

The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

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THE PLATONIST.

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EDITED BY THOS. M. JOHNSON.

The Platonist is devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases.

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In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosized, materialism absurdly considered philosophy, folly and ignorance popularized, and the dictum, "Get money, eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly, and ignorance. This philosophy recognizes the essential immortality and divinity of the human soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to, and union with, the Absolute One. Its mission is to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being,—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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The establishment of the whipping-post as a means of punishment for certain offenders is advocated by many. Only one class of criminals ought to be whipped, viz., the wife-beaters. It may be said that the whipping-post is a relic of barbarism. True. So also is the beating of wives. A man (?) that will beat his wife is a brutal barbarian of the worst type, and ought to be punished in a barbarous manner. No *manhood* can be whipped out of such a villainous brute,—for he has none,—but perhaps the application of the lash may eliminate from his system some of its brutality and devilishness.

It is universally conceded that the good are in a minority. The rabble are practically regardless, both in words and deeds, of all intellectual and moral principles. Few of them, however, have the candor to proclaim their advocacy and practice of wrong. They insolently assert that their ideas and actions are good. This shameless assertion simply demonstrates the fact that they are densely and beastly ignorant of the true nature of *good*.

PEARLS OF WISDOM.

[GATHERED FROM PLATONIC SOURCES.]

Repentance after base actions is the salvation of life.

Every place is safe to him who lives with justice.

The calamities of nations are the banquets of evil demons.

A good man pays no attention to the reproofs of the depraved.

Untaught boys confound letters; but uneducated men, things.

Neither the blows of a sick man, nor the threats of a stupid one, are to be feared.

Clouds frequently obscure the sun; but the passions, the reasoning power.

It is necessary that he who hastens to behold virtue as his country, should pass by pleasures as he would the Sirens.

The felicity of a man does not consist either in body or in riches, but in upright conduct and justice.

He who does an injury is more unhappy than he who receives one.

Neither art nor wisdom can be acquired without preparatory learning.

Garments that are made clean and bright become soiled again by use; but the soul, being once purified from ignorance, remains splendid forever.

When virtue is the object of emulation, vice must necessarily perish.

It is the business of a musician to harmonize every instrument; but of a well-educated man to adapt himself harmoniously to every fortune.

Envy is not repressed by virtue, but is in a greater degree inflamed by it. For if it naturally adheres to good, the greater the good is the more the pain of envy is increased.

Choose rather to leave your children well instructed than rich. For the hopes of the learned are better than the riches of the ignorant.

They whose minds are the least grieved by calamities, and whose actions struggle the most against them, are the greatest both in public and private life.

Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible, be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death; and you will never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

In every feast remember that there are two guests to be entertained, the body and the soul; and that what you give the body you presently lose; but what you give the soul remains forever.

The self-sufficient and needy philosopher lives a life truly similar to Divinity, and considers the non-possession of external and

unnecessary goods as the greatest wealth. For the acquisition of riches sometimes influences desire; but not to act in any respect unjustly is sufficient to the enjoyment of a blessed life.

As the sun doth not wait for prayers and incantations to be prevailed on to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal salutation: so neither do you wait for applauses, and shouts, and praises, in order to do good; but be a voluntary benefactor, and you will be beloved like the sun.

If you are always careful to remember that, in whatever place either your soul or body accomplishes any deed, Divinity is present as an inspector of your conduct, in all your words and actions you will venerate the presence of an inspector from whom nothing can be concealed, and will, at the same time, possess Divinity as an intimate associate.

As neither a goose is alarmed by gagging, nor a sheep by bleating; so neither be you terrified by the voice of a senseless multitude. As you do not comply with a multitude when it injudiciously asks of you any part of your own property, so neither be disconcerted by a mob when it endeavors to force you to any unjust compliance.

Prefer nothing to truth, not even the choice of friendship, lying within the reach of the passions; for by them justice is both confounded and darkened. Truth is an immortal and an eternal thing. It bestows, not a beauty which time will wither, nor a boldness of which the sentence of a judge can deprive us; but the knowledge of what is just and lawful, distinguishing from them, and confuting what is unjust.

Hypocrisy and fraud may win temporarily, but ultimately the right will prevail. The foundations of falsehood are in time, but Truth is grounded in eternity.

The appointment of *scholars* to important official positions shows that the President of the United States possesses excellent judgment. This country is now represented abroad by such men as Profs. James Russell Lowell and Andrew D. White. It is said that Mr. White will be succeeded by Rev. F. P. Burnard, President of Columbia College, New York.

As long as illiterate, irresponsible men are allowed to vote and participate in the management of public affairs, there is little hope for the adoption, in this country, of any reform measures. All illiterates, professional loafers, vagabonds, and other intellectual paupers and moral bankrupts, ought to be disfranchised. The exercise of the right of suffrage by such characters is a disgrace to true civilization.

Several weeks ago a cultured gentleman wrote us: "I wish that Iamblichos could be again translated. I doubt not the light of modern spiritualism would illuminate many passages which are now very obscure in Taylor's translations. If Prof. Wilder would translate Iamblichos on the Mysteries, and Andrew Jackson Davis make comments thereon, such a work would light up the past, and benefit the present age." A commentary on parts of Iamblichos, by Mr. Davis, would doubtless be of great value.

The strife in this world is not for the possession of knowledge and wisdom, but the accumulation of corporeal goods and the multiplication of physical pleasures. The multitude care naught for intellectual pleasures or benefits, and consider themselves happy if they have only sensuous comforts and luxuries. The delights of the senses are the supreme good to them. This notion, we may remark, is heartily indorsed by all animals, but no one whose mind is even partially emancipated from its material environment will sanction it. "Sókratés therefore says, in opposition to those who contend that pleasure is the supreme good, that, though all swine and goats should accord in this opinion, yet he should never be persuaded that our felicity was placed in the enjoyment of corporeal delight, as long as intellect has dominion over all things."

The bad actually hate the good. There is an intense unwillingness among depraved people to concede that others are morally or intellectually superior to them. They are perpetually trying to drag others down to their level. Neither does goodness command their love. They are compelled to respect it, for a lower nature *cannot* despise its superior. The following incident, which occurred while the Athenians were voting on the ostracism of Aristides, is a fine example of the vulgar dislike of virtue. "As, therefore, they were writing the names on the sherds, it is reported that an illiterate, clownish fellow, giving Aristides his sherd, supposing him a common citizen, begged him to write *Aristides* upon it; and he being surprised and asking if Aristides had ever done him any injury, 'None at all,' replied the fellow. 'Neither know I the man; but I am tired of hearing him everywhere called the Just.' Aristides, hearing this, is said to have made no answer, but returned the sherd with his own name inscribed."

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATON.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Continued.]

No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically, does Simplikios, in his commentary on Epiktetos, observe on this subject as follows: "The fountain and principle of all things is *the good*; for that which all things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and the end of all things. *The good* also produces from itself all things, first, middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodneses, one simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many unities, and one principle, many principles. For *the one*, the principle, *the good*, and deity, are the same; for deity is the first and the cause of all things. But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since whatever is a composite and was multitude is posterior to *the one*. And multitude and things which are not good desire *the good* as being above them — and, in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the principle.

"But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess the highest, and all power. For the amplitude of power consists in producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces many principles, many simplicities, and many goodneses, proximately from itself. For since all things

differ from each other, and are multiplied with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus, too, whatever possesses symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain respect connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals of that multitude. For *the one* is the leader of every multitude; and every peculiarity or idiom in the many is derived to the many from *the one*. All partial principles, therefore, are established in that principle which ranks as a whole, and are compounded in it, not with interval and multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in *the one*, and number in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all; and many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one goodness many goodnesses are established. This, too, is not a certain principle like each of the rest; for of these, one is the principle of beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something else, but it is simply *principle*. Nor is it simply the principle of being, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that the idiom of principle, after the same manner as after things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of principles.

Such things, therefore, as are first produced by the first good, in consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures, however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account possess the good according to participation."

From this sublime theory the meaning of that ancient Egyptian dogma, that God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle, as Simplicios in the above passage justly observes, is *all things prior to all*; *i.e.*, he comprehends all things casually, this being the most transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things, therefore, considered as subsisting casually in deity, are *transcendently more excellent* than they are when considered as effects proceeding from him, hence that mighty and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all things *prior* to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth to us its casual comprehension of all things. For all number may be considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the centre; this occult being the same in each with casual subsistence.

That this conception of casual subsistence is not an hypothesis devised by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Platon, is evident from what he says in the *Philebos*; for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts that in Zeus a royal intellect and a royal soul subsist *according to cause*. Pherekydes Syros, too, in his hymn to Zeus, as cited by Kercher (in *Oedip. Egyptiac*), has the following lines:

"Jove is a circle, triangle, and square,
Centre and line, and all things before all."

From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine is sufficiently apparent.

And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers prior to Iamblichos (as we are informed by Damaskios) asserted indeed that there is one *superessential* God, but that the other gods had an *essential* subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from *the one*. They likewise said that there is a multitude of superessential unities, who are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, imparted to essences by the highest God. That this hypothesis, however, is not conformable to the doctrine of Platon is evident from his *Parmenides*, in which he shows that *the one* does not subsist in itself. For as we have observed from Proklos, in the notes on that Dialogue, everything which is the cause of itself, and is self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence, as producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends and that which is comprehended. If, therefore, a subsistence in another signifies, according to Platon, the beings produced by another more excellent cause, a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself. If *the one*, therefore, is not self-subsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not be a true sufficiency in anything.

Besides, as Damaskios well observes, if that which is subordinate by nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of intellect. And if it be true of intellect it will also be true of life of life, of being like; wise; and if of being, of the unities above being. For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If, therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former—I mean the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the genus of substance, and is contradistinguished from accident, which cannot exist independent of a subject.

Self-subsistent superessential natures, therefore, are the immediate progeny of *the one*, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and *the one* must be conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine, self-perfect, and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect natures, *viz.*, of beings—lives, intellects, and souls—proceeds, according to Platon; in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the human soul, proximately suspended from the *dæmoniacal* order; for this order, as he clearly asserts in the *Banquet*, "stands in the middle rank between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links together all intelligent nature." And here, to the reader who has not penetrated the depths of Platon's philosophy, it will doubtless appear paradoxical in the extreme that any being should be said to produce itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The solution of this difficulty is as follows: Essential production, or that energy through which any nature produces something else by its very being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are seen in the last of things. Thus fire imparts heat by its very essence, and snow coldness. And, in short, this is a producing

of that kind in which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As this mode of production, therefore, from its being the most perfect of all others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first belong to those self-subsistent powers who immediately proceed from the ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that which subsists at the summit of self-subsistent natures, a series of self-subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; but it is produced by intellect *immovably*, and by itself *transitively*; for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So far, therefore, as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is produced by intellect; but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by itself. In short, with respect to everything self-subsistent, the summit of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that summit is its own spontaneous energy; and through this it becomes self-subsistent and self-perfect.

That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows: That which is able to impart anything superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same genus; but *well-being* confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than *mere being*. The rational soul imparts *well-being* to itself when it cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the contagion of the body. It will, therefore, also impart *being* to itself. And this with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as possess the ability of imparting anything primarily to others, necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the sun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all splendor. Hence, since the soul imparts life and motion to other things, — on which account Aristoteles calls an animal *αὐτοκίνητος*, self-moved, — it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and motion to itself.

From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Platon, respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it follows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the universe, and this, not through any defect, but, on the contrary, through transcendency of power. All things, indeed, are ineffably unfolded from him *at once*, into light; but divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Platon calls Zeus, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader will readily admit that this dogma is so far from being derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and preserves, in a becoming manner, the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. If, therefore, we presume to celebrate him, — for, as we have already observed, it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul which dare anxiously to explore him, — we should celebrate him as the principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or, in the reverential language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown. Highly laudable, indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which the great ancients paid to

this immense principle. This I have already noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides; and I shall only observe at present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated intelligible. Hence, says Proklos in his Scholia on the Kratylos, “not every genus of the gods has an appellation — for with respect to the first deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to *the one*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms and the intellectual nature of intelligibles are unfolded into light. But the natures prior to this, being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence. Hence, the whole of the teletic science energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods.”

With no less magnificence, therefore, than piety, does Proklos thus speak concerning the ineffable principle of things: “Let us now, if ever, remove from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the First be at peace; but let the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also, standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain anything of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes, adoring, as it were, the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever to behold him, — let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us, as it were, celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; — for he produced these, indeed, but among the last of things; — but, prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities, — as the God of all gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta, — as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence, — as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods.” (Plat. Theol., Lib. II., chap. 11.) Such is the piety, such the sublimity and magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to speak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the ineffable coensation of the *incomprehensible One*.

From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature — which, as is noticed in the extracts from Damaskios, induced the most ancient theologians, philosophers, and poets to be entirely silent concerning it — arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the Odyssey, when Odysseus and Telemachos are removing the arms from the walls of the palace of Ithaka, and Athena, going before them

with her golden lamp, fills all the place with a divine light, Telemachos having observed that certainly some one of the celestial gods was present, Odysseus says in reply: "Be silent, restrain your intellect (*i.e.*, even cease to energize intellectually), and speak not." Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Platon in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to Platon, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being a part of a consubstantial triad that he is not to be connumerated with anything, but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude that he is even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and habitude that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge refunded into ignorance. What that trinity, however, is in the theology of Platon, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides and the extracts from Damaskios. And thus much for the doctrine of Platon concerning the principle of things and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.

In the next place, following Proklos and Olympiodoros as our guides, let us consider the mode according to which Platon teaches us mystic conceptions of divine natures; for he appears not to have pursued everywhere the same mode of doctrine about these, but sometimes according to a divinely inspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaidros, being evidently inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the *intellectual, liberated, and mundane* gods. But in the Sophistes, dialectically contending about being, and the subsistence of *the one* above beings, and doubting against philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a passive one, but not *the one itself*, being subject to and united to *the one*, but not being that which is primarily one. [Note.—It is necessary to observe that, according to Platon, whatever participates of anything is said to be *passive* to that which it participates, and the participations themselves are called by him *passions*.] In a similar manner, too, in the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from *the one*, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again, in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators and their demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the union of loves, and in the Protagoras about the distribution of mortal animals from the gods, in a symbolical manner concealing the truth concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his mind to the most genuine of his readers.

LIFE OF PLATON.

[Concluded.]

Platon returned to the Academy and devoted himself to divine philosophy. He did not attempt to reform any more small-minded tyrants. He refused an invitation from the Arcadians to prescribe laws for Megalopolis, a city rebuilt by them after they had been disastrously defeated by the Lacedæmonians. When the Kyrenæans, likewise, requested him to send them laws for

their city, he declined, saying it was difficult to prescribe laws for men who were in a prosperous condition. However, he yielded to the importunities of the citizens of other places, and gave them the benefit of his political wisdom. Platon spent his time in lecturing and the composition of those immortal works which will ever remain the most precious intellectual treasures of mankind. They are confessedly the finest and profoundest productions of the human genius and intellect. The following is a list of these inestimable writings, arranged in tetralogies according to Thrasyllos, a noted Platonist who flourished in the first century of the Christian era:

- | | | | |
|------|--|------|---|
| 1. { | Euthyphron.
Apology of Sokrates.
Kriton.
Phaidon. | 2. { | Kratylos.
Theaitetos.
Sophistes.
Politikos. |
| 3. { | Parmenides.
Philebos.
Banquet.
Phaidros. | 4. { | Alkibiades I.
Alkibiades II.
Hipparchos.
The Rivals. |
| 5. { | Theages.
Charmides.
Laches.
Lysis. | 6. { | Euthydemos.
Protagoras.
Gorgias.
Menon. |
| 7. { | Hippias I.
Hippias II.
Ion.
Menexenos. | 8. { | Kleitophon.
Republic.
Timaios.
Kritias. |
| | | 9. { | Minos.
Laws.
Eptnomis.
Letters. |

A short time before his death Platon appeared to himself in a dream to be changed into a swan, which, by passing from tree to tree, caused much trouble to the fowlers. According to the Sokratic Simmias, this dream signified that his meaning would be apprehended with difficulty by those who should be desirous to unfold it after his death. For interpreters resemble fowlers, in their endeavors to explain the conceptions of the ancients. But his meaning cannot be apprehended without great difficulty, because his writings, like those of Homeros, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and, in short, multifariously; for these two souls are said to have been generated all-harmonic, and hence the works of both Homeros and Platon demand an all-various consideration.*

Platon died, whilst engaged in writing, on his birthday, after having lived exactly eighty-one years. Hence, says Seneca, the magi who then happened to be at Athens sacrificed to him as a being more than human, because he had completed a most perfect number which nine, multiplied by nine, produces. On Platon's sepulchre the Athenians placed the following inscription:

From great Apollo Platon sprung,
And Plato, too, we find:
The saviour of the body, one;
The other of the mind.

Statues and altars were erected to his memory; the day of his birth long continued to be celebrated as a festival by his followers, and his portrait is to this day preserved in gems. Pagans and Christians have vied with each other in expressing their admiration for Platon. The epithet "divine" has been universally given him, and he truly deserved it. Platon, says Apuleius, not only surpassed the virtues of heroes, but also possessed powers which resembled those of the gods. Among the wisest of the Greeks, says Marsilius Ficinus, there was a proverb that Platon had three eyes: one by which human, another by which natural, and a third by which divine things were surveyed by him; which last eye was in his forehead, the others being under it. "Justinus Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origines, Euse-

* Olympiodoros.

bios, and St. Augustine — these founders of the Church regarded Platon as actually inspired, so profoundly were they impressed by the divine character of his instruction." Quintilianus called him the Homeros of Philosophy; Cicero our (Roman) divinity; Klemens the truth-loving Platon; Ambrosius the greatest of philosophers; Jerome the wisest of philosophers; Lactantius the wisest of all; Arnobius the apex and foundation of philosophers; and Eusebios says of him that he alone of all the Greeks reached to the vestibule of truth and stood upon its threshold. These are the opinions of some of the most eminent Christians of ancient times. The opinion of Goethe, a celebrated modern, is no less noteworthy: Platon was a happy and beneficent spirit, sent into this world to sojourn in it for a season. He did not seek so much to make himself profoundly acquainted with it, as to communicate with gracefulness those treasures of wisdom of which mankind stood so much in need. He penetrated into the abyss of speculation, more from the lofty grandeur of his nature than from any vain desire for abstraction. He took his flight to celestial regions, his soul glowing with desire to participate again in its divine nature. Every thing, he said, had a relation with *the good, the beautiful, and the immutably true*; and he ardently desired to inspire all those who heard him with the same lofty and noble sentiments.

COMMENTARY OF PROKLOS ON THE FIRST ALKIBIADES OF PLATON.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK.

INTRODUCTION (*Ἰμμεροτομο*).

The firmest and most characteristic principle of the Platonic dialogues, and, in fact, of the whole theory of the philosopher, is the knowledge of our own nature; for, this being rightly established as an hypothesis, we shall be able to accurately learn the good which is adapted to us and the evil which is antagonistic to this good. As the essences of things are different, so are their proper perfections; to some one, to others another, according to a diminution of essence. For whether *being and the good* proceed, as Aristoteles says, from the same abode and first fountain, it is certainly necessary that the intellectual part of perfection should be imparted to everything according to the measures of essence; or whether the good proceeds from a cause more ancient and holy, and essence and being are imparted to things from another cause, still, as everything participates of being more obscurely or more clearly, so likewise must it participate of good — first beings in a greater and more perfect manner, those that rank in the middle orders secondarily, and the last of things according to the lowest order of participation. How otherwise, the Divinities and Providence governing things, can beings participate of the good according to their merit? For it must not be conceded that Mind leads things into order and imparts to each an appropriate measure, and that *the good*, which is more ancient than mind, communicates its gifts to beings in a disordered manner, viz.: that it imparts to causes and things caused the same portion of goodness, or distributes to the same things according to essence the perfection of primary and subsequent natures. For it neither was nor is lawful, says Timaios, for the best of natures to effect anything except that which is most beautiful and commensurate. And the same good is not most commensurate to primary and secondary natures; neither is there according to essence a distinct perfection to similar beings; but, as the Athenian guest says, a distribution of inequality to things unequal and of equality to things equal, of the greater to such as are greater and of the less to such as

are lesser, is of all things the most musical and the best. According to this reasoning, therefore, good is different in different beings, and a certain good is naturally coördinated to the essence of everything. Hence the perfection of mind is in eternity, and of the rational soul in time; the good of the rational soul is in an intellectual energy, while the good of the body is in a subsistence according to nature. And, again, there is one perfection of the divinities, another of angels and demons, and another of partial (human) souls. Wherefore he who thinks that, though the essence in these is different, yet the perfection is the same, has an erroneous conception of the truth of things, since there is no similar genus, as Homeros says, of either gods or men, or of those natures which exist between these genera, or again of each of the extremes. If these things are rightly apprehended, it is necessary that in each order of beings essence should be known prior to perfection; for perfection is not of itself, but of essence, by which it is participated. Hence, with respect to the essence of a thing, we must first consider whether it belongs to impartible essences, or to such as are divisible about bodies, or to such as exist between these. Likewise, whether it ranks among eternal entities, or such as exist according to the whole of time, or such as are generated in a certain part of time. Moreover, whether it is simple and subsists prior to all composition, or indeed is a composite, but is always being bound with indissoluble bonds, — or, again, may be resolved into those things from which it is composed. And if we thus consider everything we will be able to understand in what its good consists. It is evident, therefore, that the good of those natures which are allotted an impartible essence is eternal, and that the good of partible natures is connected with time and motion; and that the good of things existing between these must be considered according to the measures of subsistence (hypostasis) and perfection, viz.: that such a nature is indeed indigent of time, but of first time, which is able to measure incorporeal periods. Wherefore we repeat that the most appropriate principle of all philosophy, and especially of the Platonic, is pure and genuine self-knowledge, circumstanced in scientific boundaries, and firmly linked to the reasonings from cause. For where else is it proper to begin, except from the purification and perfection of ourselves; whence also the Delphian divinity exhorts us to begin. For, as those who enter the Eleusinian grove are ordered by a notice not to enter into the adyta of the temple unless they have been purified and initiated, so the inscription KNOW THYSELF, on the Delphic fane, manifests, as it appears to me, the mode of ascending (returning) to a divine nature, and the most expeditious path to purification; all but plainly declaring to the *intelligent* that he who knows himself, beginning from his inmost nature, may be able to be conjoined with that divinity who unfolds into light the whole of truth, and is the leader of a cathartic life; but that he who is ignorant of himself, being unpurified and uninitiated, is neither fit nor adapted to participate the providence of Apollon. Self-knowledge, therefore, is the principle of the philosophy of Platon. It is proper, then, I think, that a disciple of Apollon should begin the perfecting of imperfect things according to the mandate of the god. And Sokrates himself, who says that of Apollon he is a fellow-servant with the swans, and who received no less a gift from the divinity than the art of prophesying, also declared that philosophy should begin with self-knowledge; he obeying the Pythian inscription, and believing that it was the mandate of the god. Wherefore let us also begin conformably to the Apollonian mandate, and investigate in which of his dialogues Platon especially makes the speculation of our essence his principal design, in order that we may hence properly begin the study of this. What other work, then, of Platon can we arrange prior to the

First Alkibiades, and the conference of Sokrates which is delivered in this dialogue? Where else shall we say our essence is unfolded? In what other book are man and the nature of man investigated? Finally, where else is the Delphic inscription thoroughly examined, or in what manner shall we seek, prior to the investigation of these subjects, any other entity, whether of true being or of things in generation, — hearing Sokrates himself saying: "It seems ridiculous to me that I, being ignorant of myself, should investigate other things," — since nothing is nearer to us than ourselves. If we are ignorant of things directly present to us, by what contrivance or art will we be able to know things at a distance, which are naturally known through us? If you understand not only these things in this dialogue, which are clearly described and explained, but also that it is Sokrates who engages in the first conversation with Alkibiades and that he says that the beginning of perfection is suspended from the contemplation of ourselves, you will no longer deny that hence [*i.e.*, from self-knowledge] all must begin who are hastening to be perfected. For each of us is more or less bound by the passions which manacled the son of Klinias. For we are ignorant of ourselves in consequence of being in a certain oblivion produced by our descent into generation, and being agitated by the tumult of the irrational forms of life. In the meantime we think that we know many things of which we are ignorant, because we essentially possess innate reasons of things. And we need the same assistance [as if we really lacked innate reasons], in order that we may eliminate from our minds superfluous opinion and give proper attention and care to the work of self-purification.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE LAST WORDS OF SOKRATES.

BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

"Kritôn, I owe a cock to Asklepîos; pay the debt, and he sure you don't forget it."

It has been affirmed that the meaning of these words has been misunderstood for more than twenty-two centuries. One class of writers would have us believe that the great sage, notwithstanding his great acuteness, was still a "Pagan," the worshipper of "false gods." Another suggestion is that he retained till the supreme moment his inveterate habit of irony. I am at a loss how to relate in proper terms the conjectures which are evidently so short-sighted and superficial. It would seem to the common apprehension that at such a time the dying man had done with word-conflicts, and was himself contemplating the apocalypse of existence now unfolding to him. The whole discourse of the *Phaidôn* relates to this matter. What men call death is the real life, the awakening of the interior man to consciousness and the society of immortal and divine beings; and philosophy is the preparing, the schooling of ourselves for entering upon this mode of existence. Especially is this the case when the soul is separated in a pure condition, when it leaves the body and has not been so bewitched by it as to think that nothing is real unless it is corporeal and perceptible by the physical senses. "Every idea is a something," he declares. It will not admit or harmonize with its own contrary; as the odd will never accept the idea of the even, or the just and musical the idea of the unjust and unmusical. So, too, that which is immortal will not admit or recognize death; and the soul, being utterly incapable of making such an admission, is accordingly itself immortal. It requires our care, therefore, not for a lifetime merely, but for all time. Every soul has its respective

demon* or guardian spirit, which conducts it, after death, to its proper station. Those who have lived a life eminently holy are set free and go to supernal abodes; and there is a special beatitude for those of them who have purified themselves by philosophy — the love and pursuit of wisdom.

The conversation had reached this point when the time arrived for drinking the hemlock. The great sage complied promptly and cheerfully with the fatal sentence; and just as the poison was completing its work, he uncovered his face and delivered the memorable charge to Kritôn.

To impute the common idolatry of the period to Sôkratês, appears out of place and without warrant. Sôkratês and Platôn both agree, says Ploutarchos, that God is the ONE, having beginning from itself, sole in essence, and that he is the one only being perfectly good; all these designations and representations denoting goodness having their centre in the interior mind. Hence God is to be understood as that Mind or Spirit which is a separate idea, not mingled with matter or involved with anything having passions. "Thou shalt understand," said Sôkratês to Aristodêmos, "that there is a Deity whose eye pierceth through all nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; extended through all places, and extending through all time; and whose bounty and care can know no other bound than those fixed by his own creation."

On the morning when he repaired to the court of the archonking to answer for his life, he met Euthyphrôn, — a *mantis* or diviner belonging to the sacerdotal college, — who inquired why he had left the Lykeion and appeared where men were held to answer for murder and sacrilege. Sôkratês replied that he was there to answer the accusation of Melitos, of corrupting the young men, introducing new gods, and disbelieving in the ancient divinities. "It is because you say that a tutelary spirit constantly attends you," said Euthyphrôn. "He gives his accusation this shape, knowing that charges relating to innovations in worship are most readily entertained by the populace."

Euthyphrôn had come to denounce his own father for having murdered a slave, and, being an acknowledged authority in religious matters, Sôkratês proposed to be taught by him what was holy and what was sacrilegious. Euthyphrôn appears to have been a counsellor of the stamp of Mr. W. M. Everts, for he proposed to find the weak side of the accuser, in order to occupy the court with a discussion about him, rather than about the defendant. Stepping beyond such suggestions, Sôkratês demanded what was holy and what impiety.

"That which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not pleasing to them is impious," replied the diviner.

"An admirable answer," said Sôkratês. "But that which is holy is not the same as that which is unholy, but contrary to it; is it not so?"

"Assuredly," replied Euthyphrôn.

"Is it not said," asked Sôkratês, "that the gods quarrel and are at variance; that what some love, others hate? To be holy is to be just. Is the thing holy because they love it, or do they love it because it is holy? * * * Is not that which is loved one thing; and that which loves, another?"

This was too much for the priest, and he hurried away. "Hold!" cried Sôkratês; "you are disappointing my earnest

* The *nous* or interior mind. In the *Kratylos* Sôkratês explains that *daêmôn* is a term denoting wisdom; and that every good man is *dalmonian*, both while living and when dead, and is rightly called a *daimôn*. Menandros explicitly declares that "the *nous* is the *daêmôn*," or tutelary. I accordingly accept the tripartite distinction, which makes the *psuchê* or soul the selfhead or individual identity; the *nous*, spirit, or interior mind, the divine entity or guardian, the *deus in nobis*; and the body, the seat of the epithumetic principle. Paul, the great Christian Apostle, follows this same distinction, ascribing all evils to the heart or flesh, and supreme good and benefit to the spirit. "In my flesh dwells no good: I delight in the living God after the inward man." — A. W.

hope of learning what things are holy and what are not, in order that I might be released from the accusation of Melitos, and lead a better life in future."

But Euthyphrôn, the reputed intimate of the gods, dared not wait. He had been betrayed into the acknowledgment that holiness or justice was the principle supreme over all, and, therefore, loved by the gods. Such a declaration exposed him likewise to the imputation of sacrilege, and denying the gods of the Pantheon.

It is plain, therefore, that Sôkratês was no worshipper of many gods, as the idea is entertained at the present time. He recognized the One whose emanation permeated higher being, and acknowledged tutelary and other spiritual beings, in subordinate spheres of existence, much as it is now the fashion to recognize angels and their subordinates.

Why, then, did Sôkratês command the offering to be made to Asklêpios? He could not have been trifling at the supreme moment. It is equally certain that he who assigned to Justice a place above all the gods was not, in any vulgar sense, the worshipper of an infinitude of deities. Let us contemplate the reasons which induced him.

The priest had gone his way, as happy to escape his interrogator as he was self-complacent about his errand. Sôkratês entered the Hall of Judgment, and heard the charges which had been preferred. He then delivered his famous *Vindication*. "When your generals assigned me my port in Potidaïê, at Amphipolis and Dêlion, I remained and encountered the danger of death. So when the Deity [Apollon], as I thought and believed, had set me to pass my life in the pursuit of philosophy, and in the examination of myself and others, I was not at liberty, through fear of death or anything else whatever, to desert my post. * * * This duty has been assigned to me by God, by oracles, by dreams, and every mode by which any divine order has ever been enjoined on men."

The rêtor Lysis had prepared a defence, elaborate with legal skill and art, picking flaws in the indictment and pleading with the judges for lenity. But Sôkratês perceived himself to be prohibited by the inward voice to depart from truth and simplicity, or to seek any advantage by equivocation. When he had been condemned by a bare majority of six, and the penalty of death had been proposed, he declined to acknowledge himself to be in the wrong, to supplicate for mercy, or even to ask for a milder sentence. "Calumny and envy have condemned me," he said. "I shall not act otherwise though I shall have to die many deaths. If I had taken part in money-making, politics, military matters, popular oratory, or public life in any form, I am too upright a man to be safe; but I have labored to do a greater benefit to you all, by endeavoring to persuade each to excel in being good and wise. I deserve for this a public maintenance. I do not know whether death is good fortune or calamity. Shall I choose, then, what I know to be a calamity, — imprisonment, a slave to the magistrates, or exile, going from city to city? I have been condemned by reason of my lack of audacity and immodest boldness."

In all this, however, he attested that he had the approval of his tutelary spirit. "Twice," he declared to Hermogenês, "twice have I attempted to take this matter of my defence under consideration, but the guardian genius always opposed me." He explains this to his judges: "I wish to make known to you the meaning of that which has just now befallen me. The accustomed voice of my guardian spirit, on every former occasion, even in the most trifling affairs, opposed me, if I was about to do anything wrong. What has just happened any one would think and it is supposed to be the extreme of misfortune; yet the divine warning did not interpose when I left home this morning, nor when I came up hither to the place of trial, nor in my ad-

dress when I was about to say anything, although on former occasions it has frequently restrained me when speaking. All through this proceeding it has never opposed me in anything which I said or did. I know, therefore, that what has befallen me is a blessing, and it is impossible that those of us who think death is an evil, think rightly. The fact which proves this to me is that the accustomed signal (*σημασιον*) would have checked me, except that I had been about to meet with some good.

"If death is a sleep in which there is no dreaming, it would be a wonderful gain. Nights passed in sweet sleep are the most pleasant of all, and so the whole future will be but a single night of this character. If, however, death is a removal from one mode of existence to another, from this world to the underworld of the dead, I would be willing to die often. I would spend my time there in questioning the people, and ascertaining who among them is wise, as I have here. Surely, for that the judges there do not condemn one to death, and those who live there are happier, in other respects, than those that are here. To a good man, nothing is a calamity, either while living or when dead; nor is his welfare neglected of God."

In this frame of mind he repaired to his prison, and calmly awaited the return of the *theôris* or sacred boat from Delôs, till which period it was not lawful to put him to death. He even refused to escape when his friends had prepared everything for the purpose, and half the people of Athens desired it. Kritôn himself besought him, pleading that the populace, the great multitude, are ready at any time to do a man the greatest evil unjustly, if he has been calumniated to them. "But," replied Sôkratês, "I have made a special compact with the Athenians, choosing to dwell here with them, consenting to submit to their government, and, indeed, actually choosing death from them in preference to exile. By violating these agreements I shall compromise my friends, and actually go counter to all the precepts of my life. I seem to hear the laws protesting, as the worshippers of Kubêlê seem to hear the flutes. The sound hums in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. I will pursue this course, for the divine one leads me after this manner."

I have sometimes curiously questioned whether Sôkratês did not actually endeavor to obtain this dismissal from life. Xenophôn has declared that, with regard to death, he was no way solicitous to importune his judges, as the custom was with others. On the contrary, he thought it the best time for him to die. That he had thus determined with himself, was still the more evident after his condemnation; for when he was ordered to fix his own penalty, he refused to do it or suffer any one to do it for him, saying that to fix a penalty implied a confession of guilt. "No disgrace can it bring on me," said he, "that others have not seen that I was innocent."

This conjecture is rendered plausible from the fact that in primitive tribes, where want is imminent and old age burdensome, it is usual to make way with the aged and infirm, as well as with supernumerary infants. Several of the nations of Greece had these customs. In Kêos it was the practice, when attaining sixty or seventy years of age, to put an end to life by voluntarily drinking hemlock. Sôkratês could not, however, resort to voluntary suicide. The philosopher, he said, should free his soul as much as he can from communion with the body, but he will not commit violence upon himself, for that is not allowable. This restriction was abrogated, however, when the magistrates took the responsibility. He was at full liberty to expatiate on the advantages of dying while in possession of the physical faculties. "Does it not appear manifest to you," he asks Hermogenês, "that God thinks this the very best time for me to die? I have been second to no one in living uprightly, or even pleasantly. But now, if my existence shall be prolonged, and I am spared to

old age, what can hinder infirmities from falling upon me? My sight will grow dim, my hearing heavy; I will become less capable of learning, and more liable to forget what I have already learned; and if, in addition to all this, I shall become sensible of my decay, and bemoan myself on account of it, how can I say that I still lived pleasantly? It may be, too, that God, in his goodness, has appointed for me that my life shall terminate at a time which seems the most seasonable, and in the manner which shall be most eligible; for they who take charge of this matter will permit me to choose the means supposed to be the most easy, as well as free from those lingering circumstances which keep friends in anxious suspense, and fill the mind of the dying man with perturbation. Thus, when nothing offensive is left on the memory of those present, but the man is dissolved while the body is sound, and the mind capable of exerting itself benevolently, who can say that to die in this way is not most desirable?"

The sacred boat returned from Dêlos, and the friends of Sôkratês hastened to his prison for the last time. Speedily, after his old method, the conversation was led to the great topic of philosophy, the interior life of man.

Does it appear becoming in a lover of Wisdom, he asked, to be anxious about pleasures, as of food and drink, sex, or other bodily delights, like dress or ornament? Not at all. Do the senses of the body, like sight and hearing, convey any real truth to man? It is plain that when the soul endeavors to consider anything, acting in conjunction with the body, it is led astray. It therefore retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body and becoming separate from contact with it, when it endeavors to apprehend the real Wisdom—the knowledge of that which is. "Certainly." The conclusion, then, is that those who pursue the love of wisdom rightly are studying this matter of dying; and to them, of all men, death is the least formidable. The man who is grieved when about to die is not a lover of Wisdom, but a lover of his body, probably of riches and honor. Fortitude and control over the passions are eminently characteristic of philosophers. "Necessarily so."

They who keep their passions in subjection in order to be capable of other pleasures are but bartering the greater for the less; whereas all ought to be bartered for wisdom, the only right coin. True excellence (*ἀρετή*) subsists with wisdom, and is a purification from all these things.

In like manner, he added, those who instituted the Eleusinian Mysteries taught that the impure and uninitiated would, on their arriving in Hadês, find themselves in the mire—the primitive matter from which man originated; but the purified would dwell with the gods. "There are many who carry the *narthez*, but few entheasts." It is not lawful for any one who has not so pursued the love of wisdom and departed this life perfectly pure to pass into the society of the divine beings; but only for the lovers of Wisdom.

Thus the discourse went on till the sun began to descend in the sky. Then Kritôn asked:—

"How shall we bury you?"

"Just as you please," replied Sôkratês; "provided only that you are able to catch me and I do not escape from you." Then, turning to the others, with a smile, he added: "Friends, I cannot persuade Kritôn that I am Sôkratês who am now talking with you and methodizing each part of the conversation. He continues to think that I am that same thing which he will presently behold dead. So he asks how he shall bury me. I seem to have talked to him to little purpose, when I argued at such length that when I have drunk the poison I will remain no longer with you, but shall depart to the happy state of the blessed. You must become my sureties to Kritôn in an obligation contrary to what he undertook for me to the judges. He went bail that I

should remain; you must go as sureties to him that when I die I shall not remain, but depart. Then Kritôn, when he sees my body burned or buried, will not be afflicted, as though I had suffered something dreadful, nor will say: 'Sôkratês is laid out, carried forth, or is buried.' Be assured, most excellent Kriton, that to speak thus improperly is not only blameworthy as to the thing itself, but it likewise occasions injury of some kind to our own souls. Have good courage, then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in a manner pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to custom."

Having drunk the mortal draught, he chided his friends for their vehement grieving. "I sent away the women," said he, "on purpose to avoid such a scene. I have been taught that it is fortunate to have good omens when dying." Having laid down, the servant covered him, and, after a little while, perceiving the final moment near, he pushed away the mantle and gave the charge to his friend: "Kritôn, I owe it to Asklepîos; pay the debt, and be sure that you do not neglect it."

"It shall be done," responded the heart-broken Kritôn; "but tell me, have you more to command?"

The noble sage was unable to utter more; a gasp and a convulsion followed, and he had indeed departed.

I have judged that Sôkratês meant more in these words than many conjecture. In the *Dialogues* preserved or compiled by Platôn, he discourses much upon mind, ethics, and human immortality. He sought a criterion by which all propositions could be tested. He exhibited a rare conception of spirituality. It was not a condition induced by mere culture and discipline, according to the knowledge derived from books, teachers, and observation. "I do not possess such learning," he said, "but I wish I did." He could stand in the Agora all day, rapt in contemplation and full of the "over-soul." In his discourses with others, he sought to evolve from their minds the conception that error is an unreality, and therefore to be forsaken, while truth alone had a being. Only the spirit, the *nous*, or divine entity,* in man might apprehend this. "Essence—that which alone really is—colorless, shapeless, and intangible, is visible only to the *nous* or interior mind which guides the soul." So he compelled a sceptic, by his rigorous questions, to assent to this conclusion: "Veneration alone fits the soul for the communication of divine secrets; and no others attain them except those who consult, adore, and obey the Deity." If the soul had no moral reverence and certainty, the life was based on quicksand. He was no raving maniac, agitated by a sacred fury, but one who sought clear thinking rather than clear seeing. The rock should first be found on which to place the substructure of the life. Clear thinking is consistent with holiness and leads to it. There should be a reason for everything that is done, and that reason derived from certainty. Opinion and custom, even the enacting of a statute or the decree of a priest, can never stand in place of the person's own sense and knowledge of right and wrong. So Sôkratês had acted when a Senator of Athens, and refused obedience to superior magistrates who commanded him to do what he was conscious was wrong.

This stubborn integrity, which looked death and disgrace steadfastly in the face, and refused to be awed thereby, which obeyed the interior guide,—the divine principle from God,—was triumphant in all its encounters. The hemlock did not slay Sôkratês. But he closed up the book of the former archaic ages

*Anaxagoras taught before Platôn and Sôkratês that the *Nous*, or *Anima Mundi*, originated all things. It seems that he borrowed this idea from Egypt, where it was entertained, even the designation *nous* being apparently the same as *NOUT*, the Coptic name of the Divinity as an interior intelligence. The Ionian and Egyptian taught alike. Even the Apostle Paul declared: "We have the *nous* of Christos," evidently meaning a common spirit or divine principle actuating them all.—A. W.

and opened a new volume of life, out of which all are judged. Nobody cares what was written; no religion or school of thought goes beyond the pages of Platon. Reading there, they exclaim with a common voice:—

“The Darkness has passed; the true Light shines!”

The sceptical dreams of physicists like Démokritos, who would create spirit out of material atoms, establish a psychology with names alone and leaving the soul out, and ignore a Cause and a God, were sternly reprehended. “It is all guess-work,” said he, “these conclusions about what the earth is made of, and how it was produced. You may speculate about the floor of the firmament, what the stars are, how the winds blow, and whether the world is a colossal tortoise paddling around in the supernal ether, but you can not *know* anything about it. We can, however, learn something about ourselves. We can know what virtue is, where peace may be found, whether there is such a thing as justice, as truth, and whether man was made for a higher walk and destiny than a beaver and a goat.”

What a rebuke to the so-called “exact science” of our day, so unsatisfactory because it is, and inevitably must be, incomplete and inexact. Our scientists explore stars, rivers, and rocks in quest of the material of knowledge; but in their conception God is a figment of the imagination, the soul a region of haze, the law of right a something which nobody is sure about, and conscience an echo of passions and desires upon whose voice it is not safe to rely. Accordingly, in their purview, our bones are our noblest part, and receive from them the most attention. So reasoned not Sókratés; so no philosopher worthy of the title ever reasoned. With him Wisdom was all—the perception of ideas inborn in the interior mind from the Eternal Source, and ascertained by a faculty of vision from which external sense was excluded.

All this was shadowed forth in the Eleusinia. The worshippers were first purified and sworn to fidelity. They were afterward permitted to view mythic scenes and exemplars, which impressed the imagination, producing a state of mind favorable to learning somewhat of the inner life of Man. The many were satisfied with awe-inspiring ceremonies and the reverence paid to ancestral spirits. Démêtér, represented as the sorrowful Achtheia weeping for her daughter ravished away by the Lord of Death, only impressed such as apprehended what Gautama-Buddha showed the sorrowing mother, that there was a loved one dead in every home. Farewell, then, Kora! joy will come with gay and festive Iakchos. The flute of the Korybant and the shout of the multitude exhilarate hearts enfeebled by woe, and even intoxicate the imagination. But how many such, carrying wands and torches, enter the Mystic Cave and come forth epoptic—the true seers of Wisdom? “Few!” replies the initiator; “many are the called, few the elect!” But philosophy, the Wisdom known by the elect, transcends all; she is justified by her children.

In the Eleusinian Rites there is mercy shadowed forth for those who came late. Even the Overlord of the Nabatean *Gospel* gave full pay to the laborers who worked faithfully, though only from the eleventh hour. When the Great Day of the Festival was over, and the thousands of worshippers had been dismissed, a special rite was observed for the benefit of those who had only just arrived. Héraklés had been so favored by Eu-Molpous at Ageai; and even the later orgy of Iakchos, or old Dionysos born anew as a son of the Great Mother,* was added to the Eleusinia.

* Démêtér, from Sanskrit, *Devamatr*, or Lakohmi, the Mother of Gods. Kybélé, or Rhea, the Phrygian goddess, was another representation of the same character, and the worship of both exhibited close resemblances.

Finally, perhaps to blend them all in one, an initiatory ceremony in honor of Asklépios was also instituted.

This divinity was Phœnician, the Apollon or Overlord (*απολλωνιος* or *βασιλευσις*) of Palestine. He dwelt in underground temples, often elaborately constructed, and was renowned for wisdom and the marvellous gifts which he bestowed on his worshippers. His shrines were the hospitals of the early world; legions of spirits aided to unroll the scroll of destiny and reveal the arcane sources of disease. His rod and staff comforted the sick and despairing. Having been naturalized in Greece as the son of Apollôn, his temples and priests abounded over the country, with rites and mysteries of their own. In due time they were associated with the worship of Démêtér and Poseidôn at Eleusis.

“What the Eleusinia furnished to Greece,” says a distinguished writer, “that Sokratés furnished to himself. That man who could stand stock-still a whole day lost in contemplation, what was the need to him of the Eleusinian veil? The most self-sufficient man in all Greece, who could find the way directly to himself and to the mystery and responsibility of his own will without the medium of external rites,—to whom there were the ever-present intimations of his strange divinity,—what need to him of the Eleusinian revealings and their sublime self-intuition (*autopsia*)?”

Indeed, Sókratés had accomplished in his own career everything which the mystic orgies represented. His stern self-examination was equivalent to the purifying at the First Rites. The sow offered by his favorite pupil, Alkibiadés, was washed and again returned to her favorite wallow; Kritias bore the *narthex*, but failed at the door of the *Sekos** of the sorrowing goddess, and so was not born into the truer life; and even the better men generally did not transmit the new light without imparting to it *their own prismatic shadow*. If there was any exception it was Platon.

Sókratés himself entered the chamber of Esum-Asklépios, as we must all go thither, alone. He feared no evil; to him death was not a calamity, but a boon. It released him from the body, now an encumbrance to the vigorous soul, which had been seeking to withdraw from it, and transferred him where he might gaze upon the arcane of real Being. This led him to bethink himself of the peculiar offering, and to command Kritôn to bestow it. It was as though he had said: “I am now an initiate of Asklepios, the god of life, wisdom, and healing; the apocrypha of destiny is now becoming plain to me; the apocrypha of the Great Mystery has come.” The evening had become the morning, and Kritôn now knew what his great Master had before remarked his not perceiving—that Sokratés was in the Mystic Chamber, in the presence of the Divine Hierophant!

A gill of poison cannot extinguish a soul. There may come instead a clairvoyant insight. No more was destiny veiled in the enigma of the Sphinx. As Oidipous had come, Kriton need hesitate no longer to give the offering to Aiskulapiu, the son of Zedek, with healing in his wings. Sokrates lives—lives not merely in his loyalty to divine ideas and his interior guide, not simply in men’s memories or even in their like devotion, but in actual personal immortality—at one with the One. So, too, the word is for ourselves; we shall live in perennial life, beyond Time, with the Infinite.

* In the Hebrew sacred books this term is *Succoth*, a pun on the booths where the worship was celebrated, *Suku* being the Akkadian designation of the Babylonian Venus or Ista. Her temples were originally subterranean, and hence the term *sekos* denoted the innermost recess, and by metaphor the womb of the Universe.

ON THE UTILITY OF THE MATHEMATICAL AND METAPHYSICAL SCIENCES.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the Introduction to his Treatise on Theoretic Arithmetic.]

If philosophy, properly so called, be, according to Platon, and as I am firmly persuaded it is, *the greatest good that was ever imparted by divinity to man*, he who labors to rescue it from oblivion and transmit it to posterity must necessarily be endeavoring to benefit his country and all mankind, in the most eminent degree. * * *

In consequence of the oblivion, indeed, into which genuine philosophy has fallen, through the abolition of her schools, the mathematical disciplines have been rather studied with a view to the wants and conveniences of the merely animal life than to the good of intellect, in which our very being and felicity consist. Hence the Pythagoric enigma, "a figure and a step, but not a figure and three oboli," has been entirely perverted. For the whole attention of those who have applied themselves to the mathematics has been directed to the oboli, and not to the steps of ascent; and thus, as their views have been grovelling, they have crept where they should have soared. Hence, too, the greatest eye of the soul has been blinded and buried, though, as Platon elegantly observes, "it is purified and resuscitated by the proper study of these sciences, and is better worth saving than ten thousand corporeal eyes, since truth becomes visible through this alone."

This observation particularly applies to the Theoretic Arithmetic, the study of which has been almost totally neglected; for it has been superseded by practical arithmetic, which, though eminently subservient to vulgar utility, and indispensably necessary in the shop and the counting-house, yet is by no means calculated to purify, invigorate, and enlighten the mind, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life, and thus promote the most real and exalted good of man. Indeed, even with respect to geometry itself, though the theory of it is *partially* learned from the elements of Euklides, yet it is with no other view than that of acquiring a knowledge of the other parts of mathematics which are dependent on it, such as astronomy, optics, mechanics, etc., or of becoming good gaugers, masons, surveyors, and the like, without having even a dreaming perception of its first and most essential use, that of enabling its votary, like a bridge, to pass over the obscurity of a material nature, as over some dark sea, to the luminous regions of perfect reality; or as Platon elegantly expresses it, "conducting them as from some benighted day to the true ascent to incorporeal being, which is genuine philosophy itself." I have said that the theory of geometry is only *partially* studied; for the tenth book of Euklides, which is on incommensurable quantities, and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth, which are on the five regular bodies, though they are replete with the most interesting information, in the truest sense of the word, yet they are for the most part sordidly neglected, in this country at least, because they neither promote the increase of a commerce which is already so extended, nor contribute anything to the further gratification of sensual appetite or the unbounded accumulation of wealth.

If the mathematical sciences, and particularly arithmetic and geometry, had been studied in this partial and ignoble manner by the sagacious Greeks, they would never have produced a Euklides, Appollonios, or an Archimedes, men who carried geometry to the acme of *scientific* perfection, and whose works, like the remains of Grecian art, are the models by which the unhallowed genius of modern times has been formed. Newton himself, as may be conjectured from what he says of Euklides, was convinced of this when it was too late, and commenced his

mathematical career with the partial study only of these geometrical heroes. "For he spoke with regret," says Dr. Hutton, "of his mistake at the beginning of his mathematical studies, in applying himself to the works of Des Cartes and other algebraic writers before he had considered the elements of Euklides with that attention which so excellent a writer deserves."

Having premised this much, I shall in the next place present the reader with some observations on the essence of mathematical genera and species, on the utility of the mathematical science, and on the origin of its name, derived from the admirable commentaries of Proklos on Euklides, as they may lead the well-disposed mind to a legitimate study of the mathematical disciplines, and from thence to all the sublimities of the philosophy of Platon.

With respect to the first thing proposed, therefore, if it should be said that mathematical forms derive their subsistence from sensibles, which is the doctrine of the present day, the soul fashioning in herself by a secondary generation the circular or trigonic form from material circles or triangles, whence is the accuracy and certainty of definitions derived? For it must necessarily either be from sensibles or from the soul. It is, however, impossible it should be from sensibles; for these, being in a continual flux of generation and decay, do not for a moment retain an exact sameness of being, and consequently fall far short of the accuracy contained in the definitions themselves. It must, therefore, proceed from the soul, which gives perfection to things imperfect, and accuracy to things inaccurate. For where among sensibles shall we find the impartible, or that which is without breadth or depth? Where the equality of lines from a centre, where the perpetual stable ratios of sides, and where the exact rectitude of angles? Since all divisible natures are mingled with each other, and nothing in these is genuine, nothing free from its contrary, whether they are separated from each other or united together. How then can we give this stable essence to immutable natures, from things that are mutable, and which subsist differently at different times? For whatever derives its subsistence from mutable essences must necessarily have a mutable nature. How also from things which are not accurate can we obtain the accuracy which pertains to irreprehensible forms? For whatever is the cause of a knowledge which is perpetually mutable is itself much more mutable than its effect. It must be admitted, therefore, that the soul is the generator of mathematical forms and the source of the productive principles with which the mathematical sciences are replete.

If, however, she contains these as paradigms, she gives them subsistence essentially, and the generations are nothing else than the projections of the forms which have a prior existence in herself. And thus we shall speak conformably to the doctrine of Platon, and discover the true essence of mathematical objects. But if the soul, though she neither possesses nor causally contains these productive principles, yet weaves together so great an immaterial order of things, and generates such an admirable theory, how will she be able to judge whether her productions are stable, or things which the winds may dissipate, and images rather than realities? What standard can she apply as the measure of their truth? And how, since she does not possess the essence of them, can she generate such a variety of principles productive of truth? For from such an hypothesis we shall make their subsistence fortuitous, and not referred to any scientific bound.

In the second place, therefore, if by a downward process and from sensibles we collect mathematical principles, must we not necessarily say that those demonstrations are more excellent which derive their composition from sensibles, and not those which are always framed from more universal and more simp

forms. For we say, in order to the investigation of the thing sought, that the causes should be appropriate and allied to the demonstrations. If, therefore, partial natures are the causes of universals, and sensibles of the objects of the reasoning power, why does the boundary of demonstration always refer to that which is more universal, instead of that which is partial? And how can we evince that the essence of the objects of the reasoning power is more allied to demonstrations than the essence of sensibles? For, as Aristoteles says, his knowledge is not legitimate who demonstrates that the isosceles, the equilateral, or the scalene triangle have angles equal to two right, but he who demonstrates this of every triangle, and simply has essentially a scientific knowledge of this proposition. And again he says that universals, for the purpose of demonstration, are superior to particulars; that demonstrations concern things more universal; and that the principles of which demonstrations consist have a priority of existence, and a precedency in nature to particulars, and are the causes of the things which are demonstrated. It is very remote, therefore, from demonstrative sciences, that from converse with *things of posterior origin* (*υστερογενη χυλνα*) and from the more obscure objects of sensible perception they should collect their indubitable propositions.

In the third place, the authors of this hypothesis make the soul to be more ignoble than the material forms themselves. For if matter indeed receives from nature things which are essential, and which have a greater degree of entity and evidence, but the soul by a posterior energy abstracts the resemblances and images of these from sensibles, and fashions in herself forms which have a more ignoble essence, by taking from matter things which are naturally inseparable from it, do they not evince the soul to be more inefficacious than, and subordinate to, matter itself? For matter is the place of material productive principles, and the soul of immaterial forms. On this hypothesis, however, matter would be the recipient of primary but the soul of secondary forms. The one would be the seat of things which have a precedency among beings, but the other of such as are fashioned from these. And the former of things which have an essential subsistence, but the latter of such as exist only in conception. How, therefore, can the soul, which is a participant of intellect, and the first intellectual essence, and which is from thence filled with knowledge and life, be the receptacle of the most obscure forms, the lowest in the order of things, and participating the most imperfect existence.

By no means, therefore, is the soul a smooth tablet, void of productive principles, but she is an ever-written tablet, herself inscribing the characters in herself, of which she derives an eternal plenitude from intellect. For soul also is an intellect evolving itself conformably to a prior intellect, of which it is the image and external type. If, therefore, intellect is all things intellectually, soul will be all things psychically; if the former is all things paradigmatically, the latter will be all things iconically or conformably to an image; and if the former contractedly, the latter with expansion and divisibly. This, Platon also perceiving, constitutes the soul of the world from all things, divides it according to numbers, binds it by analogies and harmonic ratios, inserts in it the primary principles of figures, the right and circular lines, and intellectually moves the circles which it contains. Hence all mathematical forms have a primary subsistence in the soul; so that prior to sensible she contains self-motive numbers, vital figures prior to such as are apparent, harmonic ratios prior to things harmonized, and invisible circles prior to the bodies that are moved in a circle. Soul also is a plenitude of all things, and another order, herself producing herself, and at the same time produced from her proper principle, filling herself with life, and being filled by her fabricator, incorporeally and without interval. When, therefore, she produces her latent

principles, she unfolds into light all sciences and virtues. Hence the soul is essentialized in these forms, and neither must her inherent number be supposed to be a multitude of monads or units, nor must her idea of natures that are distended with interval be conceived to subsist corporeally; but all the paradigms of apparent numbers and figures, ratios and motions, must be admitted to exist in her, vitally and intellectually, conformably to the Timaios of Platon, who gives completion to all the generation and fabrication of the soul, from mathematical forms, and in her establishes the causes of all things. For the seven boundaries, viz., 1, 2, 4, 8, 3, 9, 27, of all numbers, preëxist in soul according to cause. And again, the principles of figures are established in her in a fabricative manner. The first of motions also, and which comprehends and moves all the rest, are consubstant with soul. For the circle, and a circular motion, are the principle of everything which is moved. The mathematical productive principles, therefore, which give completion to the soul, are essential and self-motive; and the reasoning power exerting and evolving these gives subsistence to all the variety of the mathematical sciences. Nor will she ever cease perpetually generating and discovering one science after another, in consequence of expanding the impartible forms which she contains. For she antecedently received all things causally; and she will call forth into energy all-various theorems, according to her own infinite power, from the principles which she previously received.

With respect to the utility of the mathematical science, which extends from the most primary knowledge to that which subsists in the lowest degree, it must be observed that Timaios in Platon calls the knowledge of the mathematical disciplines the path of erudition, because it has the same ratio to the science of wholes and the first philosophy, or metaphysics, which erudition has to virtue. For the latter disposes the soul for a perfect life by the possession of unperverted manners; but the former prepares the reasoning power and the eye of the soul to an elevation from the obscurity of the objects of sense. Hence Sokrates, in the Republic, rightly says that "the eye of the soul, which is blinded and buried by other studies, is alone naturally adapted to be resuscitated and excited by the mathematical disciplines." And again, that "it is led by these to the vision of true being, and from images to realities, and is transferred from obscurity to intellectual light, and, in short, is extended from the caverns of a sensible life and the bonds of matter to an incorporeal and impartible essence." For the beauty and order of the mathematical reasonings and the stability of the theory in these sciences conjoin us with and perfectly establish us in intelligibles, which perpetually remain the same, are always resplendent with divine beauty, and preserve an immutable order with reference to each other.

But in the Phaidros Sokrates delivers to us three characters, who are led back from a sensible to an intellectual life, viz.: the philosopher, the lover, and the musician. And to the lover indeed the beginning and path of elevation is a progression from apparent beauty, employing as so many steps of ascent the middle forms of beautiful objects. But to the musician, who is allotted the third order, the transition is from the harmony in sensibles to unapparent harmony and the productive principles existing in these. And to the one sight, but to the other hearing, is the organ of recollection. To him, therefore, who is naturally a philosopher, whence, and by what means, is the recollection of intellectual knowledge and the excitation to real being and truth? For this character also, on account of its imperfection, requires a proper principle; since physical virtue is allotted an imperfect eye and imperfect manners. He, therefore, who is naturally a philosopher is excited indeed from himself, and surveys with astonishment real being. Hence, says Plotinos, he must be disciplined in the mathematical sciences, in

order that he may be accustomed to an incorporeal nature, and led to the contemplation of the principles of all things. From these things, therefore, it is evident that the mathematics are of the greatest utility to philosophy.

It is necessary, however, to be more explicit, and to enumerate the several particulars to which they contribute, and evince that they prepare us for the intellectual apprehensions of theology. For whatever to imperfect natures appears difficult and arduous in the truth, pertaining to divinity, this the mathematical sciences render through images credible, manifest, and irreprehensible. For in numbers they exhibit the representations of superessential peculiarities, and unfold in the proper objects of the reasoning part of our nature the powers of intellectual figures. Hence Platon teaches us many admirable theological dogmas through mathematical forms; and the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, employing these as veils, conceals through them the mystic tradition of divine dogmas. For such is the whole of the *Sacred Discourse*, what is said by Philolaos in his *Bacchics*, and the whole method of the Pythagoric narration concerning the gods. These sciences, likewise, contribute in the greatest degree to the physical theory, unfolding the arrangement of those principles according to which the universe was fabricated; the analogy which binds together everything in the world, as Timaios says, makes hostile natures friendly, and things distant familiar and sympathetic, and causes simple and primary elements, and, in short, all things, to be held together by symmetry and equality; through which the whole universe likewise is perfected, receiving in its parts appropriate figures. The mathematical science also discovers numbers adapted to all generated natures, and to their periods and restitutions to their pristine state, through which we may collect the fecundity and barrenness of each. For Timaios in Platon, everywhere indicating these particulars, unfolds through mathematical names the theory about the nature of wholes, adorns the generation of the elements with numbers and figures, refers to these their powers, passive qualities, and effects, and assigns as the cause of all various mutation the acuteness and obtuseness of angles, the smoothness or roughness of sides, and the multitude or paucity of the elements.

Must we not also say that it contributes much and in an admirable manner to the philosophy which is called political, by measuring the times of action, the various periods of the universe, and the numbers adapted to generations, viz.: the assimilating and the causes of dissimilitude, the prolific and the perfect, and the contraries to these, those which are the suppliers of an harmonious, and those which impart a disorderly and inelegant life, and, in short, those which are the sources of fertility and sterility? For these the speech of the Muses in the *Republic* of Platon unfolds, asserting that the whole *geometric number* is the cause of better and worse generations, of the indissoluble permanency of unperverted manners, and of the mutation of the best politics into such as are irrational and full of perturbation. Again, the mathematical science perfects us in ethica, philosophy, inserting in our manners order and an elegant life, and delivering those figures, melodies, and motions which are adapted to virtue, and by which the Athenian guest in Platon wishes those to be perfected who are designed to possess ethical virtue from their youth. It likewise places before our view the principles of the virtues, in one way indeed in numbers, but in another in figures, and in another in musical symphonies, and exhibits the excesses and deficiencies of the vices, through which we are enabled to moderate and adorn our manners. On this account also Sokrates, in the *Gorgias*, accusing Kallicles of an inordinate and intemperate life, says to him, "You neglect geometry and geometric equality." But in the *Republic* he discovers the interval between tyrannic and kingly pleasure, according to a plane and solid generation.

Moreover, we shall learn what great utility other sciences and

arts derive from the mathematics if we consider, as Sokrates says in the *Philebos*, that all arts require arithmetic, mensuration, and statics, all which are comprehended in the mathematical science, and are bounded by the principles which it contains. For the distributions of numbers, the variety of measures, and the difference of weights are known by this science. To the intelligent reader, therefore, the utility of the whole of mathematics to philosophy and other sciences and arts will, from all that has been said, be apparent.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

IAMBlichOS: A TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION, BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

PART I.

[Continued.]

II. We will accordingly begin by communicating to you the hereditary doctrines of the Assyrians, in regard to Knowledge of Truth, and will also distinctly explain our own, deducing some of them from the innumerable ancient treatises upon Wisdom (*γνώσις*), and others the men of former times have collected into a single volume respecting the whole that is known concerning divine subjects. But if you press an inquiry after the method of the philosophers, we will adjudicate it according to the ancient Pillars of Hermes, which Platon and Pythagoras have already recognized and combined with their own philosophical maxims. We promise to handle those questions lightly and carefully which appear foreign to the discussion or of a controversial or contentious character; or we will show them to be irrelevant. We will endeavor to be very familiar and judicious in deducing those which are within the range of the general understanding; and we will set forth as far as is possible by words alone those which require an actual going through the divine orgies (*ἔργα*) in order to understand them thoroughly, as well as those which are full of interior contemplation (*νσιερίας θεωρίας*), examining them thoroughly. It is possible to obtain valuable indications, by reason of which you and others like you will be led by the interior mind near to the Essence of existing things.

We promise you that none of those matters which are made known by words shall be left without a complete explanation. But we promise that we shall set forth to you in every case what is strictly germane to each. Such as pertains to the knowledge of the deities we shall answer according to the method in divine matters, and such as belong to theurgy we will explain according to theurgic science. But when we come to matters connected with the pursuit of Wisdom, we will, in company with you, compare them together after the manner of the philosophers, and such of them as clearly involve first causes, according to first principles, we will follow up together and bring them out to light. Those which concern ethics or ends, we will adjudicate according to the ethical rule. In short, we will dispose of other matters coming before us according to their proper order.

We will now proceed to consider your inquiries:—

III. You say that, "first, the Existence of the deities is to be taken for granted." It is not proper to speak in this manner. The knowledge of the gods is innate, and pertains to the very substance of our being. It is of a higher nature than judgment and choosing, and precedes both speech and demonstration. From the beginning it was at one with its own source, and was coexistent with the inherent impulses of the soul to the Supreme Goodness.

If, however, it is necessary to state the truth exactly, the union to the divine nature is not knowledge; for it is in some way kept distinct by an otherness. But previous to this, there is the uniform embracing at all points of contact, spontaneous and indistinguishable, as of one thing knowing another (*ὡς ἑτέρας ἕτερον γνωσκούσης*), which joins us with the Godhead.

Hence, it is not proper to concede this point as though it was a thing which it is possible not to grant, nor even to assent to it as an equivocal matter. It is always established in energy as a distinct Idea. Nor is it even permissible to examine it as having authority to judge and determine. We are enclosed in it, or, rather, we are filled by it, and we have all that we are in this knowing of the deity.

I have the same thing to say to you in regard to the superior orders which came next after the deities. I am speaking of the tutelary spirits or demons, of heroes or half-gods, and of souls that have not been tainted by the conditions of life on the earth. It must always be borne in mind in regard to these that they have one ordained mode of being; and to put aside every idea of indefiniteness and instability such as are incident to the human endowment; and also to deprecate the inclining to one or the other side of a question, which is incited from the counterbalancing of opposing arguments. Any thing of this kind is alien to the sources of Reason and Life, but rather it emanates from the inferior principles, and those which are connected with the power and opposing tendency of the earthly life (*γυνάσις*). It is necessary that we conceive of them as of a uniform mode of being.

So, therefore, any interior perception in regard to the companions of the gods in the eternal world cognizes them as being alike in their nature. Hence, as they are always the same in the principles of their being, so the Human Soul is united to them in knowledge, according to the same. Having been closely associated with the gods in these matters, it never seeks by conjecture, opinion, or balancing of argument, all which originate in time, but by the pure and irreproachable intuitions which it received from them in eternity, to learn the essence which is superior to all these things. But you seem to imagine that the knowledge (*γνώσις*) of divine matters is like that of other things, and that any point may be greatest after a comparing of arguments, as is the custom in regard to propositions in debates. There is, however, no kind of similarity. The knowledge (*εἰδησις*) of these matters is entirely different and is separate from all such arranging of opposite propositions. It is not established by being now conceded, or in being developed in discussion; but it was one sole idea, and was with the soul from eternity.

I say these things to you concerning the first principle in us, at which they who would utter or understand anything whatever concerning those superior to us must begin.

IV. You ask: "What are the peculiarities of the higher Orders, by which they are distinguished from each other?" If you mean by "peculiarities" certain specific differences under the same Order which are indicated by diverse qualities, as the rational and irrational under the animal order, this is the answer: We do not admit at all of any such difference in entities that have neither a participation nor a contrast of substance to make them equal, nor derive their composition from a common indefinite principle and a particular defining characteristic. But if you conjecture that the peculiarity is a certain simple condition defined in itself, as in superior and inferior natures, which differ both in the entire substance and in all the outcome, you have the rational conception of the peculiarities. These peculiarities, having been evolved entirely from entities always existing, will be in all particulars distinct and simple. But the inquiry is

going on to no good purpose. It behooves us first to ascertain what are the peculiarities of these Orders according to essence; then according to faculty, and so afterward according to action. As you now put your question in relation to distinguishing by certain peculiarities, you speak only of peculiarities of action. Hence you ask the difference in final matters in regard to them, but leave unscrutinized those which are above all and most excellent as relating to the elements of the variableness.

You add also in the same place the expression, "active and passive movements." This division is not at all suitable to indicate the difference of the superior Orders. The discrepancy of active and passive does not exist in any of them. Their operations are unconditioned and unchangeable, and may be contemplated apart from the regard to objects in opposition. Hence we do not admit the existence of such impulses as those of action and passivity. We do not concede that there is a self-moving of the soul from something that moves and is moved, but we take for granted that it has a certain simple motion, after the manner of substance, being the same with the things themselves (*αὐτῆν ἑωυτῆς ὁμοίαν*), and not having beforehand a dissimilar tendency, and being exempt from acting on itself and suffering by itself. Who, then, may endure that the peculiarities of the Orders superior to the soul shall be distinguished according to the motions of action and suffering?

The expression also which is subjoined by you, "or the things consequent," is incongruous to them. In things which are joined together, and exist with others or in others, and are comprehended in others, some are to be regarded as precedent and others as consequent; and some as being, and others as contingent to essences. There exists a certain arrangement of them in order, and an alienation and separation occur between. But in the case of the superior Orders all things are to be considered as in being (*ἐν τῷ εἶναι*). Wholes exist as principals, are separate by themselves, and do not derive their substance from others or in others; so nothing in them is consequent. No peculiarity of them is characterized from these things.

There is also a distinction brought, according to the order of nature, at the end of your question. The question is asked: "How are the superior beings distinguished by active energies, physical motions, and things consequent?" Every thing is the very opposite to this conception. If active energies and passive motives were the essential characteristics of the superior beings, they would also be endowed with the power of creating the distinctions which exist between them. But if the superior beings, existing themselves already separately, generate the energies, they will also impart to the motions, energies, and things consequent the characteristics which distinguish them. This matter of peculiarity, therefore, which you are in eager pursuit to solve, is exactly the reverse of what you set forth.

To say all at once, whether you imagine that there is one order of gods and one of tutelary spirits, and so of heroes, and likewise of never-embodied souls, or admit that there are many of each, you exact that the difference among them shall be stated according to their respective peculiarities. If, indeed, you conjecture each of them to be a distinct unit, the whole arrangement of scientific theology is thrown into confusion. If, however, you suppose instead that it abounds with orders strictly defined, and that there is not one common reason after the manner of superior beings among them all, but, on the contrary, that the superior ones are entirely distinct from the inferior, it is not possible to find their common boundaries. If indeed it was possible, this very thing itself would destroy their peculiarities. The thing sought cannot therefore be ascertained in this way. He will be able, however, to define their peculiarities who perceives the sameness of reason among the superior beings, the many

orders, for example, among the gods, and again of the tutelary spirits and half-gods, and lastly among souls. By reason of this, therefore, the propriety of the present inquiry, its distinction, the manner in which it is impossible, and that in which it is possible, are manifest to us.

THAT INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT EXTERNAL TO MIND;
AND CONCERNING THE GOOD.

[Concluded.]

XII. Moreover, it is requisite, for the purpose of perceiving, to assume that organ by which each particular thing ought to be beheld. Some are perceived by the eyes, others by the ears, and so likewise of the rest. And it is necessary to believe that certain other things are beheld by mind, and that to understand is not the same as to hear and to see; for this would be as absurd as if any one should command the ears to perceive, and should deny the existence of voices because they are not the objects of sight. Hence, we must consider such as these ignorant of that which, from the beginning unto the present day, they desire and require; for all things desire the First from a necessity of nature, prophesying, as it were, that they cannot subsist without it. Besides, the apprehension of beauty comes to such souls as are roused (awakened) and knowing, and is attended with a stupor, and excitation of love. But good, since it is present from the beginning to our innate desires, abides with us even when asleep, and never strikes its spectators with astonishment, because it is always present, and no particular reminiscence is required to convince us of the fact. It is not generally or specially perceived by us when awake, since it is present when we are asleep. But the love of beauty, when it first appears, produces molestation, since it is necessary that the beholders vehemently desire it; but a love of this kind since it is the second, and of those things that are intelligent, plainly reveals that beauty itself is the second — and the desire of good, since it is more ancient and does not require the assistance of the senses, shows that good itself is more ancient than beauty, and superior to its nature. Again, all beings think they shall be self-sufficient if they obtain good, — as if secretly convinced that they shall then at length arrive at the desired end, — but all do not think that the possession of beauty will be sufficient to the completion of their wishes. Besides, some consider that what is beautiful is beautiful to itself, but not to them, as is the case with sensible, apparent beauty. For to many it is sufficient if they *seem* beautiful, though they are least so, — but they do not desire to possess good in opinion, but in reality. For all things strenuously strive to procure the First, and contend with beauty, as it were with a desire of victory, as if conscious it was generated as well as themselves. Just as if some one, inferior to a king, should try to equal in dignity another who immediately follows the king, and is next to him in power; for he is generated from one and the same principle as his rival, and is ignorant that he himself depends on the king, and that the other is superior to him. But the cause of error is that both participate of the same, and that the one itself is prior to both. Besides, good itself is by no means indigent of the beautiful, but the beautiful cannot subsist without the good. Hence, good is gentle, mild, placid, delicate, and such as every one wishes it to be. But beauty either renders the soul stupid, or mingles the excited pleasure with grief. Lastly, it often causes incautious souls to deviate from good, as the beloved object often separates the lover from his parent. For beauty is of a junior nature, but good is more ancient, not in time, but in truth, because it pos-

sesses a prior power — for it has universal power. But that which is subordinate to the good does not receive all power, but such only as it is requisite for a nature inferior to the First, and originating from it, to receive. Wherefore it is the lord of this inferior power, and is in no respect indigent of its offspring, viz., the beautiful, — since it existed, such as it is, prior to the generation of the beautiful, and would have lost none of its perfection if it had never been generated. And if it was possible to produce something else from its nature it would not envy it the possession of being. However, nothing else can now be generated, for nothing remains ungenerated, since the universe is complete. But the supreme principle is not all things, since in this case it would be indigent of all; but, surpassing all, it is able to produce, and leave to themselves, all things; while, at the same time, it is preëminently superior to all.

XIII. Moreover, since the Supreme Principle is good itself, and not merely good, it is requisite that it should contain nothing in itself, as it does not even contain good. For if it possessed anything it would either possess good or that which is not good; but in that which is properly the first good non-good cannot subsist, nor can good itself contain good. If then, it possesses neither non-good nor good, it contains nothing; and if it contains nothing it dwells alone, retired from the universality of things. If, therefore, other natures are either good (though not good itself), or, perhaps, such as are non-good, and it contains neither of these, certainly, as it possesses nothing, it is good itself. The addition, therefore, to its nature of either essence, mind, or beauty, deprives it of being the good itself. So, also, by taking away all things from it, and affirming nothing concerning it, nor misrepresenting it in any respect, as if something was present with its nature, we shall permit it to be what it is in reality; predicating of it none of the properties of being, since they are not present with a cause remote from even essence itself. In which respect those for the most part err who, when they know not how to praise any one, detract from the glory of the subject of their praise by attributing such things to his nature as are derogatory to its dignity; lacking knowledge sufficient to assign true praise to its proper object. Accordingly we should beware lest we add anything inferior, or unworthy the divine object of our praise; and should reflect that the Supreme Principle surpasses all things, and is their cause, though it is none of them. For the nature of good does not consist in being either all things, or some particular one of all. Since, if it was a particular one, it would be contained under one and the same nature with all things. But if it is thus contained it will vary from others only by a certain difference and circumstance. Hence, in this case it will be two and not one; one part of which two — viz., that which is common to it with the rest — will be non-good, but the other will be good. It will, therefore, be mixed from good and non-good, and consequently will not be the pure and first good. But the first good will be that of which this participating becomes good beyond the common condition. This, then, will be good by participation, but that of which this participates will be none of the universality of things; and such, therefore, must be the condition of the good itself. But if this too contains good as a part, — for it is difference by which this is a composite good, — it is necessary that this should depend on another, which is entirely simple and alone good. And hence this, which is various, depends upon that which is good alone. Wherefore, it appears, that what is first, and the good itself, is above all being, is good alone, and contains nothing in its nature but is perfectly free from all mixture; and that it is superior to all, and the cause of all. For neither beauty nor being originate from evil, nor from such things as are indifferent, for the cause is better than the effect, since it is more perfect.

HIPPARCHOS ON TRANQUILLITY.

[Translated from the original Greek — Reprinted.]

Since men live but for a very short period, if their life is compared with the whole of time, they will make a most beautiful journey, as it were, if they pass through life with tranquillity. This, however, they will possess in the most eminent degree if they accurately and scientifically know themselves, viz. : if they know that they are mortals and of a fleshy nature, and that they have a body which is corruptible and can be easily injured, and which is exposed to everything most grievous and severe, even to their latest breath. And in the first place let us direct our attention to those things which happen to the body ; and these are pleurisy, inflammation of the lungs, phrensy, gout, strangury, dysentery, lethargy, epilepsy, putrid ulcers, and ten thousand other diseases. But the diseases which happen to the soul are much greater and more dire than these. For all the iniquitous, evil, illegal, and impious conduct in the life of man originates from the passions of the soul. For through preternatural, immoderate diseases many have become subject to unrestrained impulses, and have not refrained from the most unholy pleasures. Many also have been induced to destroy their fathers and their own offspring. But what occasion is there to be prolix in narrating externally impending evils, such as excessive rain, drought, violent heat and cold ; so that frequently from the anomalous state of the air, pestilence and famine are produced, and all various calamities, and whole cities become desolate. Since, therefore, many such like calamities are independent, we should neither be elevated by the possession of corporeal goods, which may rapidly be consumed by the incursions of a small fever, nor with what are conceived to be prosperous external circumstances, which frequently in their own nature perish more rapidly than they accede. For all these are uncertain and unstable, and are found to have their existence in many and various mutations ; and no one of them is permanent, or immutable, or stable, or indivisible. Hence, well considering these things, and also being persuaded that if what is present and is imparted to us is able to remain for the smallest portion of time, it is as much as we ought to expect ; we shall then live in tranquillity and with hilarity, generously bearing whatever may befall us. Now, however, many, previously conceiving in imagination that all that is present with and imparted to them by nature and fortune is better than it is, and not thinking it to be such as it is in reality, but such as it is able to become when it has arrived at the summit of excellency, they burden the soul with many great, nefarious, and stupid evils, when they are suddenly deprived of their evanescent goods. And thus it happens to them that they lead a most bitter and miserable life. But this takes place in the loss of riches, or the death of friends or children, or in the privation of certain other things which are conceived by them to be most honorable possessions. Afterwards, weeping and lamenting, they assert of themselves that they alone are most unfortunate and miserable, not remembering that these things have happened, and even now happen, to many others ; nor are they able to understand the life of those that are now in existence, and of those that have lived in former times, nor to see in what great calamities and waves of evil many of the present time are, and of the past have been involved. Considering with ourselves, therefore, that many, having lost their property, have afterwards on account of this very loss been saved, since hereafter they might either have fallen into the hands of robbers, or into the power of a tyrant ; that many also who have loved certain persons, and have been benevolently disposed towards them in the extreme, have afterwards greatly hated them, considering all these things, which have been delivered to us by history, and likewise learning that many have been destroyed by their children, and by those

that they have most dearly loved ; and comparing our own life with that of those who have been more unhappy than we have been, and taking into account human casualties in general, and not only such as happen to ourselves, we shall pass through life with greater tranquillity. For it is not lawful that he who is himself a man should think the calamities of others easy to be borne, and not his own, since he sees that the whole of life is naturally exposed to many calamities. Those, however, that weep and lament, besides not being able to recover what they have lost or recall to life those that are dead, impel the soul to greater perturbations, in consequence of its being filled with much depravity. It is requisite, therefore, that, being washed and purified, we should by all possible contrivances wipe away our inveterate stains by the reasonings of philosophy. But we shall accomplish this by adhering to prudence and temperance, being satisfied with our present circumstances, and not aspiring after many things. For men who procure for themselves a great abundance of external goods do not consider that the enjoyment of them terminates with the present life. We ought, therefore, to use the goods that are present ; and by the assistance of the beautiful and venerable things of which philosophy is the source we shall be liberated from the insatiable desire of depraved possessions.

One of the best evidences of the moral and intellectual depravity of this generation is the deification of *brute force*. This is the god of the rabble, and they slavishly admire those who have been blessed with a portion of his power. The desperado, the pirate, the highway robber, and, in fact, every scoundrel who has distinguished himself by the exhibition of brute force and courage, becomes the object of intense interest and admiration to the unthinking, grossly ignorant multitude. He is an ideal hero to them. Living, he is regarded with respect and awe ; dead, he is spoken of as having been a great and heroic character. The deifying of force is not only absurd and irrational, but leads to extremely pernicious results. It is the basis of the opinion that "might makes right," a notion which is the *ne plus ultra* of irrationality.

We quote the following from a late number of the *Contemporary Review* : "There are not wanting signs in the air that, while the taste for literature of some sort is daily increasing, the taste for serious study of any kind is diminishing, among the great mass of the English people." The writer is speaking of the "English people," but his remarks admit of universal application. The persons that *think*, or read for the purpose of developing and benefiting their minds, are by no means numerous.

The argument that the mind is a result of the body, supported by the apparent coincidence of their growth and decay, is a *non sequitur*. The mind, when acquired or possessed (though subject to progression and retrogression), can never be lost or enfeebled by old age or bodily debility. It is the decay of the *bodily powers* which enervates or enfeebles the will, by refusing to obey its promptings.—*Coleridge*.

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