

VOL. II.

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No. 12.

THE
PLATONIST.

An Exponent of Philosophic Truth.

EDITED BY

THOS. M. JOHNSON.

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*How' charming is Divine Philosophy!
Not harsh nor crabbed, as dull fools suppose;
But musical as Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.*

OSCEOLA, MO.

The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the Human Intellect and Heart."
Esoteric Christianity is identical with True Philosophy.

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OSCEOLA, MO., DECEMBER, 1885.

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HYMN TO ATHENA.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated by Thos. Taylor.

Daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, divine,
Propitious to thy votaries' prayer incline;
From thy great father's fount supremely bright,
Like fire resounding, leaping into light,
Shield-bearing goddess, hear, to whom belong
A manly mind, and power to tame the strong!
Oh, sprung from matchless might, with joyful mind
Accept this hymn; benevolent and kind!
The holy gates of wisdom by thy hand
Are wide unfolded; and the daring band
Of earth-born giants, that in impious fight
Strove with thy sire, were vanquish'd by thy might.
Once by thy care, as sacred poets sing,
The heart of Bakkhos, swiftly-slaughter'd king,
Was sav'd in aether, when, with fury fir'd,
The Titans fell against his life conspired;
And with relentless rage and thirst for gore,
Their hands his members into fragments tore;
But ever watchful of thy father's will,
Thy pow'r preserv'd him from succeeding ill,
Till from the secret counsels of his sire,
And born from Semele through heav'nly fire,
Great Dionysos to the world at length
Again appear'd with renovated strength.
Once, too, thy warlike axe, with matchless sway,
Lopp'd from their savage necks the heads away
Of furious beasts, and thus the pests destroy'd
Which long all-seeing Hekate annoy'd.
By thee benevolent great Hera's might
Was rous'd to furnish mortals with delight:
And through life's wide and various range 'tis thine
Each part to beautify with arts divine:
Enveloped hence by thee, we find
A demiurgic impulse in the mind.
Towers proudly rais'd, and for protection strong,
To thee, dread guardian deity, belong,
As proper symbols of th' exalted height
Thy series claims amidst the courts of light.
Lands are belov'd by thee to learning prone,
And Athens, O Athena, is thy own!
Great goddess, hear! and on my darken'd mind
Pour thy pure light in measure unconfin'd:—
That sacred light, O all-protecting queen,
Which beams eternal from thy face serene:
My soul, while wand'ring on the earth, inspire
With thy own blessed and impulsive fire;
And from thy fables, mystic and divine,
Give all her powers with holy light to shine.
Give love, give wisdom, and a power to love,
Incessant tending to the realms above;
Such as, unconscious of base earth's control,
Gently attracts the vice-subduing soul;
From night's dark region aids her to retire
And once more gain the palace of her sire;
And if on me some harsh misfortune press,
Remove th' affliction, and thy suppliant bless.
All-saving-goddess, to my prayer incline!
Nor let those horrid punishments be mine
Which guilty souls in Tartaros confine,
With fetters fast'ned to its brazen floors,
And lock'd by hell's tremendous iron doors.
Hear me, and save, for power is all thy own,
A soul desirous to be thine alone.

THE CHALDEAN ORACLES.

COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ANNOTATED

By THOMAS TAYLOR.

PART III. (CONCLUDED.)

Concerning fental Time:

CXX. Another time which is fental, and the leader of the empyrean world.—Prok. in Tim.

Concerning Time:

CXXI. Theurgists assert that Time is a god, and celebrate him as both older and younger, as a circulating and eternal god; as understanding the whole number of all the natures which are moved in the world; and, besides this, as eternal through his power, and of a spiral form.—Prok. in Tim.

Concerning the fental soul:

CXXII. Abundantly animating light, fire, ether, and the worlds.—Simplik. in Phys.

The speech of the Soul of the Universe respecting the fabrication of the world by Zeus:

CXXIII. I, soul, reside after the paternal cogitations, hot, and animating all things; for the Father of gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body.—Prok. in Tim.

Concerning natural productions, and the soul of the world:

CXXIV. Natural productions consubstist in the intellectual light of the Father. For it is soul which has adorned the mighty heaven, and which adorns it in conjunction with the Father. But her horns are established on high.—Prok. in Tim.

Concerning Nature:

CXXV. Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, that heaven may run an eternal course; and that the other periods of the sun, moon, the seasons, night and day, may be accomplished.—Prok. in Tim.

CXXVI. And that the swift sun may as usual revolve round the centre.

CXXVII. You should not look upon nature, for her name is fatal.*—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

Concerning the light above the empyrean world:

CXXVIII. In this light things without figure become figured.—Simplik. in Phys.

Concerning the universe:

CXXIX. It is an imitation of intellect, but that

*This alludes to the intimate connexion between Fate and Nature. For Fate, as we have before observed, is the full perfection of those divine illuminations which are received by nature.

which is fabricated possesses something of body.—*Prok. in Tim.*

CXXX. The paternal intellect disseminated symbols through the world.

Concerning the composition of the world from the four elements, by the Demiourgos:

CXXXI. He made the whole world from fire, water, earth, and all-nourishing air.

CXXXII. The artificer who self-operating fabricated the world. And there was also another mass of fire. All these he produced, self-operating, that the mundane body might be conglobed, that the world might become manifest, and that it might not appear membranous.*

Concerning the seven firmaments, the heavens, the heavenly bodies, ether, air, earth, and water:

CXXXIII. The Father gave bulk to the seven firmaments of the worlds, and inclosed the heavens in a convex figure.—*Damask. in Parmenid.*

CXXXIV. He established the numerous multitude of inerratic stars, not by a laborious and evil tension, but with a stability void of a wandering motion; for this purpose compelling fire to fire.—*Prok. in Tim.*

CXXXV. He made the planets six in number, and for the seventh he hurled into the midst the fire of the sun.—*Prok. in Tim.*

CXXXVI. He suspended the disordered motion of the planets in orderly disposed zones.

CXXXVII. The ethereal course, and the immense impetus of the moon, and the aerial streams.—*Prok. in Tim.*

CXXXVIII. O aether, sun, spirit of the moon, and ye leaders of the air.—*Prok. in Tim.*

CXXXIX. Of the solar circles, the lunar rattlings, and the aerial bosoms. The portion of æther, of the sun, of the rivers, of the moon, and of the air.—*Prok. in Tim.*

XL. The broad air, the lunar course, and the pole of the sun.—*Prok. in Tim.*

XLI. The sun is a fire, which is the channel of fire; and it is the dispensator of fire.—*Prok. in Tim.*

XLII. He constituted the heptad of wandering animals.

XLIII. Placing earth in the middle, but water in the bosoms of the earth, and air above these.

XLIV. The oracles assert, that the impressions of character, and of other divine visions, appear in æther.—*Simplik. in Phys.*

XLV. The most mystic of discourses inform us that the wholeness of the sun is in the supermundane order. For there a solar world and a total light subsist, as the oracles of the Chaldeans affirm.—*Prok. in Tim.*

XLVI. The more true sun measures all things together with time, being "truly a time of time," according to the oracle of the gods respecting it.—*Prok. in Tim.*

XLVII. The orb of the sun revolves in the starless much above the inerratic sphere. Hence he is not the

*As every deity is a self-perfect unity, all things must be as much as possible united; for union must necessarily be the offspring of unity.

middle of the planets but of the three worlds, according to the telestic hypotheses.—*Julian. Orat.*

Concerning the middle of the five mundane centres:
 CXLVIII. And another fifth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing fire descends as far as the material channels.—*Prok. in Tim.*

Concerning the summit of the earth:

CXLIX. The æthers of the elements, agreeably to the Oracles, are there.—*Olympiod. in Phaed.*

Concerning matter:

CL. We learn that matter pervades through the whole world, as the gods also assert.—*Prok. in Tim.*

Concerning evil:

CLI. Evil, according to the Oracle, is more debile than non-entity.—*Prok. de Providen.*

Concerning the aquatic gods:

CLII. The word aquatic, when applied to divine natures, signifies a government inseparable from water; and hence the oracle calls the aquatic gods *water-walkers*.—*Prok. in Tim.*

Concerning Typhon, Ekhidna, and Python:

CLIII. Typhon, Ekhidna, and Python, being the progeny of Tartaros and Earth, which is conjoined with Heaven, form as it were a certain Chaldaic triad, which is the inspective guardian of the whole of a disordered fabrication.*

Concerning the origin of irrational dæmons:

CLIV. Irrational dæmons derive their subsistence from the aerial rulers, and hence the oracle says, "being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial, and aquatic dogs."—*Olympiod. in Phaed.*

Concerning terrestrial dæmons:

CLV. It is not proper that you should behold them, till your body is purified by initiation; for these dæmons alluring souls always draw them away from mystic ceremonies.—*Prok. in I. Alkibiad.*

Concerning divine names:

CLVI. There is a venerable name with a sleepless revolution, leaping into the worlds, through the rapid reproofs of the Father.—*Prok. in Krat.*

CLVII. There are names of divine origin in every nation, which possess an ineffable power in mystic ceremonies.

Concerning the centre:

CLVIII. The centre is that from which, and to which, the lines as far as they may happen to extend, are equal.—*Prok. in Euklid.*

Concerning Prayer:

CLIX. A fire-heated conception has the first order. For the mortal who approaches to fire will receive a light from divinity: and he who perseveres in prayer,

*The earth, according to Platon in the *Phaedon*, is everywhere cavernous like a pumice-stone; and its true summit is ætherial.—Agreeably to this theory, which probably is of Egyptian origin, and which we see was adopted by the Chaldeans, we only live at the bottom of four large holes in the earth, which we denominate the four quarters of the globe; and yet fancy, as Platon observes, that we inhabit the true summit of the earth. For further particulars concerning this curious theory, see my *Introduction to the Timaios of Platon*, and notes on Pausanias.

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without intermission, will be perfected by the rapid* and blessed immortals.—Prok in Tim.

Concerning Divine Natures, and the manner in which they appear to mankind:

CLX. All divine natures are incorporeal, but bodies were bound in them for your sake; bodies not being able to contain incorporeals, through the corporeal nature in which you are concentrated.—Prok. in Plat. Polit.

CLXI. A similar fire extending itself by leaps through the waves of the air; or an unfigured fire, whence a voice runs before; or a light beheld near, every way splendid, resounding and convolved. But also to behold a horse full of refulgent light; or a boy carried on the swift back of a horse—a boy fiery, or clothed with gold, or on the contrary naked; or shooting an arrow, and standing on the back of the horse.—Prok. in Plat. Polit.

CLXII. The gods exhort us to understand the forerunning form of light.—Prok. in Krat.

Concerning the mystic ceremonies of Apollon:

CLXIII. The Theurgist who presides over the mystic rites of Apollon, begins his operations from purifications and sprinklings. "The priest, in the first place, governing the works of fire, must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea," as the oracle says.—Prok. in Krat.

Concerning the human soul, its descent, ascent, body, etc.

CLXIV. Filling the soul with profound love.†—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

CLXV. By understanding the works of the Father, they fly from the shameless wing of fate. But they are placed in God,‡ drawing vigorous torches descending from the Father: and from these the soul descending plucks empyrean fruits, the soul-nourishing flower.—Prok. in Tim.

CLXVI. Though you should perceive this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet the Father sends another, that the number may be complete.

CLXVII. Those are in the most eminent degree the most blessed of all souls, that are poured forth from heaven on the earth: but those are fortunate, and possess ineffable stamina, who are either produced from thy lucid self, O King,§ or from Zeus, through the strong necessity of Mithos.—Synes. de Insom.

CLXVIII. Nor should you verge downwards into the darkly-splendid world, whose bottom is always unfaithful, and under which is spread Hades:¶ a place every way cloudy, squalid, rejoicing in images, stupid, steep, winding, a blind profundity, always rolling, always marrying an unapparent body, sluggish, and without breath.—Synes. de Insom.

*By the rapid the Oracle means, according to Proklos, the intelligible gods.

†Profound love must be our guide to the beatific vision of the intelligible world: and Platon informs us that a better guide than this cannot be found.

‡The soul, when united with Deity, energizes supernaturally; and is no longer self-motive, but is wholly moved by divinity.

§Apollon.

¶See the exposition of Psellos.

CLXIX. And the light-hating world, and the winding streams, under which many are drawn down.*—Prok. in Tim.

CLXX. Fiery† hope should nourish you in the angelic region.—Olympiod. in Phaedon. et Prok. in I. Alkibiad.

CLXXI. To these he gave the ability of receiving the knowledge of light, which may be taught; but to others, even when asleep, he extended the fruit of his strength.‡—Synes. de Insom.

CLXXII. Things divine cannot be obtained by those whose intellectual eye is directed to body; but those only can arrive at the possession of them who, stript of their garments, hasten to the summit.—Prok. in Krat.

CLXXIII. Rivers being mingled, perfecting the works of incorruptible fire.—Prok. in Plat. Polit.

CLXXIV. Lest being baptized in the furies of earth, and in the necessities of nature, as some one of the gods says, it should perish.—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

CLXXV. More robust souls perceive truth through themselves, and are of a more inventive nature; "such a soul being saved, according to the oracle, through its own strength".—Prok. in I. Alkibiad.

CLXXVI. According to the oracle we should fly from "the multitude of men going along in a herd."§—Prok. in I. Alkibiad.

CLXXVII. As the oracle therefore says, "Divinity is never so much turned away from man, and never so much sends him novel paths, as when we make our ascent to the most divine of speculations, or works, in a confused and disordered manner, and as it adds, with unhallowed lips, or unbathed feet. For of those who are thus negligent the progressions are imperfect, the impulses are vain, and the paths are blind."—Prok. in Parmenid.

CLXXVIII. The telestic life,|| through a divine fire, removes all the stains, together with every foreign and irrational nature, which the spirit of the soul attracted from generation, as we are taught by the Oracle to believe.—Prok. in Tim.

CLXXIX. This axiom then must be first assumed: every god is good, and the oracles witness the truth of the axiom when, accusing the impiety of men, they say: "not knowing that every god is good, ye are fruitlessly vigilant."—Prok. in Plat. Polit.

CLXXX. The powers build up the body of the holy man.¶—Boeth. de Consol.

CLXXXI. The oracles of the gods declare that, through purifying ceremonies not the soul only but bodies them-

*The winding streams signify the human body, and the whole of generation externally placed about us.

†That is, divine hope: for the ancients assimilated a divine nature to fire.

‡That is, some men acquire divine knowledge through communicating with divinity in sleep.

§He who voluntarily mixes with the multitude, necessarily imbibes puerile notions, and engages in puerile pursuits.

||That is, a life consisting in the exercise of divinely mystic ceremonies.

¶This sentence is, by all the editors of Boethius, erroneously ascribed to Hermes Trismegistos. I say erroneously, because Philosophy is made to utter it, as the saying of one greater than herself. But since Philosophy, according to Platon in the Banquet, ranks in the demonian order, it is evident that one greater than herself must be a god. As the sentence therefore is clearly oracular, I have not hesitated, from the peculiar sanctity of its meaning, to insert it among the Chaldean Oracles.

selves become worthy of receiving much assistance and health: "for, say they, the mortal vestment of bitter matter will by this means be preserved." And this the gods, in an exhortatory manner, announce to the most holy of Theurgists.—Julian. Orat. V.

CLXXII. The oracles delivered by the gods, celebrate the essential fountain of every soul, the empyrean, the ætherial, and the material. This fountain they separate from the whole vivific goddess (Rhea); from whom also, suspending the whole of fate, they make two series,—the one psychical, the other belonging to fate. They assert that soul is derived from the psychical series, but that sometimes it becomes subservient to Fate, when passing into an irrational condition of being, it changes its lord, viz. Fate for Providence.—Prok. de Providentia.

CLXXIII. The Oracle says, that ascending souls sing a hymn in praise of Apollon.—Olympiod. in Phaed.

CLXXIV. Nor hurling according to the Oracle, a transcendant foot towards piety.* —Damask. in Vita Isidori apud Suidam.

CLXXV. This psychical spirit, which blessed men have called the pneumatic soul, becomes a god, an all-various dæmon, and an image, and the soul in this suffers her punishments. The Oracles too accord with this account; for they assimilate the employment of the soul in Hades to the delusive visions of a dream.†—Synes. de Insom.

CLXXVI. The Oracles often give the victory to our own choice, and not to the order alone of the mundane periods. As for instance, when they say, "On beholding yourself, fear." And again, "Believe yourself to be above body, and you are." And still further, when they assert, "That our voluntary sorrows germinate in us as the growth of the particular life which we lead."—Prok. de Providentia.

Oracles of uncertain or imperfect meaning:

CLXXVII. The ineffable and effable impressions of the world.

CLXXVIII. He collected it, receiving the portion of æther, of the sun, of the moon, and of whatever is contained in the air.

CLXXIX. There appeared in it virtue and wisdom, and truth endued with abundance of intellect.

CLXXX. From these the body of the triad flows before it had a being, not the body of the first triad, but of that by which things are measured.

CLXXXI. The first cause is sacred, the aerial is in the middle, and there is another as a third, which nourishes earth in fire.

CLXXXII. An entire and impartible division.

CLXXXIII. For he assimilates himself, he hastening to invest himself with the form of the images.

CLXXXIV. Nor to approach in a scattered manner to the empyrean channels, but collectively.

The following Chaldean Oracles are extracted from the treatise of Lydos De Mensibus:

CLXXXV. It is requisite that man being an intelligible mortal should bridle his soul, in order that she may not incur terrestrial infelicity, but may be saved from it.

Lydos introduces this oracle by observing that Sokrates, in the Phaidros, says that the soul has triple powers, and that it resembles a winged chariot, the charioteer of which is intellect and the horses are the powers of the soul.

Lydos further observes, that the oracle delivers to us the whole soul as a divine triad. For it says:

CLXXXVI. The Demiourgos having mingled the vital spark from two according substances, intellect and a divine spirit, he added as a third to these pure and holy love, the venerable charioteer that binds all things together.

Again, Lydos observes from Proklos, in his Hypotyposis of the Philosophy of Platon,* that the summit of intelligibles is the intelligible triad, containing in itself the cause and essence of all powers, as Parmenides says. For all intelligibles are comprehended in this triad, and every divine number proceeds in this order, as also the Chaldean† says, in the Oracles.

But the Oracles are as follows:

CLXXXVII. All things are governed by the father in the bosoms of the intelligible triad.

CLXXXVIII. The Father mingled every spirit from this triad.

In the next place the Oracle says, that souls which are returning to their pristine condition, i. e. to the highest felicity of their nature, transcend Fate:

CLXXXIX. Theurgists do not fall so as to be ranked among the herd that are in subjection to Fate.

The words of Lydos are, *ταυτητας αποκαθισταμενας ψυχας υπερβαινειν την ειμαρμενην φησι το λογιον*; by which it is evident that for *ειμαρτην* in the above oracle we should read *ειμαρμενης*, were it not for the metre.

Further still, Lydos observes:

The moon proximately rides on every thing generated, and all these terrestrial natures are manifestly governed by her, as the Oracles say:

exc. Fontal nymphs, all aquatic spirits, and monthly terrestrial, aerial, and splendid bosoms, who ride on all matter, viz. the celestial and starry matter,‡ and that which belongs to the abysses.

Lydos also informs us, that Dionysos was called by the Chaldeans *Iao* (instead of intelligible light) in the Phœnician tongue, and that he is frequently called *Sabaoth*, such as he who is above the seven poles, i. e. the Demiourgos.

And lastly he says, "that the number 9 is divine, receiving its completion from three triads, and preserving the summits of theology according to the Chaldaic philosophy, as Porphyrios informs us."

*This work of Proklos is unfortunately not extant.

†i. e. Julian the Theurgist, who lived under Markos Antoninos; for an account of whose writings see Suidas.

‡The celestial and starry matter is called by the Oracles *primogenial matter*; as Lydos elsewhere calls us.

* Nothing so requisite as an orderly progression to the acquisition of a divine life.

†For he who lives under the dominion of the irrational life, both here and hereafter, is truly in a dormant state.

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It appears to be a circumstance of a most singular nature, that the oracles respecting the divine orders, which were delivered by Chaldean Theurgists under the reign of Markos Antoninos should be in every respect conformable to the Grecian theology, as *scientifically* unfolded by Platon. That this is actually the case, every one who is capable of understanding the writings of Platon, and his most genuine disciple Proklos, will be fully convinced. The philosophic reader, who is desirous of obtaining a partial conviction of this extraordinary fact, may be satisfied by perusing my Introduction to the Parmenides of Platon.

It may indeed be clearly shown that the most ancient poets, priests, and philosophers, have delivered one and the same theology, though in different modes. The first of these, through fabulous names, and a more vehement diction; the second, through names adapted to sacred concerns, and a mode of interpretation grand and elevated; and the third, either through mathematical names, or dialectic epithets. Hence we shall find, that the Aether, Chaos, Phanes, and Zeus of Orpheus; the Father, Power, Intellect, and Twice Beyond of the Chaldeans; the Monad, Duad, Tetrad, and Decad, of Pythagoras; and the One Being, the Whole, Infinite Multitude, and Sameness and Difference of Platon, respectively, signify the same divine processions from the ineffable principle of things.

I only add, that Fabricius seems to have entertained a very high opinion of these Oracles, and to have wished to see them in that form in which they are now presented to the English reader. For thus he speaks:—"These most excellent fragments of ancient wisdom deserve that the industry and wit of the learned should be, even at present, exercised upon them; so many things yet remain in them to be noted, which being ill-understood by interpreters, and because the subject on which they treat is obvious but to few, they appear for the most part foolish, or void of sense."

Moreover, he expresses his wish† that some one would consult the writers from which Patricius made his collection, a great part of which though unpublished are to be met with in various libraries, and not negligently consider the places of the authors where they are to be found.

But whatever merit there may be in the preceding collection, long experience has taught me to expect from mere verbal critics nothing but impertinent and malevolent censure, in return for laborious exertion and valuable information. However, as these men may be aptly compared to the mice that nibbled the veil of Minerva, I sooth my resentment with the consoling assurance of the goddess herself, in the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, that

"To such as these, she never imparts her aid."

*Biblioth. Graec. Tom. 1. p. 249.

†Page 250.

ON THE WANDERINGS OF ODYSSEUS.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE HOMERIC ALLEGORY.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the "Select Works of Porphyrios," Lond., 1823.]

In this region of the phantasy, then, Odysseus is represented as an involuntary captive, continually employed in bemoaning his absence from his true country, and ardently longing to depart from the fascinating embraces of the Goddess. For thus his situation is beautifully described by the poet:

But sad Ulysses, by himself apart,
Pour'd the big sorrows of his swelling heart;
All on the lonely shore he sat to weep,
And roll'd his eyes around the restless deep;
Tow'rd his lov'd coast he roll'd his eyes in vain,
Till dimm'd with rising grief they stream'd again.*

His return, however, is at length effected through Hermes or reason, who prevails on the Goddess to yield to his dismissal. Hence, after her consent, Odysseus is with great propriety said to have placed himself on the throne on which Hermes had sate: for reason then resumes her proper seat when the reasoning power is about to abandon the delusive and detaining charms of imagination. But Homeros appears to me to insinuate something admirable when he represents Odysseus, on his departure from Kalypso, sailing by night, and contemplating the order and light of the stars, in the following beautiful lines:

And now, rejoicing in the prosperous gales,
With beating heart Ulysses spreads his sails:
Plac'd at the helm he sate, and mark'd the skies,
Nor clos'd in sleep his ever watchful eyes.
There viewed the Pleiads, and the northern team,
And great Orion's more refulgent beam;
To which around the axle of the sky
The Bear, revolving, points his golden eye:
Who shines exalted on the ethereal plain,
Nor bathes his blazing forehead in the main.†

For what he here says of Odysseus is perfectly conformable to what is said by Platon in the 7th book of his Republic respecting the man who is to be led from the cave, which he there describes, to the light of day, i. e. from a sensible to an intellectual life, viz. "that he will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens themselves, by *looking in the night to the light of the stars and the moon* than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." For by this, as Proklos well observes, "Platon signifies the contemplation of intelligibles, of which the stars and their light are imitations, so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the nature of *the good*. These, then, such a one must contemplate that he may understand their essence, and those summits of their nature, by which they are deiform processions from the ineffable principle of things." Odysseus therefore who is hastening to an intellectual life, contemplates these lucid objects with vigilant eyes, rejoicing in the illuminations and assistance they afford him while sailing over the dark ocean of a sensible life.

*Odys. lib. v. l. 82 etc.

†Odys. lib. v. l. 269 etc.

But as he is now earnestly engaged in departing from sense, he must unavoidably be pursued by the anger of Poseidon, the lord of generation and a sensible life, whose service he has forsaken, and whose offspring he has blinded by stratagem, and irritated by reproach. Hence, in the midst of these delightful contemplations, he is almost overwhelmed by the waves of misfortune, roused by the wrath of his implacable foe. He is, however, through divine assistance, or *Leukothea*, enabled to sustain the dreadful storm. For, receiving from divinity the immortal fillet of true fortitude, and binding it under his breast (the proper seat of courage), he encounters the billows of adversity, and bravely shoots along the boisterous ocean of life. It must however be carefully observed, that the poet is far from ascribing a certain passion to a divine nature when he speaks of the anger of Poseidon: for in thus speaking he, as well as other theologians, intended only to signify our inaptitude to the participation of its beneficent influence.

Odysseus therefore, having with much difficulty escaped the dangers arising from the wrath of Poseidon, lands at length on the island of *Phaiakia*, where he is hospitably received, and honorably dismissed. Now as it is proper that he who, like Odysseus, departs from the delusions of imagination, should immediately betake himself to the more intellectual light of the rational energy of the soul, the land of *Phaiakia* ought to correspond to our intellectual part, and particularly to that portion of it which is denominated in Greek *dianoia*, and which is characterized by the power of reasoning scientifically, deriving the principles of its discursive energy from intellect. And that it has this correspondence the following observations will, I persuade myself, abundantly evince. In the first place, then, this island is represented by the poet as enjoying a perpetual spring, which plainly indicates that it is not any terrestrial situation. Indeed the critical commentators have been so fully convinced of this that they acknowledge *Homer* describes *Phaiakia* as one of the *Fortunate Islands*; but they have not attempted to penetrate his design, in such a description. If however we consider the perfect liberty, unfading variety, and endless delight, which our intellectual part affords, we shall find that it is truly the *Fortunate Island of the Soul*, in which by the exercise of the theoretic virtues it is possible for a man even in the present life to obtain genuine felicity, though not in that perfection as when he is liberated from the body. With respect to the *Fortunate Islands*, their occult meaning is thus beautifully unfolded by *Olympiodoros*, in his MS. commentary on the *Gorgias* of *Platon*:⁶ "It is necessary to know that islands are raised above, being higher than, the sea. A condition of being therefore, which transcends this corporeal life and generation, is denominated the islands of the blessed; but these are the same with the *Elysian fields*. And on this account *Herakles* is reported to have accomplished his last labor in the *Hesperian regions*; signifying by this that having vanquished an obscure and terrestrial life, he afterwards lived in open day, that is in truth and resplendent light."

⁶The Greek text, inserted by Mr. Taylor, is omitted.

In the next place, the poet by his description of the palace of *Alkinous*, the King of this island, admirably indicates the pure and splendid light of the energy of reason. For he says of it:

The front appear'd with radiant splendour gay,
Bright as the lamp of night, or orb of day.
The walls were massy brass; the cornice high
Blue metals crown'd in colours of the sky,
Rich plates of gold the folding doors incase;
The pillars silver on a brazen base.
Silver the lintels deep projecting o'er,
And gold the ringlets that command the door.
Two rows of stately dogs on either hand,
In sculptur'd gold, and labour'd silver, stand.
These Vulcan form'd intelligent to wait
Immortal guardians at *Alkinous'* gates.†

And he represents it as no less internally luminous by night:

Refugent pedestals the walls surround,
Which boys of gold with flaming torches crown'd;
The polish'd ore, reflecting ev'ry ray,
Blaz'd on the banquets with a double day.

Indeed *Homer*os, by his description of the outside of this place, sufficiently indicates its agreement with the planet *Mercury*, the deity of which presides over the rational energy. For this God, in the language of *Proklos*,[‡] "unfolds into light intellectual gifts, fills all things with divine reasons (i. e. forms and productive principles), elevates souls to intellect, wakens them as from a profound sleep, converts them through investigation to themselves, and by a certain obstetric art and invention of pure intellect brings them to a blessed life." According to astronomers, likewise, the planet *Mercury* is resplendent with the colors of all the other planets. Thus *Baptista Porta* in *Coelest. Physiog.* p. 88. § "You may perceive in this planet the pale color of *Saturn*, the fire of *Mars*, the whiteness of *Jupiter*, and the yellow of *Venus*; and likewise the brilliancy and hilarity of each. On this account it is not of a peculiar form, but receives the form of its associates, and thus causes astrologers to differ in describing its color."

But that the island of *Phaiakia* is the dominion of reason is, I think, indisputably confirmed by *Homer*os' account of the ships fabricated by its inhabitants. For of these he says:

So shalt thou instant reach the realm assign'd,
In wond'rous ships self-moved, instinct with mind,
No helm secures their course, no pilot guides,
Like man intelligent they plough the tides,
Conscious of ev'ry coast and ev'ry bay,
That lies beneath the sun's all-seeing ray;
And veil'd in clouds impervious to the eye,
Fearless and rapid through the deep they fly.‡

For it is absurd to suppose that *Homer*os would employ such an hyperbole in merely describing the excellency of the *Phaiacian* ships. Hence, as it so greatly surpasses the bounds of probability, and is so contrary to the admirable prudence which *Homer*os continually displays, it can only be admitted as an allegory pregnant with latent meaning, and the recondite wisdom of antiquity.

The poet likewise adds respecting the *Phaiacians*:

These did the ruler of the deep ordain
To build proud navies, and command the main;

†*Odyss.* lib. vii. l. 84 etc.

‡In *Euklid.* Element. p. 14.

§The Latin text, inserted by Mr. Taylor, is omitted.

‡*Odyss.* lib. viii. l. 556 etc.

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**Odyss.* lib.

On canvas wings to cut the wat'ry way,
No bird more light, no thought more swift than they.

The last of which lines so remarkably agrees with the preceding explanation, that I presume no stronger confirmation can be desired, nor is the original less satisfactory:

ΤΩΝ ΨΕΥΔΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΕΛΩΝ ΤΕΤΡΑΠΛΗΡΕΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ

i. e. "The ships of these men are swift as a wing, or as a conception of the mind." But the inhabitants of the place are represented as spending their days in continual festivity, and unceasing mirth; in listening to the harmony of the lyre, or in forming the tuneful mazes of the dance. For to the man who lives under the guidance of reason, or to the good man, every day, as Diogenes said, is a festival. Hence, such a one is constantly employed in tuning the lyre of recollection, in harmonious revolutions about an intelligible essence, and the never-satiating and defying banquet of intellect.

And here we may observe how much the behavior of Odysseus, at the palace of Alkinous, confirms the preceding explanation and accords with his character as a man passing in a regular manner from the delusions of sense, to the realities of intellectual enjoyment. For as he is now converted to himself, and is seated in the palace of reason, it is highly proper that he should call to mind his past conduct, and be afflicted with the survey; and that he should be wakened to sorrow by the lyre of reminiscence, and weep over the follies of his past active life. Hence, when the divine bard Demodokos, inspired by the fury of the Muses, sings the contention between Odysseus and Achilles on his golden lyre, Odysseus is vehemently affected with the relation. And when the inhabitants of the palace, i. e. the powers and energies of the rational soul, transported with the song, demanded its repetition,

Again Ulysses veil'd his pensive head,
Again, unmann'd, a shower of sorrow shed.

For to the man who is making a proficiency in virtue the recollection of his former conduct is both pleasing and painful; pleasing so far as in some instances it was attended with rectitude, but painful so far as in others it was erroneous.

Odysseus, also, is with the greatest propriety represented as relating his past adventures in the palace of Alkinous. For as he now betakes himself to the intellectual light of the reasoning power, it is highly necessary that he should review his past conduct, faithfully enumerate the errors of his life, and anxiously solicit a return to true manners, and perfect rectitude of mind. As likewise he is now on his passage, by the pure energy of reason to regain the lost empire of his soul, he is represented as falling into so profound a sleep in his vovage, as to be insensible for some time of its happy consummation; by which the poet indicates his being separated from sensible concerns, and wholly converted to the energies of the rational soul. Nor is it without reason that the poet represents Ithaka as presenting itself to the mariners' view, when the bright morning star emerges from the darkness of night. For thus he sings:

But when the morning star, with early ray,
Flam'd in the front of heav'n and promis'd day;

*Odys. lib. viii. l. 33.

Like distant clouds, the mariner descries
Fair Ithaca's emerging hills arise.†

Since it is only by the dawning beams of intellect that the discursive energy of reason can gain a glimpse of the native country and proper seat of empire of the soul.

Odysseus therefore, being now converted to the energies of the rational soul, and anxious to commence the [practice of the] cathartic virtues, recognizes through the assistance of Athena, or Wisdom, his native land; and immediately enters into a consultation with the Goddess, how he may effectually banish the various perturbations and inordinate desires, which yet lurk in the penetralia of his soul. For this purpose it is requisite that he should relinquish all external possessions, mortify every sense, and employ every stratagem which may finally destroy these malevolent foes. Hence, the garb of poverty, the wrinkles of age, and the want of the necessaries of life, are symbols of mortified habits, desertion of sensible pursuits, and an intimate conversion to intellectual good. For the sensible eye must now give place to the purer sight of the rational soul; and the strength and energies of the corporeal nature must yield to the superior vigor of intellectual exertion, and the severe exercise of cathartic virtue. And this Homeros appears most evidently to indicate in the following beautiful lines:

Now seated in the Olive's sacred shade,
Confer the hero and the martial maid.
The Goddess of the azure eyes began:
Son of Laertes! much experienc'd man!
The suitor train thy earliest care demand,
Of that luxurious race to rid the land.
Three years thy house their lawless rule has saw,
And proud addresses to the matchless queen;†
But she thy absence mourns from day to day,
And inly bleeds, and silent wastes away;
Evasive of the bridal hour, she gives
Fond hopes to all, and all with hopes deceives.‡

Hence:

It fits thee now to wear a dark disguise,
And secret walk unknown to mortal eyes;
For this my hand shall wither ev'ry grace,
And ev'ry elegance of form and face,
O'er thy smooth skin a bark of wrinkles spread,
Turn hoar the auburn honours of thy head,
Disfigure every limb with coarse attire,
And in thine eyes extinguish all the fire;
Add all the wants and the decays of life,
Estrange thee from thy own; thy son, thy wife;
From the loath'd object ev'ry sight shall turn,
And the blind suitors their destruction scorn.‡

After this follows the discovery of Odysseus to Telemachos, which is no less philosophically sublime than poetically beautiful. For by Telemachos we must understand a true scientific conception of things; since this is the legitimate offspring of the energy of the rational soul, in conjunction with philosophy. Hence Odysseus, while employed in the great work of mortification, recognizes his genuine offspring, and secretly plans with him the destruction of his insidious foes. And hence we may see the propriety of Telemachos being represented as exploring his absent father, and impatient for his return. For the rational soul then alone associates with a true conception of things, when it

†Odys. lib. xiii. l. 93 etc.

‡i. e. Philosophy; for of this Penelope is an image.

§Odys. lib. xiii. l. 873.

|Odys. lib. xiii. l. 307 etc.

withdraws itself from sensible delights, and meditates a restoration of its fallen dignity and original sway.

And now Odysseus presents himself to our view in the habits of mortification, hastening to his long deserted palace, or the occult recesses of his soul, that he may mark the conduct and plan the destruction of those baneful passions which are secretly attempting to subvert the empire of his mind. Hence the poet very properly and pathetically exclaims:

And now his city strikes the monarch's eyes,
Alas! how changed! a man of miseries;
Propt on a staff, a beggar, old and bare
In tatter'd garments, flutt'ring with the air.*

However, as this disguise was solely assumed for the purpose of procuring ancient purity and lawful rule, he divests himself of the torn garments of mortification as soon as he begins the destruction of occult desires: and resumes the proper dignity and strength of his genuine form. But it is not without reason that Penelope, who is the image of philosophy, furnishes the instrument by which the hostile rout of passions are destroyed. For what besides the arrows of philosophy can extirpate the leading bands of impurity and vice? Hence, as soon as he is furnished with this irresistible weapon, he no longer defers the ruin of his insidious foes, but

Then fierce the hero o'er the threshold strode;
Stript of his rags, he blaz'd out like a God.
Full in their face the lifted bow he bore,
And quiver'd deaths a formidable store;
Before his feet the rattling show'r he threw,
And thus terrify to the suitor crew.†

But Homeros represents Penelope as remaining ignorant of Odysseus, even after the suitors are destroyed, and he is seated on the throne of majesty, anxious to be known, and impatient to return her chaste and affectionate embrace. For thus he describes her:

Then gliding through the marble valves in state,
Oppos'd before the shining fire she sate.
The monarch, by a column high enthron'd,
His eye withdrew, and fixed it on the ground,
Anxious to hear his queen the silence break:
Amaz'd she sate, and impotent to speak;
O'er all the man her eyes she rolls in vain,
Now hopes, now fears, now knows, then doubts again.‡

By which Homeros indicates that Philosophy, through her long absence from the soul, and the foreign manners and habits which the soul had assumed, is a stranger to it, so that it is difficult for her to recognize the union and legitimate association which once subsisted between them. However, in order to facilitate this discovery, Odysseus renders all pure and harmonious within the recesses of his soul; and by the assistance of Athena, or Wisdom, resumes the garb and dignity which he had formerly displayed.

Then instant to the bath (the monarch cries)
Bid the gay youth and sprightly virgins rise,
Thence all descend in pomp and proud array,
And bid the dome resound the mirthful lay;
While the sweet lyrist airs of raptures sings,
And forms the dance responsive to the strings.§

*Odys. lib. xvii. l. 201. etc.

†Odys. lib. xxii l. 1 etc.

‡Odys. lib. xxiii. l. 88 etc.

§Odys. lib. xxiii l. 131 etc.

And afterwards Odysseus is described as appearing through the interposition of Athena, *like one of the immortals*.

So Pallas his heroic form improves,
With bloom divine, and like a God he moves.*

For indeed he who, like Odysseus, has completely destroyed the domination of his passions, and purified himself through the cathartic virtues from their defiling nature, no longer ranks in the order of mortals, but is assimilated to divinity. And now, in order that he may become entirely known to Philosophy, that chaste Penelope of the soul, it is only requisite for him to relate the secrets of their mystic union, and recognize the bower of intellectual love. For then perfect recollection will ensue; and the anxiety of diffidence will be changed into transports of assurance, and tears of rapturous delight.

And thus we have attended Odysseus in his various wanderings and woes till, through the *cathartic* virtues, he recovers the ruined empire of his soul. But as it is requisite that he should, in the next place, possess and energize according to the theoretic or contemplative virtues, the end of which is a union with deity as far as this can be effected by man in the present life, Homeros only indicates to us his attainments of this end, without giving a detail of the gradual advances by which he arrived at this consummate felicity. This union is occultly signified by Odysseus first beholding and afterwards ardently embracing his father with ecstasie delight. With most admirable propriety also Odysseus is represented as proceeding, in order to effect this union, by himself *alone* to his father who is also *alone*.

Alone and unattended, let me try
If yet I share the old man's memory,†

says Odysseus. And afterwards it is said,

But all *alone* the hoary king he found.‡

For a union with the ineffable *one* of the Demiourgos, the true father of the soul, can only be accomplished by the Soul recurring to its own *unity*; and having for this purpose previously dismissed and abandoned everything foreign to it. This occurrence, indeed, of the soul with deity is, as Plotinos divinely says, *φύγη μόνου προς μόνου*, a *flight of the alone to the alone*, in which most beautiful expression I have no doubt he alludes to this mystic termination of the wanderings of Odysseus in the embraces of his father. Proklos also, in a no less admirable manner, alludes to this union in his Commentaries on the Timaios of Platon. The allusion is in his comment on the words, "It is difficult therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe; and, when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." On this passage Proklos observes: "It is necessary that the soul, becoming an intellectual world, and being as much as possible assimilated to the whole intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the universe; and from this introduction should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about anything calls forth and resuscitates our

*Odys. lib. xxiii l. 163 etc.

†Odys. lib. xxiv l. 215.

‡Odys. lib. xxiv l. 225.

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dormant ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For discovery is this: to meet with him, to be united to him, *to associate alone with the alone*, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For, being present with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but words,* banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic or pertaining to opinion; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiourgos. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life, or as the true labor of souls. For, after the wandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light; not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of *the one* than this. *For this is the paternal port, and the discovery of the father, viz: an undefiled union with him.*"

With great beauty also, and in perfect conformity to the most recondite theology, is the father of Odysseus represented as coarsely clothed, and occupied in botanical labors:

But all alone the hoary king he found;
His habit coarse, but warmly wrapt around;
His head, that bow'd with many a pensive care,
Fenc'd with a double cap of goatskin hair;
His buskins old, in former service torn,
But well repair'd; and gloves against the thorn.
In this array the kingly gard'ner stood,
And clear'd a plant, encumber'd with its wood.†

For this simplicity, and coarseness of the garb of Laertes, considered as an image of the true father of Odysseus, is in every respect conformable to the method adopted by ancient mythologists in their adumbrations of deity. For they imitated the transcendency of divine natures by things preternatural; a power more divine than all reason by things irrational; and by apparent deformity a beauty which surpasses everything corporeal. This array, therefore, of the father of Odysseus is, in the language of Proklos, indicative "of an essence established in the simplicity of *the one*, and vehemently rejoicing, as some one of the piously wise says, in an unadorned privation of form, and extending it to those who are able to survey it."‡ And the botanical labors of Laertes are an image of the providential

attention of the Demiourgos to the immediate ramifications and blossoms of his own divine essence, in which they are ineffably rooted, and from which they eternally germinate.

Though Odysseus, however, is placed through the theoretic virtues in the paternal port, as far as this is possible to be effected in the present life, yet we must remember, according to the beautiful observation of Porphyrios, that he is not freed from molestation till he has passed over the raging sea of a material nature; i. e. has become impassive* to the excitations of the irrational life, and is entirely abstracted from external concerns. For,

Then heav'n decrees in peace to end his days,
And steal himself from life by slow decays;
Unknown to pain, in age resign his breath,
When late stern Neptune points the shaft of death:
To the dark grave retiring as to rest;
His people blessing, by his people blest.†

I shall only observe farther, that Plotinos also considered the wanderings of Odysseus as a fabulous narration containing a latent meaning, such as that which we have above unfolded.

This is evident from the following extract from his admirable treatise *On the Beautiful*: "It is here then, [in order to survey the beautiful itself], that we may more truly exclaim,

Haste, let us fly and all our sails expand,
To gain our dear, our long-lost native land.‡

But by what leading stars shall we direct our flight, and by what means avoid the magic power of Kirke, and the detaining charms of Kalypso? For thus the fable of Odysseus obscurely signifies, which feigns him abiding an unwilling exile, though pleasant spectacles were continually presented to his sight; and everything was proffered to invite his stay which can delight the senses, and captivate the heart. But our true country, like that of Odysseus, is from whence we came, and where our father lives."

THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated from the original Greek.

(CONCLUDED.)

PROPOSITION CLXXVI.

All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest.

For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it is united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused

*This impassivity, or perfect subjection of the passions to reason, which is the *true apathy* of the Stoics and Platonists, is indicated by Odysseus finding a nation

"Who ne'er knew salt or heard the billows roar."

†Odys. lib. xxiii. l. 281 etc. By the people in these lines the inferior parts or powers of the soul are indicated.

‡Iliad. lib. ii. l. 140 and lib. ix. l. 27.

*This is in consequence of a union with the Demiourgos being so much superior to scientific perception.

†Odys. lib. xxiv. l. 225 etc.

‡Prok. in Parmen. lib. l. p. 38. Cousin's ed. The Greek text, inserted by Mr. Taylor, is omitted.

with each other and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures [i. e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree, an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without distinction, and were confused together? But again the impartible hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how can you divide the impartible and *the one*? Hence, they have a simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval. For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has interval: but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each.

COROLLARY.

But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly without magnitude, and are united to each other. For that which is without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it, but the natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated by the energy of the soul.

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally.

For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form of *the one* than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain. For things that are more allied to *the one*, being contracted in quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And on the contrary, things more remote from *the one*, as they are increased in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer to *the one*. Hence the superior intellects, being established according to a

greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number of effects, according to power, through fewer things according to the quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer effects through a greater number of things, according to a defect of power. If therefore the former produce a greater number of effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are more total. And if the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater number of things, the forms in them are more partial.

COROLLARY.

Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior intellects according to one form, are produced [in a divided manner from secondary intellects] according to many ideas. And again, those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer, but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common, accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.

Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.

For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their hypostasis from intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CLXXIX.

Every intellectual number is bounded.

For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially inferior to it, and thus [more remote from *the one*, but the intellectual number is nearer to *the one*:] and if that which is nearer to *the one*, is less according to quantity, but that which is more remote from it, is more according to quantity;—if this be the case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects therefore is bounded. For that which is less than a certain thing is not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not less than any thing.

PROPOSITION CLXXX.

Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of

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parts, and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed is simply a whole, as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part; and thus is all things partially.

For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates in all of them.

PROPOSITION CLXXXI.

Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only.

For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore that the medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either therefore, it is imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in multitude analogous to *the one*. Hence, there will be a certain intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not participate] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a divine intellect,] and an intellect which is intellectual only; the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad.

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

Every [divine] participated intellect, is participated by divine souls.

For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is participated, and renders the former conascent with the latter, it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which it contains. For deity conjoins the soul which participates of it with intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.

Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.

Concerning Soul.

Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls.

For if divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls, but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive intellectually, and sometimes do not);—if this be the case, it is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXXV.

All [divine] souls are indeed Gods psychically. But all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.

For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again only sometimes participate of this perfection;—if this be the case, the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous to the Gods. But the next to these will always follow the Gods, in consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that which is intellectual to that which is divine. And the souls which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.

Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from the body].

For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself is converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself does not pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is not naturally adapted to revert

to itself as it would thus be separated from body;—if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself, and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater degree know itself from the causes prior to itself.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.

Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.

For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed which is dissolved, is corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself. Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.

Every soul is both life and vital.

For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which is deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either therefore it lived through soul or through something else, and not through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived through something else alone. For everything which is participated, either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself, to its participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated. If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life, this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i. e. the first and impartible life; but the life which is posterior to this, is both vital and life. Soul however is not impartible life. And hence it is at the same time both life and vital.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.

Every soul is self-vital.

For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not reasoning] nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by cogitation and judgment, but

by its very essence, and by that which it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul is the same as *to live*. If therefore the soul possesses being from itself and this is the same as *to live*, and it has life essentially;—if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be self-vital.

PROPOSITION CXC.

Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis separate from bodies, it is in consequence of being more excellent than, exempt from everything divisible about, body. For the natures which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, these are not the lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore soul is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from bodies, but is a participant of life. If however this be the case, it also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge from other causes. It is evident therefore that it is inferior to impartible natures, because it is filled [with life externally.] But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled with essence. For impartible life and impartible essence are prior to soul. That soul however is not primarily gnostic is evident. For every soul indeed, so far as soul is life, but not every soul, so far as it is soul, possesses knowledge. For a certain soul while it remains soul is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. Hence, it is a medium between both.

PROPOSITION CXCI.

Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy is accomplished with time.

For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however possess both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis, viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent. For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also essentially converted to itself, and pro-

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ceeds from itself. It remains therefore that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates of time. Either therefore it is essentially eternal, [but participates of time according to energy,] or vice versa. The latter however is impossible. Hence every participable soul, is allotted an eternal essence, but a temporal energy.

PROPOSITION CXCL.

Every participable soul ranks among the number of [truly existing] beings, and is the first of generated natures.

For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in time according to energy, it is generated. For everything which participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is more remote from eternal natures.

PROPOSITION CXCLIII.

Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it is perfected by and converted to intellect. And if it participates of the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all things have their progression essentially from that to which they are naturally converted)—if this be the case, every soul proceeds from intellect.

PROPOSITION CXCLIV.

Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence to soul; and if intellect subsisting immovably produces all things by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates, the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which it contains. For everything which produces by its very being, imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the representations of intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CXCLV.

Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or after the manner of an image.

For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as are divisible about body, it produces

and gives subsistence to the latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things corporeal, and without interval the principles of things which possess interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the manner of an image; so that it receives partly indeed impartibles, with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner things immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first, according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior to its own nature.

PROPOSITION CXCLVI.

Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body, which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this body. For the essence of soul is immutable.] But if this be the case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always participates of life. That, however which always lives, by a much greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul is perpetual. But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a certain body, since it is participable and not impartible, and animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially unbegotten and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CXCLVII.

Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.

For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartibility. Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according to union, they are distinguished and divided into souls. All things, therefore, subsist together in the these, and at the same time apart. But if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;

since every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are both essence and knowledge. For unessential life, and which is without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an essence.

PROPOSITION CXCVIII.

Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is measured by periods.

For since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is always moved, and this always is not eternal, but temporal, it is necessary that it should use periods. For motion indeed is a mutation from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude and magnitude. These however, being bounded, there can neither be a mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved, make its transitions finitely. Hence, that which is always moved, will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will proceed periodically.

PROPOSITION CXCIX.

Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state.

For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively and possesses a peculiar motion. But everything which is moved and participates of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of perpetual natures is *apocatastatic*, or restorative to a former condition.

PROPOSITION CC.

Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.

For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures all the periods of souls is time. But indeed if there were the same periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine state, is different in different souls.

That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved will entirely participate of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole of time did not measure its first participant, it

would not measure anything else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, however, it is evident that all souls are measured by certain measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first measured by time.

PROPOSITION CCI.

All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis.

For because they psychically participate of the natures situated above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are established according to an order in the psychical extent, analogous to the Gods, they energise not only psychically, but also divinely, being allotted a deified summit of their essence and also because they have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under intellectual essences. Hence they not only energize divinely, but also intellectually; the former indeed according to *the one* which they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. For this is the proper employment of every soul; but such energies as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to participation.

PROPOSITION CCII.

All souls attending upon and always following the Gods, are inferior to divine, but are expanded above partial souls.

For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which account they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]. Hence, the souls which always follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they participate is not divine.

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PROPOSITION CCIII.

Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

For divine souls are more allied to *the one*, on account of their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through the participation of intellect; and those of the last order are essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle and those of the first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer to *the one*, are more single in number, and are more contracted in multitude, than such as are more remote from it. But such as are more remote from *the one*, are more multiplied. The powers therefore of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more in number. For that which is more remote from *the one*, is a greater, and that which is nearer to it is a less multitude.

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Every divine soul is a leader of many souls that always follow the Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order.

[For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted an order [which is the leader or generator] of all things, and which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is divine is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods, how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from a divine soul in the second place. For through those which always participate of a more excellent condition those that sometimes only participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those that only sometimes follow, than those that always attend on the Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude, according to diminution; being deficient

indeed in power, but redundant in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls imitating in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order.

PROPOSITION CCV.

Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle to the other.

For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,—if this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls themselves of which they are the vehicles.

PROPOSITION CCVI.

Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to ascend from generation to real being.

For if it sometimes follows the Gods, but sometimes falls from an extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect and the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the following time be conversant with bodies. For that which has not a temporal beginning will never have an end; and that which never has an end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every partial soul must make periods of ascents from and of descents into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend infinitely. And this never ceases to be the case with all of them.

PROPOSITION CCVII.

The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause.

For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that uses it, being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For everything which is generated from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle, is immoveable, and on this account supermundane.

PROPOSITION CCVIII.

The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible, and impassive.

For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual, it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise, they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided, is corrupted in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, it will be indivisible.

PROPOSITION CCIX.

The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it.

For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; but it ascends, laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with which it was invested in its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle] imitates the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved, it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations it likewise represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of souls, and is connascent with them, it is all-variously changed in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes copassive with them; is restored to its pristine state together with them when they are purified; and is elevated when they are elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.

PROPOSITION CCX.

Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a dissimilar figure through the additions and ablations of other bodies.

For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.

PROPOSITION CCXI.

Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul will proximately* participate of intellect. This, however, is impossible. But if it perceives intellectually with

transition, from that which always [and from that which sometimes] energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, wholly descends.

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Τομὸς Περμπού: Μιχαὴλ Ψέλλου Ἱστορικὸι Λογοὶ, Ἐπιστολαὶ, καὶ ἄλλα Ἀνεκδότα. Ἐν Βενετία 1876. ἐπιστάσις Κ. Ν. Σάβα.

Michael Psellos was the most learned man of the eleventh century, and probably the most active and prominent participant in the affairs of the Byzantine government of that revolutionary age. He was "born" in Constantinople, A. D. 1018, and was first called Constantine. Afterwards on entering a monastery he took the name of Michael. Despite many obstacles which would have discouraged an ordinary mind he obtained a first-class education. Most of his life was spent at court as the confidant and prime minister of various Byzantine rulers. Finally, wearied and disgusted with worldly affairs, which are essentially petty to the philosophic mind, he retired to a monastery accompanied by the Emperor, Michael VI. Here he passed the rest of his days in peace, engaged in study and meditation. He migrated from this shadow of life about the year 1088. "Besides being the leading politician of his day, Psellos was a prolific writer on politics, astronomy, medicine, music, theology, demonology, and the virtues of stones. Furthermore, he was a connecting link between the past and the present, between ancient and modern Greece. In his works we read of customs which have filtered down through the corruption of Roman, Byzantine, and Turkish days, from classical times to our own; when Psellos lived they were in vogue in the capital of the east, now they may only be found in the remoter corners of Hellas. In his time Christianity had hardly conquered Paganism, for very much of the old was then being blended with the new, which accounts for the curious existence even still of pagan ideas in the orthodox church.

Psellos was the leading philosopher of his day. Through his instrumentality the University of Constantinople, which had been closed, was reopened for a season; and, whilst occupying the professor's chair, Psellos delivered a course of lectures. Like the philosophers of late Athenian life, he revived the study of Greek classics, and gave out curious ideas on the subject. To him Homer's Iliad was an allegory. Troy was the world, the inhabitants of which neglected celestial beauty, and preferred carnal lusts—namely, Helen. Jupiter and the gods of the Iliad, he tells us, are but the God of the Christians, the angels, cherubs, and saints. If Homer was Psellos' Bible, Plato was the father of his church. Plato, he says, 'was the greatest of philosophers, the precursor of Christianity.' In all his lectures he fights for Plato and runs down Aristotle. Psellos may be said to have revived or kept alive that Platonic school which migrated to Italy a little later, and which traveled northwards and developed itself into modern freedom of thought.

It was certainly a bold doctrine to establish in the very heart of orthodoxy that Plato was the father of the christian religion; and nothing more proves the license given to heterodoxy in those days, and the absence of all that narrow-mindedness which characterized the Western Church, than the fact that the patriarch Keroullarios not only winked at this teaching, but sent his nephews to take lessons at the feet of Psellos.

Psellos took a lively interest in the antiquities of his country, and formed a private museum of ancient marbles. The bygone glories of his country were forever foremost in his mind; the miserable petty intrigues of the court in which he lived must have galled his other nature, for, as we have seen, a Byzantine always had two natures, and these documents which M. Sathas has published prove to us that even in the darkest times of history there existed sparks of better things, which scintillate through the prevailing gloom.*†

These well printed volumes contain many of Psellos' numerous writings, such as the Byzantine History, Funeral Orations, Letters, etc. They are accurately edited, and will enhance the critical reputation of M. Sathas who, himself a Greek, is one of the most noted of Hellenic scholars.

*i. e. Not through the medium of daemonic and divine souls.

†J. Theodore Bent, in *British Quarterly Review* for October, 1885. Mr. Bent's paper is both valuable and interesting, but we must strongly dissent from his judgment on the character of Psellos.