TRIPLE NUMBER.

The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

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THE PLATONIST.

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EDITED BY . . . . . THOS. M. JOHNSON.

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PEARLS OF WISDOM.

[GATHERED FROM PLATONIC SOURCES.]

Hunters take hares with hounds; many take fools with their own praises.

Wolves resemble dogs, and flatterers friends, but their aims are quite different.

There is no better way to Happiness than to endeavor to be good as well as to seem so.

Tolerate not a gossiper and slanderer, for he tells you not anything out of good-will; but as he discloses the secrets of others, so will he disclose thine to others.

If every one should bring his misfortunes into the public stock to be shared alike amongst all men, the greater part of those that now complain so much would be contented, and glad to keep their own.

But in what manner a Supreme Being superintends the human race, and how he delights to be worshipped; what is Virtue, Justice, and Temperance, neither will Athos show to those who climb its summit, nor Olympos, so renowned in song — if the soul does not make such things the objects of its contemplation; and if it does engage in such topics pure and undefiled, I will not hesitate to assert that it will rise far above Kaukasos itself. — *Apollonios Tyaneus.*

It is reported that you philosophize to every one you may happen to meet, and publicly, which Pythagoras did not think fit to do. And these things, indeed, O Hipparchos, you learned with diligent assiduity, but you have not preserved them; having tasted, O excellent man, of Sicilian delicacies, which you ought not to have tasted a second time. If therefore you abandon these I shall rejoice; but if not, you will be dead in my opinion. For it will be pious to call to mind the divine and human precepts of Pythagoras, and not to make the goods of Wisdom common to those who have not even in a dream their soul purified. For it is not lawful to extend to every casual person things which were obtained with such great labors, and such diligent assiduity, nor to divulge the mysteries of the Eleusinian Goddesses to the profane. For those who do either of these are equally unjust and impious. But it will be well to consider what a great length of time we consumed in wiping away the stains which had insinuated themselves into our breasts till, after the lapse of some years, we became fit recipients of the doctrines of Pythagoras. For as dyers previously purify garments, and then fix in the colors with which they wish them to be imbued, in order that the dye may not be washed away, and may never become evanescent; after the same manner also that divine man prepared the souls of those that were lovers of philosophy, so that they might not deceive him in any of those beautiful and good qualities which he hoped they would possess. For he did not impart spurious doctrines, nor snares, in which most of the sophists, who are at leisure for no good purpose, entangle young men; but he possessed a scientific knowledge of things human and divine. These men, however, making his doctrine a pretext, perform many dreadful deeds, ensnaring youth not in a becoming nor yet in a casual way. Hence they render their auditors noxious and precipitate. For they infuse theorems and divine doctrines into confused and turbid manners. Just as if some one should pour pure and clear water into a deep well full of mud; for he would disturb the mud, and destroy the clear water. The same thing likewise takes place between those who teach and those who are taught after this manner. For dense thickets, and which are full of briers, surround the intellect and heart of those who have not been purely initiated in disciplines; obscure the mild, tranquil, and reasoning power of the soul, and openly impede the intellective part from becoming increased and elevated. It is requisite, likewise, to call intemperance and avarice the mothers of these thickets; both which are naturally prolific. From intemperance, therefore, unlawful marriages, unjust desires, corruptions, intoxication, preternatural pleasures, and certain vehement appetites blossom

forth — which impel their possessors into profundities and precipices. For now desires have compelled some to commit the most heinous crimes; and, violating the laws of their country at the dictates of passion, with their hands as it were bound behind them, they are violently dragged along like slaves to extreme destruction. But from avarice proceed rapine, robbery, parricide, sacrilege, sorcery, and such other evils as are the sisters of these. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to purify the woods in which these passions have fixed their abode, with fire and sword, and all the machines of disciplines; and having liberated the reasoning power from such mighty evils, we may then implant in and deliver to it something useful and great. — *Lysis' Letter to Hipparchos.*

A club for the systematic study of the History of Philosophy was organized in Osceola, Mo., on the first of last September.

A translation of the treatise on the "Proper Government of Life for the Individual," by Ibn Badja, a celebrated Arabian philosopher, will appear in the next number of THE PLATONIST. This work treats of the emancipation of the soul from materiality, and its ascent to "the acquired intellect (*intellectus acquisitus*), which is an emanation from the active intellect or Deity."

Miss S. E. Harris, an accurate scholar, at present Professor of English Literature in the University of Arkansas, is preparing for THE PLATONIST a translation of that part of Vacherot's *Histoire Critique de l'ecole d'Alexandrie* which treats of Plotinos. Vacherot's noted work is considered as, in many respects, the best treatise extant on the "Alexandrian School," and no English version of it has ever been published.

In this issue is finished Taylor's General Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Platon. This is probably the clearest and most logical Introduction to Platon ever written. It takes the student through all the grades of the Platonic system. The entire work has been reprinted, except a few personal paragraphs that are of no general interest. This treatise alone is worth, and could not be procured in any other form, for a dozen times the amount of the yearly subscription price of THE PLATONIST.

In this generation Folly seems to invariably dominate and direct the multitude. Note the way in which many of the citizens of Sedalia, a large, prosperous town of this State, exhibited their lack of intellect: —

"Miss N—— A——, the heroine of the Bismarck Grove race, who beat Miss S—— on Saturday last, rode through the streets to-night, preceded by a band of music, and followed by her stud of race horses, eight in number. It was a perfect ovation, and five thousand people lined the streets to see her."

In a curious review which appeared in *The Western*, of "Three Treatises of Plotinos" translated by the Editor of THE PLATONIST, occurs this sentence: "Further, in noticing that exclusive devotion to the sensuous tends to extinguish the notion of the super-sensuous, he overlooks the fact that the reverse is an equal possibility, and that so far the two sides are on the same footing, and cannot fairly call each other by hard names." The naivete of this remark could hardly be excelled. The writer "overlooks the fact," or is ignorant of it, that one of the chief objects of the Platonic Philosophy is to extinguish, not only the *notion* of the sensuous, but the sensuous itself. Further comment would be superfluous.

We are sincerely sorry that such hypocritical scoundrels, as are described in the following extract from a prominent journal, are permitted to flourish in this country. At a time when the Executive of this Nation was battling for his life, endangered by an assassin's bullet, and the American people, almost as one man, were overwhelmed with grief and indignation — it is a shameful fact that there were men (?) so thoroughly corrupt as to take advantage of a great national calamity to indulge their depraved propensities for gambling: "Men, who with long faces and furtive eyes, went into the White House with a pretence of tears, came out and made bets openly on the life or death of the President within a given number of hours. Bets to the amount of a thousand dollars were made in more than one instance by individuals; smaller jackals made smaller bets."

The *Theosophist* for September last has a handsome notice of THE PLATONIST, in which our esteemed contributor, Dr. Alexander Wilder, is mentioned in the following language, which, it is almost unnecessary to say is fully deserved: "So far we are sincerely charmed with THE PLATONIST. It comes in good time, and will fill one of the greatest needs of our age. Its value is the more enhanced in our sight by the promise we find in it from our respected friend and brother, Professor Alexander Wilder, to become one of its chief contributors. The news is gratifying, indeed. We trust his too sensitive modesty may forgive the enthusiastic, though never too exaggerated, opinion of his sincere admirers and far-away friends—if we repeat again that which we all honestly believe, namely: that there is not in the United States a scholar more competent than himself to elucidate to the reader the hidden beauties, as well as the esoteric meaning underlying Platonic philosophy." In this connection we may state that Professor Wilder is now delivering a course (the second) of valuable lectures on Psychological Science in the United States Medical College, in New York City.

The following description of certain irrational acts of "*men*" is quoted from one of the great daily papers of this city. The growth of the mind does not necessarily correspond with the growth of the body. Physical by no means implies intellectual development. There are many people whose minds are as puerile as when their bodies were in an immature condition. Sensuous experience does not produce wisdom, or even reflection: —

"Yesterday on 'Change a stranger would have been pardoned for supposing an insane asylum had broken loose and the inmates had poured forth on the floor. The wildest excitement prevailed, and pandemonium was personified in the actions of operators. Everything appeared to be in a state of chaos; buyers and sellers, mounted on the long disused stands of the old bear pit, gesticulated frantically to enforce their bids. Shouts, yells, and screams, from the shrill treble to the deep-chested bass voices, rang out on the air in a deafening noise that to the uninitiated was perfectly unintelligible. Operators crowded each other down, and actually piled up in living, moving pyramids of humanity that set at defiance all attempts at dignity."

ON THE STUDY OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

We want it distinctly understood that the Philosophy promulgated by THE PLATONIST cannot be made "easy to the meanest capacities." We say this, as complaints have been made, through the press and otherwise, that it is "too abstruse," "too metaphysical," "above the popular understanding," etc. True, it *is* above the popular understanding, but no intelligent lover of truth will find it too abstruse or metaphysical who possesses the requisite qualifications for its study. According to Platon a

student of Philosophy must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent, magnanimous, and the friend and ally of Truth, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. Thus qualified, the truth-seeker will be enabled to comprehend what may appropriately be termed the minor mysteries and doctrines of the Platonic Philosophy. In order to fully enter into the penetralia of this Philosophy, and comprehend its greatest and profoundest mysteries and dogmas, one must possess or acquire additional qualifications. These are well enumerated by the divine Proklos:

"But it is necessary that I should unfold the mode of the proposed doctrine, what it is requisite to expect it will be, and define the preparatives which a hearer of it ought to possess; that being properly adapted he may approach, not to our discourses, but to the intellectually elevated and deific philosophy of Platon. For it is proper that convenient aptitudes of auditors should be proposed according to the forms of discourses, just as in the mysteries, those who are skilful in concerns of this kind previously prepare receptacles for the Gods, and neither always use the same inanimate particulars, nor other animals, nor men, in order to procure the presence of the Divinities; but that alone out of each of these which is naturally capable of participating divine illumination, is by them introduced to the proposed mystic rites. * * *

"But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned with the moral virtues, and to be one who has bound by the reason of virtue all the illiberal and inharmonious motions of the soul, and harmonized them to the one form of intellectual prudence; for, as Sokrates says, it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. But every vicious man is perfectly impure; and the contrary character is pure. He must likewise have been exercised in all the logical methods, and have contemplated many irreprehensible conceptions about analyses, and many about divisions, the contraries to these, agreeably as it appears to me, to the exhortation of Parmenides to Sokrates. For prior to such a contest in arguments, the knowledge of the divine genera, and of the truth established in them, is difficult and impervious. But in the third place, he must not be unskilled in Physics [the science of Nature]. For he who has been conversant with the multiform opinions of physiologists, and has after a manner explored in images the causes of beings, will more easily advance to the nature of separate and primary essences. An auditor therefore of the present work, as I have said, must not be ignorant of the truth contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted with the paths of erudition, and the disciplines which they contain; for through these we obtain a more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence. But all these must be bound together in the leader intellect. Being likewise a partaker of the dialectic of Platon, meditating those immaterial energies which are separate from corporeal powers, and desiring to contemplate by intelligence in conjunction with reason true beings, our auditor must genuinely apply himself to the interpretation of divine and blessed dogmas, and fill his soul, according to the Oracle, with profound love; since, as Platon somewhere observes, for the apprehension of this theory a better assistant than love cannot be obtained.

"He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all things, and must excite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth. He must establish himself in a firm, immovable, and safe kind of divine knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire anything else, nor even to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to divine light with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of an unwearied life; and, in short, must propose to himself such a kind of energy and rest as it becomes him to possess who intends to be a coryphæan philosopher such as Sokrates describes in the THEAITETOS."—*On the Theology of Platon, Lib. I., ch. 2.*

MATERIALISM OF THE DAY.

The publication in this latter portion of the nineteenth cnetury after Christ, of a journal "devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases," is a fact which must be to some minds not a little startling. It will be asked whether, shortly, a revival may not be looked for of the ancient worship of Greece and Rome. The answer, however, is not far to seek. I suppose ancient Religion is not dead, though the *form* of it is irrevocably changed. Certainly, whether we recognize it or not, Plato and his philosophy are a living force to-day. Call it by what name we choose it has a distinct bearing on our modern life. Christianity itself would be a fundamentally different thing were it not for the Platonism which St. Paul first and after him other wise teachers infused into it. Nay, the teachings of Jesus himself, if not derived from Athens, run parallel a long distance with the teachings of Plato.

Nor is this at all strange, excepting to those who would date and localize truth. There is but one truth, beyond which no prophet can soar. All divine souls reiterate the same message, using different words and illustrations. We are all Platonists, all Christians, all disciples of Confucius, of Mahomet, in so far as we are faithful in our small degree to that which they, in their great degree, were faithful. Need there is to draw men's eyes once more to the immortal evangelist of Greece. No injury is thereby done to any truth which other men have taught. Only those who are jealous for the reputations of persons rather than for the triumph of principles have anything to fear.

If now, two thousand two hundred years after the death of Plato, it is a matter of deep concern to "revive" his philosophy, what shall be said for the boasted progress of the world. Only this: that the Supreme Fountainhead of Truth has no favorite times or places. Our century is neither less blessed nor more than the olden time. Precisely those revelations which were vouchsafed to the people then, are tendered to us to-day; and if we fail to recognize them it is because we close our hearts. Hearing we hear not and do not comprehend. The Voice never ceases, but not always is there a listener. Plato was one, and he placed on record what he heard. We do well to study that record. It is not out of date — it is *above* time.

During the last one hundred years a noteworthy revival, more or less direct, of the Platonic Philosophy, has been in progress. Kant was no Platonist but that clear, wise thinker, from his own standpoint, expounded ideas quite in harmony with those of Plato. Kant more than any other has influenced modern thought. His power is felt, though not rightly acknowledged, even in Comte's writings. Herbert Spencer owes and acknowledges a deep debt to him. Transcendentalism sprang into vigorous being in Germany, England, and America, and the parents of Transcendentalism are Plato and Kant. Goethe in Germany, Coleridge and Carlyle in England, Emerson in America, have arisen to proclaim that the newest Spiritualistic philosophy is Platonic. During this period, too, Thomas Taylor himself brought pure Platonism into prominence.

That a better understanding of this philosophy is needed, the materialism of the age sufficiently testifies. Whether this age is more materialistic or less than those which preceded it, is open to question. We cannot compare fairly the present with the past. Only the good survives — hence, in time as well as in space, distance lends enchantment. We need not too narrowly inquire; more than sufficient unto the present age is the materialism thereof.

This materialism does not display itself chiefly in the scientific movements of the day. Pure science is not materialistic. Matter and spirit are two sides of one reality — life. The laws of matter

are not less divine than the laws of spirit, and the investigation of them is noble, and makes for high ends.

Even the anti-theological crusades which so perplex the priests, though often permeated with materialism, are not to be dreaded. They are, in some sort, a protest against it. So far as the existing foundations of religion are hollow and rotten, it is well men should be warned of the fact. Let there be no pretences, no bolstering up of that which ought to fall. Trust in God, but let the images be broken. The iconoclast is an embodied protest against the confounding of form and substance.

Materialism is at its worst in the methods of society. It is dangerous because it is fashionable — the people love it, or are blind to its presence. The popular expositions of religion are of the earth, earthy. They are commercial. The question is how men may get more out of life than they put into it. What compound interest should God give them for their virtues and sacrifices in this present life if they are content to refrain from the pleasures of sin. The delights of heaven are reckoned in bullion. Golden harps and crowns are scarcely figures of speech. An outward adherence to the forms of piety is held justified because it pays better in the world, — secures business connections and social position, — and as an investment in respect to the Hereafter is safer.

Our economies are materialistic. Thrift consists in wasting life to win the means of living. Its fruits are a bank-balance, not happiness and culture. Success in life means the ability to hoard wealth, to accumulate houses and lands, to secure a social position of some eminence. Lacking these, a righteous use of all the divine gifts, a well-rounded life, is counted failure. The latest interpretation of the law and the prophets may be summed up: 'Get wealth, honestly if you can, but get wealth.' Teachers of spiritual truth are tolerated — with kindly contempt. They are supposed to be blind to their own best interests. What a pity such fine talents are not turned to trade — then the man would be sure to "get on." Having and doing, and even seeming, take precedence of Being.

Surely the time is ripe for a teacher who shall tell men the falsehood of such methods, and guide them into nobler ways. If Athens of old provided such an one, time has not made his wisdom less wise. Plato is still in advance of us, in spite of our boasted advantages, and if we will but hear him, he has much instruction to impart.

WALTER LEWIN.

BIRKENHEAD, ENGLAND.

ON MAGIC.

BY PROKLOS.

[*Translated from the Latin of Ficinus.*]

[There is no doubt but what the following treatise on Magic formed a part of Proklos' Commentary on the First Alkibiades, though the original Greek of it is not extant. It exists only in the Latin version of Marsilius Ficinus, and was first published at Venice in 1497, in a volume entitled "Procli de Anima ac Dæmone, de Sacrificio et Magia."

"Magic," according to Psellos in his work on Dæmons, "formed the last part of the sacerdotal science. It investigates the nature, power, and quality of everything sublunary, viz.: Of the elements and their parts, of animals, all various plants and their fruits, of stones and herbs; and, in short, it explores the essence and power of everything. From hence, therefore, it produces its effects. And it forms statues which procure health, makes all-various figures, and things which become the instruments of disease. It asserts, too, that eagles and dragons contribute to health; but that cats, dogs, and crows are symbols of vigilance, to which therefore they contribute. But for the fashioning of certain parts, wax and clay are used. Often, too, celestial fire is made to appear through magic; and then statues laugh, and lamps are spontaneously enkindled."

It will doubtless be objected by most of the present period, who believe in nothing beyond the information of their senses, that plants, animals, and stones no longer possess those wonderful sympathetic powers which are mentioned by Proklos in the following extract. In answer to any such objector, whose *little* soul, in the language of the Emperor Julianos, is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, it must be said that this is not at all wonderful at a period when, as the author of the Asclepian dialogue justly observes, "there is a lamentable departure of divinity from man, when nothing worthy of heaven or celestial concerns is heard or believed, and when every divine voice is by a *necessary* silence dumb." But to the philosophic reader it must be observed that, as in the realms of generation, or in other words the sublunary region, wholes, viz. the spheres of the different elements remain perpetually according to nature; but their parts are sometimes according, and sometimes contrary, to nature — this must also be true of the parts of the earth. When those circulations, therefore, take place, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and which are justly called by Platôn fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones magically sympathize with superior natures, in consequence of a more abundant participation of them, through a greater degree of aptitude to receive, and alliance to the participated powers. But during those circulations, in which the parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature, as at present, and which Platôn calls barren periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones no longer possess a magic sympathy, and consequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.

Proklos, in the 140th Proposition of his Elements of Theology, says: "Hence also in last natures there are representations of such as are first, and *all things sympathize with all*; secondary indeed pre-existing in first natures, but first natures presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For everything subsists in a threefold manner, either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation." Thus, too, Hippokrates: "There is one conflux, one conspiration, and all things sympathize with all." He who understands this will see that the *magic* cultivated by the ancient philosophers is founded in a theory no less sublime than rational and true. Such a one will survey the universe as one great animal, all of whose parts are in union and consent with each other; so that nothing is foreign and detached; nothing, strictly speaking, void of sympathy and life. For though various parts of the world, when considered as separated from the whole, are destitute of *peculiar* life; yet they possess some degree of animation, however inconsiderable, when viewed with relation to the universe. Life indeed may be compared to a perpetual and universal sound; and the soul of the world resembles a lyre, or some other musical instrument, from which we may suppose this sound to be emitted. But from the unbounded diffusion as it were of the mundane soul, everything participates of this harmonical sound, in greater or less perfection, according to the dignity of its nature. So that while life everywhere resounds, the most abject of beings may be said to retain a faint echo of the melody produced by the mundane lyre. It was doubtless from profoundly considering this sympathy between the mundane soul and the parts of the world that the ancient philosophers were enabled to procure the presence of divinity, and produce effects beyond the comprehension of the vulgar. And that this was the opinion of Plotinos, the following passage evinces: "It appears to me that the ancient wise men, who wished to procure the presence of the deities, by fabricating statues and performing sacred rites, directed their intellectual eye to the nature of the universe, and perceived that the nature of soul was everywhere easy to be attracted when a proper subject was at hand, easily passive to its influence. But everything adapted to imitation is readily passive, and is, like a mirror, able to seize a certain form and reflect it to the view." (Enen. 4, lib. 3).—Taylor.]

"By the first of these instructors they are taught the magic of Zoroaster the son of Oromazes, by which magic is meant the worship of the Divinities."—*First Alkibiades.*

In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which is apparent in sensible forms to that which is divine; so the ancient priests, when they considered that there is a certain alliance and sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to occult powers, and discovered that all things subsist in all, fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity. Thus they recognized things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the subordinate in the supreme — in the celestial regions terrene properties subsisting in a causal and celestial manner, and in earth celestial properties, existing according to a terrene condition. For how shall we account for those plants called heliotropes—that is, attendants on the sun—moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb; and selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity to her motion? It is because all things pray, and hymn the leaders of their respective orders; some intellectually, and others rationally; some in a natural, and others after a sensible manner. Hence the sunflower, as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance toward the sun; so that if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he would perceive something

composed by a sound of this kind in honor of its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence, too, we may behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene quality; and in the celestial regions all plants, and stones, and animals possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial nature. Now, the ancients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of things, applied for occult purposes both celestial and terrene natures, by means of which, through a certain similitude, they deduced divine virtues into this inferior abode. For, indeed, similitude itself is a sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus, if a piece of paper is heated and afterwards placed near a lamp, though it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the flames will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors; and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things according to time, place, and matter. But the procession of fire into the paper aptly represents the presence of divine light, to that nature which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper may be compared to the deification of mortals and to the illumination of material natures, which are afterwards carried upward like the enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine seed.

Again: the lotus, before the rising of the Sun, folds its leaves into itself, but gradually expands them on its rising; unfolding them in proportion to the Sun's ascent to the zenith, and as gradually contracting them as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less to honor the Sun, than men by the gesture of their eyelids, and the motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of supernal light is not only visible in plants, which possess nothing more than a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the sun-stone by its golden rays imitates those of the Sun; but the stone called the eye of heaven, or of the Sun, has a figure similar to the pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus too the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the Moon when horned, by a certain change of itself follows the lunar motion. Lastly, the stone called helioselenus — *i.e.*, of the Sun and Moon — imitates after a manner the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its color. So that all things are full of divine natures; terrestial natures receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial of supercelestial essences; while every order of things proceeds gradually in a beautiful descent from the highest to the lowest. For whatever particulars are collected into one above the order of things, are afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed under various ruling divinities.

In the next place there are many solar animals, such as lions and cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar divinity; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power. Hence it is said that a cock is very much feared and, as it were, reverenced by a lion; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order. For thus we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a cock than with a lion. This will be evident from considering that the cock as it were with certain hymns applauds and calls to the rising Sun when he bends his course to us from the antipodes; and that solar angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are without shape, yet present themselves to us who are connected with shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes, too, there are dæmons with a leonine front who, when a cock is placed before them, unless they are of a solar order, suddenly disappear; and this because those natures which have an inferior rank in the same order always reverence their superiors; just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are accustomed from the very view to be fearful of perpetrating anything base.

In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the Sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others, after a manner, imitate the solar rays, as the palm and date; and some the fiery nature of the Sun, as the laurel; and others a different property. For indeed we may perceive that the properties which are collected in the Sun are everywhere distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar order; that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones. Hence, the authors of the ancient priesthood discovered from things apparent the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power of which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things together, they attracted upon us a supernal influx; and by the composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to that one which is above many, and composed statues from the mixture of various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this, they collected composite odors by a divine art into one, comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a divine essence; considering that division debilitates each of those, but that mingling them together restores them to the idea of their examplar.

But sometimes one herb or one stone is sufficient to a divine operation. Thus, as a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden appearance of some superior power; but a laurel, vaccinum (or a thorny kind of a sprig), the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper, operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence the ancient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to each other, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy and antipathy; purifying where it was requisite, with sulphur and bitumen, and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies from the sharpness of its odor; but marine water on account of its fiery portion. Besides this, in the worship of the gods they offered animals, and other substances congruous to their nature; and received in the first place the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances and operations, and by these natural substances they convoked into their presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards they proceeded from dæmon to the powers and energies of the gods; partly, indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly from their own industry, interpreting convenient symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence of the gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship of the gods.

THE EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE OF MAN — THE USES OF THE WORLD WE LIVE IN.

BY DR. H. K. JONES.

[*A Lecture Delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy, in the Summer of 1881.*]

Absolute form is philosophically predicated and truly affirmed of the supersensible orders alone, namely: Of entity, the highest being is the highest and first form; every personal entity is form, Deity is form, angel is form, man is form; all nature, all physics and matter are but aspects, varying, mutable manifestations of

form. And all true personal form abides forever, and so is distinguished from that which flows forever. The Deity is a personal eternal form, and in his image and likeness man is a personal eternal form; not will be, but is now eternal in his Creator. In him now, as we see him in human aspect, he lives and moves and has his *being*. Was there ever a time when he did not subsist in *this form* from *that source*? And if the soul be an eternal personal entity, then every soul as to its *personal form*, has never been changed as to the constitution and content of that form. We see manifest to sense only the varying aspects of the soul in its various manifestations, its individualities in time and in temporal existence, especially if it be true that all this sensuous scene is of this character; the world of the senses is but *maya* and the witness of the senses invalid as to the truth, the science of things. In this sensuous apprehension the soul is Protean, while in its essential personal form it is immutable, eternal, self-identical. The individual, the sensibly manifest soul, is a mere dependence from and partial objectivation of the soul; the personal form, therefore, must precede the particular both in temporal and logical order. The personal soul is not built up or evolved out of the particular, but all that constitutes the particular must be a descent from the whole, the essential entity. This essential entity pre-existed: this partial individual objectivation is not the beginning of the being and the existence of this form.

The question of pre-existence becomes to appear to be not an idea or mere curious abstract speculation, for if we would touch its fortunes, as we propose to do, and as we really attempt to do, and as we are inevitably bound to do, we should know well the natural history, and the constitution, and the needs and purposes of the subject of our manipulations. And if we would educate, the question is a primary one. Are we about to put science into a receptacle, or are we about to realize in time reminiscent science? Is true knowledge reminiscence all?

The Platonic theorem is that all knowledge of truth and reality, or true science here, is reminiscence — a recollection of ideas which are already in the soul; that this knowledge is native to the soul, and is antecedent to all experience of this time; and that this knowledge is only brought out into the temporal consciousness by means of experience, conditions, and educations. Experience and all education must furnish the occasion for the development only, of ideas or principles of which they are not and cannot be the origin and source — for these ideas are anterior to this temporal experience. The intelligible soul form is the source of the only pure *a priori* knowledge here in this scene and sphere of time and its content. This is also a leading thought of modern philosophy as well, more clearly and logically maintained by Kant than others.

The novitiate in this thought will, however, still and properly enough return to the question, was our being conscious, or consciously existent, prior to this time? It may be said it is easier to conceive of an eternal, personal, knowing being as existent, than it is to think of it as non-existent and even unconscious. Knowing truly, science appears to us to be thought, and will, through experience concrete in the deed. And it is at least a fair question whether this science, found to be the content of the personal soul, the fountain of all absolute knowing, may be the treasure of former experience.

There is much suggestion hereto aside from philosophic speculation. For instance, said Kreeshna to the disciple: "Both you and I have been born many times. I remember my births; you do not remember yours."

Pythagoras claimed to remember that he had existed previously in this particular plane of nature, and in a degree of reminiscence indentified himself in his former individuality. Said Jesus to the Disciples: "I know whence I came, and whither I go; ye know not from whence ye came" — implying they *came* from somewhere. Sir William Jones says: "In all our conversations with the learned Hindoos, we find them enthusiastic admirers of poetry, which they consider a divine art, that is practised through numberless ages in heaven, and from thence it is revealed on the earth." Says Wm. Blake: "And now begins a new life, because another covering of earth is shaken off, and in my brain are studios and chambers filled with books and pictures of old, which I wrote and painted in ages of eternity, before my mortal life, and those works are the delight and study of archangels. My friend and companion from eternity, in the divine bosom is our dwelling-place. I look back into the regions of reminiscence, and behold our ancient days, before this earth papeared in its vegetated mortality to my mortal vegetated eyes. I see our houses of eternity, which can never be separated, though our mortal vehicles should stand at the remotest corners of heaven from each other."

This question, however, of the how the soul became, or becomes possessed of its content, all knowledge, to which time can contribute no substance or increase, must be secondary in importance to the fact of the inventory of the best thought, ancient and modern, that the ideas and principles of true knowing of all real science are already in the soul, and are not derived unto it from without, and are there prior to all this time experience. And the Dialectic of Plato is the effort and process of leading the mind to *recollect* the truth *aforetime* perceived by it; the treasury of the soul, the eternal content of the soul, the partial, the individual, is merely temporarily unconscious of it. Plato's Dialectic had for its grand aim the bringing into the consciousness the light of the truths already in the soul. A "delivering of the mind, of ideas with which it was already pregnant; and that these ideas and principles of the mind are innate and co-natural there, he held and pursued as the most vital, most precious, and the most certain of all truths; the doctrine of pre-existence as highly probable, as an hypothesis plausibly explaining the facts, but only so far speculatively held. All nature, by its objects and motions, but affords suggestion to *recollection* of what is knowable and known; but *in and of itself* nature cannot be the known or the knowable, for nature, the scene of mere sense reflection, is *in and of itself* not a whole fact, not reality, but a scene of mere reflections and correspondences, and thence of suggestions and leadings to the finding of the ground and reason and validity of the scene, in the truths and forms within the soul itself.

"The Deity did not, as we now undertake to say, form the soul posterior and junior to the body — for he who conjoined these would never have allowed the more ancient nature to be governed by the younger — and yet we, who are exposed to the blind chances of fortune, are apt to speak somehow in this silly fashion; whereas the Deity constituted the soul both in age and excellence prior to and older than the body, as being the proper mistress and ruler of its subject the body.

"*After*, therefore, the whole composition of the universal soul had been completed according to the intention of God who framed it, he in the next place formed *within it* the whole of a corporeal nature, and he aptly jointed them by uniting centre to centre. The former, the soul, being interwoven throughout from the middle to the very extremities of space, and covering it even all around externally, though at the same time herself revolving within herself, originated the divine beginning of an *unceasing* and *wise* life throughout *all time*.

"When our talk, then, is about *truth*, and consistent with itself, — whether on the one hand it be about things mutable or things constant, and is silently and noiselessly borne onward by its own motion, or when it is concerned about things sensible, and the circle of difference reports on its onward passage to

every part of the soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and persuasions: — but when, on the other hand, it is concerned about the merely rational, and the glibly whirling circle of *same* makes its indications, — then intellect and science are thus necessarily brought to full perfection. And as respects the *real essence* in which these two qualities (of knowing) are engendered, if anyone asserts that it is any other *than* the *soul*, he will assert everything rather than the truth;" that is, when the subject of natural things is reported to and speculated by the soul in its whole consciousness, in the use of all its faculties of sense and intelligence — then the mind is in true opinion and persuasion respecting nature, or it is in natural science; the man in mere sensuous cognition of nature is not in true opinion thereof; and also if the subject be that of the supernatural, then will the speculations be true science and intellect in perfection; and true science, true knowing, whether of nature or of the supernatural, as innate, engendered in the soul itself, and nowhere else, and therefore cannot be implanted in it from without as acquired knowledge.

Among the theories of a living age there lies in the threshold, challenging philosophic speculation and identification, the idea of education; and the subject ranks with the highest interests of the world.

"For if the soul be immortal," says Plato, "it were a dreadful thing to neglect so great a matter; for it is right that we should consider this, that if the soul be immortal it requires our care, not only for the present time, which we call life, but also for all time. For the soul can have no other refuge from evils, nor no other safety, except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes hence possessing nothing else but its *education* and its *discipline*, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment, on our very setting out there."

In the first place, then, whether is the soul that we propose to educate, a *tabula rasa*, or is it an abyss in which is the truth already of all things that exist? This question is of the first practical importance; for, owing to the profanity of the problem, there is no subject, no interest, of which it may be more feared that *folly* may *rush in* where angels fear to tread.

If the nature of the child be the blank sheet, then are its fortunes to be inscribed now for the *first time*. Its existence is now beginning. It has its beginning in time and sense. Its knowing begins with the senses, and through the senses come all knowledges. And so every circumstance, every touch and mark of the hand of the guardian and the educator, is predetermining fortune; and all education is cumulative *ad infinitum* of the forms more or less indelibly engraven on this scroll.

So the race, also alike with the individual, is in this cumulative progress of unlimited quantative augmentations, through this perpetual accretion of experiences of the successive generations; each generation augmented with and mounted upon the shoulders of its ancestors, immediate and remote. This is life; this is education; this is history. If so, be the soul this blank tablet, *aboriginal* in this *temporal scene;* all this and an infinity of like consequence.

On the other hand, if the soul be introduced here as form, embracing in its own abysm its own destinies and fortunes; if its business be to get down here or out here in *somewhat* that it already is, containing within itself its own determinations in potentiality, then its special business here, its special determinations and destinations, no mortal may know beforehand. Then, in this case, our business with it is quite something else than it was in the former case, and then also education and life and history are quite something else than in the former case.

If all knowing, all science, must be predicated exclusively of faculties and powers which are logically and actually prior to knowledge, and prior even to the physical frame and its use, then the end and aim and process of education must be some other than piling up stone upon stone of sensuous cognition, and science something else than heaps of rubbish, and history something else than accumulation of human experience.

Says Plato of this matter: "It is fit, then, if these things be true, that we form such an opinion as this respecting them: That education is not of that character which some persons announce it to be, when they somehow assert that there is no *science in the soul*, but that they can implant it just the same as if they implanted sight in the eyes of the blind. Our present argument, however, shows this power (of sight) to reside in the soul of every person, and to be the organ by which every one learns."

In this contemplation the business would be to find the *knower*, and as beautifully as possible, and as wisely as possible, assist in letting him down and out, a process that requires for the transaction a true kindergarten art in aid of his own endeavors; and it is a most miraculous achievement. And so he has got down into his senses imperfectly, and into some use of his instruments, the organs of his folly. Thus all life, and science, and history are a descent into the world and into its instrumentalities. And so life and science are logically prior, temporal instrumentalities and sensuous experience posterior.

In this first state of sensuous cognition the soul sees the world as in a camera. The senses behold all things in an order inverted and reversed; all things seem as they are not; all things seem to be ascending from beneath. "After this, then," says Platô, "compare our nature as respects education, or the want thereof, to a condition such as follows: Behold men, as it were, in an underground cave-like dwelling, having its aperture open towards the light, and extending through the whole cave, and within it persons who from childhood upwards have had chains on their legs and their necks, so as, while abiding there, to have the power of looking forward only, but not to turn round their heads by reason of their chains, their light coming from a fire that burns above and afar off, and behind them; and between the fire and those in chains is a road above, along which one may see a little wall built along, just as the stages of conjurers are built before the people in whose presence they show their tricks. Behold then, by the side of this little wall, men carrying all sorts of machines rising above the wall, and statues of men and other animals wrought in stone, wood, and other materials; some of the bearers probably speaking, others proceeding in silence." "You are proposing," said Adimantos, "a most absurd comparison and absurd captives also." "Such as *resembles ourselves*," said Sokratês.

Such is the condition of mind in the state of the sensuous cognitions, beholding as reality and truth of things the images inverted and reversed of the invisible world of true entity, with its living and moving forms. This is the Meister Wilhelm in the puppet-show. The next step in education is science, or true knowing of nature, and this is the peeping and peering behind the scenes, and the discovery of the wires and springs that move the puppets. The discipline and process consists of the mastery of the mathematical and the physical sciences.

The next stage is the realization of the unity of the intellectual and moral disciplines. "Have you never yet observed," says Plato, "of those that are termed wicked yet clever,— how sharply the little soul looks, acutely distinguishing all to which it is turned, having indeed no contemptible power of vision, but compelled to be so far the servant of wickedness that in proportion as its vision is more acute, the more crime it perpetrates? As regards this part of such a disposition, if from childhood upwards it should be stripped and cut off from what belongs to human production, as from leaden weights,—which have a relation to

feastings and pleasures and lusts, that turn the sight of the soul to things downward; — if the soul can free itself and turn towards truth, the very same principle in the same individuals would as acutely see those things as the objects to which it is now turned." And so "just as the eye cannot turn otherwise than with the whole body from darkness to light, so also one must turn with the whole soul from sensible objects until it has become able to endure the contemplation of what is real." This involves the whole idea of the sensuous, and the moral, and the religious education, and comprehends as the ground principle of all education, that if the child be trained in the way he should go, when he is old he will not depart from it. Just schemes of education, therefore, assist the soul in these several steps and movements through the world, to establish in the principles and cognitions of the truth of things, and in the full limits of morality and equity, the grounds and conditions of righteousness in the conduct of life, rather than in filling its *carte blanche* with other people's empirical knowings and notions.

Lastly of education, the first scheme must imply and consummate these rudiments through the institutions of poetry, the family, the church, and the State in the fruition of a manhood realizing the highest and divinest relation and correlation of the soul and nature — the just and healthful balance between the natural and the supernatural —

> He that in time would master builder be,
> Begins not in the air;
> But working earthward as the tree,
> Makes his foundations there.

Time canopied with the heavens is the theater of the universe, the objectivation of all entity, and the true, and the fairest, and the best realization. We shall never exist in a more opportune and beautiful manner, only perchance more *excellently* in wisdom and beauty. In this sense of the worlds, in this realization of the spirit in nature, we behold the *idea* and the *type* of all existence. We are eternally born from sphere to sphere, and eternally we die from sphere to sphere — maintaining eternal same through endless *generations*, with personal form and identity uninfringed and inviolate by unlimited variety of experience and change.

Eternity and time go on forever a unity in duality. The soul goes on forever, through endless successions of these realizations of their unity. Here thought and experience become one in the deed. Here the soul realizes the duality of the worlds in the unity of nature and the spirit. The ideal and the actual are one in the real. Existence is unrealized, therefore, except in and by means of the time sphere. There is no realization of the soul's content only by means of temporal objectivation — and so the corporeal frame is the soul's time sphere — and this universally and forever.

The Platonic formula of this thought is as follows: "No symmetry, or want of measure, is of more importance with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, than that of the soul toward the body. As for instance, when the soul in this compound is stronger than the body, and greatly prevails over it, then the soul agitating the whole of it inwardly, fills it with disease; and, by ardent application to learned pursuits and investigations, causes it to waste away. Lastly, when the soul employs itself in didactic pursuits and logomachies, publicly as well as in private, through a certain ambitious strife, it then inflames the body and dissolves its constitution, and by introducing distillation of humors, deceives the great part of those who are called physicians, inducing them to consider these effects as proceeding from contrary causes."

"Also, when a body that is large and superior to the soul in power, is joined with a small and weak intellect, there being naturally two classes of desires in man, one of ailiment on account of the body, the other of wisdom for the sake of our most divine part; in this case the motions of the more powerful prevailing, and enlarging what is their own, but making the reflective part of the soul deaf, indocile, and oblivious, thus induce ignorance — the greatest of all diseases. There is one safety then for both: neither to move the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul; in order that by naturally resisting each other they may be equally balanced and in perfect health."

Here are the fountains of the evils of all existence, the dissymmetries of man with nature — the dissymmetries of the spirit with nature in himself, the failure of the unity in himself, of the supernatural and the natural, — and so the unity of the divine and the human, the harmonies of the spheres of eternity and time. Erring in his ascriptions of his evils to everything and anything else than the fierce and fiery ambitions of his spirituous motions, and the deaf and oblivious sensuous motions of the soul; a chaos dissymmetric with wholes and with the divine and the holy, — here is a universal principle; only in this has evil its seal and subsistence.

Wherefore, "It is not possible, Theodoros, that evil should be destroyed; for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity moves round this mortal nature and this region. Wherefore we ought to endeavor to fly hence thither as fast as possible. But this flight consists in resembling God as much as possible, and this resemblance is the becoming just and holy with wisdom."

The disciplines of this struggle of the soul amid the contrarieties and conflicts of good and evil, and the fruits of the ordeal and the struggle, possibly, most of all subjects of the soul's history, most eludes the speculations and comprehensions of Philosophy. The pure thought, exempt of all mist and accretion of sense perception, may behold in the conflict of this contrariety a providential gymnastics for the perpetual renovation of the finite nature. As in the kingdoms of nature without, the springs of all life are between the contrarieties of light and darkness, and of fire and frost; amid the conflict between these contrarieties all nature has her perpetual spring and sustenance. And it may be that as nature incubated in the night, and in the winter hath her renewal in the new day and the new spring-time, so the soul may rebound from the earth and from night and winter with renewed energy and power unto new days and new spring-times of existence.

All souls have here their entrance and their exit. The uses of the world are education and discipline, and joy and transport of existence. Here come the novitiate soul, and the wicked soul, and the repentant soul, and the angelic soul. This temporal scene is the mutable; here all changes are wrought; here the soul may in freedom turn itself toward heaven, and also toward hell. This, too, is providence of the Divine love and wisdom and power and presence. "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." And Dante found written even over the gate of hell:—

> "Justice incited my sublime creator,
> Created me (hell) divine omnipotence,
> The highest wisdom and the primal love."

From the depths of its night, from the depths of its winter, from the depths of its hell, may not the soul rebound even with quickened energies and renovated zests and powers unto its immortal bliss? "Who are these which are arrayed in white robes? and whence came they? And he said to me, These are

they which come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb." And so the soul has a capability of existing even unto the grave and death and hell of sense, oblivioned as to true being, through the experiences of generation and of regeneration, without perfection of its ever-abiding, ever-subsisting tenure in life; thus a capability of existing mortally or in death, and immortally, or in that which is not death. And this in successive alternations.

Souls come here to realize growth and progress from state to state through changeful experience. They each seek the Lethean plain, encamp beside the River Amelete and drink its soothing waters, and when laid asleep, as stars they disappear in the realms of generation, and so are we sown in earth that we may *grow*. Somehow our business here is *growth*.

"'Twas a little seed in the dark cold ground
That said, 'Why must I slumber here
With the mists and the dampness all around,
Where no ray of light can ever appear?'
And a voice shot down on a beam of the sun,
One morning before its birth was begun,
And said, little germ, why murmur you so,
It is your business to be there and grow.
A soul within a body chained
Dropped down to earth, despised, reviled,
With darkness and with mists invelled,
Unconscious of the lip that smiled;
It said, 'Why am I imprisoned here?
Why chained in form of clay so low?'
And a voice dropped down like an angel's tear,
'Be patient, soul, 'tis your time to grow.'
And thus every darkened place of earth
Holds some secret germ of a brighter day,
And where there seems to be mold and dearth
There shall the richest glories play.
And for every struggling soul that sings
And murmurs in its march so low,
There shall bud and blossom an angel's wing,
So toil on, dear hearts, and use time to *grow*."

The soul must realize its multiform content through change, by means of its faculty of individualization: the objectivation of some special thought, or desire, or potency. And it may be the soul cannot endure forever the monotone of eternal same. The Platonic attributes, the very generic ideas of being, are: *Rest*, *motion*, and consequent *same*, *different*. Existence is rest and motion, sameness and difference. It must maintain its poise and balance through participation of change by means of the mutable, the different, the becoming. Hence —

"I well consider all things ye have sayd,
And find that all things steadily here do bate
And changed be. Yet being rightly wayd
They are not changed from their first estate.
But by their change their *being* do *dilate*,
And *turning to themselves at length again*,
They work their own perfection so *by Fate:*
Then *over* them change doth not *rule* and *reign*,
But *they raigne over change* and do their *states maintain*."

The Prodigal Son was rich, and in high estate in his father's house; but desiring a change of fortunes, he "took his journey into a far country, and there wasted his substance with riotous living. And when he had spent all, there arose a mighty famine in that land. And he began to be in want." And out of his ordeal of struggle and starvation arose the resolve, "I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee, and am no more worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy hired servants.' And he arose and went to his father." And what saith the father? "It was meet that we should make merry and be glad, for this thy brother was dead and is alive again, and was lost and is found."

Jonah was exalted even unto the wisdom of God. He knew the Divine commandment, but did not love to do the commandments. He was disobedient to the Divine behest. This is the idea and nature of sin. The condemnation is in the fact that the sinner knows the light, but loves not the light, nor walks in the light, because his deeds are evil. And what is the cycle of this objectivation of the spirit of disobedience? We have a universal, a total fact in answer. He went down and took ship to another port than Nineveh. His voyage was full of storms and desperation and disaster. His career was down, down; the victim of the merciless elements of the world, even unto the belly of the monster of the great deep. Here, as in the case of the Prodigal Son, the dregs of the cup of disobedience were too bitter for the soul's endurance, and he cried to the Lord for help. And what did the Lord? He mercifully delivered him, and returned him back to the place and condition of his departure.

Said these souls in their exaltation, "Let us drink wine, let us crown ourselves with roses, and break up this tiresome old heaven into new forms." And in yonder aphelion of the cycle of this determination their mood is, "let us pray and struggle to achieve the heavens yonder, for we can no longer endure this monotone of evil and of disobedience and suffering." But "the *cui bono?*" you demand. In the one case it amounted to the fruit of humanity and service, and in the other case it amounted to obedience, the two most eminent virtues of the soul. For even Jonah, the vilest sinner, was now *able to be willing* to go to Nineveh after this whaling.

Apropos to this problem of the evil experience and the ordeal, is the testimony of one of the greatest of modern genuises: —

"The Lord — Enough! it is permitted thee! Divert
This mortal spirit from his source divine,
And, canst thou seize on him, thy power exert
To draw him down, to make him thine.
Then stand abashed, when baffled thou shalt own,
A good man, in the direful grasp of ill,
His consciousness of right retaineth still.

Mephisto — Well, well, the wager will be quickly won,
For my success no fears I entertain;
And if my end I finally should gain,
Excuse my triumphing with all my soul.
Dust he shall eat, ay, and with relish take,
As did of yore my cousin, the old snake.

The Lord — Here too thou'rt free to act without control.
Prone to relax is man's activity;
In indolent repose he fain would live;
Hence this companion purposely I give,
Who stirs, excites, and must, as Devil, work."

"All the world's a stage." Each soul is here to dramatize, to externalize, to realize some soul content — the characteristic of his individuality. It may be some ignorance, some impotency, some desire, some ambition, some aspiration, some honorable and exalting purpose, some divine mission, something within himself to become, or something to be overcome through *growth*, through the transmutations of individual objectivation; and with the light and the heat of the day, and the joy and fruit of summer, must be comprehended the darkness of night and the dreary desolations of winter. Life's delights and joys must be toned and established in their contrarieties. In physics and in metaphysics the tonic principle is the bitter principle. And truly the leading factor in all great achievements is the ordeal and the struggle.

Accordingly the Master saith: "In the world ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, for I have overcome the world." Overcome — victory, achievement is the measure of power and virtue. Therefore the condition and the promise.

(1.) To one he saith: To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the Paradise of God.

(2.) To another: He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death.

(3.) To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and I will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it.

(4.) To another: And he that overcometh and keepeth my works to the end, to him will I give power over the nations, even as I received of my Father, and I will give him the morning star.

(5.) To another: He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment. And I will not blot his name out of the book of life, but I will confess his name before my Father and his angels.

(6.) To another: Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out, and I will write upon him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, which is New Jerusalem, which cometh down out of heaven, and I will write upon him my new name.

(7.) To another: To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame and am sat down with my Father in his throne.

"The world is a school in which the soul may realize the perennial youth of discipleship. Education and discipline realize in us the progenies of truth and good, and are infinitely more and better than all possible *possession* of terrestrial fortune. Sacrifice, toil, duty, service, are more than all terrestrial fruition. They err who think we mortals need only joy and delight of life."

THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

[Translated from the original Greek.]

[*Continued.*]

Proposition XLIX.

Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual.

For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition and the other from a subsistence in something else, as in a subject. That which is self-subsistent however is neither a composite, but a simple, nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual.

Proposition L.

Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence or according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time.

For if it is measured by time it will be adapted to it to be, or to energize in time; and the *was* and the *will be*, which differ from each other, pertain to it. For if the *was* and the *will be* were the same according to number it would suffer nothing by time proceeding, and always having one part prior and another posterior. If, therefore, the *was* and the *will be* are different, that which is measured by time is becoming to be or rising into existence, and never *is*, but proceeds together with time, by which it is measured, existing in a tendency to being.

It likewise does not stop in the same state of being, but is always receiving another and another *to be*, just as *the now* in time is always another and another, through the progression of time. Hence it is not a simultaneous whole; for it subsists in a dispersion of temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This, however, is to possess being in non-being. For that which is becoming to be is not that which is become. Such a kind of being, therefore, as this is generation.

Proposition LI.

Every thing self-subsistent is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time.

For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not, according to existence, be measured by time. For generation is conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing self-subsistent has its being in time.

Proposition LII.

Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once present, nor will it have *this* thing pertaining to itself now subsisting, but *that* afterwards which as yet is not; but as much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding in the same measure of perfection, and, as it were, fixed immovably and without transition according to one and the same boundary.

For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be sometimes, and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation and not being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and will be, but alone *to be*, and this a whole, there every thing subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with respect to the energy of that which is eternal.

Corollary. — From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal, either according to essence or according to energy, has the whole of its essence or energy present with itself.

Proposition LIII. — *Concerning eternity and eternal natures.*

Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to everything which subsists according to time.

For if everywhere the natures which are participated are prior to their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity which is in the eternal another, and eternity itself another. And the first of these, indeed, subsists as a participant, the second as a thing participated, and the third as an imparticipable. That also which is in time is one thing; for it is a par-

ticipant. The time which is in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Everywhere, also, that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which is participated is in those things only by which it is participated. For there are many eternal and many temporal natures, in all of which eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to both these. Eternity itself, likewise, is an eternity of eternities, and time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to participated eternity, but the other to participated time.

Proposition LIV.

Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings.

For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part, or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is eternity, but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other of things in time.

Proposition LV.

Every thing which subsists according to time, either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time.

For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more similar to first natures subsist in union with them prior to such as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures, for as being generated they differ from first natures, which are self-subsistent, and as existing once they are separated from things which always exist, but the media between these are such things as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them — this being the case, the medium between things which are once generated and those that exist always is either that which is always becoming to be, or that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is, however, impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be. Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains, therefore, that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be, being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to be, but through subsisting always, imitating an eternal nature.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that perpetuity is two-fold, the one indeed, being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time. The one also being a stable, but the other being a flowing perpetuity. And the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting at once, but the other diffused and expanded according to temporal extension. And the one being a whole of itself, but the other consisting of parts, each of which is separate, according to prior and posterior.

Proposition LVI.

Every thing which is produced by secondary natures is produced in a greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as are secondary were also produced.

For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from thence; for powers in producing causes are essentially productive, and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from thence. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it are effects through that which is prior to it. For the one perfects a cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the thing caused is from thence rendered such as it is.

Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thence is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause; and on this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thence a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation and primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause which imparts generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature.

Proposition LVII.

Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.

For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than that which is posterior to it, and in consequence of this is the cause of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which is able to effect greater things among similars is also capable of effecting such as are less. But that which is able to effect such as are less is not necessarily capable of producing such as are greater. If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more numerous effects.

Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is able to produce, the cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For every thing which is produced by secondary natures is in a greater degree produced by such as are prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence, together with the thing caused, to such effects as the thing caused is naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to it, it is indeed evident that it energizes prior to the thing caused, according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause, therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused, and together with it, and posterior to it, gives subsistence to other things.

Corollary. — Hence it is evident that of such things as soul is the cause, intellect also is the cause; but that soul is not also the cause of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes prior to the soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures, intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as intellect is the cause, *the good* also is the cause; but not *vice versa*. For the privations of forms subsist from *the good*; since all things are from thence. But intellect, being form, does not give subsistence to privation.

Proposition LVIII.

Every thing which is produced by many is more compounded than that which is produced by fewer causes.

For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants, some will consist of a greater number of things, but

others of a less number, of which each participates; some, indeed, through a progression from a greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those from a less number of the same causes are more simple. Every thing, therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes is more compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple. For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true.

Proposition LIX.

Everything which is essentially simple is either better or worse than composite natures.

For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle from a great number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the former some are more simple according to that which is better, but others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however, are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend beyond them to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed through a diminution of power. For on this account also the last of things *i.e.*, matter, is most simple, as well as the first of things, because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity, however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is the same reasoning in all things.

Proposition LX.

Everything which is the cause of a greater number of effects is better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the other gives subsistence.

For if the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects will produce all that the other produces; but not *vice versa*. Hence the former of these two is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect a greater number of things possesses a greater and more total power. But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That, however, which is nearer to this cause is in a greater degree good, just as the cause of all is *the good* itself. Hence that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is essentially more excellent than that which produces a less number.

Proposition LXI.

Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.

For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the case it becomes more remote from *the one*. But in consequence of this it is able to effect a less number of things through departing from *the one*, and the unity which contains it, and will be imperfect, since the good of everything consists in union.

Proposition LXII.

Every multitude which is nearer to *the one* is less in quantity than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.

For that which is nearer to is more similar to *the one*. But *the one* gives subsistence to all things without having any multitude in itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, being the cause of a greater number of effects, since *the one* is the cause of all things, has more the form of unity and is more impartible because that is *one*. As, therefore, that which is less multiplied is more allied to *the one*, so likewise, as being allied to the cause of all things, it is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that there are more corporeal natures than souls; more souls than intellectual natures; and more intellects than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things.

Proposition LXIII.

Everything which is imparticipable gives subsistence to twofold orders of participated natures — one, indeed, in things which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always and connascently participate.

For that which is always participated is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence, before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it will establish that which is always participable, and which, by being participated, differs from that which is posterior to it, but by *the always* is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated; for prior to these are the natures which are always participated, through which these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well-ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated. For these, possessing an inextinguishable power, since they are always, are prolific of other things which are sometimes participated, and as far as to these the diminution proceeds.

Corollary. — From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from *the one*, and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others sometimes participated. Intellectual participations, likewise, are in a similar manner twofold, as also are the animations of souls and the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency, and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which always participate, and, secondarily, by those that sometimes participate according to the same order.

Proposition LXIV.

Every monad which ranks as a principle gives subsistence to a twofold number; one, indeed, of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

For if progression is according to diminution through things appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the all-perfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed in a well-ordered progression, so that some, indeed, will be self-perfect hypostases, but others will be imperfect. And these latter will become the forms of participants. For being imperfect, they will be indigent of subjects in their very nature. But the self-perfect hypostases will produce things which participate of themselves. For being perfect they will indeed fill these from themselves, and establish them in themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures to their own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their principal monad, but through their self-perfect hyparxis they are in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect hypostases, in consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from that which perfects all things. Progressions, however, are through similars, as far as to natures that are entirely

dissimilar. Every monad, therefore, which ranks as a principle gives subsistence to a twofold number.

Corollary.—From these things it is evident that of the unities some are self-perfect proceeding from *the one*, but others are illuminations of unions. And with respect to intellects, that some of them are self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, being only the images of souls; and thus neither is every union a God — but this is true of a self-perfect unity alone—nor is every intellectual peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity alone is entitled to this appellation, nor is every illumination of soul a soul, but there are also images of souls.

Proposition LXV.

Everything which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists according to cause so as to have the form of a principle, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an image.

For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as preëxisting in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced. For the latter, participating of the former exhibits in itself secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists out of the cause. But that which is in the effect is less excellent than that which exists out of the cause, but is not in anything else. It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner *is*. But everything subsists, according to hyparxis, in its own order.

Proposition LXVI.

All beings with reference to each other are either wholes or parts, or the same or different.

For either some of them comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or they neither comprehend nor are comprehended. And they either suffer something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are separated from each other. But if they comprehend they will be wholes, and if they are comprehended, parts. If, also, many things participate of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from each other.

Proposition LXVII.

Every wholeness [ὁλοτης] is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in parts.

For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts, or it is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a twofold respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes the whole. Or, it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to hyparxis, consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts, is according to cause. And the whole, which is in a part, is according to participation. For this, also, according to an ultimate diminution, is a whole so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the whole, of which the parts also are wholes.

Proposition LXVIII.

Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists of parts.

For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself — the part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction with another part. For of every whole the parts are more than one, and that will be a whole from many parts of which it consists. And thus the whole which is in a part is a part of the whole which consists of parts.

Proposition LXIX.

Every whole which consists of parts participates of the wholeness which is prior to parts.

For if it consists of parts the whole is passive, — *i.e.*, the whole participates of another whole. For the parts becoming one, are passive to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsist prior to everything which is participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore, subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain form of wholeness prior to the whole which consists of parts, which is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole, indeed, which consists of parts, subsists in many places and in many things, in various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad essentially of all totalities. For neither is each of these wholes genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole and not simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness.

Proposition LXX.

Everything which is more total among principal causes, illuminates participants prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still continues to impart its illuminations.

For it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it. When, likewise, that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize. And this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the natures that sometimes participate. Thus it is necessary, for instance, that being should be first generated, afterwards animal, and afterwards man. And man, indeed, is not, if the rational power is absent, but there is still animal, breathing and sentient. And again, life failing, being remains. For though a thing does not live, yet it has existence. And there is a similar reasoning in all things.

The cause, however, of this is, that the more causal nature, being more efficacious, energizes on the thing caused prior to that which is less causal. For the thing caused participates first of that which is more powerful. And that which is secondary again energizing, that which is more

powerful, energizes with it. Because everything which the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces likewise in conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the latter is still present. For the communication of the more powerful cause operating in a greater degree, leaves that which participates it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause. For through the communication of the secondary nature it corroborates its own illumination.

Proposition LXXI.

All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications of more partial causes. And the illuminations, indeed, from higher causes receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter are established in the former. And thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more partial supplying their participants with their communications, posterior to the energies of more total causes.

For if more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also; but things more subordinate and which are second in order, are supplied from such as are more causal, it is evident that the illuminations of superior natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these, and give stability to the communications of things subordinate. But these illuminations of superior causes employ the resemblances of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior energy.

Proposition LXXII.

All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes.

For the causes of a greater number of effects are more powerful and total, and are nearer to *the one*, than the causes of fewer effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a greater number of effects.

Corollary. — From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from *the one* is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul. For matter being the subject of all things, proceeds from the cause of all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a certain manner of being.

Proposition LXXIII.

Every whole is at the same time a certain being and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.

For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior but the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. For if this were the case, a part would be a nonentity. But if a part was a nonentity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them, and therefore causally containing them in itself, or as subsisting in them. But the part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, therefore, that every whole is indeed being, but that not every being is a whole.

Corallary. — From these things it is evident that being, which has a primary subsistence, is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is present with a greater number of things; since *to be* is present with parts, so far as they *are* parts. But the other, viz. wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been demonstrated.

Proposition LXXIV.

Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.

For a particular thing is a whole, and also an individual, so far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence, whole is above the forms of beings.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form. Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings, but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of being.

Proposition LXXV.

Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

For if it is in the effect it either gives completion to it, or is in a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, it is rather a con-cause than a cause, and is either a part of that which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is a part in the thing generated is more imperfect than the whole. The cause, also, which is in the effect is an instrument of generation to the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and in short, from everything which is called a con-cause.

Proposition LXXVI.

Everything which is generated from an immovable cause has an immutable hyparxis. But everything which is generated from a movable cause has a mutable hyparxis.

For if that which makes is entirely immovable, it does not produce from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. Hence, this is always generated from

thence, and always is, conjoining with *the ever* according to energy of the cause, its own ever according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also which is generated from it is essentially mutable. For that which has its being through motion, changes it being when its movable cause is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. This, however, is impossible. It will not therefore be immutable. Hence it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the motion of that which gave it subsistence.

Proposition LXXVII.

Everything which is in capacity, proceeds from that which is in energy. And that which is in capacity proceeds into energy. That also which is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity proceeds from that which is all things in energy.

For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced by it. Hence that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of perfection; since everything which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity — but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect — or it will be in energy, and either something else or this which was in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own pecularity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy, unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains, therefore, that from that which is in energy that which is in capacity must be changed into energy.

Proposition LXXVIII.

Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however, which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of an other that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something in capacity, is imperfect For it is indigent of the perfection which is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become perfect. Hence such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and obtains perfection from the power which is in energy.

Proposition LXXIX.

Everything which is generated, is generated from a twofold power.

For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude, and an imperfect power. And that which makes, being in energy that which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that which makes did not possess power, how could it energize and produce something else? And if that which is generated did not possess power, according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the agent.

Proposition LXXX.

Every body is naturally adapted, of itself, to suffer, but every thing incorporeal, to act. And the former, indeed, is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, suffers through its communion with the body; just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which is impartible capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature; since body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be divided and to suffer. For everything which acts has an effective power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act but so far as it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures, when they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions; being divided together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though according to their own essence they are impartible.

Proposition LXXXI.

Everything which is participated in a separable manner, is present with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it.

For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner, and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain medium between the two is necessary, connecting the one with the other, and which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains the medium nor anything proceeding from it? A power, therefore, and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the participant, conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through which the participation is effected, another will be that which is participated, and another, that which participates.

Proposition LXXXII.

Everything incorporeal which is converted to itself, when it is participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.

For, if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however, this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For, being converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted to itself it will be participated in a separable manner, when it is participated by other things.

Proposition LXXXIII.

Everything which has a knowledge of itself is entirely converted to itself.

For, knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. This knowledge, also, as pertaining to that which knows, is a certain energy; but it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For everything which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence verging to and subsisting in itself.

Proposition LXXXIV.

Everything which always is, possesses an infinite power.

For if its hypostasis is never failing, the power also according to which it is that which it is, and is able to exist is infinite. For the power of existing being finite, it will sometime or other fail. But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary, therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects and contains it essentially, should be infinite.

Proposition LXXXV.

Everything which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in it is never failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it would no longer be always becoming to be. It is, however, supposed to be always becoming to be. Hence it possesses an infinite power of rising into existence.

Proposition LXXXVI.

Everything which is truly being is infinite, neither according to multitude nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

For every infinite is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite on account of magnitude,—for that which is truly being is without magnitude, being self-subsistent, since everything self-subsistent is impartible and simple, — nor is it infinite on account of multitude, for it has in the most eminent degree the form of *the one*, as being arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite according to power. Hence it is also impartible and infinite. And by how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it infinite. For the power which is divided becomes imbecile and finite, and powers which are entirely divided are in every respect finite. For ultimate powers, and which are most remote from *the one*, are in a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts. But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of everything. But impartibility, compressing and contracting that which it contains, renders it never-failing and undiminished in itself.

Moreover, infinity according to magnitude, and also according to multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, but the infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from *the one*. Hence that which is infinite according to power, is not infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite either in multitude or magnitude is most remote from the impartible. If, therefore, that which is truly being was infinite either in magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, however, possess infinite power; and, therefore, is not infinite either according to multitude or according to magnitude.

Proposition LXXXVII.

Everything eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with generated natures, so far as each of these is not that which in no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, everything eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not everything which participates of being participates also of eternity.

[To be continued.]

IAMBLICHOS: A TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION, BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

(Part I. — *Concluded.*)

THE DEITIES AND SOULS CONTRASTED.

VII. The former of the extreme Orders is exalted and perfect; the other is last in rank, inferior and imperfect. The one is uniformly capable of everything at once, at this very moment; the other is not capable universally, immediately, without premeditation, or undivided. The one, without variation of purpose, generates everything and superintends it; the other has the disposition to yield and be turned to the things that are produced and governed. The one is supreme and the cause of all, and takes the first place in everything; the other is dependent on the First Cause and on the will of the gods, and is eternally subordinate. The one apprehends in a single decisive moment the ends of all active energies and essences; the other goes from one thing to another, and so advances from the imperfect to the perfect. Moreover, the former possesses that which is highest and incomprehensible, beyond measurement and thus beyond idea, so that it is not circumscribed by any specific distinction; the other is controlled by chance, habit, and inclination, and is pervaded by eager desire for what is inferior in excellence, and by fond attachment for objects of secondary importance, and so it is shaped in various ways, and takes its proportions from them. Pure reason, or spirit [νους], the ruler and king of the things that are, the Creative Wisdom [τέχνη δημιουργική] of the universe, existing purely by itself according to energy, is always present likewise with the gods, consummate and without defect. But the soul, or psychic essence, placing its attention upon the status of everything, partakes of pure reason by measure and in different modes. It is also born into different forms, and so takes charge at various times over unsouled races.

Order itself, the Perfect Excellence, is co-existent with the nobler beings; or, if any one chooses so to express it, the Cause exists simultaneously with the gods. But there is always a participation of spiritual order and divine excellence afforded to every psychical essence. The universe, or its Cause, is in harmony throughout with the gods. But the soul or psychical entity is circumscribed in a distinct limitation by the Godhead, and partakes of this harmony according to allotment. That the gods take precedence over all beings by virtue of power and authority from the Supreme Cause, may be conceded with good reason. But the soul or psychic essence [ψυχή] has certain defined limits to the extent of which it may have preëminence. Such being the different essential properties of the two orders at the extremes, any one may perceive without difficulty the peculiarities of the intermediary races, the tutelary spirits and the half-gods. These come next to each of the extreme orders, having a likeness to each of them, receding from both toward the middle, forming a harmonious society from them thus mingled with each other, and connected with the latter in suitable degrees. Such, therefore, must be considered as the peculiarities of the first or divine Orders.

THE INFERIOR NATURES COMPREHENDED BY THE SUPERIOR.

VIII. We may not by any means admit the distinction of the Superior Orders to be what is suggested by you, which imputes the cause of their separation from each other, the matter now under consideration, to be "the distribution to the different bodies; as, for example, of the deities to ætherial, the tutelary spirits to aërial, and souls [psychic essences] to earthly bodies." This mode of classification is like that of assigning Sôkratês to the tribe, when he was a Prytanis, and is wholly unworthy to be proposed in regard to the divine Orders, all of which are detached and free of all bonds, in virtue of their superior nature. It is the displaying of a fearful absurdity to ascribe to bodies the larger influence in giving a specific distinction to their own first causes; for they themselves are wholly subservient to these, and pertain to the sphere of transition [γενεσίς]. Besides, the Orders of Superior beings are not in bodies, but rule them from without; and accordingly they are not controlled from without by them. Again, they impart from themselves to those bodies every such good as they are able to receive; but they never receive anything from the bodies. Hence they will not derive from them any peculiarities whatever. If they were as habitudes of the bodies, or as material forms, or of a corporeal likeness in some other way, it might be possible that they should change and acquire the differences incident to the bodies. But if they preëxist separate from the bodies and incompatible with them, what distinction originating from the bodies may with good reason be developed in them?

Indeed, this language of yours in regard to these spiritual beings makes the bodies superior to the divine Orders, if they furnish a vehicle [ἕδρα] for the higher causes, and fixes peculiarities in them according to their essential character [κάτ' οὐσίαν]. Whoever, then, arranges the lots, distributions, and allotments of the governing Orders and those governed, will certainly concede the chief rule to the more noble. It is because the superior Orders are such that they have obtained such a lot, and give it a sole specific distinction; but they do not thereby become in any degree assimilated to the nature of the corporeal receptacle.

It is necessary, therefore, I say, to concede such a matter in the case of each soul. Whatever life the soul presented before it was introduced into a human body, and whatever form was in readiness, it has such an organic body fastened to it and a corresponding nature accompanying which receives its more perfect life. But in regard to the higher Orders, those which include the origin of all things, the inferior are produced in the superior, the bodies in the unbodied essences, the things created in the creators, and being comprehended in them in a circle, are guided by them. Hence the revolutions of the heavenly bodies were combined from the first with the heavenly journeyings [περιφοράς] of the ætherial soul, having been always embeinged [ἐνυπάρχοντα] with it; and the souls of the worlds being allied to their interior spirit [νοῦς], are completely embraced by it, and have their parentage in it from the first. The interior spirit, equally when divided and when universal is comprehended in the nobler orders. As, therefore, the secondary are always turning themselves toward the first; and the superior natures, as being exemplars, lead those that are inferior, so Essence and Form are present in the lower from the higher Orders, and those that are last are cotemporary from the very first with the nobler ones themselves. Thus from these, Order and Proportion [μέτρων] issue forth to the lower natures, and in short, every substantial thing. But on the contrary, from the inferior orders to those more excellent than themselves, there is no transmission of peculiar characteristic qualities.

It is shown, therefore, from these premises, that such a classification, derived from bodily figures, would be false. Indeed, it is manifestly not proper to put forth any such hypothesis. Even though it may seem to you to be well enough, the falsity is not worthy of a remark. There is, to be sure, no great amount of argument in this, but one worries himself to no purpose if he endeavors, when false propositions are submitted, to refute them as untrue. How is it possible that an essence which is by itself incorporeal, having nothing common to the bodies which participate of it, should be delineated by distinctions from such bodies? How can it, not being present in bodies, so far as place is concerned, be described by distinctions of place after the manner of bodies? How can that which is not set off by circumscribed divisions of subject-matter, be marked out in divisions, like parts of the world? What hindrance is there for the gods to go everywhere; what is there to restrain their power which extends clear to the celestial vault? This would be an achievement of a mightier cause than that which encloses them and circumscribes them into certain parts. Real Being is absolutely incorporeal, and is everywhere wherever it wills. But, according to your proposition, the Godhead which transcends all things, would itself be surpassed by the completeness of the universal cosmos, and comprised in it like any part, and so would be inferior in respect to bodily magnitude. I do not see, however, in what way the various orders of existence would be created and specifically arranged if no creation by the Godhead and no participation of divine forms extends through the whole universe.

In short, however, this opinion banishes the superior orders from off the earth, and is an utter subverting of the sacred rites as well as of the theurgic intercourse of gods with the human race. It implies no other meaning than that the divine beings have been established like a colony remote from the earth, that they have no communication with mankind, and that this mundane region is the same as deserted by them. According to this logic we of the sacerdotal order have never learned anything from the gods, and seeing that we differ in nothing from common men, you are not doing right to ask us questions as persons who know more than anybody else.

Not one of these propositions, however, is sound. The gods are not confined in certain parts of the Universe, nor have the races of the earth been shut away from them. But the nobler orders are distinguished in this, that they are contained by nothing whatever, and they contain all things in themselves; whereas the races on the earth have their being in the abundant perfec-

tions [πληρώμασι] of the gods, and whenever they become fit for the divine impartation they immediately possess the gods, who, before they had their individual essence, were preëxistent with it.

That, therefore, this whole classification is false, that the way of hunting out the peculiar characteristics of the divine operations is irrational, and that the assigning of the gods to a certain place in the universe is not a just conception of their power and essence, we have shown by these facts. It would have been proper, accordingly, to pass over in silence as nothing to the purpose, the inquiry made by you in relation to this distribution of the superior races, which contradicted the true understanding of the matter. Inasmuch, however, as it is necessary rather to direct our attention to the thought and true knowledge, but not to engage in dispute with a man, we will therefore give a certain rational and theological form to the present discussion.

DIVINE OPERATIONS NOT CIRCUMSCRIBED.

IX. I consider you, therefore, as asking, for your perplexity is in relation to that very matter: "Why among the divinities inhabiting the celestial expanse, are those only of the Earth and Underworld invoked in the theurgic rites?" The position which you assumed at the outset, that the gods really dwell in heaven only, is not true; for all things are full of them. But you make the further inquiry: "Why are certain ones said to be of the water and the air, and others assigned to other places, and distributed to particular parts of bodies as may be circumscribed, having at the same time power unconditioned, undivided, and uncomprehended? Also, how will they become as one with each other when they are thus separated by circumscribed divisions of parts, and according to the diversities of places and subject-bodies?" The one best answer to all these, and an infinite number of similar questions, may be obtained by contemplating the nature of the divine allotment.

This is therefore submitted: Whether a deity is assigned to certain parts of the universe, such as heaven or earth, or to sacred cities and regions, or to certain temples or sacred images, it shines upon everything externally, just as the sun illuminates everything externally with his rays. As the light embraces whatever things are illuminated by it, so also the power of the gods comprehends those who have received of it. As, likewise, the light is present in the air and is not combined with it, which is manifest from there being no light left therein as soon as the illuminating agency is withdrawn, although warmth remains after the heating apparatus has been removed out of the way, so, likewise, the light of the gods goes entirely through objects, and from being firmly established in itself, illuminates them without uniting with their substance. Indeed, the light which is discovered by the eyes is one, connected, and everywhere the same entirety; hence, it is not possible for a part of it to be cut away by itself, and to be comprised in a circle, and to be separated from the luminous source. According to the same principles, the whole universe together, being susceptible of division, is divided in regard to the one and indivisible light of the gods. But it is one and the same entirety everywhere; it is present undivided with everything that can receive of it; it fills all things by a power operating at all times. By an infinite excellence after the manner of the First Cause, it blends all things in itself, is at one with itself everywhere, and unites the ends with the beginnings. The whole heavenly cosmos moves in imitation of this; makes stated revolutions; is at one with itself; impels forward its elements after the manner of a circle; causes all things to be in each other and to tend to each other reciprocally, and the ends to coalesce with the beginnings, as the earth with the sky; and makes one close connection and harmony between wholes and wholes.

Will not any person who contemplates this reflected image of the gods (the universe), thus compacted together into one, have too much veneration for its authors (the gods) to hold any diverse opinion which shall impel him to introduce among them artificial divisions, classifications, and delineations after a regular system? I believe that everybody will be so disposed. If there is no reason for it, no structural arrangement, nor any community of essence, no conjunction in faculty or in any active energy, between the created Universe and the Creator of the Universe, then let me say in reply, that nothing has been established in it, neither extension with intervals between, nor circuit with an arrangement as of place, nor line of separation, nor other such assimilation to natural conditions in which the gods are present. With things of similar nature in essence and power, or that are in some way related, of like species or family, a certain classifying and holding together can be conceived. But when they are entirely separate to the utmost particular, what opposing circumstance among these named, or passage through them all, or line of partition, or local limitation, or other thing of a like kind can be justly imagined?

I am of the opinion, however, that those who partake of the divinities are of such peculiar temperament that some receive them through the æther, others from the air, and others by water; which the institutors of the Divine rites observe, and employ familiar invocations suitable for such an arrangement. So much may be known in regard to the distribution of the nobler Orders in the Universe.

THE SUPERIOR ORDERS IMPASSIVE.

X. After submitting these introductory propositions, you have of your own motion instituted still another classification. You differentiate the essences of the superior orders by the distinction of "passive and impassible." I do not, however, accept this classification. None of the superior orders is passive, nor impassible in the sense of being contradistinguished from a liability to be acted upon. Nor are they naturally constituted so as to receive impressions, but are exempted from these things by virtue of their inherent excellence, or some other efficacious quality. I have, on this account, set them down as unimpressible and unchangeable, because they are entirely without the interior contradiction of being receptive or not receptive, because they are not at all constituted naturally to be receptive, and because they possess in their very inmost being an unchangeable fixedness.

Consider, if you please, the lowest of the divine essences, the Soul, pure from the bodily environment. As it is beyond the conditions of nature and lives an unbegotten life, what need has it of physical existence with its delight, or of thereby effecting a return into the domain of Nature? Being entirely without body and of a nature which is subject to division in respect to the body, and being separate in all particulars from that established harmony in the soul which goes forth into the body, why should it become a partaker of the pain which leads to the breaking up and dissolves the harmony of the body? On the contrary, it has no necessity for the conditions [πάθηματα] which are the interior cause of physical sensation; for it is neither altogether held by a body, nor is it environed by it so that it requires bodily organs to perceive other bodies which are exterior. In short, being incapable of such division, remaining permanent in one identical form, existing of itself without body, and having nothing whatever in common with a body subjected to change and external influences, it may not undergo anything by division or transformation; indeed, it has nothing whatever about it that relates

to change or condition. On the contrary, when it comes into the body, it is not itself passive, nor are the rational principles [λόγοι] which it bestows upon the body. These are forms single and of one simple substance, and they allow no agitation or change of condition [ἕκστασις] in themselves. It is therefore the residue which remains, which is the cause of such experience to the complex being. The cause, however, is not the same, whatever the effect.

The soul or psychic essence, therefore, is the first genesis or formation of complex living beings that come into phenomenal existence and pass into non-existence; but as regarded by itself, it is neither generated nor subject to decay. These beings, which partake of the psychic essence, are passive and recipient, not possessing life and real being as a whole, but being intertwined with the indefinite and alien conditions of the material principle. On the other hand, the soul is of itself unchangeable, as being superior in essence to that which is receptive, but not in any sense as influenced to any deliberate choice which would imply an inclining to both directions, nor as receiving advantageous change in the participation of condition or faculty.

As, therefore, we have shown the partaking of the passive nature to be impossible for the lowest order of superior essences, like the soul, how is it proper to attribute it to tutelary spirits and the half-gods who are eternal beings, and follow next after the gods, and who being themselves by their inherent constitution held at all times to the divine arrangement, keep it without any variation, and never permit any interval in it? We know this, of a certainty, that the receptive condition is to a degree undisciplined, discordant, and unregulated; not at all its own, but devoted to that by which it is held, and to which it is subservient during the period of transition. This condition, therefore, pertains to some other Order rather than to one which is always subsisting and is joined to the gods, going in the same order and circuit with them.

Hence the tutelary spirits, and all the superior orders that followed them, are impassive.

THE OBJECT AND UTILITY OF THE ARCANE RITES.

XI. "Why, then [you ask], are many of the representations in the sacred Orgies made as though they [the gods and the Superior Orders] were susceptible of change?" This, I must insist, has been ignorantly asserted in regard to the Sacerdotal Initiations: for among the things which are everywhere set forth in the Sacred Dramas, some have a specific arcane cause and a higher meaning; others have been sacred to the divinities from eternity as symbols; others preserve the image of some idea beyond, as Nature, the genitrix, developes certain specific visible formations from invisible principles; others are introduced from the sentiment of veneration, or are instituted for the purpose of illustrating something or rendering it familiar. Some disclose what is profitable to us, or in some way purify and set us free from our human frailties, or turn aside some other of the evils that are likely to befall us. Never, however, should any one concede that any part of the Holy Rites is employed for the rendering of service to the gods or tutelary spirits as beings subject to influence. An essence which is innately eternal and without body, is not so constituted as to permit any change from individuals in the body. Indeed, even if it should be conceded that it had the greatest need of such things, it would not then require such worship from human beings. It is amply supplied from itself, from the cosmical nature-sphere, and the abundant perfection in the transition-sphere; and, if it is permissible to say this, before it can become thus needy it receives a sufficiency from the unlimited resources of the universe, and the abundance which is enjoyed by the Order to which it belongs; for all the Superior Orders are amply supplied with the wealth [ἀγαθά] appropriate to each of them. Let this, therefore, be an encouragement to us, each and all, in regard to the worship of the PURE ONES; that it may be in other respects properly adapted to those who are our superiors, because pure things are supplied to the pure, and the impassive to the impassible.

For instance, speaking of everything in these references of yours, we said in regard to "the erecting of phallic images," that it was a specific emblem of the procreative power, and we recognize this as the invoking of it for the fertilisation of the world. On this account many of these emblems are consecrated in the spring, when the world receives from the gods the generative principle of the whole mundane creation. The "indelicate language" said to be then employed, I consider as the admission of the evidence that good qualities are absent in the material principle, and of the former immodest condition of those who are about to be becomingly apparelled. These being destitute of comely embellishment, are so much the more eager as they perceive more vividly their own unseemliness. Again, therefore, they investigate the causes of beautiful forms, learning what vileness is from these vile things of speech; and while they manifest by their words their knowledge of it, they turn away from the corresponding acts, and fix their longing upon the contrary principle.

There is, besides, another important reason for these things. The human passions which are in us as potencies, are made more urgent by being harshly repressed on every side. When they have been developed into active energy they are, by gentle persuasion and with no irritating restraint, softened to a normal condition, moderately delighted, satisfied, and thence are purified from their dregs, and caused to cease from their violence. In this way, when we contemplate the emotions of others in comedies and tragedies, we repress our own passions, moderate them, and are purified. In the Sacred Dramas also, we are freed, by the spectacles and narratives of vile and wicked matters, from the hurt which occurs from the acts illustrated by them.

For the health of the soul in us, the moderating of the evils which are incident to it in the sphere of change, and for the sake of loosing and delivering it from bonds, therefore, such things are introduced. On this account, probably, Herakleitos calls them "remedies," as being the cure for evils, and restoring the souls to soundness from the ills pertaining to our changeable life.

THE GODS LIKEWISE IMPASSIBLE.

XII. It is said, however: "Prayers are made to the gods as though they were susceptible; so that it is legitimate to suppose that not only the lower spiritual essences, but the very deities, are thus susceptible." This, however, is not as you have supposed. The illumination which comes through prayers is self-revealing and self-initiating; it keeps far beyond the tendency downward; it goes forth into full display through the divine energy and perfection, and as much excels voluntary motion as the divine will-power of the Supreme Goodness surpasses the life which has been deliberately preferred by human beings. Through such will-power, therefore, the gods, being friendly and propitious, give forth light unstintingly to those engaged in divine work [θεούργοι], calling their souls once more to themselves, providing for them that they shall be at one with themselves in the chorus, habituating them to a separation from bodily conditions even while being still in body, and leading them toward the eternal and intelligential [νοητόν] source of their own being.

From these very results it is manifest that the Safe Return of

the Soul is what we were discoursing about. In the contemplating of holy [μακάρια] spectacles, the soul reciprocates another life, is active with another energy, goes forward as not being of the order of men on earth; or perhaps, speaking more correctly, it abandons its own life, and partakes of the most blessed energy of the gods. If, indeed, the exaltation by means of prayer procures for the consecrated ones [ἱερεῦσι] purification from passions, deliverance from the world of change, and union to the Divine Source of being, how may anyone attribute to it anything emotional? Such prayer does not draw down the impassive and pure to the emotive and impure. On the contrary, it renders us pure and steadfast who had through the transition-life become susceptible.

Even the "invocations" do not join the priests to the gods through such susceptibility, but create for them a complete indissoluble connection, through the love which holds all things together. Hence they do not, as the word seems to imply, cause the interior mind of the gods to incline toward human beings; but as the truth will instruct us, they simultaneously adapt the human reason to be partaker of the divine nature, they lead it upward to the gods, and unite them together by the appropriate means of persuasion. Whence, likewise, the sacred names of the gods and other divine symbols, tending to elevate the mind, are potent to connect them with the gods.

THE ANGER OF THE GODS.

XIII. "The appeasing of divine anger" will also be clear, if we learn what the *anger of the gods* really means. It certainly is not, as some suppose, a special long-existing and constant fury of the gods, but it is, on the contrary, a turning away from their beneficial protection. We turn ourselves away from them, hiding from our view the bright noonday, making darkness for ourselves, and depriving ourselves of the rich gift of the deities. The "appeasing," therefore, is in order to turn us back to the more excellent participation, to lead us again to the sharing of the divine guardianship which we had rejected from us, and to bind the partakers and the participated to each other reciprocally and in just proportion. It stands so far aloof from the accomplishing of its work by the means of emotion, that it even leads us away from the passionate and disorderly abandoning of the gods.

The "sacrifices" also have their use, because that evil is present in the various regions of the earth. They heal and provide for us so that no turning away or ill may happen to us. Whether, therefore, this may take place through the gods or guardian spirits, the worshippers invoke these helpers, repellers of evil, and deliverers, and by their aid avert all injury which is liable from perils. They who turn aside the chastisements incident in the world of change and nature, are not attempting to do those things by means of emotional influences. If, indeed, any one thinks that the interrupted protection of the superior races is likely to induce some self-incurred harm, the persuasion of the efficacy of sacrifice may be in every respect pure and inflexible, recalling their benign disposition to exercise again a guardian care, and removing the deprivation.

DIVINE NECESSITY AND THE DIVINE WILL AT ONE.

XIV. Hence, therefore, in regard to "what are termed *the necessities of the gods*," the whole thing is this: necessities are the gods' own, and exist as divine elements, not as coming from without, or in spite of them, but as necessarily promoting the Supreme Good. Hence they are complete in every way, and in no sense whatever are they otherwise constituted. This necessity, therefore, is itself love's sweetheart, and is wedded and commingled with a will that regards only goodness. By the peculiar divine arrangement it is possessed of a like unchangeableness; and as it is accordingly and in like manner circumscribed within a specified limitation, it remains in this and never swerves. Hence, in all these respects it turns out the contrary of what you have inferred. The result of our discussion is, that if there are truly such powers in Theurgy as we have set forth, the Divine Nature is not to be charmed, influenced by emotion, or compelled.

ERRONEOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN GODS AND TUTELARIES.

XV. After this you digress in order to establish another classification of gods as opposed to tutelary spirits. You say: "The deities are pure spiritual essences [νόας]." You propose this opinion as an hypothesis, or state it as having been received by certain persons, explaining further, "that the guardian spirits are psychical, and partakers of the spiritual nature." It is by no means hidden from me that these opinions are entertained by many philosophers; but I do not think it proper to hide from you the truth as it appears. All these opinions are involved in inextricable confusion; wandering from the tutelary demons to the souls, for these also are partakers of the spiritual nature, and from the gods to that spiritual essence actually immaterial in which the gods excel in every respect. Why, then, shall we attribute to them peculiarities which are by no means altogether their own? As for this classification, it is worthy of mention so far, but it is superfluous otherwise. Since the matters relating to it about which you are in doubt belong to the sacerdotal order, let the priests have a word.

EFFICACY OF PRAYER.

You remark next: "Pure spiritual essences will be in a greater degree incapable of receiving delight and being mixed with things of sense;" and doubt whether it is a duty to pray to them. I, however, consider it unnecessary to pray to any other. The something in us divine, [νοητὸν] and one — or, if you choose to call it simply spiritual, — is vividly roused by prayers; and having been roused, it ardently desires that which corresponds to it and is joined to the absolute self-complete. If, however, it seems to you to be incredible that an unbodied essence hears sound in some way, and that it needs also the sense of hearing in order to perceive what is uttered by us in prayers, you are wilfully forgetful of the abundance of the prior causes, which excel in the knowing and comprehending of the whole at once in themselves. The gods, therefore, do not receive prayers into their interior cognisance by the agency of faculties or organs, but comprehend in themselves the internal sense of the pious utterances, especially those which happen, by the agency of the Sacred Rites, to have become established and in unison with the gods. At this time the divine essence has intercourse with itself, and has no communication with the thinking principles, as being something foreign to it.

PRAYING LEADS THE PETITIONER TO THE DIVINE.

You say further: "The prayers are entirely out of place, as being offered to pure spiritual essences." Not at all. On this very account, because we are inferiors of the gods in power, in purity, and in every respect, it is the most becoming thing to supplicate them even to passionate exaggeration. The consciousness of our own nothingness, when decided by comparing ourselves with the gods, causes us to betake ourselves spontaneously to suppliant prayer. In a very short time we are led from supplication upward to the object supplicated; we acquire the likeness to it from having an uninterrupted intercourse, and in place of imperfection we silently receive divine perfection.

If it is indeed perceived that the Sacred Prayers are sent forth from the deities themselves to mankind; that they are countersigns of the gods themselves; that they are symbols known to the godhead alone, and in a certain way have the same power with the gods, how then may it be justly supposed that a supplication of this kind pertains to sensibility, and is not divine or spiritual? Or what passion may insinuate itself into the same place with any show of reason, when a human code of ethics, however excellent, cannot easily approximate to it in purity?

You say, however: "Offerings are presented as to beings of soul and sense." If, indeed, they were entirely made up of corporeal and complex faculties, or of things which are constituted for the uses merely of the organism, this would be true. Inasmuch, however, as the offerings participate likewise of unbodied forms and of specific words and simpler proportions, the relation is to be contemplated as embracing this matter alone by itself; and if any kinship or likeness exists, near or remote, it is sufficient for the union of which we are now discoursing. *There is not anything whatever, which is in the least degree akin to the godhead, with which the gods are not immediately present and united.*

It is not, then, "as to beings of soul and sense," but to the divine forms themselves, even to the very godhead, that the connection is established in its full power. So that we have said enough against this classification.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN GODS AND OTHER SPIRITUAL BEINGS.

XVI. Next after this in your letter comes the question: "Are the deities distinguished from the tutelary spirits by the endowment of the latter with bodies, while the former are without body?" This distinction is much more common than the former one; yet it is so far from pointing out the peculiarities of their essence as not to be at the least a tolerable conjecture respecting them, nor of things happening to them. It is not possible to understand from these things whether they are living beings or not, whether they have been deprived of life, or are not at all in want of it. Besides, it is not easy to form an opinion how these names are applied, whether in common or according to their many differences. If in common, it is out of place for a line and period of time, a deity and guardian spirits, fire and water to be included under the same order as being without body. But if of the many, why do you, when you speak of the unbodied Order, indicate gods rather than symbols; or when you treat of corporeal existence, why should not the earth be understood, rather than spiritual beings? This very matter is not explained, whether they have bodies or are conveyed about by bodies as by a vehicle, or take and make use of them, or are superior to them, or are only the same with the body. It is, however, probably not quite necessary to scrutinize this contradictory classification very carefully. You do not propose it as your own judgment, but exhibit it as the opinion of others.

THE CELESTIAL LUMINARIES DIVINE.

XVII. Let us take this question instead, which you may be solicitous to include with the opinion under notice: "Why" as you express it, "will the sun and moon, and the celestial luminaries, be reckoned as gods, if only gods are unbodied?" We answer: They are not encompassed by bodies, but in their divine lives and energies are superior to bodies; they do notbetake themselves to a corporiety, but possess corporeal form turned back to its divine cause; and that corporeal form does not impede their perfection in spiritual and incorporeal matters, nor give trouble in the meanwhile by its intervening. Hence it does not require greater care on its own part, but accompanies them in a subordinate capacity, according to a way that is both self-originated and self-moving, requiring no care to be taken in regard to itself. Thus, under the lead and direction of the godhead it moves itself forward by its own impulse, uniformly with them toward the ONE.

Indeed, if it is pertinent to say this, the body in the sky is very closely akin to the incorporeal substance of the godhead. The latter is one, and the other is simple; the latter is absolutely undivided into parts, and the other inseparable; the latter is permanent, and the other in no degree liable to transmutation. If it is to be taken for granted that the energies of the gods are always alike in form, the other has but a single orbit. It is a copy of the sameness of the godhead in this respect, according to the same principles, by this same manner and in the same direction, following one law and one order of eternal motion; and is also a likeness of the divine life combined with the life innate in the ætherial bodies. Hence the celestial body is not composed of contrary and discordant elements as our body is constituted; nor does the soul combine with the body into one living thing from two. On the other hand, the living beings of the celestial region are in every respect alike and united together, and are entire, of one form, and unmingled throughout. They always excel in the same things as the Superior Orders, and in the same manner, and are likewise dependent like the lower classes in a commonwealth, upon the supreme authority of the nobles, and never attempt to extend that authority to those of their own rank. Hence they are united through the entire series into one orderly arrangement and one confederation, and are all in a specific sense incorporeal and wholly divine. On this account the divine ideal in them rules, through all things and inspires in all the one same unmingled principle of being. So, therefore, the visible heavenly luminaries are all gods, and in a certain sense incorporeal.

THE ASTRAL GODS NEVER CAUSES OF HARM.

XVIII. Next in course of explanation is your inquiry: "How is it that some [of the divinities of the sky] are beneficent, and others the causes of harm?" This opinion is derived from the astrologers who calculate nativities, and is wide of the truth in every particular. The astral divinities, all of them, are good, and likewise the causes of good; and they all with one accord lead to the One Supreme Good, in conformity with the sole principle of excellence and goodness. Nevertheless, the bodies which belong to them are possessed of incomparable powers, some of which are permanently fixed in the divine bodies themselves, while others go forth from them into the nature-sphere [φύσις] of the universe, and the universe itself, passing thither in due order through the entire transition-world [γένεσις] and therefrom pervading every part.[1]

[1] This gradation, as here set forth, is sufficiently intelligible to the expert philosophical reader; but it should not be regarded as profaning or popularizing the subject unduly, to attempt an explanation for the convenience of the novitiate, who may not have well learned this mode of speaking and classification. The cosmical universe is here treated as being in two provinces or departments: nature or φύσις, the maternal or producing sphere, which includes all things in the visible universe, and *genesis*, which Mr. Taylor and the other writers render by the term *generation*. The word, owing to its common meaning in the English language, becomes often an unnecessary cause of obscurity when appearing in philosophical discourses. The Greek word γένεσις is from the verb γίνομαι, or rather the obsolete γέναω, to become; to exist as an objective entity; to engender. Hence it means the sphere of transition or changing; and is here represented as deriving potencies from the astral and divine world and communicating them to the natural. This idea pervades the whole Platonic philosophy. Thus we have the illustration of Ploutarchos, that the three Fates, or Weird Sisters, supervise all: one, in the sun, giving the genetic principle; the second, in the moon, mingling it with the lower elements; and the third, in the earth, ordering the results. The divine essence is ἡ οὐσία, or that which *is*. Divine essences, as the preceding discourse has shown, are therefore permanent, and of

In regard, therefore, to the potencies which remain with the divine bodies in the sky, no one may doubt that they are all alike. It only remains for us, then, to treat of those which are transmitted hitherward, and are intermingled with the sphere of transition. These go forth likewise throughout the universe for its preservation, and sustain the whole intermediate world of transition by their inherent force. They are impassive and unchangeable, and yet hold fast to the changing and passive. As the transition-sphere abounds with innumerable ideal forms and is composed from diverse principles, it receives their principle of absolute oneness and non-diversity, ungraciously and disjunctively, owing to its inherent repugnant nature and tendency to division. It admits the impassible principle passively; and indeed, to sum up everything, it is constituted so that it may partake of those potencies according to its own peculiar nature and not according to their power.

As, then, that which belongs to the transition-sphere is receptive of real being after the manner of procreation, and the body is receptive of the incorporeal principle after the corporeal manner, so also the things of the world of nature and material substance which pertain to the transition-sphere, when they receive the immaterial and ætherial bodies which are beyond the world of nature and transition, are themselves disorderly and inharmonious. They are far out of the way, therefore, who attribute color, shape, and touch to mental creations because those receiving them are of such a kind. So, likewise, are they at fault who impute badness to the bodies in the sky, because those who receive of their potencies sometimes become wicked. That which is participated would never be of such a character, unless the recipient had some agency in transforming it.

If, however, that which is communicated is received as heterogeneous and diverse, it may thus become as a foreign substance, and then it is hurtful and disordering to the races that exist about the earth. This change of properties and the commingling of the emanation of material entities with immaterial, become a cause of much diversity among the lower races. Besides, that which is imparted as heterogeneous is received by these after the same way as being heterogeneous. For example, the emanation of Kronos [the planet Saturn] is conservative, and that of Arês [Mars] is impulsive; but in the races of the material world, the passive generative receptacle absorbs the former as being condensed and cold, and the other as a heat which is above the normal temperature. Do not the destructive tendency and the incongruity exist through the perverseness which receives that which is differentiating, pertaining to the material nature, and passive? Hence the weak condition which is incident to places belonging to the sphere of material and earthly existence, is not capable of the genuine strength and most holy life of the divine ones of the ætherial world, but carries its own calamity to the first sources; just as though an individual who was disordered in body and not able to bear the enlivening warmth of the sun, had the assurance, on the pretext of his own particular sufferings, to make the false statement that the sun is of no utility to health or life.

Something of the kind, it is true, may take place in the general order and constitution of the world, as that the same things may be beneficial to the whole by reason of the perfect condition of the things that may be and those that are, but noxious to parts because of their specific alienation from the order of the whole. In the general motion of all things the various revolutions preserve the whole order of the universe in equilibrium, but some one of them may now and then hit against other parts, as we see happening in a dance.

To repeat again, therefore, it becomes the innate tendency of each of these things to decay and undergo transformation; and it is not proper to impute this to universal and first causes, either as being inherent in them or as extending from them to these things. Hence, it is manifest from these facts that neither the divine ones in the sky nor what they impart [*δόσεις αὐτῶν*] are causes of pain.

HOW THE ASTRAL ARE ONE WITH THE SUPERIOR DIVINITIES.

XIX. Come now, let us resolve the next question: "What is the intermediary agent that connects the gods in the sky that have bodies, with those that are unbodied?" This has already been shown from what was said before. If these divinities go upon the celestial spheres as unbodied, intelligential, and united essences, they have their origins in the world of pure intelligence; and being cognizant of their own divine ideals, they govern the whole sky according to one unconditioned energy. If they are to be regarded as existing separate from these, and cause the unceasing revolutions solely by their will-power, they subsist unmingled with anything having physical sensibility, and co-exist with the intelligential gods alone. It is more suitable, however, to attempt an answer distinctly, after the manner heretofore employed.

I say, therefore, that the visible shapes [*ἀγαλματα*] of the gods are generated from the divine spiritual models, and with regard to them. Having come thus into objective existence, they are permanently fixed with these in all respects, and both attain thereby and possess the same image which has been perfected from them. They have made another arrangement after a different manner. The ones here below are connected to those beyond by one uniting bond. The divine spiritual ideals which pertain to the bodies of the gods pre-exist separately; but their intelligential models all remain together by themselves, in their own permanent excellence, uncontaminate and beyond the sky, in the Absolute One.[1]

There is, therefore, their common indissoluble bond, according to the spiritual energies; and it is also according to the common participation of ideals, since nothing separates these, nor is there anything coming between them. Nevertheless, this immaterial and unbodied essence is neither dissevered by spaces or by terms laid down, nor bounded by enclosures which divide into distinct parts; hence it immediately comes together and coalesces into sameness. This outcome of the whole from the Absolute One and its tendency to raise itself into the Absolute One, and the supremacy of the Absolute One over all unites the

course *ἀπαθές*, — impassible or unsusceptible of change. It may have been noticed that they are often mentioned in the neuter gender, as including both energy and potency in themselves undivided, like the old androgynous divinities of Mythology. The *γένεσις* [*genesis*] of the philosophers was the becoming objective and individual; externalization, "becoming;" existence as distinguished from being or essence; *transition* from the unconditioned to the conditioned; from the Real or noumenal to the phenomenal; from the permanent to the variable; from the eternal [*ἀϊδίων*, not *αἰώνιον*] to the temporal. The contrast between the two forms, existence or transition, and real being, is very distinctly exhibited in the remarkable utterance of Jesus in the Gnostic *Gospel according to John*: "*Πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγὼ εἰμι*"—"Before Abraham came into the transition-sphere, I was the ever-being."

The *φύσις* [*phusis*] or department of nature is the ulterior, the outgrowing; and receives the potencies of life from the world of causation through the intermediary sphere of transition. Sometimes the departments of transition and production, "nature" and "generation," appear to be treated as one — the *Cosmos*, or universe. The lower orders which belong there are denominated *μερίστος* or partible, as being divided and apart from Real Being.— A. W.

[1] PLATO: *Timaios* IX. — "Let this universe be called sky or cosmos. It is generated, and came into phenomenal existence, for it is palpable and has a body. All such things are perceptible by the senses, and are in the state of becoming. To discover the Creator and Father of this universe, as well as his work, is truly difficult; and when discovered it is impossible to reveal him to the many. * * * In regard to this Cosmos, he looked to an eternal model; so that it has been formed according to principles that can be apprehended by reason and contemplation, and subsists in the eternally-same Being."

commonalty of the gods of the cosmical universe with those that pre-exist in the Thought-World.

Besides this, the spiritual returning of the inferior to the superior orders, and the imparting of very essence and power from the higher orders to the lower, binds the whole assemblage of them inseparable in the Absolute One. In things of diverse character, like soul and body, and those of different species, such as forms which are related to the material principle, or are separated from each other in whatever manner, the co-existing factitious union originates from the powers above, and is lost during circumscribed periods of time. To whatever height we may go, even if it is to the ever-sameness of the first principles both in ideal and essence, thus raising ourselves from the parts to the whole, so much the more do we find out the unity which subsists eternally, and behold the interior and superior self, which possesses within itself and about itself, the diversity and multitude.

Since, then, the whole array of deities is absolutely in unity, and the superior and lower Orders, and the many others that are native with them, all exist together as one, and everything in them is one, it follows that the First, the intermediary and lowest, co-exist by the Absolute One itself. Hence it is not necessary in regard to these orders to explore whence the One goes forth to all. The real Being itself which is in them is present with them as the Absolute One. The lower races remain essentially in the oneness of the superior orders; whereas the higher orders impart the uniting principle from themselves to the lower ones. Thus they all have a common, indissoluble, intimate connection throughout, with each other.

From this cause, therefore, the gods that are completely incorporeal are at one with the gods that are perceptible, and have bodies. Indeed, the visible deities are distinct from bodies, and thus are in the spiritual world [ἐν τῳ νοητῳ]; and the higher Intelligences, because of their unconditioned unity, include the visible divinities in their own substance. Thus both are kept in place by a common unity and a single energy. In like manner, also, this is characteristic of the cause and arrangement of the gods; for which reason this self-same union of all extends from on high to the very extreme of the divine array. If, indeed, this seems worthy of question, the contrary proposition would be wonderful; that it should not be the case. Let so much be said concerning the connection which has been established of the perceptible gods to the divinities of pure Intelligence.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEMONS AND THE VISIBLE GODS.

XX. You continue, however, after this to repeat again the same questions, concerning which the things that had been said before seem to be amply sufficient as a solution of what you doubt about. Since, however, as they say, it is necessary often to tell over and examine excellent things, we will not pass these matters by as though they had already received sufficient answer, but pound away on all sides with arguments, and so, perhaps, evoke out of them all some assured and important benefit in the way of knowledge. You are solicitous in regard to "what is the means of distinguishing tutelary spirits from the deities visible and invisible, the visible deities being classed with the invisible." Beginning with this starting-point, I propose to set forth the nature of their differences. They are classed with the gods of pure intelligence, and are included in the same species with them; yet they stand wide apart from them in regard to essence, and scarcely compare with them in respect to similarity. On this account, the tutelary spirits are classed apart from the visible divinities of the sky. They are also divided from the invisible gods according to the differing peculiar to invisible essence; the tutelaries are unseen, and not at all comprehended by the physical sense, but the gods are beyond the purview [λόγος] of cognition and material conception. On this account, being unknowable and invisible in these respects, they are so denominated; but the invisibleness is to be understood very differently from that of the tutelary spirits. In what, therefore, are the divinities who are invisible superior to the manifested gods, so far as they are invisible? Nothing, on that account. The divine nature, wherever it may be, or whatever allotment it may have, has of itself the power and supreme dominion over all subject-orders. Even though it should be openly manifest, it would still be arbiter of the invisible tutelary spirits. Neither the space nor the portion of the world, receiving them makes any change in the supremacy of the gods; but the whole essence of the godhead remains everywhere the same, unseparated and unchangeable, which all the inferior races in their proper order, according to nature, defer to alike.

From the same starting-point we may also ascertain another difference between these same Orders. The deities, visible and invisible alike, take for themselves the whole direction of things that are, both heaven and the world in every particular, and all the Powers of the universe in their occultness. The tutelary spirits, however, having been allotted the guardian care and extending it over certain prescribed portions of the universe, rule over these, and also have an apportioned form of essence and power. They are, besides, in some manner akin and not unallied to those placed under them. The gods, on the other hand, although they may be associated with bodies, are in all respects separated from them. The caring for bodies, therefore, does not bring any diminution of rank to those to whom the body is subject; and it is preserved by a superior nature, is turned to it, and does not place any impediment in its way. On the contrary, the fastening to the transitional nature-sphere and the divided condition thereby induced, imposes of necessity an inferior destiny upon the tutelary spirits.

In short, the Divine Nature is predominant, and takes the supremacy among the races of spirits in their several orders; but the tutelary demons are ministering spirits, and receive orders from the gods, eager to carry into effect by their own operation what the gods think, will, and command. The gods are, therefore, exempt from the influences that tend to the transition-sphere; but the tutelary spirits are not wholly pure from these. Thus much have we subjoined concerning this distinction, and we think that from the former and the present discourses, it will become better known.

THE MYSTIC RITES NOT IMPLYING PASSIBILITY IN THE DIVINE BEINGS.

XXI. Perhaps some one, for reasons which we have before stated, may deprecate the classification which you approve, of "passive and impassive," as not being applicable to either of the superior orders. Indeed, it ought to be overturned on the very account that it leads to the inference from the things done in the Mysteries, "that they are passive." What holy rite, what service performed according to the sacerdotal laws is the outcome of passion, or effects any specific fulfilling of passive conditions? Is it not according to the Sacred Laws of the gods, and established as an enactment in a spiritual manner at the first? It copies the arrangement of the godhead, both that of the interior sphere and that in the sky, and includes the eternal proportions of the things that are, and wonderful inspirations [ἐνθήματα] such as have been sent down hither from the Creator and Father of All, by which things unutterable become known by means of arcane symbols, things obscure are retained in visible forms, things superior to every representation [εἰκών] are expressed by representations, and they all are performed because of the sole divine cause, which

is so far separate from passive conditions that speech is never able to affect it.

This, therefore, becomes almost the sole cause of turning aside to innumerable fancies. Men being unable to attain cognition of the rational source of these things, but imagining it possible, are carried entirely away by their peculiar human emotions, and limit divine things by those which are incident to their own selves. Hence they fail of their aim in a twofold manner; because they wander away from the divine heights, and because when they fall short of these they drag them down to the level of mere human emotions. It should not be supposed, however, that the acts of homage, such as bows, kisses, offerings, and the first fruits, which are rendered to gods and men, are of like importance; but each should be considered separately, in regard to the higher reckoning of honor. It is proper to begin by regarding the one class of acts very highly as being performed to the gods, and holding the others in low esteem as having been bestowed on human beings; and, indeed, to make a complete end to passive conditions in those who perform them, and those to whom they are rendered; for they are human and of a corporeal semblance. On the other hand, it is due to honor exceedingly and with steadfast admiration, the efficacy of those acts of worship which produce an exalted condition of spiritual joy and permanent complacency of mind, since these are sacred to the gods.

[To be continued.]

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATON.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[*Concluded.*]

If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental inquiries when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily experience[1] unhappily shows that there can be no other remedy for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Platon. So obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its author for a period of more than two thousand years has been universally celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its pre-eminence that it may be shown without much difficulty that the greatest men of antiquity, from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a countless multitude. In the catalogue of those endued with sovereign power it had for its votaries Dion the Syracusian, Julianos the Roman, and Khosroes, the Persian emperor; among the leaders of armies it had Chabrias and Phokion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those leading stars of science, Eudoxos, Arkhimedes, and Euklides; among biographers, the inimitable Plutarchos; among physicians, the admirable Galenos; among rhetoricians, those unrivalled orators, Demosthenes and Cicero; among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinos; and among poets, the most learned and majestic Virgilius.[2]

Instances, though not equally illustrious, yet approximating to these in splendor, may doubtless be adduced after the fall of the Roman Empire; but then they have been formed on these great ancients as models, and are consequently only rivulets from Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments similar to those among the Greeks might have been enumerated among the moderns if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy to retire into the deepest solitudes, by demolishing her schools and involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its more accessible parts. The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by these writers, like the fair dawning of some unclouded morning, that we have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius set before we were gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Platon; but though it rose with vigor, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for its meridean beam. In short, the principles of the philosophy of Platon are, of all others, the most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound government. For, as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts contains all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain in itself the source of all that is great and good, both to individuals and communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it exalts.

We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Platon with an occult and venerable splendor; and it is owing to the hidden manner in which it is delivered by him that its depth was not fathomed till many ages after its promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Platon, indeed, is not singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom of all the great antients; a custom not originating from a wish to become tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow, since, as Sokrates in Platon justly observes, "it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure;" and the multitude are neither purified from the defilements of vice nor the darkness of twofold ignorance. Hence, while they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the splendors of truth as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light of day.

The depth of this philosophy, then, does not appear to have been perfectly penetrated, except by the immediate disciples of Platon, for more than five hundred years after its first propagation. For though Krantor, Attikos, Albinos, Galenos, and Plutarchos were men of great genius, and made no common proficiency in philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have

[1] I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined.

[2] I have ranked Arkhimedes among the Platonists because he cultivated the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of Plutarchos, in his Life of Markellus, p. 307. For he there informs us that Arkhimedes considered the being busied about mechanics, and, in short, every act which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the necessary. The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euklides and Arkhimedes, which have not been equalled by any of our greatest modern mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important truth. On the other hand, modern mathematicians, through a profound ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry by mingling with it algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical demonstration.

developed the profundity of Platon's conceptions; they withdrew not the veil which covers his secret meaning like the curtains which guarded the adytum of temples from the profane eye; and they saw not that all behind the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles everywhere present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were born indeed in a baser age, but who, being allotted a nature similar to their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The most conspicuous of these are, the great Plotinos, the most learned Porphyrios, the divine Iamblichos, the most acute Syrianos, Proklos the consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierokles, the concisely elegant Sallustios, and the most inquisitive Damaskios. By these men, who were truly links of the golden chain of deity, all that is sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Platon (and they are replete with both of these in a transcendent degree), was freed from its obscurity and unfolded in the most pleasing and admirable light. Their labors, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light which they have benevolently disclosed has, hitherto unnoticed, illumined philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amid dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the master has been unhappily fulfilled in these, his most excellent disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he, "will only be beneficial to a few, who, from small vestiges previously demonstrated, are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain excellent things." Thus, with respect to these admirable men, the last and the most legitimate followers of Platon, some, from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Platon, and finding these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams, which, though originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer who lived after the fall of the Macedonian Empire, as if dignity and weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction, or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate age. So far is this from being the case, that though the style of Plotinos[1] and Iamblichos[2] is by no means to be compared with that of Platon, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader as motes in a sunbeam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the solar light.

As to the style of Porphyrios, when we consider that he was the disciple of Longinos, whom Eunapios elegantly calls "a certain living library and walking museum," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so, is abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapios, who particularly commends his style for *clearness*, *purity*, and *grace*. "Hence," says he, "Porphyrios being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his various erudition, unfolded everything into perspicuity and purity." And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praises of his master. With respect to the style of Proklos, it is pure, clear, and elegant, like that of Dionysios Halikarnassios, but is much more copious and magnificent; that of Hierokles is venerable and majestic, and nearly equal to the style of the greatest antients; that of Sallustios possesses an accuracy and a pregnant brevity which cannot easily be distinguished from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damaskios is clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind.

Others, again, have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading the commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry More, and other pseudo Platonists, their contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines of Platon, rejected some of his most important tenets and perverted others, and thus corrupted one of these systems and afforded no real benefit to the other.

But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Platon are reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When

> The trembling grove confessed its fright,
> The wood-nymphs started at the sight:
> Hissus backward urged his course,
> And rushed indignant to his source?

Was it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing anything of the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in *ω*, presumed to *grunt* at these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this, however, is certain, that it owes its being to Ignorance, or the most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than obscure. For, let us but for a moment consider the advantages the latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the first place, they had the felicity of having Greek for their native language, and must, therefore, as they were confessedly learned men, have understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time when the antient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Platon, which have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric writings, from which Platon himself derived most of his more sublime dogmas. Hence we find the works of Parmenides; Empedokles, the Eleatic Zenon, Speusippos, Xenokrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists or the sources of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters. And in the third place, they

[1] It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper to revile Plotinos, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no attention to the testimony of Longinos concerning this wonderful man, as preserved by Porphyrios in his life of him. For Longinos there says, "that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are disposed." And in another place he says, "Plotinos, as it seems, has explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenios, Kronios, Moderatos, and Thrasyllos to be compared for accuracy with those of Plotinos on this subject." After such a testimony as this from such a consummate critic as Longinos, the writings of Plotinos have nothing to fear from the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe that Longinos, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of having found any *polluted streams* or corruptions of the doctrines of Platon in the works of Plotinos. There is not, indeed, the least vestige of his entertaining any such opinion, in any part of what he has said about this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more acute critics of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown to the antients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid defiance even to the decision of Longinos.

[2] Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the Emperor Julianos to have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius, even to Platon himself, see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proklos on Euclides.

united the greatest abilities to the most unwearied exertions, the greatest purity of life to the most piercing vigor of intellect. Now, when it is considered that the philosophy, to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristoteles himself studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Platon informs us in one of his Epistles, to find pupils unable to comprehend its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this — when all these circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth, centuries who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of men with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their life; and who, in short, have committed that most baneful error of mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and wisest of the antients, what else can be said than that they are the legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated language of Odysseus, —

> "Laws or divine or human fail'd to move,
> Or shame of men or dread of gods above:
> Heedless alike of infamy or praise,
> Or Fame's eternal voice in future days."

But now it is time to present the reader with a general view of the works of Platon, and also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the first of these, I shall avail myself of the synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, taking the liberty, at the same time, of correcting it where it appears to be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be deficient.

The dialogues of Platon are of various kinds; not only with regard to those different matters which are the subjects of them, but in respect of the manner, also, in which they are composed or framed, and of the form under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by Platon himself in his dialogue named *Phraidros*,[1] and inimitation of the example set us by the ancient Platonists, to distinguish the several kinds, by dividing them first into the most general, and then subdividing into the subordinate, till we come to those lower species that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective denominations.

The most general division of the writings of Platon is into those of the Skeptical kind and those of the Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing is either expressly proved or asserted; some philosophical question only is examined and considered, and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions and discover such truths as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that either indirectly by involving them in difficulties and embarrassing the maintainers of them, or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions, and that either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom and showing in what manner to investigate it, or by leading the way and helping the mind forward in the search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments.[1] The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach explicitly some point of doctrine: and this they do either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching used by Platon proceeds in all the dialectic ways, *dividing*, *defining*, *demonstrating*, and *analyzing;* and the object of it consists in exploring truth alone.

According to this division is framed the following scheme or table: —



We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the characters, as he calls them, of Platon's writings, different from that exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin on account of its antiquity and general reception:—



The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with their variety, nor to teach on different occasions with more or less plainness and perspicuity; nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves, but he takes this method as a consummate master of the art of com-

[1] Whoever is unable to divide or distinguish things into their several sorts or species, and, on the other hand, referring every particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general idea, will never understand any writings of which those things are the subject, like a true critic, upon those high principles of art to which the human understanding reaches. We have thought proper here to paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so important a sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Platon's doctrine, and in order to initiate our readers into a way of thinking with which many of them, probably, are as yet unacquainted.

[1] It is necessary to observe that Platon, in the Parmenides, calls all that part of his Dialectic which proceeds through opposite arguments, an *exercise* and *wandering*.

[2] The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art; the dialogues here termed gymnastic being imagined to bear a similitude to that exercise; the agonistic to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, indeed, the word *maieutic* is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in Platon's Theaitetos. The maieutic dialogues, however, were supposed to resemble giving the rudiments of the art, as peirastic were to represent a skirmish or trial of proficiency; the endeictic were, it seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the anatreptic to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing. The principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the difference between the dialogues of Platon, was the capital error there committed in the first subdivision, of course extending itself through the latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard to their subject-matter, while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided with respect to the manner of their composition; so that the subdivisions fall not with any propriety under one and the same general head. Besides, a novice in the works of Platon might hence be led naturally to suppose that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are all of them written in the same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us termed skeptical, have no particular subjects at all; or if they have, that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogue, and are consequently unphilosophical. Now, every one of the suppositions here mentioned is far from being true.

position in the dialogue way of writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius, and turn of temper, as it were, in each.

Sokrates, indeed, is in almost all of them the principal speaker; but when he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist, when the modest wisdom and clear science of the one are contrasted with the confident ignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other, dispute and controversy must of course arise; where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, if there be no other person present; because such a man can never be confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted and exposed.

In some dialogues Platon represents his great master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth[1] the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that of the disciple is encouraged; and by proper questions the mind is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

At other times the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things; for to such an audience truth is due, and all demonstration possible in the teaching it.[2] Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons naturally arises the justly argumentative or demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to all the dialectic methods.

But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration — of which kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctional, and the matter of obedience — the air of authority is then assumed: in the former cases the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of ancient sages; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a legislator.[3]

Thus much for the manner in which the dialogues of Platon are severally composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend; or of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited to some person present the story of things past.

[1] We require *exhortation*, that we may be led to true good; *dissuasion*, that we may be turned from things truly evil; *obstetrication*, that we may draw forth our unperverted conceptions; *confutation*, that we may be purified from twofold ignorance.

[2] The Platonists rightly observe that Sokrates in these cases makes use of demonstrative and just reasoning, whereas to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable; and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are puzzling and contentious.

[3] It is necessary to observe that in those dialogues in which Sokrates is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to our view as a *learner*, and not as a teacher; and that is the case in the *Parmenides* and *Timaios*. For by the former of these philosophers he is instructed in the most abstruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in the whole of physiology.

Having thus divided the dialogues of Platon in respect o that inward form or composition which creates their genius, and again, with reference to that outward form which marks them, like flowers and other vegetables, with a certain character, we are further to make a division of them with regard to their subject and their design: beginning with their design or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects chosen. The end of all the writings of Platon is that which is the end of all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. Man, therefore, is the general subject; and the first business of philosophy must be to inquire what is that being called man, who is to be made happy; and what is his nature, in the perfection of which is placed his happiness? As, however, in the preceding parts of this Introduction, we have endeavored to give the outlines of Platon's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary in this place to say anything further on that subject.

The dialogues of Platon, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both the others, or differential, distinguishing them. The general subjects are either fundamental or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, goodness. The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in which are considered two questions: one of which is whether virtue is to be taught; the other is whether error in the will depends on error in the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to words or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of the mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man, or to his duty towards others in his several relations, or to the government of a civil State and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, sanctity, temperance, fortitude; justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; the ruling mind in civil government, the frame and order of a State, law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public conduct, the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is, a comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Platon's writings, we have attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural distinctions; whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter or their end — that is, in those more familiar terms we have used in this synopsis, their genius, their character, their subject, and their design.

And here it is requisite to observe that, as it is the characteristic of the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are benefited by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or less aptitude to receive it, in like manner the dialogues of Platon are so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good that they are calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like Thrasymachos in the Republic; humble the arrogance even of those who are ignorant of their ignorance; make those to become proficients in political who will never arrive at theoretic virtue; and, in short, like the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt.

After this general view of the dialogues of Platon, let us in the next place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, and the character of the style in which they are

written. With respect to the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first appear, they will be found on closer inspection necessary to the design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus, the prefatory part of the Timaios unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the theory of the world; and the first part of the Parmenides, or the discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, or the speculation of *the one;* to which, however, it is essentially preparatory. Hence, as Plutarchos says when he speaks of Platon's dialogue on the Atlantic island: These preambles are superb gates and magnificent courts with which he purposly embellishes his great edifices, that nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, when building a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen should be splendid and magnificient, and should, as it were, perspicuously announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view.

With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced, at the same time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labor of severe investigation. Hence Platon, by the most happy and enchanting art, contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth, through the delightful groves and valleys of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he could conduct the reader to the desired end; for, in accomplishing this, it is necessary to regard, not that road which is most straight in the nature of things, or abstractly considered, but that which is most direct in the progression of the human understanding.

With respect to the style of Platon, though it forms in reality the most inconsiderable part of the merits of his writing, — style in all philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, — yet, even in this, Platon may contend for the palm of excellence with the most renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianos, Zeus himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the Attic tongue. Aristoteles considered his style as a medium between poetry and prose; Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinos calls him, with respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by this prince of critics as deriving into himself abundant streams from the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalship of Homeros, to a new antagonist, who enters the lists against one that is already the object of universal admiration.

Notwithstanding this praise, however, Platon has been accused, as Longinos informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric magnificence of diction. Longinos excuses this by saying that whatever naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, says he, which is in every respect accurate, is in danger of littleness. He adds: "And may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and moderate genius, because they never encounter danger nor aspire after the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error, and remain in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?" Indeed, it appears to me that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic fury, occurs in the diction of Platon, it is owing to the magnitude of the inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession in the Phaidros, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly discourse as dithyrambic poem. Such a style, therefore, as it is the progeny of divine mania, — which, as Platon justly observes, is better than all human prudence, — spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, imitates a supernatural power, as far as this can be effected by words, and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition, however, both antient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general graceful and pure; and that it is sublime, without being impetuous and rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate than magnificent.[1]

It combines the force of the greatest orators with the graces of the first of poets; and, in short, is a river to which those justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied:

> "Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull;
> Strong without rage, without overflowing, full."

Having thus considered the philosophy of Platon, given a general view of his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and translation of his works; and then, with a few appropriate observations, to close this Introduction.

As no accurate and scientific arrangement, then, of these dialogues has been transmitted to us from the antients, I was under the necessity of adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Platon. In my arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe, in which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals particulars. Hence, I have placed those dialogues first which rank as wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which these systems are branched out into particulars. Thus, after the First Alkibiades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally considered by the antients, an introduction to the whole of Platon's philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Platon. After these I have ranked the Timaios, which contains the whole of his physiology, and together with it the Kritias, because of its connection with the Timaios. The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge. The subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the Parmenides, then the Sophistes, Phaidros, Greater Hippias, and Banquet follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes, subordinate to and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a whole of wholes. For in the Sophistes *being itself* is investigated, in the Banquet *love itself*, and in the Phaidros *beauty itself;* all of which are intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater Hippias is classed with the Phaidros, because in the latter the whole series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which subsists in soul. After these follows the Theaitetos, in which science,

[1] The reader will see from the notes on Platon's dialogues, and particularly from the notes on the Parmenides and Timaios, that the style of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any modern writer — an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one taken away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied to the style of Aristoteles.

considered as subsisting in soul, is investigated; science itself, according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by Sokrates in one part of the Phaidros. The Politikos and Minos, which follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws; and, in short, all the following dialogues either consider *more particularly* the dogmas which are *systematically* comprehended in those already enumerated, or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not, however, appear possible to arrange these dialogues, which rank as parts, in the same accurate order as those which we considered as wholes, it was thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one particular circumstance, — as the Phaidon, Apology, and Kriton, all which relate to the death of Sokrates; and as the Menon and Protagoras, which relate to the question, whether virtue can be taught, — or according to their agreement in character, as the Lesser Hippias and Euthydemos, which are *anatreptic*, and the Theages, Lakhes, and Lysis, which are *maieutic* dialogues. The Kratylos is ranked in the last place, not so much because the subject of it is etymology as because a great part of it is deeply theological; for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the divine orders, and their ineffable principle, in the Parmenides, and thence descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly returning to the principles whence they flow.

After the dialogues[1] follow the Epistles of Platon, which are in every respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which, though delivered enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in his more theological dialogues.

With respect to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in the first place, that the number of the legitimate dialogues of Platon is fifty-five; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws another, yet the former consists of ten and the latter of twelve books, and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three dialogues besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have said, be the amount of the whole. * * *

In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Platon, previous to which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Platon; for a man might as well think he can understand Arkhimedes without a knowledge of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion would do well to meditate on the profound observation of Herakleitos, that "*polymathy does not teach intellect.*"

By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking; that is, one who possesses a naturally good disposition, is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; one who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skilfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile multitude of doubts; — in short, who has never considered *wisdom* as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing; who expect to be wise by a desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay, affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly, however shameful and base, to such as these — and, alas! the world is full of such — the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a distempered imagination or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.

But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that twofold ignorance is the disease of *the many*. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Platon, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly, therefore, entreat men of this description not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy; for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor, as they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. It is well said, indeed, by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculation and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water in a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, as the same author beautifully observes (that is, the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, through preparatory disciplines and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before anything useful can be planted in these savage haunts.

Let not such, then, presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. The land is too pure to admit the sordid and base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskilful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Herakles, or the wisdom and patience of Odysseus, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest or perish in the storms of the ocean, must suffer transmutation into a beast through the magic power of Kirke, or be exiled for life by the detaining

[1] As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works of Platon only, I have not translated the Axiokhos, Demodokos, Sysyphos, etc., as these are evidently spurious dialogues.

charms of Kalypso, and, in short, must descend into Hades and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence into the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skilful traveller, who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptation can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaka of Odysseus, or the flying Italy of Æneas; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.

Abandon then, ye grovelling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast? A sea —

> Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails
> The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales.

And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Kalypso, —

> What ships have you, what sailors to convey;
> What ðars to cut the long, laborious way?

ON THE NECESSITY OF PURIFICATION, AND THE METHOD BY WHICH IT MAY BE OBTAINED.

BY PORPHYRIOS.

[*Concluded.*]

[The following sections are extracted from Porphyrios' work on Abstinence. They comprise the most important part of that very valuable and interesting work. The translation is by Thomas Taylor, and was made from the original Greek.]

XXXVII. All these beings, likewise, and those who possess a contrary power, are invisible, and perfectly imperceptible by human senses; for they are not surrounded with a solid body, nor are all of them of one form, but they are fashioned in numerous figures. The forms, however, which characterize their pneumatic substance at one time become apparent, but at another are invisible. Sometimes, also, those that are malefic change their forms; but the pneumatic substance, so far as it is corporeal, is passive and corruptible; and though, because it is thus bound, by the souls that are incumbent on it, the form of it remains for a long time, yet it is not external. For it is probable that something flows continually from it, and also that it is nourished. The pneumatic substance, therefore, of good dæmons possesses symmetry in the same manner as the bodies of the visible Gods, but the spirit of malefic dæmons is deprived of symmetry, and, in consequence of its abounding in passivity, they are distributed about the terrestrial region. Hence there is no evil which they do not attempt to effect; for, in short, being violent and fraudulent in their manners, and being also deprived of the guardian care of more excellent dæmons, they make for the most part vehement and sudden attacks; sometimes endeavoring to conceal their incursions, but at other times assaulting openly. Hence the molestations which are produced by them are rapid; but the remedies and corrections which proceed from more excellent dæmons appear to be more slowly effected; for everything which is good, being tractable and equable, proceeds in an orderly manner, and does not pass beyond what is fit. By forming this opinion, therefore, you will never fall into that most absurd notion that evil may be expected from the good, or good from the evil. For this notion is not only attended with absurdity, but the multitude, receiving through it the most erroneous conceptions of the Gods, disseminate them among the rest of mankind.

XXXVIII. It must be admitted, therefore, that one of the greatest injuries caused by malefic dæmons is this, that though they are the causes of the calamities which take place about the earth, such as pestilence, sterility, earthquakes, excessive dryness, and the like, yet they endavor to persuade us that they are causes of things the most contrary to these, viz. of fertility, salubrity, and elementary peace. Hence they exonerate themselves from blame, and, in the first place, endeavor to avoid being detected as the sources of injury: and in the next place they convert us to supplications and sacrifices to the beneficent gods as if they were angry. But they affect these and things of a similar nature in consequence of wishing to turn us from right conceptions of the Gods and convert us to themselves; for they are delighted with all such as act thus incongruously and discordantly, and, as it were, assuming the persons of other gods, they enjoy the effects of our imprudence and folly; concilating to themselves the good opinion of the vulgar, by inflaming the minds of men with the love of riches, power, and pleasure, and filling them with the desire of vainglory, from which sedition, and war, and other things allied to these are produced. But that which is the most dire of all things, they proceed still farther, and persuade men that similar things are effected by the greatest Gods, and do not stop till they even subject the most excellent of the divinities to these calumnies, through whom they say everything is in the most perfect confusion. And not only the vulgar are affected in this manner, but not a few also of those who are conversant with philosophy. The cause of this, however, extends equally to philosophers and the vulgar; for of philosophers, those who do not depart from the prevailing notions fall into the same error with the multitude; and again the multitude, on hearing assertions from celebrated men conformable to their own opinions, are in a greater degree corroborated in conceiving things of this kind of the Gods.

XXXIX. For poetry also inflames the opinions of men by employing a diction adapted to produce astonishment and enchantment, and not only allures the ears, but is also capable of procuring belief in things that are most impossible. At the same time, however, it is requisite to be firmly persuaded that what is good can never injure, nor what is evil can ever be beneficial; for, as Platon says, it is not the province of heat to refrigerate, but of that which is the contrary to heat; and, in like manner, neither is it the province of that which is just to injure. But divinity is naturally the most just of all things, since otherwise he would not be divinity. Hence this power and portion of good is not to be abscinded from beneficent dæmons; for the power which is naturally adapted and wishes to injure is contrary to the power which is beneficent; but contraries can never subsist about the same thing. As malefic dæmons, therefore, injure the mortal race in many respects, and sometimes in things of greatest consequence, good dæmons not only never cease to act conformably to their office, but also as much as possible presignify to us the dangers which are impending from malefic dæmons, unfolding these through dreams, through a divinely inspired soul, and through many other things; so that he who is capable of explaining what is signified may know and avoid all the perils with which he is threatened. For they indicate future events to all men; but every one cannot understand what they indicate, nor is every one able to read what is written by them; but he alone is able to do this who has learnt their letters. All enchantment, however, or witchcraft, is effected through dæmons of a contrary nature, for those who perpetrate evil through enchant-

ments especially venerate these malefic beings and the power that presides over them.

XL. For they are full of every kind of imagination, and are sufficiently qualified to deceive through effects of a prodigious nature; and through these unhappy men procure philtres and amatory allurements. For all intemperance and hope of possessing wealth and renown, and especially deception, exist through these, since falsehood is allied to these malevolent beings; *for they wish to be considered as Gods*, and *the power which presides over them is ambitious to appear to be the greatest God*. These are they that rejoice in libations, and the savor of sacrifices, through which their pneumatic vehicle is fattened; for this vehicle lives through vapors and exhalations, and the life of it is various through various exhalations. It is likewise corroborated by the savor of blood and flesh.

XLI. On this account, a wise and temperate man will be religiously afraid to use sacrifices of this kind, through which he will attract to himself such like dæmons; but he will endeavor in all possible ways to purify his soul. For these malefic beings do not attack a pure soul because it is dissimilar to them; but if it is necessary to cities to render them propitious, this is nothing to us. For by these riches and things external and corporeal are thought to be good and their contraries to be evil; but the smallest attention is paid by them to the good of the soul. We, however, to the utmost of our ability, endeavor not to be in want of those things which they impart; but all our endeavor is to become similar to God, and to the divine powers with which he is surrounded, both from what pertains to the soul and from externals; and *this is effected through an entire liberation from the dominion of the passions, an evolved perception of truly existing beings, and a vital tendency towards them*. On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to depraved men and evil dæmons and, in short, to every being that rejoices in a mortal and material nature. So that, conformably to what is said by Theophrastus, we shall also sacrifice from those things which theologists permit us to use for this purpose, as well knowing that by how much the more we neglect to exempt ourselves from the passions of the soul, by so much the more we connect ourselves with a depraved power, and render it necessary that he should become propitious to us. For, as theologists say, it is necessary that those who are bound to things external and have not yet vanquished their passions, should avert the anger of this malefic power; since, if they do not, there will be no end to their labors.

XLII. Thus far what pertains to sacrifices has been elucidated. As we said, however, at first, as it is not entirely necessary if animals are to be sacrificed that they are also to be eaten, we shall now show that it is necessary that we should not eat them, though it may be sometimes necessary that they should be sacrificed. For all theologists agree in this, that in sacrifices which are made for the purpose of averting some evil the immolated animals are not to be tasted, but are to be used as expiations. For, they say, no one should go into the city, nor into his own house, till he has first purified his garments and his body in rivers, or some fountain. So that they order those whom they permit to sacrifice to abstain from the victims, and to purify themselves before they sacrifice by fasting, and especially by abstaining from animals. They add, *that purity is the guardian of piety, and is, as it were, a symbol or divine seal which secures its possessor from the attacks and allurements of evil dæmons*. For such a one, being contrarily disposed to, and more divine in his operations than those by whom he is attacked, because he is more pure both in his body and in the passions of his soul, remains uninjured, in consequence of being surrounded with purity as with a bulwark.

XLIII. Hence a defence of this kind has appeared to be necessary even to enchanters, though it is not efficacious with them on all occasions. For they invoke evil dæmons for lascivious purposes. So that purity does not belong to enchanters, but to divine men and such as are divinely wise, since it everywhere becomes a guard to those that use it, and conciliates them with a divine nature. I wish, therefore, that enchanters would make use of purity continually, for then they would not employ themselves in incantations, because through this they would be deprived of the enjoyment of those things for the sake of which they act impiously. Whence, becoming full of passions, and abstaining for a short time from impure food, they are notwithstanding replete with impurity, and suffer the punishment of their illegal conduct towards the whole of things, partly from those whom they irritate, and partly from Justice, who perceives all mortal deeds and conceptions. Both inward, therefore, and external purity pertains to a divine man, who earnestly endeavors to be liberated from the passions of the soul, and who abstains from such food as excites the passions, and is fed with divine wisdom; and by right conceptions of, is assimilated to divinity himself. For such a man, being consecrated by an intellectual sacrifice, approaches to God in a white garment and with a truly pure *impassivity* of soul and levity of body, and is not burdened with foreign and external juices, and the passions of the soul.

XLIV. For, indeed, it must not be admitted as necessary, in temples which are consecrated by men to the gods, that those who enter into them should have their feet pure and their shoes free from every stain, but that in the temple of the father of all, which is this world, it is not proper to preserve our ultimate and cutaneous vestment pure, and to dwell in this temple with an undefiled garment. For if the danger consisted only in the defilement of the body, it might perhaps be lawful to neglect it. But now, since every sensible body is attended with an efflux of material dæmons, hence, together with the impurity produced from flesh and blood, the power which is friendly to, and familiar with this impurity, is at the same time present through similitude and alliance.

XLV. Hence theologists have rightly paid attention to abstinence. And these things were indicated to us by a certain Egyptian, who also assigned a most natural cause of them, which was verified by experience. For since a depraved and irrational soul, when it leaves the body, is still compelled to adhere to it, since the souls also of those men who die by violence are detained about the body, this circumstance should prevent a man from forcibly expelling his soul from the body. The violent slaughter, therefore, of animals compels souls to be delighted with the bodies which they have left, but the soul is by no means prevented from being there where it is attracted by a kindred nature; whence many souls are seen to lament, and some remain about the bodies that are unburied; which souls are improperly used by enchanters as subservient to their designs, being compelled by them to occupy the body, or part of the body which they have left. Since, therefore, these things were well known to theologists, and they also perceived the nature of a depraved soul and its alliance to the bodies from which it was divulsed, and the pleasure which it received from a union with them, they very properly avoid animal food in order that they might not be disturbed by alien souls, violently separated from the body and impure, and which are attracted to things of a kindred nature, and likewise that they might not be impeded by the presence of evil dæmons in approaching alone, or without being burdened with things of a foreign nature, to the highest God.

XLVI. Very properly, therefore, will the philosopher, and who is also the priest of the God that is above all things, abstain from all animal food, in consequence of earnestly endeavoring to approach through himself alone to the alone God, without being

disturbed by any attendants. Such a one is likewise cautious as being well acquainted with the necessities of nature. For he who is truly a philosopher is skilled in, and an observer of, many things, understands the works of nature, is sagacious, temperate, and modest, and in every respect the savior of himself. And as he who is the priest of a certain particular God is skilled in placing the statues of that divinity and in his orgies, mysteries, and the like, thus also he who is the priest of the highest God is skilled in the manner in which his statue ought to be fashioned, and in purifications and other things through which he is conjoined to this divinity.

XLVII. Nevertheless we permit those whose life is rolled about externals, having once acted impiously toward themselves, to be borne along to that to which they tend, but we rightly say that the man whom we designate as a philosopher, and who is separated from externals, will not be disturbed by dæmons, nor be in want of diviners, nor of the viscera of animals. For he earnestly endeavors to be separated from those things for the sake of which divinations are effected. For he does not betake himself to nuptials, in order that he may molest the diviner about wedlock, or merchandise, or inquiries about a servant, or an increase of property, or any other object of vulgar pursuit. For the subjects of his investigation are not clearly indicated by any diviner, or viscera of animals. But he, as we have said, approaching through himself to the supreme God, who is established in the true inward parts of himself, receives from thence the precepts of eternal life, tending thither by a conflux of the whole of himself, and instead of a diviner praying that he may become a confabulator of the mighty Zeus.

XLVIII. For if such a one is impelled by some necessary circumstance, there are good dæmons, who, to the man living after this manner, and who is a domestic of divinity, will indicate and prevent, through dreams and symbols and omens, what may come to pass, and what is necessary to be avoided. For it is only requisite to depart from evil and to know what is most honorable in the whole of things, and everything which in the universe is good, friendly, and familiar. But vice and an ignorance of divine concerns are dire, through which a man is led to defame things of which he has no knowledge, since nature does not proclaim these particulars with a voice which can be heard by the ears, but, being herself intellectual, she initiates through intellect those who venerate her; and even though some one should admit the art of divination for the sake of predicting what is future, yet it does not from thence necessarily follow that the flesh of animals is to be eaten; as neither does it follow that because it is proper to sacrifice to Gods or dæmons, food from animals is therefore to be introduced. For not only the history which is related by Theophrastos, but also many other narrations, inform us that in ancient times men were sacrificed; yet it must not be inferred that on this account men are to be eaten.

XLIX. To the Gods, indeed, the most excellent offering is a pure intellect and an impassive soul, and also a moderate oblation of our own property and of other things, and this not negligently, but with the greatest alacrity. For the honor which we pay to the Gods should be accompanied by the same promptitude as that with which we give the first seat to worthy men, and with which we rise to and salute them, and not by the promptitude with which we pay a tribute. For man must not use such language as the following to God: —

> If, O, Philinus you recall to mind,
> And love me for the benefits which I
> On you conferred, 'tis well, since for the sake
> Of these alone my bounty was bestowed.

For divinity is not satisfied with such assertions as these. And hence Platon says, in his Laws, that it pertains to a good man to sacrifice, and to be always conversant with the Gods by prayers, votive offerings, sacrifices, and every kind of religious worship; but that to the bad man much labor about the gods is inefficacious and vain. For the good man knows what ought to be sacrificed, and from what it is requisite to abstain; what things are to be offered to divinity, and of what the first fruits are to be sacrificed; but the bad man, exhibiting honors to the gods from his own disposition, and his own pursuits, acts in doing so more impiously than piously. Hence Platon thought that a philosopher ought not to be conversant with men of depraved habits, for this is neither pleasing to the gods nor useful to men; but the philosopher should endeavor to change such men to a better condition, and if he cannot effect this, he should be careful that he does not himself become changed into their depravity. He adds that, having entered into the right path, he should proceed in it, neither fearing danger from the multitude nor any other blasphemy that may happen to take place. For it would be a thing of a dire nature that the Syrians, indeed, will not taste fish, nor the Hebrews swine, nor most of the Phœnician and Egyptians cows; and though many kings have endeavored to change these customs, yet those that adopt them would rather suffer death than a transgression of the law which forbids them to eat these animals: and yet that we should choose to transgress the laws of nature and divine precepts through the fear of men or of a certain denunciation of evil from them. For the divine choir of gods, and divine men, may justly be greatly indignant with us, if it perceives us directing our attention to the opinions of depraved men, and idly looking to the terror with which they are attended, though we daily meditate how we may become philosophically dead to other things in the present life.

L. But as the immortal is opposed to the mortal, the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the incorporeal to the corporeal, so to the rational essence which has its existence in the nature of things, the irrational essence must be opposed, which has a subsistence contrary to it; nor in so many conjugations of things is this alone to be left imperfect and mutilated. Our opponents, however, thus speak, as if we did not grant this, or as if we had not shown that there is much of the irrational among beings. For there is an abundance of it in all natures that are destitute of soul, nor do we require any other opposition to that which is rational; but immediately, everything which is deprived of soul being irrational and without intellect, is opposed to that which possesses reason and *dianoia*. If, however, some one should think fit to assert that not nature in common, but the animated nature, is divided into that which possesses and that which is without imagination, and into that which is sensitive and that which is deprived of sensation, in order that these oppositions of habits and privations may subsist about the same genus, as being equiponderant: he who says this speaks absurdly. For it would be absurd to investigate in the animated nature that which is sensitive and that which is without sensation, that which employs and that which is without imagination, because everything animated is immediately adapted to be sensitive and imaginative. So that neither thus will he justly require that one part of the animated nature should be rational but another irrational, when he is speaking to men who think that nothing participates of sense which does not also participate of intelligence, and that nothing is an animal in which opinion and reasoning are not inherent in the same manner as with animals every sense and impulse are naturally present. For nature, which they rightly assert produced all things for the sake of a certain thing, and with reference to a certain end, did not make an animal sensitive merely that it might be passively affected and possess sensible perception; but as there are many things which are allied and appropriate, and many which are foreign to it, it

would not be able to exist for the shortest space of time unless it learnt how to avoid some things and to pursue others. The knowledge, therefore, of both these sense similarly imparts to every animal; but the apprehension and pursuit of what is useful, and the depulsion and avoidance of what is painful and destructive, can by no possible contrivance be present with those animals that are incapable of reasoning, judging, and remembering, and that do not naturally possess an animadversive power. For to those animals from which you entirely take away memory, hope, expectation, design, fear, preparation, desire, and indignation, neither the eyes when present, nor the ears, nor sense, nor phantasy, will be beneficial, since they will be of no use; and it will be better to be deprived of them than to labor, be in pain, and be afflicted, without the power of repelling these molestations. There is, however, a treatise of Strato, the physiologist, in which he demonstrates that it is not possible to have a sensible perception of anything without the energy of intellection. For frequently the letters of a book which we curiously consider by the sight, and words which fall on the auditory sense are concealed from and escape us when our intellect is attentive to other things; but afterwards, when it returns to the thing to which it was before inattentive, then, by recollection, it runs through and pursues each of the before-mentioned particulars. Hence also it is said by Epikharmos:

"'Tis mind alone that sees and hears,
And all besides is deaf and blind."

For the objects which fall on the ears and eyes do not produce a sensible perception, of themselves, unless that which is intellective is present. On which account also King Kleomenes, when something that was recited was applauded, being asked if it did not also appear to him to be excellent, left this to the decision of those that asked him the question; for he said that his intellect was at the time in Peloponnesus. Hence it is necessary that intellect should be present with all those with whom sensible perception is present.

LI. But he who thinks that the nature, which is not adapted to receive rectitude of reason, does not at all receive reason, he in the first place does not differ from one who fancies an ape does not naturally participate of deformity nor a tortoise of tardity, because the former is not receptive of beauty, nor the latter of celerity. And in the next place, this is the opinion of one who does not perceive the obvious difference of things. For reason indeed is ingenerated by nature; but right and perfect reason is acquired by study and discipline. Hence all animated beings participate of reason, but our opponents cannot mention any man who possesses rectitude of reason and wisdom naturally, though the multitude of men is innumerable. But as the sight of one animal differs from that of another, and the flying of one bird from that of another (for hawks and grasshoppers do not similarly see, nor eagles and partridges), thus also, neither does everything which participates of reason possess genius and acuteness in the highest perfection. Indeed, there are many indications in brutes of association, fortitude, and craft, in procuring what is necessary and in economical conduct; as, on the contrary, there are also indications in them of injustice, timidity, and fatuity. Hence it is a question with some, which are the more excellent, terrestrial or aquatic animals? And that there are these indications, is evident from comparing storks with river-horses; for the former nourish, but the latter destroy their fathers, in order that they may have connection with their mothers. This is likewise seen on comparing doves with partridges, for the latter conceal and destroy their eggs if the female, during her incubation, refuses to be connected with the male. But doves successively relieve each other in incubation, alternately cherishing the eggs; and first, indeed, they feed the young, and afterwards the male strikes the female with his beak and drives her to the eggs and her young, if she has for a long time wandered from them. Antipater, however, when he blames asses and sheep for the neglect of purity, overlooks, I know not how, lynxes and swallows; of which the former remove and entirely bury their excrement, but the latter teach the young to throw it out of the nest. Moreover, we do not say that one tree is more ignorant than another, as we say a sheep is more stupid than a dog. Nor do we say that one herb is more timid than another, as we do that a stag is more timid than a lion. For, as in things which are immovable, one is not slower than another; and in things which are not vocal, one is not less vocal than another. Thus, too, in all things in which the power of intellection is wanting, one thing cannot be said to be more timid, more dull, or more intemperate than another. For as these qualities are present differently in their different participants, they produce in animals the diversities which we perceive. Nor is it wonderful that man should so much excel other animals in sagacity, docility, justice, and association. For many brutes surpass all men in magnitude of body and celerity of foot, and likewise in strength of sight and accuracy of hearing; yet man is not on this account either deaf, or blind, or powerless. But we run, though slower than stags; and we see, though not so accurately as hawks; and nature has not deprived us of strength and magnitude, though our possession of these is nothing when compared with the strength and bulk of the elephant and the camel. *Hence, in a similar manner, we must not say that brutes, because their intellection is more dull than ours, and because they reason worse than we do, neither energize discursively nor, in short, possess intellection and reason; but it must be admitted that they possess these, though in an imbecile and turbid manner, just as a dull and disordered eye participates of sight.*

LII. By making pleasure, therefore, the end of life, that which is truly justice cannot be preserved; since neither such things as are primarily useful according to nature, nor all such as are easily attainable, give completion to felicity. For in many instances the motions of the irrational nature, and utility and indigence have been, and still are, the sources of injustice. For men became indigent as they pretended of animal food, in order that they might preserve, as they said, the corporeal frame free from molestation, and without being in want of those things after which the animal nature aspires. But if an assimilation to divinity is the end of life, an innoxious conduct toward all things will be in a most eminent degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is led by his passions is innoxious only toward his children and his wife, but despises and acts fraudulently toward other persons, since, in consequence of the irrational part predominating in him, he is excited to and astonished about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason preserves an innoxious conduct toward his fellow-citizens, and still more so toward strangers, and towards all men, in consequence of having the irrational part in subjection, and is therefore more rational and divine than the other character. Thus, also, he who does not confine harmless conduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is more similar to divinity; and if it were possible to extend it even to plants, he would preserve this image in a still greater degree. As, however, this is not possible, we may in this respect lament, with the ancients, this defect of our nature, that we consist of such adverse and discordant principles, so that we are unable to preserve our divine part incorruptible and in all respects innoxious. For we are not unindigent in all things; the cause of which is generation, and our becoming needy through the abundant corporeal efflux which we sustain. But want procures safety and ornament from things of a foreign nature which are necessary to the existence of our mortal part. He, therefore, who is indigent of a greater number of externals is in a greater degree aggluti-

nated to penury; and by how much his wants increase, by so much is he destitute of divinity and an associate of penury. For that which is similiar to deity through this assimilation immediately possesses true wealth. For no one who is truly rich and perfectly unindigent injures anything. For as long as any one injures another, though he should possess the greatest wealth and all the acres of land which the earth contains, he is still poor, and has want for his intimate associate. On this account also he is unjust, without God, and impious, and enslaved to every kind of depravity, which is produced by the lapse of the soul into matter through the privation of good. Everything, therefore, is nugatory to any one as long as he wanders from the principle of the universe; and he is indigent of all things while he does not direct his attention to Poros, or the source of true abundance. He likewise yields to the mortal part of his nature while he remains ignorant of his real self. But Injustice is powerful in persuading and corrupting those that belong to her empire; because she associates with her votaries in conjunction with Pleasure. As, however, in the choice of lives, he is the more accurate judge who has obtained an experience of both the better and the worst kind of life, than he who has only experienced one of them; thus also in the choice and avoidance of what is proper, he is a safer judge who, from that which is more, judges of that which is less excellent, than he who, from the less, judges of the more excellent. Hence he who lives according to intellect will more accurately define what is eligible and what is not, than he who lives under the dominion of irrationality. For the former has passed through the irrational life, as having from the first associated with it; but the latter, having had no experience of an intellectual life, persuades those that resemble himself, and acts with nugacity, like a child among children. If, however, say our opponents, all men were persuaded by these arguments, what would become of us? Is it not evident that we should be happy, injustice indeed being exterminated from men, and justice being conversant with us in the same manner it is in the heavens? But now this question is just the same as if men should be dubious what the life of the Danaids would be if they were liberated from the employment of drawing water in a sieve and attempting to fill a perforated vessel. For they are dubious what would be the consequence if we should cease to replenish our passions and desires, the whole of which replenishing continually flows away through the want of real good; since this fills up the ruinous clefts of the soul more than the greatest of external necessaries. Do you therefore ask, O man, what we should do? We should imitate those that lived in the golden age; we should imitate those of that period who were truly free. For with them modesty, Nemesis, and Justice associated, because they were satisfied with the fruits of the earth.

> The fertile earth for them spontaneous yields
> Abundantly her fruits.

But those who are liberated from slavery obtain from themselves what they before procured for their masters. In like manner also do you, when liberated fom the servitude of the body, and slavish attention to the passions produced through the body, as prior to this you nourish them in an all various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself all variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are properly your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which are foreign to your true nature and real good.

LIII. For the polity of the Indians being distributed into many parts, there is one tribe among them of men divinely wise, whom the Greeks are accustomed to call Gymnosophists. But of these there are two sects, over one of which the Bramins preside, but over the other the Samanæans. The race of the Bramins receive divine wisdom of this kind by succession in the same manner as the priesthood. But the Samanæans are elected, and consist of those who possess divine knowledge. And the particulars respecting them are the following, as the Babylonian Bardesanes narrates, who lived in the time of our fathers, and was familiar with those Indians who, together with Damadamis, were sent to Cæsar. All the Bramins originate from one stock; for all of them are derived from one father and one mother. But the Samanæans are not the offspring of one family, being as we have said collected from every nation of Indians. A Bramin, however, is not a subject of any government, nor does he contribute anything together with others to government. And with respect to those that are philosophers among these, some dwell on mountains and others about the river Ganges. And those that live on mountains feed on autumnal fruits, and on cow's milk coagulated with herbs. But those that live near the Ganges live also on autumnal fruits, which are produced in abundance about that river. The land likewise nearly always bears new fruit, together with much rice, which grows spontaneously, and which they use when there is a deficiency of autumnal fruits. But to taste of any other nutriment, or, in short, to touch animal food, is considered by them as equivalent to extreme impurity and impiety. And this is one of their dogmas. They also worship divinity with purity and piety. They spend the day and the greater part of the night in hymns and prayers to the Gods, each of them having a cottage to himself, and living as much as possible alone. For the Bramin cannnot endure to remain with others, nor to speak much; but when this happens to take place, they afterwards withdraw themselves and do not speak for many days. They likewise frequently fast. But the Samanæans are, as we have said, elected. When, however, any one is desirous of being enrolled in their order, he proceeds to the rulers of the city; but abandons the city or village that he inhabited, and the wealth and all the other property that he possessed. • • •

LIV. But they are so disposed with respect to death that they unwillingly endure the whole time of the present life as a certain servitude to nature, and therefore they hasten to liberate their souls from the bodies with which they are connected. Hence frequently when they are seen to be well, and are neither oppressed nor driven to desperation by any evil, they depart from life. And though they previously announce to others that it is their intention to commit suicide, yet no one impedes them; but proclaiming all those to be happy who thus quit the present life, they enjoin certain things to the domestics and kindred of the dead. So stable and true do they and also the multitude believe the assertion to be that souls in another life associate with each other. But so soon as those to whom they have proclaimed that this is their intention, have heard the mandates given to them, they deliver the body to fire in order that they may separate the soul from the body in the purest manner, and thus they die celebrated by all the Samanæans. For these men dismiss their dearest friends to death more easily than others part with their fellow-citizens when going the longest journeys. And they lament themselves indeed as still continuing in life; but they proclaim those that are dead to be blessed, in consequence of having now obtained an immortal allotment. Nor is there any sophist such as there now is amongst the Greeks, either among these Samanæans or the above-mentioned Bramins, who would be seen to doubt and to say, if all men should imitate you — *i. e.*, should imitate those Samanaeans who commit suicide, — what would become of us? Nor through these are human affairs confused. For neither do all men imitate them; and those who have may be said to have been rather the causes of equitable legislation than of confusion to the different nations of men. Moreover, the law did not compel the Samanæans and Bramins

to eat animal food, but permitting others to feed on flesh, it suffered these to be a law to themselves, and venerated them as being superior to the law. Nor did the law subject these men to the punishment which it inflicts, as if they were the primary perpetrators of injustice, but it reserved this for others. Hence to those who ask what would be the consequence if all men imitated such characters as these, the saying of Pythagoras must be the answer, that if all men were kings the passage through life would be difficult, yet regal goverment is not on this account to be avoided. And we likewise say if all men were worthy, no administration of a polity would be found in which the dignity which probity merits would be preserved. Nevertheless, no one would be so insane as not to think that all men should earnestly endeavor to become worthy characters. Indeed, the law grants to the vulgar many other things besides a fleshe diet, which nevertheless it does not grant to a philosopher nor even to one who conducts the affairs of government in a proper manner. For it does not receive every artist into the administration, though it does not forbid the exercise of any art, nor yet men of every pursuit; but it excludes those who are occupied in vile and illiberal arts, and in short, all those who are destitute of justice and other virtues, from having anything to do with the management of public affairs. Thus, likewise, the law does not forbid the vulgar from associating with harlots, on whom at the same time it imposes a fine, but thinks that it is disgraceful and base for men that are moderately good, to have any connection with them. Moreover, the law does not prohibit a man from spending the whole of his time in a tavern, yet at the same time this is most disgraceful even to a man of moderate worth. It appears, therefore, that the same thing must also be said with respect to diet, for that which is permitted to the multitude must not likewise be granted to the best of men. For the man who is a philosopher should especially ordain for himself those sacred laws which the Gods, and men who are followers of the Gods, have instituted.

LV. The soul, likewise, is polluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which, in a certain respect, diet is a cooperating cause. But as water which flows through a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes, because it does not bring with it much mud, thus also the soul which administers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened by the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is more uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus, too, it is said that the thyme which is dryest and sharpest to the taste affords the best honey to the bees. The dianoëtic, therefore, or discursive power of the soul is polluted; or, rather, he who energizes dianoëtically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either the imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a separation from all these; and the wisdom which is adapted to divine concerns, is a desertion of everything of this kind. The proper nutriment, likewise, of each thing is that which essentially preserves it. Thus, you may say that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its continuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form; but the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase and fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its composition. It is one thing, however, to nourish, and another to fatten; and one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is luxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various, also, is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary indeed that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly endeavor to fatten our most principal parts. Hence the nutriment of a rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But this is intellect, so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we should earnestly endeavor that it may be fattened through this, rather than that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For intellect preserves for us eternal life; but the body when fattened causes the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life not being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself insane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being. It likewise defiles by corporifying the soul and drawing her down to that which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet indeed imparts, as it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron though most heavy, is elevated and runs to the spirit of the stone. Should he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual deity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body, that is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather by contracting what is necessary to the flesh into that which is little and easily procured, be *himself* nourished by adhering to God more closely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature was not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free from molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O that, as Homeros says, we were not in want either of meat or drink — that we might be truly immortal! the poet, in thus speaking beautifully signifying, that food is not only the auxiliary of life, but also of death. If, therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we should be by so much the more blessed in proportion as we should be more immortal. But now being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if it be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant that by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says, does not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant, but gives herself wholly to it. Hence it is much to be wished that we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables in which hunger and thirst are unknown; so that by stopping the every-way-flowing river of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the most excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there, is himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of the generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish their own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves and him who truly begot them, and afterwards those that admonish them, and call on them to return from inebriety to a sober condition of being!

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS TAYLOR, THE PLATONIST.

[*Continued.*]

"The Creed of the Platonic Philosopher is added for the purpose of presenting the *intelligent* reader with a synoptical view of that sublime theology which was first obscurely promulgated by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Platon, and was afterwards perspicuously unfolded by their legitimate disciples — a theology which, however it may be involved in oblivion in *barbarous*, and derided in *impious* ages, will again flourish for very extended periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time. The reader who wishes to have a more ample view of it may peruse the author's Introduction to his translation of Platon, from which the whole of this Creed is nearly extracted."—*Preface to Miscellanies in Prose and Verse.*

In a note to this work, Mr. Taylor says: "The author also thinks it necessary to inform the liberal few that, having completed a translation of Aristoteles' Physics before he was in that debilitated condition of body which he is in at present, that

translation is now printing, accompanied with the substance (in notes) of the invaluable Commentary of Simplikios; and it is his intention — though he fears, from his infirmities, that the progress will be slow — to publish a translation of the whole of Aristoteles' works, with the elucidations of his best Greek interpreters. Fifty copies only will be printed of each volume of this work, and they will be disposed of by the translator alone; as his principal design in this arduous undertaking is, to transmit the philosophy of Aristoteles to posterity, and prevent it from becoming an article of traffic."

This version of Aristoteles' Physics appeared early in 1806, in one volume, 4to. The work has become exceedingly scarce, and I have been unable, after a search of many years, to procure a copy of it. I cannot, therefore, much to my regret, give any particular account of it. As, however, the Physics was the first of Aristoteles' writings that Mr. Taylor read, and one in which he was specially interested, it may be reasonably presumed that his translation is a faithful, accurate, and perspicuous reproduction of the original.

In 1806 Mr. Taylor also printed his "Collectanea," in one volume, 8vo. This work is a collection of hymns, poems, etc., some of which had previously appeared in various periodicals, and was privately printed for distribution among the author's friends. It was never *published*, and therefore copies of it are very rare, and are very seldom offered for sale.

The next laborious production of Mr. Taylor appeared in 1807, and was a translation of "The Organon; or, Logical Treatises of Aristoteles, with copious elucidations from the Commentaries of Ammonios and Simplikios." 1 vol. 4to. (844 pp.) This volume also contains Porphyrios' very valuable Introduction to the Categories. Those who desire to *advantageously* study the Organon should procure this work, as it has notes and elucidations which are of great value to the conscientious, intelligent student, whose object is to grasp the whole content of the Aristotelian text.

There was published in 1807, in one quarto volume, a translation of the Paraphrase of Andronikos Rhodios on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristoteles, by Mr. William Bridgman, a scholar of well-deserved repute.

In his preface, speaking of the deficiency of works for a scientific study of Ethics, he thus refers to Mr. Taylor: "This deficiency, however, will, I am happy to say, be at least partially supplied by the indefatigable labors of the celebrated Platonist, Mr. Thomas Taylor, who is now engaged in the no less arduous than laudable task of publishing an English version of the whole of Aristoteles' works. I say *partially*, because no more than FIFTY copies are to be printed, and consequently its possession must fall to the lot of this limited number.

"With respect to this translation, in the execution of which I owe much to the liberal and friendly assistance of the gentleman just mentioned, I shall say but little; for its merits, whatever they may be, as well as its imperfections, must be determined by less partial judges."

As a specimen of the malevolence exhibited by the professional reviewers towards Mr. Taylor, the following instance is no less noteworthy than amusing. The *Monthly Review* begins its notice of Mr. Bridgman's work by saying: "We boded no good of the present performance, when we saw the name of Mr. Thomas Taylor in the writer's preface. We repeat that we regarded the name of this gentleman, and the honorable mention with which it is introduced, as rather alarming omens." Mr. Taylor's comment on this reviewer's sentiments is excellent: "I have no doubt he did, and I trust my name will always be an alarming omen to the stupid, the malevolent, and the worthless; that it will always be an omen of unceasing hostility and the most strenuous exertions against folly and vice, and against illiberal criticism. For of all the species of traffic with which this island abounds, that of reviewing books, as it is at present conducted, is the most illiberal, as well as the most tyrannical. It is most illiberal, because it is undertaken from sordid motives; and it is most tyrannical, because it becomes the means of subjugating the opinion of the multitude to the decision of an obscure and worthless few."

In 1808 Mr. Taylor presented the philosophic public with an English version of the following interesting and important treatises of Aristoteles, in one quarto volume:—

On the Soul,
On Sense and Sensibles,
On Memory and Reminiscence,
On Sleep and Wakefulness,
On Dreams,
On Divination by Sleep,
On the Common Motion of Animals,
On the Generation of Animals,
On the Length and Shortness of Life,
On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death,
On Respiration.

The treatise On the Soul is illustrated by copious elucidations from the Commentaries of Simplikios.

"The present volume is much more remarkable for the importance than for the rarity of information, great as it is, which it contains. The first of these treatises, in particular, demands our most earnest attention. For what can be so interesting to man as the knowledge of his soul? since intellect, as we are taught by Aristoteles, is the true man himself; and all our wisdom and happiness consist in the knowledge of ourselves.

"This treatise, however, which is written with all that scientific accuracy by which the works of the Stagirite are so pre-eminently distinguished, and for which they are so justly celebrated, is also composed with a studied obscurity of diction, like all the other acromatic writings of this sublime genius. The reader, therefore, must not expect to understand it, however great his abilities may be, unless he is in the possession of scientific habits and a preparatory knowledge, is a sincere lover of truth, and applies himself to the study of it with a mind at once ardent, unembarrassed, and liberal. There are, I know, many who are deterred from perusing the more abstruse writings of Aristoteles by their obscurity; *there are also some who, that they may be ranked among the ignorant, dare to calumniate what they cannot understand;* and there is a third class, who labor in vain in attempting to fathom the Stagirite's profundity. The first of these exhibit their indolence, the second their improbity, and the third their folly. They detract nothing, however, from the authority of Aristoteles. For to abstain from the most beautiful and useful pursuits on account of their difficulty, is an indication of the most abject mind. To approach to the more abstruse works of Aristoteles with 'unwashed feet, and unhallowed lips,' as the Chaldean Oracle expresses it, and without a previous acquaintance with the introductory part of his writings, is insanity. And *no man is accustomed to blame what he does not understand, except one who is evidently worthless, and a sophist.* • • • Of the other treatises I shall only add, that they are consummate in their kind; that they follow each other in a scientific order; and that they are replete with the most interesting information." — *Introduction.*

In 1809 there issued from Mr. Taylor's prolific and indefatigable pen three noteworthy publications. The first of these was a translation, in quarto, of Aristoteles' "History of Animals," and his treatise on Physiognomy.

"Among the numerous and more popular treatises of Aristoteles, his History of Animals has in all ages been considered as possessing a very distinguished rank, whether we direct our attention to the comprehensive variety of the matter it contains, or to the accuracy and elegance with which it is written. Other writers on this subject, when compared with Aristoteles,

may be said to have surveyed the animal creation in a vale, while the soaring and penetrating genius of the Stagirite sees as from some sublime station,

— whatever breathes or creeps on earth.

"In the halcyon era of philosophy, Alexander the Great, who with all his imperfections was certainly one of the most heroic monarchs recorded in history, gave to Aristoteles, according to Athenaios, eight hundred talents for the expenses necessarily incurred in this arduous work. * * *

"My object in translating the whole of Aristoteles' works was not to comment copiously on all that he has written, but to bring to light all the sublime and most important dogmas of his philosophy, — this not having been executed by any one since the time of the Emperor Justinianus, — and also to prove that these dogmas are perfectly conformable to those of Platon. This grand object, to which all my labors in this very arduous undertaking are directed, must be my apology for any deficiencies or inaccuracies in other respects which may be found in this or any of the other volumes. * * *

"Of emendations and alterations of the text, had I been willing to gratify *mere verbal critics*, I might have made a pompous display in notes. But as I have always found these men to be not only egregious triflers, but also void of all principle, — men who have dared to assert that I translate from the Latin, when I profess to translate from the Greek, in order to blast my labors, and prevent me from diffusing the salutary light of genuine philosophy, — I have thought it much better to frustrate than gratify their wishes. It also occurred to me, that even if they should approve of the alterations which I had made, I ought to pay attention to the Pythagorean precept, that *'the praise of fools is a reproach.'* " — Introduction.

The second production was the "Arguments of the Emperor Julianos against the Christians," one vol., small 8vo. To this work Mr. Taylor did not attach his name. Probably he omitted to do so in order to avoid being harrassed and persecuted by the bigots of his time. The work itself was rigidly suppressed, and very few copies indeed are extant at the present day.

The third work by Mr. Taylor, which appeared in 1809, was "The Elements of the True Arithmetic of Infinites. In which all the propositions in the Arithmetic of Infinites invented by Dr. Wallis, relative to the summation of Infinite Series, and also the principles of the Doctrine of Fluxions, are demonstrated to be false, and the nature of Infinitesimals is unfolded."

"To most readers by whom the present is considered as *a very enlightened age* it will doubtless appear monstrous to assert, that the greatest of modern have been so far from adding anything of importance to the discoveries of ancient mathematicians, that some of their most splendid inventions are either wholly erroneous or remarkable instances of the possibility of deducing true conclusions from unscientific and false principles. Strange, however, as this assertion may seem, the following elementary treatise demonstrates it to be true; by showing that all the leading propositions of the Arithmetic of Infinites of Dr. Wallis are false, and that the Doctrine of Fluxions is a baseless fabric, and, in the language of the ingenious Bishop Berkeley, 'must be considered only as a presumption, as a knack, an art, or rather an artifice, but not a scientific demonstration.'

"If the following treatise, therefore, only detected the errors of some of the greatest modern, and vindicated the very scientific accuracy of the ancient mathematicians, I should conceive that my time was by no means misspent in composing it; but as I presume it will also be found to unfold the nature of the mathematical infinite more satisfactorily than it has hitherto been unfolded, I trust I shall obtain the commendation of the liberal and the wise.

"As one of the principal discoveries in this treatise is, *that in every infinite series of terms, whether integral or fractional, the last term multiplied by the number of terms is equal to the sum of the series*, I rejoice to find, as the result of this discovery, that it affords a most splendid instance of the absurdity which may attend reasoning by induction from parts to wholes, or from wholes to parts, when the wholes are themselves infinite. For this contributes to elucidate in no mean degree one of the most important dogmas in the philosophy of Platon and Aristoteles, to the promulgation of which philosophy I have devoted so considerable a part of my past life, and hope I shall be able to devote the remainder.

"In short, it will be found from this treatise that the doctrine of infinite series, as cultivated by mathematicians of the present day, is not to be employed in accurate demonstrations, however useful it may be for practical purposes. For it is here demonstrated that the fractions, from the expansion of which infinite series are produced, are not accurately [related] to each other as one finite to another finite number. And it is likewise shown in a variety of instances, that an infinite series of an infinitely repeating decimal is less than an infinite series of the vulgar fraction of which the infinite repetends are the decimal, by the vulgar fraction itself.

"Though I am fully persuaded, however, that the propositions of this treatise, as they are founded on the most evident and indubitable principles, will stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny, yet from the treatment my labors have hitherto received from those who have undertaken to appreciate their merit, I well know that I am to expect gross misrepresentation and virulent abuse, whatever the hatred of envy can administer to the purposes of detraction, or the cunning of malignant sophistry can pervert. But as the propagation of truth of the highest kind is the only aim of all my labors, accompanied with an earnest desire of benefiting through this means my countrymen, and all mankind, in the most important degree, I console myself, amidst all the defamation which I have or may yet experience, with the consciousness of the integrity of my intention, and with the firm hope that at all times what I have written for the benefit of others will meet with the approbation of the wise and good. For I have long since learned from the school of Pythagoras, that *the praise or reprehension of the stupid is alike ridiculous.*"—*Preface.*

In a note to his Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristoteles (page 458), Mr. Taylor says: "One of the greatest mathematicians of the age, on inspecting the sheet, while the treatise was printing, which contains this discovery, [viz., that in every infinite series of terms, whether integral or fractional, the last term (*i.e.*, either the greatest or the least term) multiplied by the number of terms is equal to the sum of the series] said to me that he saw nothing to object to in it, but since its publication he has preserved a profound silence on the subject. The same great mathematician also told me 'that he could never understand the principles on which the doctrine of fluxions is founded, and that he did not think they were to be understood; but that the conclusions deduced from those principles happened somehow or other to be true.' He added, 'that the Analyst of Bishop Berkeley (a work written in opposition to the doctrine of fluxions) had never been properly answered.'

"Such is the deplorable state of literature at present, in consequence of becoming a regular system of traffic, that all liberal discussion is at an end. Authors have become tradesmen. Books are manufactured at a certain price per sheet, and when manufactured, are circulated through the agency of booksellers, and their instruments, the reviewers. Hence it is a common expression with booksellers, that such or such a publication *has got into the market*, or *that the market is glutted with it*. Unless

a bookseller, therefore, is interested in a publication, however great the merit of it may be, it stands no chance of being speedily known; and it must trust, for the gradual development of its intrinsic worth, to time and a concurrence of fortunate circumstances. This is particularly the case if a work happens to oppose doctrines that, by having *got into the market* with great success, become the sources of considerable gain to certain booksellers and authors; for then the authors, being alarmed, inform their booksellers, and both these, that their pockets may not be injured, order their journeymen, the reviewers, to speak ill of the work.

"This being the case, there is no probability that any discovery, however important it may be, which is hostile to the doctrines of the existing book-makers, will be immediately noticed, unless it is supported by great power and great wealth; or, if it is noticed, it will be in order to decry it by all the arts the malignant cunning and sophistry of a little grovelling soul can devise."

In 1810 Mr. Taylor sent forth his translation of "The Treatises of Aristoteles on the Parts and Progressive Motion of Animals; His Problems; and His Treatise on Indivisible Lines." The work on "The Elements of the True Arithmetic of Infinites" is also included in this volume.

"The treatises of which the present volume consists afford a very ample specimen of that consummate skill, accurate reasoning, and fecundity of conception for which, during the empire of Philosophy, the Stagirite was so justly celebrated." — *Introduction.*

In 1811 Mr. Taylor published his admirable version of "The Rhetoric, Poetic, and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristoteles."

"The three treatises of which the present volume consists have been deservedly considered by the ancients as ranking in the first class of the most exquisite productions of human wit; and even in the present frivolous age they maintain so high a degree of reputation as to be studied at the University of Oxford. Indeed, so much penetration and profundity of thought are displayed in the composition of each, that the reader by whom they are thoroughly understood will immediately subscribe to the encomium given to the Stagirite by the great Syrianos, *that he was the most skilful and the most prolific in his conceptions of all men;* and also to the assertion of another of the ancients, which may be considered as the *ne plus ultra* of eulogy, *that he dipped his pen in intellect.* * * * Notwithstanding, however, the loss sustained by the want of the second and third books of the Poetic of Aristoteles, I rejoice that there is still extant a most admirable account of the different species of poetry, by Proklos the Coryphæus, — next to Platon and Aristoteles — of all true philosophers, whose honor will grow with increase of time, and whose fame will swim over the vast extent of ages when the *little critical vermin* by whom he has been defamed will be utterly forgotton." — *Introduction.*

Another valuable volume, and the last of Mr. Taylor's version of Aristoteles, also appeared in 1811, viz., "The Great and Eudemian Ethics; the Politics, and Economics."

As a fitting and splendid crown to his Aristotelian labors, Mr. Taylor prepared, and published in 1812, in one large quarto volume, a "Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristoteles, in Four Books. In which his principal physical and metaphysical dogmas are unfolded; and it is shown from indubitable evidence that his philosophy has not been accurately known since the destruction of the Greeks. The insufficiency, also, of the philosophy that has been substituted by the moderns for that of Aristoteles is demonstrated." This is an extremely valuable work.

"As the first and second books of this Dissertation are scarcely anything else than a collection from the volumes of my translation of Aristoteles' works, it is necessary to observe that my reason for so doing was, that I might benefit as much as possible those who were not purchasers of that translation. For, as it consists of nine volumes, quarto, and fifty copies only of it were printed, it must unavoidably be confined to a few purchasers. Of the present volume, therefore, a greater number than fifty were printed, in order that those English readers might be in possession of the principal physical and metaphysical dogmas of Aristoteles who, by the magnitude of the price and the paucity of the copies, were prevented from obtaining the translation of the whole of his works. Conceiving, also, that it would be more acceptable to the reader to present him with these dogmas in their most genuine form, I have given them in the very words of Aristoteles himself; and have added the commentaries on them of his best Greek disciples. For I have neither the arrogance to suppose that any explanations of mine could be sufficient to supersede the elucidations of these excellent men, nor the audacity to destroy Aristoteles' very scientific method of philosophizing, by attempting, like the ephemeral writers of the age, to exhibit his doctrines in a form calculated to satisfy the superficial and captivate the vulgar.

"As an apology for the freedom with which I have censured modern writers and modern opinions, I deem it will be sufficient to observe, that I write not with any view to the applause of the many; that I never was, at present am not, nor ever will be, an hireling writer; that I consider independence, both as pertaining to outward circumstances and inward mental energies, as the first of blessings when properly employed; and that, in the language of Sokrates, 'bidding farewell to the honors of the multitude, and having my eye solely fixed upon truth, I will endeavor to live in the best manner I am able, and when I die, to die so;' which can never be accomplished by him who is afraid to oppose what he conceives to be false, and averse to defend what he believes to be true." These sentiments are truly admirable, and are eloquently expressed. They may be appropriately commended to the truckling, time-serving writers of the present day — men who possess not a particle of intellectual or moral independence, but write exactly as their employers dictate. This accounts for the prostitution of the modern press to the advocacy of every immoral scheme, and its servitude to the opinions of the rabble.

"After one observation more, I shall take my leave of the reader for some time at least, as the task to the completion of which shall next devote myself is the translation and elucidation of Proklos on the Timaios and Parmenides of Platon; of his six books on the Theology of Platon; and of the works of Plotinos. The observation is this: that the translation and elucidation of the whole of Aristoteles' writings is a work OF NO COMMON MAGNITUDE; that the only view with which it was undertaken was, THE GREATEST GOOD OF OTHERS; the period in which it was begun and finished, BARREN; the country in which it was published, COMMERCIAL; and that the enemies of it are THE WORST OF MEN, but its friend is DIVINITY."—*Preface.*

Mr. Taylor says further of his version of Aristoteles: "It has been the result of the incessant labor of six years; and though it was begun by me in an extremely debilitated state of body, I found, through the blessing of heaven, that I gained strength as I proceeded, that my health was renovated, and that there was nothing which an ardent mind in a noble cause could not accomplish. For the reward of such labors I look only to the approbation of the worthy and wise. From the venal writers of the day I expect, as usual, defamation instead of thanks for what I have done, a minute detail of the errors I may have committed, a wilful misrepresentation of what I have said, a malevolent insinuation that I am incompetent to the task I have

undertaken; and, in short, as I have elsewhere expressed it, from these men I expect whatever the hatred of envy can administer to the purposes of detraction, or the cunning of malignant sophistry can pervert. But I have been too long disciplined in the schools of Platon and Aristoteles either to covet the praise or to dread the censure of such men as these — of men who are influenced by gain, and court the applause of the rabble in what they write.

"The impotence of the malevolence of these men, with respect to myself, is remarkably conspicuous. For having for the space of thirty years made the study of the philosophy of Platon and Aristoteles the principal, though, from necessity, not the sole object of my pursuit, I determined, from a deep conviction of its intrinsic excellence, and of the inestimable benefit which must result from a legitimate study of it, to promulgate it to the utmost extent of my power; and Providence, in a manner almost miraculous, has co-operated with my endeavors. For though I have met with nothing but opposition from the abovementioned writers, and others whose works are applauded by the multitude, yet I have obtained patronage in my efforts to promulgate this philosophy, the most noble and the most liberal. I have lived to see my earlier productions become scarce, and sell for more than their original price. I have been enabled to do that which no man in modern times has done: to give the works both of Platon and Aristoteles in my native tongue; to bring to light truths which have been concealed for more than a thousand years; to unfold the theology and mythology of the Greeks from the most ancient and genuine sources; and to elucidate, from the same sources, all the sublime and most important dogmas of Platon and Aristoteles. Having done all this, and I defy any one of my enemies to prove that I have not, I have lived to accomplish what I wished to accomplish: the publication of doctrines the most exalted and the most beneficial that were ever imparted by Divinity to man; and in consequence of this, whenever I die, I shall die with the pleasing consciousness that I have done that which is neither contemptible nor small."—pp. 573–576.

Speaking of the causes of the general ignorance about the philosophy of Platon and Aristoteles, Mr. Taylor says: "It must doubtless seem singular in the extreme to those who are not adepts in this philosophy, that, being thus admirable and of such exalted worth, there should have been so great an ignorance of it as I have shown, from indubitable evidence, there has been for so many ages. But the wonder will cease when it is considered that the order and method of study enjoined by its great masters, as essentially necessary to the attainment of it, has been entirely neglected. Thus, for instance, men have either applied themselves to certain portions only of the works of Aristoteles, and thus from knowing something of a part, and this very imperfectly, have presumed to judge of the whole of his philosophy; or, if they have studied him regularly, which no one appears to have done since the time of the Schoolmen,—and they barbarized him,— they have dissociated him from Platon, and have thus deteriorated the philosophy of the Stagirite, perverted his real meaning, and consequently have made no solid proficiency in the knowledge of his doctrines. To which may be added, as another most principal cause of this ignorance, the neglecting to study the commentaries of his Greek disciples. For, indeed, to attempt at this distance of time to read Aristoteles, who wrote as we have shown with a studied obscurity of diction, without the assistance of these commentaries, must be the result of the most lawless arrogance and the most consummate folly. And the same remark equally applies to the writings of Platon, which, like those of Homeros, as Olympiodoros well observes, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and, in short, multifariously. For will any man of the present period be hardy enough to say that he understands the Greek tongue so well as they did, to whom it was native? Or that he has the means of acquiring such information respecting it as they had, who had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Platon and Aristotoles, but which have been lost for more than a thousand years; who besides this had a traditional knowledge of that philosophy; and who are acknowledged to have been men of great learning and genius? It has become the fashion, however, with hireling writers to decry them; but from whom and when the defamation originated I know not; though, as I have elsewhere observed, whatever was its source, it is no less contemptible than obscure. Hence, the beautiful light which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto, unnoticed, illumined Philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. Another, and that no small cause of this ignorance, has been the want of those mental qualifications which Platon enumerates as essential requisites to the attainment of perfection in his philosophy. For according to him he who sufficiently applies himself to the study of it must be naturally possessed of a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent and graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude, and temperance. At the best of times men of this description will be rare; but in periods which, from a variety of circumstances, are hostile to genuine philosophy, and such have all the periods been since the destruction of the Greeks, they will necessarily be rare in the extreme."—pp. 564–566.

There are prefixed to this volume an elegant "Panegyric on the Most Eminent Intellectual Philosophers of Antiquity," and a catalogue of the books of one hundred and twenty-eight writers, which the author used in composing this work and in translating Aristoteles.

The result of Mr. Taylor's labors for the next four years alone justly entitles him to the eternal gratitude of all persons of elevated souls.

In 1816 appeared, in two large quarto volumes, Mr. Taylor's version of one of the most sublime and abstruse works ever written — Proklos on the Theology of Platon. In the same volumes are also translations of Proklos' Elements of Theology; his treatise on Providence and Fate; extracts from his treatise entitled Ten Doubts Concerning Providence; and extracts from his treatise on the Subsistence of Evil. Mr. Taylor added a seventh book to the work on the Theology of Platon, "in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proklos, but since lost."

"I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of presenting the *truly* philosophic reader, in the present work, with a treasure of Grecian theology; of a theology which was first mystically and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated enigmatically through images by Pythagoras, and in the last place scientifically unfolded by Platon and his genuine disciples. The peculiarity, indeed, of this theology is, that it is no less scientific than sublime; and that by a geometrical series of reasoning, originating from the most self-evident truths, it developes all the deified progressions from the ineffable principle of things, and accurately exhibits to our view all the links of that golden chain of which deity is the one extreme, and body the other.

"That, also, which is most admirable and laudable in this theology is, that it produces in the mind properly prepared for its reception the most pure, holy, venerable, and exalted conceptions of the great cause of all. For it celebrates this immense principle as something superior even to being itself; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source, and does not therefore think fit to connumerate it with any

triad, or order of beings. Indeed, it even apologizes for attempting to give an appropriate name to this principle, which is in reality ineffable, and ascribes the attempt to the imbecility of human nature, which striving intently to behold it, gives the appellation of the most simple of its conceptions to that which is beyond all knowledge and all conception. Hence it denominates it *the one*, and *the good;* by the former of these names indicating its transcendent simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to all beings. For all things desire good. At the same time, however, it asserts that these appellations are in reality nothing more than the parturitions of the soul, which, standing as it were in the vestibules of the adytum of Deity, announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable but only indicate her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and belong rather to the immediate offspring of the first God, than to the First itself. • • •

"It now remains that I should speak of the following work, and the translation. The work itself, then, is a scientific development of the deiform processions from the ineffable principle of things, and this as it appears to me in the greatest perfection possible to man. For the reasoning is everywhere consummately accurate, and deduced from self-evident principles; and the conclusions are the result of what Platon powerfully calls geometrical necessities. To the reader of this work, indeed, who has not been properly disciplined in Eleatic and Academic studies, and who has not a genius naturally adapted to such abstruse speculations, it will doubtless appear to be perfectly unintelligible, and, in the language of critical cant, nothing but jargon and revery. This, however, is what Platon, the great hierophant of this theology, predicted would be the case if ever it was unfolded to the multitude at large. 'For, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any particulars which will be considered by the multitude more ridiculous than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those who are naturally adapted to perceive them.'" —*Epistle 2.*

"In his seventh Epistle also he observes: 'Thus much, however, I shall say respecting all those who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my studies — whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves, that they have not heard anything about these things conformable to my opinion; for I have never written nor ever shall write about them.[1] For a thing of this kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light[2] as it were leaping from a fire will, on a sudden, be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself. • • • But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the *multitude* by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who, from some small vestiges previously demonstrated, are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain venerable things.'

"The prediction of Platon, therefore, has been but too truly fulfilled in the fate which has attended the writings of the best of his disciples, among whom Proklos certainly maintains the most distinguished rank. This, indeed, these disciples well knew would be the case; but perceiving that the hand of barbaric and despotic power was about to destroy the schools of the philosophers, and foreseeing that dreadful night of ignorance and folly which succeeded so nefarious an undertaking, they benevolently disclosed, in as luminous a manner as the subject would permit, the arcana of their master's doctrines; thereby, as Platon expresses it, giving assistance to Philosophy, and also preserving it as a paternal and immortal inheritance to the latest posterity. Proklos, in the first book of this work, has enumerated the requisites which a student of it ought to possess; and it is most certain that he who does not possess them will never fathom the depths of this theology, or perceive his mind irradiated with that admirable light mentioned by Platon in the foregoing extracts, and which is only to be seen by that eye of the soul which is better worth saving than ten thousand corporeal eyes.

"With respect to the diction of Proklos in this work, its general character is that of purity, clearness, copiousness, and magnificence; so that even the fastidious critic, who considers every Greek writer as partially barbarous who lived after the fall of the Macedonian Empire, must, however unwillingly, be forced to acknowledge that Proklos is a splendid exception. • • •

"With respect to the translation of the following work, On the Theology of Platon, I can only say that I have endeavored to render it as faithful as possible, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the author; this being indispensably necessary, both from the importance of the subject, and the scientific accuracy of the reasoning with which it is discussed. I have added a seventh book, in order to render the work complete; for without the development of the mundane gods, and the more excellent genera their perpetual attendants, it would obviously be incomplete. From the catalogue of the manuscripts in the late French King's library, it is evident that Proklos had written a seventh book, as some chapters of it are there said to be extant in that library. These I have endeavored, but without success, to obtain. • • •

"A translation of the Elements of Theology is added, in order to render the treatise On the Theology of Platon more complete, and to assist the reader who wishes to penetrate the depths of that most abstruse and sublime work; for the former elucidates, and is elucidated by the latter.

"The Greek text of Proklos abounds with errors, so that the emendations which I have made and the deficiencies which I have supplied in this volume amount to more than four hundred. And the Latin translation of Portus is so very faulty as to be almost beyond example bad. Having discovered this to be the case, and having in so many places corrected the original, I scarcely think that any of my critical enemies will be hard enough to say that any part of this volume was translated from the Latin, where the Greek could be obtained. As I am conscious, however, that in what is now offered to the public I had no other view than to benefit those who are capable of being benefited by such sublime speculations; that wishing well to all mankind, and particularly to my country, I have labored to disseminate the philosophy and theology of Platon, as highly favorable to the interests of piety and good government, and most hostile to lawless conduct and revolutionary principles; and that I have done my best to deserve the esteem of the wise and worthy part of mankind, I am wholly unconcerned as to the reception it may meet with from the malevolent, though I wish for the approbation of the candid critics of the day. For in all my labors I have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept: 'Do those things which you judge to be beautiful, though in doing them you should be without renown; for the rabble is a bad judge of a good thing.'" —*Introduction.*

[1] Platon means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about *intelligibles*, or *true beings*, the proper objects of intellect.

[2] This light is a thing of a very different kind from that which is produced by the evidence arising from truths perceptible by the multitude, as those who have experienced it well know.

It may be here noted, as a specimen of the esteem and respect entertained for Mr. Taylor's scholarship by continental scholars, that the celebrated Creuzer, in his edition of Proklos' Elements of Theology (Frankfort, 1822), frequently quotes Mr. Taylor's version of this work, and adopts nearly all his numerous emendations of the text.

In 1816 also appeared Mr. Taylor's "Theoretic Arithmetic, in Three Books; containing the substance of all that has been written on this subject by Theon of Smyrna, Nikomachos, Iamblichos, and Boetios. Together with some remarkable particulars respecting perfect, amicable, and other numbers, which are not to be found in the writings of any ancient or modern mathematicians. Likewise, a specimen of the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about numbers; and a development of their mystical and theological arithmetic."

"'With respect to the work itself, in the first and second books. and the additional notes, I have incorporated whatever appeared to me to be most important in the arithmetical writings of Nikomachos, Theon, Iamblichos, and Boetios, these being the only ancient authors extant in print that have professedly written on THEORETIC ARITHMETIC. Indeed, I have nearly given the whole of the last-mentioned author, both because he has written more clearly on this subject than the others, and because, as Fabricius rightly conjectures, he appears to have availed himself of a greater arithmetical work of Nikomachos, which has not been transmitted to the present time. The third book was added by me in order to show how the Pythagoreans philosophized about numbers, and to unfold as much as possible their mystical and theological arithmetic; conceiving that such an addition was wanting to the completion of the theory of numbers. The reader will also find some things entirely new. And if it should anywhere happen that I have ascribed to my own invention what has been discovered by others, I trust the reader will attribute it to my having been much more conversant with ancient than with modern writers on this, as well as on other subjects; and not from any intention of defrauding others of their equitable claims." — *Introduction.*

Nearly the whole of the valuable Introduction prefixed to this work has been reprinted in THE PLATONIST.

Mr. Taylor published in 1817 his version of several of the works of Plotinos. The volume is entitled, "Select Works of Plotinos, the Great Restorer of the Philosophy of Platon; and extracts from the Treatise of Synesios on Providence. With an Introduction, containing the substance of Porphyrios' Life of Plotinos." The following is a list of the interesting, valuable, and profound treatises of Plotinos contained in this volume: —

1. On the Virtues, En. I., 2.
2. On Dialectic, En. I., 3.
3. On Matter, En. II., 4.
4. Against the Gnostics, En. II., 9.
5. On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures, En. III., 6.
6. On Eternity and Time, En. III., 7.
7. On the Immortality of the Soul, En. IV., 7.
8. On the Three Archial Hypostases, En. V., 1.
9. On Intellect, Ideas, and Real Being, En. V., 9.
10. On the Essence of Soul, En. IV., 1.
11. A Discussion of Doubts about the Soul, En. IV., 3.
12. On the Generation and Order of Things after The First, En. V., 2.
13. That the Nature which is beyond Being is not Intellective, etc., En. V., 6.
14. On the Good, or The One, En. VI., 9.

"Let no one deceive himself by fancying that he can understand the writings of Plotinos by barely reading them. For, as the subjects which he discusses are, for the most part, the objects of intellect alone, to understand them is to see them, and to see them is to come into contact with them. But this is only to be accomplished by long familiarity with, and a life conformable to, the things themselves. For then, as Platon says, "a light as if leaping from a fire will, on a sudden, be enkindled in the soul, and will there itself nourish itself." — *Note to Introduction.*

"Plotinos was a philosopher pre-eminently distinguished for the strength and profundity of his intellect, and the purity and elevation of his life. He was a being wise without the usual mixture of human darkness, and great without the general combination of human weakness and imperfection. He seems to have left the *orb of light* solely for the benefit of mankind; that he might teach them how to repair the ruin contracted by their exile from good, and how to return to their true country and legitimate kindred and allies. I do not mean that he descended into mortality for the purpose of unfolding the sublimest truths to the vulgar part of mankind, for this would have been a vain and ridiculous attempt; since the eyes of the multitude, as Platon justly observes, are not strong enough to look to truth. But he came as a guide to the few who are born with a divine destiny [θεια μοιρα], and are struggling to gain the lost region of light, but know not how to break the fetters by which they are detained; who are impatient to leave the obscure cavern of sense, where all is delusion and shadow, and to ascend to the realms of intellect, where all is substance and reality." — *Introduction.*

In 1818 Mr. Taylor produced and published an important work, viz., "Iamblichos' Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life. Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of certain Pythagoreans in the Doric Dialect; and a Collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobaios and Others, which are omitted by Gale in his 'Opuscula Mythologica,' and have not been noticed by any editor. Translated from the Greek."

The following elegant lines are prefixed to this volume: —

> "Approach ye genuine philosophic few,
> The Pythagoric Life belongs to you;
> But far, far off, ye vulgar herd profane;
> For Wisdom's voice is heard by you in vain.
> And you, Mind's lowest link, and darksome end,
> Good Rulers, Customs, Laws, alone can mend."

"When it is considered that Pythagoras was the father of philosophy, authentic memoirs of his life cannot fail to be uncommonly interesting to every lover of wisdom, and particularly to those who reverence the doctrines of Platon, the most genuine and the best of all his disciples. And that the following memoirs of Pythagoras by Iamblichos are authentic is acknowledged by all the critics, as they are for the most part obviously derived from sources of very high antiquity; and where the sources are unknown, there is every reason to believe, from the great worth and respectability of the biographer, that the information is perfectly accurate and true. • • •

"Of the life of Pythagoras, it is necessary to observe that the original has been transmitted to us in a very imperfect state, partly from the numerous verbal errors of the text, partly from the want of connection in the things that are narrated, and partly from many particulars being related in different places, in the very same words; so that the conjecture of Kuster, one of the German editors of this work, is highly probable, that it had not received the last hand of Iamblichos, but that others formed this treatise from the confused materials which they found among his manuscripts, after his death. Notwithstanding all its defects, however, it is, as I have before observed, a most interesting work; and the benefits are inestimable which the dissemination of it is calculated to produce.

"As to the Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, all eulogy of them is superfluous when it is considered that, independently of their being written by very early Pythagoreans, they were some of the sources from which Aristoteles himself derived his consummate knowledge of morality, as will be at once evident by comparing his Nicomachean Ethics with these fragments.

"With respect to the collection of Pythagoric Sentences, it is

almost needless to observe that they are incomparably excellent; and it is deeply to be regretted that the Greek original of the sentences of Sextus being lost, the fraudulent Latin version of them, by the Presbyter Ruffinus, alone remains. * * * In the selection, however, which I have made from these sentences, I have endeavored, and I trust not in vain, to give the genuine sense of Sextus, unmingled with the barbarous and polluted interpretations of Ruffinus.

"I deem it also requisite to observe, that the Pythagoric life which is here delineated, is a specimen of the greatest perfection in virtue and wisdom which can be obtained by man in the present state. Hence it exhibits piety unadulterated with folly, moral virtue uncontaminated with vice, science unmingled with sophistry, dignity of mind and manners unaccompanied with pride, a sublime magnificence in theory without any degradation in practice, and a vigor of intellect which elevates its possessor to the vision of Divinity, and thus Deifies while it exalts."—*Introduction.*

In this same year (1818) appeared a second edition of Mr. Taylor's version of Aristoteles' Rhetoric, Poetic and Nicomachean Ethics, in two volumes, 8vo.

"I rejoice that I am able to adduce the testimony of Dr. Copleston, now provost of Oriel college, in favor of my translation of these treatises, as he is one of the brightest ornaments of the University of Oxford, This testimony is contained in a letter to me, dated Oriel College, March 8, 1811, and is as follows:—

"'You will not expect from me any of that microscopic criticism in which the gentry we have been speaking of delight to indulge. I perceive in your translation, wherever I examine it, that prime virtue of a translator — a complete subordination and subservency to his original; no tampering with the exact meaning in order to evade a difficulty, or to round a period. There is also a manly plainness and integrity which commands respect; and I have seen enough to convince me that a student will derive satisfaction often, from the literal rendering you have adopted.'"—*Advertisement.*

[To be continued.]

ON THE VIRTUES.

Enn. I., Lib. 2.

[*Translated from the original Greek of Plotinos.*]

[The first of the Virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or, rather, pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament; or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Platon speaks in the Politikos and the Laws. The Ethical Virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These Virtues Platon delivers in the Laws. They pertain, however, at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the Political Virtues, which pertain to reason alone, for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through Prudence adorning the gnostic, through Fortitude the irascible, and through Temperance the epithymetic power, — *i.e.*, the power which is the source of desire, — but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through Justice. And of these virtues Platon speaks much in the Republic. These virtues follow each other. Above these are the Cathartic Virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Platon particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phaidon. Prior to these, however, are the Theoretic Virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing it to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also *orectically;* for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul, — and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the Political; for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Platon delivers in the Theaitetos.

According to Plotinos there is also another gradation of the Virtues besides these, viz., the Paradigmatic. For as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were solar-form; so, also, our soul first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the Theoretic Virtues, but afterwards becomes as it were that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the Paradigmatic Virtues. And it is the business, indeed, of Philosophy to make us intellect; but of Theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when possessing the Physical Virtues we know mundane bodies — for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies — so from possessing the Ethical Virtues we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the Ethical Virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the Political Virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the Cathartic, super-mundane; but as possessing the Theoretic we know intellectual, and from the Paradigmatic, intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the Ethical Virtues; Justice to the Political, on account of compacts; Fortitude to the Cathartic, through not verging to matter; and Prudence to the Theoretic. Observe, too, that Platon in the Phaidon calls the Physical Virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the Ethical *adumbrations*, because their possessors only know *that* the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are so. It is also well observed by Olympiodoros that Platon calls the Cathartic and Theoretic Virtues those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz., that the Political are not telestic, — *i.e.*, do not pertain to mystic cermonies, — but that the Cathartic and Theoretic are telestic. Hence Olympiodoros adds, the Cathartic Virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in the Mysteries; but the Theoretic, from perceiving things divine. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that —

> The soul that uninitiated dies,
> Plunged in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the divinely inspired energy of the Virtues. Olympiodoros also further observes, that by the thyrsus bearers Platon means those that energize according to the Political Virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the Cathartic Virtues.

All the Virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being everywhere common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of Fortitude is the not declining

to things subordinate; of Temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of Justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of Prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodoros further observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. "For many Gods," says he, "are adorned with their appellations, and all goodness originates from the Gods." Likewise, prior to things which sometimes participate the Virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the Virtues first appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For Virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul.

The following account of the Virtues, taken from the Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, by Porphyrios, is added both for the sake of the philosophic reader, and because it elucidates what is said by Plotinos on this subject. The substance of it is indeed evidently derived from Plotinos.

There is one kind of Virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and therefore is called theoretic, and even a beholder. And there are also other Virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The Virtues, indeed, of the political individual, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterized by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbors, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And Prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; Fortitude about the irascible part; Temperance in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and Justice in each of these performing its proper duty with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, these virtues are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the Virtues of the soul, elevating itself to true being. The Political Virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these should abstain from doing anything precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, give subsistence to Prudence, which derives its perfection through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body constitutes Temperance; not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to Fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance from the irrational part, Justice is produced. The disposition, therefore, according to the Political Virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformably to nature. But the disposition according to the Theoretic Virtues is beheld in apathy,[1] the end of which is a similitude to God.

Since, however, of purification, one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the Cathartic Virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification is to become pure.

But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of everything foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification is good and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil, also, is twofold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial natures, and the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the Political Virtues which liberate the soul from one evil may be denominated virtues, and are honorable; but the Cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul when purified shall associate with its generator. Hence the Virtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific knowledge of true being; but this will not be the case unless conversion precedes.

There is, therefore, another genus of Virtues, after the Cathartic and Political, and which are the Virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, Wisdom and Prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But Justice consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and energizing according to, intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And Fortitude is apathy; according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These Virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.

The fourth species of the Virtues is that of the paradigms, subsisting in intellect, which are more excellent than the psychical Virtues, and exist as the paradigms of them, the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And Intellect, indeed, is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, Prudence is science; but intellect that knows all things is Wisdom. Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The proper work of intellect is the performance of its appropriate duty, and this is Justice. But Fortitude is sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are, therefore, four genera of Virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to Intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to Soul now looking to intellect, and being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying it, and becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also necessarily the less; but the contrary, that he who has the less has also the greater Virtues, is not true. Nor will he who possesses the greater energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the Virtues is, as we have said, generically different in the different Virtues. For the scope of the Political Virtues is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature; but the scope of the Cathartic Virtues is entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the Practical Virtues is a *worthy* man; and he who energizes according to the Cathartic Virtues is a *dæmoniacal* man, or is also a *good dæmon*. He who energizes according to the Intellectual Virtues alone is *a deity;* but he who energizes according to the Paradigmatic Virtues is the *father of the deities*. We therefore ought especially to pay attention to the Cathartic Virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. But through these the ascent is to the more honorable Virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected, and to what extent, must now be said.

[1] This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.

In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification should, as the foundation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, *in order that the rational part may not be impeded* in its energies. Pain, also, must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not co-passive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. That, however, which is unpremeditated is imbecile and small. All fear, likewise, must be expelled. For he who requires this purification will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger, therefore, and fear, must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of everything base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a Cathartic Philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks. * * * In short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man must be liberated from all these corporeal propensities. He must likewise endeavor that what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions may be moved without sympathy and without animadversion, so that the motions themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding to its perfection, but will happen to those in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these the inferior part will so venerate reason that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy. For when co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved when reason imparts excitation, through verging to the irrational nature. — *Taylor.*]

I. Since evils are here, and revolve from necessity about this terrestrial place, but the soul wishes to fly from evils, it is requisite to fly from hence. What, therefore, is the flight? To become similar, says Platon, to God. But this will be effected if we become just and holy, in conjunction with Intellectual Prudence, and in short, if we are truly virtuous. If, therefore, we are assimilated through Virtue, is it to one who possesses Virtue? But to whom are we assimilated? To Divinity. Are we, then, assimilated to that nature which appears to possess the Virtues in a more eminent degree, and also to the Soul of the World, and to the Intellect which is the leader in it, in which there is an admirable wisdom? For it is reasonable to suppose that while we are here we are assimilated to this Intellect. Or is it not, in the first place, dubious whether all the virtues, such as Temperance and Fortitude, are present with this Intellect, since there is nothing which can be dreadful to it? For nothing externally happens to it, nor does anything pleasing approach to it, which, when not present, it may become desirous of possessing or apprehending. But if it also has an appetite directed to the intelligibles, to which our souls aspire, it is evident that ornament and the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has, therefore, this Intellect these virtues? Or may we not say, it is unreasonable to suppose that it possesses what are called the Political Virtues, viz., Prudence, indeed, about the part that deliberates and consults; Fortitude about the irascible part; Temperance, in the agreement and concord of the part that desires with the reasoning power; and Justice, in each of these parts, performing its proper office with respect to governing and being governed? Shall we say, therefore, that we are not assimilated to Divinity according to the Political Virtues, but according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation? But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according to the Political Virtues? Or is it not absurd that we should not in any respect be assimilated according to these? For reason also says that these are divine. We must say, therefore, that we are in a certain manner assimilated to Divinity by them, but that the assimilation is according to the greater virtues. In either way, however, it happens that Divinity has virtues, though not such as the political.

If, therefore, some one should grant, that though it is not possible to be assimilated according to such virtues as these, since we subsist differently with reference to other virtues, yet nothing hinders but that we, by our virtues, may be assimilated to that which does not possess Virtue. But in what manner? Thus, if anything is heated by the presence of heat, it is necessary that also should be hot from whence the heat is derived. And if anything is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary that fire itself also should be hot by the presence of heat. To the first of these assertions, however, it may be said that there is heat in fire, but a connascent heat, so that it will follow from analogy that Virtue is indeed adventitious to the soul, but connascent with that nature from whence it is derived by imitation. And with respect to the argument from fire, it may be said that Divinity possesses Virtue, but that Virtue in him is in reality greater than Virtue, because it subsists causally. But if that Virtue indeed, of which the soul participates, was the same with that from which it is derived, it would be necessary to speak in this manner. Now, however, the one is different from the other. For neither is the sensible the same with the intelligible house [or with that which is the object of intellectual conception], though it is similar to it. And the sensible house participates of order and ornament, though there is neither order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in the productive principle of it in the mind. Thus, therefore, we participate from Divinity of ornament, order and consent, and these things pertain to Virtue, but there consent, ornament and order are not wanted, and therefore Divinity has no need of Virtue. We are, however, nevertheless assimilated to what he possesses, through the presence of Virtue. And this much for the purpose of showing that it is not necessary Virtue should be there, though we are assimilated to Divinity by Virtue. But it is also necessary to introduce persuasion to what has been said, and not to be satisfied with compulsion alone.

II. In the first place, therefore, the virtues must be assumed, according to which we say that we are assimilated to Divinity in order that we may discover the same thing. For that which is virtue with us, being an imitation, is there an archetype as it were, and not virtue. By which we signify that there is a twofold similitude, one of which requires a sameness in the things that are similar, these being such as are equally assimilated from the same thing; but the other being that in which one thing is assimilated to another, though the latter ranks as first, and is

not converted to the other, nor is said to be similar to it. Here, therefore, the similitude must be assumed according to another manner; since we do not require the same but rather another form, the assimilation being effected in another manner. What, therefore, is Virtue — both that which is universal and that which is particular? The discussion, however, will be more manifest by directing our attention to each of the virtues; for thus that which is common, according to which all of them are virtues, will be easily apparent. The Political Virtues, therefore, of which we have spoken above, truly adorn and render us better, — bounding and moderating the desires, and in short the passions, and taking away false opinions from a more excellent nature, by limiting and placing the soul beyond the immoderate and indefinite, and by themselves receiving measure and bound. Perhaps, too, these measures are in soul as in matter, are assimilated to the measure which is in Divinity, and possess a vestige of *the best* which is there. For that which is in every respect deprived of measure, being matter, is entirely dissimilar to Divinity. But so far as it receives form, so far it is assimilated to him who is without form. But things which are nearer to Divinity participate of him in a greater degree. Soul, however, is nearer to and more allied to him than body, and therefore participates of him more abundantly, so that appearing as a deity it deceives us, and causes us to doubt whether the whole of it is not divine. In this manner, therefore, these are assimilated.

III. Since, however, Platon indicates that this similitude to Divinity pertains to a greater virtue than that which is political, let us speak concerning it; in which discussion, also, the essence of Political Virtue will become more manifest, and likewise the Virtue which is essentially more excellent, and which will, in short, be found to be different from that which is political. Platon, therefore, when he says that a similitude to Divinity is a flight from terrestrial concerns, and when, besides this, he does not admit that the virtues belonging to a polity are *simply* virtues, but adds to them the epithet "political," and elsewhere calls all the virtues purifications, evidently admits that the virtues are twofold, and that a similitude to Deity is not effected according to political virtue. How, therefore, do we call these purifications? And how, being purified, are we especially assimilated to Divinity? Shall we say, that since the soul is in an evil condition when mingled with the body, becoming similarly passive, and concurring in opinion with it in all things, it will be good and possess virtue if it neither consents with the body, but energizes alone (and this is to perceive intellectually and to be wise), nor is similarly passive with it (and this is to be temperate), nor dreads a separation from the body (and this is to possess fortitude), but reason and intellect are the leaders (and this will be justice)? If any one, however, calls this disposition of the soul, according to which it perceives intellectually, and is thus impassive, — a resemblance of Divinity, he will not err. For Divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a kind that the being which imitates it will possess wisdom. What then? Is not Divinity also disposed in this manner? Or may we not say that he is not, but that the disposition pertains to the soul; and that soul perceives intellectually, in a way different from Divinity? It may also be said, that of the things which subsist with him, some subsist differently from what they do with us, and others are not at all with him. Again, therefore, is intellectual perception with him and us harmonious? By no means; but the one is primary, and that which is derived from him, secondary. For as the discourse which is in voice is an imitation of that which is in the soul, so likewise, that which is in the soul is an imitation of that which is in something else, — *i.e.*, in intellect. As, therefore, external discourse is divided and distributed, when compared to that which is in the soul, thus also that which is in the soul, and which is the interpreter of intellectual discourse, is divided when compared with it. Virtue, however, pertains to the Soul; but not to Intellect, nor to that which is beyond Intellect.

IV. It must, however, be inquired whether purification is the same with a virtue of this kind? Or does purification indeed precede, but virtue follow? Moreover, does virtue consist in purifying, or in being perfectly purified? For virtue, while in the act of purifying, is more imperfect than that which consists in complete purification, which is now, as it were, the end. But to be perfectly purified is an ablation of everything foreign. Good, however, is something else besides this. Or may we not say that if the soul was good prior to her impurity, purification is sufficient? Purification, indeed, is sufficient; but that which remains will be good, and not purification. And what that is which remains is to be investigated. For perhaps the nature which is left was not good; since otherwise it would not have been situated in evil. Shall we say, therefore, that it has the form of good? Or that it is not sufficiently able to abide perpetually in good? For it is naturally adapted to verge both to good and evil. Its good, therefore, consists in associating with its kindred nature, but its evil in associating with the contraries to this. It is necessary, therefore, that it should associate with this nature, being purified. And this will take place through being converted to it. Will it, therefore, be converted after purification? Or may we not say, that after purification it is converted? This, therefore, is the virtue of the soul, or rather that which happens to it from conversion. What then is this? The vision and impression of that which is seen, inserted and energizing in the soul in the same manner as sight about a visible object. She did not, therefore, possess these, nor recollect them. Or perhaps she possessed them, yet not energizing, but deposited in an unilluminated state. In order, however, that they may be illuminated, and that the soul may know them to be inherent in herself, it is necessary that she should apply herself to that which illuminates. But she will not possess these, but the impressions of them. It is necessary, therefore, to adapt the impression to the true objects from which the impressions are derived. Perhaps, likewise, she may thus be said to possess them, because intellect is not foreign, and especially is not so when it looks to the illuminating cause. But if it does not, it is foreign even when this cause is present. For sciences also are foreign, if we do not at all energize according to them.

[To be continued.]

THE DREAM.

An Imitation of the Beginning of the Eleventh Book of Apuleius.

By Thomas Taylor.

[*Reprinted from Monthly Magazine for November, 1797.*]

In order to understand the description of the Moon in these verses, which, with some addition, is taken from Apuleius, it is necessary to observe that each of those mighty powers, rooted in the First Cause, and which were called Gods by the ancients, is, according to the Grecian theologists, the leader of a luminous series of a greater or a less extent, according to its nearer or more remote alliance to the highest Divinity. Hence, as the deity of the moon, *i.e.*, Diana, is of the vivific series, she is celebrated by Apuleius as Ceres, Proserpine, Rhea, Isis, etc., in consc-

quence of those divinities belonging to the same series. She is likewise said even to illuminate the Sun; because, according to the same theologists, that *vivific* series of which she is the head is superior to the *harmonic* series to which the Sun belongs. Considered, therefore, with relation to her summit, or first subsistence, she is superior to the deity of the Sun. *Nature*, too, was considered by the same theologists as principally flourishing in the moon; and hence they called the moon, αυτοπτικον φυσεως αγαλμα, *i.e.*, "the self-conspicuous image of *Nature;*" for Nature belongs to the vivific series.

The many-colored garment of the Moon is intended to represent the various and mutable color of the lunar orb; and her darkly splendid vestment perhaps alludes to the nature of that orb, which is partly luminous and partly obscure. Her boat-like cup, perhaps, signifies her dominion over moisture, and her agreement with *Isis:*

In a vision of the night,
Bursting on my ravish'd sight,
Lo! the moon before me stood,
By the foam-besilver'd flood.
Matchless were the garb and mien
Of the heav'ns refulgent queen,
As she graceful press'd the ground,
Dews ambrosial spreading round.
Dazzling like the burnish'd gold,
Shone her hair, in ringlets roll'd,
Copious on her neck behind,
Softly waving to the wind.
Multiform, with flow'rs around,
Hecate's crown her temples bound,
In whose middle, on the sight
Flashing like a mirror bright,
Shone an orb of glorious light.
Viper's furrows, ears of corn,
Bind the di'dem and adorn.
With a many coloured vest,
Was the awful goddess drest—
Lucid now with beauteous white,
Now with yellow saffron bright;
Of this golden hue instead,
Flaming now with rosy red.
But what dazzl'd most my sight,
Was a robe like that of night,
Of the deepest dusky hue,
Darkly splendid to the view.
This the goddess spreading round,
Fring'd at bottom, on the ground
Floated gracefully behind,
By a silver zone confin'd.
Thence the folds sin'ster tend,
Emboss'd, and at her shoulder end.
Glitt'ring stars in copious store,
Spangled all the vestment o'er;
And half-full the moon between,
Breathing flaming fires was seen.
As I gaz'd with holy awe,
A brazen rattle next I saw,
Brandish'd in her strong right hand;
Emblem of her dread command
O'er the savage fiends of hell,
That in Stygian darkness dwell,
While her arm from side to side
Vig'rous shook the rattle wide,
With terrific thund'ring clang,
Triple rods resounding rang.
Next a boat-like cup of gold
In her left hand I behold,
On whose handle, proudly rais'd,
An asp, with venom bloated, gaz'd,
Sandles last her feet display'd,
From the conqu'ring palm-leaf made.
Breathing all Arabia's sweets,
Me the goddess mildly greets;
Rapture warbling as she spoke,
And night's awful stillness broke.
Moved with thy fervent prayers,
Adverse fate, and anxious cares,
I, from whom all beings spring,
Consolation deign to bring.
For I am NATURE, her whose sway
All the elements obey:
Of the starry spheres the head,
Queen of ages, and the dead.
I that of the pow'rs divine
Th' uniform resemblance shine.
Gods supernal me revere,
Me, the gods Tartarean fear.
Heav'n my pow'r resistless rolls
Round the adamantile poles;
And its all resplendent height
Marks my nod, and owns my might.
With this female light of mine,
I, on ev'ry structure shine;
And with moist enlivening fire,
The joyful seeds of plants inspire.
Balmy breezes of the sea,
Hell's dread silence yield to me.
From my fount divinely bright
Flows the sun's victorious light;
And while from Olympus steep
His strong steeds impetuous leap,
While with matchless speed they fly,
Thund'ring thro' th' astonish'd sky,
Crown'd with fire, th' harmonic king
Boasts from me his splendors spring.
Grateful lands in times of yore
Glory'd me heav'ns queen t'adore,
Under various names and rites,
Which to mark my soul delights.
Much-enduring mortal hear,
Nor adverse fate, nor fortune fear;
For in me confiding still,
Thou shalt vanquish ev'ry ill;
And with independence blest,
Soon from ev'ry ill shall rest;
And indignant from the crowd,
Vain, impertinent, and loud;
From unfeeling folly's mirth,
Doctrines of Tartarean birth,
Lab'rinths of delusion dire,
Thou shalt happily retire.
The goddess said, and swift as light,
Shot like a meteor thro' the night.
I wrote, and starting from the bed,
Her rattle seem'd resounding as she fled.

THE CELEBRATION OF THE NATAL DAY OF PLATON.

[*Selected.*]

The Florentine Academy was still more influential for good, during the lifetime of Lorenzo de Medici, who was enthusiastically devoted to its interests, and who spared neither wealth nor influence to extend its usefulness and fame. He established the Platonic festival, which had been celebrated from Platou's death to the days of his disciples, Plotinos and Porphyrios, but which had been discontinued for the long space of twelve hundred years. The day fixed for this purpose was the 7th of November, which was supposed to be the anniversary not only of the birth of Platon, but of his death, which happened among his friends, at a convivial banquet, precisely at the close of his eighty-first year. The person appointed by Lorenzo to preside over the ceremony at Florence was Francisco Bandini, whose rank and learning rendered him extremely proper for the office. On the same day another party met at Lorenzo's villa at Careggi, where he presided in person. At these meetings, to which the most learned men in Italy resorted, it was the custom for one of the party, after dinner, to select certain passages from the works of Platon, which were submitted to the elucidation of the company, each of the guests undertaking the illustration or discussion of some important or doubtful point. By this institution, which was continued for several years, the philosophy of Platon was supported not only in credit, but in splendor, and its professors were considered as the most respectable and enlightened men of the age.—*Roscoe's Life of Lorenzo de Medici.*

PLATONIC TECHNOLOGY:

A Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Plato and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense.

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Eôs, ἡ ἑώς or ἥ ἠώς. Morning; the dawn; daylight.

Ephoros, ὁ ἔφορος. An ephoros or inspector *at Sparta;* a guardian; a superintendent; also a person initiated at the Greater Mysteries. See *Epoptês.*

Epikouros, ὁ, ἡ ἐπίκουρος. A champion; an ally; an assistant.

Epimêtheus, ὁ ἐπιμηθεύς. Wise too late; over-cunning; prudent; name of the brother of Prometheus, who opened Pandora's casket.

Epistêmê, ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Knowledge, *especially of the good and true;* positive or demonstrated knowledge; knowledge of Real Being, or the First Principle; full and perfect knowledge, so far as it may be acquired by human beings; metaphysical science. "Knowledge relates to that which is, and ignorance to what has no existence; • • • and it is the function, therefore, of knowledge to define what real being is." — *Republic*, v: 20. See *Eudoxia, Gnôsis.*

Epithumia, or *epithumêtikon*, ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Desire; cupidity; eager longing; appetite; lust. Platô by the latter designation only meant "that vital impulse which leads from one sensation to another." — HENRY DAVIS. Pertaining, however, to the phenomenal world, and being the seat of sense, this life is compared to a cave in which all are captives, having their back toward the entrance, so that all they see are but the shadows of objects to which they attribute a perfect reality.

Epitropê, ἡ ἐπιτροπή. A trust; guardianship; reference to an arbiter; the superintendence of law.

Epoptes, ὁ ἐπόπτης. A witness; a seer; a spectator; an inspector or superintendent; one who had attained the *autopsia* or self-view, the last stage of initiation in the Eleusinian Rites, and had looked upon the sacred symbols in the *kista.* "We were *witnesses* of his majesty." — *Epistles of Petros*, II., i: 16 See *Ephoros.*

Ergon, τὸ ἔργον. Work; action; business; achievement; the result of endeavor. *Sometimes used for the performance of the Sacred Rites.*

Erôs, ὁ ἔρως. Love; desire; passion; the sexual attraction; also the god of love, like the Hindoo Kama and the Latin Amor, or Cupido. *In the Orphic writings*, the principle of attraction or magnetism which binds all things together; *personified* as the Creator, the Demiourgos, the elder Dionysos. "Eros, the most ancient, generated all things."—*Argonautics.* The "Platonic Love" is the eager desire of the soul for the Supreme Excellence It is also, in a subordinate sense, the attraction of souls, as kindred immortal essences, to each other in the world of sense, the latter being but a form of the higher universe. Everywhere it is the *conatus* of the spirit for the perfect, or of Divinity for man.[1]

Ethos, τὸ ἔθος. A custom; habit; an established usage; an institution. "After the *manner* of Moses." — *Acts of the Apostles*, xv: 1.

Ethos, τὸ ἦθος, plural τὰ ἤθη. Ethics; morals; customs; usage; practice; an ethical discourse. "Ill discourse corrupts *good morals,*" ἤθη χρηστά.

Euangelion, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. Good news; a reward for bringing joyful tidings; a sacrifice of praise; evangel; gospel. "Let this be my evangel." — HÔMEROS: *Odyssey*, xiv: 152. "Eteonikos offered up a sacrifice for the good tidings." — XENOPHÔN, I., vi.

Euboulia, ἡ εὐβουλία. Good counsel; sagacity; the art of planning wisely how to act and what to do.

Eudaimonia, ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Felicity; happiness; the chief good; the happy state effected by a beneficent guardian spirit.

Eudoxia, ἡ εὐδοξία. Good judgment; a well-formed opinion. See ἐπιστήμη.

Euexia, ἡ εὐεξία. A good condition; doing well; a fortunate result. "Happiness is the good work of a tutelary spirit." — ALKINOUS: *Introduction to the Doctrines of Platô*, 27.

Eugeneia, ἡ εὐγένεια. Noble birth; good parentage and ancestry; generosity; excellence from good conduct in word and deed; disposition to do aright and kindly.

Eunoia, ἡ εὔνοια. A feeling mind; benevolence; good will; kindness; *especially*, seeking the well-being of others.

Eunomia, ἡ εὐνομία. A state of being well governed; a good government or constitution; the observance of justice; equity.

Euporia, ἡ εὐπορία. Property; resource; a faculty of procuring what is desired; ready judgment.

Eustochia, ἡ εὐστοχία. Skill at hitting a mark; acuteness at conjecturing; ready wit.

Exegetica, τὰ ἐξηγητικά. The books of the priests or learned caste, *containing an explanation of religious matters;* exposition; unwritten laws; interpretations. See *Hermeneutika.*

Gaia or *Gê*, ἡ Γαιᾶ or γῆ. The earth; land; soil; region; province; country. In the *Cosmogony* of Hêsiodos, Gaia is personified as appearing immediately next to Chaos or Primal Darkness. She brought forth Ouranos and Pontos, without paternity, and then accepting the former as her consort, the two became parents of the various ancient races. Some, who are fond of tracing Indian precedents to Hellenian ideas, consider Gaia as originating with Gaya, the country in Hindostan where Buddha Siddarta lived and attained *nirvaná*, or divine bliss. From γάω, to become; to produce; to generate.

Galaxias, ὁ γαλαξίας. The Galaxy or Milky Way. It was fabled by the philosophers that souls leaving eternity passed as in a galaxy into the transition-sphere. This was declared by Pythagoras; and Plato himself, in the Vision of Eros, affirms that souls approached the sphere of γένεσις like stars. — *Republic*, x: 16.

Gamos, ὁ γάμος. The union or alliance between the sexes; nuptials; marriage; also an arcane rite in the Mysteries. The same designation was applied to the unions of the gods, and their mutual participation of each others' powers and energies; also to the admission of human beings to a participation of the divine nature. We find the term so applied in the Hebrew Sacred Writings; also in the philosophical essays. "I passed by thee and saw thee; behold it was thy time, the time of love. And I spread my skirt over thee and covered thy nakedness; and I swore to thee, and entered into covenant with thee, and thou becamest mine." — *Ezekiel*, xvi: 8. "Now her unknown bridegroom (Erôs) ascended the couch, and made Psychê his wife." — APULEIUS: *Metamorphoses*, v. "Theologists regarded this communion of the gods belonging to the same order as a sacred marriage, and called it the marriage of Hêra and Zeus, Ouranos and Gê, Kronos and Rhea; and again, where the superior order became associated to the inferior, they call it the marriage of Zeus and Dêmêtêr; and still again, where the superior is blended with underling natures, they call it the marriage of Zeus and Korê. There are with the gods these alliances to those of the same order, those of lower to higher, and of higher to those still farther beneath." — PROKLOS: *Commentary on Parmenidês.*

Gegeios or *Gigas*, ὁ γεγειος, ὁ γίγας. A giant, or offspring of the Earth; earth-born; autochthon, one native to a region. *A designation of the early races of Babylonia*, also *of the Rephaites* of Palestine, and other archaic and fabulous races, generally of Æthiopian origin.

Genea, ἡ γενεά. Birth; race; parentage, production; a lifetime.

Genethlion, τὸ γενέθλιον. A birthday, *or rather* the fifth, eighth, or ninth day after birth, *at which time it was usual to sprinkle the infant solemnly with lustral water and consecrate or legitimize it by passing it over or carrying it around the fire of the sacred hearth. The Semitic and other fire-worshipping priesthoods, like the Chaldean, Hebrew, and Arabian, made the calculations of those periods by astrological and other portents, a sacred calling.* See PLATO: *Theaitêtos*, 47.

Genesis, ἡ γένεσις. Generation; creation; nativity; rank; a period of time; *philosophically used to denote* the transition-sphere *between the states of* ὄσία *or essence, from the noumenal state to the phenomenal into the world of nature.* The movement toward phenomenal existence;

[1] Ἀγάπη [agapê] was often employed by the post-classical writers in place of *Erôs*, especially in the New Testament. It appears to be a word of Semitic origin, from AHAB, to *love*, — as, Abraham loved Isaac his son, and Isaac loved his wife Rebekah, and also "savory meat." As a noun it signifies *love;* also a *lover.* It was the designation of a king of Israel; and we find it in the *Proverbs* or *Parables of Solomon*, x: 12: "Hatred stirreth up strife; but *love* [AHAB] covereth all transgressions."

the *μετάληψις* or sharing of dual life by a change in mode of being; a becoming *as distinguished from really being;* relative existence; the passing *of the soul or prior spiritual essence from eternity into nature.* On the ninth day of the Eleusinian Mysteries, the worshippers placed two vessels of wine, one at the East and the other at the West, and emptied them in turn, pronouncing the words *ὗε* [son] and *τοκυῖε* [genitrix], as implying that man was the offspring of eternity, and nature his mother. The whole paraphernalia and ceremonial of the Mysteries related to the coming of man into the natural world and his effort to go hence. "I think we ought to define what that is which is ever-existent and has no *genesis;* and that which is in a state of transition [*γένεσις*] or becoming, but never really is. * * * There are three distinct modes that preceded the establishing of this cosmical universe: being, space, and transition" [*γένεσις*]. PLATÔ: *Timaios*, ix, xxvii. "Others of the heavenly faculties go forth from them into the nature-sphere of the universe, and into the cosmical universe itself, passing in due order through the sphere of transition [*γένεσις*] and therefrom pervading every part." — IAMBLICHOS: *Mysteries*, I., xviii. From *γίγνομαι*, to become.

Genos, *τό γένος*. A race; a genus; an order; a family; a tribe; offspring; birth; sex; the human race, etc. Iamblichos ranges the higher orders of being in *γένη*, orders, or genera, namely: divinities, daimons or tutelaries; heroes or half-gods, and souls or psychical essences. The Chaldeans had also archons, angels, archangels; and in the Pauline or Markionic Epistles to the Chrêstians of Ephesos and Kolossai, we find also enumerated *archai*, *exousiai*, *kosmokrators*, and *pneumatika*, which would seem to be in very close analogy. Platô uses it in the sense of elements or principles.

Geômetria, *ἡ γεωμετριᾶ*. Geometry; the science of land-measuring. Also *γεωμετρεῖν*, to measure the earth; to be a geometer. There was a more arcane meaning attached to these words by the philosophers, as well as to its sister terms, *μανθάνω*, *μαθος*, *μάθημα*, *μαθηματικός*, all which relate to esoteric knowledge. Thus we find in Ploutarchos, the maxim ascribed to Platô: "God is constantly a geometer." (*Symposiacs*, viii: 2.) The democratic or popular government which Solon approved as being based on equality, was denominated *arithmetical;* a show of hands by wise and ignorant alike being sufficient to determine all questions, as when Sôkratês was condemned. The *geometrical* was regarded by Platô and others as not to be excelled. It was also called the sacred or sacerdotal rule. "The statesman's science will never willingly establish a government composed alike of good and bad men;" "We assign to every one that employment which is suited to his nature, and prescribe to each his peculiar art." "It endeavors to bind and weave together the natures inclining in contrary directions from each other, so as to be in accord with the alliance that fits together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond." The Alexandrian Platonists in like manner taught that the spiritual world was arranged in geometrical order, as with gods, dæmons or guardian spirits, heroes or half-gods, and souls. Hence, geometry was not a technic of sensible things, but of facts transcending them; "a science that takes men off from sensible objects, and makes them apply themselves to the spiritual and eternal nature, the contemplation of which is the end of philosophy, as a view or *epopteia* of the arcana of initiation in Holy Rites." It is a technic of eminence according to excellence, and of all authority with sole regard to merit and ability, irrespective of every consideration of equality or the accident of factitious rank.

Gephyra, *ἡ γέφυρα*. A mound; a bridge; an embankment; a space between two points or parties. The Way of Holiness from Athens to Eleusis passed over the Kêphissos; and on the occasion of the Mysteries, men, women, and boys grouped there and interchanged ribald jests with the worshippers. These were denominated *Gephyrians*; but Herodotus and Thoukydidês both declare that the Gephyrai were Phœnicians from Boiotia who were naturalized in Athens and introduced the worship of the Achaian Dêmêtêr, — perhaps the Eleusinia or Thesmophoria, — with orgiastic rites.

Glaukôn, *Γλαύκων*. Glaukôn, *a favorite brother of Platô, prominent in the* REPUBLIC. Named from *Γλαύξ*, the owl, which was sacred to Athena. [*To be continued.*]

BOOK REVIEWS AND PERIODICALS.

THE TWO CONSCIENCES; OR, CONSCIENCE THE MORAL LAW AND CONSCIENCE THE WITNESS. An Essay towards analyzing and defining these two principles, and explaining the true character and office of each. By WILLIAM DENNIS. Boston: George H. Ellis. 1881.

"The object of this Essay is not to make a contribution to speculative philosophy, but to furnish, for practical application and use, a clearer and better-defined view than has generally been presented of the nature and office of conscience."—*Chapter I., Prefatory.*

The exact nature and duties of Conscience has long been a vexed question among moralists. This little work presents the reader with the opinions of eminent ethical writers on this important subject, and also gives him the original views of the author, which are well worth the consideration of every thinker.

AFTER DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, WHAT? MATERIALISM, OR A SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL RELIGION. By GILES B. STEBBINS. Second edition. Boston: Colby & Rich. 1880.

The genial author and scholar, Giles B. Stebbins, cannot, or at least does not, write uninteresting and valueless books. This last work of his contains much food for thought. It is one of the best statements of the philosophy of spiritualism that has lately appeared. Moreover, it contains accounts of many well-substantiated spiritualistic phenomena. The following presentation of the fundamental differences between spiritualism and materialism fully deserves quotation:—

"Materialism and a Spiritual Philosophy are unlike and opposite. Materialism makes the crude and outward stuff we call matter dominant, has no spiritual genesis of things, but only blind force and law, ignores and holds superfluous a Central and Positive Mind, relies on our external senses as the sole source of knowledge, treats a life beyond the grave as an idle dream, and religion as superstitious folly — both to vanish as rational knowledge enlightens the world.

The central and inspiring idea of a Spiritual Philosophy is an indwelling and positive Mind.

"Sustaining, all-controlling, ruling o'er."

It finds that interior and constant forces, governed by law and guided by that Mind mould, and shape, dissolve and shape again, the plastic and transient forms of matter, and so outwork an Infinite Design. Its natural religion is man's aspiration to bind himself to the Eternal Life, to obey the eternal law, to reach up toward the eternal wisdom and love, and make them manifest in his daily life. Its ethics are based on the intellectual and spiritual constitution of man, and call for obedience to a law of right *within*."

PLOTINI ENNEADES. RECENSUIT HERMANNUS FRIDERICUS MUELLER. Antecedunt Porphyrius, Eunapius, Suidas, Eudocia De Vita Plotini. Gr. 2 vols. Berlin: 1880.

This critical and commodious edition of the complete writings of the greater restorer of the philosophy of the divine Platon is not the only work for which Prof. Mueller is entitled to the thanks of the philosophic class. He has contributed to periodicals several valuable articles, illustrative and explanatory of questions relating to the philosophy and works of Plotinos, and is now making a German translation of the Enneades, of which one volume has appeared. It is much to be regretted that circumstances prevented Prof. Mueller from executing his intention of adding a Plotinian glossary to these volumes. Their value also would have been enhanced by the addition of exegetical notes, as the Plotinian text is frequently both obscure and corrupt. Taken as a whole, however, this edition is an excellent one, and will be welcomed by all Platonists and scholars. We are glad to see that Prof. Mueller has restored the order of the books of Plotinos according to the arrangement of Porphyrios. Any other arrangement is more or less unsatisfactory and arbitrary.

Lack of space forbids an examination of the numerous emendations of the text, and we will therefore note only one, as Taylor has made an emendation which we think to be exactly what is needed. The correction is in the last line of Lib. 4, Enn. V.

Prof. Mueller has substituted *επιστημη* for the senseless *επιστολη*, which is the common reading. Taylor suggested *επιστροφη*, a word which the context undoubtedly demands. This particular emendation is one specimen, among many which might be given, of that wonderful insight into Platonic texts which Taylor possessed in a greater degree than any other modern scholar.