

The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the Human Intellect and Heart."

Esoteric Christianity is identical with True Philosophy.

VOL. II.

ORANGE, N. J., APRIL, 1884.

No. 4.

THE INITIATION OF PLATO.

COSTUMES.

The Demiurges.—White robe with sky-blue tunic, mixed with silver, which reaches to the knees; the sleeves of the robe are narrow and closed at the wrists; those of the tunic are open and reach to the elbow. Worn in saltire is a broad violet ribbon, on which is embroidered the words: "Science, Wisdom, Truth." He also wears a chain of gold from which is suspended a brilliant sun. A key of ivory and gold, the emblem of mystery, is suspended at his right shoulder.

Aged Patriarchs.—Robe of celestial blue, waistband of violet silk fringed with gold; a silver chain from which is suspended a delta surrounded with a glory.

The King.—Costumes of red.

Three Patriarchs.—Robes of white; one with a black girdle; another with poppy-red; and the third of violet.

Altar.—Cover of green fringed with gold, a chandelier of seven branches, and the Book of Revelations.

Cercye.—Robe black, with blue girdle.

Etangi.—Robe white.

FIRST TABLEAU.

A grand subterranean hall with pillars. To right a vertical well whose shaft projects from the floor, and of which the top is not openly seen. An air-hole debouches upon a landing place, descended by some steps near a grating situated on the third plane at the middle of the scene. There are some mummies, the dead bodies lying in open coffins are ranged near the water abutting on the edge of this grating. Another grating on the second plane to the left. A lamp suspended from the ceiling which is not visible. Scarcely half daylight, and the ground is obscure.

SCENE I.

Three Priests.

1st. Priest.—It appears, Brothers, that the initiation of this most eminent disciple of Sôkratês will be very brilliant; they say that the King will assist.

2d. P.—They say it, in effect, and they add that our sages are marvelling at the great intelligence of the neophyte, the illustrious Platô.

3d. P.—He has made amongst them, in a single year, most extraordinary progress.

[*He goes to open a peephole in the wall; looks out and returns.*]

2d. P.—But this swan of the Akademy, as his Master calls him, is above everything a man of imagination. Will he have sufficient strength of soul to support the rude trials which commence from this moment?

1st. P.—It would be a great calamity if so valuable a man were to succumb; he would be condemned to pass his days in these dark galleries, and employed in decorating the coffins and the bandages of the mummies.

2d. P.—Without such condemnation, cruel without doubt, but necessary, our secrets would be divulged by those presumptuous ones, who would come from afar to solicit those trials, which they would be incapable of sustaining.

1st. P.—Yes, such captivity is still necessary; but a time will come when our treasures of knowledge will be the heritage of all men. Then mankind, freed from the errors which divide them and the evils which devour them, will live long and happily. They will bless our memories.

3d. P.—Brother, the neophyte, if he has escaped the abyss, is almost ready to enter here.

[*He returns to open the peephole; and after looking out closes it discreetly.*]

1st. P.—I believe that he is one of those rare men, who will be spoken of in the world for long ages.

3d. P.—Behold him!

[*The three Priests hide in the shade.*]

SCENE II.

PLATÔ, alone.

[*He puts his lamp across the air-hole and passes through head first. Rising, he looks around.*]

Into what place have I descended so painfully?

[*He advances to the grating and opens it; after he has passed it closes with an extraordinary noise.*]

How can this door, closing of itself, produce so great a noise?

SCENE III.

First Priest, PLATÔ.

1st. P.—[*Appearing.*] What dost thou seek here?

Plat.—Wisdom.

1st. P.—It is impossible, without great knowledge, for man to interpret the grand hieroglyphics of the universe. What is Science?

Plat.—It is the comprehension of causes and their effects, when the spirit of God descends into the bosom of man.

1st. P.—And Wisdom?

Plat.—The knowledge of good and evil, justice and injustice; it is the love of the one and the hatred of the other.

1st. P.—In order to reach it, know thou thyself.

[*He goes out and a flame rises behind him.*]

SCENE IV.

Plat.—I aspire to comprehend, O Sage! Why disappear thus? Know thou thyself! This profound sentence of the King Sesostriis is graven upon the Temple of Delphi. I am charged not to forget it. The divine Sôkratês incessantly recalled it to us.

[*Extraordinary monsters leap or pass him, uttering savage and frightful cries. Thunder is heard, then a great noise of chains rattling in the distance; lights pass on the scene; suddenly there is absolute silence.*]

The heroes of this place; these noises and the profound silence which succeed them may well cause the flesh to creep, but they neither affright or trouble my spirit.

Voice.—Doth thy heart fail thee? Hast thou need of assistance?

Plat.—No!

[*The place is enlightened by the rays of the moon; it represents a palace in ruins, portions of columns, and others thrown down, lie about; also tombs. Plato places his lantern upon a coffin.*]

Ruins, tombs, sublime dust, shades of my kind; is it you, then, who will reveal to me the secret of life? Is it you, O ye dead! who will teach me to live?

SCENE V.

Second Priest, PLATÔ.

2d. P.—Perhaps! Is not the past the lesson of the future?

Plat.—I know that in the natural order and in the moral order all that which has been accomplished can be done again, notwithstanding those differences which the incessant labors of matter introduce, and the progress of conscience, or rather of the human spirit.

2d. P.—[*Indicating the ruined palace.*] If they do not practice justice, the sole providence of empires, what remains of the most powerful kings of the earth? A handful of ashes and the scorn of posterity.

Plat.—The benevolent and modest man leaves at least a respectful remembrance, sympathetic regrets, a noble example. It is consoling, also, that man by his labors may prolong his existence through the centuries, and speak, so to say, from the foot of his tomb, to all generations that may come after him.

2d. P.—It is beautiful without doubt to live honored in the memory of men, and it is the noble ambition of great hearts. But know that life and death succeed each other, as do night and day. Every thing changes, transforms itself unceasingly; the ephemera an hour; man in a century, more or less; the stars in millions of years! Even the innumerable suns which roll over our heads have had, also, as we, their birthdays! Each instant which passes sees some extinguished and others setting out anew at incalculable distances! But it is given to man alone to contribute understandingly to the universal harmony by doing good.

Plat.—The sentiments of such grandeur ought to be proudly impressed on all man's most beautiful works.

2d. P.—It ought to render him jealous of his self-respect, and lead him to harbor in his heart the love of his kind, as the Parakist tends this lamp of which it is the symbol. What means the chain with which thou art yet confined?

Plat.—It symbolises the ignorance and prejudice which still oppress me, and of which I labor to set myself free.

[*After violent efforts he releases himself of the fetters.*]

Thus I liberate myself from foolish passions and from foolish beliefs, based only on hypothesis!

2d. P.—Thou hast liberated thy body only, if thy spirit still remains accessible to suggestions of intolerance and error. Know thou, that perseverance is the secret of perfection. Inspire thyself amongst these illustrious dead; read their inscriptions, or rather their sentiments, and pursue thy route. It is strewn with stones, and the way is yet long; but the knowledge of important truths will be the price of thy efforts. Demand nothing of the coffins of this gallery, as they contain only the ashes of traitors, put to death for having betrayed our Sublime Institution. Adieu?

[*He goes out.*]

SCENE VI.

Plat.—[*Alone.*] Ah! continue still thy discourse!

[*He takes up a lamp, approaches a coffin, and reads.*]

"I was a secret guardian, I suffered injuries, and I employed my time well."

Is it thee, then, O Chilon, who speaks to me here? Whoever thou art, O dead! I thank thee and salute thee.

[*Passes to another coffin and reads.*]

"I often repented of having spoken, rarely of being silent."

Yes, speech is silver, but silence is gold.

[*Reads upon another coffin.*]

"Make war only upon three things: sickness, ignorance and injustice."

Ah! without doubt; but blood will yet be spilt before the arrival of the sovereign reign of justice and truth.

[*Passes to another and reads.*]

"Render to thy kind, who is thy brother, the assistance which thou wouldst receive from him; and do not to him that which thou wouldst he should do unto thee."

It is thou, O great Confucius, who has transmitted to us these maxims so simple and salutary. They merit thee the eternal remembrance of mankind.

[*Passes to another coffin.*]

And thou, glorious shade, what is thy secret?

"O mortal, who seeketh truth! Learn that there exists but one sole Architect of this Temple called the Universe. He hath created all things, the good and the evil, the wheat and the poison; but to thee he hath given a discerning intelligence, and the liberty to labor for thy own glory and thy happiness."

It is true, O sages! O immortal dead! I am unable to remain longer with you; I honor you, and bid you adieu!

[*He advances toward the second grating, the avenue becomes suddenly illuminated. The crackling of flames is heard, bombs explode, thunder growls, lightning is produced.*]

SCENE VII.

Third Priest, PLATÔ.

3d. P.—[*At the grating.*] Thou mayst yet retrace thy steps and renounce thy enterprise; but an instant more and that will be impossible. Hast thou the courage to advance, whatever may be the perils which await thee?

Plat.—Yes, I am resolved. [*Slow music.*]

3d. P.—Ah well! behold this narrow avenue with the trees in flames, the interlacing branches forming a vault of fire!

Plat.—I see it.

3d. P.—It is the way thou must take without looking back. If thou should succeed in traversing this vast fire, thou wilt then find before thee a cavern in which is the monster of darkness, the genius of evil. He would close to thee the passage onward, take this sword and this buckler of Minerva; attack this enemy, strike off his head and bear it to the King; he will give thee his orders. But the conflagration becomes general; [*they hear crackling*] haste thee, run! Adieu!

Plat.—[*Throws away his lamp and takes the sword and buckler.*] I will free this furnace or I will perish; if I traverse it thou shalt be obeyed.

[*He runs down the avenue whilst the third Priest considers him.*]

SECOND TABLEAU.

On the floor some rocks; below winds a river. A ladder is reared abutting upon the door of a Pavilion placed at the right. A large ring is fixed in the door. Another ladder leads from the pavilion to the scene. Magnificent gardens, statues, tripods, tables, a collation; day a little gloomy.

SCENE I.

First and Second Priest, ZAIS.

1st. P.—[*Concealed near a tree considers Plato.*] He swims vigorously.

2d. P.—He comports himself marvellously. He will reach the ladder.

Zais.—[*Ascends to the pavilion bearing the linen and the tunic for investing Plato.*] You will cause him to perish.

1st. P.—It is necessary that he be purified by the four elements. [*The priests go within to the ground-floor of the pavilion.*]

SCENE II.

ZAIS, PLATÔ.

Plato in the water, reaches the ladder, but as he puts foot on it each step falls to the level of the water. Reaches the door and seizes the ring with both hands; finds himself suspended; the ladder sinks from under him.

Zais.—[*Descending from the pavilion.*] I am inspired with such tender interest for this Grecian philosopher, that I tremble, and offer up my prayers for him.

2d. P.—[*Descending from the pavilion.*] Dost thou feel thy strength failing?

Plat.—Not yet, but—

[*The door opens and admits Plato. Full light of day. Distant music.*]

SCENE III.

ZAIS, AZEMA.

Zais.—Azema wilt thou offer our services to this valiant neophyte. Hold! pray of him to empty this cup, that he may be refreshed.

Az.—[*Lighting the tripods.*]* Yes, my sister. The tripods shall fill the air with the most sweet perfume, and the melodious chants shall be full of harmony; dances, the most lascivious and enervating, shall prepare the fall of this proud philosopher—he shall not rebel against love.

[*Having knocked at the door, which Plato opens, she takes the cup and enters the pavilion.*]

SCENE IV.

ZAIS, and an Alma.

Zais.—Dear Alma, observe carefully the signs that I will give you. Enter there and display your most seductive and irresistible graces. The woman of our Priests will bear a crown of laurel; add the myrtle and the amaranth to yours; as also to that of Azema.

Alma.—Princess, the crowns are ready.

SCENE V.

ZAIS, AZEMA, PLATÔ.

Plat.—O hospitable women! Whoever you be, Nymphs or Goddesses, Platô renders you a thousand thanks, and salutes you.

Az.—It is but gallantry, that you affect to suppose we are goddesses; we are simple mortals, princesses it is true, but without pride, and very happy to see you and welcome you.

Zais.—Yes, we are delighted to receive you, and your triumph fills us with joy. Deign to seat yourself and accept this repast, which we are delighted at having prepared for you.

Az.—[*Taking the cup.*] Drink and gain new strength, for the trials will be still long. You have shown to admirable advantage; which, however, we only expected of you, my sister and I.

Plat.—Which you expected?

Zais.—Yes, the description of your rare talents had exalted you amongst us; the reports which we have received since you came here, have but confirmed the high opinion which we had before of your merit.

Plat.—If you were less flattering, charming princesses, after the rude emotions which I have resisted, I would consider myself, whilst near you, as the most fortunate of mortals.

Zais.—You are at least the most eloquent and most amiable of men.

Plat.—In mercy spare me, you are both so irresistible.

SCENE VI.

ZAIS, AZEMA, *corps-de-ballet.*

Azema rises and takes a part in the ballet. The dancers in retiring place their crowns at the feet of Plato: Zais places that of the Alma upon his head, notwithstanding that he resists it. Azema places hers upon his knees.

SCENE VII.

ZAIS, PLATÔ.

Zais.—Keep this crown of amaranth and laurel, if not to

* A consecrated lamp having three feet, and filled with perfumed oil.

oblige me, at least to be agreeable to me; I see in it the symbol of your glory, which will abide through the centuries.

Plat.—Ah! this is to forget the regard which is due to your prisoner.

Zais.—No! it is I who am the captive.

Plat.—[*Puts the crown of Azema on the head of Zais.*] Let us then both of us be immortal!

Zais.—[*Placing herself lovingly near him.*] Thanks, I will look upon this crown, which you have placed on my head, as the most precious, the most dear of my remembrances.

Plat.—Princess! [*They hear a prelude.*]

Zais.—Listen to this harmonious chant, will you—wilt thou? [*The choir behind the scene gives the following:*]

Isis! O fruitful nature!
Thou veilest night and day
Happy in giving the world
Health, joy, and love.

Let us celebrate the magnificence
Of the most radiant star.
To which man oweth existence
And the most precious gifts!
Of other suns also,
And other inhabited globes,
Rejoice in the dawn,
Surrounding us with pleasures.
Isis! etc. etc.

Love is the source of Life,
The principle of the Universe!
The grand law of harmony,
Whence divers things are born.
To remain to it faithful,
Let us guard us with oaths,
For love causeth the beautiful
To desire new loves.
Isis! etc. etc.

[*Plaintive Music.*]

Zais.—Now, dear Platô, tell me what could best please thy heart? Whatever it be, thy desires are already granted; for I love thee, and my power is unbounded in this place.

Plat.—I would respond to these cares, so delicate, so charming!

Zais.—[*Rises and admiringly embraces Plato with her arms.*] I love thee! let us go to those discreet shades! let us hasten!

Plat.—You seek to seduce me, O Princess, from my duty, and this is not the least formidable of my trials.

Zais.—Ah, well! I defend not myself! But I am taken in the snare which I laid! I know thy genius, thy great works, thy glory, and I love thee; I desire thee to prove it. Fear not! there is absolute secrecy; a favorable spot. Come, come, I say to thee! [*She embraces him and takes a few steps.*]

Plat.—Enchantress! you are adorable; but at this moment I can only admire you; you know that well.

Zais.—I love thee with all my heart, and thou hast nothing to doubt. After having supplicated thee, wilt thou betray me, treat me with indignity?

Plat.—If your sympathy was real you would not abuse your advantages; you would cease to try my fidelity. I will regard you with the greatest consideration, and the most tender remembrance.

Zais.—A distant friendship, a love without tribute, would perhaps console a woman of Greece; to me, Platô, this refusal is an outrage which might cost thee thy life. We are still free and I would not appear to command. Come! I love thee, and implore thee for the last time! Come!

Plat.—Would that I were either Hermès or Apollo; I would espouse you this hour, and transport you to Olympus, where you would be the admiration of the gods. But humble and pitiful mortal, submitting to an innocent temptation, which I know that I ought to resist, I think of the symbol of the tranquil lion in a stormy sky, and that example reassures me.

Zais.—Ah! well, cruel one, it is not thy life which is endangered but mine! Be generous, Platô! the daughter of the King of Egypt is at thy feet.

Plat.—Whether you be or be not sincere it is my duty to resist.

Zais.—Go! thy philosophic impassiveness is a small merit; moreover, it causes my death. [*She goes out.*]

SCENE VIII.

PLATÔ, the Kerux.

Ker.—Platô ! throw away that crown and take this golden branch, and deign to follow me. Knowest thou who is the most happy of men ?

Plat.—[*A little disturbed, looks toward the place where Zais disappeared, throws away the crown, and takes the golden branch.*] The most—the most happy of men ! According to Sôkratês, the most just ; according to me the most liberal.

Ker.—[*Near the scenes.*] And the most modest ?

Plat.—[*Stopping to answer.*] It is he who understands himself the best.

[*He goes out last looking narrowly at the place where Zais disappeared.*]

THIRD TABLEAU.

Room closed; door to the right on the first plane, curtains sky-blue, the sun above the floor of the centre of the stage surrounded with the signs of the Zodiac, stars. On the wall to the right two spheres, above which, without touching, are two men ; the one at the helm of a vessel, the other, beardless, holding in one hand a rod, and in the other a thunderbolt and an ear of corn. Two obelisks terminated by a ball are figured upon the wall to the left ; at each side is a canopy of red damask figured with gold, which rises above the seats of the cabinet in form of an altar terminated at the side. Triangle of fire near the wall above the central seat, two other seats before the altar. At the bottom, or upon the first plane to the left, a veiled statue of Isis ; to right a sphinx. At the rise of the curtain the Patriarchs and Herald occupy their seats, so that the priests of the dais are vis-a-vis of the altar.

SCENE I.

Three Patriarchs, the Kerux, Audience of Priests.

[*Four violent blows on the door.*]

1st. Patr.—Who is this foolish mortal that comes thus to trouble our mysteries ?

Ker.—[*Opening the door.*] Sublime Patriarch, it is the neophyte, Platô, of Athens ; he bears the golden branch.

1st. Patr.—If his conscience is pure let him enter.

SCENE II.

The preceding, PLATÔ.

1st. Patr.—[*To Plato, who led by the Kerux has made several steps.*]—Stop ! What dost thou demand ?

Plat.—The revelation of the Mysteries.

1st. Patr.—What hast thou done to merit the distinguished favor ?

Plat.—I have never knowingly done wrong to any person ; nor forgot the respect which I owe to my kind—nor even to myself—without profound repentance. I have followed the lessons of Sôkratês, and gone over the world in my exertions to acquire more wisdom. After having assiduously listened to the priests of this land of Egypt, I descended to the gloomy empire of the dead, and interrogated the illustrious shades, or otherwise collected their luminous sentiments ; then I traversed the flames, combated and slew in his cavern the monster of darkness—the Genius of Evil. Then having ascended the course of a river by swimming, after climbing a ladder which sunk under me, I arrived at a delicious place where beautiful women with naked breasts tendered me boons of love. From thence I was conducted thither.

1st. Patr.—Approach without fear. [*The Kerux seats Plato before the altar.*] What is the most beautiful and noble study to which man can devote himself in passing through the world ?

Plat.—That which has for its object the knowledge of what he is, whence he comes, and whither he goes ; that which leads to a search for the laws of nature within and without him.

1st. Patr.—Isis and Osiris, the moon and the sun, both symbolise nature ; when they represent it by Isis, a veil covers her. What is its sense ?

Plat.—That of the inscription upon the statue in the Temple of Sais : “ I am all that which has been, all that which is, all that which will be, and no mortal has yet raised the veil which covers me.”

1st. Patr.—What dost thou think of this inscription ?

Plat.—I think that it is false.

[*Movement of surprise among the Patriarchs and the audience.*]

1st. Patr.—False ! and how doth thy pride look upon this ?

Plat.—At each absolute truth, at each law of nature that he discovers, doth not man raise this veil ?

1st. Patr.—No, the difficulty is not removed ? Thou canst calculate the weight of the stars, their velocity, their distance and the paths which they overrun ; thou canst investigate the laws of light and electricity, and make the thunderbolt thy auxiliary ; plane down or pierce the mountain, cruise in the abyss. Thou canst transform the earth and loose the waves, but the great Unknown, T. S. A. O. T. U., is none the less incomprehensible, and beyond the laws of nature ! Learn that this triangle, the symbol of our cult, is an emblem of the unity of God, as the sun symbolises to us the soul of the world. Behold how the vulgar have been led to adore animals. Deprived of a calendar, the laborer called those the stars of the Bull which arose in affinity with the sun at the period of their labor ; that the stars of the Virgin, those which arose at the epoch of harvest, and so of the others. Then forgetting the reason why their fathers had thus denominated the stars, the people began to believe that the Virgin, the Bull, the Lion, actually abode in the heavens whence they favored their labors and the productions of the earth : they made of them Gods ! Believest thou that the Sphinx is one of them ?

Plat.—No, it is the double symbol of the harvest-Virgin and the Lion, recalling the fruitful inundation of the Nile.

2d. Patr.—The sun is in the centre of the universe : Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, turn at the same time upon themselves and round the sun. The fixed stars have a movement inverse to that of the earth, and gravitate afar, very far from the planets, several of which rejoice in a salubrious atmosphere, and are inhabited. Knowest thou the signification of the red cross traced upon the banner of Egypt ?

Plat.—It is the symbol of the renewal of the seasons, or of immortality. The horizontal line represents the equator, its extremities, the equinox, or spring and autumn ; the vertical line figures the meridian, and its extremities the solstices, or summer and winter.

[*The second Patriarch makes a sign of approbation.*]

3d. Patr.—What is morality ?

Plat.—It is the rule of right, and the duties which the conscience imposes, which man cannot violate without shame and disgrace.

3d. Patr.—And justice ?

Plat.—It is the practical application of the law of rendering to every one that which is his due.

3d. Patr.—Dost thou believe that the authority of the judges would be lessened by the admission of their mistakes ?

Plat.—No ; on the contrary, it is the maintenance of the condemnation of an innocent man, were he to die, that would lessen their authority.

3d. Patr.—Where do justice and morality take their source ?

Plat.—In the very conscience of humanity.

3d. Patr.—How dost thou distinguish good and evil ?

Plat.—All that which wounds the dignity or restrains the rights of man is evil ; all that which is favorable to them is good.

3d. Patr.—Thy replies are sufficiently precise. Dost thou think that woman is inferior to man?

Plat.—No, I believe that she is his equal and his best friend.

3d. Patr.—And what sayest thou to corporeal punishment, and the penalty of death?

Plat.—I say that they are the signs of a still barbarous civilisation.

3d. Patr.—Then, what will be to thy mind the signs of a civilisation superior to our epoch?

Plat.—The absence of priests.

[*Explosion of murmurs amongst the audience.*]

Priest.—[*Rising.*] We are then useless? So the observance of thy pretended rule of good and evil suffices to render man happy? Platô, thou art ungrateful!

2d. P.—[*Rising.*] Thou slanderest the first want of society!

3d. Patr.—Calm yourselves, my brothers; it were better to praise the frankness of the neophyte than throw stones at him. [To Plato.] In what dost thou make true happiness to consist?

Plat.—In the approbation of the conscience.

3d. Patr.—Yes, it is in the depth of the heart that infallible justice dwells to console the victim, chastise the criminal, and rejoice the good man.

[*The Kerux presents to Plato a cup to empty, and the Etangi.*]

1st. Patr.—It is the beverage of the Lotus: drink and forget all sentiments of hatred, envy, and intolerance; and put on this robe in sign of devotion to science and virtue. [Plato empties the cup, and assisted by the Kerux puts on the Etangi. The audience go out.] Thou goest now to be initiated in the last mysteries.

SCENE III.

The Preceding; an Aged Patriarch.

[*The aged Patriarch rises from the floor, and is preceded and followed by a flame.*]

1st. Patr.—In presence of this triangle of fire, swear to obey our sacred laws, to submit thy passions to the empire of reason, and to labor incessantly for the good of humanity.

[*The Kerux dips a reed-pen in ink and presents it to Plato before whom the Aged Patriarch holds open the golden book. Having signed the book Plato receives from the aged Patriarch the decoration which he carries.*]

Aged Patr.—This decoration is that of Neitha or Isis; it represents an owl, the symbol of a child which is blind at birth, and and only becomes a man by experience and the light of philosophy. May Wisdom always inspire thee!

[*He takes again the golden book which he had laid down to decorate Plato and disappears in the floor. A flame rises behind him. The Patriarchs descend from their seats, surround and congratulate Plato. The first Patriarch moves aside; the others place themselves in procession and advance. A gust of wind; the floor is raised.*]

FOURTH TABLEAU.

The floor of the theatre, which alone is changed, represents the face of a temple, of which the steps are terminated by two lions; an obelisk to right and left; avenues of green trees; rays of light.

SCENE I.

The Patriarchs, the Kerux, PLATÔ, the DEMIURGOS, the King, Priests, Soldiers.

[*The Soldiers are ranged before the Temple, and the Priests and Patriarchs to right and left of the Scene. In the midst and at the back of the plane are the Demiurgos and the King. The first Patriarch and Plato occupy the front of the scene to the left. Music a little lively, then slow.*]

1st Patr.—[*Low to Plato.*] Yes, worthy Platô, these are our Grand Mysteries.

Plat.—[*Low to the First Priest.*] Aye, I foresee it! They cannot for a long time yet be revealed to the people!

1st Patr.—[*Low to Plato.*] Who knows? In two thousand years perhaps; but listen. The usual procession in honor of the Initiate is constituted thus: First, the *Chanter*, bearing the symbol of music; next the *Haruspice* or observer of times; the *Sacred Scribe* marches after him bearing a book, an inkhorn, and a reed-pen; he is followed by the *Standard-Bearer*, who carries the cubit of justice; he who bears upon his breast a cruise, symbol of the thirst for science, is the *Prophet*. The others who follow the *Loaf-Bearer*, precious gift of Isis, are the *Aspirants* for initiation; they follow the various classes of medicine, mathematics, architecture, painting, etc. But advance and lend thine ear to the Demiurgos.

Demiurgos.—Platô! ever remember that all men hold from nature equal and sacred rights. Error and truth divide the world between them; therefore neither slander nor blame the faith of other. All differences will one day dissolve in the supreme and conciliating counsels of reason. Honor and serve well thy country, but in fighting for it forget not that all mankind are thy brothers! Exercise and develop thy faculties constantly; let temperance and moderation preserve thy vigorous health. In thy pleasures taste not those which may give pain to any one; and remember that mankind are only happy and great by justice. [He takes the sword from the sword-bearer and places the blade upon the shoulder and head of Plato.] In presence of the King of Egypt, initiated, just and beneficent, I the Demiurgos, humble representative of T.S.A.O.T.U., constitute and proclaim thee a Patriarch of our Immortal Institute. Go, spread upon earth the sublime truths which thou comest to learn; but accord this signal favor only to those chosen souls, who have been slowly prepared as worthy of receiving them. Build not upon sand; write not upon snow!

King.—Platô! by thy long labors, by thy constancy under great trials, by thy ardent love of truth, thou deservest this decoration, which symbolises these qualities, and I am happy in bestowing it upon thee. [He puts round the neck of Plato his decoration, the *Alidee*.] Now follow us! Let us show to a people, simple but enthusiastic admirers of the good and the beautiful, the triumph of perseverance and virtue. Although they are unable to appreciate the extended science of the Initiates, yet they know that by their lights, their courage, and their labors, they aim at intellectual enfranchisement, and the general happiness of the human race; they love to feast the Initiates, and to applaud them.

[*Lively music, departure by the floor to right. Bengal lights.*]

Hierô, the King of Syracuse, asked Simonidès, the philosopher, what God was. He desired a day to consider the question. On the day following he asked two days more. And whenever he was called on for an answer, he doubled the time. The king, surprised, asked the reason. "Because," replied the philosopher, "the more I consider the question the more recondite it seems." In the Hindu philosophy, a son asks his father, what is Brahm, and is referred to his own farther reflection for an answer. Platô, the interpreter of ancient mythology, says that by the faculty of over-knowledge (*epistêmê*) we perceive the truth; by the truth the beauty of creation; that all things partake of the Good which is everywhere the product of an unfathomable goodness that exists beyond ourselves and beyond the knowledge pertaining to this world. THE CAUSE OF THAT GOODNESS, he says, IS A GOOD CAUSE—IS GOD.

For right is right, since God is God;

And right the day must win.

To doubt would be disloyalty;

To falter would be sin.—Geo. S. Faber.

DIALECTIC.

Read before the American Akadēmē, Feb. 19th, 1884.

BY ANGUS DALLAS, OF TORONTO, ONTARIO.

"A little learning is a dangerous thing;
 Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.
 There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain;
 But drinking deeply sobers us again."

Not every one who calls "Lord! Lord!" is of the Lord. The *Clouds* of Aristophanes would be more appropriate to the age in which we live. Sophists abound not as in former times in the seats of learning only; but they engross the intervening spaces formerly occupied by fervent scholars and untrammelled seekers after truth. Everywhere philosophy is of the sensuous.

The first requisite of a student of Dialectic is to distinguish between names and words. The want of this distinction is the cause of the bewilderment universally existing when an attempt is honestly made to reach at the truth. As there is a vast difference between the thing itself and the appearance of the thing, so is there as great a difference between the suprasensuous conception of a thing and its sensuous aspect. The difference of Sôkratēs from Gorgias is, that Sôkratēs uses letters, which are the elements of names, in the same way as he uses numbers which are the elements of mathematical computations. Gorgias, on the other hand, knows of no such distinction as that of names from words, and accordingly makes use of letters and words at random without definiteness as to their proper significations. The philosopher and the Sophist have thus no common standard of appeal, and consequently they are discordant on every subject which is not about visible and sensuous things. The learned men of our day cannot conjecture what Pythagoras saw in numbers to wed him so mysteriously to their use as a philosophical basis. The mystery is solved the moment it is perceived that he looked to the definiteness of the values of numbers for the same definiteness in the values of letters. The same wonderment exists on what could be the merit of Homer, in the description of a war between Greeks and Trojans, in which nothing seems more remarkable than what appears in similar wars between petty States. The reason why Homer is misunderstood is our ignorance that names have definite mathematical values, which words have not. Learned men innumerable have dissected the *Iliad* into parts to show its agreement or disagreement with the Aristotelian rule for its structure as a whole. Pope centers his criticism on the inventiveness of the Greek dramatist. Many authors have sought for the country, the birth-place, and chronological date of the events described; while others have busied themselves to discern what they term the primary argument of the drama. In all this confusion Homer is brought down to a level with Virgil, and Shakspeare, a sensuous author dealing in flesh and bones and the emotional accompaniments of the mental passions. And all this because it has not been perceived that the conflict described in the *Iliad* is between the suprasensuous notions of the ideas and the sensuous emotions; between what is immortal in man and what is mortal; in short, between the divine and the human in our cranial organisation. More of this anon. In the meantime, what is to be shown is the mathematical structure and function of names distinguished from words which are not so used.

The object of *Dialectic*, as the name implies, being to separate the light from the darkness, the true from the false, its study begins by fixing unalterably the value of each significant

letter of the alphabet. When Platō says in the *Kratylos* that the letter *r* denotes motion and *d* rest, he strikes the keynote of the whole alphabet, and reveals the mystery by which the mythology of Ancient Greece was incomprehensible to the Sophists of that period, and remains still incomprehensible to the sophists of our own day. That each of the letters *b*, *c*, *d* has a value as determinate and unchangeable as each of the numbers 2, 3, 4, may puzzle at first sight many of our foremost *litterateurs*. When explained, however, the mystery ceases and the wisdom of a prehistoric age comes in to explain why, after two thousand years of agitation and experience, and scientific and artistic development, our moral status has been and is still unprogressive.

What is still more remarkable is that this arithmetical application of the letters of the alphabet is not of Grecian origin; but came into Greece from India from the ancient Sanskrit, which no doubt accounts for the philosophical superiority of Brahmanical scholarship over that of the rest of the world. Our future course evidently now is to cultivate the Greek language in order to get at the Sanskrit of which we know almost nothing. No Sanskrit student has yet informed us that the inflexibility of the values of the letters of the Sanskrit alphabet constitutes the basis of their philosophical doctrines. This fact seems not to be known. *It is the key, however, to the knowledge of the language*. European literati hitherto, it seems, have been groping into the dark in their attempts to read abstruse doctrinal texts without this key. What are we to think of the European teachers of Sanskrit and even of Greek, who do not know this, which they might have learned from Platō? What says the Vatican, Oxford, Harvard or Tübingen to this indictment? What becomes of the existing crusade in all the universities by options, to get rid of Greek in part or in whole? There can be no better evidence than this of the utter obliviousness of the teaching Faculties to this, the true essence of all linguistic studies. It would be scarcely credible, had we not evidence of the fact that the *Dialogues* of Platō, containing a complete exposition of this essence, has lain on the shelves of all the universities in Europe, unread or misunderstood. Professor Jowett says in his introduction to the *Kratylos*: "Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of a technical or scientific language, in which words should have fixed meanings and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Platō than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed." "But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Sôkratēs, Platō envelops the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident." "There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts or representations, but with ideas."

As letters are the elements which carry the significations, these letters with their separate values have to be learned from the following alphabet, which seems to have been used before the time of Homer down to the age of the Stoics and Epikurus:

PHONIC SEMAIC ROOTS OR ELEMENTS.

Modes of Expression.	Greek.	Other European Languages.	Significations.
Labial,	$\beta, \pi, \varphi, \psi,$ $b, p, ph, ps, f, v, w.$		Bearing, becoming, making.
Homo-Semaic,			
Lingual,	$\delta, \tau, \theta, \zeta,$ $d, t, th, z,$	(Apart)	Fixity.
Guttural,	$\gamma, \kappa, \xi, \chi, \varsigma,$ $g, k, x, ki, h, b, c, q, j.$		Holding.

Semaic,	Palatal,	λ, l, do, ρ, r,	End or Aim.
			Taking into (Motion)
	Nasal,	μ, m,	Mean (middle).
	do,	ν, n,	Being.
	Dental,	σ, s,	Commutes with the gutturals.

The linguals, the palatal L and the two nasals are the chief factors for the suprasensuous significations. D denotes *fixity* or *perpetuity*; L, the *perfect end or aim*; M, the *mean*; what is *not too much nor too little*; N denotes *being, without intermission*. A common characteristic of these suprasensuous elements is that each partakes of the autological properties of the others. That is, D, besides its own autologic signification of fixity, partakes of the perfect end of the mean, and of unintermittent being; L, the perfect end, similarly partakes of fixity, the mean and being; also M, the mean, partakes of fixity, of the perfect end, and of being; and N, unintermittent being, in like manner partakes of fixity of the perfect end, and of the mean. This communal relationship of the suprasensuous elements places them in a common category. For example 'αγαθός, hence θεός, Skr. devas; Ζεύς, Deus, God, guide; doceo, teach, duty, time, doom, theme; domo, δαίμων, time, domus, test, tutus, and so on through the various European languages. The same with L, M and N, in the simple and compound forms of vast number of names.

NAMES VERSUS WORDS.

RULE I.—Sensuous elements convey sensuous conceptions only; as horse, man, tree. Suprasensuous elements convey suprasensuous conceptions; as school, idea, notion.

RULE II.—Generally, the signification is found in the first semaic element, or two first semaic elements of a simple name or word.

RULE III.—When two or more semaic elements of the signification come together, one neutralises the others.

RULE IV.—All combinations of elements have primary and secondary significations.

Όνομα (a name) is a compound of δν (being) and ὁμοῦν (like), and denotes that the letters convey the signification of the being or thing which they are intended to represent. The primary and secondary derivations are found by the following formula, which reads from right to left:

Skr.	Primary.	Secondary or derived.
MAN—NAMAN—'or—oma—ōroma—No—Men—NoMen—Name		{ namely. nominate. nominally.

Similarly of the word *teach*, which signifies properly *show*:

Skr.	Primary.	Secondary or derived.
DIC—διδερνυμι—DOCEO—TEACH		{ disco. dico, indicate, vindicate. dictate. document.

Again, of the word *draw*:

Skr.	Primary, Latin.	Secondary Significations.
TRAH—TRANS-VEHO—TRA-HO—TRAHO		{ dredge, trudge, drag. trace—retrace. drag. trach. draw—tract—extract, at., con., de., in, trip, drive, tribe—attribute, con., dis., re., drift, travel, drop.

These elements are predicated and the arithmetical rule, that as 2 are 1 plus 1, so the semaic elements of name, *nomen*, *νομα* and Skr., *naman*, are N plus M; of *teach*, *doceo*, *διδερνυμι* and Skr. *dic*, are T plus C; of *draw*, *traho* and Skr. *trivah* are T plus R plus H. Equivalents in other European languages are derived in the same way; the Slavonian, German, French, etc., through the Latin or Greek from the Sanskrit.

Πῆμα (a word) from Πῖμα, on the contrary, conforms to no rules for the signification of the elements. National usages and custom only, are required to convey the meaning of words. A variable Parliamentary or Congressional statute is called a *law*, which it cannot be; because *a law cannot change*. By the Latins, Hermēs (the harmoniser) is called Mercury (the merchandiser). Athēnē (the immortal) is called Minerva (the patroness of literature—VARRO). Aphroditē (without mind, meaning pure intellect, exempt from sensuous passions,) is called Venus (the patroness of venery and lust). Hērā (harmony) is called Juno (Matrona). Herein, while the Grecian names are suprasensuous, those of the Latins are grossly sensuous. Aphroditē is a pure spirit, perfectly immaterial, and the most beautiful of all intellectual conceptions, whereas Venus, the creature of pollution, is represented as coming out of the bath, a most significant emblem of her impurity. By the suprasensuous interpretation, God (the good) is to be loved; by the sensuous, God (the good) is to be feared!

When, however, sensuous elements appear in the common category, a thing of rare occurrence, their sensuous interpretation, is neutralised. In suprasensuous Eros (love) the constant attendant of Aphroditē (the most suprasensuously beautiful), though the R represents love to be motional, it is superseded by the categorical relationship of Eros to Aphroditē. In οὐσία (essence) from δν (being), the ν is understood; therefore, οὐσία is categorical. Ἀρχή (arke first, what holds taking into), being in the common category, is of high order, and in Greek denotes *rule*, which like law, is the suprasensuous guide for moral conduct. Ψυχή (*psuche*, what holds nature or becoming; the soul), being suprasensuous, is for this reason in the common category. So is χάρις (grace), the unifying principle. So is ἀρετή (fitness).

Why the common category in certain cases governs the sensuous element, requires explanation. Whether by the exclusion of a suprasensuous element which the name formerly contained and is still understood, as in οὐσία, or by change of structure, is not now known; but future enquiries may divulge the cause!

Platō says in the *Kratylos*, that when people talk about iron and silver there is no disagreement; but concerning justice and goodness they cannot agree. The cause of disagreement in the latter case is the using of verbal in the place of noumenal significations. A man's conception of justice depends on the place of his birth and his education. It is just to cut a man's head off for theft in Tonkin; but it is not at Philadelphia. Goodness similarly depends on the creed. The worship of images is good at Rome, but not at Berlin. In the money-getting life, a trader considers it perfectly just to overreach his neighbor in a mercantile transaction; and thinks it a good thing to be able to have an opportunity to do so. Verbal opinions, thus, depend altogether on circumstances, which have much to do with country, climate, education and creed. But suprasensuous justice and goodness are one and the same in all ages and in all countries. The difference between local and universal justice and goodness is commensurate with the difference between the use of names and words.

The following contrast of names *versus* words will illustrate their right *versus* their wrong interpretations more clearly; and may be taken as an example of the practice prevailing in all the European languages:

Names.	Right Interpretations.	Wrong Interpretations.
Μονο.	I nourish.	I advise.
Σπείρο.	I spy.	I behold.
Ψέχο.	I reach.	I seek.
Σε-χωρ.	I reach by myself.	I follow.
" "	I seek.	" "
Ασ-σε-χωρ.	I reach by myself at.	I overtake.
" "	I ask.	
Κυρ-quare.	For which thing.	Why?
Απ-πέλο.	I put to.	I call.
Εξ-ερίτι.	The force out (Rome).	An army.

Names.	Right Interpretations.	Wrong Interpretations.
<i>Hostis.</i>	A stranger.	An enemy.
<i>Oro from os.</i>	I mouth.	I speak.
<i>Populo.</i>	I people.	I rob and spoil people.
<i>Populor.</i>	I people.	I rob and plunder.
<i>υπο.</i>	Over.	Under.
<i>Sub.</i>	"	"

LOGIC VERSUS ARGUMENTATION.

As logic denotes the light or law, or whatever is a guide for human conduct, its place is in the common category. Argumentation on the contrary, implies wrangling and strife, and seems to come from *arceo* (force). It therefore belongs to the dividual category. The contrast between logic and argumentation is, thus, most distinctly marked. Logic is of the intellect; but argumentation works through reason and geometric science. But though reason is exclusively applicable to science, in which rays of light are blended with the darkness incident to phenomena, while logic properly excludes all concrete forms; yet as the purpose of science is to acquire a logical method, in order to be able to discriminate the real from the apparent, the same form of procedure for both logic and argumentation become a necessity. Their characteristics in this respect have to be determined; which is done best by having present in the thought at the same time the contrast between straggling rays of light blended with darkness, as in Science, and the clear and unmixed discernment of light in its absolute essence, as in Intellection. Formally, the process is the same in its various applications. But it is applicable to two different classes of objects, phenomena and noumena: *phenomena* (from *φαίνω*) as appearances; *noumena* (from *νόεω*) as realities—the one sensuous and unmathematical; the other intellectual and determinate.

The difference of rational phenomena and logical noumena presents thus two ethical systems in two corresponding states of society. And as the adoption of one system with its corresponding statement necessarily excludes the other, there could be no difficulty in the mind of Sôkratês which to choose; and in choosing, to have been conscious at the same time of the insuperable difficulties with which his course of action thereafter would be surrounded. To supersede the sensuous and prevailing mode of viewing objects, could only be done by logical conviction. Rays of light incorporated scientifically with erroneous opinions had constituted hitherto the only acknowledged rule. To supersede this by a contrary system not yet generally known, difficult of comprehension and requiring no small amount of preparatory training necessitated a logical standard, as a common criterion, yet not capable of general application. The labor of constructing such a standard might appear herculean. But when we consider the mythological standing-point of Sôkratês and Platô, that it supplied the principles and formulas for the work, the labor of its execution seems less onerous than at first sight might be supposed. The first requisite—that names should be as fixed and determinate in their values as numbers—they succeeded in satisfying practically. Now the fixity of names to represent fixed and real things, led the way, as we have seen, insensibly and directly to the demand for a corresponding fixedness between habits supposed to be moral and habits actually moral; that is, between the apparent and the real. If the values of names could be fixed as unchangeably as the values of numbers, why should not moral habits equally be so fixed? This train of thought led farther—to the connection of conditions and consequents; showing the unalterable dependence of the latter on the former.

Great as was the mathematical determinateness of the values of the semaic elements, also the definite classification of the cranial faculties, there yet remained to be constructed the processes by which the faculties could make use of the semaic symbols; for without exactness in the processes the determi-

nateness of the symbols and faculties would have been comparatively of little value. These processes embraced logic, as a criterion of truth; and argument, as an art of disputation. Much as the popular teachers at Athens mistook the distinction, there is no denying that the ignorance respecting the same is equally characteristic of modern literature. The art of wrangling, which is a prominent feature of university teaching, and the rules for its practice contained in standard authorised manuals, attest the truth of this; the fruits of which are conspicuous in the eloquence of the pulpit, the bar and the forum. For it is not the discernment of the truth that constitutes the object of argumentative discrimination, but the art of persuading others to conform to one's own way of thinking; how to exercise the art so as to control public opinion, and finally to coerce the propensity whenever and wherever manifested, to question the justice of conventional institutions. Argumentation, misnamed logic, was so employed, as it is still, not for the attainment of light, but for the purpose of coercion. It is so and has continued so under every form of government, with every creed, and also in every system of jurisprudence. As it was at Athens so is it still at Mekka, at Constantinople, at Rome, at Paris, at London, at Berlin and St. Petersburg, that the popular misnamed logic, the standard misnamed logic of authority, the misnamed logic of the hour, is what maintains the *status quo*. Meanwhile the inner circles of conflicting sections, having divergent interests, convert it to the propagation and defense of their respective dogmas.

What was required, and is still the desideratum, is the common ordeal, applicable as a ready reckoner to distinguish what is right in itself, from what is conventionally declared by custom to be right. The jungle of jugglery which goes by the name of the Elements of Logic is, as in ancient times, a huge and cunningly-devised web, in which the Sophist lies concealed, and which he uses to catch his prey.* It is a system of freemasonry, within the precincts of which there is a fraternal embrace; but the outside world being excluded, because of the difficulty of getting at the passes, is the unconscious victim of linguistic arts that unceasingly exercise a corrupt influence. It is, therefore, necessary that logic should appear as what it really is, a light; and moreover, that it should appear so, not alone to a few, but to all. The great lesson taught by Sôkratês is, that the misery of mankind has its source less in the fraudulent devices of rulers, than in the ignorance and consequent helplessness of those on whom those fraudulent devices are practiced. The poet says truly:

"Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow."

And there is no surer truth than that the poor of every country are the hewers of wood and carriers of water to the rich, because of their inability to detect the cause of poverty and riches. The means for readily detecting the conventional errors that are the cause of human misery is the primary consideration. This was the aim of Sôkratês and Platô. The categorical logic is the means by which it can be effected.

It is to the definition of the theme and predicate that cate-

* "The truth is that a very small proportion even of distinguished students ever become proficient in logic, and that by far the greater part pass through the university without knowing anything at all of the subject. I do not mean that they have not learned by rote a string of technical terms, but that they understand absolutely nothing whatever of the principles of the science. I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford will censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply that such is the truth, and that I think too well of and know far too well the University in which I have been employed in various academical occupations above a quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth." **

"Now if a very large proportion of these persons neither are nor think themselves at all benefited by their (so-called) logical education, and if many of them treat and study with contempt, and represent it as a mere tissue of absolute and empty jargon, which it is a mere waste of time to attend to, let any one judge what conclusions respecting the utility of the study and the wisdom of the University in upholding it, are likely to be the result."—Preface to *Elements of Logic*, by RICHARD WHATELY, D. D.

gorical logic is particularly applicable. For it is in these definitions that error chiefly exists. We see by the text-books that logic is, in some, declared to be the science—in others, the *art*, of reasoning; while in many it is said to be both a science and art. And reason is said to be a faculty of the mind. These assumptions are all fallacies, discernible at first sight; for if logic is a science, it cannot be an art; and if an art, it cannot be a science; and if either, it cannot be both. Then reason is not a faculty. Neither is the mind an active power, independent and unaffected by surrounding influence.

The world, a panorama;
Life, the moving power;
Man, the sport of fleeting change,
Blind to the passing hour.

When, at the threshold of the study, such fallacies are piled up, without scruple, what is to be expected throughout the curriculum? To say that logic is the science or art of reasoning is not a definition. That reason is a faculty of the mind is not a definition. The rule for definition is to analyse each noun or verb into its constituent roots, showing the derivation of said roots and their mathematical significance. Such conventional logic distorts the view and falsifies the truth. What else could be looked for, under the circumstances, than what actually happens; professional finesse and a beclouding of the popular conceptions of right and wrong; by which Christian morals and actual practice are in perpetual contradiction.

The formula for the logical process is the syllogism, which is a combination of three loges, the first of which, having a general theme, is postulated. The theme of the second is a particular of the theme of the first. And the theme of the third infers for its predication the predicate of the first. Thus:

The suprasensuous is immortal.
The idea is suprasensuous.
Ergo.—The idea is immortal.
Whatever is good is of the common category.
Justice is good.
Ergo.—Justice is of the common category.
Love is an intellectual emotion.
Eros is love.
Ergo.—Eros is an intellectual emotion.
The sensuous is mortal.
The eidea is sensuous.
Ergo.—The eidea is mortal.
Whatever is evil is of the dividual category.
Injustice is evil.
Ergo.—Injustice is of the dividual category.
Lust is a sensuous emotion.
Edonè is lust.
Ergo.—Edonè is a sensuous emotion.

The three first of the above syllogisms, it will readily be seen, are in the common category; while the three last are in the dividual category. The structure of both formulas is the same, notwithstanding. Every logis is perfect in itself; and, but for the *ergo*, or a similar accident, the interdependence, in a syllogism could not exist. The structure being the same, they are distinguished by their categorical difference only. That is, the theme and predicate of each logis require to be in the same category. If the theme is in the common category, the predicate must be in the same; and *vice versa*.

The argument, unlike the syllogism, is not categorical. Its formula consists of three propositions; of which the theme and predicates may not be even equivalents. The most familiar example of the process in an argument is the following, taken from the text-books:

A tyrant deserves death.
Cæsar was a tyrant.
Ergo.—Cæsar deserved death.

In this example the postulate asserts what is seemingly true; and what is accepted as true, though the definitions of the verbal symbols used are not mathematically limited. But, that Cæsar deserved death, is not a satisfactory argument; except, as has been said, it may be so to reasoners who place no value on mathematical definitions. In the first place, *tyrant* is an ambiguous term, because its derivation is uncertain; whether it is a patriarchal or cruel despot cannot be determined. A tyrant, besides, even though cruel, may exercise commendable severity under certain circumstances. And opinion is much divided on the merits of the concentrated authority, assumed and exercised by Cæsar, at a time when the Roman Empire was distracted by the ambitious aspirations of contending military chiefs. In this example, each of the three propositions is ambiguous. Again:

A man is an animal.
John is a man.
Ergo.—John is an animal.

Herein the themes and predicates are not equivalents. Each theme is a species, while each predicate is a genus. *Is*, the predicative conjunction, being an equation, is thus misapplied; because a species cannot be a genus, nor a genus a species. The example, however, is instructive as a contrast of the argument with the syllogism. This brings us to a comparison of

THE SCHOLAR VERSUS THE LITTERATEUR.

As the name scholar comes from *σχολή*, Skr. SCHALA, and signifies a *healer*, he is necessarily a student of the principles which are to be applied for the purpose of healing society. In order to acquire a knowledge of these principles, he has recourse particularly to the ancient schools of Greece, Krotona and Alexandria, and his companionship is found to be with Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zenon of Elea, Demokritos, Anaxagoras, Sokrates, Plato, Aristoteles, the Cynics, the Stoics, and Epikurus. By receding to the period when men were more zealous in the study of nature than of commerce, what were to be learned were the unsophisticated promptings of the intellect, untrammelled by worldly cares and the insatiable pursuits of gain. A scholar, therefore, is one who has made himself conversant with the suprasensuous teachings of the greatest and most profound thinkers of the ancient world.

A *litterateur*, as the verb implies, is a trader in the sphere of books; is more concerned with the popular authors of his own time, and more particularly of his own country; is a biographer, novelist, comedian, rhymester, historian and, withal, universal critic. Principles are of small account. Popularity is the desideratum. In this comparison, the distinctive marks and features of each are derived; of one, from the study of names; of the other, from the use of words. Hence:

THE PHILOSOPHER VERSUS THE SOPHIST;

between whom there is not only no resemblance and no communication either in method or design; but on the contrary, a mutual estrangement which no social circumstances can ever remove. The philosopher being a scholar and the sophist a *litterateur*, the one is virtually a recluse by choice, whereas the other seeks the public arena. The one cannot be understood because he makes use of suprasensuous names, the meaning of which the people cannot comprehend. The other addresses the multitude in popular language on sensuous subjects of everyday occurrence. The divergence is great. The aim on the one side is humanity embarrassed with all the difficulties of its remote accomplishment. On the other it is limited to the *Ego*, to myself, to the immediate rewards of literary effort.

As the fountain of religious and moral truth, and the source from which the principles of political science and government are derived, Dialectic is entitled to the first place in the estimation of every scholar who seeks for a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of nature. Surrounded on all sides by fleeting appearances and bewildered by the uncertain concatenation of causes and effects, the tendency ever is to peep behind the curtain that conceals the unknown from the world of sense. The enigmas of generation, of life and death, of an overwhelming Providence, of an hereafter, rise up unceasingly, like phantoms before our view. The past, the present and the future are shrouded in darkness. Is there one habitable globe, or are there many? Is this earth six thousand years old or six millions? Was there an original creation? A Creator? Or only a permanent inherent force? Does design presuppose intelligence? Does intelligence presuppose organisation? To all such questions the Sphinx turns a deaf ear and preserves an eternal silence. Groping our way in the labyrinth of doubt, beclouded by ignorance, we at last have recourse to the wise men of olden times who were reputed to be the depositories of sacred lore, the astronomers, geometers, interpreters of nature and mythologists. We ransack the archeological remains of Egypt, Assyria, of the Medes and Persians, of China, of India and Greece. Hopefully indeed, but retarded at every step, less by the obscurity of their traditions than by the incompatible nature of our scholastic training with the interpretation of the fundamental truths to be found in their sacred books.

It is necessary, therefore, at this stage of the subject, to guard the student against the stereotyped custom of viewing ancient mythology through modern conventional habits of thought. With us, the young man who has passed through the university curriculum and obtained his degrees, goes straightway into the world, to prey on his fellow-creatures in order to enrich himself. As a barrister, physician, ecclesiastic or politician, his fitness is measured by the lucrativeness or money-value of his professional practice. The university curriculum, as well as the whole preparatory training is directed to this one special object. Reading, writing and arithmetic are taught in the elementary drill, for the purpose of enabling people to buy and sell. They are thereby endowed with a double facility, which enables them to overreach and to avoid being overreached in their business-intercourse with each other. The classical graduate, less vulgarly, displays the practices and arts of his profession with finesse that eludes popular criticism. But, in the one case, as in the other; in fact in all national life, the commercial value of knowledge, of science and moral culture is a conspicuous feature of the teaching and habits of modern times. Compare with this the end sought to be attained by the development of the intellect among the ancient Egyptians and Asiatics. There is a difference of circumstances, of course, in the two periods, which is not to be overlooked; also contrary advantages and disadvantages particular to each, with no disparagement or merit to one more than to the other. For, in the progress of human development each stage has its appropriate conditions; and the scientific commercial period, though deficient in its moral tendencies, being a transition-state, possesses all the requirements appropriate to the successive stage which is to complete the moral purpose. Setting aside anomalies that are thus the inseparable accompaniments of a rudimentary state of society, or of an advanced civilisation, what alone is remarkable is the difference of the object sought to be attained by intellectual culture, in each case—a difference that in a moral point of view places the ancient mythologists far in advance of any class of thinkers in after-time, not excepting those of the age in which we live. Platō, true to his mythological concep-

tions, limits the proper use of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy to the discovery of the fixity and harmony of the natural laws, in order to be able to copy their conditions, so as to be able to produce a similar fixity and harmony in the laws of society. The teaching of arithmetic for the purpose alone of traffic, he severely condemns. Among the Egyptians and Asiatics, the use of culture was to elevate the soul from a sensuous to a moral life. This could be accomplished more by the astronomers, who made use of arithmetic and geometry than by any other class. And, as the sacerdotal orders were composed chiefly of the astronomers, they were consequently the custodians and guides in all that was considered valuable of a moral nature. The aim of these sacerdotalists was not, as is vulgarly supposed, to bolster up a commercial faith in a one-sided dogmatism. Whatever the external ceremonial might be which the circumstances rendered indispensable, there was an honesty and truthfulness in the investigations of natural phenomena which enabled them to determine what is universal from what is particular, what is common from what is individual, and thereby to arrive at a clear discernment of noumenal truth. Accordingly, the Asiatic mythology rests on an undisputed noumenal basis, older than the most ancient traditions. What is true of any particular form of religion, is true because it is mythological. What is not mythological in religion, is not true. If modern ecclesiastics could be made to perceive this fundamental truism, the polemics of the so-called Christian sects might be dispensed with; and the religion of Christ could be made to assert its proper claims, divested of the crude and contradictory drapery with which it is on every side dishonored. The point of the contrast which it is necessary here to note is: that whereas the mythological ecclesiastics of the Ancient World were, in culture, transcendently above the ordinarily educated mind of their respective nationalities, the ecclesiastics of the present age are on a level only with the ordinary herd of book-makers; and are scarcely able to stand their ground or to defend their doctrines against the assaults of the scientists. This is a pitiable contrast, but a contrast that must be kept in view, in a comparison between the upholders of mythological truths and the advocates of dogmatic error. In the study of Dialectic, the student is required, for the reasons stated, to disabuse his mind of the false impressions acquired by erroneous conventional teaching. Above all, and it cannot be too often repeated, he must guard against the invariable custom of measuring the universal by the gauge constructed from a individual and opinionated standing-point.

The study of nature, according to the dialectic object which it is intended to serve, has two different modes of procedure; one is limited to science as an end, the other makes use of science as a means. Corresponding with this latter object is the mode of procedure in Dialectic. Without standards of number and measure no progress in astronomy could have been made; in which case it is reasonable to suppose that the cultivation of mathematics was coeval with earliest astronomical observations. It is also conjecturable that a long prior period of time must have elapsed in merely gazing at the multiform wonders of the revolutions of the planets before that means could be devised to compute the limits and interdependence of their movements; also that a long probation of mathematical training must have preceded the determination of the principles afterward complied by Euklides, which formed the standard of measurement. These mathematicians and astronomers were not of one nation nor confined to one region in the Eastern hemisphere. Egypt is generally presumed to be the country in which astronomy was earliest developed. And judging by the monuments which still remain to attest the antiquity of Egyptian culture, in

claim to precedence might be reasonably conceded. Yet it would be rash to affirm, from these remains of art alone, that such a conclusion is altogether reliable. Mythology is as much opposed to judgments by sensuous appearances as to awards in the dispensation of justice by majorities. Platonism settles this point definitely. And as Platonism puts us in possession of the ideal standard of truth, we are necessitated in applying that standard, to look below the surface for evidences which may be more abiding than stones, mortar and hieroglyphic representations. The materialism of the Romans and their followers is as far removed from the idealism of the East and Greece as darkness is from light. Notwithstanding the truth of these remarks, there are other difficulties in the way of the investigation that, while disputing the claim of Egypt to astronomical precedence, are far from satisfactorily determining the question at issue. These difficulties consist in our inability to interpret aright the sacred books, traditions and relics of other peoples whose ancient monuments are less material, and more of an ideal character, such for example as the *Vedas*.

Europe having inherited the institutions and genius of the Romans, looks at the East from a Roman standing-point, judges of Eastern institutions by what is essentially Roman, and can see nothing in the spirit of Eastern wisdom, because what is there spiritual is not sensuously demonstrable. It would be unreasonable to question the merits of the investigations made by English, French, and German explorers concerning the ancient cults, particularly of India. Nevertheless, the existence of this difficulty must be admitted, and till it is removed no hope can be entertained of being able to interpret the genius that underlies the written and traditional records of those countries.

If the doctrine of the Metempsychosis was carried from India to Egypt, as is reasonably assumed, the inference would be that as the knowledge of astronomy precedes that of the metempsychosis, the cultivation of both mathematics and astronomy must have been earlier in India than in Egypt. The difficulty protrudes itself here, however, to baffle all attempts in the mean time at a satisfactory solution.

Though geometric studies were common in the East and not limited to one particular nation, the preparatory training and leisure required to prosecute them with success, could be possessed by only a comparatively few. And consequently the most highly-educated class of each country was exceedingly limited. It comprised everywhere, as already stated, the sacerdotal orders. The priests of Egypt, the Magi of Persia, the Brahmans, the Gymnosophists of India, and the custodians and interpreters of the sacred books of the Chinese were the geometricians; also the Celtic Druids in Europe. It is not to be supposed that there was no communication among the different orders, nor that each developed its geometric knowledge without the mutual assistance of the others. The testimony is conclusive in confirmation of the fact of a common mythology.

In those remote times the records and traditions of which are shut out by the lapse of ages from our view, science, theoretical and as far as might be practicable, was evidently within the domain of the religious orders. They were the esoterici and depositories of learning in its most exclusive acceptance. Their language was parabolic, because beyond their own sphere no other could have been comprehended. But the essence of these myths and parables constituted, as they constitute still, the only basis of true religion. For moral purposes a living faith was necessary, and this being in conformity with true opinion and the common judgment, derived from the principles of mythology, the end was attained in so far as it was practicable under the circumstances by moulding

the habits and institutions, without committing so grave a mistake as to encourage the right of interpretation before that the dialectical faculty could be fully energised. By viewing aright the natural development of humanity, we perceive that idealism was a trust confided to a small class or caste who had intellect sufficient to comprehend that dialectically it is the receptacle of divine revelation, designed for the ultimate happiness of the whole human family. Like the germ in the seed, or the soul in the body, it is more valuable, though invisible, than the sensuous conceptions with which it is enveloped. It is slow in its progress to maturity. It has successive crises at distinct stages in its course, each of which, though apparently no improvement on its predecessor, is, nevertheless, in reality a gigantic stride toward the consummation of a vast and beneficent plan. The mythology of Asia, compared with the civilisation of Europe, resembles the relation of the fixed to the changeable. It is in the category of SAME, while the civilisation of Europe is in the category of OTHER. They are both equally necessary. And the order in which they stand, in precedence and subsequence as to time, is the necessary order of progression. Mythology, like the psychic germ, comes first. Civilisation, being the conflict of sensuous instincts, follows afterward. The object of civilisation is to shake the soil of popular sensuousness and break it up into fragments, so as to prepare it for the reception of the energised divine seed. In the present European civilisation no trace of mythology is discernible. In it idealism has no place whatever. It is absolutely unperceived. The spectacle is a conflict of ecclesiastical dogmas, professional devices and class-interests that give to the aspect of society a by no means prepossessing or hopeful appearance. Yet such a state of strife and anarchy is a necessary stage in the progress of human development. The masses, through scientific discoveries applied to commerce, learn to read, to think, and to assert their political rights. With the expansion of the public mind is its application to discover wherein lies the means for the attainment of the common good. And this may be said to be the praiseworthy object not only of standard writers of eminence but of the public press of Europe at the present day. In the midst of this moral darkness of civilisation, the popular soul aspires after something more akin to the divine, to the realisation of its hopes for the bettering of the conditions under which life is held upon earth. But to all its appeals civilisation can give no satisfactory answer. It never can, because it is only the geometric link between the sensuous and suprasensuous. Civilisation does its own work. As in other spheres, it cannot do that which is not within its province. The civic and the moral have two distinct functions. Science is the means, as has been said, for the accomplishment of the one; Dialectic for that of the other. The moral soul which has yet to enter Europe, uncontaminated by Judaism, must come from Asia. To be effective it must retain its mythological dress, and be heralded by Platonic interpreters.

The object of these remarks is to indicate on the one hand the circumstances under which the wise men and prophets of the Ancient World were limited in every country to one superiorly-educated class or caste; the necessity that such should have been the case; and the advantages accruing to posterity therefrom; and on the other hand, to mark the contrast between Eastern mythology and the civilisation of Europe, with the view of exhibiting the comparative inferiority of the corresponding European class or caste in relation to the general culture of the rest of the population. For in whatever light the modern sacerdotal order is to be regarded, as an instrument for the elevation of the national mind, nothing can compensate for a reputation of comparative inferiority. When it

considered that Dialectic is the completion of intellectual culture, and that the Church is or ought to be the exponent of the most solemn truths relating to the past, the present and the future, it will readily be considered that its prestige, in the altered circumstances, can rest permanently on no other basis than the popular veneration accorded to profound learning, attested by practical and undisputed evidences that it is in reality what it professes to be.

Dialectic being, as Platō says, the completion of intellectual culture, it is the process by which the divine will is to be communicated to mankind; by which the chasm that separates the mortal from the immortal is to be bridged, and the earth to become what it was originally intended it should become—a paradise, the abode of human angels having corporeal forms, but possessed of immortal souls.

REMARKS BY MEMBERS.

THE PRESIDENT.—I think it doubtful whether such a paper on the subject of Dialectic has ever been written on this continent. It is refreshing to hear one who stands on the plane of the supersensible and maintains all though his discourse the distinction between the Sensible and the Supersensible, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the Apparent and the Real. It is all right that there should be the two determinations of thought in man. Our business is to learn to distinguish the two, and to see through the phenomenal to the essential nature of things. This is Dialectic.

DOCTOR S.—Mr. Dallas seems to say that there is no such thing as Dialectic in this age,—no thought about other than sensible things. What shall we call this Akadēmē and similar organisations? Indeed, there seems to me to be a very decided tendency of thought to spiritual things. Mr. Dallas says again that the true Wisdom is incommunicable, except through the use of ancient myths and symbols. I think that much can be done by the wise use of means in communicating and inculcating the truth. How shall we arrive at Dialectic insight, except by means of logical methods or sensible demonstration?

MR. W.—I do not like this way of using a ladder and then throwing it away and refusing to acknowledge it as a means to the ascent. This, it seems to me, is what they do who talk about Dialectic insight as something to be arrived at by other than sensible and ordinarily appreciable means, which we call *Education*.

DOCTOR P.—We are all taught that the natural is first, and afterward the spiritual. How is the Dialectic insight to be arrived at, if not by logic and the use of reason?

THE PRESIDENT.—The eyes of all are not alike open to the vision of spiritual things. Divine truths are not communicable from man to man except with those who are first born of the spirit, through the instrumentalities of Divine Providence. He whose spiritual eyes are opened stands in the true light of life and is able to discern the real through the apparent.

MISS H.—Does Mr. Dallas place reason and its logic in the sensible category; or does he mean what the Germans call "the Pure Reason?"

THE PRESIDENT.—I understand him to place the *argumentative* reason and its logic in the category of sensible things; because that by it the worse may be made to appear the better cause. Any thing may be proved or disapproved by the logic of such reason. We have a higher faculty, by means of which we arrive at the incontrovertible; and this, I take it, is what the German metaphysicians mean by "the Pure Reason."

MR. B.—Are we to understand from the essayist that Homer is to be read historically or mythically?

THE PRESIDENT.—Mr. Dallas evidently holds that the works of Homer are mythical in their essential significance. The conflict and combat of the sensible and supersensible natures in Man are representatively portrayed by the drama.

MR. B.—I do not see how the alphabet can have any such fixed significance as numbers?

THE PRESIDENT.—There is more than the human element of invention in the formation of language. It is, however, too large a question to be dealt with briefly.

MISS F.—Our chief difficulty with the paper, perhaps, is owing to our want of familiarity with the author's habits of thought. Yet I never hear the subject of Dialectic discussed, without being obliged to return to Platō the Master, for assurance that it is not something too difficult to understand. His method is different from that of all other philosophers. He is never *definitional*. He is always willing to look at one thing at a time and from all points of view with the utmost candor and simplicity. There is an Art or technic as well as Science of Dialectic.

TAYLORIANA.

[We are indebted to the kindness of R. F. Sketchley, Esq., the scholarly and public-spirited Assistant Keeper of the South Kensington Museum, London, England, for the following valuable letters and documents, all hitherto inedited (except possibly one) of and relating to the illustrious Thomas Taylor. We note with pleasure that the interest in the great Platonist and his writings is steadily increasing. There is a growing demand for his works. They command high prices, and a desire exists to know something of the personal life of one who devoted all his time and energies to the study and dissemination of the philosophy of the Divine Platō, justly named the high-priest of Wisdom.]

In the Dyce Library of the Museum is a copy of the *Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians*, London, 1809. On half title is this manuscript note: "Only twenty-five copies of this work were printed. (Signed) THOMAS TAYLOR."

In the same Library are the following books which belonged to Taylor:

1. Andronicus Rhodius, *Ethicorum Nicomacheorum Paraphrasis, cum Interpretatione Danielis Heinsii*, Gr. et Lat. Lugd. Batav., 1617. On the title-page is the autograph of Thomas Taylor, and on the fly-leaf opposite in his handwriting: "This is a rare edition of the Paraphrase of Andronicus, and contains some Tracts at the end which are wanting in the Cambridge Edition of this book, 8vo, 1679."

2. M. Capella, Martiani Minei Capellæ . . . *de Nuptiis Philologiæ et Septem Artibus Liberalibus*, Lugd., 1617. On the title-page: "Thomas Taylor, with his Manuscript Notes." On the fly-leaf opposite, in his handwriting: "This edition is not noticed by Fabricius in his *Bibliotheca Latina*. T. T." There are one or two marginal notes, and at the end three pages of manuscript notes by Taylor.

3. *Rudimenta Joannis Despaunterii Ninevitæ*. Parisiis, ex officina Roberti Stephani, 1583. On the title-page is the autograph of Thomas Taylor, and opposite, on the inside of the cover: "This is a rare book, and the translation contained in it of Porphyry *On the Categories of Aristotle*, is uncommonly scarce and valuable. This edition of Porphyry, 1548, does not appear to have been known to Fabricius, for it is not mentioned by him in his *Bibliotheca Græca*. T. T." (Bound up with this volume is *Porphyrii in Aristotelis Prædicamentis . . . Brevis Explanatio* . . . Edita Joanne Bernardo Feliciano, Autore. Parisiis, 1548.)

4. *Proclus, Eis tov tov Hlarōvros Tiauvov. In Platōnis Timæum Commentariorum Procli Libri*, Basil, 1534. On the title-page we find in Taylor's manuscript: "Ex Libris Thomæ Taylor, containing upwards of 1200 emendations made by him."

of the text of the *Commentaries* of Proclus on the *Timæus*, and 238 emendations of Proclus on the *Republic of Plato*." On the fly-leaf opposite is Mr. Dyce's manuscript note: "Collated perfectly. ALEXANDER DYCE. Bought at the sale of the library of my much-respected friend, Thomas Taylor." And again: "Another copy was sold which contained the same manuscript notes, less fairly and completely written; the present copy is the one which Taylor had rendered as he thought most complete."

5. *Procli Successoris Platonici in Platonis Theologiam Libri Sex.* Gr. et Lat. Hamburg, 1618. On the title page the following is written: "*Ex Libris Thomæ Taylor cum ejusdem ad Græcum textum emendationibus.*" [This inscription is in a different handwriting.] On a leaf at the beginning is this: "C. P. A. Dyce. Bought this Vol. which contains the manuscript notes of my old friend T. Taylor, at a sale by Sotheby, 1839." ["C. P."—Collated perfectly.]

The card of invitation to Mr. Taylor's funeral, received by Rev. Alexander Dyce, reads as follows:

"Rev'd Sir:

You are requested to attend the Funeral of the late Mr. Thomas Taylor from his late dwelling to Newington Church, on Friday, 6th Nov., 1835. A coach will call at half-past 10 o'clock, precisely.

Performed by W. Richardson, 12 Three Crown Square Row.
The favor of an answer will oblige."

On a scrap of paper found in Taylor's copy of *The Arguments of the Emperor Julian* are the following words in his handwriting: Thomas Taylor, "εραστής σφοδρός τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας ἧς πάντες ἄνθρωποι κρυφίως ὀρεδόνται."

LETTERS TO THE REV. ALEXANDER DYCE.

I.

My Dear Sir:

Mr. Cory, the author of *Ancient Fragments*, and his brother Dr. Cory, will be happy to meet you at my house to breakfast next Sunday, if convenient to you. They rise early, and generally breakfast with me at 9 o'clock. But I will fix a later hour, if the above time is not agreeable to you. Please to inform me of this, and also whether you are otherwise engaged on that day. Hoping that you are in good health, I remain with great esteem,

Yours very sincerely,

MANOR PLACE, NOV. 2d, 1834.

THOMAS TAYLOR.

II.

My Dear Sir:

Mr. Cory has promised, if the weather permits, to breakfast with me next Sunday, at 9 o'clock, and endeavor to bring his brother, the Dr., with him. As he will be happy to see you, I hope nothing will prevent your meeting him, except a prior engagement. Hoping you are in good health, I remain, with great esteem,

Yours very sincerely,

MANOR PLACE, DEC. 11th, 1834.

THOMAS TAYLOR.

III.*

My Dear Sir:

Accept my best thanks for your kind present. I much regret that it is not in my power to call on you, and thank you personally; but I trust that the cold weather which we may shortly expect, will give me strength sufficient to enable me to walk to Gray's Inn Square. In the meantime hoping it will not be long before I shall have the pleasure of seeing you at Walworth, I remain, with great esteem,

Yours most sincerely,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

IV.†

MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH, JAN. 14th, 1835.

My Dear Sir:

Many thanks for your transcript from Elmsley's edition of the *Œdip. Col.* of Sophocles. As my studies have been principally confined to the writings of the ancient philosophers, I was not aware that the sentence alluded to in your letter is to be found in Theognis, Valerius Maximus, Solinus, &c.; but it is strange that such verbalists

*There is no date to this letter. Mr. Dyce was then living at 9 Gray's Inn Square.

†Found within T. Taylor's translation of the *Phædros*.

as Burton and Brunck should have been ignorant that Plutarch in his work entitled *Consolation to Apollonius* has inserted an extract from a lost treatise of Aristotle in which this passage is given.

Hoping that I shall soon have the pleasure of seeing you in Manor Place, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

P. S. Suffer me to remind you of the following passage in one of the letters of Apollonius Tyaneus: "Ἐμοὶ πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἐστὶ φιλία· πρὸς μὲντοι ὁμοιοτάς ἢ γραμματιστάς ἢ τοιοῦτο γένος ἕτερον ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονῶν οὔτε νῦν ἐστὶ φιλία, μήτε ὕστερον ποτε γενόιτο."

V.*

Dear Sir:

I forgot to correct the two following typographical errors in the copy of Julian which you purchased of me, viz.: in p. 35, in the last line of the note to that page, *Olympiad* should be *Olympia*; and in p. 98, l. 6, *προβαταον* should be *προβάτειον*.

Hoping I shall soon have the pleasure of seeing you in Manor Place, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

MAY 11th, 1833.

THOMAS TAYLOR.

VI.†

My Dear Sir:

Many thanks for your exceeding kindness. I am glad to find that you speak favorably of the exposition which I lent you and which you have returned. Hoping that I shall soon see you after your return from Scotland, and wishing you in the mean time perfect health and success in all your undertakings, I remain with great esteem,

Yours most sincerely,

MANOR PLACE, April 8th, 1835.

THOMAS TAYLOR.

VII.

DEAR SIR:—My design in calling on you this morning, and likewise on the preceding morning, was to present you with the accompanying extracts, one of which relates to Shakespeare and the other to the poet Gray. The former of these, if you are not already acquainted with the passage, may be useful to you in your *Notes on Shakespeare*, and the latter will, I have no doubt, be used by Mr. Mitford in his edition of Gray.

I remain, with great esteem, your much obliged,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH, March 13th, 1833.

VIII.

DEAR SIR:—I enclose a notice of a work of mine, which has been recently printed through the patronage of Mr. Charles Attwood. It contains a most admirable defence of the dispensations of Providence, and a no less admirable development of the nature of evil. If you think fit to honor me by subscribing to this work, you can obtain a copy from Mr. Pickering. The great weakness from my late fall, under which I at present labor, prevents me from calling on you, but I shall be happy to see you whenever you can make it convenient to call on me. I remain with great esteem

Yours very sincerely,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH, Dec. 27th, 1833.

IX.

To the Editor of the *Examiner*:

SIR:—It is much to be regretted that any master of a great Grammar School should have been so shamefully ignorant of the philosophy and theology of the ancients, as not only to pervert the meaning of some of the finest passages in their writings, but calumniate what he did not understand. That this, however, has been the case, is evident from the following remarks on certain parts of the 13th edition of a work entitled: "*Epigrammatum Delectus ex omnibus tum Veteribus tum Recentioribus Poëtis, accurate decerptus, etc. In usum Scholæ Etonensis.*"

In the first place, on the following well-known lines of Virgil, viz.:

"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subfecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari."

The sagacious editor remarks: "Stultus qui hoc speret in hac mortali vitâ." If it is foolish for a man to hope that he shall obtain a knowledge of the causes of things, it is also foolish to assert that there is any such thing as Science; for there can be no Science with-

* Found within *The Arguments of the Emperor Julian*.

† Found within T. Taylor's translation of the *Phædros*.

out a knowledge of causes. Hence, Aristotle in the first book of his *Posterior Analytics*, observes: "that there are three conditions of true Science. 1st. That the cause of the thing which is the object of it must be known; or, in other words, that the middle term of a demonstrative syllogism must be the cause of the conclusion. 2d. That this cause must be compared with the effect, so that we may know it to be the cause of the conclusion; and 3d. that this conclusion must have a necessary existence." It is likewise equally ridiculous to assert with this editor, that it is impossible for a man in this mortal life to rise superior to fear and Fate; for there are innumerable instances of the possibility of accomplishing this, not only among the ancient philosophers, and particularly the Stoics, but also among magnanimous men in all nations of modern times.

In the next place, the remark of this editor on the following celebrated lines of Lucan, viz.: "Victis causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni," shows that he was deficient in a knowledge of classical authors. For his observation on this line is: "Nobilis at horribilis impietas, ex qua cognosci potest, quam Deos suos Ethnici parvi fecerunt." The following extract from the fourth book of Boetius' *De Consolatione Philosophiæ* incontrovertibly proves the truth of my assertion. For Philosophy there says to Boetius: "Nam ut pauca, quæ ratio valet humanâ de divinâ profunditate perstringam; de hoc quem tu justissimum et æque servantissimum putas, omniâscienti providentiâ diversum videtur. Et victicem quidem causam Diis, victam vero Catoni placuisse familiaris noster Lucanus admonuit." Here Lucan is not only said by Philosophy to be her familiar, but she adopts what is asserted by him in this line, as perfectly conformable to her own conceptions. For Divinity who knows all things, not only what is past and present, but also whatever is future, knew that the conquering cause, in the battle of Pharsalia, would ultimately be the better of the two, tho' it appeared otherwise to Cato, in consequence of the shallowness of human compared with the unfathomable depths of divine knowledge. Besides, Lucan was a Stoic, and no man who is at all acquainted with the doctrine of the Stoics, would dare to accuse them of impiety, unless he possessed the most consummate impudence and fraud. Numerous instances might be adduced to prove the truth of this assertion, from the writings of Seneca, Marcus Antoninus, and Epictetus; but the two following extracts from the Discourses of these philosophers, as preserved by Arrian will be sufficient:*

"I am continually more and more disposed to acquiesce in whatever may take place: for I think that what God wills is far more excellent than what I will. I accord with and adhere to him as a servant and an attendant. I am impelled to and desire that which he desires; and in short my will co-operates with his." Again, Epictetus addressing himself to the Deity says: "Use me during the remainder of my life for whatever purpose you please. I accord with you, I am equally disposed. I refuse nothing that may appear expedient to you. Lead me wherever you are willing I should go; invest me with whatever garment you please. Do you wish me to fly from my country, to stay where I am, to be a ruler, to lead a private life, to be rich, to be poor, —in all these conditions, I shall justify you to others, in what you have done."

On the following lines from the 3d *Satire* of Persius, viz.:

"Discite, ô miseri, et causas cognoscite rerum;
Quid sumus, et quidnam victuri gignimur; ordo
Quis datus?—Quem te Deus esse
Jussit; et humana qua parte locatus es in re."

The editor observes "Horum nihil sciebat ipse, qui hæc dixit." Fortunately, the young Etonians will find an antidote to this stupid remark in the notes on this passage in the Delphin Edition of Persius. The editor in what he here asserts, and in his preceding observations, appears to have considered the intellect of the ancients to have been equally shallow with his own.

In the last place, on a sentence ascribed to Plato, viz.: *αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος*, the author of the *Delectus* remarks, "Sensus est nihil

* The compiler of this *Epigrammatum Delectus* was most probably a Parson; for nothing is more common than harangues from the pulpit against the ancient philosophers. The apathy of the Stoics in particular, is attacked by the clergy with all that ignorant and malignant acrimony, for which in general they have always been notorious. I am sorry to add, that this ignorance of the true meaning of the apathy of the Stoics, is not confined to the clergy, but extends to the greater part of literary men, and through both these has been the source of vulgar defamation. If, however, Diogenes Laertius had been more attentively read, it would have been more generally known, that according to the Stoics there are two kinds of *apathy*, the one pertaining to the wise man, which they inculcated, and which signified an *irreprehensible life*; but the other equivalent to the *hard and unfeeling*, which they rejected. [A Greek quotation from Diogenes Laertius is here omitted.]

egregium præstari posse ab uno homine."* The only apology that can be made for this most egregiously stupid interpretation, which gives the lie to all biography both ancient and modern, is that the Grammarian who made it considered only the poverty and imbecility of his own mental powers, and concluded that those of all other men were equally inefficient to the performance of any thing transcendently great.†

It would have been well, if this Grammatical Etonian tutor had imitated the modesty of the Grammarian mentioned by Sextus Empiricus in his treatise *Adversus Mathematicos*. p. 383, Edit. Steph. See my octavo *Plato*, p. 260.

PHILAETHES.

[This letter was found in Taylor's copy of his translation of the *Phædros* of Plato. I cannot say whether it ever appeared in the *Examiner*. Probably it has never before been printed.]

LIFE OF HAI EBN YOKDAN, THE SELF-TAUGHT PHILOSOPHER.

BY ABUBACER IBN TOPHAIL.

[Translated from the original Arabic by Simon Ockley. Revised and modernised by W. H. Steele.]

(Continued.)

He now entered upon another speculation by which he perceived that although the parts of his body were many, yet they were so conjoined as to form one body; that the difference of these parts consisted only in their peculiar modes of action, and that this diversity proceeded from that animal spirit, the nature of which he had previously ascertained. He knew that his spirit was one in essence; was in reality the substance of his being; and that the members of the body serve this spirit as instruments. From this he perceived his own essence to be *one*. From a consideration of the various species of animals he found that each individual formed unity or *one*. With regard to the members of each distinct species, he observed that they were exactly alike in the shape of their parts, both within and without; that their apprehensions, motions and inclinations were similar, and that their visible differences were inconsiderable as compared to the many aspects of their agreement. From this he concluded that the spirit which actuates any species is one and the same; and although it may be distributed among the several members of a species, yet, if it were possible to concentrate into a single receptacle, the distributed portion of this spirit it would be one in essence, or all the same thing.

By this mode of contemplation he perceived that a whole species is *one*; and that the multiplicity of individuals in the same species is like the multiplicity of parts in the same person; *i. e.*, not many, but *one*. From attentive observation of the several species of animals, he perceived that *sensation* and *nutrition* and the power of free movement, were common to them all. These actions he was assured was all very proper to the animal spirit. He, therefore, concluded that it is only one and the same animal spirit which actuates all living creatures whatsoever; although there are differences in it peculiar to the several species. For instance, he reasoned if you divide a quantity of water by pouring a portion of it into sev-

* The meaning of Plato here I conceive to be this, that the man who may be considered as a single being, either from greatly excelling or from being greatly inferior to the rest of mankind is, properly speaking, not a man; for he is in the former case something more, and in the latter something less, than man. Or Plato might mean in this sentence the same thing as Herakleitos when he said "that the man who can live by himself separated from all human society, is either a God or a beast."

† The interpretation here given by the Etonian sciolist, reminds me of an anecdote respecting a certain Scotch LL. D., and the celebrated Porson. At a conversazione of Sir Joseph Banks, the former said to the latter: "I believe, Mr. Porson, we know little or nothing about Greek accents." To this the latter replied: "Sir, if you had spoken in the singular instead of the plural number, you would probably have been right."

eral separate vessels, the liquid in one vessel may possibly be warmer than that in another, and so each portion of a different temperature from all the others; yet it is still the same water, and every degree of heat and cold in this water may represent the specific differences which exist in animals. As the water is one and the same, so is that animal spirit *one*, although in some sense there may be a multiplicity. Reasoning thus, he looked upon the whole species of living creatures to be all *one*.

He next began to contemplate the different species of plants, and observed that the individuals of every species were alike in their boughs, leaves, flowers, fruits and manner of growth. Comparing these plants with animals he found that there must exist some one thing or property common to all of them, which is the same to them that the animal spirit was to the living creature, and that with respect to this common property they are all *one*. Whereupon he concluded that their nature must be one and the same by reason of the similarity of their nourishment and growth.

Upon further consideration of the animal and vegetable kingdoms he found that they are both alike in their nutrition and growth, but that the animals excelled the plants in sensation and apprehension. He had noticed something akin to sensation in plants from the fact that some flowers turn toward the sun, and all plants extend their roots in the direction from which their nourishment proceeds. From this he concludes that animals and plants are *one* and the same with respect to that *one thing*, which is common to them both and which is the more perfect in the one than in the other.

He now proceeds to the consideration of those bodies which have neither sense, nutrition nor growth, such as stones, earth, air and flame. These, he perceived, had each of them three dimensions—length, breadth and thickness. Their differences he found consisted only in this: that some were colored; others not; while some again were cold and others warm. He observed, also, that they were subject to change of temperature, as that those which were warm grew cold, and the reverse. He perceived the rarefaction of water into vapor and that vapors again are condensed into water. He saw that such things were burned; were reduced to coals, ashes, flame and smoke; and that if the latter in its ascent were intercepted by any other body or surface, it at once accumulated or solidified and thus becomes like other gross earthly substances. From these considerations it appeared to him that all things are in reality *one*, though indeed multiplied and diversified in a great degree.

His next thoughts turned upon the identity of that common principle in which the sameness of the animals and plants consists. He perceived that it must be some body, like those bodies which have a three-fold dimension, as length, breadth and thickness, and that whether it were hot or cold, it was similar to those bodies which have neither sense nor nutrition, and differed from them only in those operations which arise from the organic parts of animals and plants. He conceived that these operations were not essential, but were derived from something else; so that if those operations were communicated to those other bodies they would be like this. Considering it abstractedly with regard to its essence only, and as stripped of those operations, which at first sight seemed to flow from it, he perceived that its resemblance to those other bodies was perfect. Hence he concluded that all bodies, both those with and those without life, and those which have motion, as those without that power, are *one*. He knew that the actions of some of these bodies proceeded from their organic parts, but as to whether these actions were inherent or essential, or were derived from some external agency, he could not yet determine. From these reflections

upon the nature of bodies, he concluded that all of them, both animate and inanimate, were in reality only *one*.

Entertaining this opinion for some time, he began to speculate upon the tendency which he observed in all bodies, both animate and inanimate, to ascend or descend. Smoke, flame and air, for instance, have a tendency upward; while water, earth, and particles of animals and plants, tend downward. He perceived that none of these bodies were ever free from one or the other of these tendencies; and that they would not remain at rest, or stationary, unless opposed by some other body. For instance, a stone in its fall is stopped by the solidity and hardness of the earth, else it would continue to descend. Smoke ascends, but if intercepted by any solid body, will divide both to the right and left, and still ascend, the air not being of proper density to restrain it. So when a leathern bottle is filled with air and corked, if placed under water it will rise to the surface where it rests; its propensity to ascend having ceased.

He next sought for a body destitute of both these motions, or a tendency toward them, but this he could not find. The reason of this enquiry was his desire to ascertain the true nature of body as such, independent of all quality, from whence arises multiplicity or diversity of kinds. But he found this task too difficult for him and he proceeded to examine those bodies which have the fewest qualities, and could find none of them void of one of these two, viz.: *heaviness* and *lightness*. He proceeded to consider the nature of these two properties and to examine whether they belonged to body, *quatenus* body, or to some other quality superadded to body. Now it seemed plain to him that *gravity* and *levity* did not belong to body as such, for if so, then no body could subsist without both of them; on the contrary, we find heavy bodies, which are void of all lightness, and also some light bodies, void of all heaviness; and yet without doubt they are both bodies. In each of these there is something superadded to corporeity, by which they are distinguished one from the other, otherwise they would be both one and the same thing in every respect. From this it plainly appeared that the essence of both heavy and light bodies was composed of two things; the one, corporeity, being common to both; the other being gravity in the one and levity in the other; both these being superadded to the essence of corporeity. In this manner he considered other bodies, both animate and inanimate; their prime essence he found being corporeity, and in some, one thing or more being superadded to it. He thus attained a notion of the forms of bodies according to their differences. These were his first ideas appertaining to the spiritual world, for these forms are not the objects of *sense* but are apprehended only by intellectual speculation. Among other things of this nature which he discovered was that animal spirit which is sealed in the heart, and it appeared to him that this must necessarily have some quality superadded to its corporeity, which rendered it capable of those wonderful actions, different sensations and profound apprehension of things. He believed that this quality must be its form by which it is distinguished from other bodies, (and this the philosophers term the *sensitive soul*). And so in plants; that which was in them the same that radical moisture was in beasts, was their *form*, which the philosophers call the *vegetative soul*. He reflected that all inanimate bodies have some quality peculiar to themselves, by the power of which they perform such actions as are proper to them; and that this peculiarity was their *form*, which the philosophers denominate *Nature*. Now when he had ascertained that this *animal spirit*, upon which he had been so intently employed, was compounded of corporeity and some other quality superadded to it, he immediately applied himself to the consideration of this superadded

quality, (which is the same, as that we call the *soul*.) the nature of which he earnestly desired to know. He began this enquiry by considering bodies, *not as bodies*, but as endued with *forms*, from which necessarily flow those properties by which they are distinguished one from another. Proceeding upon this idea he perceived that all bodies had one form in common from which proceeded one or more actions, that there were some of these bodies, while agreeing with all others in one common form, had still another form superadded to it from which some actions proceeded. He found that a third class of bodies existed, which having all the forms of the others, yet possessed a third superadded form, from which also certain peculiar actions proceeded. For instance, all terrestrial bodies, as earth, stones, minerals, plants, animals, and all heavy bodies, are similar in the form from which flows the property of descending continually, while descent is unopposed. If moved upward they will by the power of their form tend downward, if left unsupported. Again, animals and plants have a second form superadded, from which proceed *nutrition* and *accretion*. The meaning of nutrition is that process by which a nourished body supplies the matter to itself, which in the course of nature is continually wasting from that body; and accretion, or growing, is a motion according to the three dimensions—length, breadth and thickness in due proportions. These two actions are common to animals and plants, and do without doubt spring from that common form which we call the *vegetative soul*. Now animals, while they have the first and second forms in common with the other bodies, have still a third form superadded, from which arise sensation and local motion. He perceived also that every particular species of animals had some property that distinguished it from all other species, and that this peculiar property superadded to the form held in common with all other species, created the difference between them. He observed also that this was true with regard to the several kinds of plants.

It was evident to him that the essences of some sensible bodies had more qualities superadded to their corporeity than others. He reasoned that those essences which had fewer qualities would be more easy for him to understand than those essences comprehending a greater number. He therefore endeavored to get a true notion of the form of some body, whose essence was the most simple. He perceived that the essence of animals and plants consisted of many properties, because of the great variety of their operations; for which reason he deferred enquiry into their forms. The parts of the *earth* he saw differed very much, some being more simple in their constituent elements than others. He observed for instance that the essence of water, fire and air are not composed of many qualities, which is evident from the paucity of those actions which arise from their forms. Now he had a notion before this that these bodies might be changed into one another, and that therefore they possessed some one thing in common; and this common quality he concluded to be corporeity. This common element, he perceived, should be perfectly separable from those qualities which form the distinctive differences between bodies, and that it should, therefore, be neither heavy nor light, hot nor cold, moist nor dry, because none of these distinguishing qualities were common to all bodies, and therefore could not belong to body as such. He considered that if it were possible to find a body in which there was no other form superadded to corporeity, it would contain none of these qualities, nor indeed any other, but that common to all bodies. He now endeavored to find some adjunct or property common to all bodies, both animate and inanimate, but he could find nothing of this nature, only he conceived some notion of extension.

This he found was common to all bodies, in that they all possess length, breadth and thickness. He concluded, therefore, that this property *belonged to body as body*.

THE AMERICAN AKADEMÉ.

The eighth monthly meeting of the American Akademie was held at the residence of Dr. Jones, the President, Jacksonville, Illinois, on Tuesday evening, March 18th, 1884. The attendance was large. Fourteen new members were elected.

The paper of the evening was from Mrs. Lizzie Jones. It was a review of Professor Drummond's work on *National Law in the Spiritual World*. The leading idea of the essay was the unity of all law. The relative character of our understanding of this was illustrated by the ancient nations in regard to eclipses which the light of Science has dissipated. In strict analogy, the dense body of ignorance and doubt now interposed between our vision and the clear light of the spiritual world may yet be dissipated by the light to be afforded by scientific demonstration. The writer also treated of the immanence of spirit and the vehicular nature of sensible forms.

An animated discussion followed. Several assumed that what we know of law in the spiritual world is merely inferred from our knowledge of natural things; and insisted that spiritual matters should be subjected to tests as rigid as those of chemical analysis. A man's morality is affected by his physical condition.

In reply it was pleaded that immorality has much to do with the morbid condition of the body.

MR. WOLCOTT.—William Blake claimed open vision of the supernatural. "I do not see the external world," said he; "it is only a hindrance." Like Blake, there is more reality to me in the glorious company of the angelic hosts; but like Paul, I am conscious of the two natures within me.

MR. MCELROY.—I would not speak of natural law operating in the spiritual world. Law is not an abstract somewhat outside of the operations of existence; it is the potency of those operations. The spiritual region is the plane of causes; the natural that of effects. I would, therefore, speak of the laws of spiritual life in and through and by means of the natural or sensible forms.

THE PRESIDENT.—We know more of spirit, which is ourself, than of nature, which is our other self. We know more of Mind than of Matter, which is further off from us.

MR. BULLARD.—Can we know anything of Mind apart from Matter?

THE PRESIDENT.—Corporeality is a postulate of universal existence. Existence necessitates embodiment of some sort. The alternations of Matter may be infinite. There are, as St. Paul says, "bodies terrestrial and bodies celestial."

NINTH MEETING.—The Akademie met as before, April 15th, 1884. The journal was read and approved.

The President briefly addressed the meeting. This association is not *local* but *CONTINENTAL*. Its aim is to find out persons of kindred thought and appreciations. Already its membership extends from Maine to California and from Canada to the Danish West Indies. We shall continue to maintain this character. We do not claim to be an Akademie of Philosophers, but desire to be regarded simply as students of Philosophy, united as disciples for mutual help.

Two letters were read by the Secretary. The first writer says: "By the aid of the interesting article in THE PLATONIST for March, I am able to comprehend the significance of the beautiful symbols that make the Certificate of Membership a source of inspiration. I hope to receive much assistance in my effort to recover my wings, by the help of which I am to go back to my kindred and friends. * * I am much pleased with THE PLATONIST. I shall watch with great interest the monthly reports of the meetings."

The other writer said: "I am not worthy to enter the temple where philosophic minds do congregate; but standing reverently at the door, I wish earnestly that the best and the worthiest may find utterance there."

A poem, entitled *Failure*, by Mrs. Helen Campbell, was read and greatly admired.

The paper of the evening was contributed by the Rev. Doctor Campbell, of Carrollton, Illinois, upon *The Aristotelian Philosophy and Its Influence upon Subsequent Thought*. Mr. Campbell, in reply to enquiries, stated that the difference between this philosophy and that of Plato was in the aims rather than in the doctrine. The purpose of Aristoteles was to be scientific; adhering to Truth in its essence, rather than in its form.

THE PRESIDENT.—In Platonism, without the subsistence of ideas, we can have no individuals. But Aristoteles grounds his pyramid earthward.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

No I.—The Platonist; Pearls of Wisdom; The Nature and Destiny of the Human Soul; The Spectator of the Mysteries, by Alexander Wilder: Philosophic Caste, by Dr. H. K. Jones; That Intelligibles are not External to Mind—also, Concerning The Good, by Plotinos, i.-v.; Life of Plato; The Concord School of Philosophy; Platonic Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul, by Hermeias, Part I.; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor; The *Phaidros* of Plato, I.; On Wisdom, by Archytas.

No II.—Pearls of Wisdom; That Intelligibles are not External to Mind—also, Concerning the Good, by Plotinos, vi.-xi.; Platonic Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul, by Hermeias, Part II.; Hymn to the Muses, by Proklos, translated by Edwin Arnold; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor, continued; Iamblichos on the Mysteries—Letter of Porphyrios, translated by Alexander Wilder; Platonic Technology, by Alexander Wilder; Book Reviews.

No. III.—Pearls of Wisdom; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor, continued; Life of Plato, concluded; Commentary of Proklos on the First *Alkibiades* of Plato, Introduction; The Last Words of Sokrates, by Alexander Wilder; On the Utility of the Mathematical and Metaphysical Sciences, by Thomas Taylor; Iamblichos on the Mysteries—Part I., ii., iii., iv.; That Intelligibles are not External to Mind—also, Concerning The Good, by Plotinos, xii., xiii.; Hipparchos on Tranquillity, etc.

No. IV.—Pearls of Wisdom; The Best Translation of Plato; On the Utility of the Mathematical and Metaphysical Sciences, by Thomas Taylor, concluded; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor, continued; Iamblichos on the Mysteries, Part I., i.; On the Necessity of Purification, and the Methods by which it may be Obtained, by Porphyrios; The Elements of Theology, by Proklos, i.-xiv.; The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, by the Editor.

Nos. V., VI., VII., (Triple Number)—Pearls of Wisdom; The Eternity of the Soul—Its Pre-Existence, by Dr. H. K. Jones; Manuscripts

of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, by Thomas Wentworth Higginson; On the Necessity of Purification, and the Methods by which it may be Obtained, by Porphyrios, viii.-xxxvi.; Life of Hai ebn Yokdan, the Self-Taught Philosopher, by Abubacer ebn Tophail; The History of Hai ebn Yokdan; Enthiasm, by Alexander Wilder; Iamblichos on the Mysteries, I., v., vi.; The Plato Club of Jacksonville, Illinois, by Lewis J. Block; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor, continued; The Elements of Theology, by Proklos, xv.-xlviii.; Platonic Technology, by Alexander Wilder, continued; The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, by the Editor, continued; Hymn to the Rising Sun, by Thomas Taylor; On Dialectic, by Plotinos; Books and Periodicals.

Nos. VIII., IX., X. (Triple Number)—Pearls of Wisdom; On the Study of the Platonic Philosophy; Materialism of the Day, by Walter Lewin; On Magic, by Proklos; The Education and Discipline of Man—The Uses of the World we Live in, by Dr. H. K. Jones; The Elements of Theology, by Proklos, xlix.-lxxxvii.; Iamblichos on the Mysteries, I. vii.-xxi.; General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato, by Thomas Taylor, continued; On the Necessity of Purification and the Methods by which it may be Obtained, by Porphyrios, xxxvii.-lv.; concluded; The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, by the Editor, continued; On the Virtues, by Plotinos, i.-v.; The Dream, by Thomas Taylor; Celebration of the Birthday of Plato; Platonic Technology, by Alexander Wilder, continued; Book Reviews and Periodicals.

Nos. XI., XII. (Double Number)—Pearls of Wisdom; Life of Hai ebn Yokdan, the Self-Taught Philosopher, by Abubacer ebn Tophail, continued; On the Beautiful, by Plotinos, i.-ix.; Iamblichos on the Mysteries, II., i.-viii.; On the Virtues, by Plotinos, v.-vii., concluded; Selections from Ibn Badja, translated by Alexander Wilder, and Mlle. A. Peonnie; The Life and Works of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, by the Editor, concluded; The Elements of Theology, by Proklos, lxxxviii.-cvi., continued; Platonic Technology, by Alexander Wilder; Book Reviews.

VOL. II.

CONTENTS No. 1.

Salutatory: Works of Plotinos—Introduction by Marsilius Ficinus; Life of Hai ebn Yokdan, the Self-Taught Philosopher, by Abubacer ebn Tophail, *continued*; Hymn to the Artificer of the Universe, by Thomas Taylor; Psychometry, by William Q. Judge; Iamblichos: on the Mysteries, a new Translation, by Alexander Wilder, *continued*; The Scientists and the Philosophers, by Theron Gray; The Soul, by Alexander Wilder; Kabalistic Doctrine of Spirits, Part II, by Eliphas Levy; Book Reviews; The American Akademie.

CONTENTS No. 2.

The Symposium, or Banquet of Plato; Kabalistic Doctrine of Spirits, by Eliphas Levy, translated by a Fellow of the Theosophical Society, *continued*; The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas, etc., a Dissertation, by Thomas Taylor; Iamblichos: on the Mysteries, a new Translation, by Alexander Wilder, *continued*; School of Philosophy in Philadelphia, Pa.; The American Akademie.

CONTENTS No. 3.

Rabia; the "Scientia Scientiarum," by John R. Sutherland; the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas, by Thomas Taylor; the Human Soul; Death of Three Modern Hindu Sages, by Alexander Wilder; Workings of a Hindu Mind; the "Brethren," an Essay on the Essenes, by John F. Oakey; the Renewal of Isis, translation from the French, by Gen. A. Doubleday; Pre-Existence, a poem, by Paul H. Hayne; The American Akademie.

CONTENTS No. 4.

The Initiation of Plato, translated from the French for *The Kneph*, by John Yarker; Dialectic, by Angus Dallas, Toronto, Ontario, read before the American Akademie; Tayloriana; Life of Hai ebn Yokdan, the Self-Taught Philosopher, by Abubacer Tophail, *continued*; The American Akademie.

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The Rights of Brutes, 1792; Pausanias' Description of Greece, 1794, 1824; Answer to Dr. Gillies, 1804; Aristoteles' Physics, 1806; Aristoteles' Organon, 1807; Aristoteles On the Soul, etc., 1808; Proklos On Providence and Evil, 1481; Proklos on Timaios of Platon, about 1867. Also Nos. 15 and 16 of the *Pamphleteer*.

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To Our English Readers.

THE ADDRESS WANTED OF CHARLES WILLIAM JONES. (a grandson of Thomas Taylor, the Platonist), or any one of his family). In 1861 his address was: "Care of Mr. Jackson, 96 St. John-street Road, Islington E. C., London, Eng."

N. B.—A pamphlet edition of THE SOUL by A. Wilder has been printed. Price, 15 cents single copies.