

# The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

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## THE PLATONIST.

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*The Platonist is devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases.*

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In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosized, materialism absurdly considered philosophy, folly and ignorance popularized, and the dictum, "Get money, eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly, and ignorance. This philosophy recognizes the essential immortality and divinity of the human soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to, and union with, the Absolute One. Its mission is to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being,—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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The individual who always fearlessly obeys the mandates of Divinity, which are ever revealed to the sincere truth-seeker, will have terrestrial contentment and celestial happiness. For, as Platon most truly says, "whatever comes from the divinities to the man who is beloved by the divinities will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former mishap. Hence, if the just man happens to be in poverty or disease, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things issue to him in something good, either while alive or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the divinities who inclines earnestly to endeavor to become just, and practices virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God."

The value of a man's opinion depends exclusively on his knowledge. The expression of an opinion concerning any subject by one who has no knowledge of it, indicates either a brutal ignorance of what is right and proper, or an unparalleled amount of effrontery. For instance, it is alike shameful and ludicrous to hear a moral bankrupt give his opinion on any question of morality. And it is still more shameful and ludicrous if sensible people regard it as of any value.

## PEARLS OF WISDOM.

[GATHERED FROM PLATONIC SOURCES.]

It is more wretched to be subservient to passions than to tyrants themselves.

Be vigilant in regard to your intellectual part; for sleep about this has an affinity with real death.

Esteem those to be most eminently your friends who assist your soul rather than your body.

By using reason as your guide everywhere, you will avoid the commission of crime.

The unjust man suffers greater evil while his soul is tormented with a consciousness of guilt than when his body is scourged with whips.

Make trial of a man from his deeds rather than his discourses; for many live badly and speak well.

Do that which you consider to be worthy and honest, though you should acquire no glory from the performance; for the multitude is a bad judge of worthy actions.

He is a wise man, and beloved by Divinity, who studies how to labor for the good of his soul as much as others labor for the welfare of the body.

The strength of the soul is temperance; for this is the light of a soul destitute of passions; but it is much better to die than to darken the soul through the intemperance of the body.

It is impossible that the same person can be a lover of pleasure, a lover of body, a lover of riches, and a lover of Divinity. For a lover of pleasure is also a lover of body; but a lover of body is entirely a lover of riches; a lover of riches is necessarily unjust; and the unjust is necessarily profane towards Divinity, and lawless with respect to men. Hence, though he should sacrifice hecatombs, he is only by this means the more impious, unholy, atheistical, and sacrilegious with respect to his intention; and on this account it is necessary to avoid every lover of pleasure as an atheist and polluted person.

In every age and clime the acquisition of material wealth absorbs the attention and energies of the multitude. The effect of this devotion to phenomenal, transient objects is the strengthening of the walls of their corporeal, sensuous prison. They go on, year after year, immuring themselves within the dungeon of Sense, while their immortal mind, the true man, is totally neglected and becomes practically brutalized. When the body leaves them, and they pass into that form of existence vulgarly known as "death," they will discover that emancipation from the bonds of sense and matter must take place before they can become truly happy.

Our readers will confer a great favor by sending us the names of parties who are interested in philosophical subjects. To such we will gladly forward specimen copies of THE PLATONIST.

The "Shrove-tide" days have come and gone. They are regularly made, in many parts of the world, the occasion for innumerable exhibitions of puerility. These exhibitions resemble the Veiled Prophets' performance and the disgusting foolery that is often witnessed on the floor of the Merchants' Exchange, in this city, when certain men lose their manhood, if they have any, and degenerate into children and apes. It is a mystery how so-called intelligent people can be guilty of such senseless deeds. The world to-day is badly in need of *genuine* men — persons who act in accordance with the dictates of Reason.

Many unfavorable comments have been made on the late Thomas Carlyle's "ill-nature," *i.e.*, the habit he had of telling foolish persons what he thought of them. Mr. Carlyle was by no means either a perfect or an admirable character, but this habit was one of his chief virtues. It probably originated from his strong, righteous hatred of fools and foolishness. People who play the fool, or *are* fools, should not become offended if intelligent individuals plainly express their opinion of them. If they do not wish to hear truthful though disagreeable things said about them, let them cease to act in a foolish, irrational manner. Foolishness ought to be universally hated and despised. As the Divine Platon truly says: "The disease of the soul is folly, of which there are two kinds — ignorance and madness." The only physician that can cure this disease is Philosophy.

Tired of earth's petty joys and ambitions, the soul of Thomas Carlyle, when on the point of leaving this sensuous life, gave utterance to the following words, which will doubtless be heartily indorsed by many exiles from the orb of light: "I am weary — weary unto death — of this toil and moil and strife; of seeing wrong ever galloping along in a coach and four, and right ever pushed into the mire by the jostling, unthinking, beer-guzzling, and otherwise much-bemuddled crowd. I am waiting impatiently for the end. I am ready I long to go."

We notice that some professional scribblers and sciolists are amusing themselves and the readers of certain journals with absurd diatribes against the study of Greek and Latin. They are strenuous advocates of the "natural sciences," and desire to see the "dead languages" superseded by them. It might pertinently be inquired whether these writers have an accurate knowledge of the languages the study of which they denounce as useless and unprofitable. The probability is that they are ignorantly reviling and attempting to criticise something of which they know little or nothing. We have yet to hear of a scholar deprecating the study of the classical languages. They are the repositories of priceless intellectual treasures, and it will be an evil day when they cease to be studied. It is a noteworthy fact that the opposition to classical education comes chiefly from the ignorant, intellectually unrefined classes of mankind. "What," in the language of Thomas De Quincey, "it is proposed to *substitute* for classical erudition we need not too rigorously examine. Some acquaintance with the showy parts of Experimental Phil-

osophy and Chemistry; a little *practical* Mathematics; a slight popular survey of the facts of History and Geography; a sketch of empirical Political Economy; a *little* Law, a *little* Divinity, perhaps even a *little* Medicine and Farriery: such are the elements of a fashionable education. \* \* \* Edmund Burke has noticed the illiberal air which is communicated to the mind by an education exclusively scientific, even when it is more radical and profound than it is likely to be under those theories which reject classical erudition. It is not improbable, also, that a reflection upon the 'uselessness' of such studies, according to the estimate of coarse Utilitarians — that is, their inapplicability to any object of mercenary or mechanical science, coöperates with their more direct influences in elevating the taste. Thence we may explain the reason of the universal hatred amongst plebeian and coarse-minded Jacobins to studies and institutions which point in this direction. They hate the classics for the same reason that they hate the manners of chivalry or the characteristic distinctions of a gentleman."

#### THAT INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT EXTERNAL TO MIND; AND CONCERNING THE GOOD.

(*Lib. 5., Énn. 5.*)

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF PLOTINOS.

VI. However, let every one decide this for himself. But since generated essence is form, and that which is thence produced can have no other appellation, it is not a particular form, but universal, so that only this general form remains to species; and therefore it is necessary that the One itself should be without form. And, being formless (without species), it is not essence, since essence must be something determinate — limited. But neither determination nor limitation can be predicated of *the one*, since, if they could, it would not be the principle, but that alone which you declare to be something particular. If, therefore, all things are in that which is generated from the First, do you say that the author of all things is any one of these? Being none of these, he may alone be said to be above (beyond) these. But the natures generated are beings and being itself; hence, *the one* itself is superior to being. And that which is above being does not say that it is this (anything determinate); neither does it posit itself as anything. Moreover, it does not reveal its name, but alone announces that it is not this, *i.e.*, that it is *incomprehensible*. Doing this, its nature cannot be comprehended, since it is ridiculous to try to apprehend Infinity itself. Whoever, therefore, attempts to do this, fails to discover the slightest trace of the infinite nature. For as he who wishes to know the intelligible nature, only can perceive what is above sense when he is wholly destitute of even any image of a sensuous object, — so he who desires to behold an essence superior to the intelligible nature will enjoy the ineffable vision if he totally neglects everything intelligible while engaged in the contemplation; learning from this that the superior nature *is*, but entirely dismissing the inquiry concerning *what* it is. For the word *such*, when applied to it, signifies not such; since *such* is not significant of a nature to which *what* cannot be applied. But, perplexed and confused by the difficulties attending this investigation, we are dubious as to what we ought to say; but, desiring as much as possible to reveal something to ourselves concerning the Infinite, give a name to that which is ineffable. But perhaps this name, *viz.*, *the one*, has its origin from a certain negation of the many. Wherefore the Pythagoreans symbolically denominate it Apollôn, which name also implies a negation of the many. But if any one

adopts this name, "*one*," and affirms anything according to its signification, both the name and the thing named will become more obscure than if no application had been given it; for perhaps this name was selected in order that the investigator, beginning from something significative of the greatest simplicity, might ultimately deny to it even this application; satisfied, indeed, that the best name had been chosen, but that even it was not worthy to indicate its transcendent nature. For the Infinite cannot be reached by audition, nor be understood by any auditor; but if it is manifest to any one it is to the contemplator. But if the beholder seeks to speculate form (species), he will lose the intuition of the ineffable nature.

VII. Again, the energy of vision is twofold as it happens with respect to the eye. For one thing indeed is a spectacle to the eye, viz., the form of the sensuous object; but another, that by which it perceives the form, and which, though itself sensuous, is different from the sensuous form. Hence, it is the cause by which form is beheld, is inherent in form, and is perceived connected with its nature; consequently it is not clearly perceived, since the eye more intently directs itself to the illuminated object. But when there is nothing besides itself, it is beheld by a sudden intuition, though it should then be perceived adhering to another; for if it was entirely separate and alone it would not be subject to sensuous inspection — since the light of the sun would perhaps escape our sense unless its more solid orb was subjoined to it. But if it should be said that the whole sun is light, it is perhaps only asserted for the sake of explanation; for light is in no form of other visible objects, and is perhaps nothing else than that which is visible, though other things are also visible, and not light alone. Thus, likewise, the eye of Mind sees through another light the things illuminated by that first nature, and in them it truly sees the source of their illumination. But when it too earnestly converts itself to the nature of the things illuminated it perceives less of their source. And if it should dismiss the visible objects, and attentively survey that by which it perceives, it will then view light itself and the principle of light. But since it is necessary that mind should not behold a light of this kind as anything external, let us again return to the example of the corporeal eye, which at one time does not perceive external and alien light, but previous to this beholds a light more peculiarly its own, and by far more lucid, shining in a certain inviolate and pure seat; either when it perceives before itself a ray darting from its transparent receptacle through the darkness of night — or when, not disposed to behold other objects, it confines itself under the eyelids, and in the meantime produces from itself a purer light within — or, lastly, when some one by pressing the corners of his eyelids views the inward light of the eye. For then, indeed, by not seeing he sees, and then sees in the most exalted degree, for he views light itself; while other things which were before the objects of his vision were indeed luciform but not light. In like manner Mind, separating itself from all other things and confining itself in its most inward retreats, and perceiving nothing, will immediately behold light — not existing in another, but by itself alone, perfectly pure, and suddenly shining from itself.

VIII. In this case, however, it will be doubtful whence this light shines, whether from an external or internal source. Moreover, when it departs we may say this was something internal, and, again, not internal. But, indeed, it is not lawful to inquire whence it originated, for it neither approached hither nor again departs to some other place, but it either appears to us or does not appear. Hence we should not pursue it, but should abide in quiet until it suddenly shines upon us — preparing ourselves for this blessed spectacle, like the eye waiting for the rising of the sun, who, appearing above the horizon and emerging, as the poets say, from the ocean, presents himself to the sight. But whence does this light, which the sun imitates, supernally shine? And

what does it transcend, when it presents itself to our view? Indeed it illumines Mind, intently beholding its lustre. Wherefore Mind steadfastly continues to behold it, looking upon nothing else than the beautiful itself, and converting and giving itself wholly to its contemplation. Hence, abiding in this felicitous state, and, as it were, replete with divine energy, it beholds itself primarily as having become more beautiful and refulgent, since it is near the Absolute One. But it will not approach like some may expect, since it will come as if not coming. For it will be present prior to all things, even before mind approaches to the vision. But it is Mind which properly approaches and departs; which departs indeed when it is ignorant where it should remain, and where the Absolute abides, since it truly abides in no being. And if Mind could be nowhere, — not merely with respect to place, for it lacks locality, but totally nowhere, — it would doubtless always behold the Absolute, and yet would not *behold* it, since mind would become as one with it and duality would vanish. But now, because it is Mind, it thus sees, when it sees, by that part of it which is superior to mind, and which is the summit of its essence. And indeed it is wonderful how the One is present without approaching, and how, though it is nowhere, it is at the same time everywhere. This indeed is wonderful from the very essence of the One, but to him who comprehends this thing it would be admirable if the contrary should be affirmed. Indeed it cannot exist otherwise than as a most admirable object; for such is the nature of the Absolute One.

IX. Everything generated by another is either contained in its author, or in some other nature — if there is anything besides its author. For since it is produced by another and requires something different from itself to effect its generation, it everywhere needs the assistance of another nature, and hence exists in another. And thus it is ordained by nature that such things as are last should be established in such as are immediately prior to them; and again, things prior to these in such as are similarly prior, and always one thing in another up to the first principle. But the supreme principle, since there is nothing prior to it, cannot exist in another. Hence, as it is not in another, and other things exist in their superiors, therefore it comprehends all things. However, though comprehending them, it is not amalgamated with them, since it contains them without being contained. Moreover, nothing exists with which it is not present, for if it was absent it could not contain; and again, if it did not contain, it could not be present. Wherefore, the supreme principle is present and not present. As it is not comprehended by anything it is not present; but as it is free from all comprehension it is not hindered from being present everywhere. For if it was restrained it would certainly be limited by another, and subsequent natures would be destitute of its presence, and thus far the First Deity would reign; neither would other things exist for it, but it would become subservient to things inferior to it. That, therefore, which exists in anything is properly there where it exists. That, however, which is not anywhere is consequently everywhere. For it is evident that whatever is excluded from any particular place is in another, so that it is false to affirm that it is not somewhere. If then it is true that the supreme principle is not in any particular place, and false that it is somewhere, lest it be in another, it is therefore absent from nothing. But if it is nowhere absent, as it is somewhere, it will be everywhere present in itself. For one part of it will not be here and another there, nor the whole of it only in one particular place, so that it will be everywhere totally present; since no one being contains it, or in another sense does not contain it, since it is so contained that it may rather be said to contain. For example, consider our universe. If there was no other world superior to this it would neither be contained in the world nor in place. For what place could there be prior to the world? But the parts of the world are reduced



to the universe and comprehended in it. And soul is not in the world, but the world in it; for neither is body the place of soul, but soul is in mind and body in soul. Lastly, Mind abides in another (*i.e.*, the One), which is not dependent on anything superior to itself in which it is compelled to repose. Wherefore the supreme principle is not properly contained in another, and is consequently said to be nowhere. Where, then, are other things? Doubtless, in it. Hence it is neither absent from others, nor is comprehended by them, but comprehends all things in its nature. Wherefore it is considered the good of the universe; since all things exist through it, and are referred to it as their source. Hence some are more excellent than others, because some are nearer than others to the supreme principle.

X. But you must not endeavor to perceive it through other natures, for in this case you will not discover the supreme principle itself, but merely a vestige of its divinity. But think what that is which is apprehended as abiding in itself, perfectly pure and unmixed, of which all things participate, and yet none contain it—so that there is no other similar to it, and yet it is requisite that such a nature exist. Who, then, can at once apprehend the whole of its power. For if any one apprehends the whole, in what respect does he differ from its nature? Must it then be apprehended according to a part? But you who are desirous to behold the supreme principle should contemplate it with a universal vision, and at the same time not announce to yourself the whole of your perception, or you will become mind-intelligent; the principle, however, will immediately escape your intuition, or, rather, you will retire from it. But when you behold, contemplate it totally; and when you reason concerning it, whatever you remember about its nature, understand it as the good. For it is the cause of a wise and intellectual life; since it is the power itself from which life and mind are produced, and it is the author of essence and being because it is the One itself. And it is perfectly simple and primary, because it is the supreme principle; for all things flow from it. Motion first proceeded from it, yet is not contained in its nature; permanency likewise originates from it, since it is entirely unindigent. For it is neither moved nor at rest, since it contains nothing in which it can either repose or move. For about what, or to what, or in what can it either be moved or repose, since it is the first? But neither can it be defined, for what can limit its nature? Neither is it infinite, like an immense bulk. And where can it, being in want of nothing, be said to advance, as if it was indigent? But its power comprehends infinity itself; neither is the supreme principle otherwise infinite, nor is it ever deficient, since things that are superior to defect derive their perfection from it.

XI. However, this infinite is so called because it is not more than one, and because it does not contain anything by which any part, as it were, of its nature can be bounded. Indeed, from its being one, it is neither measured nor proceeds into number, and therefore is neither terminated by another nor by itself; for if this was the case it would become two. It does not possess figure, since it has neither parts nor form. Do not therefore seek after its ineffable vision with mortal eyes, nor attempt to perceive by any corporeal means that which reason proves to be remote from the apprehension of sense. Do not think it can be known in the manner they imagine who consider all things as sensible, and thus entirely subvert that which is in the most exalted degree. For those things which some consider as having the most real being have the most unreal. And that which is great in quantity is least in being; but that which is first is the principle of being, and something more excellent than essence—so that our opinion must be the reverse of that held by the sensists, or we shall be destitute of a union with the supreme deity. We will resemble those who in solemn festivals, through a shameful gluttony, fill themselves with food which it is unlawful for those to touch who

intend approaching the divinities,—considering the pains of the senses more real than the contemplation of the divinity whose rites are to be celebrated; wherefore they depart destitute of the sacred visions. For in such holy rites, when the divinity is not beheld his existence is denied by those who consider as alone certain that which is perceived by the flesh. Just as if any one should be immersed in sleep through the whole of life, and should therefore believe in the visions of sleep as alone certain and real; and, if awakened, as one who does not believe in objects beheld with open eyes, should suddenly again return to sleep and the delusions of dreams.

## PLATONIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF HERMEIAS BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the *Classical Journal*.]

### PART II.

Resuming, however, the consideration of the propositions, let us endeavor to render them as perspicuous as possible. "*The soul is self-moved.*" By motion here we must understand the life of the soul. The soul therefore is self-vital, containing in itself the principle and fountain of life. For if nature had intended that bodies should be self-moved, she would have inserted in them the principle and fountain of motion. But now, since it is necessary that they should rank as alter-motive natures, she generated bodies receiving the principle of motion from other things. The soul likewise is seen deliberately choosing many things and performing many according to its own proper, deliberate choice. But this would not be the case if it were not self-moved. At the same time also, if you look to the nature of the thing, you will find, on account of its clearness, a great abundance of arguments in proof of this. Platon, however, exciting our recollection from clear evidence and from the last of things, says that *when we see a body incapable of being moved by itself, we immediately say that it is inanimate; but when we perceive a body which can move itself we immediately say that it is animated*, in consequence of spontaneously inferring that self-motion is the form and definition of the soul. But from that which is in our power you may especially demonstrate the self-motive nature of the soul. For if well-being is more excellent and perfect than being, but the soul perfects itself, it is manifest that as it imparts to itself that which is more excellent, *viz.*, well-being, and excites and perfects itself, it will much more impart to itself that which is less excellent, *viz.*, being or existence. The being of the soul, however, is nothing else than life. But life is motion. It is evident therefore that the soul will impart to itself motion. Hence it is self-moved. But that which imparts life to other things will much more impart life to itself. For that which vivifies other things will in a much greater degree impart vivification to itself; so that the soul, by imparting life to itself, will vivify and elevate itself. But life is motion. The soul therefore will impart motion to itself. And hence it is self-moved. For divine natures, and those that first impart anything, begin their energies from themselves; just as the sun that illuminates all things is light itself, and the fountain of light. Soul, therefore, which imparts life and self-motion to other things—for animals, according to Aristoteles, are self-moved—is much more self-moved, and life, and the fountain of psychical life.

But that which is self-moved is demonstrated to be always moved, by showing that the self-moved is alone always moved, and is alone immortal, from assuming the former propositions by themselves, and so far as they are essentially what they are

Platon, therefore, demonstrates from the alter-motive that the self-moved is always moved. For it is evident that the alter-motive has not its motion from itself; and on this account it is called alter-motive. Hence, receiving this temporally from something else, it also loses it in time. But that which imparts motion to itself essentially, as being always present with itself, and the giver and receiver being one and the same, will be always moved. Platon, however, manifests that he assumes motion in life. "*For, having,*" says he, "*a cessation of motion, it has also a cessation of life.*"

But that the alter-motive has a cessation of motion, *i.e.*, is not always moved, is evident from hence. For as there are these two things, the mover and that which is moved, it is necessary, either that the mover should accede to that which is moved, and thus should move it, just as we do when we move a stone; or that the thing moved should accede to the mover, and thus should be moved, just as the soul, betaking itself to intellect, is moved by it, and surveys the forms which it contains; or it is necessary that both should accede to each other, in the same manner as the master and the disciple, for the disciple gives himself to be excited by the master, and the master hastens to excite the disciple, and, in short, is converted to him. These things, therefore, thus subsisting, that which is alter-motive is not able of itself to accede to the mover; for its very existence consists in being moved by something else. Hence, in order that what is moved by another may be always moved, it is necessary that the motive cause should be converted to it. In wholes, however, and eternal natures, it is not lawful for things which are more excellent to be converted to natures subordinate to themselves. For more excellent natures would subsist for the sake of others, and subordinate natures would be things for the sake of which others subsist, which is most absurd. That which is alter-motive, therefore, will not be always moved in this way, *i.e.*, through the conversion of eternal natures to it. But if it is to be moved at a certain time, it is necessary that it should be led by something else to the motive cause, not merely locally, but also according to aptitude. If therefore another thing conjoins it to the motive cause, from a certain time, it will again, in a certain time, be separated from this cause. For universally all things which are generated by causes that are mutable are generated and corrupted in time; but things which are generated by immutable causes are generated perpetually in a manner invariably the same.

Some one, however, may say, how is the sublunary region always moved, since it is alter-motive? May it not be said that it is never always the same, nor remains the same according to number, except in form; so that if it is not the same according to its subject, how will it be always moved? For, being corrupted according to its parts, it always remains in the same form. But if neither generation is able to accede of itself to the heavens, nor the heavens are converted to generation, in consequence of it not being proper that more excellent should be converted to less excellent natures, whence does generation receive its aptitude? May it not be replied that the motion of the heavens, being efficacious, acts on sublunary natures, celestial natures not being converted to them, just as the sun illuminates, not by being converted to the illuminated substances, but by sympathy? But how is the heaven not alter-motive, but self-moved, since it is a body? And if it is alter-motive, how will it be always moved? May it not be said that the heaven is neither alter-motive nor simply body, but an immaterial body? We also say that the self-moved is twofold, the one being simple and impartible, which is properly self-moved, but the other, having now proceeded into interval, is not simply impartible. For so far as it is distended with bulk, so far it is changed from that which is properly self-moved; but so far as it participates of a connascent life in its essence, so that it is not possible, even in

definition, to separate that body from the life of it, so far it has also self-motion in its proper essence. For self-motion is the peculiarity of soul and life. As therefore it is impossible for a material body to be uncolored and unfigured, thus also it is still more impossible for a celestial body to be lifeless and inanimate. And thus you may see the coalition of it with soul. The summits, likewise, of secondary natures, are always consigned to the extremities of first natures, in order that there may be a certain continuity, and that no vacuum may intervene; since, again, another nature would be requisite, which may fill up that which is between. Since, therefore, an ethereal body is the first of bodies, but soul is the last of intelligibles, these ought to be conjoined to each other, and possess a mutual similitude; so that a celestial body is soul amplified into bulk, and life extended into triple dimension. Hence the life which is in it is connascent, and nature in it is mingled with life. There are also in it many other forms of animals.

But it may be said, let the soul, so far as it is soul, be self-moved, and always-moved, yet nothing hinders it from being corrupted. To this we reply, that either the energy of it, *i.e.*, its self-motion, must first cease, but the existence of it be afterwards corrupted; or the existence of it first, but the self-motion of it afterwards; or both these must cease at once. For besides these there are no other cases. If the essence, therefore, of it is corrupted, it is not possible to devise how the energy of it can be saved. But neither, *vice versa*, is it possible, in the hypothesis before us, that, the energy being corrupted, the essence of the soul can be saved; for to assert this would be to forget the hypothesis which says that the soul, as far as it is soul, will be self-moved. So that it is not possible for self-motion to be corrupted, but the soul to remain. For, as the hypothesis says, as far as it is soul it will be self-moved. If, therefore, everything which is corrupted first loses its energy, but the soul, according to the hypothesis, so far as it is soul, does not lose its energy, being self-moved, it is also incorruptible.

Let, however, the third case be supposed, that the soul may be corrupted at one and the same time with its energies. We ask, therefore, whether it will be corrupted by itself, or by some external cause. But it will not, indeed, be corrupted by itself, because it preserves itself by moving itself. And it will not be corrupted by external causes, because it would thus be alter-motive instead of self-motive. Hence it will not be corrupted together with its energies. Besides, by what external cause could it be corrupted? Shall we say by natures more excellent than itself? But these are rather the saviours than the destroyers of it. Can it, therefore, be corrupted by natures inferior to it? Over these, however, it possesses a despotic power, and is the fountain of their motions. For, as there are ten motions, the motion of the soul alone is generative of all the others. But, the soul being self-moved, you may also more concisely infer that it is always moved, as follows, as we have already observed respecting self-motion. That which perfects itself, likewise produces itself. For that which perfects imparts good to itself. But that which simply produces anything, imparts existence to it. Well-being, however, is more excellent than being. Since, therefore, the soul perfects itself, it will also produce itself. But the essence of it is life, which it also imparts to other things. Hence it will impart life and existence to itself. That, however, which is always present with that which imparts existence, always is. But the soul is always present with itself. Hence the soul always is, so that it is always self-moved, and always moved. For in reality an injury would be done to anything in the universe which should be deprived of that which it imparted to itself. For it would not be injured in being deprived of that which it received from another; but it is injured, if that is taken away from it which it imparts to itself.



The last proposition, however, is not attended with any ambiguity, viz., that what is always moved is immortal. For if, according to the hypothesis, it were mortal and corruptible, it would no longer be always moved. So that all the propositions are not only true, but they are so essentially so as to be equal in power and convertible. What, then, some one may say, is soul alone immortal, but is intellect not immortal? Or is there no absurdity in saying that intellect is not immortal? For it is above the immortal. But if you are willing to say that it is immortal, you must assume another form of self-motion and another form of immortality; and in a similar manner, in the successive lives, an immortality must be assumed adapted to each. For there is a great extent of things which exist in eternity; of those which exist in the whole of time; and of those whose duration is only in a part of time. For some beings live for one day, others for a year, others for ten years, and others for a hundred or a thousand years. But how is it possible that the partial nature likewise should not be immortal, since it is self-moved? In answer to this, in the first place it must be observed that the divine Iamblichos and the philosopher Porphyrios do not admit that the partial nature—i.e., the life distributed about the body, the peculiarities of which are generation, nutrition, and increase—is self-moved, but assert that, being the instrument of the soul, it is moved indeed by it, but moves the things which are saved by it. And this they say is the ninth motion. It is evident, however, that, though this partial nature should have a certain self-mobility, yet it has this after the manner of an image, and as an instrument. But if it be requisite to say something in opposition to certain philosophers, nature is not in all respects superior to bodies, but there is something in it which is inferior to them. For, so far as it is a certain incorporeal essence, and so far as it fashions and adorns bodies, it is superior to them; but so far as it is in them as in subjects, and has its existence in them, it is inferior to them. Just as the resemblance in a mirror, in security, beauty, and accuracy of form, surpasses the mirror, but in hypostasis is inferior to it. For the mirror, indeed, is more essential, but the representation has its subsistence as an image from the mirror, is whatever it is for the sake of it, and on this account will have a more obscure being. After this manner, therefore, the partial nature subsists with reference to the body. For the nature which is divine has self-motion secondarily, as we have before observed, and connascent with a divine body. From this syllogism, therefore, it is demonstrated that the soul is not corrupted by itself. In the soul, likewise, one part of it does not alone move, and another part is alone moved, but whatever part of it may be assumed moves and is moved according to the same.

Some one, however, may still desire to learn more clearly what the motion is which subsists in the soul. It is evident, therefore, that it is not any one of the corporeal motions, not even the ninth (which pertains to the partial nature). For these are not self-motive. But neither do all the peculiar motions of the soul manifest the motion which is now investigated, such as will, opinion, anger, and desire,—for the soul is not always moved according to these,—but we now inquire what that motion is which is always inherent in it. *This motion, therefore, is the life which is connascent with the soul, which it imparts to itself, and according to which it is moved.* And these motions, indeed,—I mean will, opinion, and the like,—are the lives and the motions of the soul; yet they are not always inherent in it, but only sometimes, becoming, as it were, renewed. But from the soul perfecting itself you may especially assume that it is self-moved, and by this you may separate the rational soul from the irrational, and from nature. For it belongs to the rational soul to perfect and excite itself, and to be converted to itself, no one of which pertains to the others. Hence this exposition is adapted to the

divine and human soul, i.e., to every rational soul, and not to the irrational soul and nature. *“To such other things also as are moved, this is the fountain and principle of motion. But principle is unbegotten,”* etc.

The second syllogism which shows that the soul is immortal is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. The propositions here are five. The first of the syllogisms, therefore, shows that the soul is sufficient to itself. But the second syllogism demonstrates its extension to other things, just as all divine natures are sufficient to themselves, and the sources of good to others. For the extended here signifies that which imparts to others what it possesses itself. For it is characteristic of a beneficent and unenvying nature, and of super-plentitude of power. The intention, therefore, of the reasoning is to manifest in the soul the extension of it to other things. And the proposition, indeed, which says *“that which is self-moved is the principle of motion,”* is sufficiently demonstrated by Platon in the Laws, where he says that if all things should stand still self-motive natures would be the first things that would be moved. The order of things, likewise, is as follows: That which is immovable is the first. That which is self-moved is the second. And that which is alter-motive is the third. But *the principle*, says Platon, *is unbegotten*,—i.e., the principle of motion. For this was the thing proposed. Making, however, the proposition to be more universal, he extends it to every principle; because every principle, so far as it is a principle, is unbegotten.

But here many of the more ancient interpreters are disturbed about the meaning of Platon when he says that *“the principle is unbegotten.”* For, if he asserts this of the principle of all things, viz., of the first God, the assertion is true; but it is not now proposed to speak of this principle. And if he simply speaks of every principle, how is this assertion true? For Peleus is the principle of Achilles, yet Peleus is not unbegotten. We must consider, therefore, what the principle is of which he is speaking. We say, therefore, that principle, properly so called, is that which primarily produces the whole form. Thus, for instance, the equal itself is that which produces all-various equals, and man itself is that which everywhere produces men. Thus, therefore, since the soul is the principle of motion, it will be able to produce all the forms or species of motion, so that so far as it is motion it will not be generated. Hence if, as essence or as intellectual, it is generated from being and intellect: yet, so far as it is motion, it is not generated. For this is the principle of the motion of all things. For material forms also are unbegotten; such, for instance, as the form of man, the form of horses, of the equal, and of motion, and consequently much more must the cause of form be unbegotten. Hence, since the form of motion is unbegotten, much more will the cause itself of motion be unbegotten; but this is that which is self-moved. Platon likewise properly calls it the *fountain* of motion; for it is the peculiarity of a fountain to impart, as it were, what belongs to itself spontaneously to things which are different from itself. But it is the peculiarity of a principle to preside, as it were, and despotically rule over things which subsist through it. *For a cause is a principle, as being coördinated with the things of which it is the principle; but it is a fountain, as exempt, and subsisting in intellect, both which are inherent in the soul.* Platon, therefore, would have been liberated from any further discussion by concisely saying that the principle of motion is unbegotten, for generation is motion; but the principle of motion will not be moved by anything else, lest we should proceed to infinity. But he thought fit to give a more ample extent to the theory. The unbegotten nature, therefore, of principle must be understood

as follows: The principle is not any one of the things of which it is the principle. Thus, for instance, the sun is the principle of light. It is not, therefore, illuminated by anything else. Intellect, also, being the principle of intellect, and being itself intellectual, does not derive from anything else intellectual perception. And being, which is the cause of existence to other things, does not possess its subsistence as being from any other source. Hence the soul, which is the cause of other things being animated and possessing life, has not itself a life extrinsically derived; so that, if it is the first motion, it will be the cause of other things being moved, and will not be moved by anything else. Hence every principle is unbegotten. What, then, if some one should say, do not all things derive their existence from the first cause? To this it may be replied, in the first place, that in assuming the principle of a certain thing we ought not to consider any one of the principles above it; and, in the next place, it may be said that principle is, after another manner, a thing of such a kind as its productions; for the equal itself generates other secondary equals, and the motion of the soul generates other forms or species of motion. *But the first cause is not, after another manner, such as the things which proceed from it, for it is above principle and above cause.* Intellect, therefore, is primarily from itself intellectual, but it is being from something else (i.e., from being itself). But that which is just primarily derives its subsistence from justice itself, and justice itself does not become just through anything else; for, so far as it is justice, and so far as it directs other things, it originates from itself. Nothing, however, prevents it, so far as it is something else (such, for instance, as being, or intellect, or a certain god), from deriving its subsistence from the principle of all things. But Platon summarily demonstrates as follows: That if principle were generated it would be generated from that which is not principle, through the hypothesis that it is principle. Nothing generated is the first, but everything generated is generated from something else. No principle, therefore, is generated; for, if everything which is generated is generated from a certain principle, principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from a certain principle, so that principle would be in want of principle to its generation, and this would be the case to infinity. Again, everything generated is generated from that which is not such as itself is. Thus an animal is generated from that which is not an animal (i.e., from seed), and a house from that which is not a house; so that principle also, if it were generated, would be generated from that which is not principle. Hence, at one and the same time, as being generated, it would be generated from a principle, and as a principle it would be generated from that which is not a principle, which is impossible. Everything, therefore, which is primarily a certain thing (i.e., every principle) is unbegotten. These things, therefore, are sufficient to the demonstration of the incorruptibility of principles.

But Platon also adds another demonstration, through a deduction to an impossibility. "*For the principle,*" says he, "*being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor another thing be generated from it.*" For since everything generated is generated from a principle, nothing else could be generated from it; for the principle, from the hypothesis, is destroyed. But neither could it be generated again, because that which is generated must again be generated from a certain principle. The principle, however, is destroyed. For as, when a root is cut off, no germination can take place; thus, also, Platon says that, "*the principle of generation being destroyed, all heaven and generation falling together must stop, and would never again have anything from whence they would be generated.*"

The next proposition, which says that the unbegotten is incorruptible, Aristoteles also strenuously demonstrates; which may

concisely be demonstrated as follows: If that which is unbegotten were corrupted, either all things would come to an end, being corrupted, or they would again be restored, i.e., be again generated; and from corruptible natures we should arrive at the unbegotten. And thus that which is generated will be unbegotten. For if that which is unbegotten were corruptible, but the corruptible is generated, the unbegotten is generated, which is impossible. Platon, however, in his demonstration, comprehends both these in one. For if the principle were generated or corrupted, it is necessary that all things shall fall together with it, and thus neither heaven nor generation would exist, nor even that which is unbegotten.

Thus far, therefore, Platon collects through two syllogisms that the self-moved is immortal, without making any mention of the soul, except when he pre-announces the conclusion at the beginning; so that he has demonstrated concerning that which is self-moved that it is immortal. Now, however, he assumes the first and smallest proposition, that the soul is self-moved, when he says, "*Since, then, it appears that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul will have no occasion to blush,*" etc. But he syllogizes as follows: Every [rational] soul is alone the principle of motion to bodies. That which imparts the principle of motion to bodies is self-moved. The soul therefore is self-moved. He reminds us, however, of this from the last of things, and from what is apparent. For if the animated differs from the inanimated body, in being moved by itself and inwardly,—for that which we see moved by itself we denominate animated,—it is evident that the soul, since it moves itself, and desires to move the animal, will thus much more cause it to be moved. But we must not be disturbed lest we should be forced to admit that those souls of animals are immortal which we are accustomed to call animations alone and *entelecheias* (or forms), such as the souls of worms and gnats. For either the soul itself is inserted in bodies as the principle of motion, being itself present with them, as in us, or it imparts a certain resemblance of itself.

How, therefore, it may be said, do we see the inanimate body moved by itself to corruption? Does not fire also tend upward of itself, and a clod of earth downward? For either the body which proceeds to corruption is in reality perfectly inanimate, and the soul is not the cause of all motion; or it is animated, and the soul will be the cause of this, which imparts life and existence to other things. To this we reply that what is called an inanimate body is so called with reference to a partial soul, because it has not a peculiar soul, but is animated by the soul of the universe. For every body, considered as existing in the animated world, is in a certain respect animated; just as the excrements which are in us participate, so far as they are in us, of a certain vital heat, but, when they proceed out of the body, are deprived of this animating warmth. *Body, therefore, so far as it is in the world, has a vestige of soul which moves it, and causes it to be that which it is.* Through this also fire tends upward, and a clod of earth downward, as being moved by the soul of the universe. For nature, by which they are moved, is a resemblance of soul. But we denominate them inanimate, in consequence of comparing them with a partial soul. It is not proper, however, to wonder if the soul becomes the cause of corruption; for we have before observed that it produces motions, as looking to its own advantage and the good of the universe. In the human species, also, we see that the worthy man destroys his body by famine when by so doing it is beneficial to him. Thus, therefore, the soul of the universe, when a partial soul leaves the body, analyzes the body, and restores it to the elements whence it was derived. For its further existence in a composite state is no longer advantageous to the universe; just as the nature which is in us compounds some of the juices, but dissolves

others, extending itself to what is useful to the whole of our body.

Of the two before-mentioned syllogisms, therefore, each indeed demonstrates, both that the soul is neither corrupted from itself, nor by anything external to it; nevertheless, the first in a greater degree demonstrates the former, and the second the latter. Hence Platon assumes the proposition which is common to both the syllogisms, and which says that the soul is self-moved. And he does this, not simply for the sake of dialectic argument; but, since self-motion itself is the essence of the soul, this is the cause of the soul not being corrupted, and of other things living and being connected with it. Both the arguments, therefore, are demonstrative. For they are assumed from the definition of the soul, and all the definitions are essential, so far as the soul is what it is. Hence, also, they reciprocate with each other, or are convertible. And here it is especially requisite to admire the philosopher for employing in his reasoning that which is most peculiar to and characteristic of the soul, omitting such particulars as are common to it with other things. For *the soul is an incorporeal, self-moved essence, gnostic of beings*. You see, therefore, that according to all the rest it communicates with many things, but is especially characterized by self-motion. That also which appears principally to pertain to it, viz., to be gnostic of beings, this no less pertains likewise to sense. For sense is gnostic of things coördinate to its nature.

#### HYMN TO THE MUSES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF PROKLOS, BY EDWIN ARNOLD.

[This fine version of one of Proklos' admirable hymns is reprinted from Arnold's "Poets of Greece." Speaking of Proklos, Mr. Arnold says: Proklos was born at Constantinople in A. D. 412, and it is not too much to say that something eloquent from the greatest poet, and something lofty from the greatest philosopher of Hellas, — an inheritance at once of the melody of Hômer and of the mind of Platôn, — fell upon this last of the Greek minstrels. It is for his philosophic works and career, no doubt, that Proklos is best known. His commentary on the "Timaios" of Platôn was a masterpiece of erudition for the age. His mystic and religious writings are deeply interesting, and sublime in theory and aim, even where most extravagant. In his treatises on Providence, Fate, and Evil, he states with eloquent force the doctrine that all pain and sorrow spring from the limitation of human knowledge. In his "Eighteen Arguments against the Christians," he maintains the eternity of the world, — a favorite theory of the Platonists, — and all these, as well as his other works, are saturated with the ardent and spiritual nature of a soul truly poetic and aspiring.]

Glory and praise to those sweet lamps of earth,  
The nine fair daughters of Almighty Jove,  
Who all the passage dark to death from birth  
Lead wandering souls with their bright beams of love.

Through cares of mortal life, through pain and woe,  
The tender solace of their counsel saves;  
The healing secrets of their songs forego  
Despair; and when we tremble at the waves

Of life's wild sea of murky incertitude,  
Their gentle touch upon the helm is pressed,  
Their hand points out the beacon-star of good,  
Where we shall make our harbor and have rest —

The planet of our home wherefrom we fell,  
Allured by this poor show of lower things,  
Tempted among earth's dull deceits to dwell.  
But, O great Sisters, hear his prayer who sings,

And calm the restless flutter of his breast,  
And fill him with the thirst for Wisdom's stream;  
Nor ever suffer thoughts or men unblest  
To turn his vision from the eternal beam.

Ever and ever higher, from the throng  
Lawless and witless, lead his feet aright  
Life's perils and perplexities among,  
To the white centre of the sacred light.

Feed him with food of that rich fruit which grows  
On stems of splendid learning — dower him still  
With gifts of eloquence to vanquish those  
Who err — let soft persuasion change their will.

Hear! heavenly Sisters, hear! O ye who know  
The winds of Wisdom's sea, the course to steer;  
Who light the flame that lightens all below,  
And bring the spirits of the perfect there

Where the immortals are, when this life's fever  
Is left behind as a dread gulf o'erpassed;  
And souls, like mariners, escaped for ever,  
Throng on the happy foreland, saved at last.

So bring, high Muses! open me the scroll  
Where Truth is writ in characters of fire;  
Roll from my eyes the mists of life; oh! roll,  
That I may have my spirit's deep desire,

Discerning the divine in undivine,  
The god in man — the life of me in death;  
Nor let dire powers pluck this soul of mine  
From its most precious hope — to merge beneath

Deep floods of black oblivion, far from bliss,  
From light, from Wisdom, — never let their doom  
Shut my lost soul in such despair as this,  
My soul that is so weary of the gloom!

But hear and help, ye wise and shining Nine!  
I yearn and strive toward your heavenly side;  
Teach me the secret of the mystic sign,  
Give me the love that guards, the words that guide.

#### GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATON.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Continued.]

If, however, to speak more properly, *the one* is two-fold, *this* being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to being, but *that* conferring rectitude on being, — if this be the case, neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, it may be said that *the one* will be perfectly undigent. For neither is it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself: for there is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most undigent of all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present with it, it will not be *the one*. Or may we not say that all things subsist in *the one* according to *the one*? And that both these subsist in it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of *the one*, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things arranged posterior to it. [Note: For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the



things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the subsistence of these.] Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving are so called with reference to things benefited, preserved, and desiring. And if it should be said to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to *the one* alone, and will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will be this and no other according to *the one*. So far, therefore, as it is *the one* alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the first principle and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is preestablished as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It has, therefore, if it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure and debile impression of *the one*. And language indeed appears to be here subverted. For so far as it is *the one* it is also unindigent, since the principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and *the one*. At the same time, however, so far as it is *the one* it is also the principle; and so far as it is *the one* it is unindigent, but so far as the principle, indigent. Hence, so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it is, it is unindigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of *the one*; so that it is both unindigent and indigent according to *the one*. Not indeed that it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and that which is indigent. For how is it possible it should not be indigent also so far as it is *the one*? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things. Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all assertions. For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do not, however, think it proper to call this even *the perfectly exempt*; but that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most just axiom of our conception in the present investigation; nor yet this as uttering anything, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that immense unknown. This, then, is the mode of ascent to that which is called the first, or rather to that which is beyond everything which can be conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis.

There is also another mode, which does not place the unindigent before the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Everywhere, then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more excellent never blossoms from the more subordinate nature. Let this then be previously defined by us, according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter, therefore, was prior to itself material form; because all matter is form in capacity, whether it be the first matter, which is perfectly formless, or the second, which subsists according to body void of quality, or, in other words, mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first appeared to be the

only things that had a subsistence. For the existence of that which is common in the different elements persuaded them that there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is of things artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased and to generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain cause prior to the above-mentioned nature, viz., a vegetable power itself. But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a subject are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. Qualities, therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since, however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal, however, is not accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout the whole; but a part moves, and a part is moved. This, therefore, is the apparent self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that which is truly self-moved, and which, according to the whole of itself, moves and is self-moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of this. And, indeed, the soul which moves the body must be considered as a more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is two-fold, the one rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is evident; or has not every one a co-sensation of himself, more clear or more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and investigations of himself, and in the vital and gnostic animadversions of himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect universals by reasoning, will, very justly, be rational. The irrational soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times it exerts a different impulse. Does it, therefore, move itself from one impulse to another? Or is it moved by something else, as, for instance, by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say that the irrational energies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted from something else, but proceeding from itself. The irrational soul, therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. But if it moves itself it will be converted to itself. If, however, this be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a subject. It is therefore rational if it looks to itself; for in being converted to, it surveys, itself. For when extended to things external it looks to externals, or rather it looks to colored body, but does not see itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is colored. Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as, for instance, of colored

body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a certain object of desire, such as honor, or pleasure, or riches. It does not therefore move itself.

But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions without distortion. It must, however, be observed that the extremes are, that which is capable of being perfectly separated, such as the rational form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the inseparable, having a small representation of the separable, and the irrational soul, which verges to the separable; for it appears in a certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that it becomes doubtful whether it is self-moved or alter-motive. For it contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true, and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle subsistence. On this account, to some of the ancients it appeared to be a certain soul, but to others, nature.

Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For it neither subsists from itself nor does it in reality perfect itself, but it requires a certain other nature both for its subsistence and perfection; and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is, therefore, that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which moves always naturally prior to that which is moved? And, in short, does not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the comingled? For that which is coessentialized with another has also an energy mingled with that other, so that a self-moved nature will indeed make itself; but, thus subsisting, it will be at the same time moving and moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this alone. Every form, however, is always alone, according to its first subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being moved. And, indeed, it would be absurd that there should be that which is moved only, such as body, but that prior to both that which is self-moved and that which is moved only there should not be that which moves only. For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary, therefore, that the essence which moves unmoved should be first, as that which is moved, not being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, which, we say, requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and if it moves it is unnecessary it should remain moving so far as it moves. Whence, then, does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it derives the power either of being moved only or of at the same time abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence, then, does it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply abides. But this is an immovable cause. We must, therefore, admit that the immovable is prior to the self-moved. Let us consider, then, if the immovable is the most proper principle. But how is this possible? For the immovable contains as numerous a mul-

titude immovably as the self-moved self-movably. Besides, an immovable separation must necessarily subsist prior to a self-movable separation. The unmoved, therefore, is at the same time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that the united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the separated. For separation is always indigent of union, but not, on the contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the separated through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain respect united requires that which is simply united; and that which subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and that which subsists according to participation of that which subsists according to essence. For intellect, being self-subsistent, produces itself as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to both these. It is produced, therefore, from that which is simply united and alone united. Prior, therefore, to that which is formal is the uncircumscribed and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated *being*, possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many.

Having, therefore, arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while and consider with ourselves whether being is the investigated principle of all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? May we not say that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the one, and that by participating of the one it becomes the united? But, in short, if we conceive the one to be something different from being, if being is prior to the one, it will not participate of the one. It will, therefore, be many only, and these will be infinitely infinites. But if the one is with being, and being with the one, and they are either co-ordinate or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of something else consisting from both. And if this be the case, what will that be which leads them to union with each other? For if the one unites being to itself (for this may be said), the one will also energize prior to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. The one, therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If, therefore, they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one or not one; and if not one, it must either be many or nothing. But with respect to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more simple than the one. The one, therefore, is in every respect prior to being. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Platon, recurring to this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Platon indicates nothing concerning it, but makes his negations of all other things, except the one, from the one. For that the one is he denies in the last place, but he does not make a negation of the one. He also, besides this, even denies this negation, but not the one. He denies, too, name and conception, and all knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two principles, *bound* and *the infinite*. Platon, however, never in any respect makes a negation of the one, which



is beyond all these. Hence in the *Sophistes* he considers it as *the one* prior to being, and in the *Republic* as *the good* beyond every essence; but at the same time *the one* alone is left. Is it, however, known and effable or unknown and ineffable? Or is it in a certain respect these and in a certain respect not? For by a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by negation. And, in short, so far as it is admitted to be one, so far it will be co-arranged with other things which are the subject of position. For it is the summit of things which subsist according to position. At the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are accompanied with a representation of the contraries, and the former are more excellent than the latter. But everywhere things pure subsist prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the comingled. For either things more excellent subsist in *the one* essentially, and in a certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to *the one*, therefore, is that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things.

Such, then, is the ascent to the highest God, according to the theology of Platon, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy, and at the same time unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and enkindling that luminous summit of the soul by which she is conjoined with the incomprehensible one.

From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Platon, immediately proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case will be admitted by the reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully demonstrated by Platon in the *Parmenides*, as will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition, therefore, to what I have said on this subject, I shall further observe at present that this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate dogma of Platon from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his *Republic*. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, is superessential, and shows by the analogy of the sun to *the good*, that what *light* and *sight* are in the visible, that *truth* and *intelligence* are in the intelligible world. As light, therefore, immediately proceeds from the sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so *truth*, or the immediate progeny of *the good*, must subsist according to a superessential idiom. And as *the good*, according to Platon, is the same with *the one*, as is evident from the *Parmenides*, the immediate progeny of *the one* will be the same as that of *the good*. But the immediate offspring of *the one* cannot be anything else than unities. Hence we necessarily infer that, according to Platon, the immediate offspring of the ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ, however, from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is participated by the several orders of being which are suspended from and produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with *multitude* through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to *the one*.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

## IAMBlichOS: A TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION, BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### LETTER OF PORPHYRIOS TO ANEBÔ THE EGYPTIAN.

*Porphyrios to Anebô the Prophet,<sup>1</sup> Greeting:*

I am led to open this friendly acquaintance with you by considerations in regard to the gods and good spirits,<sup>2</sup> but more especially the speculations of philosophers which are cognate to them. Very many things have been advanced concerning them, by philosophers among the Greeks; but they, for the most part, derived the principles of their faith from conjecture.

#### DISTINCTIONS AMONG THE SUPERIOR ORDERS.

First, then, the existence of divine beings must be taken for granted. But, I ask, what are the respective peculiarities of the higher orders, by which they are to be distinguished from each other? Is the cause of the distinction among them to be set forth, perhaps, as the active energies, the passive coöperations, the things consequent,—or the distribution among the different bodies, as, for example, of the deities to æthærial, the tutelary spirits to aerial, and souls to earthly bodies?

#### INQUIRIES IN REGARD TO PECULIAR RITES.

I ask also, why, among the divinities inhabiting the celestial expanse, only those of the Earth and Underworld are invoked in the theurgic rites?

Why are certain ones said to be of the water and the air, and others assigned to other places and distributed to particular parts of bodies as may be circumscribed, having at the same time power unconditioned, undivided, and uncomprehended?

How will they become at one with each other, when they are thus separated by circumscribed divisions of parts, and according to the diversities of places and subject-bodies?

Why do the Theosophists represent them as moved by passion, and say that on this account phallic images are erected to them, and indelicate language employed in the rites?

If they are indeed without sensibility, then will the invocations of the deities, which indicate that their favor may be propitiated and their anger appeased by sacrifices, be utterly useless; and still more what are termed "the necessities of the gods." Any being without sensibility can neither be pleased, nor compelled, nor constrained by necessity. Why, then, are many things done in the Sacred Rites as though they were capable of being influenced by passion? Prayers are likewise offered up to deities as though they were subject to emotion; so that it would seem that not only the tutelary spirits, but the very deities, are affected by passion, as indeed Hómēros himself has declared (*Iliad* ix., line 493):—

"Even the gods themselves are yielding."

If, however, we declare, as some do, that the deities are pure spiritual essences, and that the guardian spirits are psychical, and

<sup>1</sup> I am very reluctant to accept this designation of prophet, because of the general misapprehension of its proper meaning. There was an order of persons bearing this title in all the countries usually denominated *Semitic*. The Aramean term *Nabîa*, from *Nabo* the Assyrian Hermes, better expresses the idea; but it cannot be employed, for obvious reasons. Anebô could almost appear to have been so named as being the student of Iamblichos, who made a special pursuit of theurgy, or the peculiar technic learning of the Akkadian priests of Assyria and the Shamans of Middle Asia. This appears to have been in contradistinction to the peculiar esoteric doctrines of the Neo-Platonic masters, Ammônios, Plotinos, and Porphyrios, which are strikingly like the Yoga philosophy of India.

The epistle to Anebô is not quite complete. This fact reminds us that the writings of the great philosopher, constituting an inexhaustible repository of the learning of the celebrated Alexandrian school, were destroyed, by order of the Emperor Theodosios I., in 381. Only a few fragments and brief treatises escaped.—A. W.

<sup>2</sup> I have rendered the term *δαίμων* *spirit*, more generally *guardian* or *tutelary spirit*. I would have preferred leaving it in the text; but it has been confounded with *devil*, and would often be misconstrued. *θεός* is generally translated *deity*.



therefore partakers of the spiritual nature, nevertheless the spiritual essences will be in a greater degree incapable of receiving delight and being mixed with things of sense. The prayers are therefore entirely out of place, as being offered to pure spiritual essence; and yet offerings are presented as to beings of soul and sense.

Are not the deities then distinguished from the tutelary spirits by the endowment of the latter with bodies, while the former are without body?

Yet if the deities only are unbodied, why will the Sun and Moon and the celestial luminaries be reckoned as gods?

How is it that some are beneficent and others do harm?

What is the intermediary agent that connects the gods in the sky that have bodies with those that are unbodied?

The visible deities being classed with the invisible, what is the means of distinguishing tutelary spirits from the deities, visible and invisible?

In what respect do a tutelary spirit, a half-god, and a soul differ—in substance, potency, or active energy?

What is the certain evidence of the presence of a deity, angel, archangel, guardian spirit, or of any potentate, or soul? For it is a common affair for the deities, tutelary spirits, and indeed all the higher orders, to speak ostentatiously, and make a pompous display of themselves; so that the order of gods will exhibit nothing superior to the tutelary spirits.

Ignorance and error in regard to divine matters are the cause of impurity of heart and impious action; whereas to know aright concerning the gods is holy and beneficial. Darkness comes from ignorance of things honorable and excellent, but from the knowledge of them is light. The one will fill men with every kind of evil, through their lack of instruction and indiscreet audacity; whereas the other will be a fountain of every species of good.

#### ENTHEASM, OR ECSTATIC EXALTATION.

What is the outcome in the entheastic condition? Often, while we are asleep, we obtain through dreams the perception of things to come, when we are by no means in any tumultuous ecstasy, for the body lies tranquil; yet these matters are not so well understood as when we are normal. So also many, in a state of mental exaltation and divine transport, will attain the perception of the future. At one time they will be so wide awake as to act under the influence of the physical senses; but at another they will not be conscious of their condition, or, at least, not so conscious as they had been before.

So, also, certain of the ecstasies become excited with enthusiastic frenzy when they hear cymbals and drums or a peculiar melody; as, for example, those engaged in celebrating the Korybantic rites, those who participate in the Sabazian Orgies, and those who take part in the arcane worship of the Great Mother. Others are likewise so affected by drinking water, as the priest of the Klarian Apollo at Kolophôn; others, by sitting above a little aperture in the ground, like the inspired ones at Delphi; others, by breathing the exhalation from water, like the women at the oracle in Branchidæ; and some even by standing upon indented marks, as though they were filled from some unperceived insinuation of the peculiar influence.

Others, who are perfectly conscious in regard to themselves in other respects, become divinely affected through the power of fancy; others employ darkness for their auxiliary to produce this condition; others make use of certain drinks, and others are excited by certain chants and compositions. Some display the phantasy through a peculiar influence of water, others in the niche of a wall, others in the open air, others in the sun or other heavenly bodies. Some have likewise instituted the art of divining the future by examination of entrails, the motion of birds, and of the stars.

#### SOURCE OF INSPIRED UTTERANCE.

I also inquire, in regard to the matter of oracular utterance, what it is, and what is its nature? The inspired persons (*manteis*) all say that it is through deities or tutelary spirits that they obtain foreknowledge of what is to come, and that others do not perceive it except those having power over the future. I question, therefore, whether the Godhead has ever been brought into such close subjection to human beings as not to be reluctant to assist those who divine with meal.

As for the origins of the prophetic art, it is to be doubted whether a deity, angel, tutelary spirit, or any other such personality, is present in the manifestations, inspired utterances, or other such sacred operations, as though drawn down through you by the necessities which come forth through the invocation. It is the soul that says and imagines these things; and, according to the opinion of some persons, they are its passions kindled into activity by a very little supply of fuel.

So, also, a certain blended form of substance is evolved, part from our soul, and part from a divine inspiration beyond. Hence, by means of joint actions of this kind, the soul generates the power of fancy which penetrates the future; or else the elements coming from the primal Matter, by virtue of the powers inherent in them, evolve the tutelary spirits,—and especially is this the case where the matter was derived from living beings.

In sleep, when we are occupied with nothing, we sometimes receive suggestions of the future. But that the soul is itself the source of inspired utterance is evident from the fact that the physical senses are restrained, vapors are administered, and prayers put up; and, also, that not every person, but only the more ingenuous and young, are suitable for the purpose.

An ecstatic condition of the reasoning faculty is likewise a cause of inspired utterance. So, also, is the mania or exaltation which supervenes in disease, or any aberration, abstinence from wine, congestion of the body, the phantasies incited by disease, or equivocal conditions of mind such as are incident after abstinence from wine, an ecstasy, or the visions artificially produced by magical means.

Nature and art, and the sympathy of parts in everything, as in a single living being, make certain things manifest to others at a time previous to their occurring. Besides there are bodies so constituted that there is a presaging from some to others. Examples of this kind are plain from the effects displayed. The persons who make the invocations carry magical stones and herbs, tie certain sacred knots and untie them, open places that were locked, and change the deliberate intentions of the persons entertaining them, so that these are transformed from being frivolous into purposes which are worthy.

Those individuals are by no means to be held in low esteem who restore the images that possess efficacious power. They observe the motion of the heavenly bodies, and are able to tell by the position and relation of one to another in the sky whether the oracles will be true or false, or whether the rites which are performed will be to no purpose or significant and effectual, although no deity or tutelary spirit may have been attracted by them.

#### ELEMENTARY SPIRITS AND SPIRITUAL MEDIUMS.

There is another class of persons who suppose that there is an order of spiritual beings that are likely to be attracted by these means, that are naturally deceitful, assuming every guise, and changing in every way, personating indiscriminatingly the deities, tutelary spirits, and souls of the dead; and they believe accordingly that by the agency of these beings all such manifestations, whether apparently good or evil, are possible. But such spirits are not able to contribute anything really good, such as relates to the soul, nor even to perceive such things; but instead they

ill-treat, deride, and often entangle the feet of persons endeavoring to attain a condition of moral excellence. They are likewise full of arrogance, and take delight in exhalations and sacrifices.

A charlatan, with wide open mouth, will impose upon us in many ways with the expectations that he endeavors to incite.

#### COMMANDING THE SUPERIOR BEINGS.

It perplexes me very much to understand how superior beings may be commanded like inferiors in these invocations. They consider it necessary for the worshipper to be just; but when they are themselves entreated to do injustice, they do not refuse. They will give no heed to the person invoking them if he is not uncontaminated from sexual intercourse; but they are not reluctant to lead chance individuals into unlawful concubinage.

I also question the utility or power which sacrifices possess, whether in the world or with the deities, and also the reason for which they are presented — fitness for those who are thus honored, and profit for those who receive the gifts.

The officials who deliver the oracles hold that it is necessary for them to abstain from animal food, in order that the divine beings may not be repelled by the exhalations from their bodies; and yet it is asserted that the deities invoked by them are especially attracted by the exhalations from sacrificed animals. It is also regarded as essential that the *epoptes* (or seer) shall not come in contact with a dead body; yet the ceremonies employed to compel the deities to be present are considered to be rendered effective by means of dead animals.

But, as if to be more irrational than such things indicate, it is not merely to a tutelary spirit or the soul of a dead person, but to the King Sun himself, or the Moon, or some one of the heavenly luminaries, as to a man that may be brought into subjection by such chance hitting upon him, that they make use of threats and senseless alarms in order to induce the disclosing of the truth. Does not the expression that the supplicant will break down the sky, divulge the Mysteries of Isis, expose to public gaze the arcanum in the inner shrine [*adyton* for *Abydos*], stop the Baris in its voyage, give the limbs of Osiris to Typhon to be scattered, etc., contain some reservation in regard to the exaggeration of rash utterance in the making of threats which he does not understand, and is not able to carry out? But what of the pusillanimous condition, very much like children not yet arrived at mature understanding, which is induced in those persons who are frightened at the vain alarms and senseless fictions? And yet Chairêmôn, the expounder of the Mysteries, records these things as common matters with the Egyptians. It is also stated by others that these and similar expressions were of the most violent character.

What sense, I ask, do these prayers have which declare that a certain divinity was evolved from the primal matter, that he is sitting upon the lotos-blossom, that he sails in a boat, that he changes his forms according to the season, and adapts his appearance according to the animal in the Zodiac? For so they say it is at the *autopsia* (or self-inspection); and, having no interior conception of the fact, they attach to him the peculiar creation of their own fancy. If, however, such things are spoken symbolically, and are symbols of his operations, then let me demand the interpretation of the symbols. For it is plain that if these things are like the Passion of the Sun, as in eclipses, they will be apparent to all who are gazing intently upon the spectacle.

#### THE USE OF UNCOUTH FOREIGN TERMS.

Why are obscure names chosen, and of such as are obscure, why are foreign ones preferred over those which exist in our own language? If the hearer fixes his attention upon the meaning, it is evident enough that the idea remains the same, whatever the names may be. The god who is invoked is evidently not an Egyptian, nor of that race; and even if he is an Egyptian, he seems never

to use the Egyptian language, nor, indeed, any which is used by human beings. These things are all fabrications of wizards, and concealments which are imputed to the Godhead, but are actually evolved from our own passions and conditions; or we are entertaining ideas contrary to the truth in respect to the Divine Nature, or it is constituted of real essence itself — ἡ αὐτὴ τοῦ ὁντος διδασκαλία.

#### THE FIRST CAUSE.

I desire it to be explained to me what the Egyptians believe in regard to the First Cause, — whether it is an Interior Mind or an entity beyond Mind; a single Principle, or associated with another, or with others; whether it is without body or has a body; whether it is the same as the Creator, or prior to the Creator; also, whether the universe has its origin from One or from many; whether they accept the hypothesis of Matter or that in respect to certain primal bodies; and whether they suppose Matter to have been unbegotten or generated.

Chairêmôn and others express no belief in regard to anything whatever anterior to the visible universe; adopting at the beginning of their discussions the deities of the Egyptians, and no others, except the planets, as they are called, and those other luminaries which fill up the Zodiac, and such as appear in their neighborhood. They also accept the division into decans, the horoscopes, the Mighty Leaders, as they are called, whose names are given in the Almanacs, the services to which they are subjected, their risings and settings, and their foreshowing of things to come. For it was perceived that what was affirmed concerning the Sun as the Creator, concerning Isis and Osiris, and all the myths related by the priests, might be changed into narrations about the stars, their phases, occultations, and risings, or else the increase and decrease of the Moon, the journey of the Sun, the vault of the Sky as seen by night or day, or the river Nile, if nothing else. Indeed, they interpret everything as physical, and nothing as relating to incorporeal and living essences. Very many of them do away with the agency of the stars in relation to humankind, and bind all things, I know not how, with the indissoluble bonds of Necessity which they denominate *Fate*; binding all things fast and connecting them absolutely with the deities, whom they worship in temples, and with statues and other emblems.

#### THE DEMON OR GUARDIAN SPIRIT.

In relation to the guardian spirit of an individual, it must be asked how the Overlord<sup>1</sup> (*ὁ ἀρχὸς οἴκου*, lord of the house, city, or habitable earth) gives it; according to what manner, what mode of emanation, or life, or faculty, it was imparted from him to ourselves; whether it has actual being or not; and whether it is possible or impossible to find out the Overlord. Hence, indeed, he is happy who, comprehending the plan of his existence, and knowing his guardian spirit, is liberated from Fate.

The canons of the science of casting nativities, however, are innumerable and hard to comprehend; but it is impossible for skill in such learning to mature into real knowledge. Indeed, there is much disagreement in regard to it, and Chairêmôn, together with many others, has disputed its pretensions. So also the right idea of the Overlord or Overlords, if there are more than one to a nativity, upon which they say that the knowing of one's own guardian spirit intimately depends, is confessed by them to be almost impossible to ascertain.

But further: does a particular guardian spirit rule parts of our organism? It is imagined by some that tutelary spirits

<sup>1</sup> This designation, both in Greek and English, is the exact equivalent of Baal-Zeboul, the Phœnician Apollo, or Esculapius. In the *Gospel* inscribed to Matthew, the play on the name repeatedly appears: "If they call the Overlord Beelzeboul." "He casteth not out *daimonia* except by Beelzeboul, archon of the *daimonia*." I judge that Porphyrios, who was a Tyrian of Jewish extraction, was familiar with this divinity, and his peculiar functions, and translated the name accordingly. — A. W.



preside over specific parts of the body, over the health, the general appearance, and the physical habits, acting in concert with each other; and that one chief is placed over them all in common. And further, that there is a guardian spirit over the body, another over the soul, and another over the interior mind; and that some of these are good, but others are bad. I question, however, whether this peculiar guardian spirit may not be itself a part of the soul; and if I am right in this matter, then whoever is wise from the interior mind is truly favored.

I observe likewise that the cultus of the peculiar tutelary spirit becomes twofold; that it is rendered as to two, and again as if to three. But the invocation is made by all according to a common form of prayer.

#### CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS.

I ask further whether there is not some other arcane way to happiness, entirely separate from this peculiar worship of the deities. I doubt seriously whether it is at all necessary to look to human opinions in divine utterances and theurgy; and whether the soul does not of itself, as by chance, perform certain great things.

Moreover, there are other methods which may be employed to ascertain things to come. Perhaps they who are endowed with the divine faculty foresee, and yet are not happy; they foresee the future, but fail to employ the knowledge to any good purpose for themselves. I desire of you, therefore, to point out to me the way of happiness, and in what its essence consists. There is a great deal of controversy about this matter among us, as though good conclusions might come from men's disputes. But, as for those who have continued means for intimate association with the denizens of the higher world, if this part of the subject is passed over in the investigation, wisdom will be possessed by them to little purpose. It will be in such case but the calling of the attention of the gods to assist in the finding of a fugitive slave, or a purchase of land, or perchance a marriage or traffic. Yet even though they do not pass this matter over, but hold discourse, and say what is most true concerning other things, but nothing certain or trustworthy about Happiness itself, — employing themselves with matters that are indeed difficult, but utterly useless to mankind, — then neither deities nor good spirits will be in association with them, but only some one of the kind denominated *erratic*; or else it will be a device of men, or a deception of the mortal nature.

#### PLATONIC TECHNOLOGY:

##### *A Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Platón and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense.*

COMPILED BY ALEXANDER WILDER, PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, ETC., IN THE UNITED STATES MEDICAL COLLEGE.

*Aër, ἡ αἴρ.* The air; the lower atmosphere which the demons or tutelary spirits inhabit; the element or compound which is constantly in motion and changing; the Primal Darkness (perhaps Chaos).

*Agapē, ἡ ἀγάπη.* Lovingness; love; the complete exercising and manifesting of the best disposition of the mind.

*Agathon, τὸ ἀγαθόν.* The Good, as considered by itself; the Supreme Good; the Divine Cause and Source of Good; that perfect principle which is in and by itself; God.

*Aídios, ὁ καὶ ἡ αἰδῖος.* Always existing; the perpetually now-existing, τὸ νῦν. As contrasted with αἰώνιος, God, the essence always existing.

*Aión, ὁ αἰών.* An age; a long period of time; a period of time not defined; unlimited time; the equivalent of *Zero-ana akarena*; an age or lifetime; time; all time; a mode of existence; (perhaps) eternity.

*Aiónios, αἰώνιος, ὁ αἰών.* Lasting; continuous; without interval, unceasing; constant; preëxistent (as distinguished from existence at the present time); lasting for an indefinite period but not perpetually.

*Aisthēsis, ἡ αἰσθησις.* Perceptivity; physical sense; knowledge which is acquired through the agency of the senses.

*Aithēr, ὁ αἰθήρ.* The ether; the supernal atmosphere, in which the stars are placed, and the *theoi* or higher divinities dwell; the fifth element, said by Aristotelēs to have appeared prior to fire at the beginning, but by Platón immediately after it, but prior to the Air. Jacob Bryant, somewhat fancifully yet not unplausibly, derives the term from *ait*, an archaic name of the sun, and fire, and *air*. It is sometimes given to Zeus himself.

*Aitia or aition, ἡ αἰτία or αἰτίη, τὸ αἰτίον.* The cause; the supernal agency by which every thing is produced; the principal or efficient cause; or in other words, the Superior or Interior Mind (νοῦς), and the reason or understanding.

*Alētheia, ἡ ἀληθεία.* The Truth; the Absolute Fact; the *enōsis* or being at one of the excellent (τὸ κάλον), the just (τὸ δίκαιον), and the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν); that which is, as distinguished from the *maya*, or that which appears, or is physical and transitory; the unbegotten ideal; the eternal fact; the uttering of that which is true. "If the Truth is perpetually in our soul, then that soul is immortal." — *Menón*. Some of the Alchemists, the mediæval Mystics, formed this word from *alē*, breath, and *theia*, divine.

*Alēthes, τὸ ἀληθές.* See *Alētheia*.

*Anamnēsis, ἡ ἀνάμνησις.* Reminiscence; recollection; remembering; memory; truth which has been concealed in the mind and is potentially contained in its faculties; ideas or concepts of the eternal world which have been latent or dormant in the interior mind, but are now brought into conscious knowledge. "To learn is to recover our previous knowledge; and this is properly recollecting." See *Dialectic*.

*Anankē, ἡ ἀνάγκη.* Necessity; matter in its unconditioned form; space, abstractly considered; the phenomenal state; the physical basis on which the Divine Mind operates; that entity without which nothing can be made to exist; that entity or condition which is the very negative of Mind (probably the same as Chaos or the Primal Darkness). It is a significant fact that the modern agnostic school of reasoners, rejecting all idea of divine or noumenal agency, but only accepting materialistic conjectures of evolution by virtue of arbitrary law, are more pronounced fatalists than ever were Calvinists or Moslems. Except, indeed, the prior and superior entity of mind is acknowledged, and phenomena are remanded to a subordinate rank, any other conclusion is logically impossible.

*Anastasis, ἡ ἀνάστασις.* A rising up to one's feet from a suppliant attitude; a resuscitation; a condition of spiritual being distinct from corporeal existence; a state of beatitude, the same as the *nirvana* of the Buddhists, and probably the *metempsychosis* of the Pythagoreans; the restoration from the *lēpsis* or *apostasia*, by which souls left their prior condition and became subject to necessity and the conditions of material existence. The doctrine of *anastasis* or removal from the Underworld or *Hadēs* to the aerial or supernal regions, was a part of the Essenean or Mithraic theosophy, and was taken from the Persian religion. "The sons of this period marry, and the daughters are given in marriage; but those who become worthy to attain that condition of existence (*diōn*), and the restoration from among the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage. For they cannot die, because they are like angels, and are sons of God and sons of the restoration." — *Gospel according to Luke*, xx: 34-36.

*Andria, ἡ ἀνδρία.* Manliness; fortitude; presence of mind; firmness in the right; a moral condition in which the individual is neither despondent nor audacious and foolhardy.

*Angelos, ὁ καὶ ἡ ἄγγελος.* An angel; a courier or messenger; a personage of the supernal world subordinate to the deities but superior to the *dæmōn* or tutelary spirit, probably the same as the *ized* of the Mithraic pantheon. Porphyrios, or Malech, the philosopher, himself of Jewish or Syrian parentage and familiar with Chaldean literature, mentions this order in his letter to Aneō; and Iamblichos in reply explains their rank and functions. The Jews, whom



- Aristotelēs declares to be of Hindoo origin, brought the doctrine of angels from Babylonia.
- Anthrōpos, ὁ ἀνθρώπος.* Man; one of human kind; a creature standing upon two feet, without wings, and having nails; the only living thing on the earth that can receive knowledge intuitively and by the interior mind. Perhaps from ἀναθίρω, to rise up, and πούς, the foot.
- Apeiron, τὸ ἄπειρον.* The Undefined; the unconditioned; the non-existing, which is nevertheless capable of being made to exist; matter in the unconditioned form, as not limited and circumscribed by the creative energy. See *Aión, Ananké, Chaos.*
- Apodeixis, ἡ ἀποδείξις.* Demonstration; just reasoning; a form of reasoning that makes a matter plain by means of that which was previously known. See *Anamnesis, Dialectic, Epistémē, Idea, Logos.*
- Apokalupsis, ἡ ἀποκάλυψις.* Uncovering of the body; the removing of a veil, screen, or curtain; hence a disclosure of arcana; a manifestation of facts and noumenal causes; an apocalypse or revealing.
- Apokatastasis, ἡ ἀποκατάστασις.* A complete cycle in the heavens when the sun, moon, and planets return to the same place from which the observation was taken; a restoration to the original condition; reestablishment. "Whom it is necessary for heaven to receive till the completion of the period of restoration of all things to the original condition." — *Acts of the Apostles*, iii: 21.
- Apokrupha, τὰ ἀπόκρυφα.* Arcana; occult learning; the interior wisdom; things hidden; the contents of the sacred kista. The modern designation of the theosophical works of certain Jewish writers of the Alexandrian school. See next.
- Aporrēta, τὰ ἀπόρρητα.* Arcana; occult rites and knowledge; the sacred Orgies or Mysteries; things that may not be divulged except by incurring the guilt of sacrilege; the sacred and arcane knowledge which is disclosed to the initiated.
- Apotelesma, τὸ ἀποτελεσμα.* Completing; the finishing of a rite; an arcane symbol; the white pebble given to a candidate on his initiation as a soldier of Mithras; a talisman; a magical emblem; an astrological symbol, having influence on destiny.
- Archē, ἡ ἀρχή.* Beginning; origin; principle; the cause of all phenomenal existence; the inherent principle in all development, as contrasted with the *στοιχεῖα*, or elements, and the *ὁλόνεκεν*, or end, for the sake of which all things exist. "In the inherent principle (*ἀρχή*) was the Reason." Plural *ἀρχαί* — elements; principles; first fruits; dominions; chieftains.
- Archētopos, ὁ ἀρχέτοπος.* The archetype, pattern, or mold; the idea or principle of determinate form according to which all things have been framed.
- Archōn, ὁ ἀρχων.* A magistrate; a lord or potentate in the aerial region; an order of spiritual beings inferior to the dæmons or tutelary spirits, that preside over the world, and impart worldly and material benefits to mankind.
- Arētē, ἡ ἀρετή.* Excellence; virtue; merit; fitness for any purpose; a just proportion of all motives; excellence as coming from the interior mind; knowledge or cognition of the Supreme Good. Platon very elaborately defines this term as embracing *φρόνησις* (sagacity, right purpose); *δικαιοσύνη* (justice, fidelity); *ἀνδρεία* (fortitude, presence of mind); and *σωφροσύνη* (orderly life, self-control, sobriety, and moderation in the enjoyment of pleasure).
- Arrēta, τὰ ἀρρήτα.* See *Aporrēta*. "He was carried into paradise and heard arcane disclosures which it is not permitted to a man to repeat." — *Epistles of Paulos to the Corinthians*, II, xii: 4.
- Asteōs, ὁ and ἡ ἀστεως.* Self-possessed; pleasing; polished; like one who lives in a city and is urbane in manners.
- Athanasia, ἡ ἀθανασία.* Immortality; the endless career of an ensouled being or living essence.
- Athanaton, τὸ ἀθανατον.* See *Athanasia*.
- Auto, τὸ αὐτον.* The same; the identical; the selfhood; the interior mind; the eternal and indivisible principle in humankind which is identical and of like nature and substance with the Divine. See *Nous, Daimon.*
- Basileus, ὁ βασιλεὺς.* An overlord; a monarch holding supreme power in a state by divine or religious authority, as distinguished from a *τύραννος* or an *Imperator*; the chief or patriarch of a family, clan, or people; the second archon at Athens, who superintended the religious rites.
- Bathos, τὸ βάθος.* The deep or abyss; the profound; the expanse. Hebrew *baṭ.* "Ἡ βάθυσ αἰθέρος, the expanded heaven.
- Boulē, ἡ βουλή.* Counsel; a weighing of the advantages offered.
- Chaos, τὸ χάος.* Chaos; the primeval darkness; the first form, condition, or evolution of matter; the first material substance, still unconditioned, in which all the elements exist potentially; the infinite Void; necessity; the *μίγμα* or mixture; perhaps what Prof. Crookes considers as the fourth form of matter. See *Ananke, Apeiron.*
- Chōikos, ὁ and ἡ χοῖκος.* Fluid; earthy; constituted of dust having in it the seminal principle and possibility of life; consisting of atoms; of spore-dust.
- Chrēsmon, τὸ χρῆσιμον.* Fitness; effectiveness to some purpose or end; the cause of good.
- Chrēstos, ὁ χρήσιμος.* Useful; worthy; noble; pertaining to temples, oracles, and arcane worship, hence a title of *Apollōn* and other divinities; a good citizen.
- Cosmos, ὁ κόσμος.* Order; trimness; the world; the universe; the extended heavens; the general order of things.
- Criterion, τὸ κριτήριον.* The criterion or standard of judging; the idea of right which exists natively in every one.
- Dadochos, ὁ δαδούχος.* A torch-bearer; one, generally of the inferior class of initiates, who carried a lamp or torch in the Eleusinian Mysteries, in commemoration of the search of *Dēmētēr* for *Korē-Persephoneia*, and in the Dionysia of *Korē* for *Zagreus*.
- Daimonion, τὸ δαιμόνιον, or δαιμόνιον τι.* A guardian principle; a certain something divine; the *νοῦς* or interior mind. Usually denominated "the demon of Sokrates," and explained by him as an interior sign, voice, or influence that restrained him from incurring danger needlessly, or doing any thing which he ought not. "Thé interior mind (*νοῦς*) is our guardian." — *Ménandros*. "An interior consciousness." — *Xenophōn*.
- Daimōn, ὁ or ἡ δαίμων.* A tutelary spirit; a guardian genius; a spiritual being next in rank after the deities and angels; the guardian of an oracle. There is some little confusion in regard to this term, strikingly analogous to that in the case of its Aryan equivalent, *daeva*. *Kleanthēs* apostrophizes the Supreme Deity as *Daimōn*, and *Hômēros* terms the gods themselves *daimones*. *Platōn*, *Iamblichos*, and *Porphyrion* rank *δαίμονες* in the order of their spiritual rank next after the angels and immortal gods; but *Ploutarchos* declares them to be mortal, perhaps meaning that they are again brought into the conditions of birth and physical existence. *Hēsiodos* described them as the souls of the men who had lived in the first or Golden Age, now acting as guardians. *Sokratēs* is represented in the *Kratylos* as stating "that *daēmōn* is a term denoting wisdom; and that every good man is daimonian, both while living and when dead, and is rightly called a *daimōn*." This statement is in very close harmony with the practice of styling men of great merit and those who were considered to be inspired or entheast, *theoi* or gods. "He called them gods to whom the word of God came." As in the old worship *daimones* were thus specially esteemed, the early Christians, in order to make it odious, were in the habit of attaching the worst meaning to the designation. The divinities of the Greek-speaking communities were so denominated; and the Pharisees of Judæa styled the Overlord of Palestine "Beel-Zeboul, the archon of the demons." Perhaps the later translation of *devils* makes much of the opprobrious meaning. The Platonists of the Alexandrian school also make mention of "material daimons," or spirits that are still held by corporeal conditions, a lower grade of essences that are able to assume forms which make them perceptible by the physical senses.
- Deinotēs, ἡ δεινότης.* Moral force; power; interior energy; the power which is felt to accompany eloquence; the peculiar influence sometimes denominated *magnetic*, which is perceived from eloquence; the interior operation of words and ideas. "Power in speaking and corresponding influence in acting." — *Suidas*.
- Deisidaimōn, ὁ and ἡ δευσιδάμων.* God-fearing; of a religious and reverential turn of mind; disposed to venerate or worship; religious; revering divine and spiritual beings; conscious of the

presence of the divine. "Those who fear the divinities fear men less." — *Xenophôn*. "Athenians! I bear witness that in all matters you are of exalted religious disposition." — *Acts of the Apostles*, xvii.

*Dekanos*, ὁ δέκανος. A decan; a chief of ten; a dean; the chief of the corpse-bearers; a chief of ten parts in a degree of the zodiac. Thus Iamblichos mentions thirty-six decans for the 360 degrees.

*Dēmiurgos*, ὁ δημιουργός. An architect; an artist; the Framers of the Universe; the demiurge; the Evil Potency, as set forth by the *Gnostics*, who formed the material universe; also, a chief magistrate in Archaic cities.

*Dēmos*, ὁ δῆμος. The country population; the populace, as distinguished from citizens; an assembly of the Commons at Athens. — *Euthydemus*.

*Desnoia*, ἡ δῆσιννα. A lady; a queen; the goddess *Dēmêtêr*, honored in the *Phigaleian Mysteries*, represented with the head of a hippo or mare, to indicate her encounter with *Poseidôn*, both having the equine form; but more probably a pun on her archaic designation of *Hippa* or genetrix.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

### BOOK REVIEWS.

HOURS WITH THE MYSTICS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS OPINION. By ROBERT ALFRED VAUGHAN, B.A. Third edition. Two volumes. London: Strahan & Co. 1880.

This is both an instructive and entertaining work. It gives in a moderate compass much valuable information, gleaned from numerous volumes, many of them rare and costly, concerning the mystical sects of various ages and countries. The work is not an exhaustive philosophical account of the manifold phases of mysticism. Indeed, superficiality is one of its chief faults. The author's mind was not free from prejudice against many whom he denominates mystics, and was, therefore, unable to apprehend their profoundest thoughts. No man whose mind is saturated, as it were, with antipathy against any system of philosophy, is capable of doing that system justice. He may succeed in grasping some of its more exoteric tenets, but he can never enter into its inner spirit or comprehend its profoundest doctrines. Mr. Vaughan's judgment was afflicted with the intellectual malady known as "one-sidedness." He could not, or would not, forget that he was a clergyman, and consequently viewed mystical ideas entirely from an ecclesiastical stand-point. All systems that deviated from his ecclesiastical notions were, exactly to the extent of their deviation, erroneous, or totally false. In other words, Mr. Vaughan, instead of beginning his investigations of Mysticism with a wholly unbiased mind, began with certain preconceptions, erroneous and misleading in many instances, of its scope, doctrines, and tendency. We do not deny that there are many appreciative, sympathetic passages in this interesting book, but it is marred by a general distrust, and unjustifiable, though perhaps unconscious, misrepresentations of even the best and highest class of mystics. A few quotations will show the author's disposition to positively pronounce hasty, ill-considered judgments: "I think we may say this much generally—that mysticism, whether in religion or philosophy, is that *form of error* which mistakes for a divine manifestation the operations of a merely human faculty." It must be remembered that the author includes under this definition nearly every phase of mysticism of which he treats. "Still, their notions concerning special revelation and immediate intuitions of God were grievous mistakes." Who is best qualified to decide that "special revelations and immediate intuitions of God" are mistakes and delusions—the men that are favored with them or he who does not believe in their occurrence? The rabble sneers at what it does not understand, and even thinkers occasionally ridicule things they lack the capacity to comprehend.

It is in his treatment of the so-called "Neo-Platonists," whom Mr. Vaughan classes as mystics, that he principally displays his antipathy and one-sidedness. Of the "Neo-Platonic" philosophy he says: "Its literary tastes and religious wants were alike imperative and irreconcilable. In obedience to the former, it disdained Christianity; impelled by the latter, it travestied Plato. But for that proud servility which fettered it to a glorious past, it might have recognized in Christianity the only

satisfaction of its higher longings. Rejecting that, it could only establish a philosophic church on the foundation of Plato's school, and, forsaking while it professed to expound him, embrace the hallucinations of intuition and of ecstasy, till it finally vanishes at Athens, amid the incense and the hocus-pocus of theurgic incantation. As it degenerates it presses more audaciously forward through the veil of the unseen. It must see visions, dream dreams, work spells, and call down deities, demi-gods, and demons from their dwellings in the upper air." There is hardly a sentence, or even an idea, in this paragraph, which does not contain a gross misrepresentation of the "Neo-Platonic" philosophy. The circulation and common acceptance of such false, silly opinions have tended to bring the Platonic philosophy, as evolved and promulgated by Plotinos, Iamblichos, etc., into disrepute. Suffice it to say that no one who has studied and understood the "Neo-Platonic" philosophy will, or can, indorse Mr. Vaughan's opinion of its origin, principles, and results. While the account of the "Neo-Platonists" frequently does them grievous injustice, still there are appreciative, fairly correct statements which show that the author occasionally sympathized with those philosophers that received "immediate intuitions of God." The following extract will, we believe, be perused with pleasure by all Platonists. The ideas are chiefly drawn directly from the works of Plotinos, and are therefore a tolerably correct exposition of his views:

"Knowledge has three degrees—Opinion, Science, Illumination. The means or instrument of the first is sense; of the second, dialectic; of the third, intuition. To the last I subordinate reason. It is absolute knowledge founded on the identity of the mind knowing with the object known.

"There is a raying out of all orders of existence, an external emanation from the ineffable One. There is again a returning impulse, drawing all upwards and inwards towards the centre from whence all came. Love, as Plato in the *Banquet* beautifully says, is the child of Poverty and Plenty. In the amorous quest of the soul after the Good lies the painful sense of fall and deprivation. But that Love is blessing, is salvation, is our guardian genius; without it the centrifugal law would overpower us, and sweep our souls out far from their source towards the cold extremities of the Material and the Manifold. The wise man recognizes the idea of the Good within him. This he develops by withdrawal into the Holy Place of his own soul. He who does not understand how the soul contains the Beautiful within itself, seeks to realize beauty without, by laborious production. His aim should rather be to concentrate and simplify, and so to expand his being; instead of going out into the Manifold, to forsake it for the One, and so to float upwards towards the divine fount of being whose stream flows within him.

"You ask, how can we know the infinite? I answer, not by reason. It is the office of reason to distinguish and define. The Infinite, therefore, cannot be ranked among its objects. You can only apprehend the Infinite by a faculty superior to reason, by entering into a state in which you are your finite self no longer, in which the Divine Essence is communicated to you. This is ecstasy. It is the liberation of your mind from its finite consciousness. Like only can apprehend like; when you thus cease to be finite, you become one with the Infinite. In the reduction of your soul to its simplest self, its Divine Essence, you realize this Union, this Identity.

"But this sublime condition is not of permanent duration. It is only now and then that we can enjoy this elevation (mercifully made possible for us) above the limits of the body and the world. All that tends to purify and elevate the mind will assist you in this attainment, and facilitate the approach and the recurrence of these happy intervals. There are, then, different roads by which this end may be reached. The love of beauty which exalts the poet; that devotion to the One and that ascent of science which makes the ambition of the philosopher; and that love and those prayers by which some devout and ardent soul tends in its moral purity towards perfection. These are the great highways conducting to that height above the actual and the particular, where we stand in the immediate presence of the Infinite, who shines out as from the depths of the soul."