

# The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the Human Intellect and Heart."

Esoteric Christianity is identical with True Philosophy.

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## HYMN TO APHRODITE.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

A celebrated royal fount I sing,  
From foam begotten, and of Loves the Spring,  
Those winged, deathless powers, whose gen'ral sway,  
In diff'rent modes all mortal tribes obey.  
With mental darts some pierce the god-like soul,  
And freedom rouse unconscious of control;  
That anxious hence the centre to explore  
Which lead on high from matter's stormy shore,  
The ardent soul may meditate her flight,  
And view their mother's palaces of light.  
But others, watchful of their father's will,  
Attend his counsels and his laws fulfil.  
His bounteous providence o'er all extend,  
And strengthen generation without end.  
And others last, the most inferior kind,  
Preside o'er marriage, and its contracts bind,  
Intent a race immortal to supply  
From man calamitous and doom'd to die.  
While all Cythera's high commands obey,  
And bland attention to her labours pay.  
O venerable goddess! hear my prayer,  
For naught escapes thine universal ear:  
Whether t' embrace the mighty heav'n is thine,  
And send the world from thence a soul divine;  
Or whether, seated in th' ætherial plain,  
Above these seven-fold starry orbs you reign,  
Imparting to our fies, with bounteous mind,  
A power untam'd, a vigour unconfin'd—  
Hear me, O goddess, and my life defend,  
With labours sad, and anxious for their end;  
Transfix my soul with darts of holy fire,  
And far avert the flames of base desire.

## ANOTHER HYMN TO APHRODITE.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Thee, Venus, royal Lycian queen, I sing,  
To whom of old by deity inspir'd,  
In grateful signal of thy fav'ring aid,  
Our country's guides, a sacred temple rais'd  
In Lycia; of the intellectual rites  
Symbolical, which link'd in Hymen's hands  
Celestial Venus and the god of fire.  
Olympian hence they called thee, by whose power  
They oft avoided death's destructive ire,  
To virtue looking; and from fertile beds  
Through thee, an offspring provident and strong  
Rose into light; while all their days were crown'd  
With gentle peace, the source of tranquil bliss.  
Illustrious Queen! benignantly accept  
The grateful tribute of this sacred hymn,  
For we from Lycian blood derive our birth.  
Expell base passions from my wand'ring soul,  
And once more raise her to true beauty's light;  
Averting far the irritation dire,  
And rage insane, of earth-begotten love.

## ON THE FUTILITY AND IRRATIONALITY OF GRIEF.

LETTER OF THE EMPEROR JULLAN TO AMERIOS.

Translated by John Duncombe.

(Reprinted.)

Your letter in which you mention the death of your wife, and express your extreme affliction, filled my eyes with tears. Painful would it have been to hear that any wife, young, chaste, and engaging, and also an excellent mother was prematurely snatched away; but that you should sustain such a loss gives me peculiar concern. For of all my friends Amerios least deserved such a calamity; a man whose understanding is superior to most, a man whom I highly esteem.

If I were writing on this subject to any other person, I should be more prolix in telling him that such is the lot of human nature, that submission is necessary, that the most poignant grief admits of consolation, and in short should use as to a novice all the arguments that are likely to alleviate affliction. But as I am ashamed of employing to one who instructs others those arguments which are used to teach and improve the ignorant, waiving every thing else I will relate to you a fable, or rather a true story of a certain wise man, not new perhaps to you, but probably unknown to many, whose only medicine, mirth, you will find as effectual a remedy for sorrow, as that cup which the fair Lacedæmonian is supposed on a similar occasion to have given to Telemachos.

It is reported that Demokritos of Abdera, finding nothing that he said could console Darius for the loss of a beautiful wife, promised to restore her to life if the King would supply him with all things necessary for the purpose. Darius ordered him to spare no expence, but to take whatever was requisite to perform his promise. Soon after Demokritos told him that "every thing was ready for the completion of the work one only excepted, which he knew not how to procure; but that Darius as he was the King of all Asia would perhaps find no difficulty in providing it." On his asking what this important matter was, Demokritos is said to have replied: "If you will inscribe on the tomb of your wife the names of three who have never known affliction she shall immediately return to life, this ceremony being irresistible." Darius hesitating, and not being able to recollect any one who had not experienced some sorrow, Demokritos laughed as usual, and said to him "and are not you the absurdest of men, ashamed still to lament, as if you alone were involved in such distress, when you



cannot find one that ever lived exempt from domestic misfortune?"

That Darius, an illiterate Barbarian, a slave both to joy and grief, should be told this, was highly proper; but you, a Greek, who cultivates true literature, should learn from yourself to govern your passions, for it is shameful that reason should not anticipate the certain effects of time.

EXTRACT FROM THOMAS TAYLOR'S HISTORY OF THE RESTORATION OF THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY BY THE LATTER PLATONISTS.

But there cannot I think be a more egregious instance of the barren state of philosophy at present, than the prevailing opinion that the most valuable knowledge is derived from common life, and the general conduct of mankind. The manners of the multitude, so far from affording any really valuable information, exhibit nothing but specimens of folly and vice, astonishingly various and differently combined. A knowledge of this kind may indeed be necessary to the man who wishes to accumulate wealth and acquire popular honors; but is infinitely remote from the possession of true wisdom, and the true cultivation of human understanding. The best as well as the most exalted knowledge is, as we have already proved, that which is desirable for its own sake; which confers felicity on its possessor, and gives a final respite to the arduous labor of mental investigation. The knowledge of common things is alone the province of common, or uncultivated minds; and men of great genius of every age have been distinguished by their happy ignorance of the trifling pursuits, and empty attainments of the vulgar. Indeed he who mixes much with the multitude necessarily imbibes false opinions, and engages in puerile occupations; the strength and activity of his mind is continually weakened or unworthily exerted, by a general diffusion; and he at length loses all that intellectual energy which nature first implants, but retirement calls forth into the blossoms of elegance, and the perfection of vigor.

The late Dr. Johnson is a striking instance of the truth of these observations; and a lasting example of the wretchedness of a mind unenlightened by philosophy. His talents were indeed vast and uncommon, but degraded by false cultivation and ruined through neglect. Hence he employed himself solely on subjects of vulgar speculation, and thought deeply on nothing but the vices and follies of the illiterate and the base. Like a giant in the dark, his strokes were indeed powerful, but often ineffectual; and were never directed by the hand of wisdom, or assisted by the irradiations of truth. Thus he constantly displayed strength without skill, and exertion without knowledge, abilities without genius, and grandeur without a grace. He appears to resemble indeed nothing so much as the eyeless Polypheme. Deprived of the cheering light of science and philosophy, he wandered in the caverns of sense, wretched through the want of sight, and avoided by the timid multitude who trembled at his strength. To approach him too near was generally destructive of the order of society, and often fatal to the peace of bold but ignorant individuals.

His piety too as well as his literary talents shows how little of felicity is to be expected when philosophy is wanting. For though he professed to believe in the immortality of the soul, he was a perpetual slave to the fear of death, and though he was continually exercised in the externals of religion, he could find no consolation when alone. There is nothing indeed whose certainty is so generally admitted in discourse as the soul's immortality; and yet nothing is at present so generally disbelieved. For I will not disgrace the word belief by supposing it possible that a man can be firmly assured of this important truth, and yet continually seek for arguments in defence of its reality. This is however the case with modern believers. They profess reverence for the decisions and faith in the doctrines of revelation; but are glad to seek for conviction in the arguments of philosophy. Faith is found sufficient to support the mind, while it reclines on the bosom of the church, or clings round the pillars of orthodox opinion. But when it is once shaken by inquiry or staggered by doubt; when it leaves the enchanted enclosure of faith and ventures on the wide ocean of inquiry, it can alone find security in the harbor of reason, and rest in the embraces of philosophy.

Dr. Johnson is however celebrated by his female biographer as "a man good beyond the imitation of mortals." As if goodness could reside in a soul perpetually harrassed with fears, and agitated with passion; distracted with the prospects of futurity, and afraid of retiring into itself. Is it ridiculous to suppose that a consciousness of virtue and worth can ever be combined with misery and fear; or that the steady and serene light of truth can ever dwell enshrined in the gloom of despondence, or beam through a mind disturbed and clouded with care? "The good man" says Plotinos, "is ever tranquil and serene, undisturbed by passion and superior to grief;" of and that religion is but little worth which confers on its votary nothing but the torments of anxiety from consciousness of inward folly and vice, and the dread of dissolution from the uncertainty of its result. We may rest assured that no one can be truly worthy who is wretched in himself; for to be truly good is to resemble the divinity; and to suppose that misery can be combined with such a character, is to ascribe imperfection to deity, and unhappiness to the fountain of good. For the exemplar cannot be contrary to its image, though it may be infinitely superior in excellence and dignity of nature.

#### ON THE PREEXISTENCE AND DESCENT OF THE SOUL.

[This paper was prefixed by Thomas Taylor to his version of the work of Plotinos On the Descent of the Soul. It is supplementary to and explanatory of that important treatise.]

This book the Platonic reader will find to be in every respect worthy the uncommonly profound and divine genius of Plotinos. In addition, therefore, to what he has so admirably delivered on this important subject, *the Descent of the Soul*, I shall in the first place offer a

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few arguments in defense of the soul's preexistence, which is necessarily included in the doctrine of its descent. Unless the soul then had a being prior to her connection with the present body, she never would be led to search after knowledge; for if the objects of her investigation were things with which she had never before been acquainted, how could she ever be certain that she detected them? Indeed, it would be as impossible on this hypothesis for the soul to know anything about them, even when she perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripatetics, in order to subvert this consequence, have recourse to an intellect in capacity, which is the passive recipient of all forms: but the doubt still remains—for how does this intellect understand? For it must either understand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics assert, that natural conceptions are the causes of our investigating and discovering truth. If therefore these conceptions are in capacity, we ask the same question as before; but if they are in energy, why do we investigate things which we know? But the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the causes of our investigations. If then they say that these anticipations subsist articulately, investigation must be vain; but if inarticulately, why do we seek after anything besides these anticipations; or, in other words, why do we seek after distinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberless instances of persons that are terrified at certain animals, such as cats, lizzards and tortoises, without knowing the cause of their terror. The nephews of Berios, says Olympiodoros,\* who were accustomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the sight of a cock. The same author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undisturbed at asps and dragons, but was so vehemently frightened at a wasp that he would run from it crying aloud, and quite stupefied with terror. Thus too, says he, Themison the physician, could apply himself to the cure of every disease except the hydrophobia, but if any person only mentioned this disease he would be immediately agitated, and suffer in a manner similar to those afflicted with this malady. Now it is impossible to assign any other satisfactory cause of all this, than a reminiscence of having suffered through these animals in a prior state of existence.

Farther still, infants are not seen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but pass the greatest part of this time in sleep; however, in their sleep they are often seen both to laugh and cry. But now is it possible that this can any otherwise happen than through the soul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the passions which it had experienced in another life? Besides, our looking into ourselves when we are endeavoring to discover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth though concealed in the darkness of oblivion. The delight too which attends our discovery of truth, sufficiently proves that this discovery is nothing more than a

recognition of something most eminently allied to our nature, and which had been as it were lost in the middle space of time between our former knowledge of the truth, and the recovery of that knowledge: for the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terror instead of delight; and things are pleasing only in proportion as they possess something known and domestic to the natures by which they are known.

In the next place I shall present the reader with the following remarkable account of the manner in which the soul descends, from the elegant Aristides,\* who says that this account is ancient and was delivered by men celebrated for their wisdom: "The soul, as long as she is seated in a purer place of the universe, in consequence of not being mingled with the nature of bodies is pure and inviolate, and revolves together with the ruler of the world; but when, through an inclination to these inferior concerns, she receives certain phantasms from places about the earth, then she gradually imbibes oblivion of the goods she possessed in her former superior station, and at the same time descends. But by how much the more she is removed from superior natures, by so much the more approaching to inferiors, is she filled with insanity, and hurled into corporeal darkness; because through a diminution of her former dignity she can no longer be intelligibly extended with the universe,—but on account of her oblivion of supernal goods, and consequent astonishment, she is borne downwards into more solid natures, and such as are involved in the obscurity of matter. Hence, when her desire of body commences, she assumes and draws from each of the superior places some portions of corporeal mixtures. As the soul passes therefore through the ethereal orbs she receives whatever is luciform and accommodated to heating, and naturally connecting the body; involving herself through an inordinate direction in certain bonds from these circles, and the mutual motions of their lines, after the manner of a net. But when she is carried through places about the moon, which possess a communion of air, and of a repercussive spirit, as she produces by this means a vehement noise through her motion according to nature, she becomes filled with a subject spirit; and extending the superficies and lines of her orbs, and being partly drawn downwards through the bulk of her spirit, and partly naturally contending for supernal essences, she loses her spherical figure, and is transmitted into a human form. She changes therefore the superficies subsisting about a luciform and ethereal matter into a membranous form; but the lines approaching to a fiery nature, and colored with the redness of fire, she changes into the form of nerves, and afterwards assumes a humid spirit from these inferior regions.—So that this first of all becomes a certain natural body to the soul, compacted from certain membranous superficies, and from parts possessing the form of nerves, lines, and spirit: for they say that this is the root of the body,—this they denominate a harmony, and affirm that through this our external shelly vestment is nourished and connected."

\*Comment. in Phædonem.

\*Περὶ Μουσικῆς.



In the third place, should it be asked why souls fall into bodies, I answer, with Proklos,—because they wish to imitate the providential energies of the gods, and on this account proceed into generation, and leave the contemplation of true being. For as divine perfection is two-fold, one kind being intellectual and the other providential, and one kind consisting in an abiding energy and the other in motion, hence souls imitate the prolific, intellectual and immutable energy of the gods by contemplation, but their providential and motive characteristic through a life conversant with generation. As the intelligence too of the human soul is partial, so likewise is her providence; but being partial it associates with a partial body. But still further, the descent of the soul contributes to the perfection of the universe: for it is necessary that there should not only be immortal and intellectual animals, such as are the perpetual attendants of the gods, nor yet mortal and irrational animals only, such as are the last progeny of the demiourgos of the universe, but likewise such as subsist between these, and which are by no means immortal,\* but are capable of participating of reason and intellect. And in many parts of the universe there are many animals of this kind; for man is not the only rational and mortal animal, but there are many other similar species, some of which are more dæmonian, and others approximate nearer to our essence. But the descents of a partial soul contribute to the perfect composition of all animals, which are at the same time mortal and rational.

Should it be again asked, why therefore partial souls descending into generation are filled with such material perturbation, and such numerous evils,—we reply, that this takes place through the inclination arising from their free will; through their vehement familiarity with body; through their sympathy with the image of soul, or that divisible life which is distributed about body; through their abundant mutation from an intelligible to a sensible nature, and from a quiet energy to one entirely conversant with motion; through a disordered condition of being, naturally arising from the composition of dissimilar natures, viz. of the immortal and mortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect, of the indivisible and that which is endued with interval,—for all these become the cause to the soul of this mighty tumult and labor in the realms of generation. For we pursue a flying mockery which is ever in motion; and the soul indeed, by verging to a material life, kindles a light in her dark tenebrous body, but she herself becomes situated in obscurity; and by giving life to the body she destroys herself and her own intellect, in as great a degree as these are capable of receiving destruction: for by this means the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole becomes a prodigy,—as Platon beautifully observes in his books of laws—composed of the mortal and immortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law, which binds the soul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cause of vivification to the mortal body.

\*For the whole composite which we call man is not immortal, but only the rational soul

## THE CHALDEAN ORACLES.

COLLECTED, TRANSLATED, AND ANNOTATED

By THOMAS TAYLOR.

### PART II.

XLIII. The course of the moon, and the advancing procession of the stars.—Prok. in Tim.

XLIV. The most celebrated of the Babylonians, together with Ostanes and Zoroaster, very properly call the starry spheres *herds*: whether, because these alone among corporeal magnitudes, are perfectly carried about a centre, or in conformity to the oracles, because they are considered by them as in a certain respect the bonds and collectors of physical reasons, which they likewise call in their sacred discourses herds, and by the insertion of a *gamma*, angels. Hence, in a similar manner, they denominate the stars and dæmons which rule over each of these herds (or starry spheres), angels, and archangels; and these are seven in number.—Anonymus, in Theol. Arith.

XLV. He who knows himself, knows all things in himself, as Zoroaster first asserted, and afterwards Platon in the First Alkibiades.—Pici Op. Tom., 1. p 211.

XLVI. Moisture is a symbol of life; and hence both Platon, and prior to Platon the gods, call the soul at one time a drop from the whole of vivification; and at another time a certain fountain of it.—Prok. in Tim.

XLVII. There are certain aquatic dæmons, called by Orpheus Nereides, in the more elevated exhalations of water, such as reside in this cloudy air, whose bodies according to Zoroaster are sometimes seen by more acute eyes, especially in Persia and Africa.—Ficin. De Immortal. Animæ, p. 123.

XLVIII. Since the soul perpetually runs, in a certain space of time it passes through all things, which circulation being accomplished, it is compelled to run back again through all things, and unfold the same web of generation in the world, according to Zoroaster; who is of opinion, that the same causes on a time returning, the same effects will, in a similar manner, return.—Ibid. p 139.

XLIX. According to Zoroaster, in us the etherial vestment of the soul perpetually revolves.—Ibid. p. 131.

L. Zoroaster calls the congruities of material forms to the reasons of the soul of the world, divine allurements.—Ficin. de vita coelitus comparanda, p. 519.

In that part of the works of Joannes Picus, Earl of Mirandola, which is denominated *Conclusiones*, there are fifteen conclusions, according to his own opinion, of the meaning of certain oracles of Zoroaster, and the meaning of his Chaldean expositors. In these the two following oracles are preserved, which are not to be found in any Greek writer now extant.

LI. Nor should you go forth when the licitor passes by.

LII. As yet three days shall ye sacrifice, and no longer.

It appears likewise from these conclusions, that the first oracle of Zoroaster was concerning a ladder, which reached from Tartaros to the first fire.

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10. P  
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loquunt  
11. D  
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prohibit  
interficie  
12. Pe  
ligas qua  
13. Pe  
ligibile q  
14. Pe  
sacrificat



That the second oracle was respecting a two-fold air, water, and earth, and the roots of the earth.

That the eleventh was concerning the two-fold intoxication of Bacchos and Silenos.

That there was an oracle respecting a syren, and another respecting she-goats.

As a translation of these conclusions, from their mixture with Cabalistic, and other barbarous jargons, would not be of the least use to the philosophic English reader, I shall only give them in the original.

Conclusiones numero 15 secundam propriam opinionem de intelligentia dictorum Zoroastris et expositorum ejus Chaldæorum.

1. Quod dicunt interpretes Chaldæi super primum dictum Zoroastris, de scala a tartaro ad primum ignem: nihil aliud significat quam seriem naturarum universi, a non gradu materiæ ad eum, qui est super omnem gradum graduate protensum.

2. Ibidem dico, interpretes nihil aliud per virtutes mysterales intelligere quam naturalem magiam.

3. Quod dicunt interpretes super dictum secundum Zoroastris de duplici aere, aqua & terra, nihil aliud sibi vult, nisi quodlibet elementum, quod potest dividi per purum et impurum, habere habitatores rationales et irracionales; quod vero purum est tantum, rationales tantum.

4. Ibidem per radices terræ nihil aliud intelligere possunt quam vitam vegetalem, convenienter ad dicta Empedoclis, qui ponit transanimationem etiam in plantas.

5. Ex dicto illo Zoroastris, Ha Ha, hos terra deflet usque ad filios, sequendo expositionem Osæ Chaldæi, expressam habemus veritatem de peccato originali.

6. Dicta interpretum Chaldæorum super 11 aphorismo de duplici vino ebriatione Bacchi et Sileni, perfecte intelliguntur per dicta Cabalistarum de duplici vino.

7. Quæ dicunt interpretes super 14 aphorismo, perfecte intelliguntur per ea, quæ dicunt Cabalistæ de morte osculi.

8. Magi in 17 aphorismo nihil aliud intelligunt per triplex indumentum, ex lino, panno et pellibus, quam triplex animæ habitaculum cæleste, spirciale, et terrenum.

9. Poteris ex præcedenti conclusione aliquid intelligere de pelliceis tunicis, quas sibi fecit Adam, et de pellibus quæ erant in tabernaculo.

10. Per canem nihil aliud intelligit Zoroaster, quam partem irracionalem animæ et proportionalia. Quod ita esse videbit qui diligenter dicta omnia expositorum consideravit, qui et ipsi sicut et Zoroaster ænigmatice loquuntur.

11. Dictum illud Zoroastris, Nec ex eas cum transit lictor, perfecte intelligetur per illud Exodi, quando sunt prohibiti Israelitæ exire domos suas in transitu angeli interficientis primogenita Ægyptiorum.

12. Per Sirenam apud Zoroastrem nihil aliud intelligas quam partem animæ rationalem.

13. Per puerum apud interpretes nihil aliud intelligibile quam intellectum.

14. Per dictum illud Zoroastris, Adhue tres dies sacrificabitis, et non ultra, apparuit mihi per Arithme-

ticam superioris Merchianæ illos computandi dies esse, in eo dicto expresse prædictum adventum, Christi.

15. Quid sit intelligendum per capras apud Zoroastrem, intelligit, qui legerit in libro Bair quæ sit affinitas capris et quæ agnis cum spiritibus.—Pic op. vol. i. p. 69.

CHALDEAN ORACLES DELIVERED BY THEURGISTS, UNDER THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR MARKOS ANTONINOS.

Concerning the summit of the intelligible order.

LIII. The monad is there first where the paternal monad subsists.—Prok. in Eucl. p. 27.

Concerning the production of the middle of the intelligible order:

LIV. The monad is extended, which generates two.—Prok. in Eucl. p. 27.

Concerning eternity, according to which the middle of the intelligible order is characterised:

LV. Father-begotten light. For this alone, by plucking abundantly from the strength of the Father the flower of intellect, is enabled, by intellection, to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual energy, and a perpetual permanency, according to an unsluggish revolution.—Prok. in Tim. p. 242.

LVI. For eternity, according to the oracle, is the cause of never-failing life, of unwearied power, and of unsluggish energy.\*

Concerning the extremity of the intelligible order:

LVII. Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time in to the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable rays downwards.†—Prok. in Theol. Plat. p. 171, 172.

LVIII. Nor has it proceeded, but it abides in the paternal profundity, and in the adytum, according to the divinely-nourished silence.—Prok. in Tim. p. 167.

LIX. It is the boundary of the paternal profundity, and the fountain of intellectual natures.—Damaskios, *περι αρχων*.

LX. It is the operator, and the giver of life-bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hekate, and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength of a fire endued with mighty power.—Prok. in Tim. p. 128.

Concerning Love.

LXI. Who first leaped forth from intellect, clothing fire bound together with fire, that he might govern the fiery craters, restraining the flower of his own fire.—Prok. in Parmenid.

Concerning Faith, Truth, and Love:

LXII. All things are governed and subsist in these three.—Prok. in I. Alkibiad.

LXIII. You may conceive that all things act as servants to these three principles.—Damask. *περι αρχων*.

Concerning the intelligible order in general:

LXIV. The intelligent order is the principle of all section.—Damask. *περι αρχων*.

LXV. This order is the principle of all section.—Damask. *περι αρχων*.

\*Agreeably to this, Plotinos divinely defines eternity to be *infinity of life, at once total and full*.

†See my Introduction to the Parmenides of Platon, near the end.



LXVI. The oracles show, that the orders prior to Heaven are ineffable, and add, "They possess mystic silence."—Prok. in Krat.

LXVII. The oracle calls the intelligible causes "Swift," and asserts "That proceeding from the Father, they run to him."—Prok. in Krat.

LXVIII. All things subsist together in the intelligible world.—Damask. *περι αρχων*.

Concerning hyparxis, power, and energy:

LXIX. What the Pythagoreans intended to signify by *monad*, *dyad*, and *triad*—or Plato, by *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed from both*—or we, in the former part of this work, by *one*, *the many*, and *the united*, that the oracles of the gods signify by *hyparxis*\* *power*, and *intellect*.—Damask. *περι αρχων*.

Concerning power and intellect:

LXX. Power is with them (father and intellect), but intellect is from him (the father).—Prok. in Plat. Theol. p. 365.

Concerning the intelligible in general:

LXXI. The intelligible is food to that which understands.—Prok. in Krat. & Hesychios in voc. *νοερον*.

LXXII. You will not apprehend it by an intellectual energy, as when understanding some particular thing.†—Damask.

LXXIII. It is not proper to understand that intelligible‡ with vehemence, but with the extended flame of an extended intellect; a flame which measures all things, except that intelligible. But it is requisite to understand this. For if you incline your mind, you will understand it, though not vehemently. It becomes you, therefore, bringing with you the pure convertible eye of your soul, to extend the void intellect to the intelligible, that you may learn its nature, because it has a subsistence above intellect.—Damask.

### PART III.

Concerning the energy of intellect about the intelligible.

LXXIV. Eagerly urging itself towards the centre of resounding light.—Prok. in Tim. p. 236.

Concerning the triad:

LXXV. In every world§ a triad shines forth, of which a monad is the principle.—Damask. in Parmenid.

LXXVI. The triad measures and bounds all things.—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

Concerning intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures:

\*By hyparxis, understand the summit of the nature of any being.

†This is spoken of a divine intelligible, which is only to be apprehended by the flower of intellect, or, in other words, the unity of the soul.

‡That is a divine intelligible.

§i. e. In each of the seven worlds mentioned by Psellos, in the exposition prefixed to these oracles; and the like must be understood in every divine order. Indeed, that in every procession of divine natures, a monad presides over, and is the principle of, a kindred multitude; and, primarily, of a triadic multitude, is largely and beautifully shown by Proklos in Plat. Theol. and is demonstrated to be the doctrine of Plato; but, to understand this, requires very different qualifications from those by which a man is able to discover, that instead of *αριθμων* in a Greek MS. you may read *αριθμων*!—Et hoc dico pro ratione officii mei; non quod velim conviciari, sed admonere.

LXXVII. Those natures are both intellectual and intelligible which, possessing themselves intellection, are the objects of intelligence to others.—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

Concerning the Iynges or the summit of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual order of gods:

LXXVIII. These being many ascend leaping into the shining worlds; and they contain their summits.

Concerning the defensive triad, which subsists with the Iynges:

LXXIX. They are the guardians of the works of the Father, and of one intelligible Intellect.

Concerning the empyrean Synoches:

LXXX. All things yield ministrant to the intellectual presters of intellectual fire, through the persuasive will of the Father.

Concerning the material Synoches:

LXXXI. But likewise such as serve the material Synoches.

Concerning the Synoches in general:

LXXXII. He gave them to guard the summits with their presters, mingling the proper force of his strength in the Synoches.—Damask.

LXXXIII. Connectedly containing all things in the one summit of his hyparxis, according to the oracle, he himself subsists wholly beyond.—Prok. in Plat. Theol., respecting the first of the Synoches.

LXXXIV. The oracles call the angular junctions of figures Synocheidae, so far as they contain an image of synochean unions, and of divine conjunctions, according to which they connect together things separated from each other.—Prok. in Euk.

Concerning the Teletarchae:

LXXXV. These fabricate indivisible and sensible natures, together with such as are endued with corporeal form, and are distributed into matter.

LXXXVI. The Teletarchae are comprehended together with the Synoches.—Damask.

Concerning Kronos, the summit of the intellectual order:

LXXXVII. The fire which is the first beyond did not shut up his power in matter, nor in works, but in intellect. For the artificer of the fiery world is an intellect of intellect.—Prok. in Tim.

LXXXVIII. And of that intellect which conducts the empyrean world.—Damask.

LXXXIX. From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the prester-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the father-begotten Hekate, together with the environed flower of fire, and the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles.—Prok. in Krat.

xc. In the oracles it is said, that Kronos, who is the first fountain of the Amilikti, comprehends and rides on all the rest. "The intellect of the Father riding on attenuated rulers, they become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire."—Prok. in Krat.

Concerning Rhea who, in the intellectual triad, is called by the Chaldeans, Hekate:

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xci. The vivific fountain of souls is comprehended under two intellects.—Damask.

xcii. Immense Nature is suspended about the shoulders of the goddess.—Prok. in Tim.

xciii. The centre of Hekate is carried in the middle of the fathers.

xciv. Her hairs appear similar to rays of light ending in a sharp point.—Prok. in Plat. Polit.

xcv. Rhea is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.—Prok. in Krat.

Concerning Zeus the artificer of the universe:

xcvi. The Duad sits with this god, and glitters with intellectual sections; together with the power of governing all things, and placing in order everything which is not regularly disposed.—Prok. in Plat.

xcvii. And the fountain of fountains, and the boundary of all fountains.—Damask.

xcviii. The intellect of the eternal Father, governing all things by intellect, said into three.—Prok. in Tim.

xcix. For the intellect of the Father said all things should be cut into three. His will assented, and immediately all things were so cut.—Prok. in Parmenid.

c. Thence the generation of multifarious matter wholly leaps forth.—Prok. in Tim.

ci. The paternal self-begotten intellect, understanding his works, disseminated in all things the bond of love, heavy with fire, that all things might remain loving for an infinite time; that the connected series of things might intellectually remain in all the light of the Father; and that the elements of the world might continue running in love.—Prok. in Tim.

cii. The paternal intellect, who understands intelligibles, and adorns things ineffable, has disseminated symbols through the world.—Prok. in Krat.

ciii. Through intellect he contains intelligibles, but he introduces sense to the worlds.—Prok. in Krat.

civ. For he is the power of a strength every way lucid, and he glitters with intellectual sections.—Damask.

cv. The artificer who himself operating fabricated the world.—Damask.

cvi. He glitters with intellectual sections, but he has filled all things with love.—Damask.

cvil. Those things the Father understood, and the mortal nature became animated for him.—Prok. in Tim.

cvi. A matrix\* containing all things.

cix. The theology of the Chaldeans attributes seven processions to this god. Hence he is called, in the oracles, *seven-angled* and *seven-rayed*.—Gal. not. in Iamblich.

Concerning the unpolluted, or guardian intellectual order:

cx. The union of the first father (Kronos) and the first of the unpolluted gods is transcendent; and hence this stable god is called by the gods, "silent, and is said to consent with intellect, and to be known by souls through intellect alone."—Prok. in Theol. Plat.

cx. And hence Platon appears to me again to assert

the same things which were *afterwards* asserted by the gods. For what they have denominated, furnished with every kind of armor, this he celebrates by the being adorned with an all-perfect and complete armor.—"For being furnished with every kind of armor, and being armed, he is similar to the goddess."—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

Chaldean Oracles, which were either delivered by Theurgists under the reign of the emperor Markos Antoninos, or by Zoroaster.

Concerning Ideas, as proceeding from the intellect of Zeus, the artificer of the Universe.

cxii. The intellect of the Father made a crashing noise,\* understanding with unwearied counsel omniform ideas. But with winged speed they leaped forth from one fountain: for both the counsel and the end were from the Father. In consequence too of being allotted an intellectual fire, they are divided into other intellectual forms; for the King previously placed in the multiform world an intellectual incorruptible impression, the vestige of which hastening through the world causes the world to appear invested with form, and replete with all-various ideas, of which there is one fountain. From this fountain other immense distributed ideas rush with a crashing noise, bursting forth about the bodies of the world, and are borne along its terrible bosoms, like swarms of bees. They turn themselves too on all sides, and nearly in all directions. They are intellectual conceptions from the paternal fountain, plucking abundantly the flower of the fire of sleepless time. But a self-perfect fountain pours forth primogenial ideas from the primary vigor of the Father.—Prok. in Parmenid.

An oracle addressed to the intellectual gods:

cxiii. Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity.—Damask.

Concerning that intelligible which is co-ordinate with intellect.

cxiv. For intellect is not without the intelligible; it does not subsist separate from it.—Prok. in Plat. Theol.

Concerning intellect:

cxv. Every intellect understands deity.—Damask.

Concerning fountains and principles:

cxvi. All fountains and principles rapidly whirl round, and perpetually abide in an unsluggish revolution.—Prok. in Parmenid.

Concerning the multitude of rulers:

cxvii. The ruler of the immaterial *worlds* is subject to them.—Damask. in Parmenid.

cxviii. Rulers who understand the intelligible works of the Father,—these he spread like a veil over sensible works and bodies. They are standing transporters, whose employment consists in speaking to the Father and to matter; in producing apparent imitations of unapparent natures; and in inscribing things unapparent in the apparent fabrication of the world.—Damask. *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*.

cxix. The employment of the assimilative order, is to elevate things posterior to itself to the intellectual

\*Agreeable to this Zeus was celebrated by the Pythagoreans as the decado, from the all-comprehensive nature of this number.

\*The crashing noise signifies the procession of ideas to the formation of the world.



demiurgic monad (Zeus); just as it is the employment of another order, which has a transporting power, to elevate natures subordinate to itself to the intelligible monad. For as the gods say, "all things proceed from it as far as to matter, and again all things return to it." Prok. in Parmenid.

### TAYLORIANA.

#### AN INEDITED LETTER.

DEAR SIR:

I send you a list of my numerous publications, for insertion as a curiosity in your Literary Gazette, if you should think fit to insert it.

If you are acquainted with the gentleman who wrote that article concerning me in the Gazette of Sept. 3rd, be so good as to present my best respects and thanks to him for his handsome defense of me; and at the same time please to inform him that I have not neglected Andronicus, nor any of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle in studying and translating the works of that philosopher.

I remain,

Your much obliged,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

Manor Place, Walworth, Sept. 19th, 1825.

Appended to a printed list of the Platonist's works and translations, which accompanies the above letter, is the following interesting note in Taylor's characteristic hand-writing:

The following Greek MSS. also were copied by Mr. Taylor from the Harleian Collection in the British Museum, viz: Proclus on the Parmenides, and on the First Alkibiades, and Olympiodoros on the Phædo of Plato. The first of these MSS. is a folio volume of 500, the second of 300, and the third of 200 pages. From the same Collection Mr. Taylor also made large extracts from the Scholia of Olympiodoros on the Gorgias of Plato. From the Bodleian Library at Oxford Mr. Taylor made copious extracts from Hermias on the Phædrus, and Olympiodoros on the Philebus of Plato, and from Damascius *Περὶ Αρχῶν*, or *Concerning Principles*. Mr. T. likewise copied the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato from an uncommonly rare MS.; and he has given in English the substance of all the above transcripts in the notes to his translation of Plato.

In the notes to his translation of Aristotle's works, he has given the substance of the Commentaries of Simplicius on the Physics, which is a folio volume of 644 pages, and of Olympiodoros on the Meteors, and very nearly the whole of the Commentaries of Syrianus on three books of the Metaphysics. He has likewise given copious extracts from the Commentaries of Simplicius on the Soul, and from the Commentaries of Alexander Aphrodisiensis on various treatises of Aristotle; and has availed himself of the Paraphrastic elucidations of Themistius. In short, he has consulted all the existing Greek Commentators on Aristotle that are published, and has enriched his notes with the information which he thence derived.

#### II

"From the catalogue of the manuscripts in the late

French King's library, it is evident that Proclus had written a seventh book, as some chapters of it are there said to be extant in that library. These I have endeavored, but without success, to obtain."—Introduction to Taylor's translation of Proclus On the Theology of Plato.

Desiring very much to obtain these chapters I wrote to Prof. Ch. Emile Ruelle, the eminent Hellenic philologist, requesting him to ascertain whether there was a MS. in any of the Parisian libraries containing the seventh book of Proklos On the Theology of Plato, or any part of it. His reply shows that Mr. Taylor was misled by the catalogue in relation to this matter. He says: "A passage from Thomas Taylor has induced you to hope that our great Library possessed a manuscript containing the seventh book of Proklos' Platonic Theology. A young friend of mine, M. Omont, a librarian at the National Library, has furnished me the means of explaining to you Taylor's mistake. The Greek MS. No. 1837 contains the seven books of Proklos' Commentary on the Parmenides, incomplete, however, at the end; it stops with the words *οὐδ' ἄρα*, page 999 of Stallbaum's edition. At the end of this text, folio 342, are fragments "Ex Libris in Theologiam Platonis," which must have been mistaken for a seventh book of this Commentary, on account of the number *seven* belonging to the preceding work. The fragments, according to the marginal notes of an unknown commentator, correspond with pages 29, 47, 56, 80, 89 of the Hamburg edition."

#### III.

##### A REMARKABLE COLLECTION.

Mr. Orlin Mead Sanford of New York City has probably the most notable set (sixty-two volumes) of the writings of Thomas Taylor, in this country. He has printed an annotated catalogue of his collection, which is very interesting to the numerous admirers of the works of the great Platonist. Mr. Sanford is to be congratulated on his signal success in securing such a bibliographical treasury. He lacks three volumes, two of which I have, viz: Hederic's Greek Lexicon, Lond. 1803, and Collectanea (only fifty copies printed), Lond. 1806. The third book, "Vindication of the Rights of Brutes" I have seen advertised but once. It is extremely rare. I trust that Mr. Sanford's unique collection will remain intact, and ultimately find a permanent abiding place in some public library, where it may delight and benefit the scholars of future ages.

#### IV.

##### LETTER TO MICHL. JONES.

[This letter is taken from Mr. Sanford's Annotated Catalogue, where it first appeared].

DEAR SIR,—Permit me to request you will do me the favor to accept the enclosed copy of Miscellanies. This little work, like my Aristotle, is not yet published, and for the same reason which I assigned to you.

Your obliged and obed't serv.,

THOS. TAYLOR.

Minor Place, Walworth, May 6, 1806.

\*In Pl



## ON THE WANDERINGS OF ODYSSEUS.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE HOMERIC ALLEGORY.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the "Select Works of Porphyrios," Lond., 1823.]

In the first place, it is necessary to observe that Odysseus does not rank among the first heroic characters, or in other words he was not one of those heroes who descend into the regions of mortality at certain periods, not only in compliance with that necessity through which all partial souls such as ours descend periodically, but also for the purpose of benefitting others, and leading them back to their pristine state of perfection. Hence, he was by no means such an exalted hero as Herakles, or Pythagoras, or Sokrates, or Platon; for they largely benefited others; but he only benefited himself. For all his companions perished prior to his arrival at Ithaka. So that he was able to save himself, but not others. "Hence," says Olympiodoros in his MS. Skholia on the Gorgias of Platon, "it is said that Odysseus wandered on the sea by the will of Poseidon. For by this it is signified that the Odyssean life was neither terrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since therefore Poseidon is the lord of the middle natures, on this account it is said that Odysseus wandered through the will of Poseidon, because he had a Poseidonian allotment. Thus also Theologists speak of the sons of Zeus, Poseidon, and Plouto, regarding the allotment of each. For we say that he who has a divine and celestial polity is the son of Zeus; that he who has a terrestrial polity is the son of Plouto; and he is the son of Poseidon whose polity or allotment is between these." Hence Odysseus, from his Poseidonian allotment, was a man who ranked among the middle class of characters that transcend the majority of mankind.

In the next place, in order to understand accurately the recondite meaning of the wanderings of Odysseus, it is requisite to know what the most divine and theological poet Homeros indicates by the Trojan war in the Iliad. For Homeros, by combining fiction with historical facts, has delivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable information, in those two admirable poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey. Hence, by those who directed their attention to this recondite information he was said, conformably to the tragical mode of speaking which was usual with the most ancient writers, to have been blind; because, as Proklos observes,\* he separated himself from sensible beauty, and extended the intellect of his soul to invisible and true harmony. He was said, therefore, to be blind, because *that* intellectual beauty to which he raised himself cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, Orpheus is tragically said to have been lacerated in an all-various manner, because men of that age *partially* participated of his mystic doctrine. The *principal part* of it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and on this account *his head*, when separated from his body, is said to have been car-

ried to Lesbos. Hence, the Platonic Hermeias, conformably to this opinion of the occult meaning of the Iliad, beautifully explains as follows the Trojan war, in his Skholia on the Phaidros of Platon:

"By Ilion we must understand the generated and material place, which is so denominated from *mud and matter*, and in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence, also, the Trojans are called *genuine* (*ιθαγενεις*). For all the lives which subsist about bodies, and irrational souls, are favorable and attentive to their proper matter. On the contrary the Greeks are rational souls, coming from Greece, i. e. from the intelligible into matter. Hence the Greeks are called *foreigners* (*επηλυδες*), and vanquish the Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet says [about the image of Aeneas]

Around the phantom Greeks and Trojans fight.

Helen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain vessel (*ελενον τις ουσια*), attracting to itself intellect. An efflux therefore of this intelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Aphrodite; and about this efflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans, i. e. rational with irrational lives. And those indeed that oppose and vanquish matter return to the intelligible world, which is their true country; but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to matter. As therefore the prophet, in the tenth book of the Republic, previously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return to their pristine felicity, according to periods of a thousand and ten thousand years; thus, also, Kalkhas predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the number ten being the symbol of a perfect period. And as in the lives of souls some are elevated through philosophy, others through the amatory art, and others through the royal and war-like disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is different according to their different pursuits."

The first obviously fabulous adventure, then, of Odysseus, is that of the Lotophagi, which Homeros beautifully narrates, and whose narration Pope very elegantly translates as follows:

The trees around them all their fruit produce,  
Lotos the name, and dulcet is the juice!  
(Thence call'd Lotophagi) which, whose tastes,  
Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts,  
Nor other home, nor other care intends,  
But quits his house, his country and his friends.  
The three we sent from off th' enchanting ground  
We dragg'd reluctant, and by force we bound:  
The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore,  
Or, the charm tasted, had return'd no more.\*

Platon, in the 8th book of his Republic, has admirably unfolded to us what the *lotos* occultly indicates, viz. that it signifies "false and arrogant reasonings, and opinions;" for daily experience shows that nothing is more enchanting and delicious than these to such as have made no solid proficiency in virtue, and who, like

\*In Plat. Polit. p. 308.

\*Lib. IX. l. 94. etc.



some of the companions of Odysseus, being fascinated by erroneous conceptions, consign their true country and true kindred to oblivion, and desire to live for ever lost in the intoxication of fallacious delight.

The next adventure of Odysseus is that of the *Kyklops*, whom he deprived of sight, and irritated by reproaches. But according to Porphyrios, in his excellent treatise on the Cave of the Nymphs, this is no other than the natal dæmon of Odysseus, or the dæmon to whose protecting power he became subject as soon as he was born. In order however to understand perfectly the arcane meaning of this fable it is necessary to observe that, according to the ancient theology, those souls that in the present life will speedily return to their pristine felicity in the intelligible world have not the essential dæmon, or the dæmon which is inseparable from the essence of the soul, different from the dæmon that presides over the birth; for they are one and the same. But the case is otherwise with more imperfect souls; as the natal is in these different from the *essential* dæmon.\*

As Odysseus therefore does not rank among the more perfect heroic characters, and was not one who in the present life is immediately ascending to his kindred star, or in Platonic language to the paternal port, the soul's true paradise of rest; but was a man who prior to this had many laborious wanderings to accomplish, and many difficulties and dangers of no common magnitude to sustain, his *natal* was not the same with his *essential* dæmon. As he is however departing from a sensible to an intellectual life, though circuitously and slowly, he is represented in so doing as blinding and irritating his *natal* dæmon. For he who blinds the eye of sense, and extinguishes its light, after his will has profoundly assented to its use, must expect punishment for the deed; as necessary ultimately to his own peculiar good, and the general order of the universe. Indeed, troubles and misfortunes resulting from such undertakings, not only contribute to appease the anger of their authors, but likewise purify and benefit the subjects of their revenge. According to the Greek theology therefore, he who in the present life, while he is in the road of virtue, and is eagerly searching for wisdom, perceives that there is a great resemblance between his destiny and that of Odysseus, may safely conclude that either here, or in a prior state of existence, he has voluntarily submitted to the power of his natal dæmon, and has now deprived him of sight; or in other words has abandoned a life of sense; and that he has been profoundly delighted with the nature of matter, and is now abrogating the confessions which he made. This too is insinuated in the beautiful story of Cupid and Psyche, by Apuleius, when the terrestrial Aphrodite sends Hermes with a book in which her name is inscribed, to apprehend Psyche as a fugitive from her mistress. For this whole story relates to the descent of the soul into this

terrene body, and its wanderings and punishments, till it returns to its true country and pristine felicity.\*

In the next fable, which is that of *Aiolos*, the poet appears to me to signify that providence of divinity which is of an elevating and guardian nature, the influence of which, when properly received by the subjects of it, enables them to pass with security over the stormy sea of life to their native land; but when this influence is neglected through the sleep of reason, the negligence is followed by a temporary destruction of hope. This providence also of the Gods is not only one but *all-various*, which *Homer* appears to indicate by *Aiolos*; the word *αιολος* signifying various and manifold. As the advancement therefore of Odysseus in the virtues is as yet imperfect, extending no farther than to the *ethical* and *political*, which are but adumbrations of the *true* virtues, the cathartic and theoretic,† he is said to have fallen asleep, and to have been thereby disappointed of his wishes, his soul not being at that time in a truly vigilant state, as not having yet elevated its eye to real being from objects of sense which resemble the delusions of dreams.

By the adventure of the *Lestrigons*, which follows in the next place, *Homer* represents to us Odysseus flying from voracity, and fierce and savage manners; a flight indispensably necessary, as preparatory to his attainment of the higher virtues.

In the next adventure, which contains the beautiful allegory of *Kirke*, we shall find some deep arcana of philosophy contained, exclusive of its connection with Odysseus. By the *Aiean* isle, then, in which the palace of *Kirke* was situated, the region of sorrow and lamentation is signified, as is evident from the name of the island itself. And by *Kirke* we must understand the Goddess of sense. For thus Porphyrios, in *Stobaios*, p. 141: "*Homer* calls the period and revolution of regeneration in a circle, *Kirke*, the daughter of the Sun, who perpetually connects and combines all corruption with generation, and generation again with corruption." And this is asserted still more explicitly by *Proklos*, in his *Skholia* on the *Kratylos* of *Platon*. For he says, "*Kirke* is that divine power which weaves all the life contained in the four elements, and at the same time by her song harmonizes the whole sublunary world. But the shuttle with which she weaves is represented by theologians as golden, because her essence is intellectual, pure, immaterial, and unmingled with generation; all which is signified by the shuttle being golden. And her employment consists in separating‡ stable things from such as are in motion, according to divine diversity."§ And he also informs us "that *Kirke* ranks among the divinities who preside over generation, or the regions of sense." *Homer* too, with great propriety, represents *Kirke*, who rules over the realms of generation, as waited on by *Nymphs* sprung from foun-

\*See the note (p. 90.) accompanying my translation of the *Metamorphosis* of Apuleius, Lond. 1822.

†For an accurate account of the gradation of the virtues see Porphyrios' *Auxiliaries to Intelligibles*.

‡For the shuttle is a symbol of separating power.

§Page 25 Edit. Boiss. Lips. 1820.

\*This is evident from the following passage in the Commentary of *Proklos* on the First *Alkibiades* of *Platon*. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀποκαταστατικὰς ζῴων ψυχὰς οὗτοι εἶναι ἀνωκαρταῦθα δαιμόνων. ταῖς δὲ ἀτελεστέροις ἄλλος μὲν οὐκ οὐσίαν δαιμόνων, ἄλλος δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸν προβεβλημένον βίον. p. 37. Edit. Creuz.

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tains; for Nymphs, says Hermeias in Plat. Phædrum, "are Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are the attendants of Dionysos, the son of Semele. On this account they are present with water; that is, they ascend as it were into and rule over generation. But this Dionysos (Bacchus) supplies the regeneration of every sensible nature."

Hence we may observe, that the Aiean isle, or this region of sense, is with great propriety called the abode of trouble and lamentation. In this region, then, the companions of Odysseus, in consequence of being very imperfect characters, are changed through the incantations of the Goddess into brutes, i. e. into unworthy and irrational habits and manners. Odysseus, however, as one who is returning, though slowly, to the proper perfection of his nature is, by the assistance of Hermes, or reason, prevented from destruction. Hence intellect, raised by its impassive power, and at the same time armed with prudent anger, and the plant moly, or temperance, which is able to repel the allurements of pleasure, wars on sensible delight, and prevents the effects of its transforming power. Odysseus also, though he was not able to send his companions back to their native land—the paternal port of the soul—yet saves them from being transformed, through the enchantments of sense, into an irrational life.

After this follows the allegory respecting the descent of Odysseus into *Hades*, which occultly signifies that he still lived a life according to sense, and not according to intellect, and that in consequence of not having yet vanquished a terrestrial life he was involved in *obscurity*. For ancient wise men universally considered *Hades* as commencing in the present state of existence, and that sense is nothing more than the energy of the dormant soul, and a perception as it were of the delusions of dreams, as I have abundantly proved in my treatise on the Mysteries. The secret meaning also of what Odysseus saw in *Hades* is no less beautiful than profound, as the following extract from the manuscript Commentary of Olympiodoros on the *Gorgias* of Platon abundantly evinces: "Odysseus," says he, "descending into *Hades* saw, among others, *Sisyphos*, and *Tityos*, and *Tantalos*. And *Tityos* he saw lying on the earth, and a vulture devouring his liver; the liver signifying that he lived solely according to the *epithymetic* part of his nature [or that part of the soul which is the source of desires], and that through this he was indeed internally prudent; but earth signifying the terrestrial condition of his prudence. But *Sisyphos*, living under the dominion of ambition and anger, was employed in continually rolling a stone up an eminence, because it perpetually descended again; its descent implying the vicious government of himself; and his rolling the stone the hard, refractory, and as it were rebounding condition of his life. And lastly he saw *Tantalos* extended by the side of a lake, and that there was a tree before him, with abundance of fruit on its branches, which he desired to gather, but it vanished from his view. And this indeed indicates that he lived under the dominion of the phantasy; but his hanging over the lake, and in vain attempting to drink, denotes the elusive, humid, and rapidly-gliding con-

dition of such a life." We must now, however, view Odysseus passing from sense to imagination; in the course of which voyage he is assailed by various temptations of great power, and destructive effect. We shall perceive him victorious in some of these, and sinking under others; but struggling against the incursions of all. Among the first of these is the enchanting melody of the Sirens.

Whose song is death, and makes destruction please.

But what is occultly signified by the Sirens is beautifully unfolded by Proklos on the *Kratylos* of Platon, as follows: "The divine Platon knew that there are three kinds of Sirens, viz. the *celestial*, which is under the government of Zeus; *that which is effective of generation*, and is under the government of Poseidon; and *that which is cathartic*, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these to incline all things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when the soul is in the heavens, they are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Odysseus, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in *Hades*, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Platon knew that in the kingdom of *Hades* there are gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there."\* Odysseus therefore as now proceeding to a life which is under the dominion of imagination, but which is superior to a life consisting wholly in sensitive energies, abandons those alluring and fraudulent pleasures of sense, which charm the soul with flattering and mellifluous incantations. Hence he closes with divine reasons and energies, as with wax, the impulses of desire and the organs of sense; so that every passage being barred from access, they may in vain warble the song of ecstasy, and expect to ruin the soul by the enchanting strain. He also restrains the corporeal assaults by the bands of morality, and thus employs the senses without yielding to their impetuous invasions; and experiences delight, without resigning the empire of reason to its fascinating control.

Odysseus, having escaped the dangers of the Sirens, passes on to the rocks of *Skylla* and *Kharybdis*, of terrific appearance and irresistible force. By these two rocks the poet seems to signify the passions of anger and desire, and their concomitants, that compress human life on both sides; and which everyone must experience who proceeds like Odysseus in a regular manner to an intellectual state of existence. Some of these are, like *Skylla*, of a lofty malignity; fraudulent, yet latent and obscure, as being concealed in the penetralia of the soul. And such is revenge, and other passions of a similar kind. In these recesses a dæmon, the prince of such passions, resides. For the Chaldean Oracles assert that terrestrial dæmons dwell in the soul, which is replete with irrational affections.†

\*Page 93. Edit. Boiss. Lips. 1820.

†And this is the meaning of the Chaldeic Oracle—*Σὺν αἰγυρίων ὄμιλιν χθονὸς ἀνιόντων*, i. e. "The wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy



This daemon also may justly be denominated a dire and enraged dog, who partly exposes his own malice, and partly hides it in impenetrable obscurity. Hence he is capable of producing mischief in a two-fold respect. For he privately hurts by malignant stratagems, openly ravishes the soul on the lofty rock of fury, and rends it with the triple evil of deadly teeth, viz. dereliction of duty, hatred of humanity, and self-conceit. Indeed a daemon of this kind will be perpetually vigilant in endeavoring to destroy at one time the whole, and at another time a part of the soul of one struggling, like Odysseus, against passion, and yielding reluctantly to its invasions.

But the other affections which pertain to desire are of a more corporeal nature, and are more conspicuously depraved. A wild fig-tree, i. e. the will, is produced on the top of this rock; wild indeed on account of its free nature, but sweet in fruition; and under which often through the day the impetuosities of the boiling body are accustomed to absorb and destroy the man, agitating upwards and downwards inflamed desire; so that mighty destruction both to soul and body is produced by their mutual consent. But it is highly proper that a rock of this last kind should be anxiously avoided by one who, like Odysseus, is laboring to return to his true country and friends. Hence, if necessity requires, he will rather expose himself to the other; for there the energy of thought, and of the soul's simple motions, is alone necessary to be exerted, and it is easy to recover the pristine habit of the soul. In short the poet seems to represent by this allegory of the two rocks, as well the dangers which spontaneously arise from the irascible part of the soul as those which are the effect of deliberation, and of a corporeal nature; both of which must be sustained, or one at least, by a necessary consequence. For it is impossible that neither of them should be experienced by one who is passing over the stormy ocean of a sensible life.

After this succeeds the allegory of the Trinaesian isle, containing the herds sacred to the God of day, which were violated by the companions of Odysseus; but not without the destruction of the authors of this impiety, and the most dreadful danger to Odysseus. By the result of this fable the poet evidently shows that punishment attends the sacrilegious and the perjured; and teach us that we should perpetually reverence divinity with the greatest sanctity of mind, and be cautious how we commit anything in divine concerns contrary to piety of manners and purity of thought. But Homeros, by attributing sense to the flesh and hides of the slain herds, manifestly evinces that every base deed universally proclaims the iniquity of its author; but that perjury and sacrilege are attended with the most glaring indications of guilt, and the most horrid signatures of approaching vengeance and inevitable ruin. We may here too observe, that the will of Odysseus was far from consenting to this impious deed; and that, though his passions prevailed at length over

his reason, it was not till after frequent admonition had been employed, and great diligence exerted, to prevent its execution. This indeed is so eminently true, that his guilt was the consequence of surprise, and not of premeditated design; which Homeros appears to insinuate, by relating that Odysseus was asleep when his associates committed the offense.

In the next fable we find Odysseus, impelled by the southern wind towards the rocks of Skylla and Kharybdis; in the latter of which he found safety by clinging to the fig-tree which grew on its summit, till she refunded the mast upon which he rode after the tempest. But the secret meaning of the allegory appears to me to be as follows:—Odysseus, who has not yet taken leave of a life according to sense, is driven by the warmth of passion, represented by the southern gales, into the dire vortex of insane desires, which frequently boiling over, and tossing on high the storms of depraved affection, plunges into ruin the soul obnoxious to its waves. However, perceiving the danger to which he is exposed when the base storms begin to swell, and the whirlpools of depravity roar, he seizes the helm of temperance, and binds himself fast to the solid texture of his remaining virtue. The waves of desire are indeed tempestuous in the extreme; but before he is forcibly merged by the rage of the passions into the depths of depravity he tenaciously adheres to his unconsenting will, seated as it were on the lofty summit of terrene desire. For this, like the wild fig-tree, affords the best refuge to the soul struggling with the billows of base perturbations. Hence he thus recovers the integrity which he had lost, and afterwards swims without danger over the waves of temptation; ever watchful and assiduous while he sails through this impetuous river of the flesh, and is exposed to the stormy blasts of heated passion, and destructive vice. Hence too, while he is thus affected, and anxious lest the loss from unworthy affections should return upon himself, he will escape being lacerated by the teeth of Anger, though she should terribly and fiercely bark in the neighborhood of Desire, and endeavor like Skylla to snatch him on her lofty rock. For those who are involuntarily disturbed, like Odysseus, by the billows of desire, suffer no inconvenience from the depraved rock of Wrath; but considering the danger of their present situation, they relinquish the false confidence produced by rage for modest diffidence and anxious hope.

Hitherto we have followed Odysseus in his voyage over the turbulent and dangerous ocean of sense; in which we have seen him struggling against the storms of temptation, and in danger of perishing through the tempestuous billows of vice. We must now attend him in the region of imagination, and mark his progress from the enchanted island till he regains the long-lost empire of his soul. That the poet then, by Kalypso occultly signifies the phantasy or imagination is I think evident from his description of her abode. For she is represented as dwelling in a cavern, illuminated by a great fire; and this cave is surrounded with a thick wood, is watered by four fountains, and is situated in an island remote from any habitable place, and en-

vessel." For as Psellus well observes, by the vessel the composite temperature of the soul is signified, and by the wild beasts of the earth, terrestrial daemons.

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vironed by the mighty ocean. All which particulars correspond with the phantasy, as I presume the following observations will evince. In the first place, the primary and proper vehicle of the phantasy, or as it is called by the Platonic philosophers *the imaginative spirit*, is attenuated and ethereal, and is therefore naturally luminous. In the next place, the island is said to be surrounded with a thick wood, which evidently corresponds to a material nature, or this body, with which the phantasy is invested. For *υλη* or *matter* also signifies a *wood*. But the four fountains, by which the cave is watered, occultly signify the four gnostic powers of the soul,—*intellect, the discursive reason, opinion, and sense*; with all which the phantasy, being also a gnostic power, communicates, so that it receives images like a mirror from all of them, and retains those which it receives from the senses, when the objects by which they were produced are no longer present. Hence the imagination or phantasy (*φαντασία*) is denominated from being *των φανετων στασις*, *the permanency of appearance*. And in the last place, the island is said to be environed by the ocean; which admirably accords with a corporeal nature, forever flowing, without admitting any periods of repose. And this much for the secret agreement of the cavern and island with the region of imagination.

But the poet, by denominating the Goddess Kalypso, and the island Ogygia, appears to me very evidently to confirm the preceding exposition. For Kalypso is derived from *καλυπτω*, which signifies *to cover as with a veil*; and Ogygia is from *ωγυγιος*, *ancient*. And as the imaginative spirit is the primary vehicle of the rational soul, which it derived from the planetary spheres, and in which it descended to the sublunary regions, it may with great propriety be said to cover the soul as with a fine garment or veil; and it is no less properly denominated *ancient*, when considered as the first vehicle of the soul.

(To be Concluded.)

## THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

Translated from the original Greek.

### PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus.

For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself, and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent na-

tures exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and every thing of this kind.\*]

### PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the more partial genera of things.

For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also, number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And the uniform, or that which has the form of *the one*, supplies the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a *certain* being. Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form.

### PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera.

For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good preexist in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more excellent than itself.] But the energy of the elevating cause is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause.

### PROPOSITION CLIX.

Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and another from infinity.

For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications of first causes pervade through all

\*The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, which I have supplied from the version of Patricius. Hence, in the printed Greek text it is necessary to supply the words, *εν τοις θεοις αρα, η μιν καθαρτης εστι και πρωτως αγαθον, και η φανεια, και παν ταιουτον.*



secondary natures. But in some things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and in which the properties of infinity predominate.

#### PROPOSITION CLX.

##### *Concerning Intellect.*

Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of *the one*, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and produces other intellects.

For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine goodness. And if this be admitted it is likewise primarily intellect, as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence.

#### PROPOSITION CLXI.

Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly existing essence.

#### PROPOSITION CLXII.

Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; but intelligible as participated by being.

For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended from them; because from these it is possible to know their different hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power

perfective of other Gods; since, as participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the things that are participated.

#### PROPOSITION CLXIII.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect, is intellectual.

For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate being are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.

#### PROPOSITION CLXIV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul, is supermundane.

For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the intelligible Gods.

#### PROPOSITION CLXV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible body, is mundane.]

For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul as media. For intellect is not present with any mundane body without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect; for intellect is not the same with *the one*. But each of these visible bodies is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is, however, divine on account of union. And if it possesses a providential power, it possesses it through this cause.

#### PROPOSITION CLXVI.

Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane souls.

For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane soul. For

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the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated, and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as the media.

## PROPOSITION CLXVII.

Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent intellects perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these, is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived.

For every intellect, either intellectually perceives itself, or that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself; and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.

But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed this is accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing, therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible, being itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this, will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives is another.

## PROPOSITION CLXVIII.

Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of another to perceive that it perceives.

For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellection it will be intellectually perceived by itself.

## PROPOSITION CLXIX.

Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity.

For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. Moreover, that the essence of intellect is eternal, is evident. For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case, intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal, it will not be measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect will be eternal.

## PROPOSITION CLXX.

Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But imparticipable intellect indeed, *simply* perceives all things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things [according to one].

For if every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things, they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things similarly, they are similarly all things, since they are the very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their intellection; since the intellection of each is the same with the being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once; or that it perceives all things according



to one.\* To assert however that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an immovable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect on this hypothesis will only understand one thing by its permanent energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, which characterizes all things with itself.

## PROPOSITION CLXXI.

Every intellect is an impartible essence.

For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immovable, it is impartible. For every thing]† which in any way whatever is partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal, the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been before demonstrated. And that the multitude in it is united is evident from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. For these are the first multitude; but intellects are next to these. Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected into profound union, and is nearer to the one, subsists.

\*By an intellectual perception of all things according to one, Proclus means a perception of all things in one. For all intellectual forms are in each; so that a perception of one, is a perception of all forms, and therefore of all things.

†It is here necessary from the version of Patricius to supply the words καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀμερίστος ἐστὶ. παν γὰρ.

## PROPOSITION CLXXII.

Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual and immutable according to essence.

For every thing which is produced by an immovable cause, is immutable according to essence. But immovable intellect being all things eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same, it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, but it is the cause of things which always exist.

## PROPOSITION CLXXIII.

Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself.

For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to its essence]; both such as are according to cause, and such as are according to participation. For every thing participates of more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations therefore are according to the peculiarity and power of the participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore, every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it contains sensibles intellectually.

## PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its intellection or intelligence, in fabrication.

For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every being which it contains. If therefore it makes by its very being, but its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists in producing. For that which produces immovably, [always possesses] its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore consists in fabrication or production.]

## PROPOSITION CLXXV.

Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.

For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the energy of intellect is immovable. And hence, the natures by which it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy.

## COROLLARY.

From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not to participate proximately of intellect.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Orphica. Recensuit Eugenius Abel. Accedunt Procli Hymni, Hymni Magici, Hymnus in Isim aliaque eiusmodi carmina. Lips. G. Freytag. 1885.

This is a work of extraordinary interest to the Occultist, who is likewise a classical scholar. It is full of rare, curious and recondite matter. To one who desires to study the invocative formulas of the ancient Magicians, and the arcane teachings of the Hellenic sages, this book will be of inestimable value. Much nonsense about the Orphic philosophy has been disseminated by writers\* who were incapacitated by prejudice and lack of mystic training to apprehend the sublime dogmas of probably the greatest mystagogue of Antiquity.

Whoever wishes to acquire scientific knowledge of the arcane teachings of the world-famous Orpheus must, when properly qualified by special training, go to the original documents or a faithful translation of the same.†

This is a superior edition, typographically considered. Both type and paper are first-class. There are a few blunders. On page 295 there is a reference to the "Classical Journal" instead of the "Classical Museum." In the index p. 317 we find *Nymphodorus* for *Olympiodorus*. M. Abel has given some very plausible emendations of the text. It would hardly be fair, however, to pass definite judgment on his labors in this respect until the larger, specially critical edition of the *ORPHICA* announced by him has appeared.

\*For instance, Lobeck, in his pretentious work entitled "Aglaophamus sive de Theol. Myst. Græcorum Causis." The vast majority of the modern lucubrations on this important subject are worthless.

†I am now collecting the materials for a satisfactory work on Ancient Magic. It is my intention to give accurate versions, in some cases accompanied by the original texts, of the *Orphic* and all other magical hymns and invocations by the Magicians of Antiquity, which are extant. Comments and illustrative notes will be added, so as to make the book a practical manual for those who desire to study the subject scientifically and experimentally. Verily, the gods of old are not dead!