


THE PLATONIST.

An Exponent of the Philosophic Truth.

EDITED BY

THOS. M. JOHNSON.



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*How charming is Divine Philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose;
But musical as Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.*

ORANGE, N. J.

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VOL. II.

ORANGE, N. J., JUNE, 1884.

No. 6.

THE INLET.

BY LEWIS J. BLOCK.

I watch the many-colored crowd
Passing me on the busy street,
And marvel at the faces proud,
Or sullen with low-browed defeat.

The blue skies smile upon the earth;
The winds are with the clouds at play;
And happiness had surely birth
With sun-dawn of the perfect day.

I dream of all the secrets hid
By placid brow or gloomy eye,
As in some rock-built pyramid
An unknown king or slave may lie.

I feel the beat of every heart,
And shed the tears tired eyes let fall,
And thrill to know myself a part
Of griefs that weary, hopes that thrall.

Ah! can it be that my weak soul
Is but an inlet of the sea,
And knows the outer sweep and roll
Of tides that forerun destiny?

If this be dreaming, let me hold
The dear delusion to my breast;
Let me grow fearless, overbold,
And dare the noblest and the best.

Children of one sweet mother, heirs
Of all the hopes that thrill all hearts,
And owners of the mystic wares
That shine within the spirit's marts;

Masters of space and lords of time,
Wearer of robes that history wove,
In far-off looms of every clime,
In snow-clad wood or olive grove;

Each soul instinct with all and each,
We rise at last unto the height,
Foresaid in strange prophetic speech,
Whence every darkness melts in light.

All wisdom in one whisper they conveyed,
All language uttered in one mystic word
Wrought of sun-heated fire-flame, first pronounced
Among the angels proximate to the throne;
Where cloaked with three-fold light the all Divine,
The infinite point, the circumfused Supreme
Deific dwells, whose thoughts are tinged with heaven,
His own æternal and inappropriate bliss,
As clouds and mountains with the noonday light.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS:

OR THE LIFE OF PLOTINOS AND THE ARRANGEMENT OF HIS BOOKS.

BY PORPHYRIOS.

Translated from the original Greek.

[This work was written by Porphyrios in A. D. 303, when he was in his seventieth year. In modern times it first appeared in a Latin translation by Marsilius Ficinus, prefixed to his version of the *Enneads* of Plotinos, Florence, 1492, fol., and also Basle, 1580, fol. Creuzer's magnificent edition of the *Enneads*, Oxford, 3 vols., 4th, 1835, has the Greek text with the version (revised) of Ficinus. The Greek text alone is prefixed to Kirchhoff's edition of the *Enneads*, Leip., 1856, and also to Mueller's, Berlin, 1878, and Volkmann's, Leip., 1883. A French version of this work by Levesque de Burigny was published at Paris in 1847. This forms the basis of the translation prefixed to Bouillet's version of Plotinos, Paris, 1857.

A German version by Dr. J. G. V. Engelhardt appeared at Erlangen in 1820. A few chapters were translated into French by Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire in his History of the Alexandrian School; and Thomas Taylor, the celebrated English Platonist, to his translation of the *Select Works of Plotinos*, Lond., 1817, prefixed an Introduction "containing the Substance of Porphyry's *Life of Plotinos*." No English version of the whole work has ever been published.

I have had before me all the various editions of this work, and have carefully and critically examined them. The text given by Mueller has been generally followed.

My version simply aims to be a plain, intelligible transcript of the ideas of the original. In the subjoined notes is given all the available information illustrative of the text.

Plotinos was one of the most sublime philosophers of any age, and his biography as portrayed by Porphyrios his faithful disciple and intimate friend possesses an intense interest for the philosophic mind. Porphyrios was peculiarly well qualified to depict the characteristics and actions of his wonderful master, and he has admirably discharged his task. We have in this book a trustworthy record of the physical, ethical and intellectual life of this "resuscitated Platon," as St. Augustine aptly styles our philosopher.

Mr. F. W. H. Myers, in his valuable and remarkable paper on the *Greek Oracles*, thus eloquently and sympathetically refers to Plotinos: "For it was now that Porphyry was to encounter an influence, a doctrine, an aim, more enchanting than Homer's mythology, profounder than Apollo's oracles, more Christian, I had almost written, than Christianity itself. More Christian at least than such Christianity as had chiefly met Porphyry's eyes; more Christian than the violence of bishops, the wrangles of heretics, the fanaticism of slaves, was that single-hearted and endless effort after the union of the soul with God which filled every moment of the life of Plotinos, and which gave to his living example a potency and a charm which his writings never can renew. "Without father, without mother, without descent," a figure appearing solitary as Melchizedek on the scene of history, charged with a single blessing and lost in the unknown, we may yet see in this chief of mystics the heir of Plato, and affirm that it is he who has completed the cycle of Greek civilisation by adding to that long gallery of types of artist and warrior, philosopher and poet, the stainless image of the saint."*

In the vivid, truthful language of Thomas Taylor, Plotinos "was a philosopher preeminently distinguished for the strength and profundity of his intellect, and the purity and elevation of his life. He was a being wise without the usual mixture of human darkness, and great without the general combination of human weakness and imperfection. He seems to have left the orb of light solely for the benefit of mankind, that he might teach them how to repair the ruin contracted by their exile from good, and how to return to their true country, and legitimate kindred and allies. I do not mean that he descended into mortality for the purpose of unfolding the sublimest truths to the vulgar part of mankind—for this would have been a vain and ridiculous attempt; since the eyes of the multitude, as Platon justly observes, are not strong enough to look to truth. But he came as a guide to the few who are born with a divine destiny (*θεῖα μοῖρα*) and are struggling to gain the lost region of light, but know not how to break the fetters by which they are detained—who are impatient to leave the obscure cavern of Sense, where all is delusion and shadow and to ascend to the realms of Intellect, where all is substance and reality."]

* *Classical Essays*, London, 1883.

I. Plotinos, a philosopher of our time, was ashamed that his soul was imprisoned in body.* In consequence of this peculiar disposition he would not permit himself to reveal anything concerning his birth, parents, or native country.† He held in such contempt a representation of the human form, that, when Amelios requested him to allow his picture to be painted, he replied: "Is it not sufficient to bear the image‡ with which nature has invested us? Do you think that a more lasting representation of this image should be left to posterity as something worthy of inspection?" He having therefore denied the request, and refused to sit for his picture, Amelios directed his friend Carterius, the best painter of the age, to frequent the lectures of Plotinos, which were free to all, and delineate the more prominent features of his countenance by repeated and constant observation and study. Carterius in this way constructed from time to time, from memory, assisted by the advice and supervision of Amelios, a picture of Plotinos; and thus finally there was produced by the skill of the artist a comparatively excellent portrait of the philosopher, though he was entirely ignorant of the whole transaction.

II. He was afflicted with a chronic disease of the lower intestines, but refused to use enemata, saying that he would not preserve the life of an old man by such means. Nor would he use theriacal remedies, remarking that he did not derive his corporeal nourishment from even domestic animals.§ He abstained from the bath, but used frictions daily at home. But when a plague, which was raging at that time,|| killed those who were in the habit of rubbing him, he, neglecting such precaution, was himself in a short time attacked by the pestilence. When I was with him there was no indication that he had been stricken by the disease. After my departure [from Rome] the disease affected him so violently that—as Eustochios, his intimate companion, who remained with him until his death, informed me—the clear and sonorous vigor of his voice was destroyed, his sight seriously impaired, and his hands and feet covered with ulcers; wherefore, being unable to receive his friends personally, as was his custom, he left the city (Rome) and went to Campania, to the estate of his old associate, Zethos, who had been dead for some time. He was here supplied with necessaries, which were also sent him by Castrikius,¶ from Minturna. When he was on the point of making his exit from this sphere, Eustochios, who was then in Puteoli, was notified, but did not hasten to his bedside, as he did not think that Plotinos was on the verge of dissolution. As he entered his room the expiring philosopher exclaimed: "I still expected you. And now my divine nature is endeavoring to return to the Universal Divinity."*

Immediately after his death a dragon, which had been concealed under his bed, wandered through a crevice in the wall and disappeared.†

Plotinos died at the end of the second year of the reign of the Emperor Claudius [A. D. 270], and was, according to Eustokhios, in his sixty-sixth year. At the time of his death I was visiting in Lilybaion, Amelios was at Apameia of Syria, and Kastrikius was in Rome. Eustochios alone was present. By computation we find that the time of his birth was the thirteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Severus [A. D. 204]. He always refused to reveal the date of his birth or even the month in which he was born, since he did not think it proper that the period of his mundane birth should be celebrated with sacrifices or festivals. However, he assisted in celebrating the natal days of Platôn and Sôkratês, and invited his friends to a philosophic banquet, where each one was required to deliver an oration adapted to the occasion. Such [and the following] are the facts concerning Plotinos, derived from my intercourse with him.

III. When he was eight years old, and even attending school, he used to visit his nurse and imbibe her milk. Being accused of troublesomeness and reprimanded, he became ashamed and abandoned the habit.‡ At the age of twenty-eight, being vehemently inflamed with the love of philosophy, he attended the lectures of the most famous teachers in Alexandria, but left their schools with sorrow and disappointment. Informing a friend of his disappointment, who was well acquainted with the character of his mind, the latter advised him to become a pupil of Ammonios,§ whom he had not yet

* Such were the last words of this mighty man, which like those contained in his writings, are great and uncommon, admirable and sublime.—TAYLOR.

The dying declaration of Plotinos is illustrated by the first sentence of *Liber V., Ennead VI.*: "That one and the same principle in number is everywhere totally present, common conception evinces, since all men spontaneously assert that the Divinity which dwells in each of us is in all one and the same."

† This species of serpents was regarded by the ancients as representative of good dæmons (*αγαθοδαίμονες*). The most trifling particulars relative to the life and death of so extraordinary a man merit our attention; and indeed we may presume without being guilty of either superstition or enthusiasm, that scarcely anything trifling could mark the existence of such a powerful and celestial genius. There is nothing that, properly speaking, can be little which has any relation to a character truly great; for such is the power of uncommon genius that it confers consequence on everything within the sphere of its attraction, and renders every surrounding circumstance significant and important.—TAYLOR.

‡ This story, however trifling it may appear, indicates in my opinion the native innocence and genuine simplicity of manners which so eminently marked the character of Plotinos. It is a circumstance which does not merely point to something uncommon, but it was the harbinger as it were of that purity and sanctity of life which so eminently formed the conduct, and adorned the writings of our philosopher.—TAYLOR.

§ Ammonios was born about A. D. 175, and died about 250. His parents were Christians, and he was educated in the Christian belief, but when "he embraced wisdom and philosophy," according to Porphyrios, he returned to the ancient faith of his philosophic ancestors, *i. e.*, the Wisdom-Religion. He was generally called Ammonios Sakkas, from the fact that his business was at first that of a porter or Sack-bearer (*σάκκας*). "But though he was not nobly-born his doctrines, as transmitted to us by his disciples, eminently evince his possessing in high perfection all the endowments of a true philosopher, viz., a penetrating genius, a docile sagacity, a tenacious memory, and every other ornament of the soul requisite, according to Platôn, to form the philosophic character. The appellation of *θεοδιδάκτος* or *divinely-taught* was unanimously conferred on Ammonios by his contemporaries. Ammonios, it is most probable, expounded his doctrines only orally. If he committed his thoughts to books they have not descended to us. Nemesios, in his work *On the Nature of Man*, gives two interesting philosophical fragments, taken from the lectures of Ammonios.

* According to Eunapios, Porphyrios himself despised the body. Most of the Platonists, if not all, entertained the same feeling with regard to the material prison-house of the spirit.

† We learn from Eunapios that the birth-place of Plotinos was Lykopolis [now Syut], a city of the Thebaid in Egypt.

‡ Plotinos calls the body an *image*, because according to the Platonic doctrine it is the image of the soul which produces it.

§ The ancients called a medicine "theriacal" in the composition of which entered not only simple herbs such as the poppy, myrrh, etc., but also the flesh of the viper, an animal which the Greeks called *therion* (*θηρίον*, venomous beast), *par excellence*.

|| This pestilence was in the time of the Emperor Gallienus, A. D. 262, and raged so vehemently, according to Trebellius Pollio, that five thousand men perished through the same disease in one day.—TAYLOR.

¶ This is the Firmicius Castrikius, to whom Porphyrio's dedicated his treatise *On Abstinence from Animal Food*. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Parmenides* of Platôn, which is lost. Castrikius did not possess very much of the philosophic spirit. This is evidenced by the fact that, having abandoned the use of animal food, he again regularly partook of it. It is to be hoped that the admirable work of his friend Porphyrios on this subject caused him to abandon permanently the use of animal food, which is generally injurious.

heard. On hearing Ammonios lecture he exclaimed to his friend: "This is the man that I have been seeking." From that day he devotedly attached himself to Ammonios, and made such progress in his philosophy that he determined also to study the philosophy of the Persians and that of the Indian Sages. Wherefore, when the Emperor Gordianus marched against the Persians, Plotinos joined the expedition, being then in the nine and thirtieth year of his age; having heard Ammonios for eleven years. After the death of Gordianus in Mesopotamia, Plotinos, barely escaping with his life, fled to Antiocheia (Antioch).^{*} In the reign of the Emperor Philippus, being then in his fortieth year, he went to Rome.

Herennios, Origenês, and Plotinos had entered into an agreement not to reveal the dogmas of Ammonios, but to preserve them safely in their memory alone. Plotinos faithfully observed the compact, and carefully concealed the esoteric dogmas of Ammonios. However, Herennios finally violated the agreement, and Origenês imitated him. Origenês wrote nothing except a treatise on *Dæmons*, and a work written during the reign of Gallienus, entitled "*The Ruler of the Universe is alone the Creator*."[†] Plotinos [though released from his compact by the action of his associates] wrote nothing for a long time, adhering to the custom he had acquired from Ammonios. And thus ten years passed away, he associating with certain philosophic friends but writing nothing. The conferences held by him with his companions were desultory and unsystematic. So Amelius informed me. This philosopher[‡] attached himself to Plotinos, after the latter had been at Rome three years, in the third year of the reign of the Emperor Philippus [A. D. 246],

^{*} Gordianus was killed near Kirkesion, in the month of March, A. D. 244, and a monument was erected to him by his soldiers near Zaitha. It seems, therefore, that Plotinos was disappointed in his purpose at that time of procuring the Persian and Indian Wisdom; it is, however, certain that he afterwards obtained his desire, and most probably without the inconvenience of a long and dangerous journey. This will be evident from perusing his works, and attending to the latent dogmata they contain.—T.

[†] But little is known of Origenês the Platonist—a different man from Origenês the Christian, though they have been confounded. Besides the works mentioned in the text he wrote nothing except a Commentary on the *Proæmium* of the *Timaios* of Platôn. It is to be regretted that all of his writings have been lost. "That *The One*, therefore, is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to *The One*, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpreters of Platôn, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom but do not venerate the ineffable transcendence of *The One*, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that this should have been the case with Origenês, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinos. For Origenês ends in Intellect and the First Being, but omits *The One* which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Platôn, nor with the nature of things. But if he omits it because *The One* is perfectly unhyarctic, and without any subsistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in asserting these things, nor will Platôn admit him, and commemorate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Platôn, and is full of Peripatetic innovation."—PROKLOS: *On the Theology of Platon*. Lib. II., Ch. iv.

Of Herennios, tradition says that he explained the term "*metaphysics*" as denoting what lies beyond the sphere of nature.—UEBERWEG'S *History of Philosophy*.

[‡] Gentilianus Amelius, a Tuscan by birth, was one of the earliest and most faithful of the disciples of Plotinos. He seems to have enjoyed the confidence and esteem of his master in an eminent degree. Amelius was a voluminous author, but unfortunately all of his valuable works have been lost. Fragments of his writings are found in the works of Proklos, Stobaios, Olympiodoros, Damaskios, and the Fathers of the Church.

and remained with him until the first year [A. D. 270] of the reign of Claudius; twenty-four years altogether. He was skilled in philosophy, having been an associate of Lysimachos. He surpassed all the other disciples of Plotinos in patient industry; committing to writing nearly all the dogmas of Numenius, and also retaining the greater part of them in his memory. He collected almost a hundred books of *Scholia* from their conferences, which he gave to Hostilianos Hesychios, of Apameia, whom he adopted as his son.

IV. In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus (263 A. D.), I, Porphyrios, came from Greece with Antonius of Rhodes. I found that Amelius, though he had attended the lectures and conferences of Plotinos for eighteen years, had ventured to write nothing except *Scholia*, which as yet did not amount to a hundred books. Plotinos was now in his fifty-ninth year; and at this time I became his disciple, being thirty-four years old. In the first year of the reign of Gallienus (A. D. 254), Plotinos began to write, and he continued to note such matters as occurred to him for the ten succeeding years.^{*} When I met him he had composed twenty-one books, which were possessed by but few; for the edition was difficult to be procured. Moreover, Plotinos was neither hasty nor rash in publishing, but gave only those productions to the light which had been approved by a mature judgment. The twenty-one books referred to, after various inscriptions—not given them by Plotinos—at length obtained the following titles:

1. *On the Beautiful.*
2. *On the Immortality of the Soul.*
3. *On Fate.*
4. *On the Essence of the Soul.*
5. *On Intellect, Ideas, and Being.*
6. *On the Descent of the Soul into Body.*
7. *How things after the First proceed from the First; and, on the One.*
8. *Whether all Souls are One?*
9. *On the Good, or The One.*
10. *On the Three Archial Hypostases.*
11. *On the Generation and Order of Things after the First.*
12. *On the Two Matters.*
13. *Various Considerations.*
14. *On the Circular Motion of the Heavens.*
15. *On the Dæmon Allotted to Each of Us.*
16. *On the Rational Exit from the Present Life.*
17. *On Quality.*
18. *Whether there are Ideas of Particulars?*
19. *On the Virtues.*
20. *On Dialectic.*
21. *How the Soul is said to be a Medium Between an Impartible and Partible Essence?*

These books I found completed at the time I first became acquainted with Plotinos, and when he was in his fifty-ninth year.

V. This year (A. D. 263) and the succeeding five I was with him. A short period prior to the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, when I was in Rome, Plotinos wrote little or

^{*} It was a long time before Plotinos committed his thoughts to writing, and gave the world a copy of his inimitable mind. That light which was shortly to illuminate mankind, as yet shone with solitary splendor, or at best beamed only on a beloved few. It was now, however, destined to emerge from its sanctuary, and to display its radiance with unbounded diffusion. But a disciple like Porphyrios was requisite to the full perfection of its appearance. * * * Amelius was not, though an excellent philosopher, calculated to urge Plotinos to write, or to assist him in writing; but this important task was reserved for Porphyrios who, in the words of Eunapios, "like a Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of mortals, by the assistance of universal erudition, explained everything with clearness and precision."—TAYLOR.

nothing, but spent his time in conferences with his associates. During the six years that I was with him, many questions were discussed in our philosophical conversations which Plotinos, at the request of Amelios and myself, committed to writing, and produced two books: *On True Being: demonstrating that it is everywhere One and the Same Whole*. Subsequently he wrote two others; one of which shows: *That the Nature which is beyond Being is not Intellective; What that is which is primarily, and also that which is secondarily, intellective*. The other is: *On that which is in Potentiality, and that which is in Actuality*. He likewise wrote the following books:

On the Impassivity of Immaterial Natures.

On the Soul, two books.

On the Soul, a third book, or, *on the Manner in which we see.*

On Contemplation.

On Intelligible Beauty.

That Intelligibles are not External to Intellect; and Concerning Intellect and the Good.

Against the [Christian] Gnostics, who Maintain that the World and its Demiourgos are Evil.

On Numbers.

Why things Seen at a Distance appear to be Small.

Whether Felicity Increases with its Duration.

On Total Mixture.

How the Multitude of Ideas Subsists; and, Concerning The Good.

On the World.

On Sense-Perception and Memory.

On the Genera of Being, three books.

On Eternity and Time.

Plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years of my association with him. Their subjects, which are indicated by their titles, were suggested by the questions proposed and discussed in his school. These works, with the addition of those composed prior to my becoming his disciple, will make the number amount to forty-five.

VI. While I was in Sicily, when I went about the fifteenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos wrote the following works, which he sent to me for revision:

On Felicity; On Providence, two books; *On the Gnostic Hypostases, and that which is beyond them; On Love.*

These books were forwarded to me in the first year of the reign of Claudius [A. D. 269]. About the beginning of the second year, and a little before his death, he sent me the following, which were the last:

On What Things are Evil, and Whence Evils Originate.

Whether the Stars Effect Anything.

What Man is and What Animal (the Living Being itself) is.

On the First Good, and Other Goods.

The whole number, therefore, of the books written by Plotinos, connecting the preceding with those just enumerated, is fifty-four. They bear evident marks of the different periods at which they were composed. For the first one-and-twenty, which were written in the early part of his life, if compared with the next in order, seem to possess an inferior power, and to be deficient in strength. But those composed in the middle of his life exhibit the vigor of power and the acme of perfection. Such, with a few exceptions, are the four-and-twenty above mentioned. The last nine, however, which were written in the decline of life, bear the marks of remitted energy and drooping vigor. And these the four last exhibit more evidently than the preceding five.*

* It must however be observed that this difference is only visible when they are contrasted with one another. To an impartial observer, zealous of truth, and not deeply read in Plotinos, each of his books will appear to be what it really is, uncommonly profound, and inimit-

VII. Plotinos had many zealous disciples, and likewise a multitude of auditors whom the love of Philosophy attracted to his lectures. Among the former was Amelios the Tuscan, whose proper name was Gentilianus. He desired that the letter "r" should be substituted for the letter "l" in his name, and that it should thus be Amerius (from ἀμερία, integrity, indivisibility), instead of Amelios (from ἀμέλεια, negligence).† Another of his companions was Paulinus the Scythopolitan,‡ a physician, who was full of bad, immature advice, and whom Amelios therefore called Mikkalos (the Little). There was also the physician Eustokhios, of Alexandria, who enjoyed the intimate friendship of Plotinos to the last, was present at his death, and giving himself wholly to his teachings became a genuine philosopher. Besides these there was Zothikos, a critic and poet, who revised the works of Antimakhos and rendered the Atlantic History very poetically in verse; but after this he became blind, and died a short time prior to Plotinos. Paulinus also died before Plotinos. Zethos was another of his intimate friends. He was an Arabian, and married the daughter of one Theodosios, the associate of Ammonios. This Zethos was profoundly versed in medicine, and very much beloved by Plotinos, who endeavored to dissuade him from engaging in the administration of public affairs. Our philosopher resided with him, and retired to his country-place when he fell sick—six miles from Minturna, where Castrikius owned property. No person of our age, apparently, loved virtue more than Castrikius Firmus; he greatly venerated Plotinos; assisted and served Amelios; and acted in all respects towards me as if he had been a genuine brother. He was strongly attached to Plotinos, though he engaged in a public life.

Not a few senators attended the lectures of Plotinos. Of these, Marcellus, Orontius, Sabinillus, and Rogatianus especially applied themselves to the study of philosophy. The Senator Rogatianus despised the things of this ordinary sensuous life to such a degree that he abandoned his wealth, dismissed his servants and rejected the dignities of the State. Hence, when he was chosen Prætor, and the lictors waited for his appearance, he neither came into public, regarded the duties of his office, or resided in the house allotted to him; but he ate and slept with certain of his friends and associates, and gave himself to absolute retirement during the day. From being so vehemently afflicted with the gout that he was obliged to be carried in a chair, he regained his pristine strength and vigor by his philosophic habit of living. And from being so diseased in his hands that he could not even extend them when necessary, he so recovered their use that he could employ them with greater expedition than the mechanic. Plotinos greatly esteemed Rogatianus and proposed him as an illustrious example for the pupils of Philosophy.‡ Serapiôn,

ably sublime. Each is an oracle of wisdom, and a treasury of invaluable knowledge; and the gradations of excellence consist in the power of composition, and not in the matter of which they are composed.—TAYLOR.

* Ἀνέκτα denotes the indivisibility which is characteristic of a divine nature, because division (separation) destroys all power.—Vide PROKLOS: *Inst. Theol.*

† Scythopolis, a city of Judea, formerly called Bethsana, or Beth-Shan, city of the Sun.

‡ Porphyrios refers to Rogatianus in his treatise *on Abstinence*, in the following passage: There was once an instance where a negligence of terrene concerns, and a contemplation and intuition of such as are divine, expelled an articular disease, which had infested a certain person for the space of eight years. So that at the very same time that his soul was divested of a solicitous concern for riches, and corporeal affairs, his body was freed from a troublesome disease." What Porphyrios here says is perfectly conformable to the *Chaldean Oracle*: "By extending a fiery (divine) intellect to the work of piety, you will preserve the flowing body." Happy Rogatianus! who could

of Alexandria, another of his auditors, was at first a rhetorician, but afterward gave himself to philosophical discussions; though he remained addicted to usury and avarice. And finally, Plotinos considered me, a Tyrian by birth, one of his most intimate friends, and entrusted to me the care and revision of his writings.

VIII. Plotinos could by no means endure to revise what he had written, nor even to read his composition, through the badness of his sight. But while he was writing he neither formed the letters with accuracy, nor exactly distinguished the syllables, nor bestowed any diligent attention on the orthography; but neglecting all these as trifles he was alone attentive to the intellection of his mind, and, to the admiration of all his disciples, persevered in this custom to the end of his life.* Such, indeed, was the power of his intellect, that when he had once conceived the whole disposition of his thoughts from the beginning to the end, and had afterward committed them to writing, his composition was so connected that he appeared to be merely transcribing from a book. Hence he would discuss his domestic matters without departing from the actual intention of his mind; and at one and the same time transact the necessary affairs of friendship, and preserve an uninterrupted survey of the things he had proposed to consider. In consequence of this uncommon power of intellection, when he returned to writing, after the departure of the person with whom he had been conversing, he did not review what he had written, owing, as I have already observed, to the defect in his sight; and yet he so connected the preceding with the subsequent conceptions, that it appeared as if his composition had never been interrupted. Hence, he was simultaneously present with others and himself, so that the self-converted energy of his intellect was never remitted, except perhaps in sleep; which the paucity of his food, for he frequently abstained even from bread, and his incessant conversion to intellect, contributed in no small degree to expel.

(To be Continued.)

MARSILIO FICINO:

AND THE CAUSES OF THE RESTORATION OF PLATONISM IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, A. D.

(From the Italian of Luigi Ferri.)

BY VIRGINIA CHAMPLIN.

[Concluded from preceding Number.]

With praiseworthy and pious intention Leopoldo Galeotti, in his learned biography of Ficino, has defended him from the reproach of adulation and servility; alleging the letters in which with loyal and almost paternal counsels the good philosopher reclaims and leads into the path of virtue the young prince who was astonishingly abandoned to dissolute courses, spoken of in energetic terms by Nicolo Machiavelli. I would not make captious objections to the authenticity or deny the importance of the letters in which Marsilio addressing Cardinal Raffaello Riario, the nephew of Sixtus IV., or the Pope himself, inculcates in one the duty of a prince of the church, and in the other the even greater obligations, of him who should rule it according to the precepts of the gospel, and relinquish power for knowledge, and prefer the perpetual inheritance of wisdom to the gaudy splendors of title, and the fleeting honors of command.—TAYLOR.

* To the mere critic and philologist, Plotinos will doubtless appear inexcusable for such *important* omissions; but to the sublime and contemplative genius, his negligence will be considered as the result of vehement conception, and profound ratiocination.—TAYLOR.

conform his conduct to the ends of Christian charity and divine goodness. The frankness and energy of this last letter, written after the conspiracy of the *Pazzi*, to Lorenzo, then excommunicated by the Pope, is worthy of a noble and courageously Christian mind. This and many other documents testify to the beneficial influence which Ficino sought to exert upon all his friends in the sphere of private relations; but it does not prove more. All his conduct shows the goodness of his heart, the rectitude of his intentions, the conformity of his life to his thoughts, and of character to Philosophy in moral matters. His numerous and continuous correspondence with the most important personages of his time which extended over almost all Europe, besides confirming the honesty and unalterable purity of his conscience, shows that he was no less noble in friendship. Princes and literary men made war, so to express it, in contending for his friendship and the honor of his letters. Pico della Mirandola, Leon Battista Alberti, Giovanni Cavalcante, Jacopo Antiquario, the Secretary of Ludovico Sforza, Bernardo Bembo, and Ermolao Barbaro were distinguished among the numerous litterati and renowned Italian writers who were his friends. The celebrated Reuchlin, (Martinus), Uranius Preninger Everard Probus, Duke of Wittenberg, Matthias Corvinus, the King of Hungary, were numbered among his correspondents and admirers. The King Matthias carried his admiration so far as to even propose to convey him to his States to found a pure Platonic Academy there. Other important personages might be added to this already long list, and give new proof of the great authority he had become through his knowledge. But this fact suffices for all: that Cardinal Bessarione submitted his defense of Plato to his judgment, wishing him to be arbiter in his dispute with Giorgio da Trebizonda.

No one then can dispute the moral and scientific influence of Marsilio Ficino. This influence was equal to his fame, to his vast erudition and the nobility of his soul. Philosophy owes much to the Florentine restorer of Platonism, not only through the effect of his translations and works on posterity, but through the immense activity in favor of this doctrine which he explained to his numerous pupils and friends during his life. Much praise is due him for the great honesty of his advice and for the goodness of his soul, the predominating quality shown in his letters and private relations. But his operations were not carried into a political sphere, nor could they be, owing to the nature of his occupations and that of his numerous works, his individual character, and his peculiar position in regard to the princely house which had lordly rule in Florence.

Marsilio was not a practical man, but one of study and science; his philosophy itself, to illustrate which he used so many translations, compilations and commentaries, was the most speculative, the most religious and the most inclined to mysticism that had ever appeared in antiquity; especially in the state in which he had received it and in the way he understood it. He translated not only Plato but Plotinos; and like several of the greatest Greeks, his contemporaries, blended the mysticism of Alexandria with the idealism of Athens. He was fond of the dreams and extravagances, mystical and full of miracles, of Porphyrios, Proklos and Iamblichos, and he studied with the same ardor of research and enthusiasm the apocryphal writings and fabled traditions of Orpheus, Zarathustra and Hermès Trismegistos, accepting without criticism all that the Alexandrian school, in the time of its opposition to Christianity and of its synthesis of all dogmas, accumulated of the falsely marvellous and occult; therefore, although in one direction his erudition was greatly extended, he certainly weakened in the other the quality of his doctrines and faculties. His mind, overburdened with so many occupations

became less adapted to strong and concentrated meditation ; it was scattered over too many objects, and he did not succeed in constructing an original system of his own ; and he really needed more positive quiet study to combat the tendency to superstition and the marvellous natural to him. In fact he believed in astrology. He sent the horoscope of his birth to his friends, and noted with credulous curiosity the circumstances and extraordinary incidents of his life ; the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent was to him accompanied by undoubted signs of the movements of the heavens. Pico della Mirandola tried to persuade him to add a translation of Plotinos to that of Platô, and he perceived in this advice the hand of God, connecting him with the will of Cosmo, his former protector. After disputing the immortality of the soul with Michele Mercati, he makes him promise to visit him in the spirit, if he dies first ; and being surprised by a vision, does not doubt that the promise was kept. He became ill in August, 1474, and made a vow and believed that he received a sign promising recovery. Certain numbers seemed to him to be endowed with special value and infused no slight degree of kabalism in his life as in his works. With such dispositions it was then not to be wondered at that he could not be a practical man, nor succeed in giving this character to his doctrines. Singing, accompanied by the harp, prayer, the pleasures of the country, friends, and his correspondence which was almost always philosophical, seemed to have been the sole diversions from his learned studies. Being prevented by the fatigue of literary work from concerning himself much about his domestic affairs, he was able to give but little attention to public matters ; and when he turned his mind to political matters, he showed neither invention nor great perspicacity. By the reflections that accompany his Italian version of the treatise on *Monarchy* by Dante, we are informed that he favored the Ghibelline idea of an Emperor superior to princes and Republics, of a ruler who should preside over the universal Confederation of States ; an idea hardly practicable even in the time of Alighieri, and much less so in the period in which the great monarchies of France, Spain and Austria were founded and Italy was about to lose her own independence through a want of unity and internal strength.*

What shall we say of the relations with Girolamo Savonarola ?

Ficino, like many others, allowed himself to be deluded in regard to the purpose of the great Dominican's preaching, his reform of customs and religious zeal. Great was his surprise when he perceived that the friar intended the destruction of the power of the Medici ; that with his concurrence the State was changed, the Medici were banished from Florence and their friends put to torture. So after exalting the holiness of Savonarola, he condemned his politics, and passing all bounds in undeceiving himself, he no longer remembered his virtues and did not do justice to the constancy of the martyr. These acts and others still, which feebly connect him with political life, harmonise with the poetic and religious habits described by him thus in a letter to Carnigioni : "I will tell you something about Marsilio. After the studies of theology and medicine, I frequently depend upon the harp and song to make me forget other allurements of the senses, to drive away the troubles of body and soul, and raise my mind with all my strength to heaven and God, on the authority of Hermès and Plato, who say that music was granted to subdue the body, temper the soul and praise God."

It is in place here to note the phases that are distinguished in his religious consciousness, and the kind of vacillation which results from it in his general thought. In treating of his doctrines we shall show that in no period of his life did his con-

ception of religion cease to be broad enough, and worthy of a philosopher. Nevertheless we must admit that his ideas on Christianity in one way were not always firm, and that in his life they certainly mark two periods ; one in which worked upon by doubt he meditated a religious philosophy hardly favorable to the Christian dogma, and another in which he was convinced he adhered to it with greater faith. It seems that the period of doubt lasted ten years, and occurred between his thirtieth and fortieth year ; and it is certain that from the fortieth year, in which he was ordained priest (December, 1473), he performed ecclesiastical duties with a zeal, that in the midst of so much other labor, might be called exemplary, officiating, preaching in the Duomo, writing about religion, and commenting on Sacred Scripture.

If these occupations were not such as would leave his philosophical mind entire independence, and strengthen his natural mystic tendency, it must be confessed that in these duties, and especially in preaching, he acquired a breadth of mind, a reconciliation of Platonic philosophy with the Scriptures, and of reason with faith, that certainly could heal many moral evils, restore peace to many consciences and help the souls of a people in need of an enlightened and civilised religion. And no one was more fitted than he to teach Christian virtues, because he understood the Scriptures by the precepts of charity which he practiced, refusing to receive compensation for his philosophical teaching, performing the work gratuitously, like a physician to the needy, and aiding his friends with the powerful.

The critic before him withholds comments and reservations, when he observes the goodness of his heart, the purity of his habits and life, his tireless and conscientious activity of mind, his insatiable desire to obtain and impart knowledge, and the fear of showing a gratitude unequal to the benefits received. Ficino was protected and benefitted by the Medici, but he returned their favors an hundred-fold, indissolubly uniting their name with the rise of Platônism. His mind was as it were a most fertile field in which bloomed in luxuriance the seeds sown by the liberality of Cosmo ; and from whence they were scattered throughout the civilised world with the doctrines and writings of Platô and the Platônists, with the love and understanding of the ideal restored to literature and Western civilisation, with the philosophical tradition of a great system re-established by him.

It would fill too much space to enumerate here all Ficino's works ; he wrote so many of every kind, and his collection of translations and original writings on Theology, morals, medicine and metaphysics is so voluminous. It is sufficient to say that his most important work, entitled : "*Platonic Theology and The Immortality of Souls and Eternal Happiness*," contains no less than eighteen books, and after his death a volume of letters by him was published and contained no less than twelve books.

So much labor weakened his already delicate health, and in October, 1499, at his villa in Montecchio (at Careggi), he ended a life that had been usefully spent in love and the culture of virtues, letters, philosophy and religion. He was buried in the Duomo at Florence, and the inscription that is still read on the monument that was erected to him by the order of the nobility attests with the gratitude and enthusiasm of his country, the importance of his works and the glory they brought him.

One more observation and I have done. In the voluminous correspondence of Ficino, there is one quite important letter, in which he defines and briefly describes the duties that belong to each class and condition of men. It speaks even of those of the philosopher, and in his words one sees his character and life, as it were, briefly outlined and pictured. Here is an

* Henry IV. of France cherished and attempted to realise a similar idea.—A. W.

example: "The philosopher should diligently seek the divine in order to enjoy it, investigate even the natural to learn how to make use of it, and take cognisance of human affairs, but not be concerned in them more than duty bids. Man, not being able to always live contented on earth regards himself as a citizen of heaven, and a mere dweller and stranger on the earth." If the Italian Neo-Platonism of the nineteenth century had written such words on its banner, it certainly would have attained the honor of a notable participation in the intellectual movement that prepared the political rising of our country.

IAMBlichOS: ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

PART III.

DIVINATION A FUNCTION OF SUPERIOR BEINGS.

XVIII.—Another controversy already awaits us, however, in no way inferior to the one just through with, which you bring on at once, namely: "As for the sources of the divining art, whether a good or angel, or dæmon, or any such personality is present in the manifestations, or oracular utterances, or other such sacred operation." The simple answer which we make to this is, that it is not possible for divine things to be performed in a way suited to sacred matters, without some one of the superior beings is present viewing and completing the sacred operation. On the other hand, when the right performances are perfect, sufficient of themselves and without fault, gods are their directors. When, however, they are intermediary and want somewhat of consummate excellence, they have angels to bring them to perfection and to exhibit them; but the lowest are assigned to dæmons to perform. Thus, the successful performance of the godlike acts is to be ascribed to one of the superior beings. As it is not possible without the gods to utter a oracular proposition concerning the gods, neither can one be accustomed to divine works and the various forms of foreknowledge without them. The human race is weak, of small account, short-sighted and insignificant by nature; and the only remedy for the inherent disposition to go astray, disorder and inconstancy is to receive a portion according to ability of the divine light. The individual who excludes this from his method, does a thing of the same character as they who endeavor to evolve a soul from things without soul, or to engender the higher intellect in those that are without the intellectual faculty. Setting aside the concept of a cause he supposes the accomplishment of divine works by energies which are not divine.

Let it be conceded, therefore, that a god, dæmon, or angel, brings the superior performances to completeness; we may not, nevertheless, grant what you throw down as acknowledged, namely: that they accomplish these things "as though attracted through us by necessities which are caused by the prayers." God as well as the entire chorus of superior beings connected with him is superior to necessity; not alone to that which is brought on by individuals, but that likewise which binds the universe. It is not, therefore, possible that an immaterial nature which does not admit of any additional order shall be subservient to any necessity which may come from an external source. Then, again, prayer and the rites performed by the adept in sublime knowledge (*ἐπιστήμων*), join themselves and are united to the superior beings by assimilation and kindred relationship, but never bring their operation to perfection though compulsory force. Hence it is not as you have held, that the theurgic adept being receptive, the results are ob-

served in the individuals inspired; nor is divining thus effected through Necessity, when the chanter of the oracles is in a passive condition. These things are foreign and otherwise unsuitable to the nature of superior beings.

XIX.—On the other hand, the (divine) cause of the superior orders is not as an intermediate instrumentality, nor does the one invoking operate through the inspired individual. To utter such things is impious. This statement is far more true, namely: that God is the principle of everything, that he can create everything, that he fills everything with himself, that he alone is eminently worthy of regard, praise and divine honor; that human nature when compared with the divine is base, ranking as of no account, and a toy. For my part I laugh when I hear any one say that God is automatically present with certain individuals, either because of the revolution of the world of transition, or through other causes. The Unbegotten will be no more the superior if the revolution of the world of transition guides it; nor will it be the cause of all things primarily if it is itself in the same class with any in the order of other causes. These things, therefore, are unworthy of the conception in respect to gods, and foreign to the things which occur in the divine rite.* Such enquiry, however, is brought to the very result to which the many are influenced in regard to the creation of the universe and foreknowledge. Not being able to learn what is the manner of these things, and rejecting the thoughts and reasonings of mankind respecting the gods, they discard the whole dogma of foreknowledge and creation. As, therefore, we are accustomed to meet these individuals with the answer that as the divine mode of creation and guardianship is different, and may not be wholly rejected because of ignorance, as though it had no existence from the first,—so, also, may it be pleaded in the issue against you, that all fore-judgment and doing of everlasting works are things of the gods, and are not brought to perfection by a necessity or through other causes recognised by mankind, but by such means as the gods alone know.

XX.—We may pass by these things, therefore, and with good reason point to a second statement of the cause of these things, as set forth by you: "The soul utters and gives form to these things, and they are its emotions kindled into activity by a very little supply of fuel." These things, however, are neither from the sphere of nature, nor does the reasoning faculty accept them as a reply. Every occurrence takes place by means of a cause, and that which is of like kind is brought to perfection by its like. But a divine operation is not automatic. A matter of this kind is uncaused and in no way arranged, nor is it engendered by a human cause. This is a thing foreign and inferior; and that which is more excellent cannot be produced by that which is imperfect. All operations therefore, spring from a divine source, which they are like, in nature. The human soul is held fast by a single form, and is eclipsed on all sides by the body; which, whether any one terms it the river Amelêta†, or the water of Lêthê, or ignorance and insanity, or bondage because of passive con-

* Iamblichos zealously insists that no prayer or religious rite has the effect to attract a divine being and so bring down God, but rather to exalt the worshipper to the divinity. Proklos also says: "In the prayers and at the Autoptic rites, the divine essence seems after a manner to come down to us, when really we are extending our selves to it instead."

† PLATO: *Republic*, x. "The souls, having chosen their lives, and their destinies being fixed by the three Fates, they all marched into the plain of Lêthê, or Forgetfulness. When night came on they encamped beside the river Amelêta, whose water no vessel contains. All of them are required to drink a certain quantity of this water, and such as are not restrained by prudence drink more than they ought; and he who drinks from time to time forgets everything."—*Amelêta* signifies carelessness, negligence.

ditions,* deficiency of vital force, or any other evil, he will by no means thereby give it a name ample to express its badness.

When, therefore, the soul is encompassed by fetters of such a kind, how may it become sufficient for such a divine activity? There is not a probability in any way for this supposition. If we seem able in any manner to effect the participation and to be enlightened by the gods, by this means alone do we derive benefit from the divine operation. On this account, the soul, having no fitness or sagacity of its own, fails itself to participate in divine operations. If things of this kind were of the soul itself, either every soul would perform them or such alone as possessed perfection of its own. Now, however, neither is sufficiently prepared for this; but on the contrary, even the perfect soul is imperfect in the matter of the divine energy. The divine activity is different, and success is given to divine matters by the gods alone. It otherwise would, however, behoove to employ the worship of the gods, but for this reason the divine assistance would be had by us without the religious rites in their honor. If then, these opinions are mad and stupid, it is a duty to discard notions of this kind, as not affording a noteworthy cause for the complete performance of divine works.

XXI. What you propose, thirdly, that "there is a mingled form of substance produced, part out of our own soul and part from a divine inspiration beyond"—is it any more true? Look to this more critically that we may not forget in regard to it, from having been led astray by the plausibility apparent in it. If in any way a single thing comes forth into existence from two, it is in every respect of like species, like nature and like substance. In this manner the elements joining together into the same thing, produce one from many, and many souls become consolidated into one integral soul. Never, however, may that which is set apart in every particular, become one at any time with that which goes forth from itself; nor the soul constitute a substance of one species with the divine inspiration.† If the divine nature will not mingle, then the soul is not blended with it; and if it is unchangeable, it will not be changed from its simple form by being combined together in common with any other substance.

Certain individuals held in former time, that "little sparks" awake the divine ideals in us; which, whether they were natural or corporeal after some other manner, cannot be changed in any way from things of chance to things divine. In the present case it is declared that the soul is a joint element of the divine compound. That is to say: it becomes equal to the gods; it both gives a specific portion to them and receives from them in turn, it gives definite measures to superior beings, and is itself limited by them. What is most strange, as some say, is that as the gods take the lead in the arranging of the component elements, they are also inherent in the things which are brought to pass by them, and there will be something produced after a time, and of a commixture according to time, which will have the gods in its very substance. What, then, is this commingled form of substance? If it is both together, it will not be one out of two, but a compound and a putting together at random from two

* Philalaos, the Pythagorean, who was cotemporary with Sôkratês informs us that the ancient theologians and interpreters of the oracles used to teach that the soul is yoked to the body as a penalty, and is buried in it as in a tomb. Hence Makrobios, in the *Dream of Scipio*, calls the body *δεμας* as denoting a prison or fetter, and *σώμα* as denoting *σημα*, a sign above a grave, or rather the grave itself. "The soul binds itself to the body," says Porphyrios. "The soul is bound to the body by its turning to the passive conditions which come from it."

† PROKLOS: *Timaios*. "The soul, by approaching to the material life, kindles indeed a light in the body, but becomes itself involved in darkness; and by giving life to the body destroys itself and its own intellect, so to speak. This natural law which binds the soul to the body is the death of the immortal life, but vivifies the mortal body."

things. If, however, it is a something different from both then eternal things will be changeable and divine essences will not differ from natural in regard to coming into new forms of existence. It being an absurd thing that an eternal nature shall be produced by the world of change, it is certainly more absurd that any thing consisting of eternal elements shall be dissolved.

By no means, therefore, has this opinion in regard to oracular utterance any rational foundation whatever. We must consider this assumption a paradox, whether it be set forth as one or two.

SPIRITUAL ESSENCES NOT PRODUCED BY THE SOUL.

XXII.—You say accordingly: "The soul by means of a kind of combined activities gives birth to the faculty of imagination which penetrates the future, or else the elements which come from material substance by virtue of the potencies inherent in them, evolved the demons or spiritual beings especially when the oracle was derived from living animals." These statements appear to me to display a fearful disregard of the law in regard to all divine science and the divinely-operative energy. One absurdity appears at the first, namely: that the demons are begotten and perishable; and another, more wonderful than this, that beings that are prior will be produced from those that are posterior to themselves. For the demons already existed in some manner before the psychic essence and the faculties pertaining to bodily structures. Besides these things how can the operations of the divided soul which is held fast in a body be transformed into essence and be established outside by themselves separate from the soul; or, how may the faculties pertaining to bodies withdraw themselves from the bodies, although having their being in bodies? Who is he that frees them from the corporeal structure, and brings together again into one organism the dissolved substance of the body? There will be such a demon preëxistent prior to the placing together of the substance. This statement, however, has also the usual difficulties. How may the oracular utterance be produced from things having no oracular quality, and soul be developed from bodies that have no soul? Or to say the whole at once, how may things more perfect be the outcome of things more imperfect? The mode of production also appears to me an impossible thing; for the producing of essence by the activities of the soul and the powers in bodies is an impossibility. It is impossible for essence to be developed from anything which does not contain it already.

TRUE SOURCE OF THE PROPHETIC FACULTY.

Whence does the Imagination, which has received the divining power somewhere, become intuitive of the future? For of the things sown through coming into the world of change, we do not see one ever possessing any more than was given to it from the source by which it was engendered. It seems, however, that it does receive a more abundant augmentation from that which is not; except it may be said that the dæmons get a foothold in the matter from living animals, and that when that is produced they are actuated in sympathy. According to this opinion, therefore, dæmons are not engendered from the forces inherent in bodies, but being before them and preëxistent, they are moved in like manner with them. Granted, however, that they are thus sympathetic, yet I do not see how there will be anything true in regard to the future. It is not the province of a sympathetic faculty, which is involved in the material principle and held fast by place and body, to foreknow and forecast the future; but on the contrary, the faculty must be free from everything. Let this opinion then receive these corrections.

ORACULAR DREAMS.

XXIII. You also bring out observations immediately after this as though doubting in regard to the technic of divination ; but they are set forth with the endeavor to overturn it entirely. Let us, therefore, direct this discourse separately in regard to both these aims. We will begin first to put an end to the former. "In sleep, when we are occupied with nothing we sometimes receive suggestions in regard in the future." This is not because the source of the oracular utterance is both from us and from outside. The first of these is defined from ourselves, and the one which follows is from without. These have a closely-connected arrangement with each other, their operations are accomplished by them as decreed, and the things which are attached to them are in strict accord with their principals. When, however, the cause is independent and pre-exists by itself, the end is not marked out for us, but all depends on potencies outside. Now, therefore, as the truth in the dreams does not concur altogether with our performances, and it frequently shines forth from itself, it shows that oracular utterance is from the gods beyond, that it is of their free power, and that it graciously reveals the future, when it pleases and as it may be willing. Let these things, therefore, have this as their answer.

XXIV.—In the things which follow, you try to interpret the technic of divination, but entirely make way with it. If "a susceptible condition of the soul is itself the source" what sensible man will accord to an unsteady and capricious thing normal and stable fore-judgment? How may the soul that is discreet and unchanging in regard to its superior faculties, those of the mind and thought, be ignorant of what is to be ; whereas the one that receives impressions from disorderly and uncertain activities is adapted to read the future? What in the world has the passive condition peculiar to itself for the beholding of the things that are? Why is it not rather a hindrance to the more genuine perception? Besides, if the affairs which pertain to the universe were combined through passive conditions, the resemblance of the passive conditions would involve a certain relationship in reference to them ; but if they are accomplished through principles and through ideas, there will be a different foreknowledge of them, which will be quit of every passive condition. Again, the susceptible state is only sensible of what is going on and is now in existence ; but foreknowledge reaches even to things which have not yet a being. Hence, to foreknow is different from receiving impressions.

Let us, however, look over your proofs of this opinion. The one that "the senses are closed up" tends in a contrary direction from what you say ; for it is a token that no human phantasm has been set in activity at this particular time. But "the vapors administered" have a close relationship to the divinity, not to the soul of the seer. The "invocations" do not awaken inspirations of the reasoning faculty or the passive conditions of body in the worshipper ; for they are wholly unknown and arcane, and are uttered intelligibly to the divinity alone whom they invoke. The fact, however, that "not all persons, but only the young and artless are suitable for the purpose" shows this thing conclusively that such as these are more ready as a receptacle for the spirit entering from without and inspiring. From these things, however, you do not guess aright that enthusiasm is a passive condition ; for it follows from these indications that it flows in from without as an inspiration. Let these things, therefore, so stand.

Do thou thy work : it shall succeed
In thine or in another's day ;
And if thou miss the victor's meed,
Thou shalt not miss the toiler's pay.

ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY

AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SUBSEQUENT THOUGHT.

BY REV. WM. M. CAMPBELL.

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In presenting you with a few observations on the thoughts of Aristotle, it may be well to begin with a brief sketch of his life, familiar though you may be with it. Our memories are sometimes treacherous and may need for special occasions a special refreshing.

His appellation "The Stageirite," indicates his birth-place. In the Grecian colony of Stageira, in Thrace, near the borders of Macedonia was born, in 384, B. C., this renowned philosopher, who has been pronounced the "strongest of the Ancients and the oracle of the Middle Ages." His father was physician to the King of Macedon, by which means it is surmised that the young Aristotle was introduced at court, and became acquainted with Philip of Macedon. The way was thus paved for the position that he afterward held of tutor to Alexander the Great. In 367, B. C., when he was 17 years of age he was sent to study at Athens. He remained there for twenty years, studying in the school of Plato, which had been founded by the great master in the olive-groves of Academus. Having a competency for his temporal support he was enabled to devote himself entirely to the acquisition of knowledge which he did we are told with "a zeal unsurpassed in the annals of study." Plato called him "the Mind of the School," and his fellow-pupils applied to him the sobriquet of "the Reader." He of course could not be in the school of such a Master as Plato for twenty years, without imbibing from him.

But by the force and independence of his genius and from the different tendency of his mind he developed his own individuality and pursued a line of philosophic thought which separated these two Master-minds. During this period he wrote some philosophical dialogues after the Platonic style, in which he took ground in opposition to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. While regarding Plato with feelings of friendship he yet regards truth as greater—"Amicus Plato, sed magis amica Veritas." All this rendered it impossible that he should be the one to assume the headship of the Akademy after Plato's death, although he was the master-mind of the school. While in Athens, although studying Rhetoric among other subjects, he yet denounced it as taught by Isocrates, the leading rhetorician of the time, in whose school had been trained many of the first men of Greece in all departments of her glorious annals. Aristotle not only denounced the method and matter of Isocrates, but went so far as to open a rival school. There is no record of the success of his school, but it bore fruit in the embodiment of his views in his treatise *On Rhetoric*, composed a long time afterward. It is creditable to him that there is no trace in this work of any ill will toward Isocrates amid the many allusions to him that abound in it. It has been remarked that a change in the character of Aristotle took place in this regard. During his first residence in Athens he attacked both Plato and Isocrates, manifesting some petulance in the doing of it. But in his later works all that is absent.

After Plato's death, his nephew Speusippos became head of the Akademy ; and Aristotle left, taking up his residence in Atarneus. Here he remained for three years enjoying the friendship of its intelligent ruler Hermeias, who gave him his daughter Pythias in marriage. After the death of Hermeias, Aristotle being obliged to leave Atarneus, went to Mitylênê. Here he lived three years, until invited by Philip to become

tutor to Alexander. He went, and the spectacle of the mightiest conqueror in the realms of thought, and the mightiest conqueror in the realms of action being thus associated is very interesting. His duties were not of a burdensome nature so that he found ample time for the prosecution of his studies. After Aristotle had lived at the court of Macedon five years, Philip was assassinated. He remained another year in that region, and then when Alexander was preparing for his Oriental campaign he removed once more to Athens, after an absence of twelve years.

With Alexander's friendship, and it is also said with his liberal financial aid, Aristotle now fifty years of age was in a good position to begin embodying the accumulations of all the previous years in those works that have exercised such a vast influence on the thought of subsequent centuries. He opened a school on the Eastern side of Athens, in the grounds attached to the Temple of the Lyceian Apollo, while the Platonic school was in the groves of the Akadēmê on the western side. Using the covered walks in these grounds for lecturing and for intercourse with his pupils the name Peripatetic came to be applied to his philosophical sect. He remained in Athens during the thirteen years of Alexander's Eastern career. Quiet, enjoyable, fruitful years those were for Aristotle. Years during which his great works were composed.

After the death of Alexander Aristotle, who had for various reasons numerous enemies in Athens, had to leave the city. There was a charge of impiety made against him; and rather than submit his life and opinions to the judgment of the populace he took advantage of a law which gave him the option of leaving the city before the day of the trial. He did this "so that the Athenians," as he said, might not have another opportunity of sinning against Philosophy as they had already done once in the person of Socrates.

He removed to Chalcis, which was under Macedonian domination, hoping to return again to Athens, to his school and his library, when the supremacy of Macedon should again be asserted there. But this was not to be. He was seized with illness and died there within a year, B. C. 322, in the sixty-third year of his age. His death has been attributed by some to the taking of poison. But that has been dismissed and the belief entertained, as being more trustworthy, that it was brought about by indigestion as the result of his intense application.

As to the works of Aristotle some were composed during his first residence in Athens. These were of a more popular form than those composed during the last thirteen years of his life, or his second residence in Athens. The librarian of the Alexandrian Library has given us a list of 146 works of Aristotle. This was drawn up about a century after his death. And yet, strange to say, they do not answer to the works of Aristotle now extant. Those now possessed amount to forty and have had a peculiar history. After Aristotle's death the works composed during his latter residence in Athens were under the charge of Theophrastus, his chief disciple. At his death he bequeathed them to his favorite pupil, Neleus, who took them away to his home in the Troad, to a place called Skepsis. Shortly afterward the kings of Pergamos began to seize private libraries so as to furnish their own; and in order to prevent this in their own case, the family of Neleus hid the manuscripts of Aristotle's works in a subterranean vault. They remained there for 150 years. During this period that dynasty of kings passed away and then the manuscripts were brought out and sold to one Apel-likôn, a Peripatetic of Athens. They were considerably damaged but the best productions of Aristotle were substantially restored. In 86 B. C., Athens was taken by Sylla, and then those manuscripts were brought to Rome.

Andronicus of Rhodes applied himself to the correction of the text and the proper arrangement of the various treatises. The result of all this is that the Aristotle of the libraries of to-day is not that of the Alexandrian Library, but the one that went through such strange vicissitudes. It is the true one. The one at Alexandria was composed of some of the more popular pamphlets of his earlier residence in Athens, besides others composed of excerpts from his larger works and papers drawn up by his disciples in Aristotle's manner, while still others were forgeries. The former set of works, although numerous, were brief and unlike the latter in which whole sciences are set forth systematically. The style of the former is more rhetorical and popular, while that of the latter is technical, condensed—no provision being made for anything except the most accurate impression of meaning in the fewest words. If these works of Aristotle had been lost during this romantic Eastern sojourn the thought of after-centuries and perhaps the course of history would have been different from what it was. Who knows whether for better or worse?

Aristotle divided the sciences into Practical, Constructive and Theoretical. The former of these has to do with human conduct. In reference to this department he composed his *Ethics* and *Politics*. Art and the laws by which it is governed, are placed in the second department. Toward the elucidation of this department he has merely left an unfinished or mutilated treatise, the one *On Poetry*. In the latter department are included Physics, Mathematics and First Philosophy or Metaphysics. It is also called *Theology*, "because all things have their root in the divine nature." He left nothing on Mathematics. His works on Physics occupy about one-half of all his writings that have come down to us. His metaphysical writings embrace about one-tenth. There is another portion of his writings, being about one-seventh of the whole, that treat of the method for the study of Science or the discovery of Truth. There are certain laws according to which thought courses in its channels and reason operates. The expression of these forms, the method or the knowledge of them, is the "organ" according to which the mind operates. It comes therefore in advance of philosophic investigation, and is its instrument or organ. The "*Organon*," or logical writings of Aristotle, therefore, comes first. Although Aristotle was not unacquainted with the inductive method for the discussing of truth, yet his formal treatment is confined to the deductive. He made no provision for the verification of the general laws that might flash upon the intellect, in an intuitive manner from the observation of facts. Being thus limited to the deductive process for the discovery and verification of truth his theory for the attainment of knowledge is in that regard defective. Bacon in laying down the method for the prosecution of truth by way of the inductive process called his method the *Novum Organum* by way of distinction. The *Organon* consists of six works. The first two treatises of this work are the *Categories* and the one *On Interpretation*. But we are told that, brief as they are, they were all that were known by thousands of those who in the middle ages fought the battles of Nominalism versus Realism and were considered, or who considered themselves masterly Aristotelians. The *Categories* are ten in number viz.: *Substance*, and nine modes of speaking in regard to it. The next work of the *Organon*—that *On Interpretation*—treats of propositions and sentences in processes of reasoning. Aristotle founded the Science of Logic and developed it to that degree that he has been copied and followed by writers on the subject down to our own day.

He did this when the idea of such a science never entered any one's mind. We are told that the only times that he ever speaks of himself, in his writings are, *first*, when he "apolo-

gises for differing from Plato because truth must be preferred to one's friend," and *second*, as to his discovery of the syllogism of which he was, we are told, justly proud. He discovered it while thinking out the rules of Dialectic. "In regard to the process of syllogising I found positively nothing said before me." In his *Analytics* he has produced nothing temporary, but an addition to human knowledge as complete, permanent and irrefragable as the Geometry of Euclid. There were two series of *Analytics* and then followed the *Topics* and the *Fallacies*. All these have to do with the *method* of knowledge. In his works on Rhetoric and Poetry he deals with the *expression* of knowledge. And then in his other works he deal with the *matter* of knowledge. Those that have a reference to the *matter* of knowledge as it relates to man are his *Ethics* and *Politics*. His *Ethics* have come down in three books, but only one of these is genuine, viz. the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is so called from his son Nicomachus, who probably had something to do with them in the way of editing. The other work is a paraphrase of the genuine work by his disciple Eudemus and called the *Eudemian Ethics*, while the third or *Great Ethics*, is simply a *resume* of Aristotle's *Ethics* by a later Peripatetic. The question proposed is: "What is the end or Supreme Good aimed at by human action?" He declares that some branch of Politics will have to settle this question, thus showing that Aristotle did not yet conceive of Moral Philosophy as a separate science.

Two especially Greek features have been noticed in this treatise: *first*, the philosophy of human life based upon the question—What is the chief good? instead of the *duty* of man; and *secondly*, the subordination of the individual to the state. In this case the attainment of the greatest good for the state, would include the highest good for the individual, as the whole includes all its subordinate parts. The chief good for the state is found in such a condition of affairs as that speculative thought would have an untrammelled cultivation. The work of the state was to be done by a slave population and the citizens were to have abundance of leisure, and were to devote that leisure to intellectual pursuits. The highest aims of an individual should be Philosophy and the highest aim of the state should be the production of philosophers. "The highest happiness consists in the exercise of man's highest powers or in philosophic thought." That which men should aim at was to live above the world, occupied with philosophy. Moral virtue is looked upon in a secondary or subsidiary sense. Socrates and Plato we are told made virtue consist in the enlightenment of the reason, while Aristotle rested it in a state of the will. In treating of the ethical nature of human actions he was true to his Greek character when he made so much of the idea of beauty and so little of the "ought" or the immutable nature of righteousness.

Actions were viewed not as right or wrong, but as "beautiful or ugly," and thus the morality of actions was made to depend upon quantity instead of quality, or they were looked upon as an artist would look upon a work of art condemning or approving according as the idea of excess or defect prevailed. Celebrated as they were for their keen appreciation of the beautiful they made *good taste* do duty for those things where in our higher appreciation of the moralities enthroned conscience as the monitor.

Other portions of the *Ethics* treat of Justice, Friendship, Pleasure. The *Politics* is the complement of the *Ethics*. However man might be looked upon as an isolated unit he could not attain his normal condition, but as a member of the state. In his *Politics* Aristotle defends slavery, has no sympathy with commercial pursuits, sought an Ideal State isolated from international relations and engaged in the fruitions of philosophic thought as the highest and most desirable. All other arrangements, such as police and war and treaties, etc., are

only so many subordinate agents for the attainment of that condition of affairs where such pursuits are possible. He treats of the various forms of government, giving even a theory of seditions and revolutions as a necessary part of political training. But in the practical application of his political ideas we are told that he had the not remarkable defects of being a great philosopher but not a great statesman. Being of a scientific and abstract nature they remain useful during all the subsequent ages.

In the third division, viz., that of theoretical speculative science, come his works on Natural Philosophy, Biology and Metaphysics. Those comprised under the heads of Natural Philosophy and Biology have been mentioned formerly under the general term of Physics. His conception and treatment of these subjects were more metaphysical than that which is given to them at the present: *e. g.* in discussing the origin of existences, in order to get out of the difficulties attached to the having of either the existent or non-existent as their antecedents, as in the former case they would thus already have an existence, and in the latter they would come out nothing, which they would not admit. Aristotle made the distinction of "possible" and "actual." Existences enter into actuality—out of the state of the "possible"—the latter being in a sense non-existent, but not a nonentity, as it is a hypothetical possibility of existence. Aristotle's method in his investigation we are told was the following:

- (a.) The statement of the problem.
- (b.) The statement and examination of all solutions of the problem given by his predecessors, and of all "popular" sayings and notions in regard to it.
- (c.) The examination of existing opinions and theories.
- (d.) Starting of ingenious difficulties, the result of which was the modification or explosion of other opinions and theories.
- (e.) The residuum was the theory of Aristotle.

He wrote five or six biological treatises, in some of which there is a large amount of philosophical disquisition: notably in the treatise *On the Soul*, where he traces the development of the vital principle and enters into the consideration of the mental faculties and the method of acquiring knowledge.

Aristotle's metaphysical writings, as such, come the last in the series. The name applied is partly owing to this fact. *Metaphysics* signifies that which comes after Physics, and is a name given by his school to papers that were edited after his death. By the use of this term they desired to indicate that they were composed by Aristotle *after* his works on Physics. In addition to this was the other idea that they treated of subjects that were *above* and *beyond* the physical condition of things. Aristotle's metaphysical thought was by no means confined exclusively to these works, but is found also in his other writings. In his Natural Philosophy it is made the very basis of its existence.

Aristotle does not separate the actual existence of things from knowledge. "A thing in actual existence is identical with the knowledge of that thing." And again: "the possible existence of a thing is identical with possibility in us of perceiving it or knowing it." Before a thing is perceived or known it has only a potential existence. So that *we* are necessary to the actual existence of anything. He makes the mind contribute to actual existence something as light does to color. Color is a potentiality, but becomes an actuality by the action of light. So there is a *non-ego* outside of mind corresponding to the elements of color other than light. That external something in conjunction with the mind, which acts upon it as light upon color, results in a third something which is the actual existence perceived or known. He is thus removed from extreme realism on the one hand and from extreme idealism on the other.

Pure matter cannot be known. It is essential to ex-

istence but does not come into actual existence as a realisation of the mind unless it be endowed with form. Without that it is not among the actual but only among the possible existences. Pure matter is a thing that we cannot grasp. It constantly eludes us when we pursue it, moving backward from the region of the actual to that of the possible. It becomes sensible to us by the assumption of form, or in other words, by possessing qualities. Divested of qualities it is no longer a subject of perception or knowledge. In a portion of his logic he gets into a metaphysical region in a three-fold division which he makes of existence, viz.: *First*, things as they ordinarily are, possible and then realised; *second*, things always actual with only an implied region of possibility—e.g., *first substances* which eternally existed; *third*, things that are always in the region of possibility without ever becoming actual—e.g., the "greatest number and the least quantity." Matter divested of qualities and thus thrown back from the actual to the possible is the antithesis of God. The latter is eternally actual, the former eternally possible and never actual.

There is no affinity between Aristotle and those philosophers who would make mind or reason the last and highest step in an ascending series or the ultimate product of matter. Mind or reason is the eternally actual, but not so matter. In the *First Philosophy* of Aristotle, which is another name applied to the Science of Ontology or Metaphysics, and also with Aristotle the same as Theology—he treats of certain principles that are common to all spheres of being. They are four in number, viz.: Form or essence, matter or substance, moving or efficient cause, and end. He was not in harmony with Plato in regard to his theory of Ideas. In the ground taken by Aristotle he makes his doctrine of Form or Essence take the place of the Platonic Idea.

The Platonic Idea, if I understand correctly, was regarded as having a separate and independent existence. All sensible things were simply shadows of the immutable forms in which they had a participation. The objects of the outer world are known to us through the representations we have of them in our minds. But then we have *mental conceptions*, which have to do not with individual sensible objects, but with the common and essential attributes of all the individuals of the species. As we apprehend the visible, mutable sensible through the mental representation thereof, so we apprehend the Platonic Idea through our mental concepts. It is the object of the concept. It is perfect, immutable, independent, and exists "*per se*." The separation of the ideas from individuals, we are told, was carried by Plato to the extent of positing them as efficient causes, whereby were given to individuals their existence and essence. They were called gods; and his highest Idea was the Idea of the Good which was identified with the Supreme Deity. This separate independent existence of the Ideas was combatted by Aristotle. And yet he would have a real objective correlate to every subjective conception. This correlate of the subjective concept was the essence that was immanent in the object of the concept. It did not, like the Platonic Idea, exist apart from the individual or the many, but a unity was conceived as present in the many. This universal notion has no existence apart from the individual, concrete object. But yet, according to Aristotle, it is first in worth and rank. It is the proper subject of scientific knowledge. With Aristotle the individual alone has substantial existence. He calls individuals, "first substances;" and species, "second substances"—so that he uses the term for substance in two ways, viz.: for the individual substance, and for the essential. In the sphere of sensible being Aristotle distinguishes matter (*ύλη*), form (*μορφή*), and then the individual whole resulting from the

union of the two, viz.: of the material substratum and of the ideal essence. It is the individual that is the subject of the various accidents enumerated in the *Categories*. Although the individual may be the first object of scientific enquiry, yet the universal is the ultimate and most appropriate.

And if the universal is the most appropriate it must also be the most real. It is such in a higher sense than the individual since it is the essential in all individuals. This distinction between the essence and the individual ceases when we arrive at the divine and immaterial sphere, since there the essence and the individual are identical—there being only one God. The immaterial and eternal Form is one that never *becomes*. Other forms of existence may be in the region of the potential or possible, and from that pass over into that of the actual. Besides the existences that are moved and being moved, there is one that is never moved, although ever imparting motion to other existences. This is the pure Actuality in which no potentiality is found—the absolute Spirit, absolutely perfect. Aristotle arrives at the existence of one Supreme immaterial principle called God from the fact that potentiality is always preceded by some form of actuality. The transition from the potential to the actual depends on an actual cause. Every particular object which is the result of development implies an actual moving cause; so that the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to the naturally passive matter which constitutes it.

"This principle, the first mover, must be one whose essence is pure energy; since if it were in any respect merely potential it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all things: it must be eternal, pure immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened with potentiality." "As being an *actual* principle, God is not a final product of development; he is the eternal *prius* of all development." This being so, the modern evolution-theory that would make mind and reason the last and highest product of development, and thus the last of the series instead of the first—that theory would find cold comfort and small favor from this master-mind.

But passing now from Aristotle's own time let us glance briefly at his subsequent fortunes and influence. On account of the burial of his writings almost immediately subsequent to his demise he was more or less eclipsed until his works were again brought to the light of the world, about the Christian era, by the labor of one or two scholars of that day. Then his influence began gradually to widen, and his light to brighten, until at length he shone for long centuries as the great luminary of the philosophical heavens.

After he was brought to the notice of the world about the Christian era, the Greeks began commenting upon him. It was considered glory enough for one man and an ample life achievement to study and comment upon Aristotle. These Greek commentators, who continued their labors for three or four centuries were called *Scholiasts*, and their labors *Scholia*. Then came the inundation of the barbarous hordes who overran the empire; and the past was buried in oblivion. But from that past there was transmitted two little treatises to subsequent Europe which exercised a great influence in stimulating mental activity, even if it was largely fruitless. They were Latin translations of Aristotle's *Categories* and *Interpretation*, together with an *Introduction to the Categories* by Porphyry. Out of them the Scholastic Philosophy took its rise. Afterward a large knowledge of Aristotle came to the schools of Europe through the Arabs. The period of Europe's greatest intellectual stagnation was the period of greatest mental activity among the followers of Mohammed. Bagdad, Cairo and Cordova became great centers of philosophic thought. And Aristotle was the chief source of this intellectual life.

One of the leading of those Arabian scholars was Averroes. He, in commenting upon Aristotle, quoted the text before commenting on it, and thus was brought to Europe, although through a double translation, a large portion of the Aristotelian writings. In treating of that portion of Aristotle where he dwells upon the two kinds of reason, viz: the Constructive and Passive, Averroes promulgated the theory of Monopsychism. He maintained that the constructive reason was one and the same in all individuals, and that individuality was only due to bodily sensations; so that these being transient the individual could not be immortal, neither could anything that was immortal be individual. This doctrine was the cause of much strife in the schools, both of Jew and Christian.

During the Middle Ages Philosophy was cultivated, but it was mainly in the service of and in subordination to theology. When there was any discrepancy between them the latter was adopted as the criterion to which the former was to be accommodated. As was before said, the only portion of Aristotle that was known for a long time in Europe was a portion of his *Logic*. But afterward his philosophy became extensively known. So that Scholastic Philosophy embraces two periods: *first*, the rise of Scholasticism, or the accommodation of Aristotelian *logic* to the doctrine of the Church; *second*, the full development of Scholasticism, or the union in the way of service of the Aristotelian *philosophy* with the dogmas of the Church of that day. There are great names in both periods. During the first period arose the philosophical discussion about universals and particulars embodied in the words Nominalism and Realism, which so largely occupied the philosophical thought of that time.

It is stated that a passage in Porphyry's *Introduction to the Logic of Aristotle* started the conflict of Nominalism and Realism. He there broached the question: *first*, whether genera and species have a substantial existence, or whether they exist solely in our thoughts; *second*, whether supposing them to exist substantially they are material or immaterial essence; *third*, whether they exist apart from the objects perceptible by the senses, or only in and with them. The doctrine that universals existed independently, apart from and before the individuals, was expressed by the formula: *Universalia ante rem*. That was extreme Realism. The doctrine that universals, while having a real existence, did not exist before and apart from, but in individuals, was expressed by the formula: *Universalia in rem*. This was moderate realism. The doctrine that universals have no real existence either before, apart from, or in the individuals—that individuals only have real existence, and that the general notions are merely the subjective combination of homogeneous attributes under one concept which we express by a single word or name instead of employing many single words—this doctrine is Nominalism. Nominalism is expressed by the formula: *Universalia post rem*. These doctrines appeared in the first period of Scholastic Philosophy, but received their fullest development, and the sharpest discussions were waged over them in the latter and more expansive period, resulting from the fuller knowledge of the philosophy of Aristotle.

The saying that every one is born either an Aristotelian or a Platonist is not strictly true, judging from the three-fold way in which it is possible to view existences, as already mentioned. Aristotle was neither an extreme Realist nor an extreme Nominalist. For although he did not believe in the separate independent existence of Ideas, he yet believed in the immanence of Form or Essence in the individuals. The greatest of the philosophers of the second period were Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. The former in setting the doctrines of Aristotle, modified to

harmonise with the Church-doctrine, held that the Universals existed in a three-fold sense, viz: FIRST, *Universalia ante rem*, in the mind of God; SECOND, *Universalia in rem*, according to Aristotle; and THIRD, *Universalia post rem*, as the subjective concept.

Thomas Aquinas, we are told "brought the Scholastic Philosophy to its highest stage of development by effecting the most perfect accommodation that was possible of the Aristotelian Philosophy to ecclesiastical orthodoxy." He agreed "with Aristotle in regarding knowledge, and preëminently the knowledge of God as the supreme end of human life." He was a realist of the Aristotelian type. Since the age of scholasticism Aristotle has been, until recent years, under an eclipse. But a growing interest has been manifested during the present century. He has at times been made to suffer for the sins of his professed followers. To both Aristotle and Plato, the two mighty masters laboring as pioneers in the great realm of thought, our profoundest admiration is due for the grand legacy they have left in the permanent contribution of the thought of the world, as well as for the inspiration furnished by the example of such lives. They throw a halo of glory not only around that wonderful little land so fruitful of great men in all departments of human activity, but around our common humanity.

May we emulate them in all that is *worthy*.

REMARKS BY MEMBERS.

MR. WOLCOTT asked why the Aristotelian philosophy had become the basis of the scholasticism of the middle ages.

MR. CAMPBELL.—Because it was, in regard to the Supreme Being, identical with the theology of the time. Plato taught that ideas have an existence separate and independent of the individuals; while Aristotle inculcated that individuals alone have an independent existence, and ideas thence derived as species and genera, have a merely relative value. In the differences of opinion among the Schoolmen there was a difference of theory so fundamental as to divide the thinking world in two, and warrant to a degree the assertion that all men are born either Aristotelians or Platonists.

MISS FULLER.—Did not Plato conceive of ideas as forms of mind?

THE PRESIDENT.—Plato certainly regarded ideas as mental forms. As Matter cannot get itself into shape, Mind must in some form take hold of it and mold it according to design. The bridge over the Mississippi at St. Louis existed in the mind of the architect before a stroke of work had been done by the constructor. The bridge may perish, but the idea in the mind of the builder had a permanent abiding form from which any number of bridges may be produced.

MR. WOLCOTT.—The first bridge-builder evidently caught the idea from seeing a tree that had fallen across a stream.

MISS FULLER.—The fallen tree would have suggested nothing, except as it was in harmony with the thought in the mind of the man to cross the stream.

THE PRESIDENT.—Two methods are employed in receiving. The one is called the Scientific or Inductive Method and proceeds from the ground of sensible cognition, inferring ideas as typical forms depending upon individual facts. With this method the Aristotelian organism is more in sympathy. The other, the Metaphysical or Deductive Method, assumes as a first principle a Science of Ideas as essential or independent forms, from which individuals depend as particulars from a whole. Of this method Plato is the most illustrious representative. These two methods are represented in every thinking age. They are the extremes of the syllogism. The two together cover the whole field of thought in its manifold elaborations, and it is necessary to comprehend them both in their interdependence or correlation.

THE APOLOGUE OF ER THE PAMPHYLIAN.

Plato's *Republic*. Book X.

BY LEWIS J. BLOCK.

Whether Er, the Pamphylian, is to be identified with Zoroaster, and the apologue, which concludes the *Republic*, is a leaf plucked from the *Zend Avesta*, it is not the purpose of this paper to consider; it is enough here to remember that Pamphylia belongs to that borderland between Orient and Occident which had from time immemorial been a hiding-place of sacred mysteries and occult worship, the meeting-ground of the gigantic and gorgeous imaginings of Asia with the clearer cut conceptions of Europe. In that region of obscurity, given up by popular belief and legend to supernatural influences, is placed with consummate appropriateness the significant adventure that brings the greatest of the divine Dialogues to a fitting and musical close.

The sphere within which the thought of the Platonic Dialogues moves is always the universal and necessary; whether a soul can re-enter its abandoned body after death, resume the interrupted movement of its earthly associations, and rehearse its experiences in the strange transition from plane to plane of life, is of less importance than to discover those essential principles of thought and action, which must be guiding stars and illuminations, whithersoever in the universe we wander, here under the pale gleams of the moon, or in after-lands, fitter and lovelier environment of the spirit that is in us. In any case the ascent into the realm of ideas or universals is not unlike death; a passing out of mists and clouds that hung around us, and an awakening on the heights whence the transfigured landscape of life shines back to us in new and transcendent guise.

Thus Er, the Pamphylian, dies; out of that sleep of death he resumes consciousness in the heart and centre of the moral world. It is a symbol and adumbration of the rise of thought from the perplexed multiplicities of prejudice and baseless opinion (*δόξα*) to splendid vision of self-evidencing verity (*διάνοια*). Into the heart and centre of the moral, not metaphysical, world, for the *Republic* deals with virtue and justice and ethical institutions. The choice between the celestial and infernal is an ever-recurring one; as we emerge from one phase of being and leave it behind us, as an experience over-lived and finished, the old problem re-presents itself in different fashion, and perhaps with more strenuous issues. With Er, the Pamphylian, we behold the mystic meadows on which are seated the dread judges beside the ascent unto the dominion of the Good, or the descent into the depth and darkness of misdoing and punishment. This constantly repeated choice is one of the basal facts of the moral world; he only wins his freedom who everlastingly reconquers it. Freedom has been won by the effort of the ages and the achievement of the nations, but it is an inheritance no man may claim save he demonstrates his right by victory in the restricted field of personal moral endeavor. Nay, there exists conditions of choice which constitute its possibility and effectiveness; mechanical absorption in the pursuit, whether of good or ill, precludes the judicial mind; stagnation in a monotony of good from which the healthful disruption of growth is shut out, or persistent declension into baser abysses of shadow and gloom, ensues; cohorts of heavenly ones descend destitute of genuine wisdom, clothed only in the lustreless white of external obedience, and incapable therefore of real election while the throes of recalcitrant vice and the avenging demons of aroused passions hurl Ardiæos, the tyrant, and his like, back into the fathomless caverns of expiation, whence they are not yet prepared to emerge. Leave hope behind all ye

who enter there; leave hope behind until the dawning consciousness of the horror of the Bad supervenes, and the way to the meadows of Choice becomes a solid one under the careful footsteps. With the moral election all nature sympathises; for it the stars put on their most brilliant effulgence, and the earth her tenderest efflorescence; as in Dante the mount of Purgatory thrills and the saints uplift their rapturous hymns as the soul mounts through all the spires of expiation and redemption.

But the vision of choice presupposes another; from the meadows where sit the judges there is a journey to a higher height whence a far nobler aspect of the universe becomes visible. After all the judges only affix the badge of a determination made by the soul itself. The Interpreter or Supreme Reason accompanies the journeying throng, and renders such help as they are capacitated to receive.

The moral world is fundamental upon the spiritual; it is only one form of manifestation of the highest principle; obligation has no significance sundered from the recognition of its relation to the constitution of things; choice or freedom is valueless save it be allied to the movement of the true and good; personal integrity is only a shadow of universal integrity; God himself is choice manifesting himself in his creatures.

The spheres of life are disclosed to the expectant throng; they revolve about a centre of light upon the knees of Necessity. Without attempting an interpretation of the symbolism of Plato in detail, it is enough to indicate, in a sketch of his meaning so hurried and elementary as the present attempt, that the spheres of life lend themselves to classification in accordance with the influence dominating them, whether it be sense, imagination, logical understanding, dialectic reason or the rest. Into these spheres the waiting souls will presently be born in strict conformity to the necessity of their choice; as the soul has built itself into pervasive activity so will be the visible scene that encircles it for habitation and home.

The spheres revolve upon the knees of Necessity; the universe is essentially freedom; free choice is its substance and necessity; no necessity intrusive from without, a manifest absurdity, for the without can only be within its all-embracing totality, but the necessity self-imposed, constituting it what it is, freedom in eternal realisation. The Fates sit on thrones at equal distances from each other, ministers and elaborators of freedom; for choice has three inherent stages of evolution and exposition; Lachesis, or abstract pre-consideration of the end which spirit purposes to bring to completion, the Past which is ever behind us, the circle of conditions within which the spirit moves, its own creation, and which itself enthrones as master of its day of experiences; Klotho, manifestation unto itself of its deed, the Eternal New, within which it has its phenomenal being and going forth into visible forms and contour; Atropos, the recoil of the act upon its source, the return of the fountain's leap into its basin, the mysterious Future, which is while it is not, the completion in which spirit recognises its universality and recovers its unity.

These spheres of life exist in consummate relation and unity; within each is seated the siren, who establishes the key-note of its melodies and governs the process and reflux of its activities; and the unanimity of these melodies constitutes the symphony of the universe, that spherical music which becomes audible to the spiritual perception, awakened to a cognition of the real and eternal. Here is the genuine establishment of free choice or self-determination as the fountain-head from whence flows the manifold spectacle of the universe. Here is the origin of justice, the birth of virtue, the throne of Destiny; from self-determination all things proceed, unto self-determination all things return.

The multiplicity of choices will not detain us long ; folly is ever true to its nature, and abuses its privilege ; the wisdom of Ulysses is rare and remarkable. Folly overrides all distinctions, and has no foresight of the morrow ; wisdom lingers and is slow to decide. In the stillness of eternity the choice is made, and the universe ratifies the election. From hence is passage to the plain of Forgetfulness, and the river of Negligence ; from height to height the soul ascends, and the experiences of choice are ever recurring. Thought exists only in the thinking, and freedom only in the constantly self-determining. Not quiescence but activity is the law of life. With the endlessness of stars rising on the encompassing dark, we burst into new regions of thought and volition, into new realms of being and doing.

"And if the company will be persuaded by me ; considering the soul to be immortal, and able to bear all evil, and all good, we shall always persevere in the road which leads above, and shall by all means pursue justice in conjunction with prudence, in order that we may be friends both to ourselves and to the gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we afterwards receive its rewards, like victors assembled together ; and we shall, both here, and in that journey of a thousand years which we have described, enjoy a happy life."

BOOK REVIEWS.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO.

Edited with Introductions, Notes, and Appendices, by R. D. ARCHER-HIND, M. A.,
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London, 1883.

In the last half of the seventeenth century there flourished at Cambridge a famous group of Platonists, of whom the most prominent were Cudworth, More, and Smith. These philosophers were well qualified to apprehend and expound the doctrines of the immortal high-priest of Wisdom. They possessed not only scholarship but, what is absolutely necessary for the understanding of Platôn, the divine faculty of Intuition by which alone the interior meaning of the Platonic text can be discerned. They worked almost purely from a philosophic standpoint, leaving philological questions to be investigated and decided by future laborers in the same field. As expositions of the Platonic Philosophy from the esoteric Christian point of view their writings are of permanent value, and cannot be superseded, though they may be modified and supplemented, by later researches.

And now in this afternoon of the nineteenth century the successors of the "Latitudinarian" divines, so far as their Platonic labors are concerned, have appeared ; and right worthy are they to continue the important work begun by the noble band of Platonists that uprooted the pernicious and blatant Atheism and Materialism which infected England in the seventeenth century. Every judicious exposition of Platôn necessarily strikes atheistic and materialistic notions a mortal blow. The Cambridge Platonists of the present day are expounding the Platonic text with special attention to both language and matter : they never lose sight of the fact that words are but symbols of *things*, and therefore they do not stop at words, but ascertain and evolve the inner meaning of the Athenian sage.

This new school of Platonic expositors is not as yet numerically strong, but is rapidly increasing. Under the leadership of such philosophic scholars as Mr. Henry Jackson and Mr. R. D. Archer-Hind, Fellows of Trinity College, there can be no doubt of its success as a propaganda of the best ideas of one of the greatest philosophers that ever descended into this sphere.

We do not hesitate to pronounce Mr. Archer-Hind's edition of the *Phaidon* the best of that noted and important dialogue which has appeared. In the preface it is said : "The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Platô's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the consecution of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Platô's thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, as far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Platô's meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors."

The Introduction is very suggestive and valuable, and is alone well worth the price of the book. We advise all students of Platôn to read it carefully. The apparent "tripartite" nature of the soul is well and rightly explained : "The three *εἶδη* of the soul are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's activity under different conditions. The two lower *εἶδη* are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter, and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter. Soul as such is simple, she is pure thought ; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action ; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought ; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter : this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual : *λογιστικόν* expressing the action of soul by herself, *ἄλογον* has action through the body. The *Πάθη* belonging to *ἄλογον* Plato classifies under the heads of *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. We see too that the terms of the *Timaeus*, *θεῖον* and *θνητόν*, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable ; but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. *Θνητόν* then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions : and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist *qua* soul, but because she ceases to operate *qua* emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time."

To those sciolists who contend that Platôn is inconsistent, vague and indefinite in his teachings we commend the following statement of a *fact* : "The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unflinching logical precision from its fundamental principles."

The text is excellent. All interpolated passages and words, and slips of the pen, are bracketed. The editor justly says : "The chief blemish in the text of the *Phaedo* is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connection." He might have added, that Platôn has been severely criticised (?) by modern philosophers for certain opinions—never held or disseminated by him—which they attribute to him through their "sheer inability" to understand or interpret his writings.

The notes are all that they should be. They are both philological and philosophic ; and, explain the real difficulties of the text, instead of passing over or obscuring them.

Sôkratês' dying words—"We owe a cock to Asklepios," etc.—over which some critics have wrangled, with no result except the exposing of their own ignorance, are thus rationally explained: "It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a 'fitful fever' was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been expended on this passage. The last words of Sôkratês are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sôkratês vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes *Timon of Athens*, v. i. 'my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend.' So Olympiodoros: *ἵνα τὰ νεροσκηκῶτα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει ταῦτα ἐξιδῶται*: he speaks too of an oracle which declares *τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομένας τὸν παῖνα ἀδεῖν*." There are two Appendices on important points, and useful Greek and English Indexes.

In this connection we desire to call attention to a remarkable and admirable series of papers on Platonic subjects by Mr. Henry Jackson: *On Plato's Republic*, VI. 509 D sqq. in *Journal of Philology*, X. 132-150; *Plato's Later Theory of Ideas*, I., *ib.* X. 253-298; II. *ib.* XI. 287-331; XIII. 1-40. These articles will richly repay close study. We sincerely hope that Mr. Jackson intends to continue the series.

HOW THE WORLD CAME TO AN END IN 1881.

"*The Perfect Way*;" Shilling Series, No. 1. Anno Domini 1884.
Anno Dominae 3.

We note with great pleasure the significant fact that the supply of occult literature is constantly increasing. This increase of course presupposes a demand, and this demand is confined to no particular country. It is apparently world-wide. One of the most noteworthy and valuable works on occult science that has appeared in modern times is *The Perfect Way*. The gifted writers of this remarkable volume now propose to issue a series of which the purpose is to "bring within the reach, intellectually and pecuniarily, of all classes of readers, the teachings contained in the book after which it is named." This is: *The Perfect Way; or, The Finding of Christ*. "It consists of nine lectures—with appendices and illustrative diagrams—which were delivered in London in the summer of 1881, and published in the winter of 1881-2. Its subject is the interior and universal truth of Religion, as based upon the actual, ascertained nature of Existence, and symbolised in the dogmas and formulas of the Christian and other creeds. And its purpose is to meet the prevailing urgent need of the age, for a perfect system of thought and rule of life, by reconstructing Religion on a scientific, and science on a religious, basis." This little treatise is well worth reading. It is divided into seven "Parts," which have the following titles: I. Introductory. II. Popular Predictions of the World's End. III. The Prophecy of Trithemius. IV. The Prophecies of the Bible, the Great Pyramid, and the Zodiac. V. Prophetic Conditions of the End. VI. The New Era. VII. Conclusion. Appendix.

We shall look with interest for the successive numbers of this series.

In our last issue there was a glaring blunder of such magnitude that we hasten to correct it, though probably most of our readers have anticipated us. One of the papers is entitled "Marsilio Ficino; and the Causes of the Restoration of Platonism in the Fourth Century, B. C."!! The first sentence of the article, and likewise the whole of it, show that the reading should be: "the Fifteenth Century, A. D."

In this connection we note the following errors: On first page, 1st column, 6th line, for *Collectanea* read *Collectanea*; samepage, 2d column, 3d line, destroy the period after "leads."

THE WORKINGS OF A HINDU MIND.

In the (American) *Platonist* for March has appeared a letter from a Hindu (evidently a member of the Theosophical Society) expressing his views on Soul, Nirvana and God. According to him "soul is material, and there is nothing immaterial. It is an agglomeration of all the attributes, together with that something which gives us the consciousness that we are."

As regards *Nirvana*, "it is that condition in which we are so etherealised that instead of being merely a mode of the Infinite existence as at present, we are merged in totality, or we become the WHOLE."

As regards God, he says: "I understand It to be nature or universe and no more; to my mind there is no possibility of the existence of an extra-cosmical Deity."

These, we assure the Editor of the *Platonist*, are not the "spontaneous workings of a Hindu mind;" it is the working of a mind in the process of imbibing the materialistic and atheistic notions of the Founders of the Theosophical Society,—a mind that as yet is incapable to think for itself, or unable to penetrate into the depths of such sublime subjects.—*The ARYA*, (Lahore, India).

It is almost unnecessary to remark that the views of contributors to *The Platonist* do not enunciate our own unless they are expressly endorsed, or are so much in accordance with the fundamental ideas of the Platonic Philosophy as to render any formal endorsement superfluous. We are glad to know that the views—which are the opposite of our own—set forth in the Letter cited by *The Arya* are not the "spontaneous workings of a Hindu mind." We do not think, however, that materialistic and atheistic notions can be justly attributed to either Madam Blavatsky or Col. Olcott. We sincerely hope that our esteemed contemporary is mistaken in this respect. In our judgment materialism and atheism are twin abominations, and it will be an evil day when they mould the opinions, beliefs and actions of any considerable number of mankind. They lack any noumenal basis, and are self-refutatory.

The reason why such papers as the one referred to occasionally appear in our journal is, we presume, obvious.

THE AMERICAN AKADÈMÈ.

The eleventh meeting of the American Akademie was held at Jacksonville, Illinois, June 17th, 1884. The attendance was larger than usual. The journal of the Secretary was read and approved.

Mr. E. A. Spring, of Perth Amboy, New Jersey, read a short paper on *Our Need of the Ideal*, showing that there are forms within us which insist upon outward expression. Painting, sculpture and architecture are the means of expression. The *life truly lived* is an outward expression of the highest ideal.

Miss L. M. Fuller read a poem on *Good and Evil*.

The paper of the evening was contributed by Mr. John F. Oakey, of Wall-street, New York, and was entitled: *St. Paul's Idea of Death, so-called: the Great Phenomenon*. The author gave a clear and succinct statement of the subject, strongly emphasising the Apostle's doctrine that "to be carnally-minded is DEATH, but to be spiritually-minded is life and peace." He showed further that Paul could not have meant physical dissolution, and considered that the Christian Church of to-day fails lamentably to teach what he really meant by death. Mr. Oakey proceeded further to say that the future life is not of necessity on some other planet; and, that as the body is the spirit's instrument, its whereabouts is of no particular importance. The life in Christ is the *only* life, whether in the body or out of it.

Two points made by the paper were themes for remark and exceptions. Mr. Oakey declares that Man loses his identity; and also maintains that neither the Hebrew writers, nor the Stoics and philosophers of ancient times had so clear a conception of the Future Life as those of the Christian period. The several members of the Akademie insisted on the other hand, that Man's identity is never lost under any circumstances; and generally hold that the ancients were no more ignorant in regard to the true nature of the Soul, than the moderns.

The meeting adjourned to meet at Jacksonville on Tuesday, the 16th of September next.

TO THE FELLOWS OF THE AMERICAN AKADÈMÈ.

The Executive Committee are deeply impressed with the importance of enlarging the membership of this organisation to the end that it shall include all who are interested in genuine Philosophy, and enable a free communication by correspondence, fraternal association, and printed documents. Every one having this matter at heart is earnestly requested to transmit names to the President or Secretary, at Jacksonville, Illinois, of such individuals as are worthy, who desire to be affiliated with this body.

THE AMERICAN AKADÉMÈ.

CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE I.—NAME.

This Association shall be known as "THE AMERICAN AKADÉMÈ."

ARTICLE II.—OBJECTS.

The purpose of this Association is: to promote the knowledge of Philosophic Truth, and to co-operate in the dissemination of such knowledge, with a view to the elevation of the mind from the sphere of the sensuous life into that of virtue and justice, and into communion with the diviner ideas and natures.

ARTICLE III.—MEMBERSHIP.

Any person in sympathy with the purpose of this Association may become a member by nomination of the Executive Committee, the unanimous consent expressed by ballot of those present at a regular meeting and signing, either in person or by authorisation, this Constitution.

ARTICLE IV.—QUORUM.

Six members present at any lawful meeting shall constitute a competent number for the transaction of business, and the affirmative vote of a majority, except when otherwise provided, shall be a sufficient authorisation of any measure.

ARTICLE V.—OFFICERS.

The officers of this Association shall be a President, a Vice-President, and a Secretary, who shall also be the Treasurer by virtue of office. These officers shall exercise the powers and functions usually attached to such office, and shall be the Executive Committee. Corresponding Secretaries may also be appointed by the Association. The term of office shall be three years, and till the election of successors.

ARTICLE VI.—MEETINGS.

The Regular Meetings shall be those which the Association itself shall appoint. Special Meetings may be called by the President and Vice-President, or any two of the Executive Committee, for the transaction of such business only as shall be specified in the call.

ARTICLE VII.—AMENDMENTS.

This Constitution may be amended at any regular meeting by a vote of two-thirds of the members present; *provided*, that there shall have been at least one month's notice given beforehand of the proposing of such amendment.

OFFICERS :

President, HIRAM K. JONES, M. D., Jacksonville, Ill.;

Vice-President, ALEXANDER WILDER, M. D.;

Secretary and Treasurer, MRS. JULIA P. STEVENS, Jacksonville, Ill.;

Corresponding Secretaries, THOS. M. JOHNSON, Osceola, Mo.;

LEWIS J. BLOCK, 127 North La Salle st., Chicago, Ill.;

MRS. BELLE P. DRURY, Orleans, Ill.

THE PLATONIST.

PUBLISHED MONTHLY.

An Exponent of the Philosophic Truth.

Edited by THOS. M. JOHNSON.

The Platonist is devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases.

In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosised, when materialism is absurdly denominated Philosophy, folly and ignorance popularised, and the dictum: "Get money, eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly and ignorance. This philosophy recognises the essential immortality and divinity of the Human Soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to and union with the Absolute One. Its mission is: to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being,—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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