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The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

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THE PLATONIST.

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EDITED BY THOS. M. JOHNSON.

The Platonist is devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases.

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In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosized, materialism absurdly considered philosophy, folly and ignorance popularized, and the dictum, "Get money, eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly, and ignorance. This philosophy recognizes the essential immortality and divinity of the human soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to, and union with, the Absolute One. Its mission is to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being,—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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Oceola, St. Clair County, Mo.

PEARLS OF WISDOM.

[GATHERED FROM PLATONIC SOURCES.]

No good originates from the body.

Be not anxious to please the multitude.

Choose rather to be strong in soul than in body.

Fly from intoxication as you would from insanity.

The reason which is in you is the light of your life.

The soul is illuminated by the recollection of Deity.

Those who praise the unwise do them a great injury.

Possess those things which no one can take from you.

You should not dare to speak of Divinity to the multitude.

Every passion of the soul is most hostile to its salvation.

Every desire is insatiable, and therefore is always in want.

Expel, by reasoning, the unrestrained grief of a torpid soul.

It is the province of a wise man to bear poverty with equanimity.

Honor that which is just, on this very account that it is just. Those alone are dear to Divinity who are hostile to injustice.

It is difficult to walk at one and the same time in many paths of life.

Every thing which is more than necessary to man, is hostile to him.

The fear of death renders a man sad through the ignorance of his soul.

Be persuaded that things of a laborious nature contribute more than pleasures to virtue.

He who believes that Divinity beholds all things, will not sin either secretly or openly.

It is equally dangerous to give a sword to a madman, and power to a depraved man.

A timid man bears armors against himself; and a fool employs riches for the same purpose.

It is the same thing to moor a boat by an infirm anchor, and to place hope in a depraved mind.

Neither is it possible to conceal fire in a garment, nor a base deviation from rectitude in time.

It is not proper to despise those things of which we shall be in want after the dissolution of the body.

Good scarcely presents itself even to those who investigate it; but evil is obvious without investigation.

As the lesser mysteries are to be delivered before the greater, thus also discipline must precede philosophy.

The fruits of the earth, indeed, are annually imparted, but the fruits of philosophy at every part of the year.

The wise man, whose estimation with men was but small while he was living, will be renowned when he is dead.

It is the same thing to drink a deadly medicine from a golden cup, and to receive counsel from an injudicious friend.

The furies pursue the sins of bad men who are impious, and those also of the stupid and daring, when they grow old.

We shall venerate Divinity in a proper manner, if we render the intellect that is in us pure from all vice, as from a certain stain.

It is requisite to defend those who are unjustly accused of having acted injuriously, but to praise those who excel in a certain good.

The intellect derived from philosophy is similar to a charioteer; for it is present with our desires, and always conducts them to the beautiful.

Think that you suffer a great punishment when you obtain the objects of corporeal desire; for the attainment of such objects never satisfies desire.

The perfection of the soul will correct the depravity of the body; but the strength of the body, without reasoning, does not render the soul better.

As we live through soul, it must be said that by the virtue of this we live well; just as because we see through the eyes, we see well through the virtues of these.

A loquacious and ignorant man both in prayer and sacrifice contaminates a divine nature. The wise man, therefore, is alone a priest, is alone the friend of Divinity, and alone knows how to pray.

Nor will I be silent as to this particular, that it appeared both to Platon and Pythagoras that old age was not to be considered with reference to an egress from the present life, but to the beginning of a blessed life.

Gifts and victims confer no honor on Divinity, nor is he adorned with offerings suspended in temples; but a soul divinely inspired solidly conjoins us with Divinity, for it is necessary that like should approach like.

Divinity sends evil to men, not as being influenced by anger, but for the sake of purification; for anger is foreign from Divinity, since it arises from circumstances taking place contrary to the will; but nothing contrary to the will can happen to a God.

Those things which the body necessarily requires are easily to be procured by all men, without labor and molestation; but those things to the attainment of which labor and molestation are requisite, are objects of desire not to the body, but to depraved opinions.

When you deliberate whether or not you shall injure another, you will previously suffer the evil yourself which you intended to commit. But neither must you expect any good from the evil; for the manners of every one are correspondent to his life and actions. Every soul, too, is a repository: that which is good of things good, and that which is evil of things depraved.

It is requisite to choose the most excellent life, for custom will make it pleasant. Wealth is an infirm anchor, glory is still more infirm; and in a similar manner the body, dominion, and honor. For all these are imbecile and powerless. What, then, are powerful anchors? Prudence, magnanimity, fortitude. These no tempests can shake. This is the law of God, that virtue is the only thing that is strong, and that every thing else is a trifle.

It is also said that Pythagoras was the first who called himself a philosopher; this not being a new name, but previously instructing us in a useful manner in a thing appropriate to the name. For he said that the entrance of men into the present life resembled the progression of a crowd to some public spectacle. For there men of every description assemble with different views: one hastening to sell his wares for the sake of money and gain, but another, that he may acquire renown by exhibiting the strength of his body; and there is also a third class of men, and those the most liberal, who assemble for the sake of surveying the places, the beautiful works of art, the specimens of valor, and the literary productions which are usually exhibited on such occasions. Thus, also, in the present life, men of all various pursuits are collected together in one and the same place. For some are influenced by the desire of riches and luxury, others by the love of power and dominion, and others are possessed with an insane ambition for glory. But the most pure and unadulterated character is that of the man who gives himself to the contemplation of the most beautiful things, and whom it is proper to call a philosopher. He adds, that the survey of all heaven, and of the stars that revolve in it, is indeed beautiful, when the order

of them is considered. For they derive this beauty and order by the participation of the first and the intelligible essence. But that first essence is the nature of numbers and reasons (*i. e.*, productive principles) which prevades through all things, and according to which all these celestial bodies are elegantly arranged and fitly adorned. And wisdom, indeed, truly so called, is a certain science which is conversant with the first beautiful objects, and these divine, undecaying, and possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence, by the participation of which other things also may be called beautiful. But philosophy is the appetite of a thing of this kind. The attention, therefore, to erudition is likewise beautiful, which Pythagoras extended, in order to effect the correction of mankind. — *Iamblichos' Life of Pythagoras.*

Exchanges will please note the fact that our address is Osceola, Mo., not St. Louis.

Elsewhere will be found a very interesting communication from Col. Thomas W. Higginson. It will well repay perusal. We hope that other similar contributions may be sent us. Every scrap of information about the manuscripts of the most genuine Platonist of modern times will be gladly received.

The lecture on the "Eternity of the Soul—its Preëxistence," by Dr. H. K. Jones, which appears in this issue, amply deserves perusal and study. It contains many valuable ideas—ideas that cannot be comprehended by a glance, or superficial reading.

Our collection of Thomas Taylor's works lacks the following volumes: "The Rights of Brutes," 1792; "Pausanias' Description of Greece," 1794, 1824; "Answer to Dr. Gillies," 1804; "Collectanea," 1806; "Aristoteles' Physics," 1806; "Aristoteles' Organon," 1807; Aristoteles' "On the Soul, etc.," 1808; "Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians," 1809; "New Arithmetical Notation," 1823. Any of our readers having copies of these works for sale will confer a favor by notifying us, stating terms. Furthermore, we desire information concerning the following editions of Taylor's translations: "Proklos on Providence and Evil," 1841; "Arguments of Emperor Julian against the Christians," 1873; "Proklos on Timaios of Platon," about 1867.

The third session of the Concord School of Philosophy, which recently closed, was a remarkable success, both as regards the attendance of pupils and the amount of intellectual work done. The lectures were in certain respects better than those of past sessions, and it was evident that they had been very logically thought out, and carefully prepared for delivery. The discussions were able and instructive, and often illuminated points that otherwise would have remained obscure. The lectures delivered by Prof. W. T. Harris, Dr. H. K. Jones, and Prof. D. J. Snider were specially noteworthy. Some of Dr. Jones's admirable expositions of the Platonic Philosophy will appear in THE PLATONIST.

The works of true philosophers — such as those of Platon, Plotinos, Taylor, etc., — cannot be apprehended at first sight, or by a cursory, superficial reading. They must be read and re-read — studied until their thoughts are grasped and wholly comprehended. The master-pieces of the human mind will yield their treasures only to the patient, persevering investigator — the indefatigable searcher after wisdom whom no difficulties can daunt. It may take months and years to thoroughly comprehend them, but “the hope is noble and the reward great.” Prof. W. T. Harris, one of the profoundest thinkers of this age, truly says on this subject: “But above all, let no one think to get what is called insight in one week’s reading of a profound thinker. If one reads once per week some profound writer, spending his hour or two over a single page, and then lays by his book to take it up again a week later, and to recur again and again to the same book, he will find after a year that he begins to see the difference between the daylight of insight which illumines all things, and the smoky torch-light of the understanding which throws an uncertain glare over things lying near it, and obscures more remote things by its smoke.”

THE ETERNITY OF THE SOUL — ITS PRE-EXISTENCE.

BY DR. H. K. JONES.

[A Lecture delivered at the Concord School of Philosophy in the Summer of 1880.]

Thoreau says: “How prompt we are to satisfy the hunger and thirst of our bodies! How slow to satisfy the hunger and thirst of our souls!”

Indeed, we would-be practical folks cannot use this world without blushing because of our infidelity, — having starved this substance almost to a shadow. We feel it to be as absurd as if a man were to break forth into an eulogy on his *dog*, who hasn’t any dog. An ordinary man will work every day for a year at shovelling dirt to support his body, or a family of bodies; but *he* is an extraordinary man who will work a whole day in a year for the support of his *soul*!

Have we not an everlasting life to get? And is not that the only excuse for eating, drinking, sleeping, and even carrying an umbrella when it rains?”

We have entertained the view, even as a conclusion, that all this terrestrial scene of matter and solidities is merely apparition, apprehended by the senses; the flowing image of something stable which must be identified by intellect. This view is supported by the joint testimony of Natural Science and the highest logical thought, ancient and modern.

In this view the sphere of time and space is the panorama of the universal psychic motions of the realms of beings; and outside of these motions and processes of being there is no time and no space. Time is duration and continuity of process, or it is quantity of motion, and space is quantity of time, and their realization is change — experience.

From this point of view, matter is an aspect or apparition to sense, of motion; and motion is an apparition of force, and so there is no objective substantive essence of matter. So much is demonstrated in natural science, and logical thought declares a nature that is self-motive, namely, entity: inasmuch as matter, non-entity, confessedly is not self-moved. And force is predicated only of entity, and force is from entity.

Force is existing entity, energizing, acting. But entity energizing is will-force. And will is the middle term of the psychic triad. The soul is postulated as an essential form, self-conscious and self-determining — these terms generalizing, respectively, all

thought and all action; and so the content of the universal expanses is souls.

THE UNIVERSE

is two worlds: the intelligible, self-determining, and the determined. The determining produces forms and powers, and that which is determined is produced by them. The two worlds are called the spiritual world and the natural world; the world of prior energies, and the world of posterior energies, of existing natures.

And so, also, the particular, personal soul exists dually in the universe. In its prior outgoing energies it is related to the intelligible world; and in its posterior or returning energies it is related to the natural world. In that self-consciousness and self-determination in which are comprehended wholes — self, and the world, and God — (together with the activities relating it to these), the soul is in the realization of its personality.

Contrarily, in its partial consciousness and exclusive corporeal determinations, limited to the exercise of the faculties relating it to the seeming and transient side of the world, the soul is in the realization of its individuality.

Mark well that the soul’s wholeness, in which it is the image and likeness of its Original and Parent, consists of its whole content and self-relation, — in that its personal consciousness comprehends self, the world, and God; and if at any time in the history of its existence it contained not these *all*, then was it a form not God-like, nor at all what it afterward became.

The ground and highest nature of the soul is so akin to the Highest of all, that we would fain be silent here, were it not that an attempt even to name this nature may serve to lead from a low and sensuous thought of it. For let us be persuaded that, if man should catch even a glimpse of the truth concerning this nature, it must greatly exalt and purify the fountains of conduct.

The fundamental principle which fountains and pervades Platonic philosophy is the Absolute, the Eternal Mind, the final Reason, the Super-essential of all essence, the Being of all Beings: not the aggregate of all, but the Author and Substance of all that substantially exists. This beginning is the Supreme Good, which is God Himself, (*ὁ θεός*), the God over all.

In the Platonic idiom this source and substance of all is the eternal Father, the sole principle and the sole beginning, the efficient cause of all things, the final cause of all things, the principle of unity in all things, the principle of law in all things. And this which is thus the ground and reason of all existence must also, especially, be the ground and reason of the form and the existence of the soul. Human opinion, founded in physical sensation of phenomena, grounds all existence in mere objects of sense. But science, intellectual knowing, reverses this judgment, and utterly refutes the hypothesis of all substantive, essential basis in the objective, natural world, for either matter or mind.

“It was not and is not to be allowed,” says Platon, “for the supreme Good to do anything except what is most excellent, most fair, and most beautiful.”

And, therefore, “inasmuch as the world is the most beautiful of forms, and its artificer the best of causes, it is evident that the Creator and Father of the universe looked to an eternal pattern.” And so this generated universe is the *image*, the irradiation of the thought of the supreme object of intelligence. The attributes of this supreme and ultimate Substance and Cause of all existence are the Platonic, archetypal *ideas*, or forms — the unvarying unities of all things. These are the *in themselves ideas* — the primal

IRRADIATIONS OF THE HIGHEST.

And the sphere of these primal forms is the celestial glory. This is also existent and creative, and its progeny is the intelli-

gible sphere. All beginning universally *is* — not was — in the Most High, not in the most low.

The Framer of the universe used, nor uses, no model or material or stuff, outside of *Himself* to build the universe or its content. It is seen as a picture, is heard as an anthem. And Creation is by no reasonable supposition a consummated event, regarded and contemplated in either its eternal or temporal aspects.

What, then, shall be affirmed of the *soul*? — the highest and divinest form. Shall we say the soul hath its beginning in this Most High? The soul is of the celestial germs and source, and is a descent into time in its temporal aspects. What form had it before it descended into time? Of all the creations of the Creator, if we say He has given existence to another mind-form, then is it a most eminent truth that the Father of the soul looked for *this*, also, to the *eternal model*. A being always born is the soul. It never was *not*, and it never had any other form, nor can it ever have any other form than that it *now is*.

It may be contemplated in the aspect of its individuality, its abstract, temporal, partial aspect; in the manifestations of its individual consciousness, and its partial content of wholes.

But, meantime, its personal powers and faculties and content are there temporarily dormant, obliterated, and we await its *quickening* and not its genesis aboriginal.

Immediately upon the quickening of the spiritual consciousness the soul finds itself seeing in the light which reveals the hitherto unseen realities, as the light of the sun reveals the objects of sense.

Says Platon: "The Idea of the Good is the sun of the intelligible world; it sheds on objects the light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows the power of knowing." For "the truths of all things that are exist in the soul."

And therefore "education is not of that character which some persons announce it to be, when they somehow assert that there is no science in the soul, but that they can implant it just as if they implanted sight in the eyes of the blind."

Not all the conventional soul-systems of the world, with all their manipulations by science, and arts, and affairs, ever pumped into the soul from the outside an infinitesimal increment, real or ideal, that ever did or ever can become component of the form and constitution of the soul, so as to change it one jot or tittle from its primeval type and faculties. The Creator uses no stuff from outside *Himself* to make and sustain things. Much less does he make up souls and *inform* souls, and sustain souls, from *without*. There is nothing without a man which, entering in, can make or unmake the man. It is in the Highest that we "live, and move, and have our being."

THE PERSONAL FORM.

In the abyss of every soul of temporal mould, concealed from mortal ken by the veil of sensuous vision, is this personal form which it is most kindred with, most homogeneous with, most like to — the nature, namely, of the Divine Father. This personal form in every soul now *is*, and it now is eternal, and it now is in eternity. And every man and every woman, quickened and resurrected in this consciousness, is consciously in eternity — as much so as he or she ever shall be when divested merely of this mortal coil.

True knowledge abides in, and is reminiscent in the personal soul, not in the individual aspect of the soul.

It may be justly questioned, at least, whether there be not a

DEEP TAIN OF MATERIALISM

in the opinion which underlies the current thought of our age respecting the nature of the soul. To approach this nature we must begin with the *firsts*. Mystery is thence accompanied with

bright evidence, religion with sublime philosophy, and science with Divine illumination. Intellect, if it ascend to principles and ideas, is in the dignity and strength of its own nature, and sees the universe pillared in intelligible entity, and not in protoplasmic ooze.

Of the Preëxistence of the Soul, Platon presents us a view in his *Apologue* of Eros, the son of Armenios, the Pamphylian.

"Approaching to generation like stars," and on this side the veil we catch the refrain: —

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come,
From God our home.

MANUSCRIPTS OF THOMAS TAYLOR, THE PLATONIST.

In answer to the inquiry made in *THE PLATONIST* after original manuscripts of Thomas Taylor, I am glad to contribute a few facts respecting autograph notes made by him in two volumes in my possession. It may be well to begin by saying that I have long been in the habit of picking up such of his translations as came in my way, and have now some twenty-five volumes. In addition to these, I possess the two following Greek texts, both of which belonged to his library and bear his autograph:

I. The first is a little black-letter volume entitled "Secreta Secretorum Aristotelis," and printed at Paris in 1520. It is neatly bound in half calf, and a large number of blank pages are bound with it, at the end of the volume, apparently with a view to a translation or commentary, of which, however, not a word appears upon them. It would be interesting to know whether this was the method usually adopted by Taylor with his translations. At any rate, his name appears in full upon the title-page of the book, and this inscription is written, in his peculiarly clear handwriting, on the fly-leaf: —

"This very rare book contains many interesting particulars, but the treatise is doubtless spurious, and is probably the production of some Arabian soon after the subjugation of the Greeks by the Caliph Omar. See my translation of the excellent moral narrative respecting an eastern Sage and a Jew in p. 49 of this work, in the Athenæum, No. 33. T. T."

There seem to be no farther notes by Taylor in this volume; there are a few memoranda, but in much older ink, and belonging apparently to the period when the book belonged to some Spanish officer, a faded record of whose name appears almost illegibly on the fly-leaf, with the date "1753."

II. The second volume in my possession contains two works bound together. The first is a collection of extracts from the Scholia of Proclus on the *Cratylus* of Plato, published at Leipsic in 1820, by Boissonade. This bears on the title-page the name of Thomas Taylor, in his own handwriting, and the added remark, which may or may not have proceeded from his hand, "With observations in the margin from a MS. in his possession, and also with his own remarks." The book contains one hundred and twenty-four pages, almost every one of which contains one or more MS. notes in pencil, sometimes filling the whole margin. These give, in almost all cases, corrections or additions from this private manuscript, mentioned always as "Codex meus." The Greek is written with remarkable clearness and even beauty, but always without the accents. The writer sometimes criticizes the

corrections of his own manuscript, adding, "sed male," or "et recte." He adds references which could only have proceeded from Taylor himself—as, "See my translation of these Scholia in Vol. V. of my Plato;" or, "vid. Collectanea mea, p. 98;" or, "See the Note concerning Venus in my Pausanias." In a few cases he cites other authorities; and in one case makes a suggestion, "e conjectura mea." It appears from allusions in Taylor's "Fragments of Proclus" (p. viii) that he was in correspondence with Prof. Boissonade, the editor of the book in my possession, and that the Professor had been very complimentary.

This volume is bound in old half calf, and lettered on the back, "Procli Excerpta, MS. notes. T. Taylor." There is bound up with it still another small volume, consisting of pages 93-152 of Taylor's "Fable of Cupid and Psyche" (1795). These pages comprise "A poetical paraphrase on the speech of Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato," and on the page bearing the above title is appended the addition, "By Thomas Taylor," in his own handwriting. These pages also contain various hymns and other poems, by the same author; and there are here and there corrections—seven or eight in all—made in ink, and evidently by Taylor himself. Most of them are merely literary improvements; the most curious is where, on page 137, in what seems to be an original poem, he strikes out the line—

"O grant my soul the lynx's piercing eye,"

and inserts—

"O grant my soul Lynceus' piercing eye;"

thus substituting the sharp-eyed hunter for the quadruped to which he perhaps bequeathed his name.

I must say that the whole effect of these volumes has been to enhance my respect for the scholarship and the literary method of Thomas Taylor. He is certainly one of the most unique and interesting figures in English literary history, and deserves at least—what he never has had—a full and accurate bibliography of his works. I do not know that even their exact number has ever been ascertained. Some of the cyclopædias give it as fifty-five. Messrs. Little & Brown, booksellers in Boston, have had on sale for two years the fullest set I have ever seen, and one which they consider "almost unexampled." It includes twenty-three volumes in 4to, and thirty-one in smaller sizes. This makes fifty-four volumes in all, and I have two not included in their set: Iamblichus' "Life of Pythagoras," and "Collectanea." Then there are the "Elements of the True Arithmetic of Infinities" (4to), the "Hederic's Greek Lexicon," edited by Taylor (1803), and the "Answer to Dr. Gillies,"—none of which I have ever seen. This makes fifty-nine volumes known to exist, representing forty-three distinct works, and there are doubtless others. I wish some American admirer of Thomas Taylor would undertake a careful bibliography of his publications.

THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., July 16, 1881.

ON THE NECESSITY OF PURIFICATION, AND THE METHOD BY WHICH IT MAY BE OBTAINED.

BY PORPHYRIOS.

[The following sections are extracted from Porphyrios' work on Abstinence. They comprise the most important part of that very valuable and interesting work. The translation is by Thomas Taylor, and was made from the original Greek.]

XIII. How is it, also, that you have decided and said that you are not passive to things which you suffer, and that you are not present with things by which you are passively affected? For intellect, indeed, is present with itself, though we are not pres-

ent with it. But he who departs from intellect, is in that place to which he departs; and when, by discursive energies, he applies himself upwards and downwards by his apprehension of things, he is there where his apprehension is. But it is one thing not to attend to sensibles, in consequence of being present with other things, and another for a man to think that, though he attends to sensibles, yet he is not present with them. Nor can any one show that Platon admits this, without at the same time demonstrating himself to be deceived. He, therefore, who submits to the assumption of every kind of food, and voluntarily betakes himself to alluring spectacles, to conversation with the multitude, and laughter; such a one, by thus acting, is there where the passion is which he sustains. But he who abstains from these, in consequence of being present with other things, he it is who, through his unskilfulness, not only excites laughter in Thracian maid-servants, but in the rest of the vulgar, and when he sits at a banquet, falls into the greatest perplexity, not from any defect of sensation, or from a superior accuracy of sensible perception, and energizing with irrational part of the soul alone; for Platon does not venture to assert this; but because in slanderous conversation, he has nothing reproachful to say of any one, as not knowing any evil of any one, because he has not made individuals the subject of his meditation. Being in such perplexity, therefore, he appears, says Platon, to be ridiculous; and in the praises and boastings of others, as he is manifestly seen to laugh, not dissemblingly, but in reality, he appears to be delirious.

XIV. So that, through ignorance of, and abstaining from sensible concerns, he is unacquainted with them. But it is by no means to be admitted that, though he should be familiar with sensibles, and should energize through the irrational part, yet it is possible for him at the same time genuinely to survey the objects of intellect. For neither do they who assert that we have two souls, admit that we can attend at one and the same time to two different things. For thus they would make a conjunction of two animals, which being employed in different energies, the one would not be able to perceive the operations of the other.

XV. But why would it be requisite that the passions should waste away, that we should die with respect to them, and that this should be daily the subject of our meditation, if it were possible for us, as some assert, to energize according to intellect, though we are at the same time intimately connected with mortal concerns, and this without the intuition of intellect? For intellect sees, and intellect hears, as Epicharmus says. But if, while eating luxuriously, and drinking the sweetest wine, it were possible to be present with immaterial natures, why may not this be frequently effected while you are present with and performing things which it is not becoming even to mention? For these passions everywhere proceed from the boy¹ which is in us, and you certainly will admit that, the baser these passions are, the more we are drawn down towards them. For what will be the distinction which ought here to be made, if you admit that to some things it is not possible to be passive, without being present with them, but that you may accomplish other things at the same time that you are surveying intelligibles? For it is not because some things are apprehended to be base by the multitude, but others not. For all the above-mentioned passions are base. So that to the attainment of a life according to intellect, it is requisite to abstain from all these, in the same manner as from venereal concerns. To nature, therefore, but little food must be granted, through the necessity of generation, or of our connection with a flowing condition of being. For, where sense and sensible apprehension are, there a departure and separation from the intelli-

¹ Sense, and that which is beautiful in the energies of sense, are thus denominated by Platon.

gible take place; and by how much stronger the excitation is of the irrational part, by so much the greater is the departure from intellection. For it is not possible for us to be borne along to this place and to that, while we are *here*, and yet be *there*, *i.e.*, be present with an intelligible essence. For our attentions to things are not effected with a part, but with the whole of ourselves.

XVI. But to fancy that he who is passively affected according to sense may, nevertheless, energize about intelligibles, has precipitated many of the Barbarians to destruction; who arrogantly assert that, though they indulge in every kind of pleasure, yet they are able to convert themselves to things of a different nature from sensibles, at the same time that they are energizing with the irrational part. * * *

XVII. The man, however, who is cautious, and is suspicious of the enchantments of nature, who has surveyed the essential properties of body, and knows that it was adapted as an instrument to the powers of the soul, will also know how readily passion is prepared to accord with the body, whether we are willing or not, when anything external strikes it, and the pulsation at length arrives at perception. For perception is, as it were, an answer to that which causes the perception. But the soul cannot answer unless she wholly converts herself to the sound, and transfers her animadversive eye to the pulsation. In short, the irrational part not being able to judge to what extent, how, whence, and what thing ought to be the object of attention, but of itself being inconsiderate, like horses without a charioteer, whither it verges downward, thither it is borne along, without any power of governing itself in things external. Nor does it know the fit time or measure of the food which should be taken, unless the eye of the charioteer is attentive to it, which regulates and governs the motions of irrationality, this part of the soul being essentially blind. But he who takes away from reason its dominion over the irrational part, and permits it to be borne along conformably to its proper nature: such a one, yielding to desire and anger, will suffer them to proceed to whatever extent they please. On the contrary, the worthy man will so act that his deeds may be conformable to presiding reason, even in the energies of the irrational part.

XVIII. And in this the worthy appears to differ from the depraved man, that the former has everywhere reason present, governing and guiding, like a charioteer, the irrational part; but the latter performs many things without reason for his guide. Hence the latter is said to be most irrational, and is borne along in a disorderly manner by irrationality; but the former is obedient to reason, and superior to every irrational desire. This, therefore, is the cause why the multitude err in words and deeds, in desire and anger, and why, on the contrary, good men act with rectitude, *viz.*: that the former suffer the boy within them to do whatever it pleases, but the latter give themselves up to the guidance of the tutor of the boy, *i.e.*, to reason, and govern what pertains to themselves in conjunction with it. Hence, in food, and in other corporeal energies and enjoyments, the charioteer, being present, defines what is commensurate and opportune. But when the charioteer is absent and, as some say, is occupied in his own concerns, then, if he also has with him our attention, he does not permit it to be disturbed, or at all to energize with the irrational power. If, however, he should permit our attention to be directed to the boy, unaccompanied by himself, he would destroy the man, who would be precipitately borne along by the folly of the irrational part.

XIX. Hence to worthy men abstinence in food, and in corporeal enjoyments and actions, is more appropriate than abstinence in what pertains to the touch; because, though, while we touch bodies, it is necessary we should descend from our proper

manners to the instruction of that which is most irrational in us; yet this is still more necessary in the assumption of food. For the irrational nature is incapable of considering what will be the effect of it, because this part of the soul is essentially ignorant of that which is absent. But with respect to food, if it were possible to be liberated from it, in the same manner as from visible objects, when they are removed from the view; for we can attend to other things when the imaginations is withdrawn from them; if this were possible, it would be no great undertaking to be immediately emancipated from the necessity of the mortal nature, by yielding, in a small degree, to it. Since, however, a prolongation of time in cooking and digesting food, and together with this the coöperation of sleep and rest, are requisite, and after these a certain temperament from digestion, and as separation of excrements, it is necessary that the tutor of the boy within us should be present, who, selecting things of a light nature, and which will be no impediment to him, may concede these to nature, in consequence of foreseeing the future, and the impediment which will be produced by his permitting the desires to introduce to us a burden not easily to be borne, through the trifling pleasure arising from the deglutition of food.

XX. Reason, therefore, very properly rejecting the much and the superfluous, will circumscribe what is necessary in narrow boundaries, in order that it may not be molested in procuring what the wants of the body demand, through many things being requisite; nor, being attentive to elegance, will it need a multitude of servants; nor endeavor to receive much pleasure in eating; nor, through satiety, to be filled with much indolence; nor, by rendering its burden, the body, more gross, to become somnolent; nor, through the body being replete with things of a flattening nature, to render the bond more strong, but himself more sluggish and imbecile in the performance of his proper works. For let any man show us, who endeavors as much as possible to live according to intellect, and not to be attracted by the passions of the body, that animal food is more easily procured than the food from the fruits and herbs; or that the preparation of the former is more simple than that of the latter, and, in short, that it does not require cooks, but, when compared with inanimate nutriment, is unattended by pleasure, is lighter in concoction, and is more rapidly digested, excites in a less degree the desires, and contributes less to the strength of the body than a vegetable diet.

XXI. If, however, neither any physician, nor philosopher, nor wrestler, nor any one of the vulgar, has dared to assert this, why should we not willingly abstain from this corporeal burden? Why should we not, at the same time, liberate ourselves from many inconveniences by abandoning a fleshly diet? For we should not be liberated from one only, but from myriads of evils, by accustoming ourselves to be satisfied with things of the smallest nature, *viz.*: we should be freed from a superabundance of riches, from numerous servants, a multitude of utensils, a somnolent condition, from many and vehement diseases, from medical assistance, incentives to venery, more gross exhalations, an abundance of excrements, the crassitude of the corporeal bond, from the strength which excites to base actions, and, in short, from an Iliad of evils. But from all these, inanimate and slender food, and which is easily obtained, will liberate us, and will secure for us peace, by imparting salvation to our reasoning power. For, as Diogenes says, thieves and enemies are not found among those that feed on maize, but sycophants and tyrants are produced from those who feed on flesh. The cause, however, of our being in want of many things being taken away, together with the multitude of nutriment introduced into the body, and also the weight of digestibles being lightened, the eye of the soul will

become free and will be established as in a port beyond the smoke and the waves of the corporeal nature.

XXII. And this neither requires monition nor demonstration, on account of the evidence with which it is immediately attended. Hence not only those who endeavor to live according to intellect, and who establish for themselves an intellectual life as the end of their pursuits, have perceived that this abstinence was necessary to the attainment of this end; but, as it appears to me, nearly every philosopher preferring frugality to luxury has embraced a life which is satisfied with a little, rather than one which requires a multitude of things. And, what will seem paradoxical to many, we shall find that this is asserted and praised by men who thought that pleasure is the end of those that philosophize. For most of the Epicureans, beginning from the Corypheus of their sect, appear to have been satisfied with maize and fruits, and have filled their writings with showing how little nature requires, and that its necessities may be sufficiently remedied by slender and easily procured food.

XXIII. For the wealth, they say, of nature is definite and easily obtained; but that which proceeds from vain opinions is indefinite and procured with difficulty. For things which may be readily obtained remove in a beautiful and abundantly sufficient manner that which, through indigence, is the cause of molestation to the flesh; and these are such as have the simple nature of moist and dry aliments. But everything else, they say, which terminates in luxury, is not attended with a necessary appetite, nor is it necessarily produced from a certain something which is in pain, but partly arises from the molestation and pungency solely proceeding from something not being present; partly from joy; and partly from vain and false dogmas, which neither pertain to any natural defect nor to the dissolution of the human frame, those not being present. For things which may everywhere be obtained are sufficient for those purposes which nature necessarily requires. But these, through their simplicity and paucity, may be easily procured. And he, indeed, who feeds on flesh, requires also inanimate natures; but he who is satisfied with things inanimate, is easily satisfied from the half of what the other wants, and needs but a small expense for the preparation of his food.

XXIV. They likewise say it is requisite that he who prepares the necessaries of life, should not afterwards make use of philosophy as an accession; but, having obtained it, should, with a confident mind, thus genuinely endure the events of the day. For we shall commit what pertains to ourselves to a bad counsellor if we measure and procure what is necessary to nature without philosophy. Hence it is necessary that those who philosophize should provide things of this kind, and strenuously attend to them as much as possible. But, so far as there is a dereliction from thence, *i. e.*, from philosophizing, which is not capable of affecting a perfect purification, so far we should not endeavor to procure either riches or nutriment. In conjunction, therefore, with philosophy, we should engage in things of this kind, and be immediately persuaded that it is much better to pursue what is the least, the most simple, and light in nutriment. For that which is least, and is unattended with molestation, is derived from that which is least.

XXV. The preparation also of these things, draws along with it many impediments, either from the weight of the body, which they are adapted to increase, or from the difficulty of procuring them, or from their preventing the continuity of the energy of our most principal reasonings, or from some other cause. For this energy then becomes immediately useless, and does not remain unchanged by the concomitant perturbations. It is necessary, however, that a philosopher should hope that he may not be in want of anything through the whole of life. But this hope

will be sufficiently preserved by things which are easily procured; while, on the other hand, this hope is frustrated by things of a sumptuous nature. The multitude, therefore, on this account, though their possessions are abundant, incessantly labor to obtain more as if they were in want. But the recollection that the greatest possible wealth has no power worth mentioning of dissolving the perturbations of the soul, will cause us to be satisfied with things easily obtained, and of the most simple nature. Things, also, which are very moderate and obvious, and which may be procured with the greatest facility, remove the tumult occasioned by the flesh. But the deficiency of things of a luxurious nature will not disturb him who meditates on death. Farther still, the pain arising from indigence is much milder than that which is produced by repletion, and will be considered to be so by him who does not deceive himself with vain opinions. Variety, also, of food not only does not dissolve the perturbations of the soul, but does not even increase the pleasure which is felt by the flesh. For this is terminated as soon as pain is removed. So that the feeding on flesh does not remove anything which is troublesome to nature, nor effect anything which, unless it is accomplished, will end in pain. But the pleasantness with which it is attended is violent, and perhaps mingled with the contrary. For it does not contribute to the duration of life, but to the variety of pleasure, and in this respect resembles venereal enjoyments and the drinking of foreign wines, without which nature is able to remain. For those things without which nature cannot last are very few, and may be procured easily, and in conjunction with justice, liberty, quiet, and abundant leisure.

XXVI. Again, neither does animal food contribute, but is rather an impediment to health. For health is preserved through those things by which it is recovered. But it is recovered through a most slender and fleshless diet; so that by this also is it preserved. If, however, vegetable food does not contribute to the strength of Milo, nor, in short, to an increase of strength, neither does a philosopher require strength, or an increase of it, if he intends to give himself up to contemplation, and not to an active and intemperate life. But it is not at all wonderful that the vulgar should fancy that animal food contributes to health. For they also think that sensual enjoyments and venery are preservative of health, none of which benefit any one; and those that engage in them must be thankful if they are not injured by them. And if many are not of this opinion, it is nothing to us. For neither is any fidelity and constancy in friendship and benevolence to be found among the vulgar, nor are they capable of receiving these, nor of participating of wisdom, or any portion of it which deserves to be mentioned. Neither do they understand what is privately or publicly advantageous; nor are they capable of forming a judgment of depraved and elegant manners, so as to distinguish the one from the other. And in addition to these things, they are full of insolence and intemperance. On this account, there is no occasion to fear that there will not be those who will feed on animals.

XXVII. For if all men conceived rightly there would be no need of fowlers, or hunters, or fishermen, or swineherds. But animals governing themselves, and having no guardian and ruler, would quickly perish, and be destroyed by others, who would attack them and diminish their multitude, as is found to be the case with myriads of animals on which men do not feed. But, all-various folly incessantly dwelling with mankind, there will be an innumerable multitude of those who will voraciously feed on flesh. It is necessary, however, to preserve health, not by the fear of death, but for the sake of not being impeded in the attainment of the good which is derived from contemplation. But that which is especially preservative of health is an undisturbed state of the soul and a tendency of the reasoning power towards

truly existing being. For much benefit is from hence derived to the body, as our associates have demonstrated from experience. Hence some who have been afflicted with the gout in the feet and hands, to such a degree as to be infested with it for eight entire years, have expelled it through abandoning wealth and betaking themselves to the contemplation of divinity. At the same time, therefore, that they have abandoned riches, and a solicitude about human concerns, they have also been liberated from bodily disease, so that a certain state of the soul greatly contributes both to health and to the good of the whole body. And to this also, for the most part, a diminution of nutriment contributes. In short, as Epicurus likewise has rightly said, that food is to be avoided, the enjoyment of which we desire and pursue, but which, after we have enjoyed, we rank among things of an unacceptable nature. But of this kind is every thing luxuriant and gross. And in this manner are those affected who are vehemently desirous of such nutriment, and through it are involved either in great expense, or in disease, or repletion, or the privation of leisure.

XXVIII. Hence, also, in simple and slender food, repletion is to be avoided, and everywhere we should consider what will be the consequence of the possession or enjoyment of it, what the magnitude of it is, and what molestation of the flesh or of the soul it is capable of dissolving. For we ought never to act indefinitely, but in things of this kind we should employ a boundary and measure, and infer by a reasoning process that he who fears to abstain from animal food, if he suffers himself to feed on flesh through pleasure, is afraid of death. For immediately together with a privation of such food, he conceives that something indefinitely dreadful will be present, the consequence of which will be death. But from these and similar causes an insatiable desire is produced of riches, possessions, and renown, together with an opinion that every good is increased with these in a greater extent of time, and the dread of death as an infinite evil. The pleasure, however, which is produced through luxury does not even approach to that which is experienced by him who lives with frugality. For such a one has great pleasure in thinking how little he requires. For luxury, astonishment about venereal occupations, and ambition about external concerns being taken away, what remaining use can there be of idle wealth, which will be of no advantage to us whatever, but will only become a burden, no otherwise than repletion? while, on the other hand, the pleasure arising from frugality is genuine and pure. It is also necessary to accustom the body to become alienated, as much as possible, from the pleasure of the satiety arising from luxurious food, but not from the fulness produced by a slender diet, in order that moderation may proceed through all things, and that what is necessary or what is most excellent may fix a boundary to our diet. For he who thus mortifies his body will receive every possible good, through being sufficient to himself and an assimilation to divinity. And thus also he will not desire a greater extent of time, as if it would bring with it an augmentation of good. He will likewise thus be truly rich, measuring wealth by a natural bound, and not by vain opinions. Thus, too, he will not depend on the hope of the greatest pleasure, the existence of which is incredible, since this would be most troublesome. But he will remain satisfied with his present condition, and will not be anxious to live for a longer period of time.

XXIX. Besides this also, is it not absurd that he who is in great affliction, or is in some grievous external calamity, or is bound with chains, does not even think of food, nor concern himself about the means of obtaining it, but when it is placed before him, refuses what is necessary to his subsistence; and that the man who is truly in bonds and is tormented by inward calamities, should endeavor to procure a variety of eatables paying attention to things through which he will strengthen his bonds? And how is it

possible that this should be the conduct of men who know what they suffer, and not rather of those who are delighted with their calamities, and who are ignorant of the evils which they endure? For these are affected in a way contrary to those who are in chains, and who are conscious of their miserable condition; since these, experiencing no gratification in the present life, and being full of immense perturbation, insatiably aspire after another life. For no one who can easily liberate himself from all perturbation will desire to possess silver tables and couches, and to have ointments and cooks, splendid vessels and garments, and suppers remarkable for their sumptuousness and variety; but such a desire arises from a perfect uselessness to every purpose of the present life, from an indefinite generation of good, and from immense perturbation. Hence some do not remember the past, the recollection of it being expelled by the present; but others do not inquire about the present because they are not pleased with existing circumstances.

XXX. The contemplative philosopher, however, will invariably adopt a slender diet. For he knows the particulars in which his bond consists, so that he is not capable of desiring luxuries. Hence, being delighted with simple food, he will not seek for animal nutriment, as if he was not satisfied with a vegetable diet. But if the nature of the body in a philosopher was not such as we have supposed it to be, and was not so tractable, and so adapted to having its wants satisfied through things easily procured, and it was requisite to endure some pains and molestations for the sake of true salvation, ought we not willingly to endure them? For when it is requisite that we should be liberated from disease, do we not voluntarily sustain many pains, — viz.: while we are cut, covered with blood, burnt, drink bitter medicines, etc., — and do we not also reward those who cause us to suffer in this manner? And this being the case, ought we not to sustain everything, though of the most afflictive nature, with equanimity, for the sake of being purified from internal disease, since our contest is for immortality and an association with divinity, from which we are prevented through an association with the body? By no means, therefore, ought we to follow the laws of the body, which are violent and adverse to the laws of the intellect, and to the paths which lead to salvation. Since, however, we do not now philosophize about the endurance of pain, but about the rejection of pleasures which are not necessary, what apology can remain for those who imprudently endeavor to defend their own intemperance?

XXXI. For if it is requisite not to dissemble anything through fear, but to speak freely, it is not otherwise possible to obtain the end of a contemplative life than by adhering to God as if fastened by a nail, being divulsed from body, and those pleasures of the soul which subsist through it; since our salvation is effected by deeds, and not by a mere attention to words. But as it is not possible with any kind of diet, and, in short, by feeding on flesh, to become adapted to an union with even some partial deity, much less is this possible with that God who is beyond all things, and is above a nature simply incorporeal; but after all various purifications both of soul and body, he who is naturally of an excellent disposition, and lives with piety and purity, will scarcely be thought worthy to perceive him. So that by how much more the Father of all things excels in simplicity, purity, and sufficiency to himself as being established far beyond all material representation, by so much the more is it requisite that he who approaches to him should be in every respect pure and holy, beginning from his body and ending internally, and distributing to each of the parts, and, in short, to everything which is present with him, a purity adapted to the nature of each. Perhaps, however, these things will not be contradicted by any one. But it may be doubted why we admit abstinence

from animal food to pertain to purity, though in sacrifice we slay sheep and oxen, and conceive that the immolations are pure and acceptable to the Gods. Hence, since the solution of this requires a long discussion, the consideration of sacrifices must be assumed from another principle.

XXXII. Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a manner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to different powers; to the God indeed who is above all things, as a certain wise man said, neither sacrificing with incense nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there is nothing material which is not immediately impure to an immaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language nor internal speech adapted to the highest God when it is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul, and with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, that, being conjoined with and assimilated to him, we should offer to him as a sacred sacrifice the elevation of our intellect, which offering will be both a hymn and our salvation. In an impassive contemplation, therefore, of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected in perfection; but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, hymns orally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each of the divinities a sacrifice is to be made of the first fruits of the things which he bestows, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore, the husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the season first produces; thus also we should offer to the divinities the first fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, giving them thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for truly nourishing us through the vision of themselves which they afford us, associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us for our salvation.

XXXIII. Now, however, many of those who apply themselves to philosophy are unwilling to do this; and pursuing renown rather than honoring divinity, they are busily employed about statues neither considering whether they are to be revered or not, nor endeavoring to learn from those who are divinely wise to what extent and to what degree it is requisite to proceed in this affair. We, however, shall by no means contend with these, nor are we very desirous of being well instructed in a thing of this kind; but imitating holy and ancient men, we offer to the Gods, more than any thing else, the first fruits of contemplation which they have imparted to us, and by the use of which we become partakers of true salvation.

XXXIV. The Pythagoreans, therefore, diligently applying themselves to the study of numbers and lines, sacrificed for the most part from these to the gods, denominating, indeed, a certain number Athens, but another Artemis, and another Apollon; and again, they called one number justice, but another temperance. In diagrams also they adopted a similar mode. And thus, by offerings of this kind, they rendered the gods propitious to them, so as to obtain of them the object of their wishes, by the things which they dedicated to, and the names by which they invoked them. They likewise frequently employed their aid in divination, and if they were in want of a certain thing for the purpose of some investigation. In order, therefore, to effect this they made use of the Gods within the heavens, both the erratic and non-erratic, of all of whom it is requisite to consider the sun as the leader; but to rank the moon in the second place, and we should conjoin with these fire, in the third place, from its alliance to them, as the theologian says. He also says that no animal is to be sacrificed, but that the first fruits are to be offered from meal and honey and the vegetable productions of the earth. He adds that fire is not to be kindled on a hearth defiled with gore; and asserts other things of a like kind. For what occasion is there to transcribe all that he says? For he who is studious of piety knows, indeed, that to the gods no animal is

to be sacrificed, but that a sacrifice of this kind pertains to dæmons, and other powers, whether they are beneficent or depraved. He likewise knows who those are that ought to sacrifice to these, and to what extent they ought to proceed in the sacrifices which they make. Other things, however, will be passed over by me in silence. But what some Platonists have divulged I shall lay before the reader in order that the things proposed to be discussed may become manifest to the intelligent. What they have unfolded, therefore, is as follows:

XXXV. The first God, being incorporeal, immovable, and impartible, and neither subsisting in anything nor restrained in his energies, is not, as has been before observed, in want of anything external to himself, as neither is the soul of the world; but this latter, containing in itself the principle of that which is triply divisible, and being naturally self-motive, is adapted to be moved in a beautiful and orderly manner, and also to move the body of the world according to the most excellent reasons, *i.e.*, productive principles or powers. It is, however, connected with and comprehends body, though it is itself incorporeal and liberated from the participation of any passion. To the remaining Gods therefore, to the world, to the inerratic and erratic stars, who are visible Gods consisting of soul and body, thanks are to be returned after the above-mentioned manner, through sacrifices from inanimate natures. The multitude, therefore, of those invisible beings remains for us, whom Platon indiscriminately calls dæmons; but of these some being denominated by men, obtain from them honors and other religious observances, similar to those which are paid to the gods; but others, who for the most part are not explicitly denominated, receive an occult religious reverence and appellation from certain persons in villages and certain cities; and the remaining multitude is called in common by the name of dæmons. The general persuasion, however, respecting all these invisible beings is this, that if they become angry through being neglected and deprived of the religious reverence due them, they are noxious to those by whom they are thus neglected, and that they again become beneficent if they are appeased by prayers, supplications, and sacrifices, and other similar rites.

XXXVI. But the confused notion which is formed of these beings, and which has proceeded to great crimination, necessarily requires that the nature of them should be distinguished according to reason. For perhaps it will be said that it is requisite to show whence the error concerning them originated among men. The distinction, therefore, must be made after the following manner. Such souls as are the progeny of the whole soul of the universe, and who govern the great parts of the region under the moon, these being incumbent on a pneumatic substance or spirit and ruling over it conformably to reason, are to be considered as good dæmons, who are diligently employed in causing everything to be beneficial to the subjects of their government, whether they preside over certain animals or fruits which are arranged under their inspective care, or over things which subsist for the sake of these, such as the good temperament of the seasons of the year. They are also leaders in the attainment of music and the whole of erudition, and likewise of medicine and gymnastics, and of everything else similar to these. For it is impossible that these dæmons should impart utility and yet become, in the very same things, the causes of what is detrimental. Among these two, those *transporters*, as Platon calls them in his Banquet, are to be enumerated, who announce the affairs of men to the Gods, and the will of the Gods to men; carrying our prayers, indeed, to the Gods as judges, but oracularly unfolding to us the exhortations and admonitions of the Gods. But such souls as do not rule over the pneumatic substance with which they are connected, but for the most part are vanquished

by it, these are vehemently agitated and borne along in a disorderly manner, when the irascible motions and the desires of the pneumatic substance receive an impetus. These souls, therefore, are, indeed dæmons, but are deservedly called malefic dæmons.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ON THE MEANS AND GRADES OF ASCENT TO ABSOLUTE UNITY.

BY PROKLOS.

[Translated from the original Greek.]

[This article is extracted from Proklos' admirable and profound Commentary on the First Alkibiades. It is a Commentary on the following passage:—

"Alkibiades. But perhaps I did not answer rightly when I declared that I had myself discovered that knowledge.

Sokrates. How, then, did you obtain it?

Alkib. I learned it, I think, like others.

Sok. We come again to the same reason. From whom did you learn it?

Alkib. The multitude."]

DISCIPLINE (*Μαθησις*) has a two-fold nature: at one time proceeding from superior to inferior causes—according to which the Demiourgos, in the Timaios, says to the subordinate deities, "learn now what, revealing my will, I declare to you;" at another, issuing from a cause externally moving—according to which we are accustomed to designate certain persons as instructors. Between these two progressions of Discipline (mathesis) is arranged Invention (*Ευρεσις*), for it is inferior to the psychical knowledge imparted by the divinities, and more perfect than reminiscence, which is external, and derived from other things. Concerning the superior progression of Mathesis, Alkibiades had no notion, except so far as he looked to the science which is essentially existent in us, which was given by the gods, and according to which he thought that he accurately knew the Just. Coming to Invention, which is a medium, and is in the soul, also a medium, and it having been demonstrated that he had neither investigated nor knew the time of the beginning of his ignorance,—which knowledge it is necessary should preëxist investigation,—he now returns to the second progression of Mathesis; and being in doubt as to who is a truly scientific instructor of just things, flies to the multitude and the unstable life of the many, and considers this as the leader of the knowledge of just things.

Here, therefore, Sokrates, like a certain Heracles, exterminating heads of the Hydra, demonstrates that every multitude is unworthy of belief respecting the knowledge of things just and unjust. This discourse apparently seems to contribute but little to the purification of the young man; but when accurately considered, it will be found directed to the same end. Primarily, Alkibiades being ambitious, drew his opinion from the multitude, and about it was filled with astonishment. Sokrates therefore shows him (1) that the opinion of the multitude has no authority in the judgment and knowledge of things, and that he whose view is directed to the beautiful ought not to adhere to it; (2) that the multitude is the cause of false opinions, producing in us from our youth depraved imaginations and various passions. Scientific reasoning, therefore, is necessary in order to give a right direction to that part of us which is perverted by an association with the multitude; to apply a remedy to our passive part, and to purify that which is filled with impurity; for thus we shall become adapted to a reminiscence of science. (3) Sokrates shows that there is in each of us, as he says, a many-headed wild beast, which is analogous to the multitude; for this is what the people is in a city, viz., the various and material form of the soul, which is our lowest part. The present reasoning, therefore, exhorts us to depart from

boundless desire, and to lay aside the multitude of life, and our inward people, as not being a judge worthy of belief respecting the nature of things, nor a recipient of any whole science; for nothing irrational is naturally adapted to partake of science, since the inferior part of irrational things, which also has multitude in itself, is contentious, and at war with itself. (4) We therefore say that the present reasoning does not think proper to admit into a wise and intellectual life an apostacy and flight from the one, together with diversity and all-various division; but indicates that all these should be rejected as foreign from intellect and divine union. For it is requisite to fly from not only external, but also from the multitude in the soul; nor this alone, but also to abandon multitude of every kind.

Beginning from beneath, we must shun the "multitude of men going along in a herd," as the oracle says, and must neither participate of their lives nor their opinions. We must fly from the manifold desires which divide us about body, and which impel us to pursue first one external object and then another: at one time irrational pleasures, and at another, indefinite and conflicting actions; for these fill us with penitence and evils. We must also fly from the senses which are nourished with us, and which deceive our dianoetic part; for they are multiform at different times, are conversant with different sensibles, and assert nothing sane, nothing accurate, as Sokrates himself says. We must likewise shun imaginations, as they are figured and divisible, and thus introduce infinite variety, and do not suffer us to return to that which is impartible and immaterial; but, when we are hastening to apprehend an essence of this kind, draw us down to passive (sensuous) intelligence. We must also avoid opinions; for these are various and infinite, tend to that which is external, are mingled with phantasy and sense, and are not free from contrariety; since our opinions likewise contend with each other, in the same manner as imaginations with imaginations, and one sense with another. But, flying from all these divisible and various forms of life, we should run back to science, and there collect in union the multitude of theorems, and comprehend all the sciences in one harmonious bond. For there is neither sedition nor contrariety of the sciences with each other; but such as are secondary are subservient to those that are prior, and derive from them their proper principles. At the same time, it is requisite here for us to proceed from many sciences, to one science—which is unhypothetical, and the first!—and to extend to this all the rest. But after science, and the exercise pertaining to it, we must abandon compositions, divisions, and multiform transitions, and transfer the soul to an intellectual life, and simple projections.² For science is not the summit of knowledge, but prior to this is intellect. I do not merely mean that intellect which is exempt from soul, but an illumination³ from thence, which is infused into the soul, and concerning which Aristoteles says, "that it is intellect by which we know terms,"⁴ and Timaios, that "it is ingenerated in nothing else than soul."

Ascending therefore to this intellect, we must contemplate together with it an intelligible essence; with simple and indivisible projections surveying the simple, accurate, and indivisible genera of beings. But, after much-honored intellect, it is necessary to excite the supreme hyperaxis or summit of the soul, according to which we are one, and under which the multitude we contain is united. For as by our intellect we participate the divine intellect, so by our unity, and as it were the flower of our essence,

¹ By this first of sciences Proklos means the Dialectic of Platon.

² Intellectual vision is intuitive; and hence intellect, by an immediate projection of its visive power, apprehends the objects of its knowledge. Hence, too, the visive energies of intellect are called by the Platonists *ἄμεραι ἐπιβουλαί*,—i. e., intellectual projections.

³ This illumination is the summit of the dianoetic part.

⁴ i. e., simple, indemonstrable propositions.

we may participate the First One, the source of union to all things. And by our *one* we are especially united to the Divine Nature. For the similar is everywhere to be comprehended by the similar, objects of science by science, intelligibles by intellect, and the most united measures of beings by *the one* of the soul, which is the very summit of our energies. According to this we become divine, flying from all multitude, verging to our own union, becoming one, and energizing uniformly. And Sokrates, previously preparing this felicitous life for us, exhorts us not to proceed in any respect to external multitude.

Moreover, we must abandon coördinate (internal) multitude, so that we may thereby reach the flower and hyperparxis of our intellect. And thus proceeding according to the gradations of knowledge, you may see the correctness of the Sokratic exhortation. But if you desire to also consider the admonition according to the objects of knowledge, fly from all sensible things; for they are divulsed from each other, are divisible, and perfectly mutable, and therefore elude an accurate apprehension. From these, therefore, transfer yourself to an incorporeal essence,—for every sensible nature has an adventitious union, and is essentially dissipated, and full of infinity. Hence, also, its good is divisible and adventitious, is distant from itself and discordant, and its hypostasis has a foreign basis. Having therefore ascended thither, and being established among incorporeals, you will behold the psychical order above bodies, self-motive and self-energetic, and subsisting in and for itself, but at the same time multiplied, and anticipating in itself a certain representation of an essence divisible about bodies. There likewise you will see an all-various multitude of habitudes of reason, analogies, bonds, wholes, parts, physical circles, a variety of powers, and a perfection neither eternal nor at once wholly stable, but evolved according to time, and subsisting in discursive energies—for such is the nature of soul. After the multitude in souls elevate yourself to intellect, and the intellectual dominions, that you may apprehend the union of things, and become a spectator of the nature of intellect. There behold an essence abiding in eternity, a fervid life and sleepless intellection, to which nothing of life is wanting, and which does not need the periods of time for its perfection. When you have surveyed these, and also seen how much superior they are to souls, investigate whether there is any multitude in these natures; and if intellect, since it is one, is likewise all-perfect, and, being uniform, is likewise multiform. For it thus subsists. Having, therefore, learned this, and beheld intellectual multitude, indivisible and united—proceed to another principle, and prior to intellectual essences survey the unities of intellects, and an union exempt from wholes. Here abiding, relinquish all multitude, and you will arrive at the fountain of *good*. You see then that the present reasoning, in exhorting us to fly from the multitude, affords us no small assistance in our ascent; and you further see how it contributes to the perfect salvation¹ of the soul if we direct our attention to the multitude which pervades through all things. The most beautiful beginning, therefore, of our perfection, is the separation of ourselves from external multitude, and from the multitude in the desires of the soul, and in the indefinite motions of opinion.

Hence, also, it is evident that souls do not collect their knowledge from sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover *the whole* and *the one*; but call forth discipline (μαθησις) from their own nature, and correct the imperfection of phenomena. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no respect a real subsistence should be the inductive causes of knowledge in the soul; that things which oppose each other, which require the reasonings of the soul, and are ambiguous, should precede

science, which has a sameness of subsistence; that things which are variously mutable should be generative of reasons which are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes of definite intelligence. It is not right, therefore, that the truth of things eternal should be received from *the many*, nor the judgment of universals from sensibles, nor a decision respecting what is good from irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within herself should there seek for *the true* and *the good*, and the eternal reasons of things. For the essence of soul is full of these, but they are concealed in the oblivion produced by generation.¹ Hence the soul, in searching for truth, looks to externals, though she herself essentially contains it, and, deserting her own nature, explores the good in things foreign to its nature. Thence, therefore, is produced the beginning of self-knowledge. For if we look to the multitude of men we shall never see the one form of them, because it is overshadowed by the multitude, division, discord, and all-various mutation of its participants; if, however, we convert ourselves to our own essence, we shall there survey without trouble the one reason and nature of men. Very properly, therefore, does Sokrates separate far from a survey of the multitude the soul that is about to know what man *truly is*, and previous to a speculation (knowledge) of this kind purifies the soul from impeding opinions. For multitude is an impediment to a conversion of the soul to herself, and to a knowledge of the one form of things. Hence, in material things, variety obscures unity, difference sameness, and dissimilitude similitude; since forms here do not subsist without confusion, nor are the more excellent unmingled with the baser natures.

LIFE OF HAI EBN YOKDAN, THE SELF-TAUGHT PHILOSOPHER.

BY ABUBACER IBN TOPHALL.

[Translated from the original Arabic by Simon Ockley. Revised and modernized by W. H. Steele.]

[Abubacer Ibn Tophall, a noted Arabian physician, poet, mathematician, and philosopher, was born at Guadix, Spain, in the year 1100, and died at Morocco in 1186 A. D. He was one of the profoundest thinkers of his age, and exercised great influence over his contemporaries. His most celebrated work is the *Life of Hai Ebn Yokdan*, in which the Platonic doctrine respecting intuition is pretty accurately set forth. It is a very curious, interesting, and valuable philosophical romance, is generally esteemed by the learned, and has been translated into French, German, Dutch, and English. The design of this work is to show the degrees or processes by which the human mind rises from that instinctive life which it shares with the lower animals, through gradual emancipation from the bonds of sense and matter, to a union with The One or Absolute Being. Tophall maintains the independence of man in opposition to the institutions and opinions of human society. In his theory he represents the individual as developing himself without external aid. That independence of thought and will, which man now owes to the whole course of the previous history of the human race, is regarded by him as existing in the natural man, out of whom he makes an extra-historical ideal. Tophall regards positive religion, with its law founded on reward and punishment, as only a necessary means of discipline for the multitude; religious conceptions are, in his view, only types or envelopes of that truth to the logical comprehension of which the philosopher gradually approaches. (Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, translated by Prof. Morris.) Tophall remarks, that man possesses three relations of similitude or affinity: namely, one with the animal creation, another with celestial beings, and the third with the necessary and divine Being. To these three orders of relationship appertain three modes of action. The first exercises itself upon our material organs; the second upon the vital spirit; and the third upon its own essence.

The first mode of action is directed towards sensible objects. For from acquiring instruction here, we often meet with great obstacles; for external things are a kind of veil which envelopes true science and knowledge. The second only obtains an imperfect intuition, or a confused assemblage of objects; but when directed upon its own essence it then confers knowledge. By the third action we acquire complete and perfect intuition. Its attention is absorbed in the contemplation of absolute Truth.

¹ Generation signifies the whole of a sensible nature.

¹ The term *salvation* is not peculiar to the Christian religion, since long before its establishment the Heathens had their *savior gods*.

Celestial bodies have three attributes: one by which they throw light, heat, and refraction over inferior substances; the second relates to their own nature, their happiness, holiness, purity, and power of rapid motion; and the third refers to the Supreme Being, whose will they execute, whose power they recognize, and whose presence they perpetually enjoy. Man ought to imitate these three kinds of attributes. To conform himself to the first, he ought to extend a benevolent protection to all animal natures, and to all plants, and endeavor to preserve them in a perfect condition. To bring himself under the influence of the second attribute he should preserve himself from all impurities, practise ablutions, and use suitable exercises of the body. In reference to the third attribute, he should avoid all obstacles that arise from sensible objects, shut his eyes and ears, repress all flights of imagination, and reduce all his faculties to a certain state of apathy, until he approaches a condition of pure intellectuality. Arrived at this high state of perfection, man will learn that his own essence does not differ from the essence of the Supreme Being; that there is really but one universal essence, though many individualities. The Divine Essence is like the rays of the material sun which expand over opaque bodies, and which appear to proceed from the eye, though they are only reflected from its surface. All beings distinct from mere matter, which possess this knowledge, are at one with the Divine Essence, for knowledge is nothing but this essence itself. These beings are, therefore, not different in essence; they are only one and the same. Multiplicity, variety, and aggregation appertain only to bodies. The sensible world is only the shadow of the intelligible or divine world.

Tophall further remarks: "In considering the number of his organs, and the variety of their functions, man would appear to be a compound being; but in looking again at the secret tie which unites all these organs, and their principle of action, man is seen to be truly but an individual being. This unity is derived from the unity of the vital principle."

This philosopher led a life of singular abstraction, and enjoyed states of pure intellectual ecstasy. In one of these he affirms that he saw the supreme and celestial sphere in which the essence of immateriality resides. All happiness and beauty are there, and the sight was the most ravishing imaginable. He perceived a spiritual Being, who was neither the first of beings nor the sphere itself; without, however, its being different from both in essence. It was like the image of the sun produced in a mirror, which is neither the sun itself, nor the mirror. (Blakey's Hist. Phil. of Mind.)

Ockley's translation of the Life of Hai Ebn Yokdan, made from the Arabic, was published at London, in 1708. It has been deemed necessary and proper, in republishing this work, which is now scarce, to subject it to a limited but very careful revision. In this attention has been directed chiefly to the elimination of extraneous matter and archaic phraseology. The purity and integrity of the author's ideas, as presented by the translator, have been wholly preserved. Only the historical and purely explanatory notes of the translator have been retained. Though an excellent Arabic scholar, Mr. Ockley was not much, if anything, of a philosopher.]

INTRODUCTION.

*In the name of the most Merciful God!*¹ Blessed be the almighty, and eternal, the infinitely wise and merciful God, who hath taught us the use of the pen,² and who, out of His great goodness to man, hath made him understand things which he did not know.

I praise Him for His excellent gifts, and give Him thanks for His continued benefits; and I testify that there is but one God; that He has no partner;³ that Mahomet is His servant and apostle, endued with an excellent spirit, a master of convincing demonstration, and a victorious warrior. The blessing of God be upon him and all his followers, to the end of the world.

You asked me, dear friend, (God preserve you forever, and make you partaker of everlasting happiness), to communicate to you what I know concerning the mysteries of the Eastern phil-

¹ This is the usual form in which the Mahometans begin all their writings. Every chapter in the Alkoran begins in this manner, and all their authors have, in consequence, adopted this style. The Eastern Christians, as also the Ethiopians, to distinguish themselves from the Mahometans, begin their writings thus: "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit— one God."

² The words in italics are taken from the 96th chapter of the Alkoran, according to the editions now in use. It is the strange yet common practice of Eastern writers to mingle quotations from the Alkoran with words of their own, without giving due credit for the expressions taken.

³ This expression ("that he has no partner") is frequently mentioned in the Alkoran, and is levelled particularly against the Christians, whom Mahomet often calls *Associantes*, i. e., persons joining partners with God; because they acknowledge the divinity of our blessed Savior.

osophy, mentioned by the learned Avicenna.¹ Now you must understand that he who would attain to a clear and distinct knowledge must be diligent in the search of it. Your request gave me a noble turn of thought, and brought me to the understanding of things I never knew before; nay, it advanced me to such an elevation as the most eloquent tongue cannot express. This knowledge is of a quite different nature and kind from the things of this world, and whoever has attained to any degree of it is so affected with pleasure and exultation that it is impossible for him to conceal his sense of it, which often leads him into strange expressions and ridiculous assertions.

If a man, unpolished by good education, happens to attain to this state, he often speaks, he knows not what; and some of this sort have been known to cry out, *Præbe te to me! How wonderful am I!* One said, *I am truth!* another, *I am God!* Abu Hamed Algazali,² when he had attained to it, expressed himself thus:—

"'Twas what it was, 'tis not to be expressed;
Inquire no further, but conceive the rest."

He was a man of good learning, and well versed in the sciences. What Avenpace³ says at the close of his discourse concerning the Union [with God], is well worth your observation, viz.:

"It will appear plainly to any one, who understands the design of my book, that this degree of knowledge which approaches man nearest to God is not attainable by means of those sciences now in use. I attained to what I know by altogether abstracting my mind from everything I knew before; and was furnished with other notions totally independent of matter, and of too noble a nature to be, in any wise, attributed to the natural life, but were peculiar to the blessed. We may, therefore, call them divine properties, which God bestows upon such of his servants as he pleases."

Now, the degree which this author mentions is attainable by speculative knowledge; but that degree to which I refer is not reached in this manner. In that which I mention there are no discoveries made which contradict those meant by this author; but the difference consists in this, viz.: that in our way there is a greater degree of clearness and perspicuity than is found in the other. We, in our way, comprehend things by the assistance of a something which we cannot properly call a *power*; nor, indeed, will any of those words used, either in common discourse, or in the writings of the learned, serve to express that by which this distinct perception does apprehend.

This degree I have mentioned is precisely the same thing which Avicenna means when he says: "When a man's desires are considerably elevated, and he is competently exercised in this way, there will appear to him some small glimmerings of the truth, as it were flashes of lightning, which just shine upon him, and then disappear. The more he considers them the oftener will he perceive them; till at last his acquaintance with them is such that they occur to him spontaneously. Then, as soon as he perceives anything, he applies himself to the Divine Essence, so as to retain some impression of it, and then a something occurs to

¹ This great man was born A. D. 980, in Bochara, a city famous as the birthplace of many very learned men. He was, indeed, a profound scholar; and, it is said, was not only a great philosopher and physician, but an excellent philologist and poet. Among other learned works he wrote an Arabic lexicon, which, unfortunately for the learned world, is lost. He was at one time a Vizier, and met with many troubles, which abated not his wonderful industry. He died aged fifty-eight years, having written more learned books than he lived years.

² Algazali was a noted philosopher, born A. D. 1059 at Ghazzalah in Khorasan, and died at Tus, A. D. 1111.

³ This author was considered a philosopher of great ingenuity and judgment. He was famous for his poetry and philosophy; yet most of his works are unfinished. He died young, being poisoned at Fez, A. D. 1138.

him whereby he discerns the *truth* in everything. At last, by frequent meditation, he attains to perfect tranquillity; and that which before was only an occasional glimmer has become a constant light, and he has obtained a lasting and steady knowledge."

He has also given an account of those several steps and degrees by which a man is brought to this perfection, until his soul is like a polished looking-glass, in which he beholds the *truth*. The impressions of truth he perceives fill him with pleasure, and he rejoices. When he has attained thus far, he employs his mind in the contemplation of *truth* and *himself*; and thus he fluctuates between both, till he retires wholly from *himself*, and seeks only the Divine Essence. If, at any time, he contemplates his own soul, the reason is that his soul looks toward God; and from thence arises a perfect conjunction [with God].

Avicenna, according to this manner which he so justly describes, by no means allows that this *taste* is attained either by way of speculation or deduction of consequences. That you may the more clearly apprehend the difference between the perception of those men who have, and those who have not, attained to the union [with God], I shall propose you a familiar instance: Suppose a man born blind, but of good capacity, a tenacious memory, and solid judgment. He has lived in the place of his nativity till he has become acquainted with many people. He knows them when he meets them, and can call them by name. Suppose he has learned the several species of animals, and things inanimate, and knows the streets and houses of the town so well as to proceed without a guide. Again, presume that he knows the names of colors, and the difference between them, by their description and definitions; and now, suddenly, he is restored to sight. Is it not reasonable, that when he walks about the town, and beholds everything for the first time, he should find them exactly agreeable to those notions which he received of them when blind? Now, the difference between his apprehensions when blind and those perceptions by sight would consist in only two great things, viz.: a greater *clearness*, and an extreme *delight*. From this 'tis plain, that the condition of those contemplators who have not attained to the union [with God] is exactly like that of the blind man, whose notion of colors received by their descriptions, is precisely similar to those things which Avenpace said were of too noble a nature to be in any wise attributed to the natural life. But the situation of those who have attained to the union, and to whom God has given that which we cannot properly call a *power*, is like that of the blind man when restored to sight. Our similitude is not exactly applicable in every case; for it is very seldom that any one is found, born *with his eyes open*, who can attain to this state without contemplation. When I speak of the ideas of the *contemplative*, I do not mean what they learn from the study of physics, nor, by the notion of some, what is learned from the study of metaphysics; for these two modes of learning are vastly different and should not be confounded. What I do mean is, that species of knowledge which is obtained from the right study of metaphysics, and which can be properly pursued only by the strict observance of this condition, viz.: that everything be manifestly and clearly true.

I have, in this discourse, as necessity required, digressed somewhat from the nature of the information you really desire; but, should I presume to describe to you that which is seen and enjoyed by those who have attained to the *union*, I would undertake a task most difficult, indeed. This it is impossible to describe as it really is, and any one who endeavors to express it by words quite alters the thing and sinks into the speculative way. When you try to express it by words, you bring it nearer to the corporeal world, and alter its real state entirely; for the signification of words which would be used to explain it is

often necessarily changed. This occasions many real mistakes to some, and leads others to believe themselves mistaken, when in reality they are not. The reason of this confusion is, because this degree of knowledge is of infinite extent, comprehending all things itself, but not comprehended by any.

Now, if your request is that I shall point out the manner of procedure followed by those who give themselves to contemplation, this may be very readily done; yet, even this degree of learning is rare, especially in this part of the world. There is scarcely one in a thousand who has acquired even a smattering of it; and the few who have very rarely communicate what they know, except, perhaps, by mere hints. Indeed, the *Hanisitic* sect¹ and the Mahometan religion forbid men to inquire too deeply into this matter. I would not have you think that the philosophy which we find in the books of Aristoteles and Alfarabi,² or those of Avicenna, furnish the especial information you seek. Neither have the Spanish philosophers³ written fully and satisfactorily concerning it; for those scholars bred in Spain, before the knowledge of logic and philosophy was introduced among them, spent their lives in the study of mathematics, in which they made great progress. After them came a generation of men who applied themselves more to the art of reasoning, in which they greatly excelled their predecessors, — yet made no such progress as to attain to true perfection. Indeed, one of them exclaimed:

"'Tis hard the kinds of knowledge are but two,
The one erroneous, the other true.
The former profits nothing when 'tis gained,
The other's difficult to be attained."

To these succeeded others, who advanced still further and approached still nearer the *truth*. Among the latter there was one who evinced better wit, or entertained truer notions of things, than Avenpace.

He was, however, too much employed in worldly business, and died before he had time to fully open the treasury of his knowledge. In consequence, most of his pieces now extant are imperfect, particularly his book *About the Soul*; as also his treatise, *How a Man should Conduct Himself who Leads a Solitary Life*. His works on Logic and Physics are likewise unfinished; indeed, his only complete writings are a few tracts and some occasional letters. In one of these he expresses an intention, if time permitted, to alter and complete his works. I never saw him, but think him superior to his contemporaries. The works of Alfarabi now extant are mostly on logic. There are many points in his philosophical writings very dubious. In his book, *The Most Excellent Sect*, he expressly asserts that *the souls of wicked men shall suffer everlasting punishment*; and yet in his *Politics* says as positively that they shall be *dissolved* and annihilated, and that the souls of the perfect shall remain forever. In his *Ethics* he says: *the happiness of man is only in this life*; and then adds: *whatsoever people talk of besides is mere whimsy and old wives' fables*. If this principle were be-

¹ This sect is a branch of the Mahometan religion, and was a very early one with the Mahometans. The *Hanisitic* sect and the Mahometan religion signify the same thing; because Abraham, whose religion the Mahometans profess to follow, is called *Hanif* in the Alkoran.

² This man was by far the greatest of the Mahometan philosophers, and reckoned by some almost equal to Aristoteles himself. He wrote books of rhetoric, music, logic, and all parts of philosophy, which have been much esteemed by Mahometans, Jews, and Christians. He died at Damascus, in A. D. 950.

³ By Spanish philosophers the author does not mean to include any Christians, but refers to Mahometans only; for the Moors conquered a great part of Spain about the year A. D. 710. After this, as learning increased among the Eastern Mahometans, it was disseminated proportionably among the Western too, and they had many learned men resident at Toledo and other places. The author of this book was a Spaniard, as appears from an expression in this Introduction.

lieved all men would despair of the mercy of God. It places good and evil both upon the same level, in that it makes annihilation the common end of both. This is an error for which he cannot make amends, nor is it to be pardoned.

He had a mean opinion of the gift of prophecy, ascribed it wholly to the faculty of imagination, and greatly preferred philosophy to any such so-called power. Avicenna, in his *Alshepha*, gives an exposition of Aristoteles' books, having followed the same philosophy, and being of the same sect. In the beginning of his book he says that the *truth* is different from what he therein delivers; for he had written it according to the philosophy of the Peripatetics. Those, he says, who would know the *truth* as it really is — clearly and distinctly — he would refer to his book on *The Eastern Philosophy*. His *Alshepha* and the books of Aristoteles will, on comparison, be found to agree; but, if the reader accept the literal sense, without penetrating the hidden sense, he will never attain to perfection.

Algazali often contradicts himself, denying in one place what he affirms in another. He taxes the philosophers with heresy, because they deny the resurrection of the body and hold that future rewards and punishments belong to the soul only. In his book called the *Almizar*, he affirms positively that this is the doctrine of the *Suphians*,¹ and that he was convinced of the truth of it after much study and research. There are many such contradictions as these interspersed throughout his works; yet he asks pardon for them in another book, where he affirms that there are three kinds of opinion: (1) Such as are common to the vulgar and agreeable to their notions of things; (2) such as we usually give when answering questions; and (3) such private views as a man keeps to himself, and which none understand except those who think just as he does.

He adds that there is nothing more in what he has written than this: That it inclines a man to doubt those notions imbibed at first, and assists him to remove the prejudices of education. It is sufficient, if it does no more, so he thinks, because he who never doubts will never weigh things aright, and he who judges not things aright will never discover the truth, but will remain in mystery and confusion.

Believe your eyes, but still suspect your ears;
You will need no starlight when the day appears.

Now, I do not doubt that the worthy doctor Algazali attained to the utmost happiness, and to those heights of thought proper to those who enjoy the union; yet the greater part of his philosophy is enigmatical and obscure, and for that reason of no benefit to any except those who have a capacity to apprehend a thing from the least intimation. He never believed any sort of multiplicity in the Godhead, as some have supposed, for this is horrid blasphemy. He wrote, he says, some books, fit only for those qualified to read them, and in which he laid down the *naked truth*, the manner of *revelation* etc.; but these works I have never seen.

What knowledge I possess I obtained from some of the books of this author, and those of Avicenna, which I have read and compared with the opinions of the present philosophers till I have come to the knowledge of the truth. I arrived at this at first, indeed, by inquiry and contemplation; but afterwards acquired a perfect sense, and I then found myself able to say something I could, in truth, call my own.

Now, my dear friend, I would lead you by the same paths I

¹ The *Suphians* are an enthusiastic sect among the *Mahometans*, resembling somewhat the *Quietists* and *Quakers*. They pretend to a stricter discipline, a greater abstinence and contempt of the world, and also to a closer familiarity and union with God, than other sects. They used many strange and extravagant actions, and uttered the most blasphemous expressions. They never wore silk, as some other sects, but clothed themselves entirely with wool.

have trod before you, make you steer by the *same compass* till you are able to see for yourself, and no longer take upon trust from me what you may have through the medium of your own experience. Since the proper examination of these matters, which I shall communicate to you, will require considerable time, you should wholly disengage yourself from all manner of business, and apply your mind with unusual zeal. I trust I may lead you in the right way, free from evils and dangers; and I therefore shall now relate to you the history of *Hai Ebn Yokdan*, and *Asal*, and *Salaman*. In this, those who understand themselves aright will find matter of improvement, and much worthy of imitation.

THE HISTORY OF HAI EBN YOKDAN.

Our ancestors of happy memory tell us that in the Indian Ocean there is an island, situated under the equinoctial, where people are generated spontaneously, and without the intervention of father and mother. It seems that this island is blessed with such a due influence of the sun as to be the most temperate and perfect of all places in the creation; yet it must be confessed that this assertion is contrary to the opinion of the most celebrated philosophers and physicians, who affirm that the fourth climate is the most temperate. If the reason given for this assertion — viz.: that those parts of the earth situated under the equinoctial are not habitable — were drawn from any impediment of the earth, then it would appear more probable; but the reason which most of them assign is that the intense heat common in that region causes this singular generation, and this reason is false; for the contrary is proved by undeniable demonstration.

It is demonstrated in natural philosophy that there is no other cause of heat than motion, or else the contact and light of hot bodies. It is also proved that the sun, in itself, is not a hot body, nor does it partake of any mixed quality; that the thickest and smoothest bodies receive light in the greatest degree of perfection, and next, the thicker bodies which are not smooth, while those which are very thin receive no light at all. This was first demonstrated by Avicenna, and never mentioned before by any of the ancients. From these premises this conclusion will necessarily follow: That the sun does not communicate his heat after the same manner that hot bodies do to other bodies near them; because the sun is not hot in itself. It cannot be said that the earth is heated by motion; because it stands still and remains in the same posture, both when the sun shines upon it and when it does not. It is evident to sense that a great difference exists in respect of heat and cold, upon the earth at these different times. Nor does the sun first heat the air and so the earth, because we may observe in hot weather that the atmosphere nearest the earth is much warmer than that higher and more remote. It follows, therefore, that the sun heats the earth by its light, for heat always follows light, so that when its beams are collected (as in burning-glasses, for instance), it fires all before it. It is demonstrated in mathematics that both the sun and the earth are spherical bodies; that the sun is much greater than the earth, and that part of the earth at all times illuminated by the sun is over half of it. In that half illuminated, the light is most intense in the midst; both because that part is most remote from darkness, which is the circumference of the circle, and because it lies opposite to more parts of the sun. Those parts nearest the circumference of the circle receive less light, and so gradually till the circumference of the circle, which encompasses the illuminated part of the earth, ends in darkness.

That is the centre of the circle of light where the sun is vertical to the inhabitants, and in that place the heat is most extremely intense, while those regions are coldest where the sun is farthest from being vertical. If there were a place where the sun is always vertical it must needs be extremely hot. It is demonstrated in Astronomy that the sun is vertical only twice a year to the inhabitants under the Equinoctial: once when he enters into Aries, and again when into Libra. The remainder of the year he declines from them six months northward, and six months southward, and for this reason they are neither too hot nor too cold, but are of a mean or moderate temperature. Much more might be added, by way of explanation, to this argument; but it is not suitable to our purpose. I have given you these hints because they assist the story somewhat, and make it more probable, that a man may be formed without the intervention of father and mother. There are people who positively affirm that Hai Ebn Yokdan was thus formed, while others deny this, and tell the story thus:—

They say that not far away from the island I have mentioned there is another great island, very fertile and well-peopled. This island was governed by a prince of a proud and jealous disposition. He had a sister, whom he confined and restrained from marriage, because he could not match her to one suitable to her quality. He also had a near relative named Yokdan, who courted this princess and married her privately, according to the rites of matrimony in use among that people. The issue of this union was a son, and the princess, fearing a discovery of this fact by her brother, selected a few of her trusty servants and friends, and, enclosing her babe in a little ark, conveyed him to the seashore. Here, with a heart equally affected with love and fear, she took her last leave of him in these words, viz.: "O God! thou didst form this babe out of nothing, and didst cherish him within the dark recesses of my womb, till by nature he was complete. I, fearing the cruelty of a proud and unjust king, commit him to thy goodness, hoping that thou, who art infinitely merciful, wilt be pleased, by thy gracious providence, to protect him, and never leave him destitute of thy care."

The ark was then set afloat, and within a day the tide cast it upon the island before mentioned. Once annually in this region, the water rises to a great height, and it was during this flood that the ark containing the princess' son was cast up, and by good fortune was left in the midst of a large and pleasant grove. In this retreat the babe was protected from both wind and sun. When the tide ebbed the wind blew hard, by which a huge bulwark, of sand was formed, sufficient to secure the island from the dangers of all future inundations. The babe soon grew hungry, and began to cry most piteously. At this juncture it happened that a roe, wandering about the island in search of her fawn, which had strayed away, heard the cries of the child, and thinking, no doubt, they were uttered by her lost fawn, ran to the grove. Seeing the ark, she immediately attacked it, and, beating it furiously with her sharp hoofs, soon loosened a board. When she saw the child she exhibited marks of the same natural affection towards it, as if it had been her own offspring, and gave it milk.

This, then, is the account given by those people who are not willing to believe that a man can be produced without father and mother. Those, again, who affirm that *Hai Ebn Yokdan* was produced in that island without the intervention of parents, tell us that in that island there is a certain low piece of ground, where a mass of earth had for a period of years been slowly fermenting. In this mass the four qualities *heat, cold, dryness, and moisture*, existed in exactly equal proportions. The mass was of great bulk, and some of its parts were better and more evenly tempered than others, and were consequently fitter for generation. The middle

part especially was near the temperature of man's body. This mass of matter being in great fermentation, there arose from it some bubbles, by reason of its viscosness; and it chanced that in the midst of the mass there was a viscous substance with a very little bubble in it, which was divided in two by a thin partition, and was full of spirituous and aërial substance of the most exact temperature imaginable. The matter being thus disposed, there was, by the command of God, a spirit infused into it, which was joined so closely to it as to be scarcely separable from it, even in thought. It is said that this spirit as constantly influenced this mass of matter as the sun does the world.

Now there are some bodies that do not reflect light, as thin air; and others which reflect but imperfectly, as thick bodies, not smooth. However, there exists a difference in the reflecting power of these last, and the difference of their colors arises from the different manner in which they receive the rays of light. From other bodies, again, we perceive the reflection of light in the highest degree, as from smooth and polished glasses. Some of these glasses, ground after a particular manner, will collect so much light as to kindle a fire. Now the spirit which comes by the command of God does at all times act upon all creatures. In some there appears but little impression of this spirit, because of their incapacity to receive it; and this includes all things inanimate which are represented in this similitude by the thin air. In the vegetable kingdom we find something of this spirit shown, and these are the thick bodies not polished. In the animal kingdom we find the impressions of this spirit in its most visible form, and this is represented by the polished glasses in our last comparison.

As these smooth and polished bodies, which are spherical like the sun, receive the rays of light more readily than any others whatsoever, so, also, do some animals receive the influence of that spirit more than others; and this is because they are more like that spirit by nature. And such is Man particularly, which fact is hinted where it is said: *God made man after His own image.*

When this form prevails to such a degree that, in comparison, all others are as nothing, and it consumes with the glory of its light whatsoever is near to it, then it is properly compared to those glasses which reflect light upon themselves and burn everything else. But this is a degree peculiar to the prophets. However, let us return and speak more fully respecting the peculiar mode of generation last mentioned. Those who favor it tell us further, that as soon as this spirit by God's command was joined to the receptacle, all the other powers immediately submitted themselves to it. Opposite to this receptacle, there arose another bubble, divided into three departments or ventricles by thin membranes, and connected with one another by minute passages. These departments were filled with an aërial substance, not much unlike that found in the other first mentioned, only that in the first was somewhat finer. In each of these ventricles were placed certain faculties subject to the governing spirit, and each faculty was appointed to take care of its particular station, to communicate everything to that spirit placed in the first receptacle. Near this first receptacle, and opposite to the second, there arose a third bubble filled with a grosser aërial substance than the others contained. This department was made for the entertainment and preservation of certain of the inferior faculties.

Thus these three receptacles were made in the order named, and were the first part formed of that great mass to which we refer. These receptacles now stood in need of mutual support. The first one, as it were, wanted the other two as servants; while they, in turn, desired the assistance and guidance of the first, as their master and director. The first receptacle, by the

power of that spirit which was joined to it, and its continued heat, was formed cone-shaped, and by this means that thick body which surrounds it became of like figure, being solid flesh, covered by a thick membrane. This is what we call the *heart*. Considering the great expense of moisture occurring where great heat is found, it became necessary to form another part, the office of which should be to continually supply the requisite moisture. Without this supply, to have survived long would have been impossible. It was necessary also to have a sense both of what was pleasant and what hurtful, so that this forming spirit should know when to attract the one or to repel the other. For this service there were two parts formed, the one called the *brain*, the other the *liver*. The first of these presides over all things relating to sense, and the other over such things as belong to *nutrition*. Both of these members depend upon the heart for a supply of heat, and for the recruiting of their proper faculties. In order to establish a good correspondence among all of these members, there were ducts and passages, of various sizes, interwoven, according as necessity required, and these are called *arteries* and *veins*.

The advocates of this theory of generation proceed further, and give us a particular account of the formation of all the various parts of the human body, and omit nothing that will support this hypothesis. You will observe, from their account, that we are to suppose the mass of earth upon which they depend to be of the most exact mixture, containing in it all the materials proper for the making of man's body. When, at last, the formation is complete, the coverings in which it is contained are burst, and thus the infant is brought into the world. Soon after birth, finding no nourishment, the infant cries, and the motherly roe, hearing it, proceeds to give it protection and sustenance. Both the advocates of this, and the asserters of the other manner of Hai Ebn Yokdan's birth, however much they may differ in this respect, entirely agree in all the particulars of his education, and give us an account as follows.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ENTHEASM.

BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

The concept of actual communication with Divinity underlies all philosophical thought. It is the basis of religious faith. It has in all ages constituted the goal toward which the steps of every believer in a future life have been directed. The world has always had its Mystics fondly cherishing that ideal, sometimes even fondly believing that they had attained it. We may deem them visionary and mistaken, but we cannot impugn the grandness of their desire and purpose. It is meritorious to do good, to be good, to entertain good-will toward others; and certainly the highest meed belongs to whomsoever aspires to achieve the Supreme Excellence.

Such an attainment requires the most imperative conditions. It is as essential to know as to believe. Indeed, faith is of little advantage where it is not the outcome of actual truth and fixed in it so that it shall possess all the stability of knowledge. It requires all the moral energy of a strong nature to believe. The weak and vacillating character carries doubt for its index. It is often necessary in important undertakings, where all the strength is required to achieve the desired result, to thrust such persons aside. The vision of the Right is darkened in the atmosphere where they dwell; and any transcendent knowledge is rendered

imperceptible. They not only shut out the *light* from themselves, but dim the sky into which others desire to peer. In this way, whether unwittingly or purposely, they do to others the greatest mischief of which they are capable.

The highest achievement, after all, is knowledge. There is really nothing which any one can afford not to know. It is a coming short of the human ideal to be ignorant in any respect. To love knowledge is to desire perfection; to despise it is equivalent to being content with a bestial life. In all times the wise have won respect, as being the abler and better among mankind; and even when they were passed by and unhonored while living, they have been praised, revered, and obeyed in subsequent time. They are the luminaries that have from age to age preserved light to the world, and thereby rendered it capable of renovation.

It has always been the aim of every right-thinking person to extend the circuit of his mental vision, and to exalt as well as intensify his perception. The field of the sciences has been explored and mastered with profit as well as pleasure. This is an achievement worthy of human endeavor. The mind is thereby expanded in its scope and faculty, and the power to accomplish results is vastly enhanced. The inventor of a mechanical implement, whether it be a stone hatchet or a telephone—the discoverer of a new star or a new mineral, is a benefactor. He has given us more room to think in, and, with it, the opportunity.

Our earlier lesson of Origins instructed us that man was produced from the spore-dust or protoplasmic material of the earth, and chemistry ratified this declaration. We have since been told that our corporeal substance was compacted from the same material as the stars, and animated by forces akin and identical with those which operate all-potent in the farthest-off world. But what matters it if the postulate of the scientists is true, that we took our origin from molecules not unlike to those of the jelly-fish and fungus? We are not bound to such conditions, but have a universe to occupy. The Delphic maxim — *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* (know yourself) is our commission of conquest. The knowledge of the *ego* is to know the *all*; and that which is known is possessed.

Charters and franchises are limited. The right of man to liberty, which we are told by high authority that no man can divest himself of, the ignorant cannot enjoy or exercise. They are free whom the truth has made so. The very word *liberty* implies a boon from the *book*.¹ The liberal are the learned, the intelligent, and these alone are the free. Codes and constitutions, whatever their provisions, can declare and establish no more; so necessary is it to eat of the tree of knowledge. But we may begin with our own interior selves. The germ is in us; it may not be transplanted from without. Not books and literature, but living, observing, thinking, and doing, constitute the principal education of the individual who becomes really wise or learned. I do not suppose that such excellence in wisdom and learning can be imparted from teachers, or that it is actually partible and to be divided and doled out in lessons. It is a divine matter, the kingdom that cometh not with observation. Our education is the drawing forth from our interior being, into external cognizance, the principles existing there dormant, that they may henceforth constitute the leading principles of character as well as life. We cannot create that which is not inborn; we may only evolve and enrich the natural endowment.

Pause right here, whoever cares for aught rather than for the highest. To such we are only visionary. They have neither

¹ *Liber*, a book or writing—*liber*, free; whence *libertas*, freedom.

time nor ears for us. Where illusion is the breath of one's life, to know is to die. As for Wisdom —

"To some she is the goddess great;
To some the milch-cow of the field —
Their care is but to calculate
What butter she will yield."¹

The endeavor has been made to set aside this whole department of higher knowledge as being imaginary only, or at least unattainable by scientific methods, and so out of the purview of common thought and investigation. Some of the representatives of what has been characterized as Modern Science, and their imitators, actually endeavor to repudiate whatever is not canonized as *exact*. Unable to cast a measuring-line over the Infinite, they are very diligent in the endeavor to eliminate God out of their methods. The personality, or, perhaps, the superpersonality, of Deity as implying a supreme, intelligent principle in and over the universe, is vigilantly overlooked, and even sometimes denied. Whatever we do, or think, or wish, would then be without any conception of a higher being or potency in the mind. An actual communion with him is nowhere recognized or even conceded within this modern scientific organon.

A medical journal in the city of Philadelphia, in the year 1875, contained an editorial article upon this subject, which significantly expresses the view taken by many physiologists and physicians who alone may be esteemed to be learned and regular. "Numa, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Swedenborg," it remarks, "claimed communion with higher spirits; they were what the Greeks called *entheast* — 'immersed in God' — a striking word which Byron introduced into our tongue." W. B. Carpenter describes the condition as *an automatic action of the brain*. The inspired ideas, he says, arise in the mind suddenly, spontaneously, but very vividly, at some time when thinking of some other topic. Francis Galton defines *genius* to be "the automatic activity of the mind as distinguished from the effort of the will — the ideas coming by inspiration." This action, the editor remarked, is largely favored by a condition approaching mental disorder — at least by one remote from the ordinary working-day habits of thought.

This is about the altitude to which "popular science" has attained in its understanding of man when *inspired*, or in the state regarded as communion with the Deity. We fail to find any better explanation in its definitions. Whoever would know the truth of the matter must go up higher. It is by no means acceptable reasoning that inspired ideas coming in the mind spontaneously indicate a condition approaching mental disorder, because they seem to be remote from ordinary habits of thought. In every-day life many faculties are atrophied, because of not having been duly exercised. On the other hand, any habitual employment becomes more or less automatic, and even, if it be proper so to express it, involuntary. What we habitually do, and often the thing which we purpose to do, fixes itself upon us inasmuch that we perform it almost unconsciously. We awake from sleep at the hour assigned; we become suddenly conscious of a fact or idea from specific association; and do things that we are not aware of or thinking about. The man who has the habit of speaking the truth may do so automatically. Honest and upright dealing may be practiced in the same way. Goodness becomes a part of the being, and is fixed in the ganglia and fibres of the brain and body. Faith, too, grounds itself in the constitution, and love in the corpuscles of the flowing blood. All this is normal. It is legitimate to carry the conclusions farther, and to consider whether *entheasm*, even though supposedly automatic, is not, nevertheless, a wholesome condition of the

human mind, as well as the true means of receiving actual knowledge.

We are not to consider the faculty of receiving impressions through the physical senses, and elaborating them into thought and opinion, as the sole medium of intellection. This would be a forcible closing of our eyes to exclude light and the vision of act. We are something more than the outcome and product of nature. We possess an organism and faculty beyond her highest achievement. We know something which no brute ever learned, that there is a right and wrong in thought and action, and that supreme devotion to selfishness is moral death. We exist each for the other, and our thorough consecration to benevolence and usefulness is the highest ideal and attainment of humanity. Nor is this aim for temporary ends alone, or even for great public or simply humanitarian advantage; but because it relates to the life beyond, where reality supersedes illusion, and love is the sole and perpetual law. The brute has no conception of this and may not be taught it; but man, the being who is truly man, possesses the faculty to apprehend, and the capacity to attain to, the excellence which this divine knowledge exhibits to him.

The operation of this interior faculty has oftentimes compelled a recognition. The reasoning powers will fail to deduce a principle or a solution to an inquiry, and in utter weariness and inability will drop the matter out of consideration. The inner mind is more tenacious and never faints or is weary. It derives its energies from a permanent source, and with them an acumen which is superior to the circumscribed observation of every-day life. When the exterior faculties are at rest or quiescent, as in sleep, reverie, or visions of the night, then it will become perceived, and its answers are given as oracular utterances, or the solution of an obscure enigma. The physical organization has little to do in this matter, and, indeed, is generally uninfluenced, till the idea or response has come forth and diffused like an electric light all through the consciousness. We have no occasion for conjecture or hypothesis about cerebration; for the higher spirit, the noëtic man, is the embeiged god in us, an incoming principle rather than a development from our own nature, and shows to us truth, leading and impelling into the true life.

How, is the next inquiry, how may we know God, or define Him? A king of Sicily once asked the poet Simonidès to give him such a definition. He craved a day to consider; then two, four, and eight. The impatient king finally asked why he required so much time. He answered that the more he considered the question the more difficult he had found the solution. The finite human understanding is not equal to the endeavor to comprehend the Infinite.

In a world of unreasoning disbelief God is regarded as a thing. Even now in several schools of opinion it is common to affirm that He is not a person. This seems to me equivalent to declaring Him an illusion of the fancy, a nonentity, and not in any sense whatever a thinking, intelligent being, but simply a vagary or whimsy of the imagination. It is doubtless a notion evolved by the rebound from that unreasoning faith which requires a thing to be worshipped as God. Somewhere between these extremes is the golden wedge of truth. It is the vocation of the true student to find it. But let modesty go hand in hand with faith. A person was once discoursing volubly with a Spartan concerning the felicity of the future life. "Why," demanded the latter, "why do you not die in order to enjoy it?" It was a pert if not a pertinent question, and certainly conveyed a taunt that might profitably be accepted as a wholesome reproof. We may not, often we cannot, speak profoundly to those who are irreverent or who disbelieve. The impure ear will tarnish the purest speech. One may profane the truth by speaking it. In uttering to another something which is real to ourselves, we veil

¹ SCHILLER.

it in a mantle of illusion which may transform its nature, in his comprehension, to some idea essentially different. Indeed it is well to believe in God, but ill to say much about Him.

We may not reject utterly the methods which they employ who stubbornly, and perhaps obtrusively, demand the reasons upon which this faith is based. We hope to be truly spiritual only by being wholly reasonable. The true man supersedes no methods because he transcends them. His concepts are characterized by the superior illumination which they possess. They may not be a product of the schools, being rather the outcome of an unconscious remembering; yet his wisdom is often capable of deriving additional lustre by a setting in their frame-work. The plurality of faculties of the human mind exists for a purpose. They are to be trained and employed, but none of them may be eradicated.

Simple men long ago inferred that fire, and air or spirit, in some arcane manner, constituted the entity of man. They had noticed that the dying departed with the breath, and that the warmth peculiar to the living body also then disappeared. This led to the adoration of the flame as the symbol, and to the contemplation of the breath or spirit as the source of life. Analogy pointed out the fact that as living beings derived existence from parents, man was descended from the First Father.

We are all of us conscious that the individual, as we see him with our eyes and perceive with our other physical senses, is not the actual personality. If he should fall dead in our presence, there would still be a body to look upon as distinctly as before. But the something has gone forth which had imparted sensibility to the nerves and impulse to the muscles. It was the person, the real man, that went. The HE or SHE gives place to the *it*. The person had seemed to accompany the body, but has departed leaving it behind. We witness the *phenomena*, but ask to learn the *noumena*. Here exterior, positive, "exact" science fails us. Its probe can detect no real personality, nor its microscope disclose any source or entity of being. The higher faculties must afford the solution of the problem on which everything depends.

The witty but somewhat irreverent Robert Ingersoll prefixed one of his lectures with the travesty of Pope's immortal verse: "An honest God is the noblest work of man." Many are astonished, perhaps shocked, at the audacious expression. Nevertheless, it has a purport which we will do well to contemplate. If we have an actual spiritual entity exceeding the constituents of the corporeal frame, it exists from a vital principle extending from the Divine Source. A genuine, earnest faith is essential to our felicity. Do we regard Him as having "formed man in His own image" and after His likeness? Are we sure that our ideal of Him is not some extraneous personification, the product of our own character and disposition—created in our image? Have we caught a view of our own reflection in the mirror of infinity and set that up as God?

Certainly we have no medium for the divine ray except in our own mental organism. If it is refracted or even hideously distorted, this must be because that medium is clouded and pervaded with evil thoughts, motives, and propensities. The image which will then be formed may be the individual's highest ideal of God. But it will look to enlightened eyes more like an adversary of the good. Fear alone could persuade us to offer it worship. To speak the truth unqualifiedly, we all hate those reflected images that are so often obtruded as the highest concept of the Divine Being. Many of us would say as much if we only had the courage.

Let us bear in mind, then, that what we consider to be God is only the index to what we conceive of His qualities and character. We need not hesitate, because His actual Being transcends the power of the mind to comprehend Him. The ability to form an

idea implies that it is possible to realize it. The idea is itself the actual entity, the prophecy of its accomplishment in the world of phenomena. Such conceptions as the being of God, spiritual existence, eternity, the interior union of God with man, the eventual triumph of the Right, could never be found in the mind as dreams, if they had not somehow been there infixed from that region of Causes where real Being has its abode. We must, however, go up higher, where external science reaches into the domain of Faith.

The ether which contains the light is more tenuous and spirif-like than the air that transmits sound; but it is none the less real because of the greater difficulty to explore the secret of its existence. All that we suppose to be known concerning it is actually a matter of faith, rather than the "exact knowledge" of the scientist. The next lessons pertain to the higher mathematics—how, from what we know of ourselves, to find out God. We must see, if at all, with a sight not possessed by us in common with the animals; piercing beyond that which *appears* clear to that which is.

Our searching awakens in us the perception of the Divine One. Our wants indicate to us His character. We need wisdom that transcends our highest learning, a providence that considers all things, a power supreme above our faculty to adapt means to ends, a love ineffably pure to inspire all things for the completest good of all. Knowing that whatever we see is transitory, we are cognizant that we must have other than mortal vision to behold the Permanent. It is enough that we acknowledge Him as the fact of which we are the image; and that we devote our attention accordingly to the clarifying of the medium which receives His effluence. Let the scope and purpose of our life be devoted to becoming what we recognize to be the inherent character of the God that we need. In due time the likeness will be indeed the similitude, and not a "counterfeit presentment." We shall embody in our disposition and character the very ideal which the witty agnostic has so queerly yet aptly pictured. This is the meaning of the problem. A pure man will exhibit the like image of his God.

Entheasm, therefore, is the participation of the divine nature together with prophetic illumination and inspiration. The modern physician, scientist, and psychologist, it has been noted, define the condition as "approaching mental disorder," "unconscious cerebration," and "remote from the ordinary working-day habits of thought." It is doubtful whether they can, from their standing-point, see the matter any more clearly. By their logic, God the Creator seems to be only a myth, or, at most, the cause of disorder in the minds of men. We cannot wisely seek for truth at such oracles.

The earlier teachers taught and builded better. The conviction has been universal that men did communicate with the Deity and receive inspiration from Him. The Hebrew polity had its seers and prophets, schooled by Kenites and Nazorim. There were similar castes of wise men in the various countries of Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Inner Asia. The Greeks, whose arts and poetry are even now praised and imitated, had also their sages, seers, and hierophants. The Romans, likewise, however bestial, cruel, and arrogant, nevertheless endeavored, by means of pontiffs, augurs, and haruspices, as well as by adopting the worship and divinities of other nations, to learn whatever they could from the supernal world. All seem to have believed that the living on earth was really death, and that dying from the earth was a passing from this death to that of actual life. The phenomena of the every-day world were regarded as the illusive cheat of the physical senses; but beyond it they contemplated the existence of a region æthereal, and not aerial, with no limits of time or space, where all was real and permanent.

Thitherward they aspired in the hope that haply they might unite the potencies of that world with the scenes of the temporal universe. Was it a bootless aspiration, a beating of the air, a vagary of untutored frenzy?

Among the individuals notably regarded as euntheists, were Sôkratês, also styled *theomantis*, or God-inspired, Ammonios Sakkas, the God-taught; and Baruch or Benedictus Spinosa, the God-intoxicated. Platôn, Gautama-Siddarta, Apollonios, and Iamblichos were also named DIVINE. "They were called *gods* to whom the word of God came." It was the universal belief that men might receive superior illumination, and that a higher and more interior faculty was thereby developed.

It should not embarrass us that peculiar disorders of the body are sometimes attended by extraordinary spiritual phenomena; nor that great and unusual commotions of the mind may occasion them. No more is proved by this than by the fact, equally well established, that shocks and excitement often restore paralyzed limbs and functions. As for fasting and prolonged intense mental action, these are methods in every studious endeavor to develop a more perfect perception. They are legitimate aids to enable the mind to get beyond the impediments to clear thinking and intuition into a higher spiritual domain. There is no morbidity or abnormality in this, but a closer approaching to the source of real knowledge. Even Science owes more to such methods than scientists are aware or willing to acknowledge. It is not fair to cite them as arguments against spirituality. Such a condition is more noble than the one considered as normal; that which comes from within and beyond, than that which proceeds from men.

The entheastic condition indicates a life that is lived beyond and above the physical senses. It is a state of illumination rather than a receiving of messages from the Divinity. Indeed, it is safe to affirm that there are no new revelations. The same word that ordained light to exist never ceases to so ordain; the same spirit or mighty mind that moved and operated upon the waters at the *genesis* is potent and active to-day. The world may vary in form and aspect, but that which gives it life is always the same. Whoever will ascend above the changing scenes will know and mirror in himself the unchanging. This is what is meant by being involved and included in the divine aura and light.

The old Mystics used to teach that we must be passive and not active. This by no means implied physical or moral inertia, but simply receptiveness. Just as a mirror receives and infixes an image, so every divine radiation and inflowing should be retained and embeiged. The light is not given or received for the sake of having the borrowed splendor to shine with, but that it may be assimilated and incorporated into the life. The word is not mere speech, but the mind taking that form. The true speaking of a man is itself the man. Every revelation of God is God himself coming to man. Every such one expressing God in his life and act is the word of God made flesh.

Thus we perceive that entheasm is the participation of the divine nature, spirit, and power. It is the end for which mankind have existed on the earth, the culmination of the Divine Purpose.

IAMBlichOS: A TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION, BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

(PART I. — *Continued.*)

V. Let us proceed in due order next to answer the questions which you have submitted.

There is, then, the Good; both the good which is beyond Essence and that which is with Essence. I am speaking of the Essence which is most ancient and venerable and not contained by a body. It is a distinguishing peculiarity of divinities, and extends through all the orders that existed among them, preserving their proper classification and arrangement; and they are not severed from this essence, but remain the same equally through the entire series.

Neither the essence of Goodness nor the Cause of Good, which is prior to Essence, is present, however, in souls that rule in bodies, that take care for them before every other consideration, and that were assigned to them in the eternal world before the earth-life [*γενέσεως*]. But a certain restraint and habit derived from it are present, just as we may notice that the sharing of excellence and merit is very different from what we observe among human beings. In composite natures this exists as something of a two-fold character, and acquired from elsewhere. But the former condition is established unchangeable and constant in souls. It is neither removed at its own instance, nor is it taken away by any other agencies. Such is the beginning and ending in the various orders of divinities. Consider, then, the two intermediates between these high elevations [*ἄκρων ὕψων τούτων*]. The order of half-gods may be exalted higher than that of souls by inherent faculty and merit, excellence and dignity, and, indeed, may excel in all good endowments belonging to souls. Yet it cleaves tenaciously to them, being closely united by the kinship of a life-principle absolutely similar. But the order of tutelary spirits is connected with that of the deities, although it is far inferior. It follows, as not being before in activity, and attends like an assistant upon the good pleasure of the Gods. It also, by copying after their goodness, which was otherwise imperceptible, brings it to light in action; and by so producing its likeness it also perfects their operations. It renders utterable the facts pertaining to the divine good which were otherwise arcane; it causes that which was without form to become manifest in forms; it exhibits in open speech that principle of good which was otherwise beyond all expression. It received, at the beginning, a participation in the supernal excellence, and freely imparts it to the races which are of lower rank. In this way these intermediary orders, having received the sources of all these things from the Gods alone, fill out the connection which is common alike to the divinities and to the psychical essences; make the bond which unites them indissoluble; ally the superior to the last of these orders in one continuous succession, and make the entire communication to be indivisible; and cause every individual essence to have the most perfect blending and continuing with the whole series. They induce an outflow of energy from the nobler to the inferior orders, and a reciprocal influence from the subordinate races to those above. In some peculiar way, they establish among the more undeveloped spirits a means and measure for the proper and equal distribution of the benefits which are transmitted from the nobler and intermediate orders, and so make all things from the divine source to be addressed and adapted to all.

Do not imagine, therefore, that this diversity is a "characteristic of potencies or energies, or of essence," nor consider any one of them singly, taking it up separately. Extend your inquiry, instead, to all of them equally. You will obtain completely the answer in regard to the peculiarities of the deities, tutelary spirits, half-gods, and ensouled entities [*τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς*], concerning which you made inquiry.

DEITIES AND SOULS DISTINGUISHED.

Again, however, proceeding from another starting-point, it is necessary to ascribe to the deities all these things worthy of notice; as, everything which exists as a unit, such as it may be

and of whatever kind; everything which is duly fixed in itself as a principle, and is the origin of indivisible [immaterial] essences; the immovable, which is to be considered in this case as the cause of all motion [or change], and which is superior to all things, and has nothing in the least in common with them, namely, that which is commonly considered as unmingled and separate in essence [*ἐν τῷ εἶναι*], potency, and active energy.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, everything that is divided into groups; that is able to impart itself to others; that receives limitation of its operation [*τὸ πέρας ἐν ἑαυτῷ*] from others; that is capable for the distributing of divisible things so as to make them complete; that partakes of the first-operative and life-imparting motion; that has common participation [*κοινωνία*] with all things existing and coming into existence; that receives an admixture of qualities from all, and imparts a diffusion of its own elements to all; and that extends these peculiar influences and characteristics [*ιδιώματα*] through all the potencies, essences, and active energies, by its own operation—ALL THIS we will concede to the Souls, declaring truly that it is inborn.

TUTELARY SPIRITS AND HOLY GODS.

VI. What, then, shall we say concerning the intermediate Orders? I may infer that they have been made clearly manifest to every one from the things which have been already explained. They make complete the connection between the extremes, which may not be broken. It is certainly very proper, however, to set forth this subject further. I maintain, therefore, that the race of tutelary spirits as a unit is numerous, closely interblended together with no foreign admixture, and only associates with the other more imperfect races as their superior. But the race of half-gods is more readily associated with division and increase, as well as motion, intermingling, and matters akin to these things, and is so placed from above. It has likewise received boons of a nobler character—such are concealed within. I mean unity with the other Orders [*ἐνότης*], stainless purity [*καθαρότης*], and a permanent condition, an indivisible identity, and superiority to other natures. Each of these intermediaries is next to one of the extreme Orders; one next to the very highest and the other to the last. Hence it follows, as a matter of course, that the one which takes its starting-point from the most excellent proceeds in a continuous chain of relationship to the lower Orders; and the other, having its first connection with the last and lowest, maintains also in some way a connection with the superior races. Hence, any one may perceive the complete intercommunication of the highest and lowest orders through these intermediaries, and that this is a complete adhering together, equally in essence as in potency and active energy.

Thus in these two ways we have set forth the complete distinction of the four Orders of superior beings. We deem it sufficient, therefore, in our other endeavors, to exemplify the peculiar powers and endowments of the Extreme grades alone. This will be done for the sake of brevity, and because that which remains, the comprehending of the intermediate Orders, is to some degree already clear. So we will omit the intermediaries, already known from the others, and make our definition of the latter in very short terms.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE PLATO CLUB OF JACKSONVILLE, ILLINOIS.

I.—HISTORY.

The club began some twenty years ago, when its leader, Dr. H. K. Jones, essayed the reading of a dialogue of Plato with two or

three ladies. It has had vicissitudes of interruption and resurrection. Meeting originally at various residences, it at length found a permanent home in the parlors of Mrs. J. O. King, who has been a member from the first. A few years ago the meetings were transferred to the rooms of the sister of Mrs. King, Mrs. Elizur Wolcott, who also is one of the original members. Some thirteen years since the club received a considerable accession of members, and more fully assumed an organized form. This organization is of the simplest. Dr. Jones is the permanent lecturer, and any one interested is cordially welcomed.

It is difficult to give an estimate of the number of persons who have been members at different periods. The number is large when account is made of the smallness of the community and the nature of the subjects considered. At one time the regular attendance was twenty and over. It is nearly as large at the present time. Its members are of all religious denominations, and of the most diverse convictions on all points. They are of course agreed in many matters, but it would not be easy to find a body of people more independent in their thoughts, and more possessed of the courage of their opinions.

The club has attracted considerable attention, and has been honored by the presence of many distinguished visitors. Among these may be mentioned A. Bronson Alcott, Dr. Wm. T. Harris, Ralph Waldo Emerson, D. J. Snider, Thos. M. Johnson, H. H. Morgan, and Thos. Davidson. These visitations have given rise to animated discussions, and clear enunciations of opinions. Clubs in the neighboring city, Quincy, have shown their interest in the interpretations of Dr. Jones, and considerable correspondence has ensued with various individuals and associations.

For the past thirteen or fifteen years copious notes of the proceedings have been taken by at least two members, and have been carefully re-written and preserved. These will furnish, when desired, a generally accurate exposition of Dr. Jones's views, a service the more valuable, as he is averse to the labor of composition.

II.—LEADER.

Dr. H. K. Jones is a native of Virginia, and is now in the full vigor of a mature manhood. A physician by profession, he will everywhere be the saving third person of the trinity celebrated in the old adage, "*Ubi tres medici, duo atheni*." For the past three years he has been the lecturer on Platonism at the Concord School of Philosophy, and is unquestionably one of the most indefatigable and original students of Plato of the present day.

III.—METHOD.

The method of the club is as simple as its organization. It meets every Saturday at ten o'clock A. M. The leader ordinarily uses the Bohn translation, from which he reads, and delivers lengthy interpretations as he proceeds. The Greek original is at hand. The members ask questions, suggest comments, and not unfrequently a general conversation is the order of the day. Dr. Jones prefers to keep as close to the original text as possible, and therefore, in the main, eschews commentaries and elucidations. An exception to this rule is occasionally made in favor of the translation and notes of Thos. Taylor. But the writings of the great masters of literature, and the sacred books of the world, are frequently adduced in corroboration and explanation of statements made. In this way are frequently used the Bible, Homer, the Greek Tragedians, the Hindu Dramas and Sacred Texts, Shakespeare, Dante, and Goethe.

IV.—WORK.

The work has of course been the reading of the Platonic

Dialogues. These the club is now reading for the third time. An exception must be made in the case of the *Laws*, which Dr. Jones does not consider genuine, and believes to have been written by a satirist of Plato's opinions, probably a pupil of Aristotle. This the club has not read at all. Some of the minor dialogues have been omitted as not warranting detailed exposition.

V.—DOCTRINES.

The First Principle is self-moved, self-caused, projects over against itself its own image, the total universe, but is wholly exempted of its effects or creations, being ineffably one and same, and is superessential—that is, absolute energy, of which absolute substance is a product or reflection. Its primordial product is of all products likest itself, the first order of Gods, from which by necessary gradations descend the orders of Gods to man. The sphere of life of each order of Gods is correlative with its inner activity, and each sphere transpierces spiritually the entire universe, existing in cause in spheres above, in effect in spheres beneath. Each sphere, hence, in some sense concentrates in itself the total activities of the universe, but formaliter according to the necessary constitution of itself. Between man and absolute personality, or God, subsist hierarchies of divinities and spheres of life in spiritual relation, and spiritual diffusion, the one within the other, "orb in orb inwoven;" for all movement, in its total sweep, is circular, being reflected from its ultimations back to its source. Man occupies the middle ground, infinite hierarchies of divinities above him, infinite abysses of spheres antagonistic to the good, beneath. Hence the spiritual doctrine of the centrality of the earth.

The Universe is the image or reflection of the First Cause. As such it has neither substance nor potency in itself, but derives all it is from its office as reflection of God. Nothing is the mirror; the universe is the image. The sphere of the gods, or the metaphysical sphere, is the fountain of life and power; the sphere of the natural is the effigy, the plane in which power realizes itself and builds up its representation. Nature and human life are the plane of the return of the divine activities from externality, otherness to itself. Every cause completely ultimates itself, and thence returns to itself.

The Human Soul is eternal—that is, it always has been, never has not been. Life on the earth is a single experience in its manifold livings; all souls circulate like planets around the central spiritual sun, thus traversing in turn all the spheres of life. Through its dual consciousness of sense and reason it allies itself on the one hand to the world of nature; on the other, to the world of Ideas or Essences—the Platonic Ideas being the necessary forms of activity inherent in the metaphysical or intelligential sphere. The soul has descended to the mundane spheres for purposes of experience and purification. The philosophy of the descent of the soul is treated mythically in the apologue of Erus, to be found at the end of the *Republic*.

History is the great school of humanity. Dispensation succeeds dispensation, each diverse from all others, but consummating in itself the total possibilities of mankind, and unfolding arts, religions, philosophies suited to its needs, and co-equal with all that preceded or will follow. Hence the thought of a progressive and cumulative development as ordinarily held is fallacious. Each dispensation constitutes a cycle, the Platonic Year, and passes through stages of youth, manhood, old age, death. All is but an image of the soul in whose abysses are the essential forms of which the world of history is but the effigy.

All social organization rests upon two pillars—the Church and State. The former is the great spiritual leader, the custodian of

the Sacred Texts, which have descended from the Heavens through the medium of divinely-illuminated seers; it has been founded by successive incarnations of the Divinity in the earth. So Buddha, Zoroaster, Christ, Apollo, are each God made flesh, the saviors and divinest oracles of their age and generation, and the illumination of millions who come after them. All faiths pass from a carnal to a spiritual state. The Church at first holds fast to the letter of the inspired writings, and then awakens to the spirit enshrined therein. Inspiration is an idea in the history of the world—all truth and goodness eternally descending from the spheres above—Man in and of himself being worse than nothing. The State is again a manifestation, takes its form and constituency from the Church, and is the divinely appointed plane in which the latter finds room for the play of its activities. The Bibles of the races contain the prophecies of all that transpires thereafter, and are the everlasting oracles of their generations. Hence the brotherhood of the faiths. Man has always been man. Darwinism is an inversion of the truth. Nature has descended from man, not man sprung from it. All religions are the same in content, however different as to form.

The discussion of Sacred Texts leads naturally to the doctrine of mythic speech. The natural being but the representative and inverse of the spiritual is incompetent to the adequate expression of the latter. It can but adumbrate and symbolize. All nature is thus a vast symbol. But the heavens cannot leave themselves without a witness. The truth, although transcending all earthly measure, can be disclosed in apologues or myths divinely fashioned for that end, and communicated through selected prophets. All Bibles are myths—narratives so constructed as to reveal to the fit interpreter the Absolute Truth. The Platonic Dialogues, and the works of the great poets are intensely mythic, and strenuously demand elucidation from this point of view. All the fine arts are essentially mythic. It is only thus that the pure truth can conform itself to earthly vessels. This is the genuine intuitive knowing of wholes, which is the highest form of knowing, all analytic or dialectical processes being distinctly lower. Plato leads the reader to the mount of vision; he points upward to the divine idealities; he formulates no conclusions of verities which defy formulation; all seeing of truth is individual and constantly growing. Truth is not a substance to be seized, but a divine life conjoining the soul to God, and eternally unfolding to its rapt gaze the deeper fundamentals of its being and its inalienable kinship with the good.

God in himself is the Absolute Good, whose process of self-knowing is the Absolute Truth, and whose resplendence is the Absolute Beauty. The inevitable attraction which the Absolute Beauty possesses for the soul is Love. Through the purifying phases of emotion it is elevated and restored to the intelligential sphere from which it has wandered.

It will be impossible in so brief a *resumé* to speak more in detail of the Platonic Nature-Philosophy, Ethics, Psychology, Ideas, Reminiscence, Preexistence. Those who know will read between the lines, and all these subjects have been touched in the foregoing outlines.

VI.—CONCLUSION.

The inadequacy of the above summary is more apparent to myself than it can be to any one else. It must be taken as a report, and not as a statement of opinion. I should have preferred making constant reference to the text of Plato, but, on second thought, it seemed undesirable in so rapid a review. I trust that I have nowhere done injustice to a club of which I have so long been proud to be a member, nor to a guide whom I have so long been glad to follow. LEWIS J. BLOCK.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATON.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Continued.]

"I however, to an objection of this kind, shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then, that Platon everywhere discourses about the gods agreeably to ancient rumor and to the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas; and thence, as from a watch-tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But sometimes he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaidros his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading from thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory order.

"But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue the all-perfect, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the complete number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our opponents that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed in order from the first cause, and evince their mutual connection and dependence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, conate with *the one*, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unical occult and simple form of *hyparxis*; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and are exuberant in number but inferior in power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their proper progeny. And in short all the axioms of the theologic science appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connection. So that this is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the Gods, and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Platon the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before-mentioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogues, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things of which, according to the Platonic Timaios, they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides; just as the Timaios is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent to contain the whole science about nature."

All that is here asserted by Proklos will be immediately admitted by the reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the theology of Platon, and who is besides this a complete master of the mystic meaning of the Parmenides, which I trust he will find sufficiently unfolded through the assistance of Proklos, in the introduction and notes to that dialogue.

The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that concerning ideas about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little, however, is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately received his doctrines, among

whom Platon holds the most distinguished rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz.: intelligible, intellectual, dianoetic, physical, or in short, vital and corporeal essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally subsists together with such progression and the power of diversity in coordinate genera, give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in the whole extent of beings, viz.: the *intelligible*, the *dianoetic*, and the *sensible*; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the respective essential properties of the natures by which they are contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed among divine natures, together with the producing paradigmatic and final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes sometimes concur, and are united among themselves (which Aristoteles says is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which, on account of their exuberant fecundity, have a power generative of all things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the natures which they have generated, are the paradigms or exemplars of all things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake and on account of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since, therefore, intelligible forms are of this kind and are the leaders of so much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the artificer of the universe. But dianoetic forms or ideas imitate the intellectual which have a prior subsistence, render the order of the soul similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a secondary degree.

These forms, beheld in divine natures, possess a fabricative power, but with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic through the defluxion of our wings or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, as Platon says in the Phaidros, when the winged powers of the soul are perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction with divine natures governs the world. In the Timaios he manifestly asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoetic forms in souls, in geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions; but in his Republic (in the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. In the Phaidon he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscences; because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle dianoetic forms from which the productive powers of nature being derived and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phenomena.

Platon, however, did not consider things definable, or in modern language abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the soul, as is evident from his Phaidros and Phaidon. In the 10th book of the Republic, too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine intellect. In the Phaidros, he asserts that souls elevated to the supercelestial place, behold justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself; and lastly, in the Phaidon he evinces the immortality of the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms.

Syrianos, in his commentary on the thirteenth book of Aristoteles' Metaphysics, shows, in defence of Sokrates, Platon, the Parmenaidæans, and Pythagoreans, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men, according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of Chrysippos, Archedemos, and many junior Stoics; for ideas are distinguished by many differences, from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do they sub-

sist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of Longinos; for if that which subsists is un-substantial, it cannot be consubstantial with intellect. Nor are ideas, according to these men, *notions*, as Kleantes afterwards asserted them to be. Nor is idea definitive reason, nor material form; for these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder is there, says Syrianos, if we should separate things which are so much distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in particular Plutarchos, Attikos, and Demokritos, who, because universal reason perpetually subsists in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these reasons are ideas; for though they separate them from the universal in sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same the reasons of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and immaterial forms and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Platon says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent spectacles which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction with divinity. Boethos, the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to join Cornutus, thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they are not prior in such a manner as to be denuded from the habitude which they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of particulars, both which are the prerogatives of ideas; or whether they are posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative ideas?

In what manner then, says Syrianos, do ideas subsist according to the contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically, in *animal itself*, or the extremity of the intelligible order; but intellectually and decadically in the intellect of the artificer of the universe. For according to the Pythagoric Hymn, "Divine number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad both by the immortal gods and earth-born men."

And such is the mode of their subsistence, according to Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Platon. Or, if it be requisite to speak in more familiar language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these governs all its parts: but at the same time that it fabricates all mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it illuminates all things is not mingled with the natures which it illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes privation of cause, and casual subsistence from its energy. But as it imparts every good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it converts the universe to itself and renders it similar to its own omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not anything which ranks among true beings that is not comprehended in the essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas which are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it, and introduce to the whole of things a cause which is at the same time productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and the ideas which it con-

tains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to refute.

From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible world, according to Platon, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity, the sensible universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be consubstantial with its cause, or, in other words, must be a perpetual emanation from it. This will be evident from considering, that every thing which is generated, is either generated by art, or by nature, or according to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but that things operating according to power should have their productions coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent with itself; fire, heat; and snow coldness. If therefore the artificer of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be incorporeal. It remains, therefore, that the demiurgos produced the universe by power alone: but every thing generated by power subsists together with the cause containing this power: and hence productions of this kind cannot be destroyed, unless the producing cause is deprived of power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe caused it to be coexistent with himself.

This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an intelligible world, replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and perpetually advancing to being, and compared with its paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Platon in the *Timaios* to be a blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called, *a whole with a total subsistence*, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence Platon called it *a whole of wholes*; by the other wholes which are comprehended in its meaning, the celestial sphere, the sphere of fire, the whole of air considered as one great orb: the whole earth, and the whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers, *parts with a total subsistence*, are considered by Platon as aggregately perpetual. For if the body of the world is perpetual, this also must be the case with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and in order that *wholes with a partial subsistence*, such as all individuals, may rank in the last gradation of things.

As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called by Platon a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains is a world, possessing in the first place a selfperfect unity; proceeding from the ineffable, by which it is a god; in the second place, a divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be a whole prior to

parts; because considered as possessing an eternal form which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For as Theophrastos well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession of soul.

And now having with venturesome yet unassuming wing, ascended to the ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning him, but only indicate our doubt and disappointment, and having thence descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, terminating our downward flight in the material universe, and its undecaying wholes, let us stop a while and contemplate the sublimity and magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here then we see the vast empire of deity — an empire terminated upwards by a principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and downwards by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after this immense unknown, we in the next place behold a mighty all-comprehending one, which as being next to that which is in every respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. From this principle of principles, in which all things causally subsist absorbed in superessential light, and involved in unfathomable depths, we view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we see being, life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; monads suspended from unities, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in and returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny, are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-comprehending one. Thus all being proceed from, and are comprehended in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.

Such, according to Platon, are the flights of the true philosopher, such the august and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge loses itself in the ineffable.

And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say that all this is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; and that it is merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths either in morality or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know concerning either God or himself is so plain that he that runs may read. In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more, — a cant produced by the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended by the

most deplorable envy, — I ask, is then the Delphic precept, *KNOW THYSELF*, a trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of beings? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge or the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience is master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperturbed conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves as Aristoteles justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge that it must be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with everlasting bars.

Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympos, and from which all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man comprehends in himself partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. Hence, according to Platon, he is endowed with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which also it is coördinate.

With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls are derived, is said by Platon, in the *Timaios*, to be a medium between that which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, *i.e.*, the mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner the human soul is a medium between a dæmoniacal intellect proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is the cause of its generation, nutrition, and increase. This dæmoniacal intellect is called by Platon, in the *Phaidros*, *theoretic* and *the governor of the soul*. The highest part, therefore, of the human soul is the summit of the dianoetic power, or that power which reasons scientifically; and this summit is our intellect. As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union with things themselves. Though too often it energizes from itself, and contains intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive nature of the soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate from the transcendently fulgid and self-luminous nature of first intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly

indivisible knowledge, it requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant and unremitted; and its intelligibles, that they may become perfect, are indigent of the light that proceeds from separate intelligibles. Aristoteles, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our intellect to colors, because they require the splendor of the sun, and denominates an intellect of this kind, *intellect in capacity*, both on account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Platon *dianoia*, and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms, from intellect. And the extremity of the rational soul is opinion, which in his *Sophistes* he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of a *dianoia*.

This power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man is a biped, but it knows only the *essence*, or that a thing is, but is ignorant of the *essence* or *why* it is, knowledge of the latter kind being the province of the *dianoetic* power.

And such is Platon's division of the rational part of our nature, which he very justly considers as the *true man*; the essence of everything consisting in its most excellent part. After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with figure and interval; and on this account it may be called a figured intelligence. This power, as Iamblichos beautifully observes, grows upon, as it were, and fashions all the powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, says Proklos, it folds itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the *dianoetic* power and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all thing passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account Aristoteles calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by Platon to be rather *passion* than *knowledge*, since the former of these is characterized by *inertness* and the latter by *energy*.

Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, according to Platon, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal and the other aerial; and of these the ethereal vehicle is *simple and immaterial*, but the aerial *simple and material*, and this dense earthly body is *composite and material*.

The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior cause from which it proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through participation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and unextended of such as are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles, after manner of an image, and receives partly their impartible forms, such as are uniform variously and such as are immovable, according to a self-motive condition. Soul, therefore, is all things, and is elegantly said by Olympiodoros to be an *omni-form statue*, for it contains such things as are first through participation, but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar.

As, too, it is *always* moved, and this always is not eternal

but temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is perfectly stable and has no transitive energies, hence it is necessary that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and magnitudes. These, therefore, being terminated, there can neither be an infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same, and will thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this, also, is true of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. For in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively and possesses a proper motion. But everything which is moved perpetually and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion and energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion and restitutions to its pristine state. Again, as the human soul, according to Platon, ranks among the number of those souls that *sometimes* follow the mundane divinities in consequence of subsisting immediately after dæmons and heroes, the *perpetual* attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending infinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal beginning, both according to Platon and Aristoteles, cannot have an end; and that which has no end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from generation and of descensions into generation; and that this will never fail through an infinite time.

From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of light. Hence Platon, in the seventh book of his "Republic," considering our life with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes, too, that they have the light of a fire burning far above and behind them, and that between the fire and the fettered men there is a road above, along which a low wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is carried along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the opposite part of the cave. He supposes, too, that the opposite part of this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this the fettered men, when they hear anyone speak, will imagine that it is nothing else than the passing shadow.

Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, the road above, between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more elevated life. By this ascent, therefore, Platon signifies the contemplation of *dianoetic* objects in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible objects are the immediate images of *dianoetic* forms, or those ideas which the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are *dianoetic*. It is requisite, therefore, that the

dianoetic power exercising itself in these should draw forth the latent principles of these from their latent retreats, and should contemplate them not as images, but as subsisting in herself in impartible involution.

In the next place he says, "that the man who is to be led from the cave, will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars and the moon, than by day looking on the sun and the light of the sun." By this he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles, for the stars and their light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun in the same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the nature of the good. After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the sun himself in the last place in like manner, according to Platon, the idea of the good must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He likewise divinely adds that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only be conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which it is beheld by the ascending soul.

In short, the soul, according to Platon, can only be restored while on earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her from the defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the vision of true being; for thus, as Platon says in the *Timaios*, "the soul becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit." The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without divulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes pure from co-passivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, therefore, we become sane, in consequence of being liberated from the passions as diseases; but we become entire by the reassumption of intellect and science, as of our proper parts; and this is effected by contemplative truth. Platon also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he defines in his *Theaitetos* Philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial evils, for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, "that neither can evils be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature." For those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be effected in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he, "to fly from hence thither, but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy in conjunction with intellectual prudence." For it is necessary that he who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a mortal nature; since it is not possible for who are mingled with it to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore through our flight from divinity, and the defluxion of those wings which elevate us on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature and by the germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the essence of man subsisting as a medium between dæmoniack natures, who always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who are never adapted by nature to understand

him, it ascends to the former and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature. When the soul, therefore, has recovered her pristine perfection in as great a degree as possible, while she is an inhabitant of the earth, by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, as he says in the *Timaios*, to her kindred star from which she fell, and enjoys a blessed life. Then too, as he says in the *Phaidros*, being winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this indeed is the most beautiful end of her labors. This what is he calls, in the *Phaidon*, a great contest, and a mighty hope. This is the most perfect fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things really beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, and place her in the islands of the blessed.

From this account of the human soul that most important Platonic dogma necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in reality nothing more than a recovery of what she once possessed. This recovery is very properly called by Platon reminiscence, not as being attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being in actual re-possession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which discipline evocates from its dormant retreats, Platon says, in the *Sophistes*, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proklos well observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover the whole and the one. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no respect a real subsistence should be the leading causes of knowledge to the soul, and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous should precede science, which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that things which are variously mutable should be generative of reasons which are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes of definite intelligence. It is not fit, therefore, that the truth of things eternal should be received from the many, nor the discrimination of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within herself, should investigate in herself the true and the good, and the eternal reasons of things.

We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of the soul; and Platon considered this as particularly effected by the mathematical disciplines. Hence he asserts of theoretic arithmetic, that it imparts no small aid to our ascent to rea being, and that it liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge of the good, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, and contemplating in most splendid images the ideal world and its ineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient to our ascent, viz.: when from sensible we betake ourselves to the contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus employ the mathematical disciplines, the study of them is justly considered by Platon as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as the true end of man, according to his philosophy, is an assimilation to divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, whatever contributes to this is to be ardently pursued; but what has a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and conveniences of

the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. Hence it is necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect: For the mathematical sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoetic power; call forth its essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore beautifully said by Platon in the seventh book of his Republic, "that the soul through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is blinded and buried by studies of a different kind—an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this alone."

Dialectic, however, or the vertex of mathematical sciences, as it is called by Platon in his Republic, is that master discipline which particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of the sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the same with what Aristoteles calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the Parmenides. Suffice it, therefore, to observe in this place that dialectic differs from mathematical science in this: That the latter flows from and the former is void of hypothesis; that dialectic has a power of knowing universals; that it ascends to the good and supreme cause of all; and that it considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Platon does not dispel mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to be next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent propositions.

Hence Sokrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, says that it surrounds all discipline like a defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use it to the good itself and the first unities; that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus great, and the end of this path so mighty, it must by no means be confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion; for the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through these, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. To which we may add that the method of reasoning which is founded in opinion regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method endeavors to arrive at *the one* itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of *the good*. Very different, therefore, is it from the merely logical method, which presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Platon for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progression of beings from *the one*, and their conversion to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration.

The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Platon's dialectic: Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles to the first intelligibles; a second is

an ascent through things demonstrated and subdemonstrated to undemonstrated and immediate propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical principles. Of the first of these species Platon has given a most admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty; and thus proceeding, he at length arrives at the beautiful itself.

The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the thing investigated the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing, and to which we give our assent. But beginning from this we descend synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following is an example from the Phaidros of Platon: It is inquired if the soul is immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next inquiry is, if that which is always moved is self-moved; and this again being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved is the principle of motion; and afterwards, if the principle is unbegotten. This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what is unbegotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul is self-moved. Soul, therefore (*i.e.*, the rational soul), is incorruptible, unbegotten, and immortal.

Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to that which is unhypothetic, Platon has given a most beautiful specimen in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his hypothesis that *the one is*, he proceeds through an orderly series of negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of things which are, as it were, their opposites, till he at length takes away the hypothesis that *the one is*. For he denies of it all discourse and every appellation; and thus evidently denies of it not only that it *is*, but even negation. For all things are posterior to *the one*; viz., things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, and truly ineffable.

Having taken a general survey both of the great world and the microcosm man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Platon with the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it a subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers.

In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common conceptions, is the cause of good to the subject of its care; and Fate is the cause of a certain connection to generated natures. This being admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between these two extremes are natures which, in a certain respect, have an essence permanent and better than generation or a flowing subsistence, but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every procession from things first to last should be effected through media. The medium, therefore, between these two extremes must either be that which has an eternal essence but an energy indigent of time, or, on the contrary,

that which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. And the three orders which compose this first, middle, and last, are the intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to the soul), and corporeal. For from what has already been said by us concerning the gradation of beings, it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in essence, but temporal in energy. Where, then, shall we rank things which, being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination and sympathy with each other through connection? It is evident that they must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place and time; and others, though they according to time, appear to be entirely pure from any connection with places.

Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest that admitting Fate to be the cause of connection, we must assert that it presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If therefore we look to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and through which also altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, and increase. If therefore this power not only subsists in us and all other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is motive of all bodies, it follows that nature must be the cause of things connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence Fate is nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and connecting the motions of things, that by places and times are distant from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of mortal natures, and their conjunction with such as are eternal. For the nature which is in us binds and connects all the parts of our body of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generation of the less principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz., the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the circle of the former is the image of the latter.

Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted to all things but from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Platon says, to be assigned. And in the next place, as this cause is superior to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to Fate. Whatever, too, is subject to Fate is also under the dominion of Providence; having its connection, indeed, from Fate, but deriving the good which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate, for intelligibles are exempt from its sway. Fate, therefore, is profoundly conversant with corporeal natures, since connection introduces time and corporeal motion. Hence Platon, looking to this, says in the *Timaios* that the world is mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other places he calls Fate; and this with great propriety, since everybody is compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it

suffers; to heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective power is unknown to a corporeal nature; so that the necessary and non-elective may be said to be the peculiarity of bodies.

As there are two genera of things, therefore, the intelligible and the sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these: that of Providence upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles; and that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence likewise differs from Fate, in the same manner as deity, from that which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in other things we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists according to participation. Thus, the light which subsists in the orb of the sun is primary light; and that which is in the air, according to participation, the latter being derived from the former. And life is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus, also, according to Platon, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a god: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is, as it were, the image. As Providence, too, is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles; and, alternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of Providence.

In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information,—as when it accuses the sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a foot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and exclaims with *Odysseus*,—

“Endure, my heart;”

or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight. For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them as from things foreign to its nature. If, therefore, reason, when it energizes in us as reason, restrains the shadowy impression of the delights of licentious desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses as full of deception, asserting that—

“We nothing accurate, or see or hear;”

and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons—none of which it knows through the body or through corporeal cogitations—it is evident that according to this energy it removes itself far from the senses, contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows and delights.

After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of our rational soul, when, during the tranquility of the inferior parts by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a rational world, the image of prior natures from which it proceeds, but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute; for these remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with images, and knowing nothing subtle, and unattended with material garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable necessity of demonstration, and forms full of certainty and immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellect and life from things which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our perception of true being?

After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now

survey her highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the world. But above all souls she sees intellectual essences and orders. For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of intellect, those beings that are entirely exempt from all connexion with a corporeal nature.

The rational and intellectual soul, therefore, in whatever manner it may be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again it becomes manifest that when it energizes according to its nature, it is superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it follows downward natures, and lives with them as with inebriated neighbors, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings of such a kind as to subsist according to essence above Fate, but to be sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings — and such are all intellectual natures — which are eternally established above the laws of Fate, and also such which, according to the whole of their life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies.

The free will, therefore, of man, according to Platon, is a rational elective power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the soul to both through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which characterizes our essence. According to this power we differ from divine and mortal natures; for each of these is void of that twofold inclination: the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect, too, characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as Plotinos says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account is all powerful because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But the elective power is twofold, and on this account is not able to affect all things; because by its inclinations to true and apparent good, it fall short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however, be all powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according to good, because the will naturally tends to good, and such as life makes that which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence through this the soul, according to Platon, becomes divine, and in another life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much for the outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Platon.

In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that in drawing these outlines, I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary paths, — solitary indeed they must be since they have been unfrequented from the reign of the emperor Justinian to the present time; and novel they will doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to those who have been nursed, as it were, in the bosom of matter, the pupil of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another, — to such as these, the road through which we have been travelling will appear to be a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing more than phantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow.

The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are plunged, and gain a glimpse of that most weighty truth, that there is another world of which this is nothing more than a most obscure resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. My present discourse, therefore, is addressed to those who consider experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all demonstrative propositions are these: that they exist as causes, are primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable were called by the ancients axioms, from their majesty and authority, as the assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their force and efficacy from these.

In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware that universal is better than partial demonstration. For *that* demonstration is the more excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is better and more extended than a partial cause, since the arduous investigation of the *why* in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the triangle is isosceles; we again ask, But why because isosceles? And if it be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why because a triangle? To which we finally answer, Because a triangle is a right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add, too, that the demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of universals, the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no science. *That* demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind with the most ample knowledge; and this is alone the province of universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows particulars likewise in capacity; but we cannot infer that he who

has the best knowledge of particulars knows anything of universals. And lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; but particulars are coördinated to the perceptions of sense.

But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this I answer, that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise subservient to its existence than as an exciting cause. For if scientific conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary and eternal, this universal is *truly all*, and not, like that gained by abstraction, limited by a certain number of particulars. Thus, the proposition that the angles of *every* triangle are equal to two right — if it is indubitably true, — that is, if the term *every* in it *really* includes *all* triangles — cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of universal comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoetic power concludes thus confidently the proposition is true of *all* triangles? For if it be said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain number of particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the *all*; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain whether that which is added to complete the *all* is *truly* added; and thus the conclusion will no longer be *indubitably necessary*.

In short, if the words *all* and *every*, with which every page of theoretic mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and if the universals which they signify are proper objects of science, such universals must exist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. Hence it follows that induction is no otherwise subservient to science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and this by exciting the universal conception of these, latent in the soul. The particulars therefore of which an induction is made in order to produce science, must be so simple that they may be immediately apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated without hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called.

Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, and in consequence of this he is likewise ignorant that parts can only be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case with parts when they belong to a whole, which as we have already observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces is called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any part of the human body without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he know anything truly of the vegetable life of plants who has not a previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as a whole prior to, because the principal and cause of, all partial vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that greater whole of this kind which subsist, in nature herself; nor as Hippocrates justly observes, can he know anything truly of the nature of the human body, who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascend in the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here,

then, is the great difference — and a mighty one it is — between the knowledge gained by the most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, founded on the spontaneous, unperverted, and self-luminous conceptions of the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up through all the several mundane wholes to that one nature of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, blossom as from a perennial root; the latter conducts its votary through all the several mundane wholes in which all other wholes are centred and rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable, likewise, is the difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits; for the one elevates the soul to the most luminous height and to that great ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression of Plutarchos, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye, the knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, sublime, and splendid in the universe; the other, to all that is little, grovelling, and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent piety; the genuine progeny of the other is impiety and atheism. And in fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and exalted delight; the other, continual disappointment and unceasing molestation.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

[Translated from the original Greek.]

[Continued.]

PROPOSITION XV. — *Concerning an incorporeal essence, and what the peculiarity of it is.*

Everything which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that which is converted to anything is conjoined with that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is converted to itself will be conjoined with all the parts. For this it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is converted, and that to which it is converted become one. This however is impossible in body, and in short, in all partible things. For the whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated differently from others. No body, therefore, is naturally adapted to revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole. Hence, if there is anything which has the power of reverting to itself, it is incorporeal and impartible.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a certain energy separate from body. For thus energy would be more excellent than essence; since the latter, indeed, would be indigent of bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be in want of bodies. If therefore anything is essentially inseparable from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But if this be the case, it will not

revert to itself. For that which is converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy separate from body, and not either through or together with body, since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is entirely separate from bodies.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.

For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or the contrary. But if one part, indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.

If, however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and at the same time is moved. And this is that which is primarily self-motive. If, however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. But it is converted to that toward which it energizes. Every thing, therefore, which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence.

For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by the seventh proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a certain thing is better than and not the same with it. For it is primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the other secondarily. If, however, indeed, there is the same definition of both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation; nor will the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to the existence of the other. Hence it remains that the one should be primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily that to which existence is given; the former supplying the latter from its very being.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner.

For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily, nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is

imparted from some other place to the things in which it is thus inherent.

PROPOSITION XX.

The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and *the one* is beyond all intellectual hypotheses.

For every body is movable by something else, but is not naturally adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself, lives on account of soul, and, when soul is present, is in a certain respect self-movable, but when it is absent is alter-movable, as deriving this nature from soul, which is allotted a self-movable essence. For, to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. It is, however, by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence it is beyond bodies which become self-movable by participation as being essentially self-movable. Again, however, soul which is moved from itself has an order secondary to the immovable nature, which subsists immovable according to energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-movable essence is the leader; but, of all that move, the immovable is the leader. If, therefore, soul, being moved from itself, moves other things, it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves immovably. But intellect moves being immovable, and energizing always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul, on account of intellect, participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as body, on account of soul, possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary, therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily intellectual. And hence intellect is prior to souls.

Moreover, *the one* is prior to intellect. For intellect, though it is immovable, yet is not *the one*; for it intellectually perceives itself, and energizes about itself. And of *the one* indeed, all beings, in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect is present by participation necessarily participate of knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principal and first cause of gnostic energy. *The one*, therefore, is beyond intellect; and there is no longer anything else beyond *the one*. For *the one* and *the good* are the same. But *the good*, as has been demonstrated, is the principal of all things.

PROPOSITION XXI. — *That intellect is not the first cause.*

Every order, beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

For the monad, having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one series and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connection, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principle. In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connection to the natures arranged in it, both to each other and to the whole.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series; but that which ranks as the cause of the one series must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as coördinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. It follows also that the order of souls originates from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls; that in the intellectual essence also there is an intellectual monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, and is converted to it; that a multitude of unities likewise originates from *the one* which is prior to all things; and that there is an extension of these unities to *the one*. Hence, after the first one there are unities; after the first intellect there are intellects; after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature there are natures.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Everything which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist, since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if, indeed, it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor, if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not, that which it is said to be.

If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be, — for this primarily suffers that which is the same, — both will not be first, but will be that of which both participating, are thereby said to subsist primarily.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful and the primarily equal. And in a similar manner in all things. Thus, also, with respect to the form of animals, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the demonstration is the same.

PROPOSITION XXIII. — *Concerning the imparticipable.*

Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

For that which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing honorable, or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates; but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But everything which is something belonging to a certain thing by which it is participated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that

which is in one thing is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates, which makes it to be perfect. That, however, which is participated, since it belongs to a certain thing and not to all things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less allied to it.

The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and everything which participates is not one, and at the same time one.

PROPOSITION XXV. — *Concerning the perfect.*

Everything perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence to all beings, — for *the good* and *the one* are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical, — thus, also, those things which are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is a certain portion of *the good*, and the perfect, so far as it is perfect, imitates *the good*. But *the good* gives subsistence to all things. So that the perfect is likewise productive according to the nature of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect participates in a greater degree of *the good*. It is therefore nearer to *the good*. But, this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all. And thus it is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause; for, being more remote from that which produces everything, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates all things, that nature is most allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

Corollary. — From these things it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the principle of all, is unprolific and is not the cause of anything. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it

would no longer be most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive power, and, besides this, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive.

For if it imitates *the one*, but that immovably gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, everything which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But *the one* gives subsistence to things immovably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it; and, being moved, it will no longer be *the one*, in consequence of being changed from *the one*. But if motion subsists together with it, it will also be from *the one*, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or *the one* will produce immovably, and everything which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For everywhere from that which is primarily that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished cannot abide such as it is.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

Every producing cause, on account of its perfection and abundance of power, is productive of secondary nature.

For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own order immovable. For that which imparts existence to another thing through defect and imbecility imparts subsistence to it through its own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immovably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them nor diminished. For that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself and from itself imparts secondary hypostases.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each other and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different from it. For that which is participated gives communion to its participant with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence possessing its essence.

But if that which is produced is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, — if, indeed, it suffers each of these equally, — it will equally participate and not participate. So that after the same manner it will both have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence — if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united to their producing causes than separated from them. Things, however, which are more united are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures.

For if that which produces gives subsistence to similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a certain sameness of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree, as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars — if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it and will not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide in its cause in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause in order that while it abides, it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence it abides and at the same time proceeds, and it is neither of these without the other.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

For if it should proceed, indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause.

Every thing, therefore, aspires after its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which appetite is first directed.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted.

For every thing which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude—if this be the case, all conversion will be effected through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

Everything which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it has a circular energy.

For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued; one motion being from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes; greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some of which are to the natures immediately placed above the things that are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far as to the principle of all things. For all things proceed from this principle, and are converted to it.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its conversion to that from which also it had the progression of its proper hypostasis.

For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this, however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the conversion is according to nature.

Corollary.—From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world, though it is perpetual, possesses its essence from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect because it is perpetual. For neither, because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially perpetual, and is always converted, and is indissoluble according to order.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns or is converted to, its cause.

For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, being without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause,

having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that which has not its essence from the cause be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural desire to everything of well-being and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but should not abide, how, being separated from its cause, will it hasten to be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; since, if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how can that which is not separated be able to revert to its cause? For everything which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary, however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that everything must abide in its cause, proceed from, and be converted to it.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first, it follows that first natures in proceeding, are more conjoined with their causes, being, as it were, germanations from them. But second natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner such as are successive. Things, however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes are more perfect. For causes are more perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but the last are the most perfect.

For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion is directed to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the first, but such as are most perfect, the last.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Every thing which proceeds from certain numerous causes is converted through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and all conversion is through the same things as those through which progression is effected.

For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed which has a transition immediately from a certain thing is also immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding requires also a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the conversion will be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than the medium. Through such things, therefore, as being is derived to each thing, through so many well-being is also derived, and *vice versa*.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also gnostically.

For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together with being, or it likewise receives from thence a gnostic power. So far, therefore, as it alone *is*, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a gnostic conversion. For in such a way it proceeded from its cause, such also is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire, therefore, is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude to the participation of causes; but to others it is according to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others it is according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes.

PROPOSITION XL.

Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the leaders.

For if every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is suspended from another cause; but that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; but that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to *the good*; but things more allied are similar to their causes, subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, things which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or *the good* is a thing of this kind, or the first things that subsist from *the good*. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not in reality be in any thing self-sufficiency. Nor will it be in *the good*, since that being *the one*, is better than self-sufficiency. It is also *the good itself*, and not that which possesses *the good*. But if *the good* was self-subsistent, in consequence of itself producing itself, it will not be *the one*. For that which proceeds from *the one* is not *the one*. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that *the one* would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the first. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause. For it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to *the good*, as has been demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLI.

Every thing which is in another is alone produced by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

For that which is in another thing and is indigent of a subject can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to generate itself does not require another seat, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of itself. And thus it is in itself, as the thing caused in its cause. For it is not in itself, as in place or as in a subject. For place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent; for it is self-subsistent. And it is in such a manner in itself as that which is from a cause is in the cause.

PROPOSITION XLII.

Everything self-subsistent is convertive to itself.

For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a conversion coördinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone proceeded from itself, but, having proceeded, was not converted to itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which it is able to impart to itself. Every cause, however, is able to impart to that which proceeds from it, together with the essence which it gives, well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not be the object of desire to that which is not converted to itself. But not desiring this, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it, it will be imperfect and not sufficient to itself. If, however, self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to anything, they must pertain to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good, and will be converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

Every thing which is convertive to itself is self-subsistent.

For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to every thing, essential progression is from that to which conversion according to nature is directed. If, therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent.

PROPOSITION XLIV.

Every thing which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also converted to itself essentially.

For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is without conversion in its essence, the former being convertive, but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself, it is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which has a power of preserving itself is more perfect than that which is alone preserved by another. If, therefore, it is convertive to itself according to the energy proceeding from essence, it will also be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize toward itself, but will depend on itself, and will be contained, connected, and perfected by itself.

PROPOSITION XLV.

Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten.

For if it is generated because generated indeed, it will be imperfect of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because, however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself. For every thing generated is perfected by another, which imparts generation to it not yet existing. For generation is a path from the imperfect to its contrary, the perfect. But if anything produces itself it is always perfect, being always present with the essence of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of essence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.

For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself and would be without itself. This however is impossible. For being one thing, it is at the same time cause and the thing caused. But

every thing which is corrupted, departing from the cause of itself, is corrupted. For so far as it adheres to that which contains, connects, and preserves it, it is connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves its cause because it does not desert itself; for it is cause of itself. Every thing, therefore, self-subsistent is incorruptible.

PROPOSITION XLVII.

Every thing self-subsistent is impartible and simple.

For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself partible, and the whole will be converted to itself, and all will be in all itself. This, however, is impossible. Hence that which is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For, if a composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent, and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the elements of itself of which it consists.

Every thing, therefore, which is self-subsistent is simple.

PROPOSITION XLVIII. — *Concerning the perpetual, in order to demonstrate that the world is perpetual.*

Every thing which is not perpetual is either a composite or subsists in another.

For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject, it departs into nonentity. But if it is simple in itself it will be indissoluble and incapable of being dissipated.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

PLATONIC TECHNOLOGY :

A Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Platon and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense.

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Despotia, ἡ δεσποτία. A lordship; absolute rule, in which the head of the government is not subject to the scrutiny, or other interference from a Senate or Sacerdotal College; the dominion of a despot or plebeian not belonging to the military or sacerdotal class; tyranny.

Diabolos, ὁ ἢ ἡ διάβολος. A detractor; a slanderer; one who falsely accuses or detracts from the good fame of another. Perhaps a corruption from *Diabolos*, the thunder as sent by Zeus (genitive *Διός*); a son of that God, as *Bacchus*. It was a common practice to change the spelling of a name in order to make it a term of reproach, as *Satan*, the adversary, for *Seth*; *Beel-Zebub*, the lord of flies, for *Baal-Zebul*, the Overlord, or the Lord of an Oracle. As *Seth* the Hittite divinity was probably identical with the Oriental *Bacchus*, it is very possible that the designation *Diabolos*, or *Zeus-begotten*, was changed to *Diabolos*, devil or false accuser, and *Seth* in turn became *Satan*, or adversary. The Aryan terms *Akura*, *daeva*, *yezid*, are good or evil in signification, as employed by Brahmins or Parsis. *Sōkratēs* denominated the judgment of his adversaries a *διάβολη*.

Dialectiké, ἡ διαλεκτική. Dialectic; discourse; the elementary principles of interior knowledge; the conversational method employed by *Platōn* and his disciples, by means of which interior truth, which had been before latent or dormant in the mind, is brought into the foreground of consciousness; the evolving of interior truth. See *Anamnēsis, Techniké*.

Dianoēma, τὸ διανόημα. A conception of the mind; purpose; intention; a thought; an opinion deduced from reflection. See *Nous*.

Dianoēsis, ἡ διανοήσις. The mind; thought; the act of thinking; the forming of a conception. See *Nous*.

Dianoētikos, διανοητικός, ἄ, ὡν. Relating to the faculty of intuition; whence τὸ διανοητικόν, the faculty of comprehending interior truth. *Platōn* employed the adjective ἡ διανοητική in antithesis to ἡ διέδοξις, to denote the world of causes, the noumenal as contrasted with the phenomenal; the field of real knowledge as distinguished from matters of conjecture and speculation. See *Nous*.

Dianoia, ἡ διάνοια. The understanding; the mind or reasoning faculty as distinguished from the *nous* or intuitive principle; the faculty of tracing relations, of which the λόγος is the open showing; the mind as distinguished from the body; the affections as a whole; the faculty which reasons from things known and understood to deductions still more recondite. "The spirit is in mankind, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." — *Job, xxxii.* "The son of God hath given us understanding that we may know the truth." — *Epistles of John, I, v.*

Diatheisis, ἡ διαθεσις. A transient tendency or disposition; an arrangement of parts.

Dikaiosune, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, also τὸ δίκαιον. Justice; the right; doing exactly what ought to be done. *Platōn* defines justice to include equity, truthfulness, fidelity, usefulness, kind endeavor to secure the well-being of others, and holiness, or being like God. "Nor does it regard merely a man's external action, but what is really internal, relating to the man himself and what is properly his own; not allowing any principle in him to attempt what is the province of another, or to meddle and interfere with what does not belong to it; but well establishing in reality his own proper affairs, and maintaining proper self-government, keeping due order, becoming his own friend, and most naturally attuning these three principles" — namely: the restraining principle of the interior mind, the will or psychic entity, and the *epithumetic* or external principle.

Dinos, ἡ δίνος. A vortex; a turner's lathe, whence *δίνος αἰθήριος*, the vortex of infinity. A designation given by *Aristophanēs* to the deity which, as he asserted, *Sōkratēs* had introduced instead of *Zeus*.

Dogma, τὸ δόγμα. A tradition; a dogma, a tenet; a decree or ordinance; a doctrine or command uttered and arbitrarily enforced. "Not facts, but dogmas, perplex men." — *Επίκτητος*.

Doxa, ἡ δόξα. Opinion; empirical knowledge; judgment based upon experience; conviction; physical as distinguished from moral and interior science; probable truth, the knowledge of which is acquired by the perception of the external senses. "This is called *opinion*, through our combining of the recollection previously brought into action with the *sense-perception* recently produced." — *Αλκίνοῦς*. The Christian writers frequently use this term in the sense of glory, splendor, brilliant luminosity.

Doxastikos, δοξαστικός, ἡ, ὡν. Relating to the forming of opinions; judging empirically from appearance; opinionable.

Doxastos, δόξαστος, ἄ, ὡν. Pertaining to the sensible world; relating to opinion. "The opinionable is to the cognizable as the image to the reality." — *Platōn*.

Dunamis, ἡ δύναμις. Power; a faculty; energy; the necessary conditions for the existence of any thing before that thing comes into being. Used in the *New Testament* to denote the orders of superior and supernal beings, miracles, wonderful powers. Also, a mantic or ecstatic condition of mind. "My discourse and doctrine were in demonstration of spirit and interior power." — *Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians, I, ii: 4.* "I am not ashamed of this gospel: for the power of God is to salvation." — *Epistle to the Romans, i: 16.* To this day the Shamans and some Christian sectaries denominate a trance by this epithet, "the power."

Dusapodeiktos, δυσἀποδείκτος, ὡν. Hard to demonstrate.

Dusgnōstos, δύσγνωστος, ὡν. Hard to perceive; difficult of knowing.

Dusgnōstos, δύσγνωστήσις, ὡν. Not easy to deceive; hard of impressing with falsehood.

Dusnoēta, τὰ δυσνόητα. Things hard to understand; hence, interior knowledge not brought out to the comprehension of persons who are external, superficial, and scientific rather than philosophical. "None of the archons of this world have known Divine wisdom; for the psychical man receiveth not divine things, because they are

- foolish to him." — *Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians*, I., ii. "In which are certain things difficult to comprehend, which the untaught distort to their own ruin." — *Catholic Epistles of Peter*, II., iii: 16.
- Dusthanatío*, *δοσθανάτιω*. To die a lingering death; to contend against dying. "Struggling against death by his superior skill (*σοφία*), he achieved a great age." — *PLATÓN: Statesman*, iii: 406.
- E*, *E*. Thou art. *The inscription on the temple at Delphi*, meaning the cognition of the Absolute One.
- E*, *γ*. He said.
- E gar?* *ἢ γάρ*? Is it not so? *The interrogatory clause at the end of sentences in the Dialogues.*
- E gar an*, *ἢ γάρ ἄν*. Else; otherwise.
- Ecclesia*, *ἡ ἐκκλησία*. An assembly called by public proclamation; a stated meeting; an assembly or regular meeting of the people, as distinguished into ranks and orders, in distinction from the *ἀγορά*, a mixed and promiscuous assemblage; the meeting-house; the place of meeting. Also, a meeting or feast of the gods; the place of such meeting. In *Christian usage*, the church; the association of holiness; the whole Christian body; the hall or edifice where *Christian assemblies are held*; the clergy as distinguished from the laity. From the Phœnician *KAL*, to call; to assemble by a public crier; also, the leader in the meeting.
- Eclecticoi*, *οἱ ἐκλεκτικοί*. The Eclectics. This designation, though somewhat indefinite, is generally applied to those philosophers, both of the New Academy and the Alexandrian School, and especially the followers of Potamón, who endeavored to cull the doctrines of Platón, Zênón, Aristotélès, Epikouros, and the various Indian and Babylonian sages and prophets, and to combine them into a homogeneous system of ethics and metaphysics. A sect of physicians of which Claudius Galenos was the brightest luminary was also so denominated. The Neo-Platonists, and perhaps Philón, Apollonios of Tyana, etc., were generally included under this name. Their teachers, Ammonios Sakkas, Plotinos, Porphyrios, Iamblichos, Hieroklès, Proklos, Marinos, Isidóros, and Zênodotos, taught the Platonic philosophy in the form of a religion embracing some of the characteristic features of Jainism, the Sankhya and Pythagorean schools, and the occult rites of Mithras. See *Eklektos*.
- Egersis*, *ἡ ἔγερσις*. An awakening; rousing from sleep; resuscitation; rising up.
- Eidésis*, *ἡ εἰδήσις*. Skill; knowledge; ability; science. This term, and also the verb *εἰδῆσαι*, used as a noun, denote only the mediate knowledge which we acquire through external sources, and is not to be confounded with that derived from intuition or demonstration.
- Eidólon*, *τὸ εἶδωλον*. A likeness; effigy; representation; simulacrum; the image of a person or object; a wraith; a spectral representation; perhaps a spiritual materialization; an image formed in the mind.
- Eidos*, *τὸ εἶδος*. Form; likeness; species; the form or exemplar according to which a thing is produced. Both Platón and Aristotélès use this term as synonymous with *idea*, yet often as distinct. It is the productive force in matter, but distinct from it; the indwelling energy, whereas matter is the *δύναμις* or potentiality. See also *Eínai*, *Idea*, *Dunamis*, *Energieia*.
- Eikasía*, *ἡ εἰκασία*. Guess; conjecture; the knowledge of the images or shadows of bodies, as distinguished from the faith or knowledge of their property, and from demonstrated or intuitive knowledge.
- Eikón*, *τὸ εἶκόν*. An image; a representation; a resemblance; a statue; a simile or comparison.
- Eínai*, *τὸ εἶναι*. An infinitive verb used as a noun. Being; being in itself; absolute being; the ground and reason of all being, the noumenal as contrasted with *γινεσθαι* and *γένεσις*, the phenomenal. See *Eidos*, *Ousia*.
- Eiréné*, *ἡ εἰρήνη*. Peace; concord; tranquility; friendship. Probably the same as *SALAM*, peace, perfection, prosperity; a word common from the China Sea to the Atlantic. The Syrian goddess *Salamó* was the personification of this principle; as also, perhaps, the Israelitish king *SALAMBA*, or Solomon. *Eiréné* and *Sophia* — peace and wisdom — were also personified in the Gnostic pantheon; and the first Konstantinos, upon the establishment of his capital at New Rome, not only struck off coins and medals to *Sol Invictus*, but erected temples to these two principles.
- Eirónéia*, *ἡ εἰρωνεία*. Irony; dissimulation; language meaning differently from what it seems — *the method employed by Sókratés*. "Under the hypocritical pretense of knowing nothing, he attacks and brings down all the fine speakers, all the fine philosophers of Athens, whether natives or strangers from Asia Minor and the islands." — R. W. EMERSON.
- Eklektos*, *ἐκλεκτός*, *ἢ*, *ὄν*. Elect; chosen; choice; excellent.
- Eklepléxis*, *ἡ ἐκπληξις*. Terror; panic; dismay; astonishment; consternation.
- Ekstasis*, *ἡ ἔκστασις*. Astonishment; amazement; ecstasy; trance; a standing or existing outside of the objective personality; a condition in which the activity of the senses is more or less suspended, and the interior consciousness is correspondingly vivid. *This term is not used by Platón or classical writers.*
- Ekstatikos*, *ἐκστατικός*, *ἢ*, *ὄν*. Having the faculty to perceive while the external senses are quiescent; entranced; ecstatic; transported; inspired with a divine fury; entheast; frantic; astonished.
- Ektasis*, *ἡ ἔκτασις*. Extension; lengthening; stretching out; the lengthening of a short syllable in versification.
- Ektos*, *ἔκτος*. Outside; without; beyond. *Ὁ ἔκτος*, the outside; the external surface. *οἱ ἔκτος*; those who are outside; strangers.
- Elenchos*, *ὁ ἐλέγχος*. Scrutiny; argument; contradiction; disputation; refutation; investigation; demonstration; moving; conviction; anything which seems to convince or confute. "Confutation is the greatest and chief art of purifications." — *PLATÓN: Sophistés*, 34. "Faith is the substructure of things hoped for, the certain persuasion [*ἐλπίσις*] of things not seen with the eyes." — *Epistle to the Hebrews*, xi: 1. "All scripture divinely inspired, and profitable for teaching, for the *elenchos*, etc., is to the end that the man may be expert, ready for good work." — *Epistle to Timotheos*, II. iii: 16, 17. When refutation had done its utmost, and all the points of difficulty and objection had been brought out, the Dialectic method had accomplished its purpose. By its application the philosophers demonstrated as a consequence that we are in possession of some elements of knowledge which have not been derived from perception through the senses; that there are in all minds certain notions, principles or ideas, which have been furnished by a higher faculty, which transcend the limits of experience and reveal the knowledge of real Being. See *Anamnésis*, *Dialektiké*.
- Eleutherion*, *eleutheriotés*, *τὸ ελευθέριον*, *τὸ ελευθεριότης*. Freedom; self-government; liberality of sentiment and action; generosity.
- Eleutheros*, *ἐλευθέρως*, *α*, *ω*. Free; able to rule one's self; liberal; liberated.
- Elpis*, *ἡ ἐλπίς*. Hope; trust; reliance; expectation; opinion; notion. *Used by Platón in this latter sense.*
- Emmanés*, *ἐμμανής*, *ὄ*, *γ*. Raving; full of mantic ardor; entheast. See *Entheasmos*.
- Enmeleia*, *ἡ ἐμμελία*. A sacred dance, as at the *Mysteries and Orgiastic revels*; harmony in music.
- Empeiria*, *ἡ ἐμπειρία*. Experience, especially without the knowledge or comprehension of principles; skill; practice; reflection; the operation of the mind upon facts and principles, elaborating them into scientific form.
- Empeirikoi*, *οἱ ἐμπειρικοί*. Empirics; the designation of a school of physicians who profess to be practical, to the disregard of rational inductions. Also, philosophers the followers of Hárakleitos, Protagoras, and Aristippos, who appear to have ignored the existence of any faculty beyond the receptive energy of sense, like the agnostics of the present century. Aristotélès may also be included.
- Empousa*, *ἡ ἔμψουσα*. An apparition; the spectral appearance witnessed by neophytes about to undergo initiation; a hobgoblin. — *Hekaté*.
- Empsuchos*, *ἐμψυχος*, *ὄ*, *γ*. Endowed with soul; animated; living; breathing.
- Energieia*, *ἡ ἐνέργεια*. Active energy; actuality; efficacy; operative power as distinguished from *δύναμις*, or potentiality. It is the formative cause, as set forth by Aristotélès. "One energy is invariably antecedent in time up to that which is primarily and eternally the Moving Cause." — *Metaphysics*, viii, ix.
- Enkrateia*, *ἡ ἐγκράτεια*, also *τὸ ἐγκράτειον*. Self-command; moderation; restraint; continence; the ability to restrain by the power of will

the desire of improper pleasures; bearing up against a natural desire or passion.

Ennoia, ἡ ἐννοία. An idea; interior thought; an intuitive suggestion.

Ennomos, ἐννομος. According to law; just; coöperating with law as a magistrate.

Entelechia, ἡ ἐντελέχεια, from ἐν τέλει ἔχειν, being in a state of perfection. Entelechy; actual existence; the perfected act; the completely actual; absoluteness; completion; actuality; the tendency of passive matter to perfection, and the energy of active powers; actual existence as opposed to possible existence. The word is altered from the συντέλεια of the ancient Pythagoreans, and is more expressive because the syllable *en* denotes that the tendency to perfection or to the accomplishment of the purpose is actually resident in the being of which it is predicated. "The soul is the first actuality of a physical body having life in potentiality [*δύναμις*]."—ARISTOTELIS: *Concerning the Soul*, ii: 5.

Entheasmos, ὁ ἐνθεασμος. Entheasms; the mantic condition; inspiration by a divine spirit. See *Mania*.

Entheastikos, ἐνtheastικός, ἡ, ον. Entheast; rapt; inspired; filled or led by a divine impulse; enthusiastic.

Entheos, ἐθεος, ὁ, ἡ. Entheast; divinely inspired; mantic; divine; full of God; led by God. Τὸ ἐθεον, divine guidance; inspiration.

Enthousiasis or *enthousiasmos*, ἡ ἐθουσιαστική, ὁ ἐθουσιασμός—also τὸ ἐθουσιαστικόν. Divine transport; the entheast condition; enthusiasm; the raving induced by the sacred fury; fanaticism; wild passion.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS TAYLOR THE PLATONIST.

[The Life of Taylor, which appeared in "Public Characters of 1799," has been incorporated in this work. It is believed that the facts related in that biography were furnished by Mr. Taylor himself.]

In the latter part of the year 1788 the Marquis de Valadi, a philosophic French nobleman, visited England. He was an ardent admirer of the Pythagorean Philosophy, and desired to see it universally promulgated. In London he chanced to hear that Mr. Taylor was generally considered the principal Pythagorean in England. He immediately wrote him the following characteristic epistle:—

LETTER OF MARQUIS DE VALADI TO THOMAS TAYLOR.

To Thomas Taylor, better named *Lysis*, G. Izarn Valadi, of late a French Marquis and *Tanissaire*, sendeth Joy and Honor:

O Thomas Taylor! mayest thou welcome a brother Pythagorean, led by a savior god, to thy divine school. I have loved Wisdom ever since a child, and have found the greatest impediments, and been forced to great struggles, before I could clear my way to the source of it; for I was born in a more barbarous country than ever was Illyria of old. My family never favored my inclination to study, and I have been involved in so many cares and troubles that it cannot be without the intervention of some friendly Deity that I have escaped the vile rust of barbarism and its attendant meanness of soul. My good fortune was that I met eighteen months ago an English gentleman of the name of Pigott, who is a Pythagorean philosopher, and who easily converted me to the diet and manners agreeable to that most rich and beneficent Deity, Mother Earth. To that heaven-inspired change I owe perfect health and tranquillity of mind, both of which I had long been deprived of. Also my own oath has acceded to the eternal oath (which the golden commentator on the Golden Verses mentions), and I would more cheerfully depart from my present habitation on this Themis-forsaken earth,

than defile myself evermore with animal food, stolen either on earth, in air, or water.

I met with thy works but two days past. A divine man! A prodigy in this iron age! Who would ever have thought thou couldst exist amongst us in our present condition? I would have gone to China for a man endowed with the tenth part of thy light. Oh, grant me to see thee, to be lustrated and initiated by thee! What happiness, if, like to Proklos Leonas, to thee I, who feel living in myself the soul of Leonidas, could be a domestic!

My determination was to go and live in North America, from love of Liberty, and there to keep a school of Temperance and Love, in order to preserve so many men from the prevailing disgraceful vices of brutal intemperance and selfish cupidity. There, in progress of time, if those vices natural to a commercial country are found to thwart most of the blessings of Liberty, the happy, select ones, taught better discipline, may form a society by themselves,—such a one as the gods would favor and visit lovingly,—which would preserve true knowledge, and be a seminary and an asylum for the lovers of it. There I would devoutly erect altars to my favorite gods and demi-gods—the Dioscuri, Hector, Aristomenes, Pan, Orpheus, Epaminondas, Pythagoras, Platon, Timoleon, Marcus Brutus and his Portia, and above all, Phosbos, the god of my hero Julianos, and the father of that holy, gentle *Commonwealth* of the Peruvians, to which *nullus ultor* has, as yet, been suscited!

Music and gymnastics are sciences necessary for a teacher to possess,—what a deep and various sense these two words contain,—and I am a stranger to both. O Gods, who gave me the thought and the spirit, give me the means; for all things are from you.

Thomas Taylor! Be thou their instrument to convey into my mind knowledge, truth, and prudence. Do thou love and help me. I will go to thee to-morrow morning.

P. S. May I look to thee endowed with *ancient* and no modern enthusiasm!

GRACCHUS CROTONEIOS.

12th Dec., 1788, Vul. Agra.

According to the promise contained in his letter, the Marquis visited Mr. Taylor the following day, threw himself in due form at his feet, tendered to him a small sum in bank notes, which at that moment constituted all his fortune, and begged with great humility to be admitted as a disciple into his house. His prayer was granted, and for some time he enjoyed the advantage of imbibing philosophy from the fountain-head; but, finding himself more formed for an active than a contemplative life, he determined to temporarily quit the study of philosophy in order to participate in the political commotions which began at this time to agitate France with a redoubled force. When he took leave of his master of philosophy, he had exchanged his quaker-like apparel for a complete suit of military clothes. "I came over Diogenes," said he; "I am going back Alexander."¹

In 1791 Mr. Taylor published, anonymously, at Amsterdam, Holland, his exhaustive "Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries." Though ostensibly printed at Amsterdam, it was the production of the London press. It is by far the best treatise of modern times on the ancient mysteries. The lucubrations of other writers on this subject are shallow compared with it. The work was very favorably received, especially by the continental scholars, and generally quoted as an authority on the subject. This volume also contains a valuable and most eloquent hymn of Proklos to Athena, which Mr. Taylor discovered in the British Museum. The original Greek is accompanied by an English paraphrased translation. The following is

¹ Anecdotes of the Founders of the French Republic, Vol. 1, London, 1797.

the "Advertisement" prefixed to the first edition of this "Dissertation": "As there is nothing more celebrated than the mysteries of the ancients, so there is, perhaps, nothing which has hitherto been less solidly known. Of the truth of this observation the liberal reader will, I persuade myself, be fully convinced from an attentive perusal of the following sheets, in which the secret meaning of the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries is unfolded from authority the most respectable, and from a philosophy of all others the most venerable and august. The authority, indeed, is principally derived from manuscript writings, which are, of course, in the possession of but a few; but its respectability is no more lessened by its concealment than the value of a diamond when secluded from the light. And as to the philosophy by whose assistance these mysteries are developed, it is coeval with the universe itself; and, however its continuity may be broken by opposing systems, it will make its appearance at different periods of time, as long as the sun himself shall continue to illuminate the world. It has, indeed, and may hereafter be violently assaulted by delusive opinions; but the opposition will be just as imbecile as that of the waves of the sea against a temple built on a rock, which majestically pours them back,

Broken and vanquish'd, foaming to the main."

Speaking of certain "machinery" of the Mysteries, Mr. Taylor says: "I would willingly unfold to the reader the mystic meaning of the whole of this machinery, but this cannot be accomplished by any one without at least the possession of all the Platonic manuscripts which are extant. This acquisition, which I would infinitely prize above the wealth of the Indies, will, I hope, speedily and fortunately be mine, and then I shall be no less anxious to communicate this arcane information than the liberal reader will be to receive it." Although published in 1791, the "Dissertation" was probably written several years before, as Mr. Taylor refers to it as "one of my juvenile productions." In concluding our notice of this work we take pleasure in informing our readers that a fine edition of it, with some omissions and alterations, however, was published at New York in 1875. It is edited, "with introduction, notes, emendations, and glossary," by Prof. Alexander Wilder, who is a thorough scholar, and well skilled in the ancient philosophy.

The next work with which Mr. Taylor delighted the philosophic readers of his age was an English version of the Phaidros of Platon, which appeared in 1792, in quarto. The following elegant and truthful lines are prefixed to this volume:—

"Immortal Plato, justly named divine,
What depth of thought, what energy is thine!
Whose God-like soul an ample mirror seems,
Strongly reflecting Mind's celestial beams;
Whose periods too redundant roll along,
Grand as the ocean, as the torrent strong.
O may some portion of thy sacred fire
The last, most hapless of thy sons inspire,
Who singly ventures in an impious age
To unfold the wisdom of thy mystic page."

Mr. Taylor says that his notes to the Phaidros "are very far from being intended as a complete commentary on this important dialogue. * * * My design, however, is, in some future period, if Divinity crowns my intentions with success, to publish copious commentaries on this dialogue, the Parmenides, Timaios, Kratylos, Phaidon, Philebos, the first and second Alkibiades, and Gorgias, from the inestimable commentaries of the later Platonists on these works, with additional observations of my own; and this, that I may leave to posterity a monument of those blessed visions, and exalted felicity, of which, through this divine philosophy, I have been fortunately a partaker.

"With respect to the following translation, I have everywhere

endeavored to be as faithful as possible to my author, well knowing how important it is, in translating such a writer as Platon, to attend to the accurate meaning of every word. At the same time I have attempted to imitate the majestic elegance of his diction, and to imbibe some portion of that divine enthusiasm which is the predominant character of this sublime piece of composition. How far I have succeeded must be left to the judgment of the discerning and impartial reader. With respect to the class of readers called verbal critics, it is necessary to observe that they will doubtless look with great disgust on a translation at the bottom of which no variety of different readings, no critical acumen of verbal emendation presents itself to the view. * * * To an English reader, who understands nothing of the Greek, such criticism is useless and disgusting; and at most it can only gratify a set of pedants—men who have lost all the vigor of their understanding by too much attention to words, and who have at length become so mentally imbecile as to mistake *words* for *things*. I have been in company with the first-rate characters of this description, and their conversation has never excited in me any other sensations than those of pity and contempt—pity for their ignorance and infatuation, and contempt for their imperious and savage behavior. For such is the ferocity of these critics that a modest man can hardly speak without danger of being insulted; and such their ignorance, that I once heard one of them maintain that a *river* was not a *stream*. The ferocity of their manners, indeed, may be well enough accounted for from their similitude to porters, who should wait at the doors of some august and beautiful building, the rooms of which are filled with things of the most precious and admirable nature, and who should open the gates to others, without having the least anxiety to explore the contents of the building themselves. For thus the critic opens the door of ancient knowledge to others, but has no desire himself to view the inestimable treasures which it contains."

In 1792 also appeared Mr. Taylor's "Rights of Brutes," a little work written in ridicule of Paine's "Rights of Man." In 1793 was published in one volume an English translation of the Kratylos, Phaidon, Parmenides, and Timaios of Platon, by Mr. Taylor. His version of these dialogues, together with that of the Phaidros, were executed in the short period of about seven months, and for the copyright of both volumes he received no more than forty pounds. In a note to this work Mr. Taylor gives the public some idea of the extent of his arduous labors: "To convince the reader that I have, at least, been in earnest in my pursuit of the Platonic philosophy, I may inform him that I have the following Platonic manuscripts. The seven books of Proklos on the Parmenides, the Scholia of Olympiodoros on the Phaidon, and large extracts from his Scholia on the Gorgias, the Commentary of Proklos on the first Alkibiades, and his Scholia on the Kratylos. All these manuscripts are copies taken with my own hand, and some of them I have read through twice, and the rest once; Proklos on the Timaios thrice, and on Platonic Theology five times at least. And surely after all this I may be supposed, without any vanity, to know more of Platonism than those men who never consult such authors but to gratify an indolent curiosity, to find out some new phrase, or to exercise their critical acumen in verbal emendation. I omit mentioning other Platonic authors which I have diligently studied, because these are the most voluminous, the most difficult, and the least generally known." The following interesting and instructive passage is from the preface to the work under consideration: "As an apology for the boldness with which I have censured certain modern opinions, it may be sufficient to observe that to reprobate foolish and impious notions, where there is nothing personal in the censure, is certainly the duty of every honest

and liberal mind. Indeed, such conduct can never be objected to by any, but either those who embrace such opinions, and are secretly conscious of their baseness, or those who cannot *rationaly* defend their belief, or, lastly, those whose souls, as Platon beautifully observes, are *crushed* and *bruised* by servile employments. I have always found, indeed, that men of this last description are particularly averse to the honesty of attacking tenets which are generally received, and this for a very natural reason — the danger of suffering by such a conduct in their worldly concerns. For with these so powerful is the influence of corporeal good, which they feelingly call their *dearest interest*, that, rather than diminish the wealth which they are yearly amassing, they would leave the man of whom they ridiculously call themselves the friends to perish through extremity of want. It is, however, no uncommon thing at present to find men with such degraded souls deciding on the most abstruse subjects with much greater confidence than the profoundest philosopher of antiquity ever employed on such an occasion. But the absurdity and arrogance of this conduct may be easily pardoned when we consider that these men are perfectly ignorant that *magnificence of thought* and a *contempt of wealth* are essential characteristics of the philosophic genius, and that to toil in the same dull round from year to year, merely to acquire a fortune, can be borne by none but *slaves*."

This same year (1793) Mr. Taylor sent forth a translation of "Sallustius on the Gods and the World; and the Pythagoric Sentences of Demophilos; and Five Hymns of Proklos in the original Greek, with a poetical version. To which are added Five Hymns by the Translator," one volume, 8vo. The work of Sallustius is a beautiful epitome of the Platonic philosophy, in which the most important dogmas are delivered with such elegant conciseness, perfect accuracy, and strength of argument, that it is difficult to say to which the treatise is most entitled, our admiration or our praise. The Sentences of Demophilos are well worth perusing on account of their intrinsic excellence and truth; the Hymns of Proklos are truly admirable, and those by the translator breathe the genuine poetic spirit. Of these last Mr. Taylor says: "They form only a part of a complete collection to all the divinities, which I design to publish at some future and more auspicious period than the present. My principal intention, with regard to the public, in the composition of most of these hymns, was to elucidate the ancient theology by explaining the mystic appellations of the gods; but my design with respect to myself was to reap that most solid advantage with which the celebration of divinity, *in a becoming manner*, is invariably attended."

In 1793 there was also published from the prolific and laborious pen of Mr. Taylor "Two Orationes of the Emperor Julian; one to the Sovereign Sun, and the other to the Mother of the Gods; translated from the Greek, with notes, and a copious introduction, in which some of the greatest arcana of the Grecian Theology are unfolded." This volume also contains an elegant hymn to "Apollon and the Sun, considered as in a certain respect one and the same divinity;" and a fine apostrophe "To the Ancient Platonic Philosophers." The following passages are extracted from the introduction: "The Emperor Julianos is well known in the character of a Sovereign and an Apostate, which he once sustained; but very few are acquainted with him in the characters of a Theologist and Philosopher, which he displays through the whole of his works in a manner by no means contemptible or weak. It is true, indeed, that his philosophical and theological attainments are not to be compared with those of Pythagoras, Platon, and Proklos, who appear to have arrived at the summit of human piety and wisdom, or with those of many of the Platonists prior and posterior to Proklos; but, at the

same time, they were certainly far superior to those which many celebrated ancients possessed, or which even fell to the share of such a man as the biographer Plutarchos. Indeed, it is impossible that a man burdened with the weight of a corrupt empire, such as that of Rome, or that the governor of any community except a republic like that of Platon, should be able to philosophize in the most exquisite degree, and leave monuments behind him of perfect erudition and science. Julianos, however, appears to have possessed as much of the philosophical genius as could possibly be the portion of an Emperor of Rome, and was doubtless as much superior to any other Emperor, either prior or posterior to him, as the philosophy and theology which he zealously professed transcend all others in dignity and worth. Hence, in the ensuing orations, he has happily blended the majestic diction of a Roman Emperor with the gravity of sentiment peculiar to a Platonic philosopher, and with that scientific and manly piety which is so conspicuous in the writings of ancient theologians. His language is, indeed, highly magnificent, and in every respect becoming the exalted rank which he sustained, and the great importance of the subjects of his discourses; in short, the grandeur of his soul is so visible in his composition that we may safely credit what he asserted of himself, that he was formerly Alexander the Great. And if we consider the actions of Alexander and Julianos, we shall easily be induced to believe that it was one and the same person who, in different periods, induced the Indians, Bactrians, and inhabitants of Caucasos to worship the Grecian deities; took down the contemptible ensign of his predecessor, and raised in its stead the majestic Roman eagles, and everywhere endeavored to restore a religion which is coeval with the universe, by banishing gigantically daring and barbaric belief." In this work Mr. Taylor, who was a most enthusiastic admirer of Proklos, pronounced the following eulogy on that profound and justly celebrated philosopher: "He was beyond all doubt the man who, in the language of Ammonios Hermeias, possessed the ability of interpreting the doctrines of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the greatest perfection possible to man. For my own part, indeed, the whole of time would not be sufficient to pay him thanks adequate to the benefits which I have received from his incomparable works; and I shall consider the employment, if permitted me, of translating and illustrating the whole of his philosophical works in English, as forming a very principal part of the felicity of my life."

Mr. Taylor was never idle. His tremendous energy and perpetual perseverance enabled him to perform an amount of mental work which very few men have ever exceeded. In 1794 Mr. Taylor sent forth a very important work, "Five Books of Plotinos, viz.: on Felicity, on the Nature and Origin of Evil, on Providence, on Nature, Contemplation, and the One, and on the Descent of the Soul. Translated from the Greek, with an introduction, containing additional information on these important subjects." Appended to this volume is an interesting original hymn to Apollon. These are some of the best and deepest works of Plotinos, and the translation is generally good and accurate, though it is too paraphrastic. Mr. Taylor's pecuniary remuneration for his arduous labors was ridiculously small. For his versions of Sallustius, Julianos, and Plotinos he received no more than twenty pounds. Literary hacks of his time usually received a greater amount than this for single articles, which, as regards value and merit, could not possibly be compared with Mr. Taylor's profound productions.

But the most laborious of all his undertakings, and for which he received less in proportion than for any of his other publications, was his translation of the valuable and entertaining work of Pausanias, the Description of Greece, which appeared in 1794,

in three volumes, 8vo. Mr. Taylor affixed many profound and interesting notes to this work, which contain a treasury of mythological information which is nowhere else to be found collected. When the task of translating Pausanias was first proposed to Mr. Taylor by the bookseller; Mr. Samuel Patterson, a gentleman well known to the literary world, happening to be present, observed that "it was enough to break a man's heart." "Oh," replied the bookseller, "nothing will break the heart of Mr. Taylor." This Herculean labor our Platonist accomplished in ten months, though the notes are of such an extent, and so full of uncommonly abstruse learning, that the composition of them might be supposed to have taken up a much longer time. For this arduous work we blush to say that Mr. Taylor received no more than sixty pounds, and are grieved to add that his health was greatly injured by his excessive application on this occasion. We are, indeed, informed that the debility of his body became so extreme after this that at times he was rendered incapable of any exertion, and he was from this time deprived of the use of his fore-finger in writing. In 1795 Mr. Taylor published "The Fable of Cupid and Psyche, translated from the Latin of Apuleius: To which are added a poetical paraphrase on the speech of Diotima in the Banquet of Platon; Four Hymns, etc., with an introduction in which the meaning of the Fable is unfolded." The allegory of Cupid and Psyche is too well known to need any particular mention. The paraphrase of Diotima's discourse is a curious and valuable production; the hymns breathe the true poetic *mania*; and the other poetical pieces, some of which are original and others translated, possess great merit.

"Apuleius was by birth an African, and by profession a Platonic philosopher. From the account which he gives of himself it appears most probable that he lived in the times of Antoninus Pius and his illustrious brothers.¹ He seems to have been very much addicted to the study of magic, but has very ably cleared himself from the accusation of practising it, which was brought against him in an oration, the whole of which is extant. However, though he was a man of extraordinary abilities, and held a distinguished place among the Platonic philosophers of that period, yet he was inferior to any one of that golden race of philosophers of which the great Plotinus stands at the head. Of the truth of this observation few, indeed, of the present age are likely to be convinced, from that base prejudice which has taken such deep root in the minds of men of every description, through the declamations of those literary bullies, the verbal critics, on the one hand, and the fraudulent harangues of sophistical priests on the other. Posterity, however, will warmly patronize my assertion, and vindicate the honors of those venerable heroes, the latter Platonists, when *such* critics and *such* priests are covered with the shades of eternal oblivion." (Introduction.)

In an appendix to this volume Mr. Taylor replied to the malevolent account of his version of Pausanias, which was given by the *British Critic*, a pretentious periodical of that day. After speaking of the necessity which obliged him to finish so large a work in the short space of ten months, "a necessity arising from indigent circumstances," Mr. Taylor observes: "I may further add in my defence, supposing the translation to be as faulty as they represent it, — for I have only carelessly glanced over their criticisms, — that, having devoted myself to philosophy, I am much more familiar with the phraseology of the Greek philosophers than of the Greek historians; and both Mr. Porson and Mr. Beloe² would, I am persuaded, find more difficulty in translating a Platonic book than I should in translating Aischylos or Herodotos, because grammatical skill avails but

little where intellect must be principally employed; and I have always found that such men possess but very little of mind.

* * * Conscious, therefore, that Pausanias was an author out of my track, but at the same time impelled by *extreme* necessity to translate his work, I considered that in the opinion of the liberal and philosophic part of my readers I should amply compensate for any errors of my translation by presenting them in the notes with as much mythological and theological information, derived from ancient sources, as I was able. I rejoice, therefore, in the opportunity which the pressure of want afforded me of disseminating the wisdom of the Greeks by means of this translation. The prospect, indeed, of the good which might result from such information, enabled me to struggle with cheerfulness through the difficulties of embarrassed circumstances and disease, which attended me during my laborious task. Happy would it be for these critics if the prospect of benefiting mankind influenced their monthly productions. I only add that their invidious insinuation that I do not understand Greek is too contemptible to merit a reply, unless they mean that my knowledge of Greek is by no means to be compared with that of Mr. Porson, because I am not, like him, unable to do anything without accents; for I confess, that in this respect I am so far inferior to him, that I can read a philosophic Greek manuscript without accents with nearly as much facility as a book written in my native tongue."

It may be remarked that the errors in the Pausanias of which the *British Critic* complains are mostly of a trivial character, and do not detract from the general correctness and merit of the translation. Of Porson's incapacity to comprehend the Greek philosophic writers we have his own statement, made in a conversation between himself and Mr. Taylor, which took place at a book sale, in which he acknowledged that he could not read Plutarchos, the biographer, saying that he (Plutarchos) was "too much for him."

During the next six years (1795–1801) Mr. Taylor was engaged in translating the remaining dialogues of Platon which had not been rendered by Floyer Sydenham, and also in translating some of the works of Aristoteles. He also contributed frequently to the periodicals, notably the *Monthly* and *European Magazines*. It may be stated here that he became a contributor to the periodicals at an early age, and many of his articles are valuable and worthy of republication. Among them may be noted a collection of the Chaldean oracles, translated (*Monthly Magazine*, 1797), and a paraphrastic version of the greater part of the work of Okellos Lukanos on the Universe (*European Magazine*, 1782).

About 1799 Mr. Taylor became assistant secretary to the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce — a position which he obtained by a very considerable majority of votes, through the uncommon exertions of his friends. A short time prior to this some of his friends had procured him a place in one of the public offices, to the fatigues of which finding his strength by no means adequate, and the employment appearing to him extremely servile, he relinquished it almost immediately after his appointment, and composed the following lines on the occasion: —

"To ev'ry power that reigns on high,
Swifter than light my thanks shall fly,
That, from the B * * * 's dark dungeons free,
I once more hail sweet liberty!
For sure, I ween, fate ne'er me doom'd
To be 'midst sordid cares entomb'd,
And vilely waste in grovelling toil
The mid-day blaze and midnight oil,
To some poor darkling desk confin'd;
While the wing'd energies of mind
Oppress'd, and crush'd, and vanquish'd lie,

¹ He was born about 130, A. D., and died about 190 A. D.

² In a note Mr. Taylor convicts Beloe of a gross error in his translation of Herodotos.

And lose, at length, the power to fly.
 A doom like this be his alone
 To whom truth's charms were never known;
 Who many sleepless nights has spent
 In schemes full fraught with *cent per cent*.
 The slave of avarice, child of care,
 And lost to all that's good and fair."

In 1801 Mr. Taylor gave to the philosophic public a noteworthy work — "The *Metaphysics of Aristoteles*, translated from the Greek, with copious notes, in which the Pythagoric and Platonic Dogmas respecting Numbers and Ideas are unfolded from ancient sources: To which is added a Dissertation on Nullities and Diverging Series, in which the conclusions of the greatest modern mathematicians on this subject are shown to be erroneous, the nature of infinitely small quantities is explained, and the *To E*, or the One of the Pythagoreans and Platonists so often alluded to by Aristoteles in this work, is elucidated." To the work is prefixed an admirable introduction of fifty-five pages.

"In translating the *Metaphysics of Aristoteles* I have endeavored as much as possible to give the literal meaning of every sentence, without paraphrasing what I conceived to be the sense of my author, or expanding what might appear to be too concise. The studied obscurity, indeed, of Aristoteles' diction in this work is perhaps without a parallel in any ancient or modern writer. Not daring, therefore, to impose on the reader by presenting him with my conceptions as those of the Stagirite, nor presuming to measure that mighty genius by my own, I have in general, after giving the most faithful translation in my power of dubious passages, either explained them by notes or left them to the decision of the reader; for as I write not with any design of procuring the fleeting and contemptible applause of the day, but with an eye to the approbation of more equitable posterity, I have endeavored, by acting the part of a faithful translator, to procure for the following copy a duration coextended with that of the original. It is surely not arrogant to hope that, while the genius of Aristoteles, like some mighty vessel, sails triumphantly through the vast sea of ages, followed by other vessels of considerable magnitude, and with all its sails swelling with the strongest breath of fame,

My bark attendant may auspicious sail,
 Pursue the triumph, and partake the gale.

"And here I cannot refrain from noticing, and, with an indignation which I trust Platon himself would allow to be generous (*θυμῶς γενναίως*), the arrogance of Dr. Gillies, in the preface to what he calls a translation of the *Ethics and Politics of Aristoteles*: 'My time was miserably misspent in examining Aristoteles' numerous commentators — Greek, Arabic, and Latin.' That his time might have been miserably misspent in perusing the Arabic and Latin commentators of Aristoteles may perhaps be admitted, though even here an exception is to be made to such a writer as Averroes, because his commentaries contain extracts from ancient authors whose works are now no more; but his time could only have been miserably misspent in examining the Greek interpreters of Aristoteles because he did not understand them. What! after a period of more than two thousand years, — after the abolition of the Academic and Peripatetic schools, — when Philosophy has retired into deep solitude, and even Echo no longer answers to her lyre, shall one who is no native of Greece, and who is totally unskilled, as we have seen and shall still further see, in the sublimer part of Aristoteles' works, presume to vilify the writings of men of exalted genius who devoted their lives to the study of the Peripatetic and Platonic philosophy, of which they had a traditional knowledge, who had the felicity of having the Greek for their native tongue, and of being able to consult books written by the immediate disciples of Aristoteles and Platon, and which are now irrecoverably lost? I am sure

I have no personal enmity to Dr. Gillies, nor is what I have said or shall say of him dictated either by malevolence or envy. . . . His translation of Aristoteles has neither the manner, nor frequently the matter, of the original! His style, instead of conveying to the reader an idea of the unadorned purity and wonderful compression of that of the Stagirite, is pompous and diffuse; and he frequently ventures to introduce entire sentences of his own, which are wholly unauthorized by the text. . . . 'The real subject,' says Dr. Gillies, 'of Aristoteles' *Metaphysics*, which has been grossly mistaken through a preposterous arrangement of the treatises which they comprise, is the vindication of the existence and nature of truth, against the cavils of Sophists and those now called *Metaphysicians*; and this doctrine concerning truth illustrated in the demonstration of the being of one God, in opposition to Atheists on the one hand, and Polytheists on the other.' If by Polytheists Dr. Gillies means men who believed in a multitude of self-existent beings independent of each other, and of one first cause, there were no such men among the Greeks and Romans, as must be obvious to every one who is conversant with the writings of the heathens, and as is fully evinced by Dr. Cudworth in his *Intellectual System of the Universe*; nor am I acquainted with any ancient nation who entertained an opinion so monstrous and dire. But if by Polytheists he intends to signify men who believed in the existence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one first cause, with which they are profoundly united, Aristoteles is so far from opposing this doctrine in his *Metaphysics*, that, in the eighth chapter of the twelfth book, he demonstrates their existence. . . . And this shows how little Dr. Gillies was acquainted with the *Metaphysics of Aristoteles*, of which he has presumed to give an analysis, and with the general opinion of all antiquity, on a subject which of all others is most interesting and the most sublime. I shall, therefore, conclude these strictures on Dr. Gillies with observing, that if all the philosophical writings of the ancients were to be translated into modern languages in the same manner in which he has translated the *Ethics and Politics of Aristoteles*, and the same analysis were given of their doctrines which he has given of those of the Stagirite, supposing the originals to be at the same time destroyed, a period more dreadful would be realized than when

The North by myriads pour'd her barb'rous sons,
 Dire nurse of Goths, of Alans, and of Huns.

"From a sincere love of truth, which I firmly believe is, as Platon says, the source of every good, both to gods and men, and from my great veneration for the works of Aristoteles, of which, in conjunction with those of Platon, I have been a student nearly twenty years, and not from any personal enmity whatever to Dr. Gillies, I have been unavoidably induced to be thus severe."

"Whatever may be the fate of the following work, whatever the opinion which may be formed of it by the critics, this I can say with justice and without vanity, that the reader will find the genuine doctrines of Pythagoras and Platon on the most sublime subjects more fully and faithfully unfolded, and this from ancient sources, in the notes to this translation, than in any modern publication. To accomplish this, I have devoted myself to the study of ancient wisdom amidst the pressure of want, the languor and weakness occasioned by continual disease, and severe toil in situations not only uncongenial with my disposition, and highly unfavorable to such a pursuit, but oppressed by tyranny and aggravated by insult. Amidst all this, — and yet this is but a rude delineation of endurance, — what has been my recompense from the critics for having brought to light truths which have been concealed for ages in oblivion, for having translated and illustrated writings which, from their intrinsic merit, have been

preserved amidst the ravages and revolutions of time, fanatic fury, and barbaric devastation? Not the praise due to well-meant endeavors and generous exertions; not the equitable decision of candid criticism; not even the cool, dispassionate, and benevolent censure which Pity suggests while Humanity writes; — but the savage invective of merciless Malevolence, the stupid slander of Ignorance, and the imbecile scorn of dull Impertinence. These have been my rewards from the critics. Through the combined efforts of these foes to great and virtuous emulation, my writings have been explored for the purpose of detecting and magnifying faults which in other authors have been consigned to oblivion, and not with any intention — for to this, indeed, they were inadequate — of combating the doctrines which I have so zealously endeavored to propagate. Yet it is from a faithful representation of these doctrines that I look forward with ardent, and I trust unpresuming hope, to the approbation of a better age, in which the page of criticism will not be stained by malignant defamation, and in which the labors of the now oppressed champion of Truth and Wisdom shall be appreciated by Equity herself, and be at least *honorably*, if not largely, recorded in the archives of Immortality.

“Yet while the hand of Misfortune has thus heavily oppressed, though not subdued me, and gigantic Injustice has endeavored to crush my literary exertions, the eye of Providence, from which nothing can be concealed, appears to have more than glanced at my endurance. It sent me friends, it even procured me patronage, in two gentlemen, whose merits are as uncommon as the pursuits which they have patronized are sublime. Of these gentlemen, WILLIAM and GEORGE MEREDITH, were I to say all that friendship prompts, or gratitude demands, I should only wound their sensibility, and perhaps weary the reader, without either satisfying justice on the one hand or adequately expressing all that I feel on the other. Let silence, therefore, indicate what cannot be told.

“Thus much, however, may and must be said, that the present work is given to the public under the auspices of these gentlemen. . . . The author, therefore, of the present work glories in being able thus publicly to testify that for the completion of such an arduous undertaking he has not been obliged to stoop to any of those humiliating methods by which works of considerable magnitude and importance are unfortunately too often forced into light, and that under the auspices of these gentlemen he has been enabled to unfold the wisdom of Aristotcles and Platon, without any other view than that of benefiting mankind, and receiving that approbation from the liberal and discerning which his labors may deserve. While he has the good fortune to enjoy their friendship and experience their support, as he has hitherto dared the attacks of malevolent critics, by whom, like Odysseus, he has been

Spurned, but not moved,

he is confident that he shall still be able to defy the united efforts of the whole tribe of verbalists, sciolists, and pedants,

‘Though numerous in our Isle,
As half-formed insects on the banks of Nile.’

Lastly, it is my intention, if the present work is sufficiently successful, and if I am blessed with health and leisure adequate to so great an undertaking, to give the public, under the same liberal patronage, and in an English dress, all that remains of the mighty leader of the peripatetic philosophy.

“With respect to the Dissertation on Nullities and Diverging Series, the mathematical reader will, I trust, be pleased with a discovery which unfolds the nature of infinitely small quantities, and may probably lead to the complete summation of all kinds of infinite series; and the reader of Platon will, no doubt, be

gratified to find a Pythagoric and Platonic dogma elucidated which is of all others the most abstruse, the most important, and the most sublime.”

At the close of the “Additional Notes,” illustrative of the Platonic doctrine concerning ideas and the principle of the universe, Mr. Taylor truly observes: “He who can read these passages, and afterwards pity the ignorance of the heathens in theological concerns, is himself an object of extreme pity, having the *greatest eye* of his soul blinded by Ignorance and buried in the darkness of Oblivion.” It may be remarked that the admirable passages referred to are taken chiefly from Proklos’ Commentary on the Parmenides of Platon, and the works of the great Plotinos.

Mr. Taylor’s next publication appeared in 1803, and was a new edition of Hederic’s Greek Lexicon, in which “many words are inserted not found in other modern lexicons, and an explanation is given of some words agreeably to the Platonic Philosophy.”

We have seen that Mr. Taylor, in the introduction to his version of Aristoteles’ Metaphysics, sharply criticised Dr. Gillies’ so-called translation of the Ethics and Politics of the mighty Stagirite. This severe but just criticism produced a violent and scurrilous attack from Dr. Gillies, to which Mr. Taylor replied in his masterly and irrefragable “Answer to Dr. Gillies,” an octavo pamphlet which was published in 1804. In this he convicts the Doctor of taking the most extraordinary and unwarrantable liberties with his original, and of ignorantly and basely calumniating some of Aristoteles’ best and most faithful interpreters.

In the same year (1804) appeared one of Mr. Taylor’s greatest works — one of those monuments of learning and industry which of themselves are sufficient to perpetuate a man’s name to the latest posterity. This production was “The Works of Platon, viz., his fifty-five dialogues and twelve epistles, translated from the Greek; nine of the dialogues by the late Floyer Sydenham, and the remainder by Thomas Taylor; with occasional annotations on the nine dialogues translated by Sydenham, and copious notes by the latter translator, in which is given the substance of nearly all the existing Greek MS. commentaries on the philosophy of Platon, and a considerable portion of such as are already published. In five volumes, quarto.” In the notes to this stupendous and inestimable work, Mr. Taylor has given the substance of the Commentaries of Proklos on the Parmenides and First Alkibiades; of Olympiodoros on the Phaidon, Gorgias, and Philebos; and of Hermcias on the Phaidros, which at that time were only in MS., but have been since published. The originals of these commentaries were copied by him from MSS. in the British Museum and the Bodleian Library of Oxford. He has likewise given copious extracts from the profound and valuable treatise of Damaskios on First Principles, which were also copied by him from the magnificent MS. of this work in the Bodleian Library. In the additional notes is given a translation of almost the whole of the Scholia of Proklos on the Kratylos, which Scholia were then only extant in MS., but were afterwards published by the celebrated Boissonade, (Leipsic, 1820), who mentions Mr. Taylor as “*vir in Platoniorum philosophia versatissimus*.” The work was dedicated to, and appeared under the patronage of, the Duke of Norfolk, who, we presume, defrayed the printing expenses. We may remark incidentally that it is said that the Duke locked up the greater part of the edition in a warehouse, and that it there remained until several years after his death. We are not informed as to the cause of this eccentric action.

“If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, it would have been necessary to apologize for its

literal exactness. Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning of the original, have omitted almost all connective particles, have divided long periods into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of Platon's language into smooth-gliding, shallow and feeble streams; but as the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefiting all, but with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have endeavored not to lose a word of the original, and yet at the same time have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavored to preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are not as much as possible preserved.

"My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Platon, as they are found dispersed in his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, and who is able to give the works of Platon to the public on a more extensive plan."

It may be truly said that, in all human probability, no one will ever present the works of Platon to the public "on a more extensive plan" than that of Mr. Taylor. His edition leaves but little to be desired.

"With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation, — for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault, — I might plead as an excuse that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances, and that a very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser particulars have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those great truths in the philosophy and theology of Platon which, though they have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with the universe, and will again be restored and flourish for very extended periods through all the infinite revolutions of time."

We will quote no further, as the admirable Introduction from which these extracts are taken, is now being republished in *THE PLATONIST*.

Mr. Taylor also published his faithful and elegant version of the "Dissertations of Maximus Tyrios," in 1804, in two volumes, 8vo. "These Dissertations, therefore, as all of them are on very important moral and theological subjects, are highly worthy the attention of the liberal reader; and are calculated to be largely beneficial, notwithstanding their inaccuracy in certain parts which pertain to the sublimities of the Platonic philosophy. These inaccuracies, wherever they occur, I have endeavored to correct in the notes which accompany this translation. * * * I have already observed that these Dissertations are calculated to be largely beneficial, and I now add, peculiarly so at the present time. For there surely never was a period in which it was so necessary that sound reasoning on some of the most important subjects of inquiry in ethics and theology should be promulgated as the present; since nothing is more common than to hear the fundamental principles of these sciences called in question, and even the existence of axioms, those unperverted and spontaneous conceptions of the mind, those self-luminous pillars of all knowledge, treated with ridicule and contempt. Bishop Berkeley, who, amidst all his eccentricities, possessed great penetration on some of the most interesting subjects of speculation, saw this evil

advancing in his time with giant strides, and very acutely ascribed its origin to the rage for experiment and the introduction of it into our great seminaries of learning. For where a principal part, even of a university education, is made to consist in believing that nothing is real which the eye does not see and the hand cannot grasp, and which, in short, does not fall under the cognizance of the senses, — what else can be expected but that even truths which men in all ages, both the unlearned and the learned, the wise and the ignorant, have invariably acknowledged to be self-evident, should be considered as nugatory, because they cannot be brought to the test of experiment? What else can be expected but Pyrrhonism in knowledge, a belief that nothing is worthy of attention which does not pamper the appetite or fill the purse; indifference in, or a total neglect of, the duties of religion; and atheistical conceptions of Divinity? As a partial remedy to this mighty evil these Dissertations are recommended to the earnest attention of the English reader. I have already put him in possession of the sovereign cure in presenting him with the whole of Platon's works; and I have no doubt he will gratefully accept this lesser, as an appendage to that greater labor, and consider it as one more effort, among many others, of a man who, in order to benefit his countrymen, both of the present and future generations, has hitherto abandoned all consideration of personal interest, and sacrificed to public good *health, strength, and ease*, though these have always been considered as ranking among things the most dear and valuable in life." In the "additional notes" to this excellent work there is much novel and important information concerning Prayer, derived from rare and ancient sources; and also an account of the festivals of the ancients, from Libanios, which had not previously been translated into English. It was in this same year (1804) that a small octavo volume entitled "Translations from the Greek," by Mr. William Bridgman, appeared. This volume contains a reprint of Mr. Taylor's version of the "Pythagoric Sentences of Demophilos." In his preface Mr. Bridgman mentions Mr. Taylor in the following appropriate language: "It is to this gentleman that English literature owes the accession of some of the most valuable productions of ancient Greece, which are rendered doubly valuable by the elucidations and ample explanations which his intimate knowledge of the Platonic Philosophy, and laborious investigation of the early commentators on it, have so well qualified him to give. * * * But I am still more indebted to him for the great assistance he has afforded me in the translation now given of the very difficult and corrupt text of the Explanation of the Pythagoric Symbols by Iamblichos."

In 1805 Mr. Taylor gave to the public "Miscellanies in Prose and Verse: Containing The Triumph of the Wise Man over Fortune, according to the Doctrine of the Stoics and Platonists; The Creed of the Platonic Philosopher; A Panegyric on Sydenham," etc. The motto of this work is:

"Untam'd by toils, unmoved by *venal spite*,
Truth to disseminate I still *shall* write."

"I rejoice in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the liberal reader a specimen of that heroic virtue which was once taught in the porch and the academy, and which its preceptors once no less happily possessed than splendidly promulgated. The sentiments, indeed, contained in the following Dissertation are so truly sublime, and so calculated to raise man, even in his present degraded state, above the ordinary condition of humanity, that they evidently prove themselves to be the progeny of genuine philosophy and genuine religion, which always amicably and inseparably accompany each other.

"In the example of Stilpon, which appears to me to be one of the most illustrious instances on record of magnanimous endurance,

the reader will see an unequivocal proof of that doctrine of the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Platonists, that the *true man* is *intellect*, or the most excellent part of man; that the body is nothing more than the instrument of the rational soul; and that external possessions are, indeed, the good of the body, but are totally foreign to the exalted good of the mind. Such a doctrine, accompanied by such an example, while it adds vigor to the efforts of the virtuous, attacks with irresistible force that ignoble opinion of the Epicurean vulgar, that the body is a part of man.

“If, also, the author of the following pages be permitted to add his own testimony of the great advantages which may be derived in adversity from such sentiments and such examples, — suffice it to say that in a state of general bodily debility, which at present prevents him from any continued exertion, accompanied with a weakness in his hands which almost totally incapacitates him from writing, and unfits him for public employment, he has found them to be a source of the most solid consolation and incentive to disinterested endurance. They have taught him to submit patiently to the will of heaven, to follow intrepidly the order of the universe, and to abandon private advantage for general good. Having, therefore, experienced such mighty benefits from these doctrines, he is anxious that others also may derive similar advantages from them; and trusts that the liberal reader will gratefully accept one effort more of a man whose labors, though they have been unthankfully received by his countrymen, have, nevertheless, been invariably directed to their greatest good, and who, while life and any portion of bodily strength remain, will still continue to exert himself for their benefit and that of posterity.”

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

TO THE RISING SUN.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the *Monthly Magazine for June, 1797.*]

See! how with thund'ring fiery feet
Sol's ardent steeds the barriers beat
That bar their radiant way;
Yok'd by the circling hours they stand,
Impatient at the god's command,
To bear the car of day.

See! led by morn, with dewy feet,
Apollo mounts the golden seat,
Replete with seven-fold fire!
While dazzled by his conqu'ring light,
Heav'n's glittering host, and awful Night,
Submissively retire.

See! cloth'd with majesty and strength,
Thro' sacred Light's wide gates at length,
The god exulting spring;
While lesser deities around,
And demon powers his praise resound,
And hail their matchless king.

Thro' the dark portals of the deep,
The foaming steeds now furious leap,
And thunder up the sky:
The god to strains new tunes his lyre,
Which Nature's harmony inspire,
And ravish as they fly.

Ev'n dreadful Hyle's sea profound
Feels the enchanting, conqu'ring sound,
And boils with rage no more;
The world's dark bound'ry Tart'rus hears,
The life-inspiring strains reveres,
And stills its wild uproar.

And while thro' heav'n the god sublime
Triumphant rides, see rev'rend Time

That is, with his own proper fire, and the fire of the other planets.

Fast by his chariot run:
Observant of the fiery steeds,
Silent the hoary king proceeds,
And hymns his parent sun.

See! as he comes, with gen'ral voice,
All Nature's living tribes rejoice,
And own him as their king;
Ev'n rugged rocks their heads advance,
And forests on the mountains dance,
And hills and valleys sing.

See! while his beauteous, glittering feet
In mystic measures ether beat,
Enchanting to the sight;
Paeon, whose genial locks diffuse
Life-bearing health, ambrosial dews,
Exulting springs to light.

Lo! as he comes, in heav'n's array,
And scattering wide the blaze of day
Lifts high his scourge of fire,
Fierce demons, that in darkness dwell,
Foes of our race, and dogs of hell,
Dread its avenging ire.

Hail, crown'd with light, creation's king!
Be mine the task thy praise to sing,
And vindicate thy might;
Thy honours spread thro' barb'rous climes,
Ages unborn, and impious times,
And realms involv'd in night.

ON DIALECTIC;

OR, THE THREEFOLD ASCENT OF THE SOUL TO ABSOLUTE BEING.

(*Lib. 3, Enn. 1.*)

[TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF PLOTINOS.]

[The Dialectic of Platon which is here discussed is not the same with that dialectic which is the subject of opinion and is accurately investigated in the topics of Aristoteles. For the former is irreprehensible and most expeditious; since it is connate with things themselves, and employs a multitude of powers in order to the attainment of truth. It likewise imitates intellect, from which it receives its principles, and ascends through well-ordered gradations to real being itself. It also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles, and explores everything by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things. The business, likewise, of this first of sciences is to employ definitions, divisions, analyzations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it as the ultimate object of desire.

“But there are three energies,” says Proklos in his Commentary on the Parmenides, “of this most scientific method; the first of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for the purpose of exciting their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth through opposite positions the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain anything worthy of belief; and lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the speculation of beings, and beholds Truth itself firmly established on a pure and holy foundation. This energy, according to Sokrates, by a progression through ideas evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is First; and

this by analyzing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely investigated the essence of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is delivered in the *Phaidros* and *Sophistes* is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other, operations of the dialectical art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is declarative according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance, when its reasons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the *Sophistes*." — *Taylor*.]

I. What art, or method, or study will lead us to that end to which we ought to proceed? That we ought, indeed, to arrive at the Absolute Good, and the first principle of things, is granted, and is demonstrated through many arguments. The arguments, also, through which this is demonstrated, are a certain elevation to this end. But what kind of a person is it necessary the man should be who is elevated to the Absolute Good? Is it not, as *Platon* says, one who has seen all, or most things? And who in his first generation has descended into a progenitor who will be a Philosopher, or a Musician, or a Lover? The Philosopher, therefore, the Musician, and the Lover, are naturally adapted to be elevated. What, therefore, is the mode? Is there one and the same mode for all these? Or is there a different mode for each? There is, indeed, a twofold progression to all of them: one to those who are ascending, and the other to those who have arrived at the supernal realms. For the former proceeds from things beneath; but the latter ranks among those who are now in the intelligible region, and who in that place have, as it were, a foothold. There, also, it is necessary for them to proceed till they have arrived at the extremity of the place. The end of the progression, however, is obtained when some one arrives at the summit of the intelligible world. But let this at present remain without any further discussion. And let us first endeavor to speak concerning this ascent (return).

Primarily, therefore, let these men be distinguished by us, and let us begin with the Musician and show his natural characteristics. We must admit, then, that he is easily excited and astonished at the beautiful, yet is not disposed to be moved from himself, but is prepared by casual occurrences, as from certain types or impressions, to be excited by sounds, and to the beautiful in these, just as the timid are by noises. He likewise always flies from dissonance, and pursues in songs and rhythms that which is one, congruous, and elegant. After these sensible sounds, rhythms, and figures, therefore, it is necessary that he be thus elevated, viz., by separating the matter, in which analogies and ratios are inherent, and contemplating the beauty which they contain. He must also be taught that the things about which he was astonished were intelligible harmony, and the beauty which is in it, and in short the Beautiful itself, and not a certain beauty only. The reasonings, likewise, of philosophy must be inserted in him, through which he will be led to a belief of truths of which he is ignorant, though he [occultly] possesses them. What these reasonings, however, are, will be hereafter unfolded.

II. The Lover, into which the Musician may be changed, and being changed will either remain in that character or will pass beyond it, has in a certain respect a recollection of beauty. Being, however, separated from it, he is incapable of learning what it is. But as he is struck by the beautiful objects which present themselves to the sight, he is seized with astonishment

about them. He therefore must be taught not to be abjectly astonished about one beautiful body, but he must be led by the exercise of the reasoning power to all beautiful bodies, and he who does this must exhibit to him that which is one and the same in all of them, and inform him that it is different from bodies and is derived elsewhere, and is rather inherent in other things, such as beautiful pursuits, and beautiful laws. For the Lover will now become accustomed to incorporeal natures. He likewise must be led to the beauty which is in the arts, in sciences, and the virtues, and afterwards to that which is one and the same in all these; and he must be taught after what manner beauty is inherent in each of them. And from the virtues he must ascend to intellect, and being itself, and there commence the progression to the Absolute Good.

III. The Philosopher, however, is naturally prompt to ascend, and is, as it were, winged, and does not require a separation from sensible objects, like the other characters; since he is excited to the supernal region, but is dubious as to the method of ascent, and therefore is only in want of one to point out the way. The path, therefore, must be shown to him, and he must be liberated, since he is naturally willing to ascend, and was formerly released from the corporeal bonds. Hence he must be instructed in the mathematical disciplines, in order that he may be accustomed to the perception of, and belief in, an incorporeal essence. For he will readily admit its subsistence, as he is desirous of learning. As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he must be led to the perfection of the virtues; and after the mathematics he must be taught dialectical reasonings, and in short must be rendered skilful in Dialectic.

IV. What, then, is the Dialectic which ought to be delivered in addition to the former particulars? It is, indeed, a habit (*εξέτις*) enabling its possessor to reason about everything, to know what each thing is and in what each thing differs from other things, what the common something is which it participates, where each of things subsists; if a thing is what it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non-beings, which are not nothing, but different from beings. Dialectic also discusses *the good*, and that which is not good; such things as are under *the good*, and such as are under the contrary to it; and what that is which is external, and that which is not a thing of this kind. All these, likewise, it discusses scientifically, and not from opinion. Resting also from the wandering about a sensible nature, it establishes itself in the intelligible world, and there has its employment, dismissing falsehood, and nourishing the soul in what is called the plain of truth, using for this purpose, and also for the separation of forms, the division of *Platon*. It likewise employs this division for the purpose of defining what a thing is, and in order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which results from these, till it has proceeded through the whole of an intelligible nature; and again, by an analytic process, it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first. Then, however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and, being no longer busily employed, but becoming one, it surveys what is called logic, which is occupied about propositions and syllogisms, — just as if giving to another art the knowledge of writing; some of which it considers as necessary and prior to art. But it forms a judgment of these as well as of other things, and thinks that some of them are useful, but others superfluous, and pertaining to the method by which these are discussed.

V. Whence, however, does this science derive its principles? May we not say that intellect imparts clear principles to the soul that is able to receive them? Afterwards the soul compounds the things consequent to these principles, and connects and divides them till it arrives at a perfect intellect. For, as *Platon* says,

this science is the purest part of intellect and intellectual prudence. It is necessary, therefore, since it is the most honorable habit of those things that are in us, that it should be conversant with being, and the most honorable nature; and that prudence, indeed, should be conversant with being, but intellect with that which is beyond being. What then, is philosophy? That which is most honorable. Is philosophy, therefore, the same as Dialectic? Or is not Dialectic the most honorable part of philosophy? For it must not be fancied that it is the instrument of the philosopher; since it does not consist of mere theorems and rules, but is conversant with things, and has beings, as it were, for its subject-matter. Nevertheless, it proceeds in a path to beings, possessing things themselves together with theorems. It knows, however, that which is false and sophistical accidentally, something else being the cause of these; and it forms a judgment of them as of that which is foreign, knowing the false by the truths it contains in itself, when it is adduced by any one, because it is contrary to the rule of truth. Propositions, therefore, are not the object of its knowledge; for these are letters. But, knowing truth, it knows that which is called a proposition. And, universally, it knows the motions of the soul, what the soul admits and what it rejects, and whether it rejects that which it admits, or something else. Likewise, whether different or the same things are adduced, applying itself to them in a way resembling sense.¹ But it assigns to another power an accurate discussion of these particulars.

VI. This, therefore, is an honorable part; since philosophy has also other parts. For it speculates about nature, receiving assistance from Dialectic in the same manner as the other arts use arithmetic. Philosophy, however, proximately derives assistance from Dialectic. And, in a similar manner, it speculates about manners, surveying them through Dialectic, but adding habits, and the exercises from which habits proceed. The rational virtues also have habits, which are their peculiarities (forms), which they derive from thence (*i. e.*, from Dialectic.) And the other virtues indeed, have their reasonings in peculiar passions and actions; but prudence is a certain ratiocination, and is conversant with that now to which is more universal. For it considers whether it is proper to abstain or hereafter, or, in short, whether another thing is better. Dialectic, however, and wisdom, introduce all things to the use of prudence, universally and immaterially. But is it possible to know inferior concerns without Dialectic and wisdom? Or may they be known in a different and defective way? It is possible, however, for a man to be thus wise and skilled in Dialectic without a knowledge of these. Or this will not be the case, but they will coalesce either previously or together. And perhaps some one may have certain physical virtues, from which, when wisdom is possessed, the perfect virtues will be obtained. Wisdom, therefore, is posterior to the physical virtues, but afterwards it perfects the manners; or, rather, the physical virtues existing, both are co-increased, and mutually perfected. Or, one of them being previously assumed, the one will perfect the other. For, in short, physical virtue has an imperfect eye, and imperfect manners; and the principles of both are, for the most part, derived from those things which we possess.

The most malignant feelings which enter into the present struggle between capital and labor have been generated, especially in England, by the ostentation of idle wealth in contrast with surrounding poverty. No really high nature covets such a position as that of a luxurious and useless millionaire. Communism, as a movement, is a mistake; but there is a communism which is deeply seated in the heart of every good man and which makes him feel that the hardest of all labor is idleness in a world of toil, and the bitterest of all bread is that which is earned by the sweat of another man's brow. — *Goldwin Smith.*

¹ *i. e.* By intuition, so as to come into immediate contact with the objects of its knowledge. It does this, however, so far as its energy is purely intellectual.

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

We are indebted to Walter Lewin, Esq., for the following interesting and instructive "Papers for the Times:" "Locke on Innate Ideas," by J. Whitely; "A Chapter on Form," by Daniel C. Angus; "Worry," by Walter Lewin; "Nineteenth Century Prophets," by Walter Lewin; "Philosophy: its Purpose and Place," by J. Whitely; "Emerson and the Transcendentalists," by Walter Lewin. "Papers for the Times are intended for men and women who have a living interest in social, ethical, and religious questions, in their bearing on human welfare. They are especially suitable as a medium for the spread of Liberal Thought and Culture." They may be obtained from Mr. Lewin, 4 Germain Terrace, Birkenhead, England, at about twelve cents each, postage prepaid. Remittances should be made in currency-notes, not postage stamps.

THE THEOSOPHIST. A monthly journal devoted to Oriental Philosophy, Art, Literature, and Occultism; embracing Mesmerism, Spiritualism, and other esoteric sciences. Conducted by H. P. Blavatsky. Published at Bombay, India. Price to American subscribers, \$5.00 per annum, postage prepaid; single copies, fifty cents. It may be ordered through Colby & Rich, 9 Montgomery Place, Boston, Mass.; J. C. Bundy, 92 La Salle Street, Chicago, Ills., or W. Q. Judge, 71 Broadway, New York.

The *Theosophist* is the only journal that is devoted to the exposition of the principles of Oriental philosophy and the Occult sciences. It aims to show the world that India deserved its ancient reputation as the fountain-head of occult wisdom, and that even in this day of her degradation and oppression, there are still true sons of Arya, hidden amidst inaccessible mountains and impenetrable jungles, who consecrate their lives to the study and practice of the sublime science of Yoga. The Yogis are seen only by those who are worthy to see them. "Their secrets are never communicated by them to profanes, nor do they teach their secret science (*vidya*) except to such as, upon trial, they find deserving."

Madame Blavatsky, the able conductor of this journal, is well and favorably known to the philosophic world by her erudite and profound treatise on the occult sciences, — "Isis Unveiled," — a work no one will regret having read and studied. Madame Blavatsky, though she modestly disclaims the title, can be truly termed an "adept." Few of the present day are better qualified to expound pure Theosophy. She is assisted in her editorial labors by Col. Henry S. Olcott, the President-Founder of the Theosophical Society, and a gentleman noted for his proficiency in the various occult sciences.

We hope that the *Theosophist* will soon present the philosophic public with English translations of the *Dnyaneshwari*, and the works of Patanjali.

We can cordially recommend the *Theosophist* to those of our readers — and we trust there are many — who desire to investigate the mysteries of Theosophical science.

THEOSOPHY AND THE HIGHER LIFE; OR, SPIRITUAL DYNAMICS AND THE DIVINE AND MIRACULOUS MAN. By G. WYLD, M.D. London: Trubner & Co., 57, Ludgate Hill. 1881. Copies may be obtained by remitting the equivalent in American currency of 3s. 6d. direct to the publishers.

This is one of the most deeply interesting and valuable works on supersensible science which has appeared for a long time. The author, Dr. George Wyld, the president of the British Theosophical Society, is probably the profoundest Christian theosophist of the age. He has for years been a patient, unselfish, intelligent student of the occult sciences; and the results of his investigations, and his strictly scientific conclusions, as embodied in this work, will be of intense interest to all who believe in something better and higher than Sense and Matter. This book, to be appreciated, must be read and studied. The following list of its contents, and extracts, will give an idea of the general range and scope of the work: I. The Synopsis. II. The Key to Theosophy. III. Spiritual Dynamics. IV. Man as a Spirit. V. The Divine and Miraculous Man. VI. How best to become a Theosophist. VII. Can Anesthetics Demonstrate the Existence of the Soul? VIII. The British Theosophical Society.

The quotations are from the chapter entitled "The Key to Theosophy," and will doubtless be read with pleasure and profit by all.

"Theosophy signifies the knowledge, or the science of the wisdom and will of God, and His relation to the external universe and to man.

"God is the supreme unity. He is the centre and the circumference, and is thus the key to man and Christ, to earth and heaven, and to

universal law. He is absolute *unity*, and thus absolute perfection; but He may be said to manifest himself as a *trinity* of Spirit, Power, and Matter.

"Man, as the microcosm, 'is made in the image of God,' and is thus also a triune being of body, soul, and spirit.

"This triune nature of man as the Son is thus the key to the nature of God as the Father, and is thus the key to Theosophy. Without this key it is impossible to know what man is, and impossible to know what Christ is, and impossible to understand how man can see God in Christ, and thus save his soul.

"When, therefore, the ancient wrote on their temples, *Man, know thyself*, they enigmatically gave the key to all knowledge and all Theosophy. Because to know thyself in the centre—that is, to be born of the Spirit—is to know God.

"The soul rules the body; the spirit rules the soul, and God rules the spirit. Thus the soul is the ego of the body, the spirit is the ego of the soul, and God is the ego of the spirit.

"As the soul is the ruler of the body in this physical world, so the spirit is the ruler of the soul in the spiritual world. The spirit is the *unity* in man, and thus is *en rapport* with the *unity* of God. As the spirit is a unity it is indivisible, and therefore indestructible, and hence immortal.

"Bishop Berkeley says: 'As we can only know external nature through the mind, we have no proof that nature exists externally to the mind.'

"This dogma the common sense of mankind rejects, and yet, in a sense, it is philosophically true, but in the world of spirit it is simply true, for there external forms are created by the mind, and are materialized thoughts. * * *

"The Theosophist therefore does not so much interest himself in the insatiable accumulation of spiritual phenomena as in that philosophy of spirit which is built on spiritual facts, his absorbing interest being in the nature, capabilities, and development of his own personal soul and spirit, in their relation to himself, to external nature, and to God.

"The Oriental Adept is one who has devoted himself to Theosophy, and who by a long and severe training, described in another place, commands by means of soul-force his own spirit, and acts as if he were a demi-God.

"I briefly elsewhere describe how this power is achieved, but here I may say that a long course of training, having for its object the subjugation of the body to the will of the soul—or, in other words, a long training in self-denial—constitutes the essence of the adept life."

It must be remembered that Dr. Wylde is a *Christian* Theosophist, and therefore finds the highest form of Theosophy in pure Christianity. In this connection it is only just to quote the remark of Col. Henry S. Olcott, the "President-Founder" of the parent Theosophical Society, of which the British Society is a prominent branch: "We Theosophists of the inner ring adhere to the Oriental religious philosophies, as better guides to happiness than the Christian theology."

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION TO THE YEAR 200. BY CHARLES B. WAITE, A.M. Second Edition. Chicago: C. V. Waite & Co. 1881.

We have given this work a careful examination, and can unhesitatingly recommend it to our readers as a generally impartial investigation and account of the records and doctrines of the Christian religion. We do not think that Mr. Waite overestimates the value of his labors when he expresses his belief that "this [work] will be found to be the most complete record of the events connected with the Christian religion during the first two centuries that has ever been presented to the public." Mr. Waite generally manifests a laudable indisposition to pronounce hasty judgments. He gives what he conceives to be *facts*, and, as a rule, permits the reader to deduce his own conclusions. The work is written from the rationalistic standpoint. Nothing is accepted on faith. The authorship of the Scriptures is subjected to the same critical tests as are applied to the writings of "profane" authors.

While we believe that Mr. Waite's work was written without prejudice, and with an honest intention to give nothing but facts, we cannot accept all of his statements and conclusions. He occasionally rashly makes a statement that lacks sufficient authority. For instance, the assertions in the following paragraphs are not only erroneous and misleading, but lack absolutely any historical basis. The italics are ours: "Eusebios quotes, as evidence of the truth of the Christian religion, from a *pretended* work of Porphyrios, entitled 'The Philosophy of Oracles,' a *work never heard of before the time of Eusebios, and never since* but from those who accept as authority the author of the ecclesiastical

history. * * * The 'Philosophy of Oracles' has been branded as spurious by Vandale, by Frontenelle, and other able writers" (page 294). Here it is maintained: 1. That Porphyrios did not write a work on the "Philosophy of Oracles," and that there is no such work. 2. That no author living prior to Eusebios, nor any after him except on his (Eusebios') authority, mentions or refers to it. 3. That the work has been "branded as spurious" by Vandale, Frontenelle, and others. We have space for only a few words on each of these points: 1. The work on the "Philosophy of Oracles" *does* exist—in a mutilated form, it is true, but there is reason to believe that the major part of it has been preserved. It is even probable that the whole work is still in existence concealed in the recesses of the Vatican or Escorial libraries. Again, there is ample evidence showing that Porphyrios was the author of this work. 2. Eusebios is neither the first nor only writer that quotes from it. Wolff, in his edition of this book, mentions several authors, some living prior to Eusebios, who quoted it. Joannes Philoponos, in 550 A. D., saw the complete work. 3. What we have of the book is genuine, though there may possibly be a few interpolated passages. Neither Vandale nor Frontenelle were qualified to pronounce a critical opinion as to the genuineness of the work. As for Frontenelle, however, he merely echoed the opinion of Vandale, whose superficial work on the "Oracles" he abridged and popularized.

A SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. BY LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. Revised with the cooperation of JULIUS M. SEELYE, D.D., LL.D., President of Amherst College. Boston: Ginn & Heath. 1880.

This is the last edition of a valuable work. It is primarily designed for college study, and the best evidence of its value is the fact that it has been adopted as a text-book by a large number of the colleges and high schools of this country. The author says: "The aim has been to make it as concise as clearness would admit; and this has been connected with the full persuasion that no labor of the teacher can give to the student a *dispensation from close thought and hard study*, if he would attain to any adequate apprehension of the groundwork of moral science, and comprehend the completeness of the system." We have italicized a part of this sentence, as the idea is excellent and specially noteworthy in this day of loose thinking and attempted popularization of every science. The notion of the "Ultimate Rule of Right" is set forth with great perspicuity. This is a subject of general importance and interest, and we will therefore quote a part of Dr. Hickok's second chapter, which treats of the nature of the ultimate rule:

"As our first inquiry in Moral Science is for an ultimate rule of right, let us start the inquiry with a clear view of what we mean by an ultimate rule. Nothing is ultimate where there is anything beyond. An ultimate, therefore, is not simply the last point our thoughts can reach because they are too feeble to go farther; rather is it the truly last, on which our thoughts rest when they reach it, because they see that there is nothing farther. No fact, therefore, can ever be ultimate; for a fact is something made, and, of course, beyond it is its maker. An ultimate is unmade. It could never either begin or cease to be. It knows no past nor future, but only ever is. The limitations of space are also as little beyond it as are those of time. It is everywhere as well as everywhen.

"An ultimate, therefore, has its ground only in itself, and the light which reveals it is altogether its own. It is both self-supporting and self-evident. It rests upon itself, and the thoughts that reach it rest because itself rests.

THE SOUL: ITS POWERS, MIGRATIONS, AND TRANSMIGRATIONS.

This is the title of a work which Prof. F. B. Dowd, "Grand Master of Rosicrucia," is now engaged in writing. We quote the following from the Professor's circular: "The work embodies Rosicrucian principles of being and action never before given to the public. It contains new and startling ideas of Man, Mind, its Laws, Faculties, etc. Spirit—what is it? Its powers and modes of action. Laws of mediumship and the road to positive knowledge. Clairvoyance—its development. The regeneration of man—the way of the spirit given. The Soul—what is it, and where located?—its wings and its flights. The Imagination, the Love, Wisdom, and Will of man. Rules of will-culture and the production of trance. Life, Birth, and Death, or why do we die? etc. It is not my object to give an extended synopsis of the work. Suffice it to say that it has no chaff in it. * * * To all who will subscribe and pay in advance I will put the price at sixty cents, post free, and forward the book as soon as published. The price of the work after publication will be \$1. Address J. F. Kline, Orange, Texas, who will receipt for all money received and keep lists of names."