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The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

VOL. I.

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No. 1.

THE PLATONIST:

A monthly periodical, devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases. In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosized, materialism absurdly considered philosophy, folly and ignorance popularized, and the dictum, "get money, eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly, and ignorance. This philosophy recognizes the essential immortality and divinity of the human soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to, and union with, the Absolute One. Its mission is to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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THOS. M. JOHNSON,
Osceola, St. Clair Co., Mo.

THIS NUMBER OF THE PLATONIST IS SENT TO MANY NON-SUBSCRIBERS WHO WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE ARE INTERESTED IN PHILOSOPHY. WE TRUST THAT THEY WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY PLEASED WITH THE PLATONIST TO SUBSCRIBE FOR IT, AND THAT THEY WILL NOT TAKE IT AMISS IF WE ASK THEM TO FORWARD THE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE AT THEIR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. SUBSCRIBERS ARE URGENTLY SOLICITED TO TRANSMIT THE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE AT ONCE.

PEARLS OF WISDOM.

Depraved affections are the beginnings of sorrows.—*Sextus*.

An evil disposition is the disease of the soul; but injustice and impiety are the death of it.—*Sextus*.

It is impossible that he can be free who is a slave to his passions.—*Pythagoric*.

Orphan children have not so much need of guardians as stupid men.—*Demophilos*.

Intemperance is the vice of the desiderative part of the soul, through which men engage in depraved pleasures.—*Aristoteles*.

The friendship of one wise man is better than that of every fool.—*Demokrates*.

Fraudulent men, and such as are only seemingly good, do all things in words and nothing in deeds.—*Demokrates*.

It is better to live lying on the grass, confiding in divinity and yourself, than to lie on a golden bed with perturbation.—*Pythagoras*.

It is the same thing to nourish a serpent and to treat a depraved man; for gratitude is produced from neither.—*Demophilos*.

He who loves the goods of the soul will love things more divine; but he who loves the goods of its transient habitation will love things human.—*Demokrates*.

Consider both the praise and reproach of every foolish person as ridiculous, and the whole life of an ignorant man as a disgrace.—*Demokrates*.

The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed as much as possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar. For the pleasure arising from them is genuine, incorruptible, and divine.—*Pythagoric*.

Virtuous, therefore, is the man who relieves the corporeal wants of others, who wipes away the tear of sorrow, and gives agony repose; but more virtuous he who, by disseminating wisdom, expels ignorance from the soul, and thus benefits the immortal part of man.—*Taylor*.

THE PLATONIST will be enlarged as soon as the patronage justifies such an action. It will depend on its friends how soon this will be done. THE PLATONIST relies for support solely on the philosophic few. It will not pander to the passions and prejudices of the rabble, and therefore can expect nothing from the multitude. We trust that the lovers of philosophy will generously aid in increasing the circulation of a periodical exclusively devoted to their interests. Each future number of THE PLATONIST will be made, if possible, better than the preceding one. We believe that no thinker will ever regret having subscribed for it, or having advised others to subscribe.

We take pleasure in announcing to our readers that we have been promised the hearty coöperation of several distinguished scholars and philosophers, and that contributions from them will, from time to time, appear in THE PLATONIST. The article in this month's issue by Alexander Wilder, F. R. S., a critical scholar and profound thinker, will doubtless be read with great interest by all.

Besides many valuable articles and reviews, translations of the following interesting, instructive, and profound works are being prepared for THE PLATONIST:

1. Proklos' Commentary on the Parmenides of Platon.
2. Damaskios on First Principles.
3. Iamblichos on the Mysteries.
4. Proklos' Commentary on the First Alkibiades of Platon.
5. Porphyrios' Letter to Markella.
6. The Eneads of Plotinos.

One of the gentlemen to whom was sent a prospectus of THE PLATONIST writes: "Your prospectus reached the wrong address when directed to me. I hold with Aristoteles '*non est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*,' and have therefore no use for Plato." Mr. H—— must not flatter himself that Aristoteles was of his opinion. The great Stagirite believed with his greater master in a species of knowledge that antecedes all experience.

A materialist asks us: "Why resuscitate a philosophy that has done so little good?" Our friend's materialistic notions have blinded his intellectual eye. Without death there can be no resurrection. Ideas never die: they are eternal. They are more than any other system of thought. The reason is obvious — its basis is TRUTH.

It is generally supposed that Congressmen are persons endowed with both reason and dignity. This is a great mistake. There are probably not a dozen men in Congress whose actions are dominated by reason. If any one doubts this, let him peruse the record of congressional proceedings. A short time ago, two honorable members (one recently a presidential candidate) engaged in a disgraceful, irrational wrangle that would have been a serious reflection on the intelligence of a couple of Hottentots. Too many of our public men exhibit the characteristics of the wolf and the monkey.

As all marble is potentially statues, so all men are potentially intellectual. It is better to define man as a being capable of reason (*animal rationis capax*), than as one gifted with reason (*animal rationale*).

If a man's thought has any real significance for him, his life will conform to it. It is not maintained that the life of a philosopher must invariably, under all circumstances, be occupied with intellectual matters; but it is certain that, if he desires to genuinely philosophize, his general life must be regulated according to the loftiest ideas. A sensualist, for instance, cannot be a philosopher. He may use philosophical terms — he may even write, with an ostentatious display of apparent erudition, reviews of the works of philosophers, but his opinions will be of no value. They will necessarily be superficial.

The truth is always in order, and should be spoken at all times and under all circumstances. The individual that objects to the truth being told, either about himself or another, displays an amount of depravity and effrontery which, if justice was meted out to him, would entitle him to a place in the penitentiary.

It is a lamentable fact that there are few men, very few indeed, who have the moral courage to enunciate their real opinions. All will readily acknowledge that hypocrisy is an abominable vice, and that it is our duty to invariably speak the truth. Yet, how many practice what they profess to believe to be right? The cause of this moral cowardice is, that the majority of mankind never advance beyond their first childhood; their notions about almost everything are necessarily puerile, and they therefore lack the stamina to exercise the liberty of thought and speech secured to them by the divine, if not the human, law.

For a specimen of the current misapprehension of the philosophy of Platon, we refer our readers to an article in the *Westminster Review* for October, 1880, styled "Plato and his Times." There is nothing particularly original in this article. It is mostly a restatement of erroneous notions concerning the Platonic philosophy which ought to have been long since discarded. The following extract will forcibly illustrate the author's utter inability to apprehend Platonic conceptions: "The ascription of an objective, concrete, separate reality to verbal abstractions is assuredly the most astounding paradox ever maintained even by a metaphysician; yet this is the central article of Plato's creed." Comment is unnecessary.

Let the philosophic souls scattered throughout this vast sensuous, regarded, rabble, ers, and on of the essential principle of things."

The *International Review*, for December last, contains a paper by Mr. D. G. Thompson, entitled "English Philosophy and English Philosophers." It is clearly evidenced by this article that Mr. Thompson is very poorly qualified to write about either philosophy or philosophers. Having asserted that the modern (English) philosophers — the word philosophers should have been used — are superior to the ancient thinkers, he seriously states that Herbert Spencer "must always remain as the leading philosopher of the present generation." This remark alone is sufficient to show that the writer's philosophic ideas are not of a high order. If any further proof is needed, the following sentence will certainly supply it: "After the present day, I do not believe there will ever be anything called philosophy, save by its authors, which does not profess to stand upon experience as its sole foundation, or which assumes to be aught other than the highest generalizations of the facts of experience."

Mind is said by Mr. Thompson to be "by far the best journal devoted to psychology and philosophy printed in the English language." Is he ignorant of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, established in 1867, and edited by Prof. Wm. T. Harris, a thinker beside whom such philosophers as Spencer are intellectual pigmies?

The man who sneaks through life, unwilling to express his genuine sentiments through fear of becoming unpopular with the rabble, is beneath the respect of every intelligent individual, and should be ostracised from the society of all truly intellectual persons.

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

There are few subjects that possess a more vital, absorbing interest for the thinker, and even the non-thinker, than that of the soul. But though the universal importance of the subject is conceded, yet, strange as it may seem, there is no topic about which more confusion of ideas and vagueness of opinions exist. Materialism has made many converts in this generation, and the deniers of the very existence of such an entity as soul, in the spiritual meaning of the word, are very numerous, and, we regret to say, rapidly increasing. This is preëminently a skeptical age. Worse still, the skepticism of this century is an irrational skepticism. Honest, rational doubt is commendable; stolid, arbitrary denial, is imbecile and entitled to no consideration.

The genuine lovers of Wisdom are very few. The fact is, that about nine-tenths of human beings are adverse to the acquisition of intellectual knowledge, and delight to grovel in the mire of ignorance. They can perceive the necessity (?) for laboring for years like slaves to accumulate money in order to gratify the desires of the senses, but they appear utterly incapable of apprehending the essential superiority of the mind to the body, the transcendent excellence of Wisdom, and the real object of this sensuous, material life, which is to purify and perfect the soul, so that it may be enabled to return to the intelligible world whence it came, or was sent. To these human earth-worms this existence is a finality—a practical finality to even many of those that profess to believe in another life.

Of the nature and destiny of the human soul, Platon and his disciples had a positive, scientific knowledge, obtained by an arduous, logical process of reasoning. They began with a rational skepticism, and ended with positive *knowledge*. According to the Platonists, the soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, indestructible, with life which has living from itself, possessing being. It is, therefore, truly and essentially immortal. Its immortality does not date from its connection with the body. In other words, to use scholastic language, it is immortal both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*. We emphasize this point, as the *eternal* nature of the soul is one of the cardinal dogmas of the Platonic Philosophy. Prior to its descent into body it abided with Absolute Being or The Good. Having lapsed from its natural, felicitous condition, it becomes immersed in matter and is in body as a prison. "All, indeed," says Macrobius, "in descending, drink of oblivion; some more, others less. On this account, though truth is not apparent to all men on the earth, yet all exercise their opinions about it—for a defect of memory is the origin of opinion. But those discover (recall) most who have drank least of oblivion." The soul must be purified from the defilements of sense and matter before it can return to its pristine abode with The One. Neither is this purification effected by "death." "That which nature binds nature also dissolves; and that which the soul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. Nature, indeed, bound the body to the soul, but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore, liberates the body from the soul; but the soul liberates herself from the body. Hence there is a two-fold death—the one, indeed, universally known, in which the body is liberated from the soul; but the other, peculiar to philosophers, in which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the one at all follow the other." (Porphyrios.) How, then, is this purification, so essential to the true happiness of the soul, effected? Listen, again, to the erudite Porphyrios, one of the true philosophers.

"In the first place, then, the foundation, as it were, and basis of purification, is self-knowledge—knowledge that one's soul is bound up with an alien substance of different essence. In the second place, that which is seen from this basis is how to collect

oneself from the body, and that which, as it were, is extended in places, and certainly stands in apathetic relation to it. For a person who energizes continually according to sense, even if he does not do so with sympathy and enjoyment of pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the body, being connected with it through sense; and we share in the pleasures or pains of the objects of sense with a sympathetic inclination and approval. From which disposition it is incumbent upon a man to purify himself above all things. And this will be done if one partakes only of necessary pleasures, and of the sensations only as far as is necessary for health, or as a relaxation from labor, in order that the rational part may not be impeded in its energies."

THE SPECTATOR OF THE MYSTERIES.

BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

"Who knows himself knows all things in himself."

—[PICUS MIRANDULA.]

Professor Tyndall conjectures that the main office of religion in its future form may possibly be to purify, elevate, and brighten the life that now is, instead of treating it as the more or less dismal vestibule of a life that is to come. Perhaps we need have little controversy with this sentiment, yet it seems to have a strong flavor of disregard for the facts which constitute the genuine realities of existence. There can be little for the present life but sensuous and bestial attractions and enjoyments, except we may consider it as a school and theatre of exercise, with regard to the adult stage that lies beyond. It is well for children at their lessons to concern themselves with performing well the tasks at which they are engaged, rather than to be incessantly speculating upon the utility and influence of this and that science or study in the coming period of life. The discharge of our relations to family, neighbors, and society at large, is properly the business of us all. We are not obligated to trouble ourselves much about our future existence till the time approaches for us to assume its conditions. Our best preparation for it consists in the faithful performance of whatever we have to do. It is nobler to confide in the Supreme Power than to ask from it a lease of infinite ages.

Nevertheless, our fidelity is rendered more certain by a reasonable and intelligent conception of the end and purpose of existence. We all have the intuitions of immortality, of the Deity as loving and beneficent, and of the final conquest of evil by the good. Believing that death does not end all, we naturally aspire to shape our mundane experience by its relations to the permanent life. Aware of our shortcomings, we seek the knowledge of Deity in the hope that He will aid and enable us to apprehend the chief good, and with somewhat of confidence that all things are directed for the best, and therefore have no real harm in store for us. None of us can believe in a good or goodness that could be complete, and leave us out of its aims. We feel that we are, in some peculiar sense, necessary to God.

To know the truth is the impulse of every worthy mind. It is not enough to entertain plausible opinions. Even faith were better, being, as we have seen it defined, "the essence of what is hoped, and the conviction of what is invisible" to such as see with their eyes, but perceive not with a higher faculty. But let us go beyond this, not resting even in what is considered philosophical reasoning and demonstration. If we did, we would be very likely to fall short of the good of actual knowledge. This is what, as we apprehend, Prof. Tyndall has done. His highest mental altitude, as depicted by himself, is still within the atmosphere of the life that now is; and to imagine that there is a continuing beyond this point, is to him an idea more or less dismal.

Beyond this earth-life, all to him is chaos and the eternal void. But it is not unknowable.

There is a higher, a profounder knowledge. The real, which lies at the foundation and is the inmost of all, is not everlastingly apart from human ken. We have no necessity for resting content with assertions and half-truths. It is the function of philosophy to explore even to the causes of things, and to make as at one with them. The union of the interior mind with the everyday soul is the essence of all wisdom. We may look in and about us, but here we will find the radiant light. Our own shadow is the spot in our sunshine. The goal and reality of life is to baptize that shadow in the pure, white light, and blend the two into one. Burnish and brighten our earth-life as we may, our actual progress is to know this aright.

Human worships are, all of them, endeavors to achieve the ideal. They have somewhat of the god-like in them, whatever may be the grotesqueness which they exhibit. They transcend alike the skepticism of savants and the prayers of those who would cajole or bribe the Infinite. I would myself dispense with all forms and formulas, serving God by my work in useful avocations, having no temple but the open world with the sky for its dome; no church but my own heart; no symbol of religion except what science gives me; no dependence on good reputation or fear of ill report, but reposing on the verdict of my own conscience, and always feeling myself in the presence of the high causes that rule and animate all things. Yet I would respect as well as tolerate the opinions, customs, and ceremonies which others feel to be so essential. I can even unite with them in the comprehensive summary of the Roman sage and emperor, Marcus Aurelius: "It is pleasant to die if there are gods, and sad to live if there are none."

The Mysteries which in ancient times included the more important elements of religion, were founded upon the idea that our earth-life was infelicitous and the sequence of an unhappy separation from the Divine source of existence. This condition was prefigured in the fable by Psyché "falling asleep in the death-world." Plotinus has depicted it with greater emphasis: "When the soul has descended into the earth-life (*genesis*), it partakes of evil and is brought into a condition the very opposite of her first purity and integrity, the complete merging into which is a falling into a dark mire." This *mire* is a negative condition, the antithesis of the positive, the just, and the good. Omitting for the present all reference to the implied preëxistence, which must be accredited to the noëtic or spiritual entity, I must conceive this negative condition as incidental to our mundane existence and personal individuality. In making the human soul objectively distinct from his own essence, the Divine Creator must needs place the element of vitality "a world apart" from himself. Such a condition being, however, opposite if not antagonistic to the good, the soul should, on its awaking, endeavor to extricate itself from this calamitous involvement. This awaking is dependent upon a perception of the essence and nature of things; in other words, *real* knowledge or wisdom. Philosophy is the love and pursuit of such knowledge; and being this, it assimilates the person to the Divinity himself. This assimilation is the enfranchisement of the divine element of the soul. To cognize God as the essence of truth, is to be intelligent; to cognize Him as the substance of goodness in truth, is to be wise; to cognize Him as the essence of all that is desirable in goodness and truth, is to love.

This "Platonic Love" is an essential feature of our philosophy. According to the great prince of sages, excellence (*kalon*) was the highest aspiration of the soul; and the intuition (*noësis*) of truth its most exalted condition. All preliminary discipline was preparative of this final effort of the soul, the struggle for

the possession of the great central excellence. Love is developed in the higher form when the soul strains after the infinite excellence, prompted on its path by earthly manifestations. It is developed in a subordinate sense when souls, as kindred essences, recognize each other in the world of sense; hence it includes the ordinary notions of exalted friendship. The popular opinion only takes account of this lower form, totally ignoring the higher, which is, after all, the genuine and real.

It is generally supposed that Plato taught the preëxistence of the soul as essential to its immortality. There are plausible grounds for imagining that we have existed, and perhaps dwelt upon the earth. Persons and scenes often present themselves to us with the consciousness that we have encountered them before. We may know, speaking after the manner of men, that this cannot have been true. Yet we cannot well avoid feeling, if not thinking, that we have inherited this consciousness from some ancestor who met with the adventure; or else that we were our own predecessors, and, in some former term of existence, had witnessed and acted personally in the matter. If this be so, our birth is indeed "a sleep and a forgetting."

It is more probable, however, that the great philosopher was employing this suggestion of a former life to tell us the meaning of the "mystic drama," which was regularly exhibited as a solemn religious representation, to such as were initiated. It was common in all ancient countries to have these scenic displays and initiations; and some, who went to great lengths in divine studies, were taught a profound as well as arcane learning. It would not have been safe for Plato to discourse in familiar language of the doctrines illustrated and enforced at the Sacred Orgies. Aischylos but barely escaped death for a sentence in one of his productions; and Aristarchos was charged by Kléanthes with impiously profaning the secrets of the Mysteries, because he divulged the heliocentric doctrine now imputed to Kopernik. Even in the Christian period, the Alchemists found it necessary to employ a peculiar jargon to veil their distinctive sentiments. To show how successful they were, it is only necessary to note the fact that Paracelsus, four centuries ago, discoursing after their manner about mercury, is now frequently decried as having been the first to use it as a medicine! The logic of prisons, racks, thumbscrews and autos-da-fe, not only produced martyrs, but utterers of vague sentences. A similar logic may account for certain "dark sayings" of Plato.

Every sciolist is ready to tell us what constitutes the Myth of the Mysteries — the misfortunes and calamities of Adon, Osiris, Zagreus, and the maiden Kora; the wanderings and bitter grief of Démêter, Isis, and Astar-Salambo. The processions, the dances, the tumultuous runnings to and fro, the watch-nights, the wailings, the hilarious mirth at the rising of the Lost One from the Death-world, are plain to such men without an interpreter. Lobeck has told us that the Eleusinia were but insignificant affairs, having little in them not apparent on the surface. Any theatre could reproduce them. Even Aristotélès was of opinion, it is said, that the initiated learned nothing definite; but received impressions, were put in a certain frame of mind. Alkibiadès, himself a pupil of Sôkratès, found the arcane rites a rare theme for sport; but Plato felt that he was beholding eternal realities. Ploutarchos reminded his bereaved and sorrowing wife that she had been instructed in the ancient doctrines and also in the sacred Mysteries of Dionysios, and knew, therefore, that souls passed immediately into a happier and diviner condition. Even Paul, the Christian Apostle, whom it was sought to discredit as holding "the doctrine of Balaam," made use of the mystic and Platonic language, declaring the Jesus of his Gospel was the *Chrêstos* or oracle-god, and the spirit that imparted arcane knowledge (*gnosis*) and enfranchisement. "We speak wisdom among the

initiated," said he — "the wisdom of God in a mystery, arcane; of which no one of the archons of the present period ever had cognition." It is easy to perceive from these expressions that he apprehended that the purport of the Sacred Rites was something transcendent, lofty, and far-reaching. We do not go far astray in taking like views of the matter, and shall deem it fortunate to be able to read between the lines.

When the Sphinx sat on the summit of Phikeio and propounded her riddle, only one man, it is said, was able to solve it. Alas, poor Oidipos! You first explained the enigma, and then became its woful exemplar. To each of us is the same riddle propounded; we must give the solution in our own persons. It is alike the secret of the Mysteries and the problem of the ages; "the dream is one." Races, nations, and individuals are engaged in deciphering its meaning. Platô in the *Timaios* declares to us: "To discover the Creator and Father of the universe as well as his work, is difficult; and when discovered, it is impossible to reveal Him to the many." So with the riddle of the Sphinx; no one who can interpret it can make the solution known to another. It was exhibited to the *epoptes* at the last unfolding, and constituted the autopsy, or view of himself. He came forth a seer, clairvoyant; or else saw and understood nothing. "*Tis gar oiden anthrôpon ta [bathê] tou anthrôpou?*"

Under the allegory of the Charioteer and his winged horses, Platô has indicated the arcane truths of the *real world*, as illustrated and typified by the Orgies. He purposely omits the coming of the neophyte to the portal of the Mystic Cave, his baptism, the vision of the *empousa*, the appearing of the Eumenides and other personages. The psychopompos is also unnoticed; and even the Great Mother and her hierophant. It may as well have been the Rites of Bacchus or the Egyptian Isis as of Demêter. What we are told constitutes the substance of all telestic rites. It is the veritable unlocking of both microcosm and macrocosm with "the keys of Hades and Death." An open eye is requisite in order to read aright what Platô has uttered so artfully in *Phaidros*. Cary, Sydenham, Thomas Taylor, and the erudite Professor Jowett, have endeavored to transcribe his narrative in plain English; but how far have they done it aright? Must we not read it too, with eyes fixed and ears clairaudient?

Some would have us believe that the philosopher was making a *resumé* of the doctrines of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of the Buddhists of India. It may be so; still he represented Sôkratês as speaking from mantic impulse. The ancients knew and wisely taught that a state of mania or agitation of the soul, was an incident of prophetic inspiration. "When you can use the lightning," said Napoleon, "it is better than cannon." Sôkratês declares that "this mania is given by the gods for the purpose of conferring the highest felicity. The proof of this is incredible to the shrewd and cunning, but credible to the wise."

Platô accordingly depicts the autopsy of the Mysteries as a reminiscence of what the seer or spectator had witnessed in the eternal world. The horses of the gods are noble, he tells us; but those of mortals are unlike, one well-trained, and one the opposite. So long as the soul is in its perfection, it goes everywhere and controls all; but when the wings fail, it moves at random, finally coming into union with the body. The wings, more than anything else that is corporeal, partake of the divine nature. Now that which is divine is the excellent (*kalon*), the true, the good (*agathon*), and everything like these. It is this which sustains and strengthens the wings of the soul; but that which is vile and evil enfeebles and destroys them.

The divine ruler Zeus and the greater gods, all except Hestia, who remains alone, drive those winged chariots, attended by a host of lesser divinities [*daîmones*] to order and direct all things. Then, what delightful views, what grand spectacles opening out

to the sight, enliven all the interior depths of the heavens while the blessed ones go about on their several offices; all who have the will or power to follow accompanying them on their rounds! The chariots of the gods move easily, but those of the others toil on with difficulty, because the horse that is vicious leans and presses heavily toward the earth, unless the driver has trained him well. Here, then, the severest toil and trial is laid upon the soul. Essence or real being, without color, shape, or sensibility to the touch, is perceptible only to the interior mind, which is the guide of the soul. The sphere of true knowledge surrounds essence. The mind of each divinity is fed by intelligence and knowledge; so too, the interior mind of every soul that would do its proper work, loves to contemplate that which is, and is delighted accordingly and nourished, till the revolution of the sky has brought it once more to the place of setting out. In this circuit the divine one beholds justice, wisdom, and knowledge—the interior knowledge of real being. Such is the life of the gods.

The man who turns these reminiscences to right account, is constantly perfecting himself in the genuine initiations, and only such a one becomes truly a seer, clairvoyant and clear-hearing. He is isolated from the anxieties and disquietudes incident to others, and cares only for divine matters. Hence he is designated by the multitude as a man out of his senses: they do not see that he is inspired!

This is the best of all enthusiasms, and best in its origin, both for him who possesses and him who shares in it. Every one who desires excellence partakes of the divine mania, and is styled in the Platonic dialect, a *lover*. Few have sufficient memory, we are told, to recall to mind the Sacred Spectacles. Those who chance to see a resemblance of what was beheld, are transported with the view and are no longer masters of themselves.

None of these resemblances are bright, however; and hence only a few are able to discern the character of what is represented. "But," says our philosopher, "it was easy to perceive the most exquisite excellence when, together with the divine chorus, we, being with Zeus, and others with other gods, beheld the blessed view and spectacle, and were also initiated into Mysteries which it is proper to call the most happy. We then celebrated these orgies, being sound and entire, and accordingly free from the evils which awaited us in the coming time. Likewise, both the initiates and seers witnessed visions in the pure light, entire, simple, fixed, and blessed, being ourselves pure and not as yet marked by this which surrounds us and we call *Body*, to which we are fastened like an oyster to its shell."

From this description by the Master we can trace the purport of the initiation and subsequent rites. The *Mystes* or candidate was required to wash himself thoroughly before entering the Sacred Cavern or *Sêkos*. It was customary at the Minor Rites to wash a hog, to typify the incomplete character of the ceremony, because the brute would return speedily to the mire. After a prolonged wandering, beset of spectres, the neophyte was escorted into the presence of the gods, and saw them represented in a glowing light. Some belonged to the Underworld and some to the supernal regions. He maintained the strictest silence, contemplating the *petrôma*, or tablet of stone, from which the hierophant read the Awful Lesson.

Thus was the Sphinx's secret revealed, the mystery of ages and times; and its apocalypse is MAN. The drama of Eleusis exhibits the riddle in a mystic guise; but the end was only the grand lesson which all the sages endeavored to inculcate: *Gnôthi Seauton*—know thyself!

All the supernal world, with its gods, half-gods, and other divinities, is comprised in this. Every fugitive of fate is wandering hither and thither in quest of it. Happy if, like Odys-

seus, he has Wisdom for his companion, and so escapes the perilous rocks in safety, is not transformed of the cup of Kirké, nor seduced into the dilettantism of the Lotos-eaters, or by the blandishments of the Seiréns. He may descend into the world of mortality, but he will emerge into true life. No more walled in by circumstance, he will abide henceforth in the Higher Good and behold everything with the eye of the Infinite.

PHILOSOPHIC CASTE.

[From Dr. H. K. Jones's Concord lecture on "Philosophic Outlines," as published in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.]

The idea of the soul is not a *thought*, nor a mere thinking machine; but an entity self-conscious—a living form with a thinking faculty. And, in the cognition of true being, the factor of sentence is logically prior, and the act of thought posterior. Jove himself is a royal soul with a regal intellect.

True philosophy realizes the contact of the spiritual affection or sentence with *living ideas*, and so hints and glimpses of the first cause are beheld and contemplated, and they generate in the attentive soul knowledges divine. Man thinks and feels. Conventionally, science is predicated of the processes of abstract thought; philosophy of the concrete processes of the thinking and sentient faculties of the soul. The blood of science is water, the blood of philosophy is the *wine of life*. Science is inductive in its method; philosophy is deductive in its method.

Caste is an idea, a principle universal in the mental generations of man. The Oriental quaternary castihood still frames the social fabrique, whether individually or collectively considered. Man, in the social genesis of this planet, is ever intellectual, moral, mercenary, and desiderative. His motives are science, heroism, reward, and sensuality. In the Platonic idiom we predicate of the social order—the servile class, and the mercenary class, and the auxiliary class, and the guardian class. In the Oriental idiom, the Sudra, the Vaisya, the Kshatrya, and the Brahman.

(1.) Those who through life employ sense without intellect are conversant only with sensibles—esteem sensibles the firsts and the lasts of things—apprehend that whatever among sensibles is painful is *evil*, and whatever among them is pleasant is *good*. And their life endeavor is to avoid the one, and to procure as much as possible of the other. This life is depraved in sensibles, and is therefore full of servitude, and is the remotest from *God*, the *true good*—these souls issue from the foot of Brahma.

(2.) The mercenary caste, those who traffic in affairs, opining that magnitude and parvitude of soul are mensurable by corporeal bulk of things, and that the massing of worldly riches and honors and power is the *chief good*. And in this phantasy they toil from the cradle to the grave—these souls, these soul forces, these social forces are the mercenaries, the Vaisya class, and these issue from the thigh of Brahma.

(3.) The auxiliaries, the military class, the forces of the social moralities and heroic virtues, the social will forces of the church and the state, constitutive of the civil institutions, administrative of the laws, and defensive and protective of the common weal—this is the Kshatrya caste. These issue from the arm of Brahma.

(4.) The guardians, the governors, the intellectual social forces, intellectual soul forces, mind exalted to the intelligible, the supernatural consciousness, to the sphere of the pure thought, to the sphere of ideas, the sphere of universals, exempted of the image of sense in the cognition of true entity, the true sacerdotal order, mind in the transcendence of ideas and principles—these forces issue from the mouth of Brahma, and in

this meru, this golden mountain of the gods, in this seat of Jupiter Olympus, in this Zion, the mountain of our king, this summit of the beauty and the joy of the whole earth, must we establish our observatory, would we adequately survey the broad fields or fathom the golden mines of the Platonic philosophy. This mental eminency must we achieve and occupy, rightly to estimate and identify, and unify, all systems of philosophic thought.

These four orders of the social forces are generalized as two, because the mercenary and the epithumetic are unified in the irrational corporeal, while the moral and intellectual are unified in the rational, the spiritual. And hence the *natural man* and the *spiritual man*. He in whom desire leads and mercenariness ministers, is natural, earthy; and he in whom intelligence leads, and will and conscience minister, is the spiritual man, the *divine man*.

THAT INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT EXTERNAL TO MIND; AND CONCERNING THE GOOD.

(*Lib. 5., Enn. 5.*)

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF PLOTINOS.

I. Does any one believe that mind—truly existing mind—is ever deceived, and thinks things which lack real being? Doubtless, no one. For how would it be mind if it is liable to be deceived? It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that mind should always know; that there should be nothing beyond its power of comprehension; and that its knowledge should be neither conjective nor dubious, nor received as it were from something else. Neither is mental knowledge similar to that derived from demonstration. For, though some one should say that there is a species of knowledge received from demonstration, still it must be conceded that there is something intuitively apprehended by Mind, and reason pronounces that all things are known by it. In what respect, then, is the intuitive knowledge of mind distinguished from that of another kind? Likewise, if it is admitted that Mind intuitively knows, whence is derived the certitude of this species of knowledge? Also, whence is the foundation of its belief that it is endowed with essential knowledge? Since, even concerning things perceived by sense, the perception and belief of which appear to be most certain, it is doubtful whether their apparent hypostasis (nature) is in the subject things, or merely in particular passions; where a judgment of mind, or at least of the dianœtic faculty, would be necessary. For though it should be conceded that the natures of the objects of sense are in their subject bodies, still that which is apprehended by sense is a mere image of the thing, as sense cannot perceive the thing itself, as it remains external to its perception. But mind knowing, and knowing intelligibles, *how*, if it comprehends these as other beings than itself, is it connected with them? True, it may happen that it will not meet with them, and thus be ignorant that this connection is possible. Or, perhaps, when it meets with them it immediately knows them, though, on this hypothesis, it will not always have this knowledge. And if it is said that intelligibles are connected with Mind, it will be proper to inquire about the nature of this connection. Moreover, the intellects themselves will be types, and consequently adventitious and mere pulsations. How, therefore, will mind be typified, or what form will there be of such intelligibles? And, finally, on this theory, intelligence—like sense—will be a mere perception of externals. In what respect, then, will these two (intelligence and sense) differ? Shall we say that the difference is, that one apprehends smaller things than the other? How, then, will mind know that it has truly comprehended anything? Again, in what manner

will it know that *this* is good, *that* beautiful, *that* just; for each of these is different from mind, and, according to this theory, it lacks the principles of judgment by which it decides, since these, and also truth, will be external to its essence. Again, intelligibles themselves are destitute of sense, life and mind, or they possess mind. If they have mind, they will likewise contain the others — viz., sense and life, — and this mind will be the true and first mind. And we must inquire, concerning this, how it contains truth, intelligible itself, and mind, — whether in the same and together, being two and yet different, or in another manner. If intelligibles are destitute of both mind and life, what are they? They are certainly not propositions, axioms, or dictions; since, if they were, they would affirm something of other things, but would not be things themselves. They would say, for instance, that what is just is beautiful, when the just and the beautiful are different. If, however, they should consider the just and the beautiful apart from each other, as simple essences, — primarily, the intelligible itself will neither be a certain one, nor in one, but each intelligible will be separate from the others. When, and in what localities, are they separately arranged? Moreover, how will mind, operating discursively, find them? And how does it (the intelligible itself) abide, and how does it remain in the same? Again, what form or figure will it have? Perhaps, however, intelligibles are situated like certain images formed from gold or some other matter, by a statuary or painter. If so, mind in its perceptions will be sense (sensation). Moreover, among such intelligibles, in what respect will *this* be justice, but *that* something else? Lastly, the greatest objection to this theory is, that if any one should admit intelligibles to be extrinsic, and mind speculates them as externally posited, it necessarily follows that mind lacks a true perception of them and is deceived in its contemplation. For they will truly be external things. Mind will therefore apparently speculate them, but will only apprehend their images by a knowledge of this kind. Wherefore, not having truth itself, but merely images of truth, it will possess what is false and have nothing true. If, therefore, mind knows that it has what is false, it must concede that it is destitute of truth. However, if it is ignorant of this, and thinks that it has the truth when it lacks it, it is doubly deceived, and is far distant from the truth. On this account it is, I think, that truth is not in sensibles, but merely opinion; since opinion is conversant in receiving, whence its name. Wherefore it receives something different from itself, since that also is different from which it possesses what it receives. If, then, truth is not in mind, such a mind cannot be truth; neither will it be true mind, nor, in short, will it be at all mind; neither will truth be anywhere.

II. It is not, therefore, proper to seek for intelligibles external to mind, or to maintain that (only) the forms (types) of beings are contained in mind; nor is it right to deprive it of truth whilst we concede that it is ignorant of intelligibles, that the objects of its intellection have no existence, and when we even subvert mind itself. But we must attribute all things to true mind, if it is necessary to introduce knowledge and truth, to preserve beings themselves, and that knowledge by which the essence of everything is known; neither to rest content with that knowledge which merely apprehends the form of each particular thing, and not its essence, since we thus possess only the image and vestige of the thing known and not the object itself, neither dwelling with it nor being at one with its nature. For mind truly knows; neither is anything concealed from it, nor does it wander in its investigation, but it contains truth and is the essential foundation of things, and is ever vital and intelligent — all of which properties it is necessary should subsist in the most blessed nature. Or, where else indeed can anything honorable

and venerable be found? Hence, it neither requires proof nor faith to show that mind is essentially intelligent, for this is self-manifest; since anything prior to it is constituted from it, and if there is anything after it, it is itself, and there is nothing more worthy of faith than its own essence, and it everywhere truly and essentially exists. So that it has truth not consonant to another, but to itself; neither does it assert the existence of anything besides itself, and its true nature it clearly enunciates. Who, therefore, can refute it? Whence can he bring his refutation? For the argument which is adduced must resolve into the same with the former. And although it is employed as different, it must be referred to the thing first proposed, and is one with it. For nothing can be discovered truer than Truth.

III. Wherefore this one nature, Mind, is all beings, and also truth. If so, it is a mighty divinity, or rather it is not a particular (certain) deity, but is every deity, and is worthily considered to be all things. And of such a nature is this divinity — a second god, manifesting itself (shining forth) prior to the beholding of the superior God, who is preëminently seated and established on, as it were, a beautiful throne, which is suspended (proximately proceeds) from Him. For it is proper that He should not exist in an inanimate seat, nor appear to us in the chariot of soul, but that an inestimable beauty shining forth, as before a mighty king, should precede His manifestation. For to such as advance to the intuition of Him it is ordained that, in the progression, lesser (inferior) things should first occur, and that afterwards greater and more venerable should appear to them. Moreover, that those things that surround the King should be more royal and the rest honorable in a degree proportionate to the distance they are from the supreme sovereign. But after proceeding beyond all these inferior things, the mighty King himself suddenly shines forth, and all suppliantly venerate — i.e., all who have not previously returned, satisfied with the spectacles met with prior to the vision of the Supreme King. In the intelligible world, therefore, there is another king, and his attendants are different from him. This king does not rule over aliens, but possesses naturally a just government and a true dominion. He is the king of Truth and is by nature the lord of his offspring, the universe, and the divine order of beings. Hence, he is the king of a king, and of kings, and is styled more justly the Father of the gods. In a certain respect Zeus imitates him, since he is not content with the speculation of his father, but proceeds to his grandsire, as to an energy in the very inmost nature (hypostasis) of his essence.

IV. It is now requisite that we ascend to the One itself — that which is indeed truly one, and not like other things which, being many, are one through the participation of unity. For we must now receive the One itself, and not that which is one by participation, which is no more truly one than many. It must also be said that the intelligible world, the interior mind (nous), is more one than other things; and, though it is not purely one, there is nothing nearer the One itself. But we desire now to contemplate, if possible, the pure and true One — that which does not derive its unity from another, but from itself. It is therefore here requisite to give ourselves entirely to the One itself, without adding anything to its nature, and to steadfastly contemplate it, being careful not to wander from it in the least, lest we should thereby fall into two (duality). If we are not extremely cautious we shall speculate two, nor in two possess the one itself, since they (i.e., two) are both inferior to one. And one will not suffer itself to be numerated with another, nor even with a particular one, nor in short to be numbered at all, since it is a measure itself and cannot be measured. Nor is it equal to any others so as to agree with them in any particular, for there would thus be something common to it and the natures numerated with

it, and this something in common would be prior to the one, which is an utter impossibility. Hence, neither essential number, nor quantitative number which is inferior to this, can be predicated of the one. For the essence of essential number always consists in intellection, and quantitative number includes quantity and other things different from one; since the nature pertaining to number, which is inherent in quantity, imitating the nature essential to prior numbers, looking back to true unity and likewise beholding the principle of numbers, receives its hypostasis—neither dispersing nor dividing the one. But while it (quantitative number) becomes the duad, unity remains prior to the duad, and is different from both the ones comprehended by the duad, and from each apart. For why should one unity of the duad, rather than another, be one itself? If therefore neither of them apart, nor both together, constitute unity, certainly unity is something else; and, truly abiding, apparently does not abide. How are these unities different from the one? And how is the duad in a certain respect one? And, again, is it the same one that is contained in each unity (of the duad)? Or, perhaps, it must be said that both unities participate of the first unity, but are different from that which they participate; and that the duad, so far as it is a certain one, participates of the one itself, but not everywhere in the same manner. For neither are an army and a house similarly one; since these, when compared with continued quantity, are not one either according to essence or quantity. Are, therefore, the unities in the pentad and decad differently related to one? And is the one in the pentad the same as the one in the decad? Or, if the whole of a small ship, is compared with the whole of a large one, a city to a city, and an army to an army, perhaps there will be in these the same one. But if not in the first instance, neither in these. However, if there are any further doubts about this matter they must hereafter be solved.

V. But let us return to the One itself, maintaining that it always remains the same though other things are generated from it. In numbers indeed the one abiding in its simplicity, but producing another (one), number is generated according to this latter unity. The one, however, which is prior to beings, much more remains within itself. But while it abides, another does not create beings according to (first) unity, for it has sufficient power of and to itself to generate beings. And as in numbers the form of the first monad (unity) is preserved in all numbers primarily and secondarily, while each of the following numbers do not equally participate of unity,—so, in the order of things, every nature subordinate to the first contains something of its nature, which is, as it were, its form. And in numbers indeed the participation of unity produces their quantity. Here the vestige of the One itself gives essence to all things, so that being itself is a vestige of the first unity. Hence, he who asserts that this *einai* (existence), which is an appellation indicative of essence (*ousia*), is derived from *en* (one), will not perhaps deviate from the truth. But that which is called *on* (being), first of all shining forth, and as it were not proceeding far from its source, is unwilling to advance beyond its original, but abides, converted to its most interior nature, where it becomes essence, and the essence of all things, and which containing itself though struggling as it were with sound pronounces that the One itself subsists, and declares by its speech that it flows from unity. And indeed *to on* (being) thus pronounced signifies its origin as much as possible. Thus that which becomes *ousia* (essence) and *to einai* (being) imitates to the utmost its author, from whose power it perpetually flows. The interior mind perceiving this, being moved by the spectacle, and imitating what it knows, suddenly utters in an energetic voice the words *on* (being), *to einai* (existence), *ousia* (essence), and *estia* (participant of essence,—essence). For these sounds

endeavor to express the substance of that which is generated—the enunciating nature striving as it were with the expression—and imitating as much as possible the generation of being itself.

LIFE OF PLATON.

Into the world of sense, on the memorable 7th day of the month of Thargelion, B. C. 429, descended from the sphere of reality the wonderful soul of Platon, wisdom's high-priest, probably above all other men that have ever lived most eminent and renowned for the profundity of his intellect and his similarity to Divinity. It is, indeed, related by Plutarchos and others that the god Apollon was the direct cause of his descent—i.e., in vulgar phrase, was his father. His mundane family was noble and wealthy. It could boast of a distinguished line of ancestors. The name of his father was Ariston, and that of his mother Periktione. Their ancestors were, respectively, Kodros and Solon. Apuleius says that "habitude of body gave a surname to Platon, for he was first called Aristokles." It is far more likely that the breadth of his superb intellect caused the name "Platon" to be given him, and it must be said that a more appropriate and expressive appellation could not have been chosen. "While he was yet an infant, his parents are said to have placed him on Hymettos, being desirous, on his account, to sacrifice to the gods of that mountain, viz.: Pan, the nymphs, and the pastoral Apollon. In the mountain the bees, approaching as he lay, filled his mouth with honey-combs, as an omen that in future it would be truly said of him:

Words from his tongue than honey sweeter flowed.

But Platon calls himself a fellow-servant with swans, as deriving his origin from Apollon, for, according to the Greeks, that bird is Apolloniaca! (Olympiodoros). He was instructed in the rudiments of learning by Dionysios. In gymnastics his teacher was the Argive Ariston; and in music, Drakon. After having completed his preliminary education, he became a pupil of the Tragedians, who at that time were celebrated as the preceptors of Greece. He applied himself to these writers on account of the sententious and venerable nature of tragic composition, and the heroic sublimity of the subjects. He was likewise conversant with Dithyrambic writers, with a view to the honor of Dionysios, who was called by the Greeks the inspective guardian of generation; for the Dithyrambic measure is sacred to Dionysios, from whom it derives its name, Dionysios being Dithyrambos, as proceeding into light from two avenues, viz., Semele and Zeus. For the ancients were accustomed to call effects by the names of their causes, as in the appellation Dithyrambos given to Dionysios. Hence, Proklos observes: "With their late offspring parents seem to mix."

But that Platon applied himself to Dithyrambics is evident from his Phaidros, which plainly breathes the Dithyrambic character. In the year 409, at the age of twenty, Platon became a pupil of Sokrates. A short time before this Sokrates had a curious and wonderful dream, in which he saw a swan without wings sitting in his bosom, which, soon afterwards obtaining wings, flew into the air, and with the sweetness of its voice charmed the ears of both gods and men. While he was narrating this dream to an assembly of men, Ariston brought the boy Platon to him as a pupil. As soon as Sokrates beheld him, and saw from his outward form what the recondite nature of his mind was, he said: "This, my friends, is the swan I saw in my dream." Previous to his acquaintance with Sokrates, Platon had composed tragic and Dithyrambic poems, and some other

poetical pieces, all of which he burned when he began to associate with him, at the same time repeating:

Vulcan! draw near; 'tis Plato asks your aid.

Henceforth he resolved to devote himself to divine philosophy, to the exclusion of all other things. Platon was an attentive hearer of the Sokratic discourses for eight years, or until the death of his great master, which occurred in 399. During the trial and imprisonment of Sokrates he was his most faithful friend, and aided him by every means within his power. He desired to address the judges in behalf of his master, but was not permitted to do so. They probably feared the effect of a logical, eloquent discourse by Platon. Illness prevented him from being present at the triumphant exit of the soul of Sokrates from the corporeal prison, but he deeply lamented the departure of his friend and teacher, and commemorated his life and actions in two of his most impressively eloquent works. After the ascent of Sokrates to the intelligible world, Platon retired to the residence of his friend Euklides at Megara. He remained at Megara several years engaged in philosophic studies. About this time he became acquainted with the Heraklitean philosophy through the instructions of Kratylus. From Megara he went to Kyrene and studied the mathematical science under Theodoros, one of the most celebrated mathematicians of the age. Thence he travelled to Magna Graecia, where he was initiated into the mysteries of the Pythagorean philosophy by the justly famous Archytas. After visiting Sicily, where he remained but a very short time, he proceeded to Egypt, the great seat of ancient wisdom. Here he remained thirteen years, sedulously devoting himself to the study of science and philosophy. All their intellectual treasures were freely imparted to him by the Egyptian priests, and he became deeply versed in oriental learning and wisdom. His fame preceded his return home. "At the time young students at Athens were inquiring for Platon to instruct them, he was busied in surveying the intricate banks of the Nile, the vast extent of a barbarous country, and the winding compass of their trenches, a disciple of the Egyptian sages." * After his return from Egypt, in 389 B. C., he visited Syracuse, during the reign of the tyrant Dionysios the Elder. His object was to study the character of the people and their institutions, and to endeavor to reform and change the government. He was kindly received at first, but carefully watched. He had frequent interviews with the tyrant, but they resulted unsatisfactorily. On one occasion Dionysios, supposing that Platon would flatter him, asked him whom he considered happiest among men. He replied, "Sokrates." Again the tyrant asked him, "What do you think is the business of a politician?" His reply was, "To make the citizens better." The third question was, "Does it appear to you to be a small matter to decide rightly in judicial affairs?" The answer was, "It is a small matter, and the least part of good conduct; for those who judge rightly resemble such as repair lacerated garments." Dionysios finally asked him, "Must not he who is a tyrant be brave?" Platon answered, "He is of all men the most timid; for he even dreads the razors of his barbers, lest he should be destroyed by them." These bold, candid, thoughtful answers so enraged the tyrant that he ordered him to leave his dominion, and even threatened him with death. Perceiving that he had incurred the vindictive enmity of the tyrant, and that it was utterly useless to attempt to reform him, Platon returned home.

About this time (388 B. C.), having studied under the truest and profoundest thinkers of his age for over twenty years, and having thought out and solved for himself many of the deepest

philosophic problems, Platon opened a school of philosophy at Athens, in a grove in the Akademia, which was situated in one of the beautiful suburbs of the city.

See there the olive grove of Academe,
Plato's retirement, where the Attic bird
Trills her thick-warbled notes the summer long.

Here Platon spent his life tranquilly, lecturing to his numerous pupils and composing those immortal works which have alike delighted, instructed, and astonished mankind. He attracted many to philosophical studies, both men and women eagerly flocking to hear his discourses. In the year 364 Platon made a second trip to Syracuse, at the urgent solicitation of Dion, who told him that through his exertions the tyranny might now — Dionysios the Younger having ascended the throne — be changed into an aristocracy. However, as Dionysios had been informed by some of his courtiers that Platon designed to destroy him and transfer the government to Dion, he ordered him to be arrested and delivered to one Pollis of Aigina, a Sicilian merchant, to be sold as a slave. Pollis, taking Platon to Aigina, found there Annikeris, the Libyan, who was then on the point of sailing to Elis, for the purpose of contending in the races with the four-yoked car. Annikeris gladly bought Platon of Pollis and sent him to Athens, rightly conceiving that he should thence procure for himself greater glory than by conquering in the race. Afterwards Dion and others offered to refund to Annikeris the amount of the philosopher's ransom, but he refused to receive it, nobly replying that they were not the only persons concerned in Platon's welfare. The tyrant, learning that his infamous plot had been frustrated, had the effrontery to write to Platon, requesting the philosopher not to speak disparagingly of him. Platon replied that he had not time even to think of such a man as Dionysios.

In 361 Dion was proscribed by Dionysios and ultimately thrown into prison. He wrote to Platon that the tyrant had promised to liberate him if he (Platon) would again visit him. Platon, always willing to serve his friends, again visited the Syracusan court. However, his trip was unproductive of beneficial results. The tyrant refused to be reconciled with Dion. The shallow-brained courtiers that surrounded Dionysios urged him to dismiss the philosopher. Their actions should not excite surprise. The mere presence of a wise man is an annoyance to fools. Envy and malice soon took possession of the tyrant's miserable soul, and he ordered Platon to leave. In fact, so great was his animosity against him, that it was only through the intervention of his Pythagorean friend Archytas that he was permitted to depart in safety.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

During the past two summers a school of philosophy held its sessions at Concord, Mass. These sessions were numerous attended by persons of every species of intellectual character, from the philosopher to the newspaper reporter that wrote down many words that, to him, were utterly void of meaning. The lectures and discussions resembled the auditors. Some of them were profound, others shallow. No one probably regrets of having attended the school, but a few, possibly many, think that some of the lecturers were not exactly well qualified to discuss their subjects. We heard statements concerning the Platonic "ecstasy," for instance, that were not only novel but totally erroneous. We were naturally most interested in the course of lectures on the Platonic philosophy delivered by Dr. H. K. Jones, the leader of the noted Plato Club of Jacksonville, Ill. Dr. Jones is one of the few men in this age that are qual-

* Valerius Maximus.

ified to discourse on Platonic themes. Though in our opinion he occasionally allegorizes too much, we think that he generally correctly apprehends the inner signification of the Platonic text. He is an eloquent and impressive speaker, and no one can justly complain of having wasted his time in listening to his wonderful discourses. Lack of space prevents us from giving any extended account of Dr. Jones' lectures, but we hope to be able to hereafter review them when published, revised by himself.

The sage of Concord, Mr. A. Bronson Alcott, well and widely known as a philosopher, delivered a series of very instructive and interesting lectures on mysticism. Prof. W. T. Harris, a thinker of universal reputation, delivered two series of lectures, one of which, on the history of philosophy, was specially noteworthy.

The school is now a permanent institution. When first established even its friends were doubtful of its having anything more than a temporary existence. Its enemies, the men of the world and the superficial critics, grew wonderfully wise, and demonstrated in advance that it would prove an ignominious failure. However, the thinkers decided otherwise. They found that a visit to Concord resulted in, to them, a positive intellectual benefit. The consequence was that the school flourished, and its success, instead of being a doubtful matter, became a matter for wonder. We trust that a wise selection of lectures will be made for the next term. Neither narrow-minded theologians, nor sciolists, should be permitted to inflict their vapid utterances on thinkers and scholars who have long since passed beyond their intellectual sphere.

PLATONIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK OF HERMEIAS BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted from the *Classical Journal*.]

PART I.

Platon has demonstrated the immortality of the rational soul in three of his dialogues, viz.: In the *Phaidon*, in the Tenth Book of his *Republic*, and in the *Phaidros*. But though the arguments employed by him in each of these dialogues, in proof of this most important truth, will be found to possess, by those that understand them, incontrovertible evidence; yet it appears to me, that this is peculiarly the case with the reasoning in the *Phaidros*, which is not only, in the language of Platon, accompanied by geometrical necessities, but is at once admirably subtle and singularly sublime. As this reasoning is most perspicuously developed by the Platonic *Hermias* in his *Scholia* on the *Phaidros*, I shall give a translation of his elucidations, and also of the text of Platon, on which these elucidations are a comment. The words of Platon are as follows: "Every soul is immortal; for that which is always moved is immortal. But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another, in consequence of having a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this is also the fountain and principle of motion, to such other things as are moved. But principle is unbegotten, for it is necessary that everything which is generated should be generated from a principle, but that the principle itself should not be generated from any one thing. For if it were generated from a certain thing, it would not be generated from principle. Since, therefore, it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible. For, the principle being destroyed, it could neither itself be generated from another thing, nor

another thing be generated from it, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from principle. Hence the principle of motion is that which moves itself; and this can neither be destroyed nor generated. For otherwise, all heaven and all generation falling together must stop, and would never again have anything from whence being moved they would be generated. Since, then, it appears that the nature which is moved by itself is immortal, he who asserts that this is the essence and definition of soul will have no occasion to blush. For every body to which motion externally accedes is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this were the very nature of soul. If this, however, be the case, and there is nothing else which moves itself, except soul, it necessarily follows that soul is unbegotten and immortal.

The following are the elucidations of *Hermias*:—

In the first place, it must be inquired about what kind of soul Platon is speaking. For some, among whom is the Stoic *Posidonius*, are of the opinion that it is alone about the soul of the world, because it is said *hosa* (all), and it is added a little after, "all heaven and all generations falling together must stop." But others say that it is simply concerning every soul, so as to include the soul of an ant, and a fly. And this was the opinion of *Harporokration*. For he understands the word *hosa* as pertaining to every soul. If, however, it be requisite neither to restrict the problem nor to extend it simply to all animals, we must assume from Platon himself what kind of soul it is of which he is now speaking. He says, therefore, that it is necessary in the first place to speak about the nature of soul, both the divine and the human, i.e., about every rational soul; so that the present discourse is concerning the rational soul. To which we may add that the ancients are accustomed to call the rational soul that which is properly soul. For they call that which is above it intellect, and that which is beneath it not simply soul, but the irrational life, or the animation of the spirit—the life which is distributed about bodies, and the like. But they denominated the rational part that which is properly soul. For Platon also calls the rational soul that which is properly man. He previously, however, enunciates the conclusion, since he is about to make the demonstration from things which are essentially inherent in the soul, and which pertain to it, so far as it is soul—on this account, therefore, he first enunciates the conclusion, indicating by so doing that *the why* is contractedly comprehended in *the that*. For the soul possesses the immortal from its essence. Hence, prior to the evolved, divided, and expanded demonstration, he gives the contracted and that which contains *the why* together with *the that*. But there are here two demonstrative syllogisms, through which the immortality of the soul is demonstrated, and which directly prove that it is so; and there is also another syllogism which demonstrates this, through a deduction to an impossibility. Why, however, is there this number of syllogisms? For the intention of Platon was not simply to adduce a multitude of arguments, since in this case he would have employed many others, as he does in the *Phaidon*; but he uses such as are adapted to each subject of discussion. For now, as we have already observed, he adduces arguments derived from the essence of the soul, and from things which are essentially inherent in it. In answer to this it must be said, that since it is proposed to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, if we see how many modes there are of corruption, and show that the soul is not corrupted according to any one of them, we shall then have demonstrated that it is incorruptible and indestructible; and it will also be evident that it is immortal, for everything that is corrupted, is corrupted in a twofold respect. For either it is itself corrupted by itself, through the matter which it contains, or it is corrupted externally. Thus, for instance, wood, by alone lying on the

ground, is corrupted through the putrefaction which is in itself, for it contains in itself the cause of its corruption. Platon also says in the Republic, that everything which is corrupted, is corrupted by its own appropriate evil. But it may also be corrupted externally, by being burnt, and cut. Since, therefore, there are two modes of corruption, on this account Platon adduces two syllogisms. For one of these demonstrates that the soul is not corrupted by itself, which he shows through its being self-moved and perpetually moved; but the other syllogism demonstrates that neither is the soul corrupted by anything else, which he shows through its being the principle of motion.

Shall we say, therefore, that each of these syllogisms is imperfect, but that the demonstration derives perfection from both? Or, shall we say that in either of them the other is comprehended, but that the peculiarity of each previously presents itself to the view? For that which is not corrupted by itself cannot be corrupted by another thing. For having itself in itself, the cause of preserving itself, and always being present with itself, how can it be corrupted by anything else? For that which is self-motive is a thing of this kind, as will be demonstrated. And how can that which is not corrupted by another thing, but is the principle and cause of other things being preserved, be corrupted by itself? For the principle of motion will be demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. For neither will it be corrupted by the things which are above it, since it is preserved by them; nor by the things posterior to itself, since it is the cause of their being and life. If, therefore, it cannot be corrupted by anything, how, since it is the fountain of life, can it be corrupted by itself? Hence, as we have said, each of the arguments is of itself perfect, and comprehends in itself the other. But one of them shows, and is characterized by this, that the soul is not corrupted by itself; and the other by this, that the soul is not corrupted by any other thing. Let us, however, in the first place, arrange the propositions of the syllogisms, and afterwards consider the development of them.

The first syllogism, therefore, is as follows: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is perpetually moved. That which is perpetually moved is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. Hence this reasoning shows us that the soul is not corrupted by itself. But the second syllogism is: The soul is self-moved. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. The principle of motion is unbegotten. The unbegotten is incorruptible. The incorruptible is immortal. The soul, therefore, is immortal. And this reasoning demonstrates to us that the soul is not corrupted by a certain other thing. The truth of the assumptions, therefore, we shall accurately discuss in what follows. But now considering the first and common proposition of the two syllogisms by itself, that the soul is self-moved, which Platon arranges in the last place of the whole reasoning, let us survey how that which is self-moved is the first of things that are moved, especially since no casual man (*i.e.* Aristoteles) doubts concerning the existence of the self-motive essence. And perhaps it will be found that the philosophers do not dissent from each other. For Aristoteles indeed takes away all corporeal motions from the soul; which we also say is most true. But Platon clearly shows that the motions of the soul are different from all the corporeal motions. For he says in the tenth book of the Laws, "that soul conducts everything in the heavens, the earth, and the sea, by its motions, the names of which are *to will to consider, to attend providentially to other things, to consult, to opine rightly and falsely, together with rejoicing, grieving daring, fearing, hating, and loving.*" That there is, therefore a certain principle of motion, and that it is that which is self-moved, will be from hence evident. For as it is manifest that there is that which is alter-motive, this will either be moved by

another alter-motive nature, and that by another, and so on to infinity; or alter-motive natures will move each other in a circle, so that the first will again be moved by the last; or, if it is not possible that either of these modes can take place, it is necessary that the self-motive nature have the precedence. It is evident, therefore, that motive natures cannot proceed to infinity—for neither is there the infinite in essence, nor is there any science of infinities. But neither is it possible for motive natures to be in a circle. For the order of beings would be subverted, and the same thing would be both cause and effect; so that it is necessary there should be a certain principle of motion, and that motion should neither be to infinity, nor in a circle. This principle of motion, however, which, according to both the philosophers, is soul, Platon says is self-moved, but Aristoteles immovable. But that it is necessary this principle of motion should be demonstrated to be self-moved, even from the dogmas of Aristoteles, you may learn from hence. In all beings nature does not proceed without a medium from a contrary to a contrary, as, for instance, from winter to summer, but it is entirely requisite that a medium should precede, at one time spring, and at another time autumn; and the like takes place in all bodies and incorporeal essences. Here, likewise, as there is the alter-motive and the immovable nature, it is necessary there should be a medium which is the self-moved essence, being one and the same in number and in subject. For that which Aristoteles calls the self-moved nature, as for instance the animal, is not that which is now proposed for investigation. For the animal, according to him, being composed of the immovable and the alter-motive, he says that the whole is self-moved. So that, as there is that which is entirely immovable, such for instance as the principle of all things; and as there is that which is alter-motive, such as bodies, there will be between them the self-moved nature, which is nothing else than soul. For that which we see moved by it, this we say is animated, so that this is the very nature of soul, itself to move itself. There are, therefore, these three things according to Aristoteles, *viz.*, intellect, life, and being. And in the first place, that we may speak of being, as there is something which is generated from another thing and which receives existence from another, there is also that which imparts existence to itself, such as the heaven and intellect, which he says always exist unbegotten by any other cause. For according to him they are neither generated by a cause, as neither are they generated in time, but they are always unbegotten, and the causes of existence to themselves. And, again, in life there is that which receives life from other things; for man generates man; and there are also things which have life from themselves, such as the heaven and intellect. For they have not an *adscititious*, but a *connascent* life. Farther still, as there are things which receive from others the power of intellectual perception, and become through them intellective, as the intellect which is in capacity; [so,] according to Aristoteles, there is also intellect which is in energy, which possesses from itself intellectual perception, and intellectually perceives itself. Hence from all this it follows that, as there is that which is moved by another thing, there is also necessarily that which is the cause to itself of being moved, and imparts self-motion to itself. For, otherwise, it would be absurd to pass entirely from the alter-motive to the immovable without assuming that which is self-moved as the medium; in the same manner as it is absurd to pass from that which is generated, and which only sometimes exists, to that which is super-essential non-being, without assuming being as the medium. For it will be immanifest what kind of non-being we assume, whether that which is inferior to a generated nature, or that which is superior to it, unless we assume the intermediate nature, which is eternal being. Thus, likewise, in motion, it will be

immanifest what kind of the immovable we assume, whether that which is subordinate, or that which is superior to the alter-motive nature, unless the self-moved is assumed as a medium. And the like takes place in life, intellect, and other things.

This self-motive motion, therefore, is demonstrated by the philosopher in the *Laws*, to be the first principle of all other motions, and the cause of them according to all the significations of cause. For it is the effective, the paradigmatic, and the final cause of them, which are alone properly causes. For the formal cause is in the effect, and is the effect itself. And the material cause is much more remote from being properly cause, since it has the relation of things without which others are not effected. [Note: Because it is that *from which* or *in which* other things are effected.] Hence, that the self-moved nature is the effective cause of other motions is evident, as Platon demonstrates in the *Laws*. "For if all things," says he, "should stand still, what would that be which would be first moved?" Is it not evident that it must be the self-moved nature? For if that which accedes to the motive cause is moved, and all other beings are alter-motive, but that which is self-motive possesses in itself a motive power, and does not merely approximate to it, but is united to it, or rather has motion for its essence, it is evident that this, being first moved, will move other things. For as, if the sun did not set and rise but was immovable, we should be dubious about the cause of so great a light; and if he were invisible to the things which he illuminates, we should be still more dubious; thus also, with respect to the soul, since being incorporeal it is the cause of all motions, it occasions us to doubt how this is effected. As, therefore, the sun who illuminates all things, much more makes himself luminous; thus, likewise, the soul, which moves all things, by a much greater priority moves itself. For every cause begins its energy from itself; and you will find that the motions of the soul are the paradigms of corporeal motions.

Let us then assume the corporeal motions, and these are eight in number, being rather passive than effective, viz., *generation, corruption, increase, diminution, lation, circulation, mixture, and separation*. In the soul, therefore, there is increase, when giving itself to more excellent natures it multiplies its intellections. But there is then corruption in it when, departing from thence, it becomes more imbecile and more sluggish in its intellectual perceptions. Again, generation takes place in it when it ascends from this terrene abode. But the corruption of it is its last lapse from the intelligible. And mixture, indeed, in it, is collected intelligence, and at the same time the contemplation of forms. But separation in it may be said to be a more partial intelligence, and the contemplation of one form only. Again, lation in the soul is the motion of it according to a right line, and into the realms of generation. But circulation in it is its periodic revolution about forms, its evolution, and its restitution to the same condition. Circulation, therefore, may be more appropriately assigned to divine souls, but lation to ours. You may also perceive in divine souls both these motions. For the Demiourgos, says Platon in the *Timaios*, taking two right lines bent them into a circle. Hence it is evident that the circular inflection and intelligence of souls is not without the right line. For it pertains to intellect alone to be purely moved in a circle. But the ninth motion, which is that of incorporeal natures about bodies, such as calefactions, refrigerations, and animations, has a paradigmatic cause in the soul, so far as the soul gives life to bodies.

And thus we have sufficiently shown that there are motions of souls which are the paradigms of corporeal motions. It remains, therefore, to demonstrate that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions. [Note: The demonstration of

this is wanting in the original. It may, however, be summarily shown as follows, that the motions of the soul are the final causes of other motions. The motions of the soul are, as has been demonstrated, the effective causes of other motions. Everything desires good. Good is proximately imparted.]

For immortality is not predicated of the soul as a certain other thing, but is co-essentialized in the very essence of it, and unically comprehends the whole demonstration. For immortality is a certain life in the same manner as self-motion. Platon, therefore, afterwards adduces an evolved and expanded demonstration, when he says: "*for that which is always moved is immortal*," etc., omitting to say that the soul is self-moved, as being common to the two syllogisms, and intending to introduce it as the last of the four arguments, where also we may more accurately investigate it. Now, however, prior to the discussion of the parts of the first arguments, let us logically adapt the words themselves of Platon to the propositions.

All the propositions, therefore, of the syllogisms are three: The soul is self-moved; the self-moved is always moved; that which is always moved is immortal. But as we have said, the first and smallest of all the propositions, which says the soul is self-moved, is ranked as the last. For the third and greatest of all of them is placed first, as being connective of the whole reasoning; and this is that in which Platon says, "*for that which is always moved is immortal*." But the proposition posterior to this, which says that which is self-moved is always moved, is introduced through the contrary, the alter-motive, together with demonstration. For Platon here says: "*But that which moves another thing, and is moved by another*," i.e. the alter-motive nature, "*in consequence of having a cessation of motion*," i.e., not being always moved, *has also a cessation of life*, i.e., is not immortal. If, therefore, that which is moved by another, in consequence of not being always moved, is not immortal, that which is self-moved, being always moved, is immortal. All the propositions, however, are assumed essentially, and so far as each of them is that which it is. For from that which is moved by another, it is not only demonstrated that the self-moved is always moved, but also that the always-moved is self-moved; so that they convert—as for instance, the self-moved is always moved, and the always-moved is self-moved. For if that which is moved by another has a cessation of motion, i.e., if the alter-motive is not always moved, it will be evident that the always-moved is self-moved. For this is collected by the second hypothetical syllogism. For if the alter-motive is not always-moved, it is evident that the always-moved is not alter-motive. But that which is not alter-motive is self-motive. And from the words, "*because it does not desert itself*," it is collected that everything which is always-moved is self-moved. For if the alter-motive is likewise always-moved, it is in consequence of subsisting in conjunction with the motive cause. Much more, therefore, will that which is self-moved be always-moved, because it is not only always present with itself, but is united to itself.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF PLATON.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

[Reprinted.]

"PHILOSOPHY," says Hierokles, is the purification and perfection of human life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality and the mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of our proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these two is the province of *virtue* and *truth*; the former exterminating the

immoderation of the passions, and the latter introducing the divine form to those who are naturally adapted to its reception."

Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions, — of this philosophy, august, magnificent, and divine, Platon may be justly called the primary leader and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and venerable splendor. It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate; for if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions, and assimilates us to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it is easy to collect its preëminence to all other philosophies; to show that when they oppose it they are erroneous; that so far as they contain anything scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth.

To evince that the philosophy of Platon possesses this preëminence; that its dignity and sublimity are unrivalled; that it is the parent of all that ennobles man; and that it is founded on principles which neither time can obliterate nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of this Introduction. To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with the outlines of the principal dogmas of Platon's philosophy. The undertaking is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the journey; for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that the country through which he is passing is his native land. At least, if his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious (for the objects which he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes), and his absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power of wisdom,

"From mortal mists to purify his eyes,
That God and man he may distinctly see."

Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin the solitary journey.

Of all the dogmas of Platon, that concerning the first principle of things as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends other causes. For, according to Platon, the highest God, whom in the Republic he calls *the good*, and in the Parmenides *the one*, is not only above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, since everything which can in any respect be known, or of which anything can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by Platon to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis, therefore, of his Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, concludes as follows: "*The one* therefore *is* in no respect. So it seems. Hence it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be *being*, and participate of *essence*; but as it appears, *the one* neither *is one*, nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can anything either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither, therefore, does any *name* belong to it, nor *discourse*, nor any *science*, nor *sense*, nor *opinion*. It does not appear that there can. Hence it can neither be

named, nor *spoken of*, nor *conceived by opinion*, nor be *known*, nor *perceived* by any being. So it seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the philosophy of Platon from others is this, that every part of it is stamped with the character of science. The vulgar, indeed, proclaim the Deity to be ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and waking, like Phaiakia to Odysseus when sailing to his native land,

"That lay before him indistinct and vast,
Like a broad shield amid the watery waste."

In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the Divinity resembles that of a man who, on surveying the heavens, should assert of the altitude of its highest part that it surpasses that of the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this scientifically is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by the astronomer; for he, by knowing the height of the media between us and it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the loftiest tree but the summits of air and æther, the moon, and even the sun itself.

Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffable, and after what manner it is accomplished, according to Platon, from the last of things, following the profound and most inquisitive Damaskios as our leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is last; and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and known to sense, ascend to the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from hence thither. I say, therefore, that the unindigent is naturally prior to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. And if it is in want of anything, according to this it will not be the principle. It is, however, necessary that the principle should be this very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent, therefore, pertains to this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is anything prior to it. This, however, would be acknowledged, if it had any connection with the indigent.

Let us then consider body (that is, a triply extended substance) endued with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is sensible. Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things: body, and quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these, therefore, is by nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts; and that also which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that body itself is the principle and the first essence? But this is impossible; for, in the first place the principle will not receive anything from that which is posterior to itself. But body we say is the recipient of quality. Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, in the second place, body is every way divisible; its several parts are indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it

is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent.

Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Platon says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless, being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a certain particular quality; as, for instance, a fiery or earthy body, and in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject of which also it is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a subject, but one of the elements in each, as for instance animal in horse and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz., this subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be indigent. For elements are always indigent of each other, and that which is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body — for this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality, — for this does not possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the object of sight is neither body nor color; but colored body, or color corporealized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally, that which is sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of sense. From hence it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object of sense. Body, therefore, requires that which is incorporeal, and that which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature is not of itself sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsist prior to the other, but, being elements of one sensible thing, they are present with each other — the one imparting interval to that which is void of interval, but the other introducing to that which is formless sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both these together the principle, since they are not unindigent; for they stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. The composite, therefore, either produces itself, which is impossible, for it does not converge to itself but the whole of it is multifariously dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other principle prior to it.

Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from, nor prior to them, but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; though it possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz., the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so that when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz., nature, is not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible imparts that which is appar-

ent in matter, and that which falls on sense. But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly proceeding natural energy, whether according to place only, or according to nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature, however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is subordinate. For it will not be wonderful if, being a certain principle, it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful if it were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed to be the principle.

By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational soul, whether sensitive or orectic. For if it appears that it has something separate, together with impulsive and gnostic energies, yet at the same time it is bound in body and has something inseparable from it; since it is not able to convert itself to itself, but its energy is mingled with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this kind; since if it was liberated, and in itself free, it would also evince a certain independent energy, and would not always be converted to body, but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, therefore, of the multitude of mankind, though they are conversant with externals, yet at the same time they exhibit that which is separate about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe that deliberation is necessary in order to effect or be passive to apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses of other irrational animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect by them, it is evident that the psychical energies (*i.e.*, energies belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the animated body, or of the soul corporealized, though in such perception the psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies the corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate; but a thing of this kind will not be the principle.

Prior then to this essence we see a certain form separate from a subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies, and corrects itself. This, however, would not be the case unless it was converted to itself; and it would not be converted to itself unless it had a separate essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then say that it is the most perfect principle? But it does not at once exert all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent; but the rational nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential energies, always concurring with its essence according to the self-moved, and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent, and will be the principle. To this we reply that the whole soul is one form and one nature, partly unindigent and partly indigent; but the principle is perfectly unindigent. Soul, therefore, which exerts mutable energies, will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there should be something prior to this which is in every respect immutable, according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and energies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and such as is much honored intellect, to which Aristoteles, having ascended, thought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting

to that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes, and of which neither addition nor ablation changes anything belonging to it? Or is not this also one and many, whole and parts, containing in itself things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides *the one* here is indigent of *the many*, because it has its subsistence in *the many*. Or it may be said that this one is collective of the many, and this not by itself but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its proper plenitudes, from which the whole at once receives its completion, it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of that which generates, but also that which generates of that which is generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is intellectual of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the intellectual is indigent of the intelligible as of its proper object of desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual because it wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain indigence is naturally coessentialized with intellect, so that it cannot be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Platon calls *the one being*? For as there is no separation there throughout the whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to itself, what indigence will there appear to be in the perfectly united? And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? Hence the great Parmenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that which is most unindigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to the conception of Platon, that the united is not *the one itself* but that which is passive to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it ranks after *the one*; for it is supposed to be *the united* and not *the one itself*. If also being is composed from the elements *bound* and *infinity*, as appears from the Philebos of Platon, where he calls it that which is mixed, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of *being* is different from that of *being united*, and that which is a whole is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the whole which is called *one being* is indigent of the two. And though *the one* in this is better than *being*, yet this is indigent of being, in order to the subsistence of one being. But if *being* here supervenes *the one*, as it were, form in that which is mixed and united, just as the idiom of man in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also *the one* will be indigent of *being*. If, however, to speak more properly, *the one* is two-fold, *this* being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to being, but *that* conferring rectitude on being, if this be the case, neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, it may be said that *the one* will be perfectly unindigent. For neither is it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself—for there is nothing in it besides itself,—nor is it in want of itself. But it is one because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not even the relation of itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one, since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is at once the first of all things.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE PHAIDROS OF PLATON.

I.

The Phaidros is one of those grand monuments of ancient wisdom which have ever commanded the admiration of both philosophers and scholars. It is one of the most subtle works ever written, and contains the result of Platon's maturest thoughts concerning some of the questions that possess the greatest and most permanent interest for mankind. It is generally (and probably truly) considered to have been the first work written by the prince of philosophers. However, it must be remembered that Platon at the time of the composition of the Phaidros (about A. C. 384) was forty-five years old. He had been studying and solving the problems of philosophy for over twenty years. Consequently, though perhaps among the first dialogues, chronologically viewed, it is, if we consider the exhaustive treatment of the various questions investigated and the important results attained, one of the last productions of Platon's mighty mind. We propose, in a series of articles, to give an exposition of the Phaidros which will adequately elucidate the inner signification of this arcane dialogue. Our exegesis will be chiefly based on the commentary, or rather scholia, of Hermeias, a noble link of that "golden chain" of Platonic philosophers whose writings entitle them to the eternal gratitude of the thinking part of the human race. This valuable commentary has been, unfortunately, transmitted to us in a very imperfect condition. As Taylor observes, it is likely that what we have of it are extracts made by some disciple of Hermeias. It is of great value, however, even in its present mutilated state, and is our most trustworthy guide to the recondite meaning of the Phaidros. The Phaidros belongs to that class of Platonic dialogues aptly denominated ethical and purificative. Primarily, the subject of it must be stated; for, strange as it may seem, there has been much diversity of opinion about this matter. Some, says Hermeias, have endeavored to show, looking only to its beginning and end, that this dialogue is about rhetoric; others, that it is about the soul, since here Sokrates especially demonstrates its immortality; and others, that it is about love, since the beginning and occasion of the dialogue originate from this. For Lysias had written an oration in order to prove that it is not proper to favor a lover, but one who is not a lover, he being vehemently in love, but pretending that he was not. Wishing, therefore, to withdraw his beloved from others, he viciously composed an oration, the design of which was to show that it is requisite rather to favor one who is not a lover than one who is; which gave occasion to Sokrates to discourse concerning this intemperate love, together with temperate, divine, and enthusiastic love, because it is a love of this latter kind which should be embraced and followed. Others, again, assert that the dialogue is theological, on account of what is said in the middle of it. But, according to others, its subject is *the good*, because Sokrates says that the supercelestial place has never been celebrated according to its merit, and that an uncolored and unfigured essence there subsists. And, lastly, others assert that it is concerning the beautiful itself. All these, therefore, form their opinion of the whole scope of the dialogue from a certain part of it. For it is evident that the discourse concerning the soul is assumed for the sake of something else, and also that concerning the first beauty; for Sokrates ascends from other beautiful things to this, and to the supercelestial place. It is also evident that the discourses about love are to be referred to the lover. It must not, therefore, be said that there are many scopes; for it is necessary that all of them should be extended to one thing, that the discourse may be, as it were, one animal. In short, Sokrates speaks concerning all-various beauty. Hence, he begins from the apparent beauty in the form of Phaidros with which Lysias

was enamored, in consequence of falling off from the character of a true lover. But afterwards he proceeds to the beauty in discourses, of which Phaidros is represented as a lover. From this he ascends to the beauty in soul, viz.: to the virtues and sciences; and thence, in his recantation, to the mundane divinities. After which he ascends to the intelligible fountain itself of beauty, to the divinity of love, and to the beautiful itself; whence he again descends through the divisive art to the beauty in soul, and in the virtues and sciences, and afterwards again to the beauty in discourses, thus conjoining the end with the beginning. In short, the whole intention of the dialogue may be divided into three parts, corresponding to three lives: into the intemperate love, which is seen in the oration of Lysias; into the temperate, which is seen in the first discourse of Sokrates; and, in the third place, into the divinely-inspired, which is seen in the recantation, and in the last discourse of Sokrates. It may also be said that the lovers, the loves, and the objects of love are analogous to these lives. Hence they do not much deviate from the design of the dialogue who assert that it is concerning love, since love is seen in a relation to the object of love—and it is necessary indeed not to be ignorant of kindred differences, since Platon himself does not deliver casual distinctions of love and the object of love. However, it is evident that the leading scope of the dialogue is not concerning love; for neither does it discuss its essence, nor its power, but discourses concerning its energies in the world, and in souls. But if Platon anywhere makes love the leading scope of a dialogue, he discourses concerning its essence, power, and energy. Hence in the Banquet, where love is the leading subject, he delivers its middle nature, and its order, calling it a mighty daimon, as binding secondary to primary natures. But here a discourse concerning the beautiful takes the lead, to which all things are elevated by love. With respect to the persons of the dialogue, they are Lysias, or rather the oration of Lysias, Phaidros, and Sokrates; Lysias and Phaidros being, as we have said, lovers of each other, but Sokrates being the curator of youth, and the providential inspector of Phaidros, elevating him from the apparent and external beauty in words to the beauty in soul and intellect. As some, however, have charged that the diction of the dialogue is inflated, on account of what is said in the recantation, it is necessary to observe that Sokrates employs words adapted to the things themselves. For, as he discourses about objects unapparent, and unknown to the many, he accordingly uses an elevated diction, and such as accords with an intelligible and divine essence. Indeed, as Taylor truly remarks, if human nature in its present degraded condition is capable of receiving the inspirations of divinity, and if a part of this dialogue was composed under such an influence, an accusation of this kind is certainly its greatest commendation.

Hence it is justly observed by Proclus that "Platon in this dialogue being inspired by the Nymphs, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, entheasm (*ἑνθεσμός*), he divinely unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual deities, and many concerning the liberated rulers of the universe, who lead upwards the multitude of mundane deities to the monads which are intelligible and separate from mundane wholes. But, relating still more about those deities who are allotted the world, he celebrates their intellections and mundane fabrications, their unpolled providence and government of souls, and whatever else Sokrates delivers entheastically or according to a divinely-inspired energy." And he further says: "From the Phaidros you may acquire a scientific knowledge of all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and of the liberated orders of deities, which are proximately established above the celestial circulations."

ON WISDOM.

BY ARCHYTAS.

[Translated from the Original Greek—Reprinted.]

1. Wisdom as much excels in all human affairs as the sight does the other corporeal senses, intellect the soul, and the sun the stars. For the sight is the most far-darting and the most multiform of all the senses; intellect is the supreme part of the soul, judging by reason and dianoia what is fit, and existing as the sight and power of the most honorable things; and the sun is the eye and soul of things which have a natural subsistence. For through it all things become visible, are generated, and rise into existence. Deriving also their roots, and being generated from thence, they are nourished, increased, and excited by it in conjunction with sense.

2. Man was generated by far the wisest of all terrestrial animals. For he is able to contemplate the things which exist, and to obtain from all things science and wisdom. To which also it may be added that divinity has engraved and exhibited in him the system of universal reason, in which all the forms of things in existence are distributed, and the significations of nouns and verbs. For a place is assigned for the sounds of the voice, viz.: the pharynx, the mouth, and the nostrils. But as man was generated the instrument of the sounds, through which nouns and verbs are signified, so likewise of the conceptions which are beheld in the things that have an existence. And this appears to me to be the work of wisdom, for the accomplishment of which man was generated and received organs and powers from Divinity.

3. Man was generated and constituted for the purpose of contemplating the reason of the whole of nature, and in order that, being himself the work of wisdom, he might survey the wisdom of the things which exist. For if the reason of man is contemplative of the reason of the whole of nature, and the wisdom also of man perceives and contemplates the wisdom of the things in existence,—this being acknowledged, it is at the same time demonstrated that man is a part of universal reason, and of the whole of the intellectual nature.

4. Wisdom is not conversant with a certain definite existing thing, but is simply conversant with all the things that exist. And it is requisite that it should not first investigate the principles of itself, but the common principles of all beings. For wisdom so subsists with reference to all beings that it is the providence of it to know and contemplate the universal accidents of all things. And on this account wisdom discovers the principles of all beings.

5. Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and connumerate them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men and to possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he will also have discovered a beautiful place of survey, from which it will be possible to behold Divinity, and all things that are in coördination with, and successive to him, subsisting separately or distinct from each other. Having likewise entered this most ample road, being impelled in a right direction by intellect, and having arrived at the end of his course, he will have conjoined beginnings with ends, and will know that God is the principle, middle, and end of all things which are accomplished according to justice and right reason.