin. In Paris, an elaborate pack of Taro cards may be bought for eight francs with a book of instructions by the notorious and illiterate whilom barber, Etteilla, entitled, "Art de tirer les Cartes." It is used by ladies and others "pour dire la bonne fortune." It is a mere fortune-telling affair, of little or no use to the student of true occultism. It is almost needless to say that the French and Italian Taros, as now made, are very imperfect. The Italian was once made properly in Marseilles with the right colours which is a very important part, but we are told that this manufacture has ceased. It would be desirable to have a manufactory of them in America, if the true forms and colors could be obtained. The importance of the colours will be better understood by a short reference to the Chinese Taro.


The Chinese do nothing like other people, and, as might be expected, their Taro is peculiar to themselves, though the same correspondence with nature's laws is its principle. It is composed of straight lines distinguished by different colours, instead of hieroglyphical coloured forms as in the Indian and Egyptian. The same English neophyte mentioned above, has attained a great insight into it, and we will quote some of his words upon it.

"THE CHINESE TARO."

"If you desired to represent the pure Masculine principles



by straight lines, you would do so by



(Black face represents red and light face blue.)

Blue being the opposite colour to red you would express the pure Feminine condition or




by

These two forms therefore would express the two divine principles which underlie all created nature and correspond to the well known symbol



By the various combinations of these six lines we should be able to express the union of the several principles under various relationships as seen in nature and corresponding thereto.

Three red and three blue lines alternated with each other, or interchanged, give rise to



The divine source numbers 1 and 2 or the divine unity contains 3 red and three blue lines, that is, a pure masculine trinity, and a pure feminine trinity.

The six sub-results or forms are therefore combinations of the first primary form or unity, only that each three must be an imperfectly balanced entity when taken by itself—some of them containing two masculine and only one feminine principle, and *vice versa*, but if we associate them in pairs, thus putting

2 and 3 together	}	1
4 " 5 "	}	2
6 " 7 "	}	3

we get divine attributes 3 red and three blue in each pair. The three pairs forming a sub-perfectly balanced trinity, in so far as they contain (as just said) an equally associated group of the divine principles, each pair being perfect in itself."

He then shows that an analogous kind of combinations apply to music and finishes by saying,

"The 12 signs of the zodiac are the 4 trinities of principles.

The 6 planets are the result of their unity, or the *interior* principles influenced by the condition of the surrounding and uniting 12, and the sun is the centre or seventh principle of the enclosed six.

As we have seen these principles to be applicable to musical chords, it is evident that the music of the spheres is no myth, but that when we are able to attach these principles to the combinations of the planets and the signs of the zodiac (which can be done the same as to this Chinese Taro) and place them upon the astrological chart, then can be written the music of a life, and as the cadence leads us back to the common chord upon the tonic, so may we calculate the approaching conclusion of the human symphony."

This short but hitherto unpublished extract will also aid in understanding the form of Taro which is used by Rosicrucian adepts.

In the Egyptian mysteries of initiation as celebrated

in the adyta of the pyramids, the aspirant, after triumphing over the first trials of his courage and self-command, was led into a chamber on the walls of which were portrayed these 22 arcana, and an explanation was given him. Through this ordeal passed Pythagoras, Plato, Apollonius Tyaneus and other sages of antiquity. Yes! the Divine Plato learned the secret of the Taro in the pyramids of Egypt. Hence the appropriateness of this subject to this journal.*

All occultists should know that the Taro rightly used is a source of the most perfect illumination and approach to divinity, whilst, perverted by the profane to mere worldly purposes, it becomes an instrument to drag them to still further degradation. To misuse the divine gifts of God, brings with it its own punishment, and renders them not only useless, but dangerous. The tree of knowledge may be one of good, but it may be also one of evil. The wise will understand.

It has been sedulously inculcated recently that we Westerns have not the natural qualities for success in occultism, and that the natives of the East are the only possessors of these natural gifts. It is quite true that they did once possess them in perfection, but to any one calmly considering the history of India, it is evident they have lost them, have not for generations made proper use of the stupendous secrets contained in their own sacred books, the Vedas, and have fallen into a state of physical and moral degradation. They will at some future time rise from it, but meanwhile, we Westerns are in the ascending scale and are destined to reach the top of it. We are probably undergoing the same gradual process of elevation which took place in India some thousands of years ago. One has only to contemplate such books as "Fahnestock's Statuovism," "Dowd's Rosy Cross," "J. R. Buchanan's Therapeutic Sarcognomy" and "Psychometry," and last but not least "Babbitt's Principles of Light and Colour," to perceive that they are leading thoughtful minds in the direction of the occult sciences. They may not be perfect in the particular department they have taken up of these immense subjects, but what they have taught has a very strong savour of the arcana taught by the ancient sages of India and Egypt. There was a great divergence at a certain point between the occultism of the two nations. The latter tended more to development of soul-power and the making of heroes, instead of the do-nothingness of Nirvana, and we follow the Egyptian system. The sages of the ancient world, perhaps of the gold or silver age, seem to be inspiring the minds of certain men in America with the great truths of occultism so far as the development of their psychic organism will permit. As their psychic organism is not yet perfect, truth and error must necessarily be somewhat mingled. From what I see and hear, I am convinced that the time is not so far distant when at least some few men in America will so far have developed as to be able to read perfectly, as did the ancient hierophants, in that most perfect and divine sybilline oracle, the Taro. It might even be that the ancient initiations will be restored on American soil in their pristine majesty, magnificence and splendour.

*The Isiac Table also, depicted by Athanasius Kircher, is really a description of the powers of nature, and the Taro is the same. The Isiac Table formed the altar in one of the subterranean halls of initiation in Ancient Egypt. Before this very altar, was, in all probability, the Divine Plato initiated into the mysteries of Isis. On this see "Histoire de la Magie, par P. Christian."

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