


THE OPEN COURT

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VOLUME XXXVI


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LAO-TZE WRITING HIS BOOK.

By MURATA TANRYO.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF NON-RESISTANCE.

BY SIDNEY HOOK.

“The essence of (institutionalized) religion consists in this, that certain phenomena of nature and history, which according to time, and circumstances, acquired an unusual importance, have been personified and put on so high a pinnacle that they appear to be independent of time and place”.

—Dietzgen *Philosophical Essays*.

SIX hundred years before the Christian era and a century before the advent of Buddha, Lao-Tze, the venerable Chinese sage preached the doctrine of non-resistance as part of his more comprehensive philosophy of non-assertion. The latter doctrine, it may be remarked, is considered by some, despite the fact that it has enjoyed comparatively little circulation or renown, to be immeasurably superior in profundity and spiritual riches to many regnant philosophies of a latter day. Concerning virtue, Lao-Tze teaches in his *Tao-Teh-King*: “The good I meet with goodness; the bad I also meet with goodness; that is virtue’s goodness. The faithful I meet with faith; the faithless I also meet with faith; that is virtue’s faith”.¹

One hundred years later we find Buddha exhorting his disciples thus: “Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good, let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by the truth”.²

The classic formulation of the doctrine lies, however, as resurrected by Tolstoy, in the Sermon on the Mount where Christ pronounces the golden words of brotherhood: “Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil; but whosoever smiteth thee

¹ Lao-Tze’s *Tao-Teh-King*, p. 107 Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago.

² *The Gospel of Buddha*, “The Dharmapada”, Open Court Pub. Co.

on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compell thee to go one mile, go with him two”.

Christianity renounced this cardinal principle of love when it entered into concubinage with the decadent Roman Empire and became the Church. Here the final betrayal of its heritage was wrought in the attempted suppression of dissenting sects which had taken the words of Christ to heart. It was not until the dying years of the nineteenth century when Tolstoy delivered his smashing blows at the foundations of orthodox theology, that the world was awakened to the full import of the doctrine of non-resistance. So interwoven is this philosophy in the structure of his dramas and novels that many an artistic passage is marred because of its naked didacticism. Tolstoy succeeded in bringing down upon his head the scathing criticism both reactionary and revolutionist alike. Both would say with Ambrose Bierce “The camel and the Christian take their burden kneeling”.

The common criticism levelled against the Tolstoyan philosophy holds that the practice of non-resistance would lead society into social stagnation and that its policy is inherently suicidal. Of course this brings up the question concerning the literal implication of the Christian injunction: “Resist not Evil”. There are some who have insistently maintained that the connotation of evil in this case embraces not alone the evil of man but also the evil of nature. Consequently, the adherents of this doctrine would be strictly enjoined from mitigating the rigors of the natural forces or reducing the discrepancies between what is and their ideal of what ought to be. Such an attitude obviously precludes any possibility of sanitation, mechanization, in short, of any effort designed to render this planet more inhabitable.

Tolstoy in strenuously combating this interpretation insists that these “irrelevant perversions” cloak either a cowardly reluctance or an utter impotence on the part of his critics to grapple with the larger problems of human conduct presented by the doctrine of non-resistance. Though he is somewhat justified in imputing the motives of those who shirk facing the salient features of the non-resistant philosophy, he nevertheless errs in failing to realize that submission to the ordering of nature is implicitly expressed in the theological Christian creed and was scrupulously observed by its

early devotees. Lecky makes mention of a certain St. Simeon Stylites, one of the most revered anchorites of the fourth century, who had bound a rope around himself so that it became imbedded in the flesh which putrified and ulcerated around it. Whenever he moved worms dropped from him and when he was doing penance atop of his sixty-foot pillars he commissioned his followers to pick up the worms that fell from his body and replace them in the purulent sores, the saint saying to the worm, "Eat what God has given you".³

Any belief in an omniscient extra-mundane creator makes superfluous all efforts to ameliorate conditions or alleviate human suffering. Yet even if the point made above is incontrovertible, the vitality of the doctrine of non-resistance is not seriously affected for it does not constitute an insuperable task to reconcile a truly Christian pacificism in the affairs of man with a sincere militancy in the affairs of nature.

The flaw in this social philosophy lies at its heart. When we direct our attention to the sphere of human activity we can readily note the inherent contradictions in the non-resistant attitude. To be genuinely "*non-resistant*" is equivalent to being totally "*acceptant*". Non-resistance implies that on no occasion can the individual who holds those views manifest the slightest trace of hesitancy or obduracy in complying with the demands of constituted authority of his fellow man. A non-resisting person, in the full sense of those words, would not only refuse to meet "*physical force*" with "*physical force*", but to be consistent, he would also refuse to combat "*moral suasion*" with "*moral suasion*". And so his very belief in the doctrine of non-resistance would vanish as soon as it encountered opposition in a hostile world. Yet how unflinchingly and steadfastly have the early disciples of Christ and Tolstoy clung to their faith—how often have they succeeded in kindling the inner light in the bosoms of their oppressors, radiating an ineffable calm and contentment as a balm to the wounded in spirit.

In view of all this, we may reasonably maintain that to justify life and make its existence possible adherents of this theory have been compelled to adopt an attitude of PASSIVE RESISTANCE. Passive resistance should not be confused with non-resistance. The early Christians in the Arena resisting the attempts of the Romans to compel them to abjure their faith, the Tolstoyans who endured excruciating agony rather than render compulsory military service.

³ Lecky *History of European Morals*. Vol. 2, page 119.

mass sabotage on the industrial field—all these are splendid and inspiring examples of the passive resistant attitude.

Now the implications of the passive resistant attitude are very significant. The question is asked wherein lies the difference or rather the superiority of a doctrine of "passive resistance" to a doctrine of "active resistance". Both terms connote an opposition to something definite—or an approach, let us say, to some social end. The difference between the anarchism of a Most and the anarchism of a Kropotkin lies in their different methods of executing what basically is a common plan or scheme. The doctrine of passive resistance is not an end in itself but merely a method of successfully coping with the exigencies of life, at most working towards a perfected social existence.

In answer to our question the passive resistant would respond that his philosophy was morally superior to that of active resistance in that it was more humane, less calculated to destroy society through strife. So it seems after all that the difference between these two types of conduct has been reduced to one of degree. This, I submit, invalidates the humanitarian basis of the doctrine of passive resistance for it can be shown that passive resistance, or rather the effects of passive resistance can be more injurious to the individual and the community, than the more active form of resistance. A general walkout in a key industry for instance may inflict greater privations upon the community than a small riot. In our own experience, we know that an abject humbleness is not always more effective than a spirited defence. There are times when a tractable and yielding disposition provokes continued affronts instead of inducing a change in heart of the aggressor.

Both the utility and limitations of the doctrine we are discussing can the sooner be grasped if we delve into the genesis of its extended sway and influence. The period in which Christ lived had witnessed several persistent attempts by the Jews to liberate themselves from the galling yoke of Rome. These proved to be uniformly abortive. Soon, a direct, frontal attack upon an apparently impregnable Rome, came to be regarded as chimerical. A more subtle and insidious method had to be adopted to undermine the Satyr State. Passive resistance and seditious propaganda, the most effective instruments at hand, succeeded in rocking the Roman Empire to its very foundations. Meekness and resignation, in this instance, had accomplished what force had left undone. Christianity could only be conquered by being adopted.

The home of the great Christian revival in the nineteenth century was Russia—frozen in the icy clutches of a demented dynasty and deadening church; a land of perpetual darkness illumined here and there by the effulgent idealism of its revolutionary martyrs. The ruthless suppression of the Polish insurrection, the restoration of the “Nicholas” system, the seeming futility of “propaganda by the deed”—all these influenced Tolstoy.

Tolstoy repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the non-resistant attitude was the only one which could break through what he called the hypnosis of the press, the Church and the State; and his expectation that this attitude would proselytize society is sufficient evidence of a “method”. The general position of the Tolstoyan is voiced by Darrow today when he explicitly states, “I would not be so much opposed to force if I thought it would work”.⁴ The Quaker challenge to a world of force sets out to convince humanity that the passive resistant attitude is invariably a more effective method than any other, even in wars of self-defence.

The philosophy of passive resistance originally was applicable to a certain, specific situation—it was employed as an instrument in remedying defects in the social organism. If as Prof. Kallen puts it, “We hypostatize our instruments of thought” or conduct, we are destined to defeat the very ends for which we forged them.

Would Belgium have had endured a worse fate if she had offered no resistance to her spoliator instead of arching her back? After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were the invading armies of Germany perceptibly humanized by the affable passive resistance of Russia? When Bertrand Russell abandons his faith in the necessity for armed insurrection on the ground that violence may destroy “the priceless heritage of civilization”, is he not called upon to show that the inevitable wars generated by the present industrial system are less devastating in their ravages, less destructive to art and beauty than any social revolution can be? If not, we may at least request enlightenment on how philosophical anarchism intends to prevent the destruction of civilization.

Every social philosophy including the philosophy of passive resistance has had its beginnings in some sort of pragmatic sanction. The danger to society arises when the pragmatic criterion is not retained, when those modes of conduct which are adapted to specific situations are reified above the dialectical flow of natural and social forces.

⁴ *Marx vs. Tolstoy*. Chas. Kerr & Co.

THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE.*

BY HENRY FRANK.

SCENE:

Vision of a revolving globe, enwrapped in bright, floating clouds against the blue back ground of the skies. Gradually the clouds disappear, leaving the globe distinct and clear, whereon betimes appear the various characters and scenes as set forth below.

MIND:

(represented by a radiant beam of light shining resplendent above ALL OTHERS, and from which THE VOICE melodiously flows)

How vast and radiant the realm wherein
I reign! How far the reaches of my power!
Naught so minute, but in its breast I lie,
And view the marvel of its miniature world.
No sphere so vast, nor systems infinite,
But I, on wings ethereal, surmount
Their inmost substance, penetrate and delve
Into their myriad mysteries, to draw
Aside the veil of ignorance, which long
Hath mantled men with terror.

MIND:

No mightier power
Than mine: No substance, or of adamant,
Or iron, so firm but I, with magic wit,
Dissolve to primary elements, and fuse
Again in subtle unions; a world, mine own,
Creating, marvellous as Nature's work!
Crowned thus with kingly thought I reign supreme
In realms reflective, spurred by Reason, and

* A Philosophical Allegory Setting Forth an Answer to The Riddle of Life.

Wrapped in Imagination's dazzling robes!
 I hold abjectly at my feet the slaves
 Who answer instantly at my command:
 All things material are my subjects base,
 Which, void of me, were shapeless and inane;
 For I am mirror of the rolling orbs,
 And primal Ether, whence they sprang: of Space
 And Time, whose only registry am I.
 I trace the Atom's geometric forms,
 From crystal sand-grain to a human cell,
 And read the cosmic secret of the stars.
 Without me all were naught; for naught exists
 Save I that was and is and is to be, be,
 All penetrant and universal.

BRAIN:

*(a whitish grey cloud, RISING above the horizon catching the radiance
 of the beam of MIND and reflecting its glory, rolls upward
 bravely and emits a strong, firm, but pleasing VOICE)*

Hold!

Self deceived, misguided Ministrant,
 And false Ambassador, of Truth! Thy words
 Have burned into my blood, and raised my gorge,
 So conjuring my spirit to resist
 The fell, erroneous eloquence, thy lips
 Discourse, that silence, hence, were dastardly.
 Thy boasted regnancy supreme, thy keen
 All penetrating presence, wizardry
 Of wisdom, conjuring of knowledge, and
 Mastery of Time and Space, are plumes
 Purloined from crown I wear. Not increate,
 Art thou, nor I; beginningless, nor free
 From source evincing earthly origin.
 No freer thou, than I, to soar, thought-winged,
 Ethereal realms of space, and essence solve
 Of the pervasive Substance of all things.
 Like me thou art of Matter sprung, begot
 Of That without which heaven and earth were void.

MIND:

Who art thou, thus durst thunder in this court,
Rebellious tongue, disquieting our peace?
Be silent, or fear judgment dire—

BRAIN:

Withhold
Thy anger, nursed by age-insatiate
Ignorance, and sprung from vanity.

MIND:

Seize him, ye guards and servitors of Truth,
Who dares with impious tongue our wisdom spurn!
Clothed in the regal robes AUTHORITY
Bestows, my ears are waxed to his vain speech.

*(here THOUGHTS, KNOWLEDGE, IMAGINATION, descend as small,
fleecy clouds, shot with white light, and whirl dizzily around the
figure of BRAIN as the following conversation proceeds.*

*REASON represented by a violet tinted cloud of
somewhat larger and more compact quality,
hovers over the scene in meditative sway)*

THOUGHTS:

Hark! We are servants of King Mind,
In whose sovran power we find
Privilege to mould our form,
Tempered by Time's stress and storm.
Mark, our weapon's sharpened edge;
Service to our lord we pledge!

BRAIN:

O, foolish foundlings, thy vain master serve;
Know ye not, ye change as changeful clouds,
When rent by winds, dissolved by suns—

KNOWLEDGE:

(interrupting)
Hear, then, Dullard Me,
Lord of land and sea,
Firm as rooted rock,
Storm-waves never shock.
In me Mind doth mould
Sovranty to hold.

BRAIN:

On vain and foolish offspring of my cells,
 Thou art but temporary stuff I store,
 To trade for better substance Time provides
 Ephemeral is thy being, for today
 Casts yester's garb and waits tomorrow's guise.

IMAGINATION:

Then, to Me, hark!
 God's living spark,
 Worlds new-create,
 Fashioning Fate.
 Cosmic space, I,
 Wind-wing'd fly,
 For estalling truth,
 In eld or youth.

BRAIN:

Thou, too, O beauteous child, thy liberty,
 Like birds, pursuest through the ambient air,
 Beguiled by native poise or Freedom's wings,
 And thinkest, unrestrained, thy boundless course.
 Thy wings are not of air but of the earth,
 Refined and levitant, yet wove by me.

REASON:

(approaching calmly)

Then, I, by my unchallenged right,
 Assert o'er thee my regnant might,
 Supreme I stand around Mind's throne,
 And serve, unswerved, for Truth alone.
 I find, as Logic by my side,
 That Mind is right, though thou deride:
 Naught is but Mind; all else is vain,
 Shadows in shadowy domain.
 Truth gives consent to Reason's sway,
 Pursue, thou wilt, Error's way.

MIND:

Thou hear'st, Intruder base, the Highest Voice,
 That speaks within the realm of Mind. Depart

E're all my servitors avenge my wrath,
And clutch thee in the vise of my stern power.

BRAIN:

Thou art deceived, O fatuous King! E're pass
The Age, delusion's bandage from thy eyes
Shall fall, and nobler light thy slaves shall guide.
These minions, Thoughts, Imagination and
E'en Knowledge, I do fain commiserate,
Knowing they are but passing phases of
Thy changing moods: Truth's bastard children sprung
From thy all-harboring breast. Soon shalt thou shame
To honor them, and welcome foundlings fresh,
From loins that champion a bolder love.

MIND:

Silence, impertinent, preposterous,
And impious monster! Strike, ye Servitors,
My faithful guards, else venom'd words encoil
Our hearts and crush our faith.

THOUGHTS:

KNOWLEDGE:

IMAGINATION:

(together)

Monster avault

And heed the Master's voice or bare thy breast
To Vengeful blade!

BRAIN:

Nay, hold thy wrath, for see.
Far off stands Reason from thy ranks and waits
My calmer words. Him do I fain address,
Discardant of thy presence and thy threats.
He knows that Truth ne'er won by bloody blows;
Therefore, withdraws from coadjutors false.—
To him then I appeal.

REASON:

(meditatively)

And I attend,

Distraught by thoughts that rend my peace.

MIND:

What, Reason, dost thou halt when crisis grave
Confronts my sovranty and sway of right?

REASON:

Lord, thou canst reign alone as Truth permits;
I must all claims heed well and Logic's test
Apply, that majesty of Truth prevail.
I shall with swerveless and impartial mien
Withhold my judgment till the last word's said.

MIND:

I would, in sooth, avoid such menial tilt,
Nor cross my knighted sword with blade so base.
But that thy calm, impartial dignity
Assurance gives, I will thy wish obey.
My argument is simple—known of all,
To child as native, as to man mature.
I am eterne and increate—a beam
Of Infinite Intelligence that throbs
In inert atom or in vibrant nerve.
As sun-ray leaps from fiery breast of heaven's
Majestic King, and dwells in sod and soil,
In leaf and bough and flower and fruit, awhile,
And then returns, its labor finished, to
Its heavenly source, thus I, sojourning here
Awhile, in mould of clay, my service done,
Depart from this dissolving house of earth,
To seek the heights supernal whence I came.
Were I but mundane matter, whence my power
To conjure Memory, the pivot on
Which Consciousness revolves; yea, what were source
Of Consciousness itself, no clod of earth
Contains, nor lifeless matter can express?
Let me but summons them that they themselves
Divulge the secret of their being:

BRAIN:

(interrupting with eagerness)

I

Consent and gladly hear all evidence
That may sustain Mind's claim, withal.

MIND:

Come forth,
Dear Memory, sweet solace and rare source
Of spiritual assurance, my mystic self.

MEMORY:

(a thin, vague cloud is seen slowly RISING from far beneath the horizon, struggling through heavier and darker clouds to wend its way to the upper part of the globe where the other characters are talking)

Who hath summonsed me from sleep,
So fondly on my eyelids lay?
Up from crypts of silence deep,
Why am I called to garish day?

MIND:

Speak, Child, the source and essence of thyself,
And thus base Matter's minion here confute.

MEMORY:

I know not aught of Matter, I,
Who weave the mystic web of time,
From Past to Present fondly fly,
And epochs merge in every clime.

I conjure Childhood's smile or tear,
And Youth's impulsive vanity,
Or Manhood's dignified career,
And Age's noble dignity.

Like as a spring from fountain deep,
Unfathom-bedded in the earth,
The waters of my being leap,
Exhaustless in renewing birth.

I come when mother Mind doth bid,
Defiant of the coarsen flesh,
E'en though for years I lay there hid,
All undiscerned within its mesh.

I'm ever young; and elder time
Renew I, in the birth of thought.
With my rejuvenescent rhyme
Is happiness or sorrow wrought.

BRAIN :

Pause, poor, untutored Child ; how little taught
In knowledge of thyself ! Did'st thou but know
I am the womb whence sprung thy being ; I,
The cradle, wherein rocked and lulled so oft,
Hath sleep perched on thy brow ; did'st thou but know
No notion thine, nor link twixt sep'rate thoughts
Were possible to thee, save as I wrought ;
Did'st thou but know the many mansions of
My complex structure, where I thee enclose,
And suffer thy release at Mind's loud call ;
Did'st thou but know thy very life depends
On my existence——

MIND :

Silence him, O Judge ;
Let not my child's chaste ears be thus abused
With foul defilement of contemptuous lies ;
I summons Consciousness, the Self of selves,
The mystic element and source of life,
Which was and is to be whom none
Can comprehend or fathom. Sourceless source
Of Being and Intelligence, speak thou !

BRAIN :

(half to himself in low voice)
'Tis well she comes ! I would behold her clear
And naked in her native form ; so long
Hath mystery mantled her to mortal eyes,
I fain would tear the evil from her fair face.
Thou Pythoness whose false, deceptive fane
Compels the worship of thy myriad dupes,
Come teach me who am sponsor of thyself !

(a bright mist appears in the background as at sunrise, which increases in splendor and gradually gathers into folds of various brilliant hues, pouring forth a flood of unusual effulgence. The folds then seem to part and singly float around as if blown by a gentle wind, then slowly assemble, coming closer and closer till, mingling, THEY RISE together spirally, gathering into one body, the upper portion of which is of brilliant golden hue, which gradually fades into orange, violet, indigo, green and blue at the bottom. Whirling round and round the brilliant cloud slowly assumes a human shape resplendent beyond description)

CONSCIOUSNESS:

I am the Self of self, self-found,
 Unknown to all save to myself;
 I climb Life's ladder, round by round,
 And make the books on Memory's shelf.

I antedate all form and force,
 And build by my intelligence
 All living things, of which the source
 I am, the substance, soul and sense.

I was before e'en Matter moved;
 I shaped thyself, O menial Brain,
 Which thou thyself, unwitting, proved
 As instrument to artist's strain.

No cell athrob within thy sphere,
 Nor fibre vibrant to a thought,
 But I, its impress in a tear
 Or smile, within thyself have wrought.

My mystic touch endues with life
 The chemic substance of the soil,
 Nor suffers planetary strife,
 Unfought, its destiny to spoil.

There is no bridge twixt consciousness
 And Matter's far-off shelving shores;
 Myself on substance I impress,
 As sun in seed its presence stores.

BRAIN:

Absurd thy claim, as I had thought, for thou
 Thyself, on Life depend'st, without whose throb
 And magic work what were thy prowess brave?

MIND:

Well said; then let me summons Life herself,
 To prove how she with magic thrill awoke
 Earth's inert mass, that hailed the Breath divine
 Into the living clod and gave it soul.

BRAIN:

Nor shall I disapprove; for I would face
The combined hosts that parry Common Sense
With fragile arrows hurled from Fancy's sheath.

(the globe begins to writhe and throb, swelling and sinking; here and there little nodules of soil strive for shape and expression, till slowly some unseen power seems to mould them into shapes that creep upon the sands, fly in the air, climb the limbs of trees, and assume the human form. Shining round the figure that represents Man, is an electric glow that completely envelops him)

LIFE:

I am the power divine that breathed
In inert clod a living soul;
Which, in coarsen clay though sheathed,
On earth hath played a varied role.

Of lifeless mould I fashioned rare,
The things that crawl and creep and fly;
I caused fructiferous seeds to bear
Rare fruitage, reared twixt earth and sky.

I surge and sweep, a ceaseless stream,
Through soil and seed and leaf and cell,
And work God's miracle supreme,
More wonderful than tongue can tell.

I give thee life, O Matter base,
And from thee life I take again;
Upon thee, like a tablet, trace
The impress of my joy and pain.

And thou, impertinent, O Brain,
How couldst thou throb with thought divine,
If I fed not thy cells again,
Though dying, with immortal wine?

MIND:

I thank thee, brave and valiant Prince of Power,
Thus to set forth with clarity and truth,
What well I know, but thou canst best express,
Thyself supremest miracle of God.

REASON :

(to mind)

Thy witnesses are strong and eloquent :
 Almost persuaded I would verdict yield,
 Full favorable to thy claims sublime ;
 Yet am I forced, ere judgment from my lips
 May fall, to ask if Brain can aught rebut ?

BRAIN :

Most noble Reason, calmly have I heard,
 And patiently endured the subtle stuff,
 These servitors of Mind have blown, withal,
 To blind the eye and stultify the sense.
 I marvel not such plausibility
 Should lure thy judgment. For Ages, thus, has wit
 Suffused the skies of Ignorance with Truth's
 Reflected glow ;—a moon in nightly skies
 Pretending to supplant the luminous globe
 Of day. But I, O Reason, witnesses
 Shall summons, who shall swift refute the false
 And spurious doctrines, have misled the world,
 Of these too purblind leaders of the mind.
 These laggards, Mind and his vain retinue,
 Have slept the while that Truth hath upward climbed,
 From lowly valleys where Ignorance prevailed
 To sun-crowned peaks of Learning's lofty range.
 Speak, then, ye, who know how came the World.

(a great convulsion ensues : Tempests tear the darkling clouds to shreds, which sweep madly through the torn and thundering branches felled in the deep forest. Earthquakes break forth and the entire globe rocks with furious gales. At length, slowly, calm settles on the scene and swaying in mid-heavens there RISES the kingly and majestic figure of COSMOS, who slowly descends upon a lofty peak and thus declaims)

(To be Continued.)

M. K. GANDHI AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN INDIA.

BY TARAK NATH DAS.

ANYONE who wishes to understand the ethical and philosophical basis of the struggle for Independence that is going on in India, led by Mahatma M. K. Gandhi, should carefully study the following teachings of Buddha :

"I teach the not bringing about of all those conditions of heart which are evil and not good. . . . However, I teach Simha, the doing of such actions as are righteous, by deed, by word, and by thought. I teach the bringing about of all those conditions of heart which are good and not evil. . . . I proclaim the annihilation of egotism, of lust, of ill-will, of delusion. . . . However, I do not proclaim the annihilation of forbearance, of love, of charity, and of truth. . . ."

"He who deserves punishment must be punished, and he who is worthy of favor must be favored. Yet at the same time he teaches us to do no injury to any living being but to be full of love and kindness. . . . These injunctions are not contradictory, for whosoever must be punished must be punished for the crimes which he has committed. He suffers his injury not through the ill-will of the judge but on account of his evil-doing. . . ."

"The Tathagata teaches that all warfare in which man tries to slay his brother is lamentable, but he does not teach that those who go to war in a righteous cause after having exhausted all means to preserve peace are blameworthy. . . . He must be blamed who is the cause of war. . . ."

"The doctrine of the conquest of self, O Simha, is not taught to destroy the souls of men, but to preserve them. . . . He who conquered self is more fit to live, to be successful, and to gain victories than he who is the slave of self. . . . He who harbors in his heart love of truth will live and not die, for he has drunk the

water of immortality. Struggle, then, O General, courageously and fight your battles vigorously, but be a soldier of truth and Tathagata will bless you".¹

Mahatma Gandhi is not a Buddhist by faith. He is a Jain by birth and by faith, and he believes that all religions lead to the same goal. Fundamentally he is a product of various spiritual influences. All India has been enriched by the ethical teachings of Buddha. Hinduism, Jainism, Christianity, Confucianism, and other religions have absorbed much of the truth taught by Buddhism, as truth is no religion's monopoly.

"Be a soldier of Truth" is the spirit of Buddha's teaching and we find that Mahatma Gandhi is teaching the same doctrine when he calls upon the Hindus, Mohammedans, Christians, Parsees, Sikhs, and others to take the vow of "Satyagraha", which means "Hold fast to the Truth". Gandhi preaches that you should not only know that you are standing on the ground of truth, but should stay by it, suffer for it, and never surrender yourself to any force so long as you are true. Here he again is doing what the ancient sages of India advised regarding Politics. For them Politics could never be separated from ethics, and Politics was known to be "Rajaharam" or righteous guide in the science of ruling.

Gandhi like the sages of the past, including Buddha, preaches love, but he emphasizes that Truth must be upheld and the offenders must be punished. So Gandhi demands from the Government of India that those who were responsible for the wholesale human slaughter at Amritsar, those who lied to the Indian people and the world regarding the war aims of the British Government, must be punished and the wrong done to the people and to the world at large be rectified. Gandhi demands these with no spirit of hatred to the culprits but with a feeling of love for humanity. He declares to the English people and to the world in his simple and prophetic way that he has no hatred against any person, but if he had the power he would destroy the Satanic (unrighteous) rule of Britain in India.

Gandhi's method of warfare is peculiarly strong because he supplies his soldiers with a philosophy which makes him and them prepared for all forms of sufferings for a righteous cause. They face the consequences with conscious determination to uphold the truth and the cause of righteousness. Gandhi has proclaimed Non-co-operation against the Government and is asking the people to

¹ *The Gospel of Buddha* by Paul Carus, pp. 125-129.

build up their own government without fearing any consequence or adopting any violence. But Gandhi is not afraid of a war if that is to come. He does not advocate bloodshed but he sees that there may be blood shed to uphold the cause of righteousness, so he proclaimed the other day:

"The time is coming soon when I may have to order you to disobey all state-made laws even if it means pools of blood."

He knows that there will be need of sacrifice for the cause of liberty, and he will make the sacrifice; but he sees as did the great Gautama Buddha. "He must be blamed who is the cause or war," when he says:

"The responsibility for anarchy, if it does overtake, will rest with the Indian government and those who support it, in spite of its wrongs, not upon those who refuse to perform the impossible task of making people forget vital wrongs and try to direct their anger into a proper channel. . . . We are not going to tamper with the masses. They are indeed our sheet anchor. We shall continue patiently to educate them politically, till they are ready for safe action. There need be no mistake about our goal. As soon as we feel reasonably sure of non-violence continuing among them in spite of provoking executions, we shall certainly call upon the Sepoy (Indian soldier) to lay down his arms and the peasantry to suspend payment of taxes. We are hoping that the time may never have to come. We shall leave no stone unturned to avert such a serious task. But we shall not flinch when the moment comes and the need arises".

Followers of Gandhi are performing their tasks with religious scrupulousness. They are engaged not only in boycotting English goods, English courts, and the Government in general, but also in the task of National purification, by boycotting the liquor and drugs of India. Here again Mahatma Gandhi is acting like Buddha, who enjoined his disciples not to use any drinks nor drugs. He is also following in the footsteps of Gautama Buddha when he urges the Indian nation to purge itself of the curse of untouchability among castes and pleads for the oppressed, the disinherited, and the poor of all lands.

THE SPIRIT OF THE FOLLOWERS OF MAHATMA GANDHI.

Mahatma Gandhi advises his followers to boldly oppose the present Satanic government of Britain in India, but not to use force. The followers of Mahatma Gandhi are commonly known in

India as Non-co-operators. They must not co-operate with the Government. They must not even defend themselves before a British court of justice. The British Government has begun to arrest the prominent followers of Mahatma Gandhi on the charge of spreading disaffection against the established Government. On the 25th of July, District Magistrate K. N. Knox of Allahabad issued a notice under Section 112, Criminal Procedure Code of India, against Srijut Ranga Iyer, the editor and publisher of the Independent, to appear before the Court of the District Magistrate and show reasons why he should not be required to enter into a bond for Rs 10,000, and also give security by the bond of two sureties in the sum of ten thousand rupees each for his good behavior for the term of one year. The editor was charged with spreading disaffection against the British Government in India.

Instead of defending himself, Mr. Iyer made the following statement:

"I plead guilty to the charge of spreading disaffection. I have no affection for the present system of government. That, however, does not mean that I have got any ill-will against the Europeans, or Indians who happen to be in the Government. I consider it a sacred duty to change the present system of administration. I want the present system of administration to be removed root and branch, and a system created responsible to the people of India; but this object I have always maintained should be achieved by non-violent efforts. My religious teachers teach Ahimaga (not harming anybody). The National Congress of which I am a member has stipulated that we should be non-violent in method. I have to be true to my religion, to my conscience, and to the Congress. I have only to add that I am ready to deliver my body to the present Government and by so doing to contribute my little share to prevent their great endeavor to crush the Nation's soul".

On July 26th Swami Krishananda, a prominent non-co-operator and a leader of the liquor shop picketing movement, was arrested and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The accused made no defence and said that he was a non-co-operator.

Because of the persecution of innocent patriots, Indian police officers are resigning from the British Government service. When Mr. Maulana Sherwani, a Mohammedan non-co-operator was sentenced to imprisonment, Mr. Syed Mohammed Riza, Sub-inspector Criminal Investigation, Department of the British Indian Police, resigned his office with the following declaration:

“Maulana Sherwani’s arrest and the charge brought against him and his conviction on the evidence produced against him, have convinced even a sinner like myself that no justice can be expected from the British court and that the whole bureaucracy is working against Islam and India. My conscience compels me now to give up the Government service in order that I may serve my country and my religion. . . . I hope that you will accept my resignation as Police Sub-inspector as soon as you can and allow me to serve my God and my country.”

THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS.

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

WHILE wrestling some time ago with a more or less philosophical problem I found it necessary, and at the same time a pleasure, to make frequent reference to Kant, Spinoza, Maudsley, Spencer, Fouilleé, Mills, and to that sublime pessimist, Schopenhauer. The last made most appropriate reading for that particular time, the one hundred and thirty-second anniversary of his birth, and exactly seventy years since he said: ". . . . when I note the profound impression my philosophy has made upon even the laymen of today I hardly dare to think of the role it will play in 1900. . . ."

Now 1900 has come and gone and twenty-one more years and we are, perhaps, as profoundly impressed with the various systems of philosophy as their authors could well have desired or hoped for, yet all things appear to us much as they did to the men of 1800, to those of 100, and those of 10,000 before our era, in different aspects, under varying colorings, sometimes brilliant and pleasing, and oft'times dull and gloom-inspiring, depending upon the age, the hour, whether a healthy activity forces one out into Nature, or that we allow ourselves to lapse into sombre introspection, within ourselves. The universe changes not, we are the changeful element.

Reading these masters, one feels, with Beaussire, that it is difficult indeed to establish anything like a direct connection between any system of philosophy and the actual state of our ideas of today. Skepticism regarding all such systems and even all questions of principle has become general. They are superannuated, and we fight shy of all that lies beyond positive, actual, palpable fact. They are considered dangerous and some of us believe actually compromising to that confidence that is or ought to be the principal directing force in our notions of morality. They are set aside in

the name of positive science and in the interest of moral order itself.

Even the idealists, those sensitive souls whose very idealism is but a sort of sauce or savory that they dare not subject to a too analytical examination, look not with favor upon those systems, those questions. Renan, himself, an idealist among idealists, refined and delicate of touch, claimed that the origin of virtue was in each one of us, not a system, and that "of the twenty or more philosophical theories upon the 'foundation of duty' not one of them could stand the light of even a most superficial examination. The transcendental significance of a virtuous act is, and justly, that in doing it we do not exactly know why we do it. A hero, if he begins to reflect upon his heroic actions, soon feels that he has acted unreasoningly, perhaps idiotically, and it is exactly for that reason that he is a hero. He obeys an order from the highest authority, an infallible oracle, a voice that orders most clearly within each one of us, and that never prefaces its orders with reasons and explanations. . . ."

This joining of a skepticism, so satisfied with itself, to sentiments so near akin to mysticism is perhaps refreshing to one accustomed to the grosser "positivism" of our day that seems to dominate all things. But it is only a momentary pleasure, for we have to face such general peculiarities, not to say degeneracy, of conduct, of mind, and of heart among men that the mirage of an "infallible oracle" soon vanishes in their mist, and the important questions of principles and of morals cannot be set aside as easily as the skeptical positivist and the skeptical idealist would have us believe.

Vices and errors are of all times, but when there were firm beliefs they were universally known without being universally common. Consciences were troubled though the flesh was weak; the best established maxims were susceptible of captious interpretations; but, at least, there were common rules of conduct, a moral code that was a law to all; there was basic certainty.

Today all this is changed.

Religious faith has lost control over many, and its control over others is of most doubtful tenure, no philosophical beliefs have replaced it, no civil or lay authority receives the respect that faith used to call its own, there is a preponderance of democratic governments—dependent upon all men, they no longer create opinions, but are subject to them. All is in doubt, not only these principles and systems of philosophy but even those individual inspirations of

conscience to which some would have us subject all questions of ethics, of morals.

But in all this the progress of skepticism is far from producing absolute indifference, never have those questions of ethics and of morals been debated so hotly and excited such general and keen interest. They are the absorbing ones in public debate, political caucus, the drama, our literature, and private conversation. If it be a matter of international comity or of rights, yes, or peace or of war, nations weigh other considerations in the scale than mere interests; they at least prate of justice, the most elevated notions of generosity, protection of the weakly, etc.; or, if it be party-strife, there each reproaches the other with all that can be found against it that is immoral or unjust, and it has effect with the people who, however used they may be to corruption, or however unwilling to change the order of things political, still desire the ideal; or in private life, that most of our acts are in harmony, whatever our beliefs or our doubts, with hereditary traditions that are strong in us.

Our crimes, our lesser sins are, as in times gone by, as attributable to momentary passion, thoughtlessness, as they are to a spirit of skeptical "Don't care", and they are more numerous than in those times when men had far better defined codes.

Still, is it not astonishing to listen to the discussion anent these crimes or lesser sins, the paradoxical justifications advanced for their commission, their defence in the name of "advanced thought", that, in nine cases out of ten, is undertaken by men who would shudder at the thought of being guilty of them?

That same spirit obtains apologists, the able ones, for commercial crimes, extortion and fraud, in the name of "business methods", and impels us to laugh at what we term excesses of probity, scruples—a conscience, public or private!

Then, again, in all such casuistic discussions, why is it that we, in spite of our new definitions and upsetting of old maxims, are invariably carried on by some irresistible current to those old principles that the positivist and the critic would have us believe are condemned to an eternal oblivion? Is it merely an hereditary taint not yet outgrown?

Modern skepticism, forsooth; absolute indifference! Why, these is hardly an assembly, a meeting of a few friends, a banquet, the most frivolous "five o'clock tea", at which, at some time or another, you will not hear the weightiest questions of ethics, of

morals discussed, perhaps flippantly but discussed nevertheless, aye, even as abstruse questions as that of the existence of God.

These old principles that crop out with such assiduity, contradicted, or approved, show us how indelibly they are imprinted upon the consciences of some persons, and at the same time how little influence they have upon their acts, and it is surprising indeed to note how unconsciously we of today ignore the old necessity of having one's conduct harmonize somewhat with one's principles—even modern principles. We are proud of our good thoughts, our elevating ideals, our principles on paper, and do not blush to live by a diametrically different code or the absence of all codes. We naively and sincerely wish to be troubled neither in our beliefs nor in our pleasures. In real life, as in the play or in our reading, we despise the traitor and applaud the hero; not merely for art's sake, but because we are in accord with and feel attracted to the good.

But what shall we deduce from all these strange contrasts in contemporaneous conscience? We certainly cannot depend upon any professed principles to reach any conclusion. Yet we must not imagine that those self-same principles count as nought. If many set aside, disdainfully, sometimes with asperity, the traditional basic ethics and religious dogmas there are also many who preserve them most sacredly, even though their acts do not always bear witness to their beliefs. Then there are those "of the great majority" who are neither completely absorbed into skepticism nor yet entirely ruled by principles. These principles, therefore, continue, between the believers, the skeptics and the middle-of-the-road philosophers, to be the principal points of contention and at the same time agreement. We may say they form a most unstable foundation, but it will take much digging and blasting yet to prove it such to those who have resolutely built thereupon, or who fear to extend their structures of thought much beyond its lines.

Some have sought to establish another code, outside of previous ones, more substantial, upon a better foundation of facts, that all men can be in accord upon—common ground. Facts, human nature studied as is a positive, an applied and known science, by psychology, by physiology, by anthropology, and by history. These cannot be principles in the metaphysical sense, but rather, as Spencer calls them, "the data of ethics". Two insurmountable obstacles confront them all, however: First, there is no common accord in what is understood by "human nature". According to spiritualistic, ideal psychologists, morals, consciences are inherent in the nature of man;

it is what distinguishes him from the lower animals. The difference, again, is but of degree, "a chimerical distinction" claim the materialists, the positivists. There is a difference between man and the lower animal, say they, but the difference in degree in animal evolution, as between the highest development and the lowest faculties of the mind, or "soul", and only in the successive periods of the double evolution working through all creation since all time and in each individual during the brief period of his life. And these differences will always exist so long as there are psychologists to contend as to "free-agency" against the distinction as between reason and the instincts, the soul and the body of man and of the animal.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that that difficulty should be disposed of; are we very far advanced in the solution of the question of morals?

It is not merely a case of what *is* man and what are the laws of his nature, but it is far more what he *should do* in deference to a law of individual character that is not always obeyed necessarily, but that commands in no uncertain terms nevertheless. There is no common accord upon the moral qualifications of an act. One condemns it, the other condones, if he does not approve it. But Nature, in its general laws, is the same with the one as with the other; one acts one way, while the other without any violent metamorphosis does the contrary and each is assured that he is right. Would you suggest personal interests merged into the greater good? And do you make any distinction between pleasures, for instance, and claim, with John Stuart Mill, that there are degrees, that a hog cannot be as happy as a refined, intelligent, sensitive human being? You cannot distinguish between pleasures any more than you can between moral acts except in the former case by their degree of intensity, and in the latter by the way they impress your moral sense.

Whatever may be the destiny of naturalistic ethics, it is certain that a great majority of us continue their claims, and will continue to make them for a long time to come; that these questions are of a higher order than mere material interests; that this solution is unnecessary, they are established; we can but obey the laws and live up to the code laid down by the Fathers, believe in the existence of a God and the immortality of the soul, and all is well!

And it is most legitimate that all the efforts of the churches should be to prop our conscience, our moral sense, as it were, against their dogmas, their creeds.

You may say these are but fragile supports, and that their weak-

ness is most manifest in these times when luke-warmness is so common, even amongst the "true believers", the faithful, and that it is a confounding of universal moral rectitude with the individual interests of each church, that it authorizes that monstrous conclusion that there is no bond or tie betwixt the believer and the heretic and that all those separated from the church are as exempt from all moral as they are from ecclesiastical control.

It is right here that the so-called liberal churches have done much good, by throwing a mantle of more ample fold around those who fretted in the rather close-fitting garments of orthodoxy, and at the same time exerting a liberalizing influence even upon those older churches, resulting in the establishing of closer bonds between all men and a more common code of public morals—a step in the direction of the "brotherhood of man".

But even the old theology may answer that it is in matters of faith that men differ the least; that all the unbelievers together agree upon exceedingly few doubts; that it penetrates regions and souls, for their good, where positivists and materialists never dream of going, and that today, in these very irreligious times, conversions to its dogmas are frequent, oft'times among the most enlightened, the greatest thinkers, and that in times when its downfall seemed most assured while nations awoke to great and unexpected religious revivals.

A strange world, indeed!

Theological ethics do not necessarily exclude natural, rational, philosophical ones, Faith in all great religious bodies goes hand in hand with Conscience—sometimes with Reason.

There is danger here, not in theology, however, but in its application; the tendency—and a natural enough one—of those in authority is to be more solicitous for the interests of the Faith than those of mere morality; they are ever ready to excuse lapses for fear of scaring away souls by a too exacting application of the code. Yet we are prone to exaggerate the scandalous contrasts these conditions do create, and to wrongly attribute them to hypocrisy rather than to what may be in part, at least, good policy.

The search after and discussion of moral principles belongs as legitimately to all churches as to all philosophies and schools; but a code of morals purely theological hardly seems sufficient or desirable for either church or society. New elements of morality must develop with the progress of ideas. We had to open our minds to tolerance before tolerance became a factor in our customs.

Progressive ethics are necessarily mobile, and their authority, always open to discussion, is as necessarily unstable as their evolution is progressive. A weakness, if you wish, yet, paradoxical as it may seem, a very element of strength. Was it not Kant who, while he recognized in the existence of a God and of a future life two conditions necessary to morality, was yet well pleased that neither proposition could withstand a too searching analysis? He wanted his God and his Eternity to be wonderful, awful, and thought it dangerous to dispel any of the mysticism and clouds that surrounded both.

One of the greatest dangers to morals is to wrap their ethics about with too binding formulas, accepted in all confidence, as oracles of divine wisdom. The most exact formulas fail to cover specific cases. Acts become legal without being moral. A moral act must conform to the spirit as well as to the mere letter of a formula and one can enter into the real spirit of a thing only by going back to its very principle, its source.

Morality can but begin when we have risen above the merely literal observance of its decrees. Nothing can so clearly show the insufficiency of formulas as the philosophical doubts and the serious discussions of which they are the subjects.

No precept or principle is vast enough to take in or to regulate all our actions. Consciences require personal acts, initiative and independent, to test these principles.

It is by such efforts that nobly liberal spirits have in all times created the reactions against abuses and false maxims generally admitted and sustained by all about them, even by their own doctrines and tendencies.

Philosophical doubts should extend even into one's self. Thought and Analysis should be the jury before which we try our "reasonable doubts", our "impulses of the heart", as well as the accepted maxims, creeds, formulas and all else about us.

But, then, philosophical thought and the weighing of ethics, of morals, of maxims, are confined to so few that it becomes a very duty, and today particularly, for all who do think to call attention to the meritorious in philosophical systems, to the evolution of ethics. The thinking man may hope, and that without any unappreciation of the limitations of thought, to ever enlarge its sphere, its scope, by its very force to carry further and further the subordination of Nature even to their ideals, moral and social, and, in consequence thereof, to carry onward the evolution, the progress we should all

strive for from the lower to the higher. With Fouilleé we may exclaim, when we see Science confronted with the enigma of the origin of the world, "Ignorabimus!" but when Morals confront the enigma of the destiny of the world we may with equal justice exclaim "Sperabimus!"

NATURE UNMASKED.

BY ALEXANDER MOZKOVSKI.

A SCIENTIST sets to work with some special purpose in view and prepares an infusion of certain vegetable fibres. After a few days a very lively little community of infusoria begins to develop in this fluid. It is visible only under powerful magnification. In general these infusoria appear to be content with their condition. Only one particularly clever animalcula ventures upon criticism and communicates this to his kind. This drop of water was altogether too constricted, the conditions of subsistence were far from favorable, yes, the very construction of their own bodies with their bits of tissue, hairs and feelers must be regarded as a clumsy makeshift affair. And thus, applying his deductions to the subject of his origin, the microscopic critic comes to the conclusion that certain gross errors had been made, and that he himself would have arranged all this far better.

This procedure must be consigned to the realm of the impossible. Even the most brilliant of infusorial animals cannot realize the scientist in thought, the human creator who prepared the solution, nor the intentions by which he was governed, nor the factors of development with which he reckoned. The thinking and criticizing infusorium is an incongruity. But what if it were *not* an incongruity? What if it were merely a tiny simulacrum of the scientist himself, he who smiles at the phantasy I have conjured up, and who, a little later pursues the same line of thought in his lecture?

For our scientist goes to his lecture-room and sets to work to discuss the intentions of Nature. He compares these with his own and discovers errors in the plan of creation, especially in the structure of organisms. He proves where they have missed the proper connection or made a *faux pas* and how this or that might have been done more logically or efficiently or expediently. When he speaks of Nature or, in rhetorical moments of Mother Nature, an ironic

undertone is likely to creep into his discourse. For Nature, the maternal and the almighty, has set up her rules for all conceivable happenings, natural laws, as they are called which, once we subject them to the probe of the human reason, are disposed to reveal certain moral weaknesses on her part. But our scientist goes still further; he ventures to speak even of the *vices* of Nature! And coldly and clearly and with an astonishing intellectual acumen he proves that these exist.

He may cite eminent authorities in support of his attitude, that is if we may accept the reported words of the Great Ones who did not wholly agree with Nature, and had many a sharp difference with her. This group of Irreconcilables is led by one of the mightiest of them all, perhaps by the greatest master in the co-ordination of natural, scientific and philosophic knowledge: Herman Helmholtz. We need not for the present consider whether he really meant all this in the anthropomorphic, human—all-too-human way in which he gave it utterance. But he gave this dictum voice and his word must be given the value of an historical verdict.

He first proceeded against Nature as the manufacturer of the human eye. Helmholtz did not deny that this organ possessed certain very admirable qualities, but most emphatically he condemned the fact that there was no proper central registration in the relation of the cornea to the hyaline lens. And then he uttered his famous saying that were a mechanician to bring him an instrument so full of flaws and unnecessary difficulties, he would show him the door. A snub direct for Mother Nature and a strong snub.

It is therefore clear that Nature has either not studied optics sufficiently or that she has not quite understood what she did study. Or else she went to work with unskillful hands, or committed sins even greater than these. For let it not be forgotten that Nature, the Master Mechanician, created the entire mechanism of the Universe as a kind of preliminary condition of her work, and that this cosmic mechanism is based upon a law which Galileo discovered in 1638, the Law of Inertia. How clever, how cunning of Nature! She decrees that a vice shall be the general *Leitmotiv* and takes advantage of this vice whenever the responsibility for her own creations comes into play. This law—as someone has already disclosed—is nothing more than a subterfuge, an excuse for every bit of scamped work in the workshop of the Universe. Nature suffers from Inertia, she is lazy, she shuns work, she does not take sufficient pains to execute her orders properly.

The alleged botching of the human eye is merely a particularly crass example of these methods of hers. But there are also other organs which give us occasion for disconsolate discoveries. First of all: Nature never tests the things she has made; she does not repair the things that require repair, she neglects to make the damage good. It was because of this behavior of hers that the famous Metchnikoff of the Pasteur Institute, the co-creator of the theory of organic immunity, gave her such a raking over the coals.

In taking over old house furnishings, we are apt to find among the useful things many that are useless and even pernicious, for example, we use electric light and inherit a pair of candle-snuffers. Man has inherited organs which resemble such utensils. The vermiform appendix is the snuffers of the human house. Nature cannot be brought to concede that she is merely imposing a sinister burden upon us with this thing. She persists in fabricating again and again out of sheer, outlived routine, this wholly purposeless and disturbing organ which we would do well, whenever this be possible, to cut and cast behind us. And the same thing is true of the large intestine. This not only serves no purpose, but nourishing, as it does, some 120 billions of bacteria every day, it becomes a protector of microbes and the herd of infection of numbers of devilish diseases.

Metchnikoff considered that the stomach was also the result of a bit of botch-work, at least in so far as stale routine and inertia continued to afflict it. "Nature will not see"—declared the great savant, and then left it to his hearers as to whether they chose to charge Nature with folly or with malice, or with both. The professor acted the part of the Attorney-General and accepted the ancient evasion based upon the Law of Inertia merely as an extenuating circumstance. It was surely incumbent upon Nature to see something which a child of hers, such as Metchnikoff, saw so clearly.

There is no doubt that at the beginning of things Nature had the choice of different methods of work. According to Leibniz, supported by Browning's Pippa and the American New Thoughters, the result has been the best of all possible worlds—varied, to be sure, by Schopenhauer's dictum that it was nevertheless still worse than none at all. Our great contemporary scientist seizes upon special organs and declares: This vermiform appendix or this large intestine is the worst of all possible intestines.

Having reached this point, we are suddenly face to face with a most momentous counter-claim. It grows out of our consciousness

of our *missing* organs. Consider! Nature has placed us in the midst of the things she has created and bade us comprehend them, yet did not even equip us with the most necessary means and organs for this purpose? The eternal surges and vibrations of the electromagnetic world surround us on every side, and yet we are able to conjecture or compute them only by way of the most arduous and indirect calculations, bring them to the consciousness of our imperfect senses only by means of unrecognizable disguises, and never, never in their elemental form. Our eye, subject to all the ordinances of optics, is a blind instrument in comparison with the electric eye—the eye which Nature denied us. Our ear is deaf, our sense of touch dull as a clod in this electric infinity. And it is in such a universe that we are to find our way, like a wanderer lost in the ranges of the Himalayas with nothing but a guide-book to the Catskills! What purposeless close-fistedness! Animals of the lower orders, such as the electric eel, or the sheath-fish of the Nile, even inanimate iron has been given this sense of orientation. But Man, *Man* must go the whole distance from the ancient sages of Egypt to Volta, Guericke, Edison, Roentgen and Rutherford in order to find a poor and broken staff which will help him to totter and blunder onward for a foot or two.

Thus niggardliness must also be inscribed upon the record of Nature's sins, and set in juxtaposition with her senseless extravagance—in germs and seeds, in space, in unutilized forces. The two together give us a zig-zag curve of mad inconsequentiality, wreaking havoc upon every law of logic, a dizzy and staggering senselessness which is, of course, apparent even in her primal and original laws. She invented the shortest line, alleging it to be a rule for the carrying out of the greatest tasks with the expenditure of the least energy, and great was the praise showered upon her for this by Fermat, Maupertius, Euler and others. And then on the other hand, she invented the longest line, the principle of the great round-about, whenever it came to the breeding of a species, or an organism. If, according to the Theory of Selection, only the fittest creature survives, and if no single path of development is thereby brought to a close, then this surely proves that up to the present no single type or specimen has really fitted properly into the world, and that Nature has so far bungled everything she has attempted.

Whether it be a species or an individual of a species, whether it be an organ or an organism—no matter—Nature manhandles and meddles with them with the same stinginess, the same extravagance,

cruelty, sloth and precipitation. She is eternally proving by one principle that the other hasn't a leg to stand on. It took her millions of years to develop her show-piece, the eye, out of a patch of pigment—a botch job which would have brought Helmholtz's mechanician into serious difficulties with his employer.

This black list of sins and delinquencies and their proofs might be extended over hundreds of pages. But let him who would perforce make a book of them, remember this—as I have not failed to remember it—to connect the last chapter with the introduction—to let the last word be spoken by the infusorial animalcula which criticizes the infusorial fluid. For we shall never be able to get beyond the closure of the circle. If the works are poor and imperfect, so are the instruments of reason and apperception with which we have been equipped, and the former appear to us as we see them merely because we see them with an untrustworthy instrument.

When a scientist strives to find perfection or flaws in what must remain the Inconceivable, he is as a man who is attempting to jump over his own shadow. He cannot leap over anything save his own imperfection. Never before and never after has any one of the supreme spirits of which we can boast expressed this so briefly and so strikingly as Goethe in his world-embracing line: "Man can never conceive how anthropomorphous he is!"

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT CHINA.¹

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

Ts'ang Chieh, now revered as a Tzu Shen or god of letters, was a minister of instruction under the Yellow Emperor (2700 B. C.), and is credited with having been the inventor of the Chinese written characters whence he may also be credited with initiating one of the world's most profound and prolific enterprises—the literature which contains the record of Religion and Philosophy in China. It was during an age which, by immediately preceding the Wu Ti Shih² or period of the five emperors, about 2850-2205 B. C., held the distinction of bringing into the world some of Heaven's most cherished secrets, among them being righteous government, intelligible language, the use of fire, cookery, clothing and music. It was also an age which served the lofty purpose of preparing the empire for a greater and nobler civilization yet to come. For as we are told, the rulers even of that remote time not only taught the people courtesy and true amiability, but further, they were personal exemplars whose lives promoted benevolence and encouraged an actual regard for all humanity. If for no other reason, it could yet be said that this very principle of goodness, which

¹ This whole article is really no more than a "general survey" of such a fertile and profound subject as Chinese Religion and Philosophy. I will therefore ask my readers to consider that it is not my purpose to fully explain any particular situation or doctrine on which I may touch in the course of this writing. I will feel that they value it properly only when it arouses them to seek further into the traditions of a nation whose civilization far antedates ours, but yet seeking with the aim to understand the native viewpoint of a people whose aspirations and intellectual achievements have survived for fifty centuries.

² This is a semi-legendary period whose dates were worked back from subsequent times. While we find that the reigns of the Yellow Emperor's son and grandson, and of Yao's father are usually absorbed into the reigns of the former and latter respectively, the period is divided as follows: Fu Hsi (c. 2850-2738), Shen Neng (c. 2738-2697), Huang Ti or Yellow Emperor (c. 2697-2435), Yao (c. 2435-2255), and Shun (c. 2255-2205 B. C.).

was their constant instruction, entitles them to all the ancestral worship they have had throughout the thirty dynasties of Chinese History; it makes them as worthy of the sacrificial offerings as it makes their worshippers worthy of the blessings they enjoy.

The course of civilization, like everything else, follows a natural series of causal events. In the particular case of early Chinese civilization it followed a series which may be illustrated by their conception of filial piety. According to this conception there was a series of three stages or degrees making up complete filiality: the first and superior degree was that of the T'ien Ching or standard of Heaven consisting of filiality to God; the second and medium or constant degree was that of the T'u I or norm of the Earth which is filial to Heaven alone; while the third and inferior degree was that of the Jen Hsing³ or Duty of Man whose conduct should be filial alike to his fellow man, Earth, Heaven and God. Herein we see a melioristic conception; it was an upward attitude nobly aspiring each toward the next higher degree which marked their notion of the Cosmos and Man's relationships therein.

Altogether a race of great prudence and tranquil thought, the Chinese saints and sages of antiquity offered up their intellectual treasures in the simple faith that they were conceived in moral truth and could not but be sought by the courageous and received by the humble. They seemed to know that the aspiring and inquisitive spirit of man can always give hospitable ear to any tongue which speaks nobly and intelligibly. It was accordingly their own peculiar merit to have laid the lasting foundation for a national heritage of literary skill, ethical latitude, religious exaltation and philosophical depth which has seldom been surpassed for semi-universality and length of duration, especially when we acknowledge the difficulties of language under which the ancient sages must surely have labored. Thus we can doubly appreciate the meritorious endeavors of those remote times when the Yellow Emperor composed his Canon of Inner Life;⁴ when the Great Yü gave his moral injunctions to the

³ These are often called San-hsiao shang t'ien-ching chung t'u-i hsia jen-hsing, literally meaning "Triune filiality: first, Heaven standard; second, Earth norm; third, Man's conduct."

⁴ This work, as published in 1893 at Shanghai, is in three volumes containing 81 Discourses, some of them treating of the heavenly endowments of remote antiquity (1), life, spirit, reason and heaven (God) 3, the Yin and Yang elements (5-7), the five treasures (virtues) make life complete (10), perverse laws disregard harmony (12), blood and spirit, body and purpose (24), general discussion of purity and truth (28), taming the shrew (34), arguments explained (49), errors examined (63), 5 cardinal virtues (70).

people;⁵ when Wen Wang and Duke Chou developed their mathematical analysis of Nature;⁶ when the Viscount of Chi composed his "Great Pattern"⁷ for rulers and thinkers to adopt; and when Lao Tzu and Confucius were setting forth the fundamental principles of reality and conduct.⁸

It is the usual thing in practical research for philosophical sinologists to draw a line between those thinkers who are popularly looked up to as moralists and those who for the most part are cherished for having patronized and developed the Yih hypothesis; between those who have made efforts to popularize the notion of Man's divine heritage and relationship, and those who have sought to criticize and purify this notion in an inquiry into its actual rationale and possible sublimation. To a sensible degree this is the proper thing to do; but it is not the primary thing to do. We should first distinguish between those who take Reality, both human and divine, to be independent of what we think about it, and those who try either morally or scientifically to make Reality subject to "the vanity of human wishes". Illustrative of this distinction mention might be made of Yü, Chi, Lao Tzu, and Yang Chu as representing the former while Wen Wang, Confucius, Mencius and Chou Tun-I are found implicitly holding to the latter.

On the one hand, and apart from the empirical application, the argument is that all things have a root and branch, that is they have an essential causal nature as well as an actual manifest structure, and that the proper inquiry into the nature of things has nothing to do with the secondary inquiry into their structure, relationships, or manifestive effects. Wisdom and tranquillity then may be obtained not by means of the latter, but by means of the former. On the other hand the argument is that any such inquiry as the former is a vain and idle pursuit, that such a goal is unknowable and unattainable except to the degree that we can reach practical certitude by means of observational methods and ceremonial practices. Together with a sufficient faith in their adequacy we can be happy.

⁵ These injunctions have been lost, but mention of them is made on a stone tablet set up in Yü's honor on Mt. Lou, E. Hunan.

⁶ These two men gave great impetus and elaboration to the method of calculating natural phenomena with abstract symbols called Kwa.

⁷ The Hung Fan seems to be also an esoteric document which embraces the substance of Yü's advice on government as well as what were then the latest developments of the Yih calculus.

⁸ The favorite terms for these principles were, for Lao Tzu, Tao and Teh, but for Confucius they were T'ien and Li.

and knowing how to hold ourselves within the bounds of the empirical constitutes true wisdom.⁹

Thus there may be found a division of the ancient thinkers of China into two sorts of viewpoint and method, the mystic philosophers and the scientific religionists. Thus also we have reasonable grounds for judging their intelligence, their faith-energy and their moral fibre; and will not, like many native scholars, require to make a list of those who were or were not orthodox. In this way for instance there would be no need for questions of this or that sort of orthodoxy so long as we find that the Yellow Emperor really canonized the Inner Life, that Duke Chou's occult calculus was the true touchstone of the Cosmos, that Lao Tzu really sought for reason and virtue, that Mencius really lived to further introduce and secure the Confucian teachings in the hearts of the people, that Mo Ti had a real altruism in his daily practice, or that Yang Hsiung actually taught self-cultivation and by his own example showed people how to dwell in the hermit's hut contented with the ecstasy of righteousness and meditation.

These and many other similar points stand eloquently advising how Western Philosophy may qualifiedly look to the Chinese for some very keen discernments of the "goodness of Reality and the beauty of Truth";¹⁰ some notes of criticism not far below those of Kant or Maimon; and not a few remarks quite as keen as those of Croce or Bertrand Russell on our own smug notions of what is at the bottom of real wisdom, just and honorable conduct. The Chinese have produced a vast fund of documentary evidence showing many anticipations of western culture, and it is a known fact that they long antedated our discovery of paper, printing, indelible ink, the compass, thread-twisting and silk-weaving machinery. All they lacked, it might further be said, was the genius for perfecting and simplifying their inventions; but this they have left for western brains and capital to do. However, in the matter of ethical and governmental advice, mystic speculation, religious fealty, and even in a fairly thorough lexicography their literature abounds. All these subjects usually find a conjoint harmony in the Chinese

⁹ One of the constant refrains which is figuratively followed throughout the *Shih Ching* or *Book of Odes*. The first half of the Chou period, i. e., from 1122 to 600 B. C., was the golden age of Chinese poetry, being now often called *Shih Shih* or period of Odes. A large part of the philosophers' war on man-made theism, after Confucius' time, was in opposition to the anthropomorphic Odes.

¹⁰ One of Hsün Tzu's phrases. Cp. my article, *Open Court*, June, '21.

philosopher's way of conceiving the world, and we can only assume that it is because of their ingrained conservatism if anything new is considered heterodox to their racial traditions. This conservatism, as regards philosophical matters, was given a sturdy foundation by Confucius and was further driven into the popular oriental mind by the Mencean commentaries on the Confucian Canon. It served then the direct opposite to what such thinkers as Wen Wang, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, Yang Chu, Hsün K'uang, Yang Hsiung and Wang Ch'ung were trying to establish: namely, that the world is of a structure and nature apart from human measures and analogies; that it is alive with growth, intelligence, power and spiritual possibilities not limited to or by any stretch of the human imagination. The latter viewpoint, therefore, would appear to us of the Twentieth Century to be the real orthodoxy because it was not of an absolutist or anthropomorphic outlook, and hence was able to let the Universe be itself, free and unlimited, secure from human meddling and independent of what is too often a dictatorial and rationalizing intellect.

Surely it was this purer manner of philosophizing which enabled Lao Tzu to propound his strange paradoxes of thought and conduct; Chuang Tzu to argue that possibly he was a butterfly dreaming he was a man; Yang Chu to believe in the ethical validity of true egoism and separateness; Hsün K'uang to show why it is that although God has made the universe beautiful and benevolent, He made man more often ugly and selfish; Yang Hsiung to say that even though both ruin and self-preservation are more primordial than prosperity, yet we can follow out the path of life rejoicing in heavenly guidance and living under the glory of divine protection. Wang Ch'ung, we may well suppose, also had this sense of the independence and plurality of things, else he would hardly have made his philosophy consist of theories of such a miscellaneous domain as he measures in his *Critical Essays*.¹¹ And as we might further note, who could say that Ma Jung¹² of Mou Ling was not orthodox merely because he departed from the ancestral conservatism enough to invent the use of commentary notes arranged with smaller type in double columns; or that the Twelfth Century poet Kao Ssu Sun committed a religious crime when, through an historical knowledge

¹¹ Called in Chinese, *Lun Heng*, translated by Anton Forke, formerly professor of Chinese at the University of California. (2 vols., Berlin, 1911).

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¹² Lived about 79-166 A. D. and was also called T'ung Ju, or the Universal Scholar.

of Ma Jung's invention, he was able to prove the so-called book of Lieh Tzu a spurious document? K'ang Kao and K'ang Hou commented critically and often adversely on the Confucian Canon, but are they to be considered any less justified than Chu Fu Tzu, the Aristotle of them all? Chu, for various talents and services, enjoys a great native reputation as an astute scholar, and a foreign one too, to a degree, through his "Lesser Learning", a work originally intended for the young. But should we not add that his reputation as a philosopher suffered materially when, in 1745, Wang Pu Ch'ing published that monument of constructive analysis entitled "The Four Books, Chu Tzu, and the Original Commentaries".¹³ The spirit of the age apparently has much to do with whether or not a certain philosopher is a heretic, or his books burned and his teachings proscribed.

Thus at the present time it is the popular custom to look more leniently on the notions of such oldtime targets of rabid criticism as Han Wen Kung, Wang An Shih, and even of those old rivals of Mencius, Yang Chu and Mo Ti. It might hereby seem reasonable to say that even the worst of us will some day be vindicated, and that some benevolent philosopher of a future age will champion our cause with the amiable power of a new logic. Our knowledge of Epicurus and Schopenhauer wins from us a sympathy for Yang Chu. The conception Comte has given us regarding the Religion of Humanity settles our differences with Mo Ti. And the literary nationalism and socialistic democracy which are current topics of modern belief and discussion may be said to minimize the shock we might otherwise receive at being informed of the anti-Buddhist exhortations of Han Yu or the radical governmental irreverence of the Peaceful Rock Prince.

It is not always easy to trace the development of anything in China; and especially is this difficulty noticeable when we attempt a survey of the religious ideas and philosophical methods which have so effectively aroused the Chinese mind to achieve its long chronicle of devotion and speculation. However, we can mention a few of the leading conceptions and viewpoints, analyses and criticisms which have held the interest of educated Chinese for the last fifty centuries. Among these various points of interest, divided more or less uncertainly into speculative and ethical groups, and represented more or less in gradual chronological order as developed by

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四書朱子本義匯參

the numerous saints and sages, may be mentioned conceptions such as were represented by such terms as T'ien (Heaven, meaning both the divine realm and the astronomical universe), Tao (the undeviating Way and Principle of all existence), Ti (the Earth as immediate Mother of Life as we know it), Jen (Mankind), Shang-ti (the Lord Supreme over all these various realms), Yih, the mathematical calculus of universal evolution), Li (the rationalia of things), and Teh (Virtue or the power of individual character over circumstance).

There are two expressions of faith which have been held inviolable ever since the pre-Confucian days when the Yih philosophy was the mystic sesame of life and government was administered as a divine dispensation. These are the two venerable symbolic maxims of Chinese Masonry: one announcing cryptically that "In the Beginning there was the Way, the Compasses and the Square",¹⁴ and the other enumerating "Heaven, Earth, Ruler, Parents and Teachers as the five sorts of Reverence".¹⁵ There are three other mystic symbols known only by oral communication by the Upper Five composing the inner council of the Triad Society. They are known popularly as being represented at the esoteric Taoist festivals of the Three Great Primordial Powers, ¹⁶ the greater, middle, and lesser ceremonies being held for the last two thousand years on the 15th of the first, seventh, and tenth moons, respectively. Their first arrangement and practice took place in the Taoist monasteries grouped around the foot of Lo's Floating Mountain near Canton

元 始 有 道 有 規 有 矩 ¹⁴ Yüan shih yu Tao, yu Kuei, yu Chü. Tao is not only the Divine Reason, it is the *way of life*. Compasses are used to draw circles and spheres, hence Kuei is a symbol of Heaven; while the Square for lines and angular measurement is a symbol for Earth.

天 地 君 親 師 五 教 ¹⁵ T'ien Ti Chün Chin Shih, Wu Ching. These five are said to constitute the full religious duty of man.

上 中 下 三 元 ¹⁶ Shang Chung Hsia, San Yüan. The first is the Feast of Lanterns celebrating God, Heaven and paternal devotion; the second is the Feast of Departed Spirits celebrating Earth, Water, Fire, Motherhood and Culinary Arts; while the third is the Feast of Food and Drink, a sort of thanksgiving for abundant crops, man's work and secular affairs. With the Buddhists the second is a sort of All Souls' Day when hungry ghosts are fed; while with the Taoists it is also called Burning Clothes because all the old clothes of the deceased are gathered up and burned at a public fire lasting three days. In either case the miserable condition of the departed is supposed to be alleviated.

which were supposed to have been founded by Lao Tzu's successor Fou Chiu Kung, and the third century saint, An Chi Sheng.¹⁷

Chinese religious faith is a matter of very simple devotion but extremely complex and often confused as to the divinities which are recipients of that devotion. Their pantheon is as crowded with both male and female divinities as is their literature with legends¹⁸ of how they came by such divine nature. There are gods and goddesses of almost everything under the sun: gods of Nature, agriculture, literature, war, luck, retribution; and goddesses of mercy, house-keeping, beauty, and sericulture. Even St. George and the Dragon¹⁹ are claimed to have had their original combat on Chinese soil. But throughout all the vast forest of legend and superstition the saints and sages of Ancient China still managed to follow the blazed trail of rational thought, trusting with unfathomed devotion that the light of Shang-ti would now and then shine through, enlightening the path of human wisdom and virtue.

II:—FU HSI to LAO TZU. (2850-520 BC.)

The two milleniums covered by this period were almost totally given up to the pioneering efforts of civilization and political organization, and are now commonly represented by the nine wise men of antiquity, viz.: Fu Hsi, Yellow Emperor, Yao and Shun, the Great Yü, Wen Wang, Duke Chou, the Viscount of Chi, and Lao Tzu.²⁰ Early tradition claims that Fu Hsi was born to his mother by the miraculous inspiration of Heaven (Possibly a comet) after a twelve years' period of gestation. But letting this be as it may, he

¹⁷ Many legends and miracles center around this famous patriarch. One account in the *Chronicle of Exalted Scholars* (Kao Shih Ch'uan) says that he was an itinerant apothecary and magician who lived a thousand years and wandered along the shores of the Eastern Sea where he one day met the First Emperor to whom he explained the occult Tao and promised another meeting in the Isles of the Genii—a fabulous Utopia for which the mystics have been searching ever since.


¹⁸ Among the numerous collections of travels and legends bearing on mysteries, supernatural beings, apotheoses, etc., may be mentioned: Wu Shu's *Liao Chai Chi I* (tenth century), greatly enlarged and re-arranged by P'u Sung Ling (1710); Kuo Po's "Green Satchel Treatise" (276-324) on Taoism, alchemy, miracles; and the work referred to in the next note. See also note 59.

¹⁹ The first account in Chinese literature of this almost universal legend appears in the *Sou Shen Chi*—*Researches into the Nature of the Gods*, supposed to have been written by Kan Pao of the Chin dynasty, i. e., sometime between 265 and 419 A. D.

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九師伏美堯舜
聖文周箕老

subsequently became, as a successor to the primordial divine beings, the first ruler over the temporal empire, founder of the Chinese social polity, innovator of the peculiarly human custom of cooking food, and is also credited with the invention of various agricultural and musical instruments. To further encourage his efforts toward raising humanity up from savagery, legend has it that Heaven caused a supernatural being, the dragon-horse, to appear in the world, one day rising out of the waters of the Yellow River and on its back presenting to Fu a diagram of the eight Kwa.²¹ These Kwa were the eight possible groups in series of three of the Yang and Yin symbols,²² and were used by Fu to philosophize about the numerous aspects and changes of physical Nature. These dual symbols, originally called Liang I, meaning the two essential powers of Nature, (Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, Male and Female) and often pictured as a sigmatically divided circle of White and Black with a germ of evolution in each side, were later on made to include the supplementary power of Man, and were therefore called San I. The word Kwa is the literary designation of each of these groups, but in their diagrammatic combinations they are represented by full and broken lines, thus:



They are here given in their original order as produced by the dragon-horse in an octagonal design, and are said to indicate respectively: Strength, Pleasure, Brightness, Mobility, Penetration, Danger, Rest, and Docility. Thence according to the various combinations allowed by changing and regrouping the Yang and Yin elements of the Kwa, it was possible to account for the existence of all things, their nature, uses, and ultimate fate in the cosmic game. From this early start was soon derived the many methods of abstract calculation, which are now grouped together into the intricate science or system of cosmogonic permutation as developed in the

²¹ 八卦

²² Yang and Yin as symbols in diagrams are written as full and broken lines respectively. In trigrams three Yang and Yin elements are used in proportions of 3-0, 2-1, 1-2, or 0-3. In hexagrams six are used, squaring the possibilities of the trigram formations thence making 64 different combinations.

Yih King and the writings of its vague but industriously inventive commentators.²³

One of the foremost of these early commentators was Wen Wang, posthumously known as Hsi Pei, Chief of the West. Having been imprisoned in 1143 B. C. by the cruel Chou Hsin, last ruler of the Shang Dynasty, Wen Wang found great consolation in his mystic interpretation of Fu Hsi's magical Kwa, not resting content in holding to Fu's symmetrical diagrams, but gave them an irregular order so as to more faithfully represent the actual conditions of universal life and mobility of form. In this he was aided by the enthusiastic genius of Yu Hsiung and Duke Chou;²⁴ the result was that another permutation was added, producing 64 diagrams arranged as a larger octagon of two rows on each side. The inner row was called Chen, meaning pure, high-principled, and applied to divination; while the outer row was called Hui, meaning to repent, and applied to the calculation of effects. These abstruse diagrams are given an even more esoteric interpretation in the "Chou Tz'u or similar argument" of the 17th century mathematical poet Pan Lei, who appends metrical blank verse notes of different (but significant) lengths under each diagram.

A slightly younger contemporary of Wen Wang was the Viscount of Chi, one of the greatest of the Shang scholars. He was unfortunate in reproving Chou Hsin for his cruelty and debauchery and hence shared the same fate as Wen Wang; but when the latter's eldest son Wu overthrew the Shang Dynasty, Chi Tzu refused to serve under him and was offered a fief in what is now Korea. Before he departed, however, he composed for Wen and Wu's guidance a work called Hung Fan, a "great pattern" of governmental

²³ The octagonal design of the Kwa, both the eight and the sixty-four figure representations, follows the original Ho T'u or Map of the Yellow River which the dragon-horse presented to Fu Hsi. But the designs in square and circular formation follow the development given the Yih philosophy by Wen Wang and Duke Chou who first appended the explanatory notes in seven lines under each hexagram. While the first political applications of Yih symbology were made in Confucian days, it was not until the Sung period that any rational attempt was made to integrate the variable aspects of the Yih diagrams. The first of the Sung scholars to do anything approximating such an achievement was Ts'ai Yüan Ting (c. 1100-1126) who reduced both the Ho T'u and the Lo Shu to a sort of magic square like our old "15 problem of the digits". Others, even more abstruse but less mathematically simple, have been made by Ch'eng I (1033-1107) in a work entitled *Yih Ch'uan*, and Wang Chieh (1724-1805) whose lectures on the subject are called *Yih Shuo*. Cf. note 77.

²⁴ Duke Chou was Wen Wang's fourth son and lived about 1170-1116 B. C.

principles and practices in nine divisions, viz.: (1) on the five physical elements of Nature, (2) on conduct, (3) on the proper objects of government, (4) the division of time, (5) perfect kingship, (6) regal virtues, (7) on divination, (8) astrological verification of facts, and (9) happiness and misery. This rare production of ancient wisdom now constitutes an important part of the Shu King or Canon of Historical Records. Chi Tzu was a believer in speaking only to the point, one of his famous sayings was that "If there is much talk then an inferior sort of instruction is sure to follow".²⁵

Another famous statesman of the Chou Dynasty was Kuan Chung or Kuan I-Wu,²⁶ a minister under Duke Huan of the Ch'i state, whom he aided in crushing the savage tribes on the west and north frontiers. While the Duke was energetic but proud and sensual, Kuan was more sagacious and firm in his decision of policy. And although Confucius has criticized him for lack of propriety and as being small-minded, proud and covetous, we still find that he was popularly regarded as a wise and worthy minister. His fame as a philosopher rests upon a voluminous speculative work, supposed by many to be a forgery by some subsequent admirer, but which seems to be quite universally credited (at least in the principal subject matter) to his hand. This work, simply entitled "Kuan Tzu", was originally a compilation of 389 sections, but after the Burning of the Books only 86 remained, and since then ten more have been lost so that only 76 sections are now extant. The Shanghai edition of 1893, of which I have a copy, gives the titles and short explanatory notes on the ten missing sections. Some of the most important of the other sections deal with physical strength (2), balanced development (3), upright government administration (4), legal distinctions (29), exact expression (34), mystery of mind (36), the four seasons and the five elements (40-41), intelligent laws (46), developing one's person (6), trifling and serious affairs (80-86).

However, the only sage who has enjoyed the fame of being called the real philosophical light of China lived about five centuries after the foundation of the Yih calculus and two generations before the ethical establishment of Confucianism. Strange to say he does not appear to mention anything about the abstruse Nature-lore of Wen Wang's diagrams, nor does he emphasize ancestral worship,

²⁵ 老子則小教
從也

管子

²⁶ Lived about 700-645 B. C.

but is still looked up to as a most profound and devout thinker. This sage is popularly known as Lao Tzu²⁷ and was keeper of state records at Lo Yang, the capital of the Chou dynasty. Because he was not mentioned specifically by either Confucius or Mencius, and was for the first time only quasi-authoritatively referred to by his great admiring follower, Chuang Tzu, Prof. Giles, the learned English sinologist, has some doubts as to the actual historical existence of Lao Tzu and claims that he at least should not be taken as the individual author of the Tao Teh King, a work on which the whole structure of his fame rests. Nevertheless, we can reasonably agree with King Shu Liu, the native Taoist scholar, writing in the *Monist* for July, 1917, that Lao Tzu must be taken as the founder of the religio-philosophical system called Taoism, if not the author in toto of the work in question, because the whole system is but a development of his cryptic paradoxes. This work then should not as a whole be expressly attributed to the Old Philosopher, but is more likely the subsequent compilation and abstruse simplification of various teachings which started with his original speculations, and which by the time of Chuang Tzu's writing had been put in need of some such fatherly countenance. At least this is the general situation as argued by Ho-Shang Kung, a most exacting scholar of the second century B. C., in the preface to his first edition of the Tao Teh King.

Shen Tzu, an astute and somewhat adverse critic of the ancient mysticism, tells us in his account of primitive jurisprudence that in Huang Ti, the Yellow Emperor (c. 2700 B. C.), from the 61st year of whose reign Chinese historians usually calculate their chronology, Lao Tzu had an early if not mythological predecessor,

老子道德經

²⁷ Is the commonly accepted title of the paradoxical little volume reputed to have been written by the "Old Philosopher" Lao Tzu (c. 604-520? B. C.). One of the favorite native schemes for establishing his actual historical existence is claiming that he once gave an interview to Confucius. Just such an incident as this makes up the very last lines of a work (Shanghai, 1893), called K'ung Tzu Chi Yu—Collected Discussions on Confucius, by the Commissioner of Revenue for Shantung, Sun Huang Yen. Herein it is said: "By imperial order for inspection, the 616th anecdote in the Shen Hsien Ch'uan recites that Confucius was one day reading a book when Lao Tzu saw him and inquiring said: 'What book is this?' Confucius replied: 'It is the Book of Rites; holy men likewise study it.' Lao Tzu then said: 'Holy men are already competent in virtue and propriety. Wherefore then do you study it repeatedly?' Practically every other anecdote extant which purports to cover a meeting between Lao Tzu and Confucius has this tone of haughtiness and mockery which seems quite foreign to the character Western interpreters have given Lao Tzu. However, for the reliability of the Shen Hsien Ch'uan, see note 59.

especially in his doctrine of the Wu Wei²⁸ which was an expression of the all-sufficiency of inaction and non-assertion. And Wang Hsü, the Taoist patriarch of the 4th century B. C., who is popularly known as "the Demon Gorge Philosopher",²⁹ also offers an item of emphasis on Lao Tzu's doctrine or *pas trop gouverneur* (don't govern too much) which was practiced with such rare success by Chi An, the shrewd minister of the warlike Wu Ti of Han.

The ancient Odes³⁰ continually celebrated an anthropomorphic God, no matter to what domain of Nature their devotion was directed; but Lao Tzu makes such a God depend, not only for his power, but even for his very existence, upon Tao: the Way, the Principle of Life, i. e., a conception similar to what we call Evolution. Thence it was that Tao, like the evolutionary method which Nature follows in her efforts to perfect things or like a hollow vessel which is free of all self-sufficiency, performs the functions and duties natural to it with no conscious effort or motive. Tao is pure spontaneity; its essence is expression and its only law is rectitude. Thence it is that a man devout with Tao and living after its unworldly example, has virtue, does good wherever he is, and therefore has happiness and long life.

The following are a few points of distinction in Lao Tzu's

²⁸ See the delightful interpretation in Henri Borel's little volume "Lao Tzu's Tao and Wu Wei" (1920).

²⁹ Kuei Ku Tzu, during the time of the Warring States (460-220 B. C.), lived in retirement in Demon Gorge, a hermitage in the district of Ying Ch'uan, in the Wei state or what is the northern part of modern Honan. His only extant writings have been published (1893) as a short treatise in twelve sections and a supplement on magic, cosmology, alchemy and the seven arts. He probably also specialized in political advice, as we learn that his school was the center from which several of his pupils, called Yu Shuo Chih Shih or Peripatetic Politicians, journeyed to the surrounding states offering their services to the various rival princes. Two of the most famous of these pupils were Su Ch'in who was largely instrumental in joining the Six States, and Chang I who served the Ch'in state against the latter confederation, finally conquering them all. One of Kuei Ku Tzu's vague postulates was that "Altho we now live in a world of light, its origin was obscure (in darkness); altho Tao began in Chaos, Chaos gave birth to the visible universe."

³⁰ Most all the Odes are really secular events or incidents in someone's personal experience which are put in anagoge and given a religious significance thru the metonymy of mystic conception. Thus when God wines and dines his guests, it signifies Divine Grace and Hospitality; when He takes sides in a battle, it means that the one who wins was right more often than that the one who was right wins; Hou Chi's parthenogenesis signifies spiritual purity; Pan Ku's humorously manlike cosmogony means absolute human dependence upon Nature; and the width of the Ho river or the distance of Mt. Sung are simply moral difficulties.

conception of Evolution and Virtue, and are numbered according to the order provided both in Dr. Carus' English translation (1909) and the new Chinese edition (1893). The latter also contains an appendix consisting of a "standard pronunciation and interpretation" which I have made use of for verification:

Tao is the first ancestor of the Universe and apparently is a predecessor to the Lord Shang himself (chap. 4); T'ien or Heaven grows and endures, and the Earth is everlasting (7); the high beneficence of Heaven (81) may be known to the good man (79) whence the sage will assist Heaven in this, not by asserting his own will (64), but by keeping his self-control (66) and attending dutifully to his ethical obligations (74 and 79). Tao then, as the Godly Reason of the Cosmos, is free of all humanistic finite measurements, and is in fact the acme of all that is non-human (77). But by means of the spiritual nature of man he may imagine or name it, and to a practical degree judge of the divine power that is its standard (25). Thence, by holding to the profound wisdom and simple devotion of the good men of old, a holy proximity to Tao may be attained and its practical example followed (14-15); and this, with the inspiration of Heaven, is living according to Nature, it is the return to one's origin, the great Mother of all existence (51-52).

Thus we might say that Lao Tzu's philosophy was a primitive mystic naturalism, more metaphysical and paradoxical than that of Huang Ti and far less romantic in literary alchemy than that of his great successor Chuang Tzu. He bluntly emphasized the untenability of local analogies and temporal attributes as arguing any specific human character to the Deity. He urged instead that we attain to the divine more by way of renunciation, self-restraint, and charity of the silent heart, than by the strenuous bribery of worldly effort, material ceremonies, and expectations of post-mundane reward. Few people know the *way* to accomplish or preserve this rare achievement, for the truly sage and holy men wear hemp clothes but in their hearts may be found jewels. Their polish is not external but their spiritual splendor shines through high thought and simple living. It is all the result of Reason and Virtue, and with Lao Tzu (even if he did not measure up to its high ideals in practice) it was the logical development of his primary conception of Wu Wei,³¹ the non-assertion of self, the restraint of personal desire.

³¹



The Wu Ki spoken of in chapter 28 refers to the non-finite terms by which Heaven shelters its own. It is the absolute non-human sphere which protects and exemplifies, but is in no wise personal or worldly. In this sense it is correlative instead of synonymous with the Infinite which is Tao. The esoteric aspects of this conception, with a somewhat forced bolster from the Yih speculations, is given in a recent treatise by Zeikuas J. Boyle entitled *The Fundamental Principles of the Yih King Tao* (1921). But a simpler and more profitable survey of the ethical counsel of Lao Tzu's book comes down to us from the early part of the third century A. D., when Yü Fan, while banished to Chiao Chou during the last ten years of his life, composed the popular work entitled *Lao Tzu Ming Yu*.³² I have a copy of an ornate tuitzu or wall-motto bearing one of Yü Fan's quotations from the *Tao Teh King*.

虞翻老子命語
blood in his veins.

³² Yu Fan, c. 164-233 A. D., was a native of Chekiang, having some measure, it is said, of royal

(To be Continued.)

LABOR AND THE COMMUNITY.

BY H. R. VANDERBYLL.

✓
THE views expressed in the following paragraphs partly originated and partly assumed definite form in a life of labor that lasted for a number of years. I flatter myself with the hope that experience and observation lend to them the neutral tint of non-prejudice. My judgments own a foundation which differs from that on which the average worker builds his views. The cause of this difference must be found in the fact that nature did not endow me from the start with those qualities, physical and otherwise, that make a good laborer. If there be question of a rise and a fall in my career, then I fell into the world of labor and subsequently emerged from it. And it is for that reason that I consider myself to be in a better position to rightly discern the place which labor occupies in the community, and to pass fair judgment on the nature of its relations with capital and with the balance of society, than the average worker, himself, is.

In order to see things and their relations clearly, impartiality is a first requisite. It is unnecessary to remark that impartiality is a rare phenomenon. We not only view facts and conditions with the assistance of our own particular more or less developed intellect, but we judge them from a standpoint of self-interest. In the first instance there is question either of ignorance or of understanding, in the second instance, of prejudice. I think prejudice a more vicious disturber of peace, a more malignant enemy of the human race, than ignorance. Prejudice finds its source in selfishness whereas ignorance is the natural expression of a brain as yet undeveloped. However, a certain amount of self-interest would appear to be necessary to the health of the community. It seems to be a useful tool of evolution wherewith she coaxes man to struggle towards better and nobler things. It is not surprising, therefore, that prejudice taints most controversies relating to mat-

ters of popular interest. There are many different individuals and groups of individuals whose judgments reflect their respective desires. This fact makes it almost impossible for a particular class of society to fairly judge another, or to view impartially the condition of society as a whole. A workingman's opinions about such matters do not altogether originate in the cells of his gray matter. They are mixed with a dash of self-interest. The same may be remarked about corporation heads, preachers, lawyers, publishers; in short, about the representative of any class or group of people that are active in society in a particular manner.

In order to be able to clearly discern facts and their relations, in order to be in a position to justly praise or condemn conditions, so far as society is concerned, one must be something more than a group—or class-representative. One must be a member of the community, of the nation, of the human race. I am not so sure but one may be required to be a member of the infinite universe, the fruit of whose eternal labors we sometimes so heartily and blindly condemn. At least, one must be broadminded, able to place oneself in the position of one's fellow being, able to survey the world from his particular standpoint, able to realize that the individual is a member of society and humanity rather than of a class or of a group. A most difficult thing to do, unquestionably! I believe, however, that as man evolves, he realizes more and more that self-interest is but a means to an end, and that life's struggle at bottom is a question of intellectual, moral and spiritual development. Broadmindedness grows with that realization, and the provincialism of the class-representative accordingly becomes less intense.

Having labored for a number of years, I find myself in a position similar to the one of an American who has lived among a foreign people, who has participated in their struggles and their joys, who has studied their nature, their customs, their morals and ideals, without having destroyed that which characterizes him as an American. In other words, the fact of my having been a laborer did not destroy my original personality. It probably added something to it, or it annihilated some of its undesirable features. My original self, however, continued to exist, to experience and to evolve. It is clear, then, that the ideas set forth in this article do not emanate purely from the laborer's standpoint, but rather from that standpoint which is as broad or as narrow as my personality.

Prejudice is therefore out of the question, although, of course, a certain degree of ignorance may be reflected in those ideas.

I am well aware that I am contradicting a certain theory which holds that "circumstances make the man." My long and intimate association with the worker has, according to that theory, moulded my inner being in such a manner that my former self has been transmuted into the self of the average laborer. Or, at least, it has hampered or completely stopped its development. Abilities, inclinations and capacities which I once possessed have been reduced, stifled or destroyed by conditions among which drudgery and poverty are not the least conspicuous. But I must deny that circumstances have thus influenced my being. I admit that the external world of condition and circumstance has moulded my being, but I object to the manner in which this is supposed to have been accomplished. In a moulding process, two factors have to be considered; that which moulds, and that which is being moulded. If we agree that the external world is the moulder, then the thing which is subjected to a continuous moulding process is our inner being. It stands to reason that the nature of the resultant product at any time depends on two things: on the conditions of the external world, and on the nature of our being. The most skilled potter cannot create a fine vessel from low grade material. Nor can the clumsiest of potters destroy the originally high grade matter which he is manipulating. I am of the opinion that our popular theories of evolution largely ignore the nature of the thing upon which the conditioned external world acts, and that, as a consequence, the fact that evolution operates from external as well as from internal forces, is not sufficiently considered. If evolution be a fatalistic process (wise or otherwise), then we should not seek its directing forces merely in nature and the universe, but also in the individual. Is not this also a condition which results in fatalistic direction (wise or otherwise), viz., that the individual is born with a certain quality of gray matter and with certain qualities of being?

In these days, rich with theory and ism, fad and cult, we are inclined to recognize but a single wing-tip of the white bird of truth. We cling to a detached truth with blind fanaticism, use it as a cornerstone for a new structure of philosophical religion or religious philosophy, and are nicely on the road towards narrow-mindedness and mental stagnation. Thus there are some who say that circum-

stances and conditions mould the individual, and there are others who claim that the individual moulds himself. Both classes of people are right, and both are wrong. They are both wrong because they fail to recognize the truth of which their opponents are aware. The bad feature of their failure is, that their theories are not only philosophically but also morally unsound. Believers in the theory of circumstance and condition have the tendency to transmute a firm, healthy spine into the backbone of a jellyfish. Their opponents, holding their fellowman absolutely responsible for what he is and in time becomes, are in danger of parting forever with Christian principles and ethics.

II.

I have made the preceding remarks, personal and impersonal, for the purpose of introducing something which in my opinion constitutes one of the two most important elements of social development. I am referring to individuality. Individuality is the key to the explanation of society's present condition. Let us leave individuality out of our discussions of social problems, and we shall be considering the features of an empty shell. We shall be philosophizing on the destruction of that shell or on the problem of its re-creation. All which is very interesting, but unfortunately a waste of time and mental energy. The empty shell is visible society; its good and bad conditions, the weak and strong links that unite its parts, the contrast between the condition of one member and that of another. We unconsciously picture to ourselves this empty shell when referring to society. We ignore its contents, of which this shell is but a reflection, a necessary expression. What is society at bottom if not a group of individuals, similar but not alike, whose relations are determined by the nature of their various beings? We are scratching on the surface of things, so long as we consider visible society only. Underneath, within and back of it, is its creator—invisible society. And if asked to partly define invisible society, I should say that it is a group of brains and souls of many degrees of development. This definition implies, of course, the presence of many degrees of intelligence and morality, of a variety of ambitions and ideals, of a considerable number of religions and pet theories, of a vast quantity of likes and dislikes, of innumerable natural abilities and capacities. Of the billion and a half birds of different plumage that constitute humanity, those that

outwardly resemble one another flock together. Differences of minor importance are overlooked. On the whole, they are birds of a feather. And why do they flock together? Because, primarily, there is an inner resemblance. This inner resemblance is a matter of evolutionary development. Then, again, we find groups within groups. Consciously, their members seek association only with those who express themselves in life in a manner almost identical with their own manner of expression. Unknowingly, they acknowledge finer distinctions of evolutionary development. And, although conditions of harmony do not always prevail within the sub-group, and certainly not within the group, foreign birds of a feather will find a united front of attack and defense. There is a certain natural opposition between human beings whose fundamental natures and whose intellects differ greatly in development.

After this bird's eye view of society, visible and invisible, the question may well be asked, where is the superman who can change the constitution of society and remedy its ills? This question occurs, mainly, of course, because there are so many would-be saviors of society who by the stroke of a pen, or by the throwing of a bomb, or by eliminating capital, or by other methods, would produce an ideal state of affairs. But this ideal condition would be a surface condition, only. What about invisible society, the thing which society really is? What about those many and different brains and souls that, knowingly or unknowingly, faithfully reflect themselves in their own creation of social conditions? The problem, I think, is not one of improving the expressions of an organized humanity, but rather of improving that humanity itself. If we can improve the individual being, we need not be concerned about its expressions in life and society. They take care of themselves. They reflect at any time what man is, mentally, morally and spiritually. They slowly move towards the ideal as he develops.

Our question, therefore, if put a little more pointedly, reads: Where must we look for the superman who is able to develop the individual? My own answer is, nowhere.

III.

Most of the proposed schemes for the improvement of the conditions of society are built on a shaky foundation. Their foundation is sought in the expressions of society rather than in its constitution. We consider the conditions of labor, or those of

capital, but we seldom consider the inner condition of the laborer or of the capitalist. If the face of society is wrinkled, haggard and diseased, a dash of powder and rouge may temporarily improve appearances. But the unhealthy condition remains, and only a fool is deceived by an artificial appearance of health. It is not in society's diseased countenance but rather in its constitution that we should find the cause of its disease. By society's constitution we should mean something ultimate. When we say that laborers, doctors, bakers, capitalists, preachers and kings constitute society, we are speaking of expressions, not of fundamentals. Barring exceptional cases, leadership expresses roughly what a man is; so does labor, so does art. The surface of society is lit up by a glimmer which is the resultant light of the many glows cast by the individual beings separately. At bottom, society is that which is capable of producing leadership *plus* that which is capable of producing art, etc. At bottom, society is an organization of brains and souls of many degrees of development.

An important question is, How well or how badly does a scale of human development fit into society? Each member of the community, I take it, is active in the interest of the whole of which he is a member. No matter how thoroughly absorbed he may be in his personal interests, his activities are nevertheless instrumental in determining the condition of the whole. It is a simple fact, which is not sufficiently realized, that absolutely independent individualities and activities are impossibilities in community life. Being a member of the community, the individual not only contributes his share towards its preservation, but is also compelled to respond to certain demands that emanate from the whole. The nature of those demands is determined by the nature of the whole, and the nature of the whole is, of course, the blended product of the many and various natures of the members. The family, for example, is a small community, and it determines certain boundaries within which the member may move. The whole of which the husband is a constituent member places certain restrictions upon him, and demands certain things of him. The interest of the family is his own, and he cannot, logically, object to the restrictions and demands in question. Similar relations between the member and the whole exist in larger communities. The voice of the individual is never heard singly, nor is his individuality considered separately. There is a voice of the community in which the voice of the member can be but partly heard, and his particular nature is merely one of the

many component parts of the nature of the whole. Society's healthy or unhealthy appearance, therefore, is determined by the several natures of its constituent members. If that appearance is the indicator of that which we call civilization, then the degree of civilization which exists at any time is the reflection of the average degree of mental, moral and spiritual development of its members.

I cannot, at this point, refrain from referring to a bit of cosmic philosophy. The most interesting and best operated community is the infinite community of the universe. Each member of the universe contributes his share towards preserving the eternal balance of the whole. All members, so far as their existence and their activity are concerned, are interdependent and interrelated. There is a universal law to which each member of the whole obeys. Were it possible for a single member to escape that law, and to become an absolutely independent individual, the eternal balance of the whole should become disturbed, and the universe should crumble into an unimaginable nothing.

A comparison between our human community and the infinite community of the universe cannot, of course, be a fair one. The universe as a whole is perfect, its members are perfectly interrelated, and the nature of their various activities cannot, therefore, be questioned. We cannot consider the limits within which their individualities are moving anything but just. Our own community, however, is imperfect. Human effort, conscious or unconscious, is constantly urging it towards the ideal. I believe, however, that if we consider society as it is, and not as we think that it should be, viz., perfect, we shall find justice in place of injustice, wisdom instead of circumstance, purpose rather than whim. But this justice, purpose and wisdom are expressions of an impersonal whole, not of the individual. I have particularly in mind the fact that one member of society labors for a wage while another makes a profit.

Were it possible for members of the community to be absolutely independent individuals, society might consist solely of capitalists. But to think of absolute individual independence in community life is to think of a contradiction. We have in our American Declaration of Independence a glorious clause which states a relative truth. All men are born free and equal. To a limited extent, I think. Were there fifteen hundred million islands, absolutely alike, on each of which were placed a single individual, and were these individuals absolutely alike, then truly it could be said that all men are born free and equal. In view of the reality, however, we

are born free when we consider ourselves in relation to slavery, which we repudiate in any form whatsoever. Barring this freedom which is the repudiation of slavery, there is no such thing as freedom in community life. And in view of the existences of innumerable degrees of mental and moral development, equality is out of the question.

There is no more repulsive argument than this one of freedom and equality when it is used by the ignorant and discontented individual for the purpose of being convincing. If there be freedom and equality, why should he be the employee of his employer? Why should he obey laws formulated and passed by others? A just state of affairs would see him his own employer, his own law-giver. Experiments in the direction of such a just state of affairs are proving to be colossal failures in Russia, Italy and elsewhere. Hysterics produced by the recent war have distorted a dim conception of democracy into fantastic nonsense. An industrial democracy is no more a democracy than a capitalistic one. And the former is a little worse than the latter on account of the elimination of a certain kind of leader who, as it happens, is seldom produced by the working class, so-called. Man is a creature born to take orders, who unconsciously demands the direction and the leadership of his superior in ability and intelligence. The most unpretentious section gang is at sea without its boss.

Discontent is not altogether objectionable. But there are two sorts of discontent. The first is the result of a constant realization that the struggle with life is a hard one. Added to this is the desire that the struggle may be eliminated through the medium of outside agencies. The second kind of discontent is sometimes called divine discontent. It is the voice of nature urging the individual to seek conditions and surroundings that more closely express the nature of his being. Unfortunately, this last sort of discontent is rare in comparison with the first. It is human to dislike struggle, and to wish to acquire possessions in the easiest manner possible. We find this human trait among rich and poor, among the powerful and the weak, alike. At heart we are capitalists, though sometimes circumstances prevent us from demonstrating the fact.

The truth that society is, fundamentally, not a homogeneous but a heterogeneous whole, is the one to which we are blind. We are in the habit of classing men under a single heading—human beings. We endow them with the same inherent capacities and abilities. We imagine that all men suffer, enjoy, experience and

evolve in the same manner. At the same time we concede that there are no two people alike. We meet with different likes and dislikes, with a variety of vices and virtues. The trouble is that we conceive people to be alike fundamentally, and that we do not associate the differences that appear on the surface with the differences that concern their inner beings. The result is that we expect a single religion to suffice for an entire humanity. We think all people capable of living up to a single code of morals. We consider all men to be potentially able and intellectual. We go so far in contradicting the result of our observations as to declare that man's personal choice decides whether he shall travel towards intellectual and moral brilliancy or towards ignorance and perdition. Such rot it is which causes un-Christian souls to hold the intellectually, and sometimes morally, unpretentious toiler responsible for what he is and for the manner in which he is active in society.

Our observations of man concern reflections. His actions and activities in this society of ours not merely betray but actually reveal his ME. They are the odor of his individual self, and belong to it as perfume belongs to the rose. We are compelled to accept them as the necessary and natural expressions of that which he is. That which he is prompts him to act in a certain manner, endows him with certain capacities and abilities, causes him to become laborer or president, criminal or saint. What, at bottom, is an individual? He is a product of evolution—a fine, bad, or mediocre product, according to our viewpoint. It stands to reason, then, that the degree of evolutionary development which he represents, and which was determined before birth, clears him of the responsibility for the nature of his being *and* its necessary expressions. That a man is not responsible for the quality of his soul and for that of his gray matter seems to many of us to be an indigestible truth, simple as it is. "Why does he not do this or that?" we ask. Or, "Why does he not educate himself?" What foolish questions, and what foolish answers we find for them. Why does not the fish fly? Why does not the rose grow below the surface of the soil? What a man does expresses what he is. Because he is what he is, he does what he does.

IV.

When we accept man's individuality as the true foundation of society, we are compelled to rid ourselves of the erroneous idea

that our fellowman forces us into our particular station in life. If there is any compulsion, if there are any demands, they originate in society as a whole, of which we are a constituent member. There is no question of one class of men driving another to labor. Society, at its present stage of development, demands labor. Certain of its members are peculiarly fit to supply it.

It is this response to an impersonal demand which lifts labor above the level of inferiority on which we are apt to replace it. We too often make the mistake of mentally separating the individual and his activities from society as a whole. We see only the individual, and compare his being, his activities and his abilities with our own. As a result, we conceive of inferiority and superiority, of servant and master, of enslaved labor and ruling capital. It is the wrong conception. If there were no such thing as the community, we could think of the capitalist's playing a little game of his own with the laborer. Capital would be a criminal institution, and labor an unheard of injustice. And this is exactly what capital and labor think of each other: that they are playing a little game of their own. In reality, however, they are active in the interest of the community of which they are constituent members. For it is as impossible for the member of the community to travel an absolutely independent path as it is for a planet to move at will about the solar system.

The community as a whole is the great coercer and dictator. The natures of its various demands are determined by the average evolutionary development which it represents. Its demands are distributed among the members in accordance with the nature of their being. And it is the member, himself, who being peculiarly fit to represent a source of supply, responds in a natural manner to the demands placed upon him by the community. Labor being necessary to the preservation and to the welfare of the modern community, there are members who, being peculiarly fit to supply this demand, are usefully active as laborers. Only a fool, and sometimes a prejudiced laborer, will deny the necessity or underestimate the value of capital. Only a fool, and sometimes a prejudiced capitalist, will deny the necessity or underestimate the value of labor. But it matters little how superior or inferior, necessary or unnecessary, one member considers the activities of another member. Considered from the standpoint of the community as a whole, there is no question of superiority or inferiority. Each member contributes his share towards making society what it is. The

nature of his contribution is determined by the nature of his being.

Those who wish to uproot society in a single night, and reconstruct it in a single day, let them think well. Eliminate the street-sweeper; does not the community lose something of its near-perfection? Does not the same thing result when the manufacturer and employer is eliminated? Clamoring for equality is demanding the impossible. The various needs of the whole must be supplied, and they are being supplied by unequal members.

Fraternity, equality, liberty! Yes, indeed—until a leader arises, whose very presence takes away a little from fraternity, a little from equality, and a little from liberty. On the whole, man is dangerously in love with liberty and equality. He does not always fully comprehend that the only possible liberty is that liberty in a democracy which eliminates slavery, and that equality is not fundamental, but concerns useful activity in the interest of the whole. Absolute liberty, something inconceivable, would silence the voice of the community. Where there is a community, there is also a task for each member, which must be performed for the sake of the whole. Community-life thus prevents the individual from following a path of absolute liberty, and keeps him circling around the center of social interest like a planet around its sun. Incidentally, this curbing of the individual's movements coincides with the wise purposes of evolution. It is hardly necessary to observe that the principal tool of evolution is obstacle thrown in the path of the self-propelling individual. Is it not primitively a painful rubbing of shoulders with nature, and subsequently with a more or less organized humanity, that made it necessary for the individual to struggle and conquer in order to lift himself to a higher level of development?

As to equality, fortunately for society it does not exist. Considered from the personal viewpoint, there is everywhere superiority and inferiority, leadership and following. Only with regard to useful activity, useful when considered in relation to the condition of the whole, can we speak of equality. Each member is as important and valuable to the entire community as any other member, whether he be active as laborer or as manufacturer. But, comparing one member with another, inequality is apparent. It is fundamental, touching the being and the intellect of the individuals compared, expressing itself in difference of abilities and gifts, of stations in life, of conditions and surroundings, and even of modes of evolving. Destroy this inequality, what becomes of society?

Must all its members perform similar tasks? Must leaders be eliminated, and the blind lead the blind? Must all useful activity have a single reward, and the demand for skill, ability, integrity of character, and leadership find no supply? It is unnecessary to try to picture a condition of absolute equality. The picture would be an impossible one.

When I stated that man is often dangerously in love with liberty and equality, I had in mind the fact that his conceptions of liberty and equality are utopian. Whenever he tries their practical application, he shakes the very foundations of society. There follow blood and thunder, lawlessness and disorganization. A leader generally arises, and with him iron rule. After a while, when the heat of passion has cooled and the thunder of revolution has subsided, there is an unuttered realization that the healthy community is founded on something of which the violent reformer of society had not thought. The trouble with the violent or radical reformer in most cases, is that in his intellectual analysis of society he ignores society as a whole and considers his individual problems only. On the whole, he is intensely aware of his own struggle with life. And so, he conceives of an ideal state of affairs—ideal as regards his individual well-being—leaving the natural demands of the balance of the community out of his considerations. He commits the blunder which the average man is inclined to commit in the mental process of society building. He employs a single kind of building material, say bricks, laboring under the delusion that he can very well dispense with steel, plaster, cement, lumber; in short, with those materials which are necessary to complete the solid structure. If given the opportunity to construct his society, it will turn out a tottering group of individuals of a single kind who vainly and madly hunt for something, they know not what, that will solidly cement them together. The rest of the original community is dumb, inactive, and bereft of the opportunity to be useful in behalf of the whole. Then follows the guillotine or the machine gun.

V.

The philosophy of community-life reaches to far greater depths than we at first imagine. Were it only a matter of injustice, perhaps the various clashing groups of members could arrive at an amiable and satisfactory understanding. I have had the opportunity to consider the laborer's position in society from two stand-

points. There is the personal, the laborer's standpoint, and there is the impersonal, the philosophic standpoint. It is hardly possible for the laborer, who is not also thinker and philosopher, to be unaware of injustice of some sort which accompanies his position in society. Painful experience has caused me to ask a few questions which are not so easily answered by a human being who is also humane. Here follow a few of these questions: Why should the wage earner be compelled to expose himself to constant danger, to shorten his life in the evil fumes of mine and plant? Why should he be compelled to violate the laws of nature, to work and eat in the hollow of the night, to sleep when the sun is bright in the sky? Why, loving his wife and children, should he not be in a position to give them the best that life can offer—comfort and education? I repeat that such questions are not so easily answered. In many, many instances, however, I have found the answers in the individuals themselves—in their supreme physical constitution, in their natural aversion to intellectual development, in their particular conception of ideal living. And I have come to the conclusion that nature has made it possible for each class of members of the community to successfully bear the burden of the particular task which they perform in behalf of the whole.

There is another viewpoint—the philosophic one. As I have stated before, the philosophy of community-life penetrates far below its surface and touches the very being of the individual—one of the reasons, perhaps, why a satisfactory understanding between opposing groups is forever out of the question. Satisfaction and evolution do not travel together very well. And if I be not mistaken, it is evolution which is at bottom of society. Or, is it merely an aimless scramble for money and for the things which money will buy? But we see civilization advance and the health of society improve, year by year, century by century. That advancement and improvement are indicative of a growing average human development. The growth of average human development is the leveling sum-total of all individual development. If our present civilization is superior to that of a century ago, we must not, as we are often inclined to do, seek the cause in the creative efforts of a few individuals or of a single class of individuals. Civilization, at any time, reflects the average development of the individual brain and soul. Its progress mirrors that of a nation, or of the human race—as the case may be—not that of a few favored individuals. Labor of five centuries ago is not the sort of labor that we know to-day. Is such the case

because those who are "in power" and who represent a cause of external conditions, have become more tolerant, generous and Christian in their attitude towards their fellow being? Such is partly the case, undoubtedly. But internal as well as external changes affect the conditions of labor from time to time. With the development of his individual being, the laborer's useful activities in society become more dignified and the conditions of living continue to harmonize with his developing mind and soul.

For illustration's sake, I am perhaps permitted to digress. Consider from a purely philosophic and therefore impartial viewpoint, competition between Japanese, Chinese, and Hindu labor on the one hand, and American labor on the other, as a crime against the nation. Facts are facts, and that the average American represents a higher degree of human development than the average member of the Yellow race cannot be denied. What is it which really happens to our American society when hundreds of thousands of Orientals are allowed to become usefully active constituent members? The average level of society is lowered, as the viscosity of a heavy oil is lowered by adding a lighter oil. The demands and needs of the community as a whole lose something of their more or less lofty nature. For the demands of the new element which has been added to the original, reflect different degrees of intellectual and moral development. There is labor and labor. There is Hindu labor, and there is American labor—for the very simple reason that there are Hindus and Americans. The needs and demands of the former are few and humble, those of the latter more dignified and more in keeping with their evolutionary development. Only in case the American laborer should have evolved beyond the point of labor and should be required by the community to be usefully active in a different manner, could we logically conceive of American labor performed by Orientals.

I have made this digression for the purpose of pointing out that the conditions of labor are caused by external as well as by internal influences. The latter emanate from the laborer himself. When we add the external and the internal influences, we obtain a sum-total of influences that emanates from the community as a whole. We must not make the mistake of conceiving the laborer to be apart from the whole of society. The labor-group, although it is not the whole of society, is *of* society. The laborer, by being what he is, individually, helps to make society what it is, and to a certain extent imposes its conditions upon himself. Should he therefore

be desirous of changing those conditions, he could not very well escape the necessity of changing himself—or, rather, his self.

And thus we return to the simple fact that society changes with the individual. Its condition improves as the individual being of the member improves. This change and improvement are universal. They touch every group and level of society. The laborer evolves as well as any other member. The evolution of his being is one of the determining factors in the re-moulding process of labor's conditions. It should be realized that conditions and institutions exist because they are tolerated. They are tolerated because they reflect a certain average human development. When average human development appreciably soars to higher levels, ancient institutions begin to totter on their foundations, and social conditions to clamor for improvement. It is not a particular religion which is forced upon man; it is man, being what he is, intellectually and morally, who accepts it. It is not a Kaiser who forces his individuality upon a German people; he is the response to a demand which emanates from a certain average intellectual and moral development. In the most common bypaths of life we meet with this law of intellectual and moral supply and demand which allows things, conditions and institutions to flourish temporarily. A homely illustration is perhaps that of the popular newspaper. Ask a Brisbane whether or not a successful newspaper should print the news and the articles which people desire to read. Study the popular newspaper or magazine and you will obtain some conception of the average intellectual and moral development of the reading public.

VI.

How does evolution operate among human beings? Does it operate as an external force that influences and moulds the individual being? Is it an internal force operating within the confines of the individual being, and do its hidden activities express themselves outwardly and visibly? Is, for instance, the balance of society also the fatal power that directs a single group of its members? Or do the members themselves mould their individual present, with its conditions, and do they themselves lay the cornerstone for their particular future?



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CONFUCIUS.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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PROGRESS THROUGH SCIENCE.

BY ROBERT SHAFER.

“**P**ROGRESSIVE human activity subduing the world”; “a common society, working together for the conquest of nature and the improvement of life”; “the evolution of that collective human force which is growing and compassing the conquest of the world”;—where has one, or where has one not, heard these phrases before? They are the air we breathe, the authentic creed of innumerable men and women now living. The phrases come, in fact, from *The Living Past*, a little book by Mr. F. S. Marvin, but Mr. Marvin did not invent them. He would himself indeed not claim that sort of merit for his work; and it is just because he has succeeded in making himself representative of a very large contemporary group that his writings deserve scrutiny from men who wish to understand the present age.

The movement of thought during the last two centuries has been exceedingly complex, and has landed us at length in such a confusion of ideas, purposes, and standards, as cannot be exaggerated. During these centuries on the one hand the material of knowledge has rapidly grown to such unwieldy bulk that scarcely any one can now grasp it even in outline, and, on the other hand, men have become increasingly busy with their own private affairs, with ever less inclination and less time for contemplation of the work and thought of others. The result is that practically no one today takes or is capable of taking a complete view of his world. Yet, though the complete view has become practically impossible, and though the effort towards it is cried down by those who have a vested interest in partial views, men still find in themselves an

unconquerable need for generalization. Not some men, but all men have a deep necessity for a general belief or creed which will give meaning to their lives and their age—and what do they do? For their practical working purpose they take whatever is at hand, the data furnished by their own limited experience and imperfect development, and erect it into a structure which somehow serves them. The building looks sound in fair weather when no winds blow. Their method is simple, yet they do not truly simplify. They do what they can; they seize upon the dominant idea closest to their practical activities and make it serve all ends.

No one can doubt that in recent years the two ideas dominant in the minds of most men have been Progress through Science and Progress through Political Reconstruction. For the moment the latter is in the foreground, but it has not superseded the first idea. On the contrary, social theorists and political reformers for the most part assume progress through science to be a fact and make it the foundation for their effort. Examination of this "fact," consequently, is of immediate importance. The phrase means, in brief, that exact science has given us almost unimaginable power to control nature for our own purposes, and has thus opened up before us illimitable vistas of real progress towards a perfect human society. We are given to understand, moreover, that science's past achievements are but an earnest of greater things in store.

This popular belief Mr. F. S. Marvin has sought both to expand and to strengthen in *The Living Past*, already mentioned, and in *The Century of Hope*.¹ His method is historical; he calls the former volume "A Sketch of Western Progress," and the latter "A Sketch of Western Progress from 1815 to the Great War." His object is to disclose progress through science as the central "clue" to the whole history of the race. He says of *The Century of Hope* that it "endeavors to exhibit the growth of humanity in the world, taking as a leading—though not exclusive—thought, the development of science and its reactions on other sides of national and international life." He explains somewhat more fully in the Preface to *The Living Past* that this interpretation of history "first came clearly into view with Kant and the philosophers of the eighteenth century. Take Kant's theory of universal history as the growth of a world-community, reconciling the freedom of

¹ Both books are published by the Clarendon Press.

individuals and of individual states with the accomplishment of a common aim for mankind as a whole. Add to this the rising power of science as a collective and binding force which the century since Kant has made supreme. You have then one strong clear clue which, with the necessary qualifications, seems to offer in the field of history something of the guidance and system which Newtonian gravitation gave to celestial mechanics in the seventeenth century. The growth of a common humanity; this is the primary object to keep in view. But it will prove vague and inconclusive, unless we add to it a content in the growth of organized knowledge, applied to social ends."

The recipe for history, then, is a fervent belief in "science organizing industry in the service of an united humanity." Mr. Marvin, it should be said, is an outstanding figure amongst those who advance this view. He endeavors to be frank and straightforward; he is at once more thoughtful and more temperate than are some of his fellow spokesmen² for the army of believers in progress through science; and indeed it is safe to say that in his writings this view appears on the whole at its best. Hence it is just to centre in them a consideration of the doctrine. By some it might be supposed that the war has been itself an adequate criticism of this doctrine; but the war, in this direction as in others, appears very little to have affected opinions held in those different days before the summer of 1914. All available evidence supports such a conclusion. Mr. Marvin spoke for very many besides himself when in 1915 he confidently said that "catastrophes such as we are now witnessing can only delay, but not defeat, the purpose of the ages and the nature of man." Later he was even able to persuade himself, as any one can see in *The Century of Hope*, that the war was actually furthering his notion of "the purpose of the ages."

Belief in progress through science is not, of course, an entirely new thing. It has spread widely and become a dominant article of faith practically within the memory of men now living; yet some centuries ago the compass and gunpowder first notably showed men the power and consequent profit that might accrue from putting natural forces to work for human purposes. And following these

² See Professor Walter Libby's *Introduction to the History of Science* (1917), particularly the last chapter and the Preface; also M. George Sarton's article, "The Teaching of the History of Science", *The Scientific Monthly*, September, (1918).

discoveries at a considerable distance came Bacon, sharing "to the full the enthusiasm and the sense of power which the age of discovery had inspired in western Europe", and adding "to these the two fundamental traits which distinguish the great founders of modern science in the seventeenth century. One is the critical spirit, determined to sweep away the false Aristotelianism and mere authority which obstructed the progress of effective knowledge: the other, the new impulse to turn to nature as the source and material of truth, and on the truth of nature to build a system for the general amelioration of mankind." Bacon was not one of the actual builders of the new structure. "He was distracted by his erudition and his literary gifts"—two qualities which generally arouse the distrust or hostility of the eulogizers of science—"and still more fatally by the interests of wealth and world success," whereas "the actual builders were men of intense and unbroken devotion to the pursuit of truth."

They were, in the first instance, Italians, but the pursuit of truth soon became "an international work, within the area of that smaller progressive world, which Greek intellect, supported by Roman power, had divided from the rest of mankind." The particular kind of truth pursued "in common by many minds in all the leading nations"—"forming a model, as well as a stimulus, to human co-operation"—was what the founders of the Royal Society elegantly called "Physico-Mathematical Experimental Learning." Whether or not the mathematical and astronomical developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were regarded by those who took part in them as steps towards "the amelioration of mankind," the advances made at least "show the natural co-operation of several independent minds, working consecutively to attain the one simplest and most consistent explanation of a vast number of hitherto uncorrelated facts." Newton, in whom the development culminated, had "the genius which perceives true resemblances between remote and apparently disconnected facts," and his achievement is "the most fruitful instance in history of the unifying tendency of thought, seen more or less in all its aspects, but above all in mathematics, the 'art of giving the same name to different things.'"

Earlier than Newton, however, there had appeared a worthy companion of Bacon in Descartes. "All his science," Mr. Marvin says, "arose from the intensive cultivation of his own spirit, which

was enlarged, as he tells us, by the unfolding of every new truth in surrounding nature." This sentence is perhaps almost worthy to stand beside Mr. Marvin's statements that Archimedes "is the first pure man of science whose works have come down to us," and that Newton invented the law of gravitation, and that Harvey discovered the movements of the earth. Concerning Descartes we have specially to note that he shared Bacon's confidence in the meliorative efficacy of physical science. Mr. Marvin quotes his prophecy: "We shall be able to find an art, by which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens and all other objects, as clearly as we know the various trades of our artisans, we may be able to employ them in the same way for their appropriate uses, and make ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. And this will not be solely for the pleasure of enjoying with ease and by ingenious devices all the good things of the world, but principally for the preservation and improvement of human health, which is both the foundation of all other goods and the means of strengthening and quickening the spirit itself." Descartes, we are told, "was the first clearly to suggest" a reconciliation "between the fullest individual culture and the pursuit of a social end;" and "the three centuries since Descartes have brought more and more fully into prominence the social harmony between science and life." In a specifically scientific direction Descartes' greatest achievement was the "mathematical expression of that fundamental conception in modern science which distinguishes it from the science of the Greeks, the idea of movement and continuous growth." This was an achievement which he shared with Newton and Leibnitz, and "with the invention of the calculus in the seventeenth century we reach the last stage yet known to us in that part of measuring which brings the world into subjection to man."

The nature of this achievement indicates for us the general trend of seventeenth-century science. It was, as the founders of the Royal Society had adumbrated, "a physico-mathematical movement, and as such it ran its course before the more complex sciences of life took definite form. It has grown continuously ever since, and by its connection with industry and the practical arts has become the most powerful and typical branch of science as the agent in subduing the forces of nature to the use of man." Yet there were in the seventeenth century isolated advances in other sciences, such as Harvey's anticipation of the foundation of biology and John

Mayhow's discovery, through experiments with candles and small animals, of the existence and fundamental property of oxygen; and—though we are not told why—these “instances bespeak the intimate similarity of all scientific truth.”

The eighteenth century witnessed two grand results of the scientific development of the seventeenth. In England it saw the industrial, and in France the social and political, revolution. The former led to the socialization of science, for science “did not affect the whole of society, until the sweeping changes in the life of the people, which resulted from the union of science and industry, brought men together in masses and made all men think.” This union of science and industry “is really another example of that integration of human powers of which science by itself offered so many striking instances.” What happened essentially was that, first through the steam-engine and ever since through a miraculously increasing number of other devices, science actually began to be applied to the satisfaction of human needs and desires. Practical fulfilment came to the prophecy of Bacon and Descartes. And thus the English mine-owners and cotton-mill operators of the eighteenth century were in reality the great humanitarians of the period, although the merely superficial results of their labors of love were such that Mr. Marvin admits that “the condition of the mass of the people of England was probably worse than it had been at any previous period, while landlords, manufacturers, and capitalists generally, were making larger profits than ever.” This was the temporary result of sweeping changes. The permanent result was the utilization, made possible by capitalists and manufacturers, of the almost unimaginably great stores of power for the control of nature opened up by iron and steam. One aspect of this industrial revolution calls for special notice. Wherever modern industry has developed it has gathered men closely together into towns. This has been essential “for the work in hand in the world.” “The assimilation of the vast resources which the new science and mechanical inventions had put in man's command, and the organizations of a society strong, keen, and united enough to grasp and utilize them,” has demanded a “quick exchange of ideas, vigorous combination of many minds and many wills. This is the gift of the town.”

“The gift,” Mr. Marvin sagely observes, “must be studied with discernment and the eye of faith.” Proper discernment and faith

show, in the first place, that the highly specialized work necessitated by modern industry is an important step towards human unity; it is, "from one point of view, narrowing, mechanical, monotonous; from another, an impressive lesson in the dependence of every particle in the social organism on every other and on the whole. To the countryman, to the workman in a simple state, the fact, equally true, is more remote; the factory worker is surrounded by his fellows and depends at every step on what others send him. This co-operation, which we take for granted in any running concern or running engine, is really the expression in concrete fact of a vast force of organizing mind, which has itself grown up with the system, making and being made by it together. Nor does it reside exclusively in any one set of minds; though there must be special organizers, such as foremen and directors. Every person taking part in such a system has in some degree his spirit of co-operation heightened." And in the second place Mr. Marvin, with similar discernment and faith, says that "the town even more than the trade encourages this tendency. For the business-relations, which gave rise to the town, become but a small part of all the forms of association by which its members are developed in co-operative activity: and it grows by its own growth. It is Aristotle's city-state, writ large, in letters of steel. The necessities of machine production made the modern town: its organization offers to the citizens a larger and fuller life. Iron for marble, smith's work for sculptor's and mason's—much of the difference between the modern state and its archetype is expressed in that change—both as a fact and as a symbol. Less beauty, less individual work, less freshness of thought mark the modern structure; but its material is more durable, the lines of the building are larger, and the ties and stresses are arranged in the light of a higher mechanical science."

Such, then, were some of the earlier results of the application of science to the amelioration of mankind. They gave, Mr. Marvin proudly says, definite primacy to the leading nations of western Europe; and he adds in quaint forgetfulness of the whole purpose of his writings that England in particular now "indisputably took the lead of the world" because of her early use of her providentially-given "sinews of the new war."

Concurrently with this English development there came into prominence in France a group of thinkers, commonly known as

the Encyclopædists, who united to preach the perfectibility of man. The doctrine was in the air. Everybody had begun to believe in it, yet each one had his own pet theory for attaining the easy perfection of the race, and it is sometimes difficult to discover their common element. Diderot and some of his immediate associates derived the idea as well as the inspiration for the Encyclopædia largely from Bacon. As Mr. Marvin says, not incorrectly, "They refer constantly to Bacon as their apostle and use his language to express their purpose. Like him they set out to found an 'empire of virtue' and to increase human happiness by the growth and spread of science." They went further, however, than Bacon expressly did—though not further than most have thought he should have done on his principles—in denying the validity of all revealed religions, most of them showing a special and venomous hostility to Christianity. Our sole source of knowledge, they said, is the observation of nature, and all possible knowledge is summed up in the descriptive and generalizing exact sciences. They saw that Bacon had already been proved correct in his prophecy that we should learn to command nature by observing or discovering her laws and obeying them; and they looked forward to a progressively increasing command over nature for the satisfaction of human desires as the exact sciences should further develop. Thus these sceptical materialists, flushed with optimism, dreamed that at last humanity was on the true path leading to a perfect state where misery should no longer exist, and where all should dwell in happy concord.

But the precept to obey nature's laws led also to a somewhat different argument. Were not men's miseries due simply to the human institutions of civilization which had resulted from the pursuit of mischievous and perverse ideals and wrong-headed aims? Did not men become vicious just through their failure to obey nature's laws in their highly artificial organization of society? Would they not, therefore, speedily attain perfection if they resolutely struck off their fetters of custom and law, and so achieved freedom to be their naturally good selves, to satisfy their naturally good desires? Such a view puts the responsibility for men's miseries and imperfections entirely upon Society, and accordingly it was asserted that the immediate condition of indefinitely great progress for humanity was revolutionary change in the direction of securing for all men freedom, equality, and unity or concord.

A still different yet allied view of progress came a little later

in the biological speculations of Lamarck. He had been, it is true, anticipated in some respects by Diderot, and in others by other thinkers of the period. But he it was primarily who brought the theories of the time to bear upon the subject-matter of biology. "We find in him," Mr. Marvin says, "frequent mention of an inherent tendency to progressive improvement in living things. Nature was compelled, by a law the Supreme Being had imposed, to proceed by the constant fresh creation of the simplest forms, the monads of life which are the only beings directly created. These then develop by gradual steps towards the highest level of intelligence and organization, partly through their own innate tendency to perfection, partly through the force of external circumstances, the variations in physical conditions on the earth and their relations to other beings." "What is this?" Mr. Marvin asks, "but a short and general statement of beliefs held by a large part of all subsequent thinkers on the subject?"

Mr. Marvin goes on to say that Lamarck in his investigations foreshadowed later geology as well as biology, and so supplied "the first hint of the correlation between earth and life. . . . Lyell and Darwin, which was ultimately to win universal assent for the doctrine of evolution." And in the middle of the nineteenth century Darwin, "and his fellow workers on the doctrine of evolution, transformed the old simple faith in human perfectibility by two additions. They gave a body of facts, a set of operative causes to fill out the vague and somewhat empty formulæ which satisfied the first enthusiasts. And they supplied the other complementary term which any sound notion of progressive life requires, the idea of the environment upon which the developing organism acts and which reacts upon it. To Condorcet, to the enthusiasts of the Revolution, the future was a vision of 'mankind marching with a firm tread on the road of truth, virtue, and happiness,' a road on which 'we could see no limits to our hopes.' To Darwin, to any one who had studied the facts of life from the new perspective, progress was no less real, it was a palpable and concrete thing, but its reality could and should be measured by the adaptation of the living being to its environment, including in its environment those fellow creatures with whom it lives." Mr. Marvin is aware that biological science has not the exactness of physical science, and he instructively compares the former to a journey by aeroplane: "There is no permanent way. We travel quickly; we feel our way and dart hither and

thither to escape a contrary wind. But the speed, the exhilaration, the prospect are superb, and the solid world recedes beneath our flight." Yet, he says, "however Darwin's theory is finally modified, it remains the dominating influence in all the sciences of life. It transferred the centre of interest from the life of the individual to the growth of the species. . . . Darwin's law, moreover, becomes itself another and potent link in the unification of mankind, for like all science it brings together the co-operating and consenting minds, and also gives us an objective unity among things outside us which were before regarded as separate beings. In the light of a general law of evolving life, all animal and vegetable species appear as branches and twigs and flowers of one great tree springing from a common root."

This I think is true. Darwin, Lyell, and their co-workers and followers seem to prove what many had already said and what everybody was anxious to believe. Not quite everybody, after all, yet to speak thus inclusively is not to ignore the great controversies of the nineteenth century; it is only to recognize what most have long since felt, that the resounding battles against Darwinism, as they were actually conducted, were lost before they were begun. The Darwinians "had the goods." They seemed to guarantee the fact of real progress towards perfection as an inherent natural tendency of all living things. It was enough; it meant a "fuller life on all sides, the fullest life of which the individual is capable," as a fact which we might all count on in the future. Whose future was scarcely asked, in an age of action rather than of sickly thought. It was for a constantly increasing number of men sufficient that the new facts gave substance "to a view in which all good things, the beauty of nature and the joy of living, as well as knowledge itself, are all included in that manifestation of the Highest to which our being tends. The barriers of asceticism, partly mediæval, partly puritan, have been broken down, and our ideal of the Best does not seem to grow only as one side of our nature by some stern law imposed from without, but embraces all congruent things, and will, as the self develops, embrace still more." Doubtless; and, men felt, the instrument of this so charming progress is science itself, which has miraculously begun, is doing more, and will surely end by doing everything.

Very important for this progress is the increasing unity of mankind, without which, indeed, its chief benefits can never be achieved.

Mr. Marvin is certain that much has already been accomplished towards this end. The first steps were taken in the building-up of the ancient empires in the rude religious infancy of the race. "For the task of building up a great society round one centre of government, the scientific intellect is of itself unsuited; it is a probe before it is a link." But the beginnings once safely made, science became in modern times—need it be said?—"link" as well as "probe." This in fact is Mr. Marvin's fundamental claim, which he never wearies of repeating. "The earlier developments of applied science. . . . tended on the whole in a very marked degree to the unification of the world. Steamships, steel rails, and telegraph wires were the chief agents, and later improvements, the turbine engine, the internal-combustion engine worked by oil, wireless telegraphy, are all developments tending in the same direction. The inhabited world thus moves on clearly to a common goal just as the members of the solar system are all one in their concerted movements round the one source of light and heat and motion." Mr. Marvin goes on to say that this alone is a stupendous fact, full of lessons for us. It may both inspire and guide us. In these achievements "man has found himself as the continuous creator. His thought, growing from age to age, has linked itself in the work with his active and inventive powers, and gone on adding strength to strength. It is the application of his knowledge which proves to him both its foundation in reality and his own capacity for using these realities for his own ends. From this comes confidence and a vista of fresh conquests awaiting him in the future. The guidance comes from reflecting on the conditions which have made this progress possible. The thought lying at its basis is a collective thing, not limited by any national boundaries, but spreading freely wherever it finds congenial elements, just as a Frenchman, an Englishman, and a German co-operated to establish the law of the conservation of energy. The fact that such co-operation is often unconscious is the strongest evidence of the inherent likeness in the working of all human minds and of the common process which unfolds itself continually throughout the world. Unconscious and obscure as the first workings of this thought may be, when once announced and applied to the world of facts it proceeds to create an organization of life as complete and unbreakable as the links which bind the thoughts themselves together. This is the patent and most significant result of the triumph of applied science in the last century, as true and striking as the

social nature of the science itself, Society has become, in all those countries where industry has been organized and developed by science, a far more united and stable thing than it was before, or than it is in other regions less advanced in this respect."

This and preceding quotations exhibit Mr. Marvin's reasons for asserting that science is our greatest agent, and a demonstrably efficacious agent, for unifying mankind. Yet he may be quoted further upon so important an assertion: "This growth of science," he says, "is by no means the whole of civilization, but it holds a commanding position in it, and several features in the scientific evolution seem identical with the conquering social spirit itself. Like language, the method of exact science has a double aspect, the external facts which it brings together and arranges, and the human minds of which it correlates and expresses the thought. Now on each side of this double process the unifying action of scientific thought is its most striking feature. On the objective side it carries the generalizing process of language much further and applies it exactly. Where language gives the same name to like things, science, seeing deeper, can give it to the superficially unlike, and express by the same equation the fall of the stone and the revolution of the planet. . . . It is the logical essence of the process, though we are here rather concerned with the social aspect of the fact. Just as the method consists objectively in collecting resemblances from the complex of phenomena and expressing them in the simplest exact general statements or laws, so, on the side of the human minds perceiving the resemblances and formulating the statement, there is a corresponding process of comparison and unification. The differential equation, though Leibnitz suggested its precise form, sums up the consensus of innumerable minds, the earliest savages who noticed the likenesses of things around them, the first measurers who agreed to lay out their fields and decorate their buildings on a common scale, the Greeks who formulated the similarities of figures in the first equations, the Arabs who improved the notation, the thinkers of the seventeenth century whose genius, co-operating, through many minds, carried the idea of a common law into the recesses of space, and expressed it so concisely that it has become the universal and permanent intellectual currency of mankind." Thus "scientific method" is "firmly established as the natural and fundamental link of progressive human society." And, further, both the history and the use of science "proclaim the necessity unity of human effort.

For science arose from the simplest facts of common experience, and grew by the co-operation of the mass of men with human intellect at its highest. And when developed it returns again to widen and strengthen the common intelligence and increase the common good. Above all, more perfectly than any other form of thought, it embodies the union of past and present in a conscious and active force."

Thus we see that exact science exerts its unifying influence in several directions. It unites diverse appearances in the world of phenomena, knitting up lightning and magnetism, falling stones and the revolving earth, plant and animal and man, past and present, into one coherent whole. Likewise through the steamship, the railroad, the aeroplane, the telegraph, the telephone, it makes our world more compact, throwing all men closely together, making them rub elbows, as we say, so that it is no longer possible for us to escape our fellows if we would, but as never before, necessary for us to accommodate ourselves to each other, suppressing our peculiarities or "unsocial" qualities in the process. Further, science unites men's minds; it "is man's true universal language;" and in its theoretic aspect it is both international and co-operative in character in the greatest degree, while in its applications in industry it again brings home to every worker the fundamental importance of co-operation in human effort for the common good, and exhibits to him the complete dependence of each human being upon all others. This last point perhaps deserves further support from Mr. Marvin, who says that "just as the humblest worker in a great observatory may feel some glow in the revelations of the telescope above him, or the fitter on the railway bridge reflect that his work is vital to the lives of thousands and the welfare of a continent, so we may believe that all organized industry is capable of inspiring this feeling and giving the worker this foothold in a universal scheme."

THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE.

BY HENRY FRANK.

(Continued).

Cosmos:

I am the infinite and all!
My compass and circumference
Outreach the far ethereal wall
That halts the march of human sense.

Myself the Nebulae begot,
And substance of the rolling orbs,
That from my breast arise and rot,
As Time the subtle stuff absorbs.

Most plastic of all essences,
I whirl the Ether round and round,
Which, firmly in an atom, is
In after ages sought and found.

The titan force thus Ether-born,
And whirled revolving from my grasp,
Sucks to itself all forces torn
From atoms, flying from my clasp.

Thus atom flies to atom far,
Awhirl unconsciously and blind,
From sand-grain to a flaming star,
Till worlds their spiral orbits find.

Yea spheres with fiery auras whirl
Round flaming worlds through vistas wild;
Their banners to the Void unfurl,
And seek far spaces undefiled.

At length, the fiery mist is chilled;
The cooling globe, athirst, absorbs
The moisture of the air, that filled
The firmament of seething orbs.

Earth, erst, was watery waste, and void
Of vital element or form,
Till soil and sea enmixed and cloyed,
When from the slime sprung seed and worm.

For aeons, long, vast jungles swept,
Unchallenged, earth's redundant breast,
Where monsters clomb or slyly crept,
With murd'rous jaw and bloody crest.

Through strife and stress and war-some strain,
The most unwieldy fell, whilst few,
More agile, could their place maintain,
And thus victorious waxed and grew.

Life came from lowly origin,
And basest forms at first prevailed;
Till Time the thickly ranks did thin,
And brains for doughtier toil were mailed.

All things have come by stages slow,
All forms from other forms were shaped:—
The myriad plants did unlike grow,
Because some variant escaped.

From Time's benumbing usage old,
The vagrant, in its freedom young,
Far from its parents ventured bold,
Whilst they to ancient custom clung.

Thus species all from species grew,
All forms of life from one prime norm,
As each, the fitter, caught and slew
The slowthful and unvantaged form.

All life streams on from primal drop
 Of protean protoplasm's mould;
 Nor aught the reddened stream can stop,
 Once it begins in Nature's wold.

No eye can trace it to its source,
 Nor microscope discern its trend:—
 Whether in leaf, its ruddy course,
 In ape or man, shall seek its end.

MIND:

I cannot longer hold my silence while
 Such rash assertions smite my ear!
 This pompous witness, Matter's menial slave,
 Here summonsed, speaks as by authority,
 Whose shallow ignorance his vapid breath
 Divulges. Whence is he, who vauntingly
 His infinite immensity proclaims?

THOUGHTS:

(fluttering round excitedly)

Yea, whence his origin;
 Whence came this Force that moves,
 Through subtle matter thin,
 Like hands astir in pliant gloves?

IMAGINATION:

(hiding behind a fan-shaped cloud, and looking askance)

Who first conceived, and patterned vast,
 In mental imagery, the whole,
 Stupendous plan; whose mind first cast
 The swaying worlds from pole to pole?

KNOWLEDGE:

(blowing through a brazen trumpet)

'Tis true; naught is, save first conceived:
 The mind's eye sees ere matter moves;
 All form and substance hath received
 The pattern, God himself approves.

MIND:

For this corroboration, Children true,
I yield thee thanks; whoe'er this Cosmos be,
He hath no wisdom childhood's simple faith
Assures, or can the wounded heart assuage,
Which stands confounded midst the maze of worlds!
Boast on thou pompous puff of vacant wind,
None but fools, denying God, would give
Thee heed.

BRAIN:

I pity them that, uninformed,
Dare smite their shallow pates against the walls
That Science rears. Speak on majestic Voice,
Howe'er they storm and rave vexatiously.

COSMOS:

(continuing more vigorously)

Know, then, beginning there is none:
What is, hath always been innate
Within the worlds, from Ether spun,
Whose soul is motion, change whose fate.

The substance of the Universe
Is increate; itself creates,
By Motion's laws, the things diverse,
That amply thrive till Time abates.

The God who is, is All in all,
Inseparate, revealed in aught,
That looms in heaven or this slight ball,
Where human tragedies are wrought.

Ask ye whence came the Force that thrives
In ocean slime and starry flame?
As well ask ye whence He derives
His being, whom ye bravely name!

Ye think Ideas throve, full formed,
Within the primal cosmic Mind,
Where aeons long they lay endormed,
Like, in some cave, the wintry wind?

But naught has come, full formed, from birth:
From primal Chaos I was brought,
With halting step and treach'rous dearth,
Whilst vast, contentious Powers wrought.

Not tiniest seed, but Nature strove,
Oft failing in her trials and tests.
To shape the form that Wisdom wove,
When Function answered Need's behests.

"The flower in the crannied wall",
The wing-songed insect in the air,
No cosmic Genius shaped withal,
By magic mind or cunning stare.

The crystallised sand-grains on the shore,
No less than sentient cell or nerve,
Their final shape and fashion wore,
When best they could fair Nature serve.

She runs her blind, persistent course,
Like river-beds that carve the earth,
And follows where the Moving Force
Directs, throughout the cosmic girth.

Not true, God thought and worlds began:
But worlds themselves are Thinking-God:
Self-shaping moves the Cosmic Plan,
In stellar dust or verdured sod.

The lowest, as the highest, seeks
Through Man the climax glorious;
In whom no less the reptile lurks,
Than angel soars from substance gross!

MIND:

I could my heart tear from my breast than list
To such invidious words that Hell itself
Inspires. I ask thee, gracious Judge to heed
My plea, and though my noble witnesses,
Thus far, should amply claim thy judgment fair,

Yet I would crave one more to summons, whose
 Inviolable fame and ancient probity,
 Will stultify insidious sophistry,
 That blaes so blasphemously from yon lips.
 Thy patience, Judge, I crave.

REASON:

But I must wait
 The willingness of your contestant. Should
 He not yield, I cannot him gainsay.
 The time's his; if he int'ruption spurns,
 You must await the final hour:

BRAIN:

Halt not,
 Majestic Judge, I would that all the force
 And vigor of mistaken error lay
 Exposed to observation clear. I seek
 But Truth's acclaim, whate'er thy verdict be.

REASON:

Thou hast permission, Mind, to summons whom
 Thou wouldst that utterance relevant hath.

MIND:

Then rise
 From where the mystic crypt conceals thy form,
 Thou ancient Messenger and Voice of God;
 Mysterious Visitant, who art the womb
 Whence I, myself, leapt forth in infantile
 Expression, and have since to wisdom grown,
 Thy tutelage vouchsafed: O Soul divine
 Implanted in my breast by God Himself,
 This tenement of clay to guard and save,
 Speak the indisputable word shall crush
 Irrevocably the lie this miscreant shouts.

*(soft, filmy, velvety clouds of white, shot with delicate pink and lurking
 hints of blue or violet, roll gently over the face of the globe,
 gradually gathering into a lissom figure, draped with
 ethereal gauze, revealing the rounded limbs and
 perfect figure of a female form divine)*

SOUL:

I am the pure ethereal Ray,
That flutters on the breast of God;
I vitalize the vulgar clay,
That looms in man from earthen sod.

Co-eval with Man's mortal frame,
And prisoned in its crumbling walls,
My presence, like a Vestal flame,
Forestalls the Fate that Man appeals.

Instinctively, as scented flower,
Seeks freedom for its perfumed breath,
I seek release from mortal power,
Ere freed by courtesy of death.

My feet, like down in dewy dusk,
Fall stealthily and soft;
My wings, like follicles of musk,
Ascend unseen the airs above.

As mist arises from the sea;
And, wind-wound, wends its moon-lit way;
Casts silver sheen athwart the lea,
And, dying, greets the new-born day;

So, float I o'er the minds of men,
And filter on their trembling hearts,
A light ne'er seen on field or fen,
That briefly lingers and departs.

Who seeks me, loses ere he finds:
As dusk with gloaming vapor reeks,
My form in tremulous folds unwinds,
Like vanishing clouds on mountain peaks.

Nor here, nor there, yet everywhere;
Though rooted in the earth yet free:
As steals a perfume through the air,
I float through space insensibly.

The flower that earns its golden crown,
Through death's decay and struggle came:
Thus I, this mortal flesh outgrown,
Shall elsewhere flaunt my wings of flame.

Perchance begot in blighted birth,
Man's natal curse devolves on me,
And I, Perdition's flame-swept girth,
Mayhap shall wend eternally.

Or, haply, not begot nor born,
But, primally, my substance one
With God, fell from His breast forlorn,
As stars from primal loose-swung sun.

I know not how my Fate is writ;
The stars my destiny may scorn:
His judgment will my deeds befit,
Who summons me to Death's dark bourne.

Perchance, like wraith of sun and sea,
Which glides awhile o'er crested wave,
Then melts in air invisibly,
I may dissolve above the grave.

Methinks, as soul of soil and seed
Is winged upon the flower's breath;
So I, from fleshly substance freed,
May, like a breath, float on through death.

Or, mayhap, like a hovering cloud,
That lingers in the moon's pale light,
—A faintly limned and filmy shroud—
I may disturb the viewless night.

BRAIN:

Alas, perplexed, bewildered Soul, I ween,
Thou canst not better read thy lore than I,
Or whoso marks the glamor of the sun,
Or pale grimaces of the moon, in Heaven's

Transforming phases, or who reads the book
The stars indite upon the vaulted Blue.
No wiser, thou, though spirit, sprung from God,
Than I ; no knowledge thine intuitive,
Profounder than that I permit the mind
To grasp by labor's search. Wert thou innate,
Co-eval with unfathomed Deity,
Then would His Wisdom like resistless stream
From fountain-head through all thy being flow.
But thy frail vision is oft blurred by fumes,
That rise from ruddy rivulets of flesh,
And dim with temporal deceit the eyes
That search for truth. Beshrew me not ; thou art
Not heaven-sprung but earth-begotten as
All substance else that Nature weaves, withal ,
In Magic tapestries of her conceit.
Wert thou as sanely privileged as Mind,
Who wanders through the myriad corridors
Of my housed cells, wherein she sleeps and wakes,
And waxes with experience ; wert thou
Conducted and sustained, like Mind, my ward,
(Howbeit she conceives herself estranged,
And crows o'er me with supercilious pride)
If guarded thus, I say, thou wouldst well know
That not by magic nor by mummary
Of words, haphazard intuition, nor
Vain Imaginings, is knowledge gained,
That guides the path of man, or Truth's impress
Engraves upon the tablets of the brain.
As grows the subtle essence of the leaves,
That crown and plumage noble trees, the Mind
Is wrought ; as buds that burst from flaming breasts
To winged flowers, and perfumes rare exhale,
Wrought from embosomed cells of complex life,
So mind is essence of the cells, that spin
Through me the myriad miracles of thought.
The mind, as thou, is not so sublimate,
It can disown the realm of matter or
Of sense.

MIND:

Halt! disputatious Fiend, think'st thou
 Revolting ignorance can sway this court?
 Think'st thou the mace of logic thus to wield,
 With juggler's nimbleness and wit? Am I
 But juice of thee, as bile of liver; I,
 But sweat that seethes from toil belabored cells,
 Or oil that fatty muscles squeeze about
 The surface of the skin; or like the flame,
 The torch releases from the fibrous wood?
 Where were all thy complex, trembling cells
 That mark the crowning miracle of earth,
 O Brain, without the architected plan,
 God images in me to guide withal
 And goad them to their tasks? What throbbing cell,
 That seems autonomous, is not my slave?
 What motivated fibre vibrates, not impinged
 By me; what nerve is conscious of itself?
 Hath cell a soul that is not mine; or mind,
 Not mine imparted?

Is the radiance of
 The sunbeam not the sun's? Shall dewdrop vie
 The heavens, or think the universe itself,
 Because it mirrors them? No more the cells,
 Thou vauntest, which but mirror me, can me
 Disown—their source—! Shall instrument disclaim
 The fingers thrumming music from its heart?

MIND:

As well believe that yonder golden sun,
 Who treads the zodiacal path and hails
 The seasons at appointed times; who marks
 Diurnal hours, and woos the swelling tides
 With arms invisible in vacuous space,
 Or clothes the humble grass with verdant robe,
 Might dissipate to nothing, and leave whole
 The world, as to assume, O foolish One,
 That Mind's imperious reign is not supreme,
 And rules all lesser kingdoms within Man.

KNOWLEDGE: *(interrupting)*

Else were mind but titillation
Of a nerve some motion caught:

THOUGHTS: *(chiming in)*

And fruit of cellular vibration,
Were each rare and noble thought.

IMAGINATION: *(sarcastically)*

And Genius, lofty inspiration,
Would from cell-coils oft receive:

MEMORY: *(solemnly)*

Whilst ancient scenes, their intimation,
Would only in scarred fibres, leave!

MIND:

Yea sore and sodden were the world, and dim
With murky visage of grim pessimists:—
And Mind with Mud were co-efficient in
Negation's fatuous sum as Nothingness
Were multiplied by Nothingness to make
Infinity of Naught. The bankrupt Age,
Would like a croaking raven reign, in black
Despair, o'er solemn rookeries of ruin!
No more, good Reason, prithee, suffer such
Base calumnies an utterance so vile!

BRAIN:

Ha! Ha! Fear sits with trembling wing upon
Thy brow and bats thy blinking eyes. Hark ye!
Ere yonder Judge his verdict renders, ye
Must hear the serious utterance of Sense,
And solemn Science. Hence I summons those
Who bear the records of their lives within
Their substance; who on metaphysic wing,
Seek not to fly or hide in foggy mist.
Hail, microscopic Dot wherein mankind
And all earth-life is registered:

*(there is a tremulous stir throughout the planetary substance while the
waters gather to a mantling cream, from whose slimy green arises
a slight FIGURE, globulous, with a large head, whose color
is green or glaucous, shimmering and vibrating cease-
lessly, and covered with filmy oscillating fibres
which are constantly reaching out as if to
grasp invisible germs in the air)*

THE SKY LORD.

BY JAMES N. WOOD.

HERALDED with high-flown phrases, the Peace Conference runs its race of audacious denial. This need not excite surprise. The mystery lies in the bland popular belief in certain related ideas, none of which are true. It seems there is to be no more war; nations are to live in amity; kindness of spirit at last hold sway among peoples. The vision would be an engaging one if there was some basis for accepting it. Unfortunately, to depict the truth, even in mild terms, is to arouse angry protest and the boisterous affirmation of righteous purpose.

Yet the error is with those who cherish illusions; it is not with those who boldly face the actual. There are principles behind the relations of men and nations so simple that they are elementary. Interest is the bond between races, nor does any other motive inspire the movements of the powerful. Peace exists no longer than interest elects, it ceases when interest is threatened. So in an assembly that embraces the representatives of rival groups, it is fair that the subject nearest the heart of each should lead to a discussion of the means best adapted to future conflicts; in this attitude candor essays to manifest itself. On fundamentals all are agreed; about them there was never any discord, in fact. The weak are to remain weak, the strong enjoy the glory of strength. On a master's will, the inferior groups must wait. To explain this dismal prospect an age of antithesis compels antithetical reasons. The apologists of the executive powers indulge in language that defines altruism only. Truth conceals itself behind inversion. Power is the crown of moral excellence.

The public will continue to accept the representations of those who speak in lofty tones of a future humanity. It will applaud the prophets who tell of an order of life they have glimpsed in the

eternal heavens. Let them enjoy the expanse, while they may, for it is a day dream that will end, as all day dreams end, in the cry and jostle of the real world. Universal empire, alone, might effect a technical avoidance of war. It would then be called treason.

With due apology to those who have read the secret script on the leaves of the sybilline books, I make bold to say that the key they use unlocks no other mystery than credulity, and there has never been much question about that. The object of the conference is far from failure. It accomplishes much, for it was called by men who are accustomed to doing things. These men deal with the palpable world. They know nothing of sentiment, except that it is a useful emotion to bestir, at times. The important move of the World Conference is that which turned the delegates to a discussion of weapons, a theme made important by many overlooked tendencies. As is usual in an age that does everything in the open, the conversation is about something else. This is democratic frankness, of which much is heard. Armaments are to be scrapped, at least a part of them. Immediate dilemma alone prevents a more drastic policy. Japan and America include opposing forces upon which time is reluctant to wait. Japan, above all, hesitates. For her, the future is more obscure. Preparedness, that magic word, chimes harmoniously with her policies.

The seriousness of the transformation at hand in military method has escaped the general. The ancient and honorable art of war promises to enter upon a phase more consonant with its traditions. Confusion about it is increased by the overdone play upon horror, something that has badly shaken the nerves of the populace. Stories of future battles between vast numbers, equipped for promiscuous slaughter; cities wiped out, engagements between monster fleets, contending against sea and heaven—faith in such forecasts has drawn a shudder from those who must man the new instruments of murder. Optimism rises to palliate dread. The net result is hopeless confusion.

Nevertheless, the future may be more considerate than propagandists would have it, for, excepting the exigency already cited, there is little for the masses to apprehend.

If the invention of gunpowder made democracy possible, the appearance of more decisive factors promises its deserved relegation to oblivion. Civilization, indeed, has reached a point in the effort to use the crowd for fighting where their utility has been proved a hopeless absurdity. The days of mob armies and mob terror prom-

ise to vanish from the struggles of the practical men for whom wars are conducted. The stupendous combination of machinery and organization by which the common man was converted into a military force has revealed its own futility. In annulling that last word of engineering art, the battleship, impotence admits its weakness. Intelligent men recognize the fact, but a dispassionate statement would have no meaning to a multitude that goes behind a mirror to discover what is reflected on its face.

When and where gunpowder originated are questions that have never been answered satisfactorily, but it is certain that by its employment the gulf separating superior and inferior was temporarily bridged. A cannon ball made no distinction between a coat of mail and a jerkin. War, once a game for men of intelligence and courage, was brought within the reach of all. The simple became complex, and the strategy of armies altered. Wholesale destruction was the ideal of a benign age. The conception of means for the cold-blooded butchery of armies, *en masse*, was one of the early manifestations of the spirit of democracy.

To this it will be answered that men were killed as effectively under the old scheme of things as they were later. This similarity is only apparent. If the losses at the battle of Chalons were as great as has been claimed, they were incurred in contests where man met man. The catastrophe was not the triumph of a machine, designed and built to exterminate a species. The warriors who blocked the path of Attila exploited their personal valor, and staked their lives on their prowess. Today, the barrage can even stop retreat.

There is food for reflection in the thought that means for inciting mass action appeared simultaneously with the changes that have been alluded to. To inspire martial spirit among a class averse to risk intensive labor was found necessary. The further development of machine warfare, the increased danger accompanying it, made it difficult to collect the material upon which the apparatus of death was to act. Hence the widespread evocation of fear before initiating modern hostilities. The crowd must be terrified by tales of what may happen if the coming enemy is victorious. From this it is but a step to a more common-place delusion, the perception of fiendish propensities in an enemy, propensities hitherto unguessed. There follows a frenzy that rouses the mob to a final effort—the mass rush. If inglorious, the method, at least, is above criticism. Numbers were necessary in recent wars and extraordinary means

to get them were justified. It is not easy to bring the ordinary man to accept the hazard of so dubious a fortune. The superior groups that dominate societies will have their differences settled. Unreasonable though it may be in the abstract, man will never consent to surrender his place in the world without a last resort to force.

The introduction of shock troops, towards the end of the late struggle, was a desperate effort to reach a conclusion through sheer bravery. It failed, for man had become powerless against embattled machinery. Flesh and blood have limitations. Steel and bronze had crushed the spirit. It was not in the mudholes where dug-in heroes awaited respite from intolerable agony that the future cast its shadow. Above the heaps of death, it serenely beckoned to the fore-runners of more human scenes. The allusion is to aircraft. Here is something that is not merely destructive—that property, alone, would only add another to the methods of taking life, numerous enough already. A different kind of man is needed to handle them. A simple statement, but one with implications that may change the world. Above the bleak stretches of trench life events transpired that brought back memories of a fairer age. The chivalry of men who recognized their own courage and that of their antagonists as well, was blazoned in the heavens like a novel ensign of Constantine. New spirits were revealed, contending in a generous rivalry.

That what they achieved was but part of the object of the masses beneath them is a small matter. What stands out is that here were men obtained with difficulty, for a difficult business. A class found after much labor, exacting selection, grim experiment, gruesome ordeal and, once trained, left to undertake attacks against men as clever as themselves.

It will be contended that the status is temporary; the air machine is only elementary, armies may yet be transported by them. Aerial conflicts may be decided by forces relatively as numerous as the hosts that war now demands. Ships manned by combatants safely behind armored barbettes, a mere matter of horsepower. The idea of safety is popular, of course. To ride the clouds in insolent security touches the popular imagination. Unfortunately, it must remain a shadow in a land of dreams. In the air certain physical requirements must be met, and with a morale unknown to the land fighter. An iron heart, the capacity to sweep through varying densities of air at lightning speed; a poise that preserves

mental clarity where the conditions call for momentous decision under extreme strain. Such men are not gathered from the casual lists of a directory. Those states will be fortunate that can find a hundred in the million. Is the statement strong? Examine the records of the recent war. Those who attained greatness in the new sphere bore the same relation to the inferior that the eagle does to the hawk. To meet them was to meet death!

One of the errors of the United States, in so far as the aerial program was conceived as a war measure, lay in believing that great numbers of hastily manned plans could accomplish something among Gargantuan scenes. No doubt graft opportunism played its part in this doleful policy, but the trivial has no place in war; certainly not in the kind the future seems to hold in store. Two considerations must be faced. The movement of an army subject to sky attack will not be practicable. To hold such forces within protecting enclosures—if that were feasible—would render them useless. The mobility and destructiveness of air units would make maneuvering impossible. The elimination of the mob army is the only corollary.

The purpose of military operations is to strike points of cardinal importance to the enemy; to destroy manufacturing centers; to achieve a moral collapse through the capture of capitals, the keys to a psychology that strikes deep into an opponent's heart. Without motion these objects must be abandoned. No body of men could be held together in the face of resolute attack from above, and with the insidious weapons now within the reach of science. The present search for an ultimate long distance gun is nothing more than an attempt to match the air machine with the ground machine. It meets none of the conditions of the problem. Vulnerable, itself, to air assault, its own fire, effectively delivered, could only inspire fear in the city that it reached. Municipalities must be defended by their own aircraft; these defeated, death will face them from bomb and gas. Immediate capitulation would follow the failure of the aerial supports.

The argument might be continued at great length, but elaboration is not necessary. One fact stands out, and it surpasses all others in significance: the revolutionary change in the character of the men required to conduct offensives. The limitation of the quality of the acting units affirms the passing of armed multitudes. But what of the political consequences? Here is a new world for the curious to ponder over.

Modern civilization holds to one path, the destruction of individualism. The ease with which the masses that compose present day society can be converted into negative will elements has been grasped, and all the forces at the command of propaganda have centered on their ruin. However great the indignation such a statement excites, it remains true that all the tendencies of social life are towards a return to ancient slavery. The mass man seeks a master, and he may yet come from the heights, for it is there the sphere of future military power is unveiled. To military power man has ever deferred. The sky lord may only await his hour!

REASON, TRADITION, AND "PURE" RELIGION.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

HISTORIANS, and especially students of religious and theological movements, are familiar with the apparently inevitable tendency to corruption and attenuation, or, more accurately, to reversion and reaction, in all great religious and ethical movements. The Founders teach revolutionary doctrines, and just because they are radical and original they challenge attention and attract converts by the thousand or the million. Novelty, boldness, daring, enthusiasm, faith, inspiration, self-sacrifice, these are the elements which give to a new religion its power over minds, hearts and imaginations. The world, alas, is always full of evil, injustice, maladjustment, bitterness. The victims of these conditions are only too ready to receive "glad tidings"—hope, reassurance, the promise of a new heaven and new earth. Discontent, of course, may be spiritual, and the comfortable, prosperous and dominating elements of a society not infrequently throw up rare individuals who can find no peace or happiness in the privileged and enviable position in which they find themselves. Christianity was slurringly called by Nietzsche a "slave religion" and its ethics he likewise called "slave ethics", but while Christianity did appeal first and principally to the disinherited, the downtrodden, the poor and lowly, it did not wholly fail to arouse the interest and devotion of men and women of the aristocratic and wealthy circles. Such disciples had their own peculiar grievances, anxieties and quarrels with the social and moral atmosphere of their time. Their still small voice protested against tyranny, wrong, cruelty and inhumanity. We may now distinguish between their altruism and the egoism of their inferiors, whose woes were more material; but the fact remains that they were not much happier than the others and the new gospel of brotherhood and equality satisfied their moral craving and longing.

Thus, to repeat, a new religion spreads and conquers by virtue of the startling and really revolutionary doctrines its founder proclaims, often at grave risk and cost, and by virtue of the striking contrast those doctrines present to the traditions and stereotyped beliefs of the community. But the converts, as they multiply and in turn seek to make fresh converts, unavoidably dilute, corrupt and misinterpret the doctrines and sayings of the founder. This process is easily explicable, and history illustrates it superabundantly.

This is why we so often hear and read of movements "back to——". In philosophy there are movements "back to Kant" or "back to Plato." In economics there are movements back to Adam Smith and Ricardo, the founders of classical political economy. In American politics we are often exhorted to revert to "the Constitution" or "the teachings of the Fathers." In religion there are sects or schools that, in so-called Christian communities, preach a return to Jesus and his own simple injunctions and principles. In other communities there are movements respectively known as the back to Mohammed, back to Buddha, or Gautama rather, and back to Confucius movements.

All this signifies that now and then a disciple of exceptional moral earnestness, or of exceptional vision and intellectual power, arises who realizes how the religion or philosophy he professes has been overlaid and conventionalized and distorted, and who would brush all these cobwebs and artificialities aside with a gesture of impatience and contempt. The fate of such conservative-radical reformers is not of the kind that generates enthusiasm in observers and would-be followers. The attempts to "go back" seldom succeed, even partially. But it is creditable to human conscience and mind that they continue to be made, despite disappointment and failure.

Just now, by reason of the lessons of the world war, or of its disillusioning aftermath, much is said concerning the need of rehabilitation and reclamation of civilized man by and through a return to genuine and primitive Christianity. True, we are told that many of the masterful leaders of modern nations are not Christians, whatever their professions may be, have no faith in Christian teaching, but rather despise and ignore it, and that, therefore, it is idle to agitate a return to Christ and the application to our problems of the gospel of Jesus—Jesus, the carpenter, the itinerant preacher, the dreamer and advocate of non-resistance. But the question is not

what this or that group, educated or miseducated in a particular school, living in a narrow and isolated sphere, thinks about genuine Christian teaching and its practicability. The question is, What does the average person in the so-called Christian world think of that teaching, its real meaning, its implications, its practicability?

If we are to revert to Christ, or to Gautama, or to Confucius, it is very important indeed to ascertain just what that return would mean to the average person, or the average body of persons, in a modern community, in terms of life, conduct, human relations and human practices.

Vague generalities will not avail. Pious wishes and sentimental exhortations will not answer. We must clear our minds of cant and be candid with ourselves. What does the formula, "Back to essential Christian teaching", involve in terms of industrial, social, political and other activities? Not to face this question is to betray intellectual and moral insincerity.

One point is absolutely clear at the start: To go back to Christ is to study earnestly and critically His own words and injunctions. We have no other source of information worthy of a moment's consideration. We have to determine what Christ said, what He meant, and what he left to the common sense and reasoning of His followers. His terms have to be interpreted in accordance with reasonable canons of interpretation. We cannot accept that which pleases us in His teaching and reject that which we deem impossible by pretending to interpret His words when, as a matter of fact, we quite obviously misinterpret them.

Now, how are we to decide what is essential, basic and irreducible in Christ's teaching? He used metaphor, imagery, fable and symbolism very freely, and many of his parables are eloquent, significant and beautiful. A few examples will suffice here: The parable of the two foundations; that of the sower; that of the grain of mustard; that of the little child; that of the marriage feast; that of the fig tree; that of the garment and the bottles; that of the creditor and two debtors.

But can we apply these fine things to problems of economics, politics, government, social organization, family life, recreation and esthetics? We cannot, for they are too abstract, too general, too vague or too subtle. We require more positive, explicit, concrete recommendations, more intelligible "middle principles", plainer mandates and directions.

Do we find such in the words attributed to Christ by the gos-

pels? We certainly do. Beyond all question, the essentials of Christian teaching are contained and imbedded in the following commandments, injunctions and "sayings":

"Love one another".

"Love thy neighbor as thyself".

"Love your enemies".

"Do good to those that hate you".

"Judge, not, condemn not, forgive".

"Resist not evil".

"Take no thought for your life".

If the foregoing quotations do not embody essential Christianity, there is no such thing as essential Christianity.

We are told by some scholars and commentators that Jesus addressed Himself only to a certain generation, to a certain *milieu*, and to a certain particular set of conditions. We are asked to bear in mind that He preached to an agricultural and primitive people, or tribe, and, further, that He believed the end of the world to be nigh. We are told that what He said to the Jews and Romans and others within his purview over nineteen centuries ago cannot be rationally supposed to apply literally to the advanced industrial populations of the present time, to a state of civilization characterized by trusts, corporations, wireless communications, cables and ocean liners, international markets, world credit facilities, federal republics, newspapers, insurance systems, investments in securities, and the like.

That the sayings of Jesus must be read and interpreted in the light of his time, environment, place and all else that these terms connote, is perfectly true. But it assuredly does not follow that the commandments and sayings of Jesus are without relevancy or applicability to modern conditions and ways of life, for to make this assertion is to renounce and repudiate Christianity altogether as a system of general and eternal truth. It is to assert that Christianity has no vital message and no significance for our day and society.

If, then, Christianity is applicable and relevant today, how are the injunctions just quoted to be applied? We must acknowledge that we violate every one of them in our daily practice. We do not love our neighbor as ourselves. We do not love our enemies. We judge and condemn. We resist and fight evil in a hundred forms. We take thought for our life and esteem that conduct a virtue. We

preach foresight, thrift, saving, insurance. We maintain court and jails and penitentiaries. We punish crime.

If to return to essential Christianity means to abolish all these evolved institutions, to renounce our habits and practices regardless of their reasonableness and wisdom, simply and solely because they *appear* to be repugnant to Christ's teaching, then, it is to be feared, such a return is absolutely impossible and unthinkable.

There remains but one possible alternative. Reason must be applied to Christian doctrines and traditions, and literal interpretation must give way to interpretations consonant at once with modern science and with the spirit and intent of the teachings in question.

We have the right to say that Christianity as taught by Jesus is an ideal—an ideal to be realized gradually and slowly. We may say that the sincere Christian is bound only to square his conduct, and preach and demand the squaring of social conduct generally, with the principles of brotherhood, solidarity, service, mutualism and loving kindness. If, for example, we punish crime, the Christian may ask us to do away with cruel and vindictive penalties, with the death sentence, with solitary confinement, with idleness in prison or like atrocities and barbarities. He may ask us to convert jails into industrial workshops and truly correctional institutions. This policy would not refrain from resisting evil, but it would deal humanely and thoughtfully with evil and eliminate malice and hatred from discipline. Again, in insisting upon justice as a foundation and adding thereto negative and positive beneficence—acts of kindness, generosity and forgiveness, the Christian has the right to claim that he is living up, as far as possible, to the spirit and essence of Christian teaching.

So far, it may be assumed, there is little room for controversy. But in the great sphere of industrial relations, what does the spirit or the essence of Christian teaching require of the nominally Christian community? This is a difficult question—one not to be disposed of by fallacious, paradoxical and rhetorical phrases.

We are told that the consistent Christians must become Socialists—Fabian, constructive, pacific Socialists, of course, not revolutionary and destructive ones. Bernard Shaw has solemnly argued that if you become a collectivist and do away with capitalism and private enterprise, with competition and individualism, you live up to Jesus' injunction against taking thought for your life. The socialist state takes thought, runs the argument, but the individual is relieved

of that burden. The individual trusts Providence, but the State keeps its powder dry, as it were, creates and saves wealth, provides pensions and insurance, and conserves the life, health and peace of all its members. This is a strange and clumsy evasion, a transparent trick. If it is un-Christian for individuals to take thought of their life, to plan and save and accumulate, then it is just as sinful for the state, the body collective, to do the same things. If Jesus had intended to preach and teach socialism, he would have done so in unmistakable terms. We would have drawn the distinction made by Mr. Shaw and not left its discovery to chance. Mr. Shaw is guilty of levity when he argues that the way to "try" Christianity is to establish the socialist state.

Moreover, what he says for Fabian Socialism might be said—indeed has been said—for Communism, for syndicalism, for Guild Socialism, for Single-Taxism. Any reformer who is convinced he has a cure-all, an ideal scheme of social organization, a certain road to freedom, harmony and well-being, is entitled to claim that society, by adopting *his* ideas, would become essentially Christian. And since there are several schools of radical reform, and since each school is as sincere and confident as any other, who is to decide which of them is sound, right, scientific and therefore Christian? Each individual must decide this matter for himself. Hence the reformer who affirms and protests that he is merely preaching Christian doctrines adds absolutely to his case. He merely makes the assertion that his scheme, if practical and workable, would bring happiness, solidarity and peace to the world. The assertion needs precisely the same kind, quality and amount of proof as his central claim does—the claim that his scheme is workable, just and reasonable.

Nay, even the earnest and high-minded defender of the existing social and economic system is entitled to assert that he is a true and consistent Christian, provided he is convinced that no better system has yet been proposed, and that fundamental change—though not, of course, minor improvements in a hundred directions—would be detrimental and disastrous to society, including the poor and the weak. A man is not un-Christian because he believes that Socialism is impracticable and undesirable. He is not un-Christian because he believes that the present economic system, with all its faults, needs no radical alterations.

Only those are un-Christian or anti-Christian who deliberately or recklessly do harm, inflict suffering, sweat and rob and plunder

their fellows, and resist such changes as are manifestly proper, reasonable and human.

The hard heart, the indifferent attitude, the denial of social solidarity, of responsibility, of duty to one's fellows—these things are un-Christian or anti-Christian. Differences of opinion regarding private property, capitalism, competition, wage relations, forms of social co-ordination and co-operation lie wholly outside the fields of Christian teaching. They are scientific and methodological differences. They concern ways and means, not the goal, the ideal.

In other words, Religion only says, Be just, Upright, Pure and Humble. It cannot undertake to translate these terms into concrete proposals respecting wage standards, rates of interest, scales of rent and profit, exact forms of industrial organization. Whatsoever promotes justice, amity, concord and peace is consonant with religious teaching. Whatsoever makes for friction, suspicion, hatred and injustice is irreligious. The contribution religion, even that of pure Christianity, or pure Buddhism, may make is wholly moral and emotional. It can and does strengthen *the desire* to seek and apply righteousness. It makes one ashamed of callousness and indifference. It energizes and inspires. It stirs and disturbs. It destroys the false peace that is based on wrong and blindness. But it cannot supplant reason, science, painstaking research and calm analysis. The problems of today must be solved by science and by open-minded experiments in social and political "laboratories". The determination to seek and work out solutions is, however, dependent less on self-interest, on short-run considerations of expediency, than on good will, the conscious recognition of the duty and blessing of service and helpfulness. Hence the value of the ethical and the religious motive. Hence the need of moral and emotional culture. Hence the legitimacy of the appeal for a return to essential and simple teachings of the great founders of religious and ethical systems which time and human error have so lamentably perverted and distorted. Recalling Matthew Arnold's definition of religion, "ethics touched with emotion", it is necessary to add that ethics based on mere and sheer self-interest will inspire no emotion. The emotion can only be called forth and perpetually renewed by the contemplation of the sublime, the mysterious, the eternal and the beautiful, and by pondering on the place and mission of moral man, with his marvelous endowments, in the cosmic scheme. In invoking pure and undefiled religious principles, let us make sure that reason and conscience alike accompany us on our pilgrimage.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT CHINA.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

(Continued).

III. CONFUCIUS TO HSUN TZU (551-212 B. C.)³³

ON his own confession and as we can readily see otherwise, Confucius³⁴ was not an original thinker, but professed only to be a transmitter of the maxims of the ancient sages, of whom he was a very eager and conscientious editor and admirer. Nor did he need to be any different than this in view of the place which he sought to fill in the history of Chinese religion, philosophy and literature. His only original work was the "Ch'un Ch'iu Ch'uan"³⁵—Spring and Autumn Records', some loosely put together annals and anecdotes of his native Lu state. He kept always before his mind's eye the practical aim to instruct the rulers of the feudal states to which he travelled; and thus, by rendering the governments of the various departments more tranquil, just and peacefully in-

³³ The period between the birth of Confucius and the death of Hsün Tzu, being perhaps significantly enough the three centuries leading up to the Burning of the Books, covers the lives of most all the original Chinese philosophers—original in the sense that nearly all subsequent sages have become famous thru taking part pro and con in the controversies arising from the numerous doctrines which were promulgated during this period. That these doctrines were of the most radical diversity, and yet had a subtle thread of common purpose and rationality connecting them, we may readily observe from mere mention of names and viewpoints, thus: Confucius and his Chesterfield ethics in government policy; Mencius the apostle of moral dignity and adversary of the mystics; Chuang Tzu the romanticist of Taoism; Yang Chu the incorrigible Schopenhauer-Walter Pater of Chinese hedonism; Mo Ti the all-suffering altruist; and Hsün Tzu the misanthrope of Divine Law.

孔夫子
see note 29.

³⁴ Literally, The Teacher K'ung. For a recent exposition of the general viewpoint of the Confucian system,

春秋傳

³⁵ They cover, none too thoroly, the period 722-481 B. C.

clined, the people of the empire as a whole could be more easily ruled and ennobled. Like Plato, his ideal man was a combination of the king and the sage into one harmonious soul. The philosopher-king would make no unseemly assumptions of power or authority in administering the sacred functions of his office, heavenly not personal disposition being his holy covenant and avowed responsibility. Such a kingly sage is thus considered the son of Heaven and, on taking over the rule of a state, will choose equally enlightened men for his superior officers; the superior officers will then select talented men of similar character for the inferior offices, and so on down to the general population who would thereby have a complete cycle of example, as well as a just, peaceful and prosperous government, after which to pattern their own lives. The manner in which this was to be accomplished was worked out in the Ta Hsüeh ³⁶ or "Great Learning", where it is laid down that nothing can compare with the honor and happiness of him who places all his thoughts on the three cardinal virtues ³⁷ of wisdom, humaneness, integrity; while trusting all his actions to accord with the five practical virtues ³⁸ of sincerity, courage, conciliation, justice and courtesy.

Above all natural gifts and unaided accomplishments, Heaven has decreed that by nature man should be predisposed toward good; that perversity is not human nature, it is atavism, it is submission to animal propensity; and that it is only because of sloth, inertia, dullness or downright sensual desire in the individual himself if some slight betterment of the original birthright is not pursued and in some measure realized. This is also the main argument to be traced through the Lun Yu ³⁹ or Analects, as they are called in Dr. Legge's translation, where it is constantly reiterated that everyone in the empire has sufficient strength to attain to a virtuous life if he only exert it in that direction. In this work there appears a fine example of how Confucius would put into practice his theory of state instruction. It is a dialogue in which a certain ruler named Chi K'ang asked "What do you say to my killing off the unprin-

³⁶ A study whose *greatness* consists in lofty moral sentiments and political rationalia which are universally applicable to the affairs of empire, state, family and personal life.

大學

³⁷ 三常德仁中

³⁸ 五德信勇和義禮

論語

³⁹ Literally, expository discussions (with disciples).

cipled for the good of the principled?" Confucius answered him, saying: "Sir, in carrying on your government why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desire be for what is good, and the people will be good. . . . The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass: when the wind blows the grass must bend". (Is it any more than a strange coincidence that our own New England philosopher Thoreau has almost the identical words in the eighth chapter of "Walden"?)

The Confucian ethic of ceremony and respect for tradition, however, was the direct opposite to that of Lao Tzu; and the agnostic attitude which he obstinately professed against metaphysics did not encourage any inquiry as to the existence of God or any other superhuman beings or powers. There are only a few straggling allusions which only mention a divinity of merely passive functions. One of these appears in the *Chung Yung*⁴⁰ where Tzu Ssu speaks of the Supreme Ruler receiving sacrificial offerings which are made at the equinoxial ceremonies in reverence of Heaven and Earth. It is almost a measure of pathos to find that Confucius had a great reverence amounting almost to a worship, not of God and things divine, but for things aged or associated in any symbolical way with the past. And yet he preserved an attitude of strict reserve in regard to religion, and only emphasized the analogy between the way physical nature was ruled from Heaven and the way a kingdom should be ruled by the sovereign-sage. He revered, not so much a God conceived ideally in his own mind, as the one that his fathers and other preceding sages had revered and made sacrifices to. Accordingly then, he came to advocate a religious doctrine of the divinity of man's neighborly service to his fellow man—a notion under which, being so narrowly concerned in finite interests, any direct worship or duty toward God was superfluous if not foolish and futile. He allowed, however, that the highest degree of divinity can only be that purity of spirit, that specific genuineness of heart to which men at best can only approximate. He did not seem capable of objectifying this conception, and consider that there was a regnant spirit of Reality and Truth which is the governing principle of the Cosmos.

子思中庸

⁴⁰ Literally, middle course (of meritorious conduct). A brief but scholarly resume of the Confucian viewpoint in relation to Western thought was written as a thesis for the Chūjen degree by Wu Tun-I who took first honors at the Chekiang provincial examination in 1903. A translation of this essay, together with many other interesting features, appeared in the "East of Asia" magazine for June, 1904, an educational number.

Some of the more famous disciples of Confucius, and those of his immediate followers who expanded and championed his institutions, were first the group called "the four associates of the Master", consisting of his grandson, Tzu Ssu, or K'ung Chi, who was author of the *Chung Yung*, Ts'eng Ts'an, who wrote the *Hsiao King*,⁴¹ Mencius "the second holy sage", and Yen Hui or Yen Yüan,⁴² who was one of Confucius' favorite disciples and upon the event of whose death Confucius lamented: "Alas, alas! Heaven is ruining me, Heaven is ruining me!" Yen Ying, who wrote a preface to the "*Spring and Autumn*",⁴³ is remembered for serenity and thrift, having worn the same fox skin robe for thirty years. Yen Wang, governor of Wu Ch'eng, who advocated music and ceremonial as a means to social reform, and who is now rated one of the "twelve wise men" in the Confucian Temple at Peking. Tzu Kung, magistrate of Hsing Yang and one of the "four friends", who is noted as a debater of quick perception and who did not believe in the actual sovereignty of Heaven because of the evil and misery in the world. Another of the Four Friends was named Tzu Lu, the brusque but capable magistrate of P'u I, considered rashly brave but yet filial, frugal and generous whence he is ranked one of the 24 examples of filial piety. It is said that he had a fondness for periodically retiring to some shady nook in the woods and humming over the lines of the Ode beginning: "Unhampered by aversion and envy, what else besides good can we do?" Then there were Tzu Yu and Tzu Hsia, the students of literature and history, who pledged themselves to the joint purpose of teaching that "wide research and steadfast decision, eager questioning and close reflection—these are the ultimate principles of ethics which serve to civilize mankind."

Mencius,⁴⁴ who lived two centuries later, was the most able

曾子孝經 ⁴¹ Was written about 475 B. C. Ts'eng Tzu is also said to be the author direct of the "Great Learning" which he wrote as a posthumous memoir of the Confucian aims and principles.

顏回子 ⁴² Lived about 514-483 B. C.: "The good die young".

晏嬰子春秋序 ⁴³ Lived about 537-493 B. C. I have a copy of notes, Shanghai, 1893. Commissioner Sun Huang Yen's standard edition with

孟軻子 ⁴⁴ About 372-289 B. C. There are two extant phases of Mencius' intellectual labors which make up the seven books of his "Works". One is the Wan Chang (three books), named after a contemporary philosopher with whom, and a few other disciples, Mencius discussed the virtues, wisdom, ways, and experiences of the ancients. The other, entitled Liang Hui Wang chuan chu (Chao Ch'e is editor of the standard edition), is in four books and contains discussions with King Hui of Liang, capital of the Wei state.

and loyally industrious of all the followers. He was a sturdy exponent of the Confucian doctrine of human goodness at birth, arguing from the assumption that the four virtues, charity of heart, ethical duty, integrity and wisdom are innate. Into nearly all events and incidents he read the sacred dispensations of God, providing, however, that any evil or inauspicious occurrence was largely a result of some sort of humanistic tampering with the divine will,—a nobly aspirational (for that time) but still largely anthropomorphic provision, to be sure. He pointed out that the moral dignities of God, which are essential to the balance and preservation of life, survive through the turmoil of the material world only because of our “good birth”, although they are very often obscured and even lost occasionally in the mad struggle to acquire the temporal or political dignities of man. The fact is that this latter worldly ambition is the curse of all human existence; it throws sand in our eyes and then leads us astray; it corrupts us with the bribe of immediate reward and then cheats us out of the eternal integrity which is our birth-right. In the Works, I, vi, 2-4 Mencius gives an illustration of this all too universal folly by hinging his argument on that false conception of a humanistic satisfactorism, the notion of *profit*, and intimates that it is totally unnecessary in the just and righteous conduct of affairs both of the state and of the individual.

Hui Wang of the Liang Capital of Wei State⁴⁵ welcomes Mencius, saying: “Venerable Sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand li, may I presume to ask if you are likewise provided with counsels that will profit my kingdom?” To this Mencius surprises the king by answering him with a counter question and exhortation thus: “Why must your majesty speak of profit? There are benevolence and righteousness, and any sincere practice of these should suffice. If your majesty continue to say, ‘What can I do to profit my kingdom?’, the superior officers will take example to say, ‘What can we do to profit our families?’, and the inferior officers will then hold it no more than expedient for them to say, ‘What can we do to profit ourselves?’. Superiors and inferiors will then try to snatch this profit the one from the other, while the opportunist ruler watches to see who shall prove the winner, and the state is endangered. There never has been a man trained to benevolence who neglected

⁴⁵ Amout 368 or 366-319 B. C., was the famous patron of Mencius (see preceding note). It is said he had a ready ear for slander and plans which bordered on unscrupulous expediency, as witness his treatment of the astronomer Tsou Yen.

his parents; there never has been a man trained to righteousness who made his sovereign an after-consideration. Let your majesty rather say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and these only'. Again Sir, I ask, why must you use that word profit?"

And further on, in Book III, he lays it down that "a man's impulse is to do good, for his nature is good. That he does not do good is not to be considered the fault of his natural faculty, but as the result of some external persuasion. . . . Humaneness, the sense of justice, propriety, and the sagacity of intelligence ⁴⁶ are not what may be molded or instilled into us from without. They are inherent in us, only people are not conscious of their presence". In view of this confident appreciation of human nature, Mencius was yet sufficiently belligerent and controversial to entertain a strong feeling against the egoist pleasure-seeker, Yang Chu, and the all-suffering altruist, Mo Ti, urging in Section 14 that the "refutation of the specious arguments of Yang and Mo should be like the taming of wild hogs: after they have been put in a pen, they should be bound fast and silenced". Truly a strange remark from an ethical teacher!

Like his great predecessor, Confucius, Mencius gave little quarter to metaphysical doctrines, and with the exception of a few passages in book three where he remarks that Ch'i the prime mover, aether, spirit, pneuma or animated air, is for him the psychical magician of the Cosmos,⁴⁷ there is little thought given to theorizing about such things as before his time had delighted and fascinated Kuan Chung, Lao Tzu, Wang Hsu, and the other mystics and rationalists. His favorite literary model was the Chung Yung of Tzu Ssu, after whose style he developed most of his ethical notions, arguing that the qualities known as benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are irreducible from empirical conditions alone, but must rather be recognized as arising from the inherent constitution of our feelings and the freewill of moral choice. The nature of the propensities with which we are born are appointed of Heaven, are therefore good, and must be developed and matured in the proper way if we expect no evil to be known or practiced afterward.

In keeping with this divine origin, human nature is to be conceived as a co-operating organism jointly ruled by mind and

⁴⁶ 仁義禮智

⁴⁷ 天皆有自然之氣

spirit,⁴⁸ the first to judge and guide us through the ever darkening world, the other to energize and enthuse us with the aspiration toward our goal where we will ultimately realize our sacred heritage. Accordingly then, each of us is responsible for the degree of his nobility and the moral growth to which he has attained; and this responsibility confers the right and authority of instruction in how those of lesser attainment may make further progress past their lowly station. Outside of the filial duties of children to parents, of wife and husband, and of all men to their ancestors, this qualification for moral instruction is to be had only through a supreme fidelity to the service of Heaven, the delight and constancy of men living for the Truth, for the sake of God's domain and the encouragement of all humanity.

A slightly younger contemporary and rival of Mencius was the mystic philosopher Chuang Sheng,⁴⁹ who explained and defended the positions taken up by his traditionary master Lao Tzu, trying thereby to supplant Confucius as the popular idol and moral arbiter of the day. His work, originally in 53 chapters, survives at present in 33 well commented chapters entitled "*The Sacred Book of Nan Hwa*", this last being the name of a hill in modern Shensi to which he retired from official life. It is a document devoted to a degree to refuting the too hypocritical ethics of Confucius and the utilitarian love notions of Mo Ti, not so much by any direct logic of opposition, as by means of a more subtle style of expressing his more speculative and suggestive thoughts. Chuang was as much a mystic perhaps as Lao Tzu; he was certainly more romantic and prolific in imagination, although he did not pronounce with as much cryptic emphasis the necessity of the clearest moral virtues resulting from the practical Tao.

Lao Tzu's *T'ien Tao* and *Jen Tao*, the heavenly reason and human reason, became for Chuang simply T'ien and Tao. In Chapter 13 where this subject is discussed he shows that the former remains the First Cause while the latter becomes a conception more relative and personal like what we popularly conceive as God. To

⁴⁸ 志氣

莊子內篇齊物論 and the title of the standard edition of his writings, first collected together and published in 1005 A. D. by order of Emperor Chen Tsung. Even before that, during the early part of the eighth century, considerable prestige was attached to his doctrines, as there was an imperial decree requiring the civil examinations to cover questions relative to Taoism as presented in his expositions. Lin Hsi Chung and Yao Nai are his foremost modern interpreters.

Chuang not this personal being, but T'ien the Heavenly Way was more truly God, for it was the sole universal Reality. And though it was considered the first principle of all things, yet it was a less abstract conception and stood in need of Tao as its practical possibility, and later as supplying also the method itself of the T'ien's manifestation. Thus the absolutism of Lao Tzu's Tao is transferred to T'ien, and as all else depends upon the variations of the Tao-method, so does a through and through relativity obtain in the Universe which has resulted from it and which we seek to know.⁵⁰ This theory is charmingly illustrated in the famous Chapter 17 entitled *Ch'iu Shui* (Autumn Floods) where he explains his idea of the cosmic relativity, using the allegory of the Ocean Spirit speaking to the River Spirit about knowledge, dimensions, time, and the fallacy of absolutist criteria in human thought and science. Again, in a section in the Hidden Spring, he tells that "The ultimate end is God. He is manifested in the laws of Nature. He is the Hidden Spring of all existence. At the beginning He already was; in the end He will continue to be. This, however, is inexplicable; it is unknowable. And yet from the unknowable we reach the knowable."

Chuang Tzu conceived the human personality of soul to be of the divine essence a portion which suffers the misfortunes of birth and worldly life and relishes the release of death; but withal a goodly portion quite capable of that smooth polish which will reveal to us the truth as in a mirror. But it must be recognized as spiritual not sensual. Its development requires a training and a constant care apart from the hearing of the ears, the vision of the eyes, the travel of the feet, or the selfish thinking of the finite mind. It requires the diligent attention of the fasting heart, the contemplative stillness of the philosophic retreat, and a steady emulation of the noble deeds and doctrines of the worthy men of old. There seemed to be a tincture of Buddhist asceticism in this spiritual advice. Thus too, in the chapter (32) on the mystery and imminence of Tao, he uses the imaginary philosopher Lieh Tzu to illustrate the superiority of the Tao-sage over the mere magic of earthly or humanistic shrewdness. Chuang's ethical theory then had a sort of "beyond good and evil" notion holding that our dualism of vir-

天道人道 ⁵⁰ "Heavenly Reason and human reason" as a phrase of profound philosophical importance has had quite a history, not only from Lao Tzu's original use and the mysticism attached to it by Kuei Ku Tzu and Chuang Tzu, but by the several masonic and monastic orders of Taoism. "Faith in God and devotion to the Righteous Way secure the Seven Jewels in the human heart".

tue and vice, pleasure and pain, wisdom and folly, is but a one-sided attitude. The true philosophic view looks upon the situation from an impersonal standpoint; it is therefore one of natural tranquility and passive intellectual calm, free from any consciously directed motive, and acts only in a selfless sphere of non-moral content.

His cosmology too, as presented in Chapter 12, might be summed up in the sentence: "All things are One, and that One is God", thus departing from the teaching of the Odes in which God is held aloof, in fact too far away from human affairs to afford us any practical assistance in times of dire need. It was also a departure from the anthropomorphic notions of the more secular-minded religionists, for his unique instruction was that God, being One, is all embracing and therefore leaves no room for differences or distinctions of quality or attribute. Nevertheless, at a later period of his life Chuang came to see Lao Tzu's Tao a greater-than-God, i. e., the spirit of growth and betterment which supplies our aspirations and keeps even God Himself from going into worldly discard. Accordingly then Tao, being the Way and the Word, soon came to be looked upon as the only really eternal and omnipresent law in the Universe, whereby all beings draw their spirituality and all things attain to their co-ordinate oneness of value and destiny among the divine evidences.

Chuang Tzu also had the flower-name Hu Tieh (Butterfly) derived from his famous dream in which he believed himself to be a butterfly, and on awakening from which he wondered if it were not highly possible that his wakeful state was itself a deeper dream in which he believed himself a man. The account of this dream, ridiculed by Hui Tzu, Chuang's sophist opponent and minister of Liang, has been given charming interpretation by Hsiang Hsiu⁵¹ (3rd Century A. D.) and is considered a fine piece of philosophical allegory by Kuo Hsiang, his latest editor (1893). At any rate it is a conception which might remind us of the Byzantine Greeks of a contemporaneous period who used the design of a butterfly as a symbol of the soul, its bipartite symmetry of form, its beauty, innocence, elusiveness of capture, and the mystery of its metamorphic birth.

As above mentioned Mencius had another contemporary rival

南秀 ⁵¹ Was one of the Seven Sages of Bamboo Grove near modern Tientsin. Hsiang Hsiu says that the Hui Tzu here mentioned is not King Hui, but his minister, albeit of similar disposition.

named Yang Chu⁵² who was a native of Lian, Capital of Wei State. He was an egotist and pessimist in many respects very similar to Schopenhauer. But in his doctrine of virtue he made it a point to "steer clear of culture" consistently almost as if he had been a disciple of Epicurus himself. Though an industriously busy thinker and exhorter, yet he wrote nothing so far as has been recorded, and excepting a few anecdotes in Chuang Tzu's writings, the only surviving account of his opinions is a lonely chapter (7) in the pseudo-authoritative *Lieh Tzu*. We are there instructed that all truth and wisdom and merit are but relative qualities, in that our individual natures are so made up that what one recognizes and aspires to as being true, prudent and honorable, another will deny and condemn as being false, foolish and vicious; and also that individual relish and ability are such that what is easy and natural for one to do, is found difficult and disagreeable to another. Thus is the principle introduced that we should follow our own natural talents and propensities regardless of others' notions about what is best for us to do. Any attempt at criticism or advice being largely an automorphism anyway.

Herein we find that Yang Chu was a philosopher of sense-validity and with keen discrimination took Man and Nature as found at first hand and free of the secondary metaphysical subtleties and suppositions which, down through the ages of personally biassed speculation, have become so strongly attached to them. He preached also the validity of true egoism which looks on men and things as *separate* from one's self, totally independent not only in their life-functions, but even in their ideals, their chosen activities, aversions, work-motives, and sense-judgments of what constitutes propriety in ethics and religious ceremony. Hence it is to be considered not only unphilosophical and irreligious, but also as bad governmental theory for us to assume the care or control of others, or to take sufficient presumption to lay down a code of laws which the people of a whole kingdom are expected to conform to without question and without any expression of personal choice. Individ-

揭朱 ⁵² In a prefatory note to *Lieh Tzu*'s seventh chapter we read that Yang Chu was a younger contemporary of Mo Ti; that their doctrines were diametrically opposite; and that while the latter was so full of brotherly love that he would sacrifice all to save the world one item of sorrow, the former was so full of self-love that he would not injure a single hair even tho it were of service to the whole world. Thruout the chapter Yang Chu appears to be anti-religious, anti-ritual, anti-ancestral, anti-everything except self-serving pleasure and whatever else would minister to his hedonistic conception of life and Nature.

ualism can save a state if let alone, but autocracy and despotism lead to ruin.

The far wiser and more natural course, according to Yang Chu, is to look to our own heart and mind and soul for the simplest solution to life's problems,—these problems being in general little more than difficult personal or family affairs in which another's way of thinking and living will neither fit absolutely nor serve economically. And furthermore, we would never be content to express our individual talents in the way best suited to another nor according to any foreign code; no more readily than a musical genius would attempt to do his composing in a shambles or a boiler-shop. Thus there are as many answers to the riddle of life as there are individual minds and organisms to share its experience. They all vary and are uncertain of any universal specific. No particular one is the absolute decision; and so accordingly we should conceive of the world as a pluralism of living motive, independent in both the structure and function which are sufficient to the carrying out of whatever the individual motive is to which they may belong. On the other hand, if we should once find that all was certitude, that every one of our actions was already blocked off in strict and miserly economy, and that the ten-thousand-things in the Universe had no individual reality or freedom of moral choice, there would then be no more room nor even necessity for aspiration in our religion nor speculation in our philosophy.

With this note of individualism constantly on his lips, Yang Chu taught that the practice of virtue is of no tangible avail in this world, grown as it has so divergent from the Way of Heaven and the benevolent way of the ancients, grown weak-hearted and careless by natural process of years and now being fast made worse by the evildoings of cunning but unscrupulous men. Virtue is not even its own reward in the vulgar world, for cleverness, seeking the reward first, will make a sham pretence and spoliage the virtue. As often as not the wicked are the most fortunate while the virtuous are the most afflicted and miserable; and it is a constant hazard whether or not this discouraging circumstance shall ever be reversed and put into its proper proportion. Therefore with happiness in a hopeless minority, the best plan of life is to shun all idle and vain pursuits, such as fame, wealth, social prestige, official preferment and left-handed (i. e. mercenary) altruism; seeking only that form of conduct of content of life which shall make for the most security, simple loyalty and tranquil thought.

With all his sage pessimism Yang Chu did not exercise the same influence against the Confucian Canon as did the more thorough-going misanthrope Hsün K'uang or Hsün Tzu⁵³ magistrate of Lan Ling in the Ch'u state. If, as we have agreed, it was Mencius who developed the humanism involved in the Confucian teachings, so can it also be said that Hsün emphasized the ceremonial side, holding not that the end justifies the means, but that the proper means are required in order that the end may be justified. The end that is sought is the improvement and rectification of man's nature, which though evil at birth, may yet be redeemed and purified through the good graces of time if we will but employ the proper methods for so doing. Thus then, it is first laid down that human nature is primarily bad, a structure from its very dedication standing in need of numerous vital repairs; and that the purpose, not only of ethics, but of all our cultural efforts both sacred and secular, is how to intelligently devise ways and means of rectifying the crookedness. Two principal disillusionments are to be sooner or later accomplished. First, the social illusion must be destroyed because it serves no really useful purpose: society being a purely artificial growth on the face of the earth, and even the so-called superior man is merely the highest type of such artifice. Second, self-culture unaided by example or instruction is impossible, owing to the inherent tendency toward reversion and the evident limitations of individual power and initiative faculty.

Were society not an illusory organism of artifice, and if man were of a nature good at birth, personal culture would then be quite possible and in proportion to its relish would also be a most useful and practical pastime. But with the condition of things as they are at present constituted, we must also do away with the illusion that the ego has powers above itself or that it can secure a latitude beyond its original endowment. There are, however, relative degrees of goodness to be found in the State which existed as an organized and law-abiding community long before the birth of the individual. It was the peculiar purpose of these relative degrees of goodness to have given us the rules of propriety primarily meant to hold in abeyance the evil tendencies surviving in every man, but which have been thinly glossed over with a veneer of what we are pleased to call civilization. Herein then was shown the supreme function of the State, which was to so apply its rules of propriety

⁵³ About 280-212 B. C. See my translation in the *Open Court* for June, 1921. The standard edition of his writings was published by Chia Shan Hsieh, Shanghai, 1893 (32 chapters).

that a man, who in his original nature was uncouth and rough-hewn, could be rendered more shapely and more nearly akin to moral symmetry. If from no other evidence than this we were to judge the perfection of a State, we could readily see the degree of goodness to which it had attained and that for which it was seeking.

The fundamental viewpoint on which Hsun Tzu's whole apparatus revolved was expressed in his famous essay⁵⁴ on the innate depravity of human nature. He argued that "If man's nature were inherently good he would not need to be continually taught and governed; he would do right spontaneously. No one lives a virtuous and noble life without constant self-denial; but if man is naturally good as Mencius claims, why do his natural inclinations require that he exercise denial and repression, replacing them with the artificial manners of etiquette and external law? No tenable answer being offered I conclude that man's nature is therefore crooked and perverse, always in need of the everlasting instruction of the sages and the constant restraint of wise rulers". Hence, although his attempt to prove that human nature is evil at birth was in direct contradiction to the notions held by Confucius and Mencius, yet he also opposed them indirectly with an objectivistic hypothesis which seemed to be intended to undermine the whole structure of ancestral aid and the much-sought reward for being properly filial in their presence. He tacitly set forth "that a man who is not erect by nature has a stupid and vulgar (monkey) heart, and all the penalties of retribution will not completely restrain what the example of sages fails to inspire. Moral practices do not progress by any means of retrospection; rather must a man consistently apply himself to the immediate discipline, neither seeking pleasure nor fearing pain."

This limitation of the moral development to processes of the immediate present served to show how badly in need all men were, and how urgently they required both the ethical regulations of the State and the patient instructions of qualified teachers if a moral end or any degree of good were ever expected to result from their life. But even with this high ideal, the intended improvement was not to be made for the glory of God's domain, for God himself was conceived as a being merely improvised for the sake of leading us on, encouraging us with a sense of divine succor and security, and aiding our realization of happiness, goodness and truth. According-

人之性惡其善者偽也⁵⁴ This is the first sentence of chapter 23 which now includes both the original essay and Hsun Tzu's subsequent remarks in rebuttal of certain critics and opponents. It means that: "Man's natural disposition is evil; his goodness is artificial".

ly then, man's theological invention is a personal God who is to be distinguished from the guardian spirits of Nature, because they are subject to the vicissitudes of time and space, while God is subject only to reverence and supplication. Hsün still seems also to conceive an impersonal God who is unchangeable and omnipresent, while yet remaining a Being who is knowable through the justice and moral economy of His Laws. Thus, like Chuang's Tao, He is not to be blamed if failure and calamity follow upon transgression, on our part, of those laws. If we contract a loan we should not expect it never to fall due.

Altho Hsün Tzu met his death at the hands of some law-breakers who were taking advantage of the First Emperor's decree that all the classical books should be burned, and many native scholars place a charge of ingratitude upon his two famous pupils, Li Ssu and Han Fei Tzu, for counselling such a decree, we still have a few tokens of their regard for his stern justice and versatile learning. The latter⁵⁵ was the most sorry of the two, altho he shared with Hsün a well developed sense of sternness and official dignity. In his writings, which are preserved to us in 55 chapters, we find such notions as follows: that the Lord Tao is the First Reality and, unobserved by men, governs the Universe; that this government covers the world of man and is carried on by means of inexorable laws (6, 40, 54); that useful men take pattern from antiquity and watch the five degrees of reverence (27); that learned men are of two sorts—philosophers and literati (50); that the proper exercise of authority is difficult (36 to 40); that laws of mind are sublimations of physical laws (51, 54); and six chapters on the various aspects, causes, uses, and opinions concerning the inner life and external affairs (30-35). In this latter discussion he claims that we might have ten Yellow Emperors, but if there is no popular regard for benevolence and rectitude our governmental efforts will be futile.

(To be continued.)

士其難 ⁵⁵ Lived about 290-233 B. C. One outstanding contrast between Han Fei Tzu and his master Hsün Tzu is that he lacked the pessimism and misanthropy of the latter; he was rather a mystic with sympathies for Taoism and antiquarian lore. In Ch'ien Tao's revised edition (1893) of his writings, chapter 20 is devoted to "explaining Lao Tzu". After analyzing the internal and external economy attending virtue, benevolence, rectitude, propriety, and sincerity, he says that: "These qualities are the human version of Tao. Understanding their nature constitutes wisdom. Practicing them constitutes virtue. Virtue is Tao realized. Charity of heart is the glory of virtue. Rectitude is benevolence privately applied. Courtesy is the ornament of duty. And sincerity binds the whole. . . . This is the Law and the Covenant".

EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK: A PROPHET OF CIVIL WAR TIMES.

BY CHARLES KASSEL.

TO THE readers of the *Open Court* the name of Edwin Miller Wheelock is not wholly unknown. As early as 1908—less than ten years after the death of that obscure but highly gifted personality—excerpts from *Proteus* were published in the *Open Court*, accompanied by a remarkable photograph of its author; and a beautiful edition of the work complete came from the press of the Open Court Publishing Company in 1910, with an appreciative foreword by Dr. Paul Carus and a biographical note by the present writer. A fragment in the strain of *Proteus*, found in a manuscript sermon, was published in the September issue, 1920, of the *Open Court*, and the same issue of that magazine contained a more elaborate life-sketch by the writer of the present paper, condensed from an unpublished biography.

Proteus and its author were distinctly a discovery of Dr. Paul Carus. The work itself, in the form of a pamphlet privately printed, remained unnoticed until chance brought it to the attention of Dr. Carus, whose verdict upon its philosophy and rare poetic beauty was immediate and enthusiastic.

It was not only, however, as a philosopher and writer that the name of Edwin Miller Wheelock deserves a place in the annals of his time. He was a powerful and eloquent preacher as well, whose utterances in a great crisis of American history mark him as belonging to the true order of prophets.

In every age there are impressive and heroic figures who, long before the mass of men, seem by some mysterious faculty to sense the on-coming of events. These are the seers of humanity, and literature and history are full of their marvelous glimpses into the unlighted future. It is as a seer, whose place in the authentic line of his fellows has been fixed by events, that we deal in this paper with the author of *Proteus*.

The anti-slavery cause, to which our subject was bound by every instinct of his being, passed with the death of John Brown beyond the stage of academic discussion. It was now a great crusade with its own shining martyr, whose blood should serve as the seed of victory. It was the execution of John Brown, indeed, which offered the supreme challenge to the heart and intellect of our minister and evoked those impassioned and prophetic utterances which are and must forever remain unique in the history of the period.

By the law of the land the revolutionary is always a criminal. Under the statutes of England, Washington and his compatriots were rebels and outlaws. Such, likewise, according to the North, were the leaders of the Southern armies. The historian brushes aside these superficial considerations and looks upon historic movements in the light of their final destiny. In this light John Brown was a capital figure in American history. That truth the humblest of us now perceive. It was because Edwin Miller Wheelock perceived it *then*, and perceived it earlier and more clearly than the other thinkers of the time, that this essay becomes worthy of publication, embodying as it does, in the ensuing paragraphs, a quotation from the unpublished biography we have mentioned.

The second day of December, in the year 1859, was a day of awful moment in American History. On that day the edict was registered in the Book of Fate that the American nation should suffer the pangs of a gigantic revolution and that a great national sin should be purged away in a baptism of fire and blood—a baptism not brief but, on the contrary, bitterly prolonged that the agonizing ordeal might sear into the nation's memory and leave its impress forever.

The makers of the federal constitution, approaching the problem of confederating the victorious colonies into a cluster of states, snuffed danger in the institution of slavery but thought it best to avoid an issue with it rather than imperil the hope of union. It was a compromise with an institution clearly recognized as an evil but it was a compromise which would make possible the adoption of the Constitution by all the colonies and which would leave open the problem of chattel slavery for final solution in the future. Could the bloody sequel have been foreseen, that compromise would have been refused, and all plans for the consolidation of the colonies might have fallen.

There might still have been time in the early decades of the

federal union for a successful grapple with the evil, and the enduring interest of the nation dictated an unrelenting effort in this direction. The presence of human slavery in a nation peculiarly dedicated to liberty was a reproach. It gave the lie to all the fine professions of the Declaration of Independence. Everywhere, North and South, sensitive natures felt the stigma of the institution. More and more, however, the material interests of the people stilled the voice of conscience, and the hour of settlement, which the wisest men felt to be inevitable, was again and again postponed.

It was a mere accident of climate, perhaps, that gave slavery its chief foothold at the South, and about the South, as about Laocoon and his sons in the marble group, this serpentine institution wound itself with ever deadlier folds. Time was, even at the South, when every sober mind recognized in slavery a moral evil for which no practicable remedy seemed to present itself, but as events grew toward the catastrophe a moral numbness upon the subject spread itself over Southern minds.

The time had now passed for any peaceful settlement. In the procrastination of a quarter of a century the remission of this sin without the shedding of blood had become impossible. The fathers had hoped for an extinction of slavery and the removal of this single stain upon American good faith in the cause of liberty. But that hope was now gone. All that remained was to prevent its extension and to this end alone Northern statesmen devoted their energies.

Even that effort, however, was vain. It was an issue of arms and events waited for the man who could realize this truth and who could see that the lasting interest of North and South alike dictated the hastening of the contest that its conclusion might be speeded, and a new birth of freedom for the land assured while yet there was time. A little more folding of the hands in sleep and the hour, even for a warlike settlement, might pass and the country become wholly slave or be effectually broken up into a slave nation and a free.

The role of John Brown in that crisis springs from the fact that he clearly saw this truth and acted upon it. While all about him at the North were moving under a spell of fancied security, he sensed the hour of fate and knew that the appointed time was at hand. His bloody part on the side of freedom in Kansas during 1856—something which was not known or believed at the North until long after his death—can be understood only by remembering

that he thought of the war intuitively as on already, and it is only with this in mind that the exploit at Harper's Ferry becomes comprehensible. Success at Harper's Ferry was wishworthy from Brown's standpoint but even failure there and ultimate martyrdom would serve a supreme use.

The surprise and seizure of the arsenal at Harper's Ferry by John Brown and his handful of men occurred on October 16, 1859. It was the first step in a plot to free the slaves of Virginia. If successful, the raid was to be repeated on a larger scale elsewhere. The adventure was meant to be a bloodless one but this hope was as vain as the plot itself. John Brown had reckoned on the co-operation of the slaves, but the slaves were apathetic and held listlessly the weapons placed in their hands. This was a factor he had not counted on and it was the factor that made his whole plot absurd.

Within a short space of time the folly of the whole attempt was plain. Two of Brown's sons lay dead and the old man himself, wounded and bleeding, was a prisoner. His trial quickly followed and on December 2nd, 1859, the chief actor in the adventure was dangling from the gallows.

For awhile, it is plain, after the failure of the raid, Brown felt a deep sense of disappointment. All along he had felt that only by direct action could the national evil be done away—so much, indeed, that he held the Garrison abolitionists in contempt who only talked and would not fight. He had nursed the hope, however, that by force, yet without much bloodshed, the slaves in Virginia might be freed and thus slavery everywhere rendered so insecure that the masters would be content to give up the institution. He had believed, too, devoted to his Bible as he was, that in the crucial hour divine aid might come to him as divine aid had seemed to come in Kansas in his miraculous escapes from harm.

Now, however, as the days went by, a new light broke and the thought which had been dimly present at the outset spread itself over his whole mental horizon. It was the *failure* of the attempt, and not its success, that was divinely pre-destined. In the providential plan for a salvation of the nation while yet there was time a supreme sacrifice was needed and he had been chosen for the part.

The place of John Brown in history cannot be rightly assigned, perhaps, for another half century, but a study of the man and his life and thought suggests to the attentive mind the estimate we

have offered. The notion advanced at the time by Edwin Miller Wheelock was much the same. He believed the exploits of Brown and his death on the gallows marked the beginning of the end—a belief which the subsequent course of history amply justified. “John Brown,” he said in a sermon at Dover—we quote from Von Holst’s *Constitutional History of the United States*, Vol. 7, Page 54, note 1—“is the first plague launched by Jehovah at the head of this immense and embodied wickedness. The rest will follow and then cometh the end.”

The discourse at Dover referred to by Von Holst, and mentioned by Villard in the *Life of John Brown* among the typical sermons of the time, was originally delivered in the Unitarian Church at that place under the title of “Harper’s Ferry and its Lessons,” and excerpts from the discourse appeared in the *Liberator*, Vol. 29, Page 184. The utterance of the young minister, full of unwonted force and fire, attracted instant attention, and on November 27, 1859, it was re-delivered by its author at Theodore Parker’s Music Hall in Boston to an audience of three thousand listeners. In that edifice, where so often he had thrilled to the rich eloquence of Parker, it was now his privilege to stand and speak his message without stint or reserve.

The sermon was one which made a peculiar appeal to Theodore Parker himself, then ill in Italy. “He pasted in his journal,” says John White Chadwick in his life of Parker, “accounts of various John Brown meetings with the splendid Music Hall sermon of Edwin M. Wheelock.” To Joseph Lyman of Boston, Parker wrote on December 10th, as we learn from *St. Bernard and Other Papers* by Theodore Parker, edited by Charles W. Wendte, “how admirably our best men have behaved, Garrison, Emerson, Wendell Phillips—surpassing himself, noble man, and dropping all extravagance at just the time when even a plain statement seems excessive panegyric to an outsider. How well Wheelock spoke at the Music Hall.”

The John Brown sermon of our minister has survived as a pamphlet printed for circulation shortly after its delivery, and is a part of James Redpath’s *Echoes of Harper’s Ferry*. Of the pamphlet a copy of the second edition under the name of *Harper’s Ferry and Its Lessons*, and bearing the sub-title, “A Sermon for the Times preached at the Music Hall, Boston,” published by *The Fraternity* in 1859, is to be found in Astor Library in New York City, to which place it had been transferred from the Lennox Library as a part of the Ford collection of pamphlets, and a copy of the same

pamphlet appears in the Library of Congress at Washington. A copy of the first edition of the pamphlet is accessible in the Boston Library, bound up, curiously enough, with a number of early pamphlets in defense of the institution of slavery.

We learn from Redpath's preface to *Echoes of Harper's Ferry* that the addresses contained in the work had been revised by the respective authors at the editor's request, or were printed with their consent from properly corrected editions, and each address is followed by the autograph of its author. Among these utterances are two speeches of Emerson in behalf of Brown, the paper read by Henry D. Thoreau to the citizens of Concord, Massachusetts, on Sunday evening, October 30, 1859, a lecture of Wendell Phillips on "The Lesson of the Hour," delivered at Brooklyn, November 1, 1859, a sermon by George B. Cheever delivered November 24th, another of Henry Newhall on December 4th, a discourse of the same date by Moncure D. Conway, with a poem by William D. Howells entitled "Old Brown," breathing a spirit of admiration for Brown as a great hero and martyr. In addition to this the book contained the words of Lydia Maria Child, Edward Everett and Henry Ward Beecher.

It was in a goodly company that our young minister thus found himself, his own prominent in a galaxy of illustrious names, but his words were no mere echo of the words of his more distinguished fellows. There was a distinctly individual ring to every sentence. Indeed, the views of the differing speakers and writers displayed wide divergence in important respects. Emerson, Thoreau, Parker and many others whose words are preserved in this work voiced sentiments of appreciation for the spirit which inspired Brown's efforts, though disclaiming sympathy with the raid itself. Edward Everett and Henry Ward Beecher declined to utter words of praise—they referred to the invasion as a wild and criminal act. Beecher twitted the North with hypocrisy in censuring the South for its treatment of the negro, declaring that the negro in the North did not enjoy rights of citizenship, that white laborers declined to work with him and that on the whole he was not sure there was not more humanity toward the negro in the South, even under slavery, than in the North. Largely through natural causes, Beecher thought, slavery would ultimately disappear.

Our minister took no part in views such as those of Beecher and Everett. He shared with Emerson and Parker and Thoreau the view that Brown was a saint and martyr in a great cause, and

that his act, whatever its value, was the first gust of a coming storm through which, and through which alone, the iniquity of slavery could be done away. A touch of reserve is apparent in the words of Emerson and even in those of Thoreau—the merest hint of an impulse to “hedge” and to avoid broad generalizations as to the effect of the raid and the coming martyrdom of its chief figure upon the future of the institution of slavery. No such thought is linked with the clear, ringing, bell-like words of our fearless young preacher. There was a complete abandon to the rush and passion of his thought.

Could he have re-read his discourse with eyes opened by the experience of the ensuing ten years many of the harsh words would have been supplanted by kindlier ones, but it is much to be doubted whether in its essential aspects his thought would have changed. It was far the most wide-ranging of the utterances of the time and it is set off from all others by the fact that it dealt with the subject prophetically as though the war were already a realized event and no more was necessary than to justify it in the eyes of the North.

“And all men mused in their hearts of John whether he was the Christ or not.” Such was the significant text at the Music Hall that morning. The minister’s attitude toward the prisoner in Virginia was thus made plain at the outset.

“There are certain focal points of history around which all others cluster and revolve—Paul on Mars Hill, Luther nailing his thesis to the church door—Columbus on the quarter deck of the Santa Maria—Cromwell training his Ironsides—Joan of Arc in the flames—and such a focal point, marking a new era in American history, was the man and his deed at Harper’s Ferry. The bondman was standing at last face to face with his Moses.

“When there came to Pharaoh in the days of old the divine summons to let the Jewish people go, and the summons was unheeded, the Lord plagued Egypt. For more than half a century the spirit of God has, through religion, the conscience, the humane instincts, the heroic traditions of our land, been pleading with the American Pharaoh to let his people go. But in vain. Now the plagues are coming.”

In celebrating Bunker Hill, the minister insisted, the right to condemn Harper’s Ferry disappears, and he remonstrated with those friends of the slave who so earnestly deprecated and condemned that “war cloud no larger than a man’s hand” which had just broken over Virginia. Freedom through purely moral and

peaceful means was impossible. A true peace is indeed a blessing—a peace that comes from knowing God and loving God and doing the will of God—but slavery knows no peace and its most tranquil state is worse war than the worst insurrection. Such was the burden of the early portion of the sermon. He continued:

“The terrible logic of history teaches us that no such wrong was ever cleansed by rose-water, that evil is used by the Almighty to crowd out worse evils.

“The slave has not only the right to be free—it is his duty to be free. God help the slave to his freedom without shedding a drop of blood; but if that cannot be then upon the felon soul that thrusts itself between God’s image and the liberty to which God is ever calling him—upon him, I say rests the guilt of the fierce conflict that must follow.

“It is fashionable now to call John Brown a ‘crazy’ fanatic but history will do the head of John Brown the same ample justice that even his enemies do to his heart. Last year the word ‘insurrection’ affected even anti-slavery men with a shudder; next year it will be uttered in every Northern legislature as a thing of course. Pharaoh may sit on the throne but he sits trembling. To hush the clink of the dollar and the rustle of bank bills over the land, if only for an hour, that the still small voice of God’s justice may be heard—can our ‘sane’ reformers show a wealthier record? His scheme was no failure but a solemn success. Wherein he failed his foes have come to his aid. The greatness of their fears reveals the extent of his triumph. John Brown has not only taken Virginia and Governor Wise and his company but the whole slave faction, North and South. All his foes have turned abolition missionaries. They toil day and night to do his bidding and no President has so many servants as he. The best Sharpe’s rifle in all his band could scarcely throw a bullet a single mile, but in every corner of every township in thirty-three states the people are reading his living and inspired words—words filled with God’s own truth and power and so more deadly to despotism than hosts of armed men.

“Behold on what platform the insane rage and fear of his foes have lifted this anti-slavery veteran to the stars! Strangling John Brown will not stop the earthquake that has followed his shattering blow; or if it does science teaches us that when the earthquake stops the volcano begins.

“John Brown’s aim was to render slavery insecure and he has succeeded. He has forced the telegraph, the press, the bar room, the parlor, to repeat the dangerous story of the insurrection in every corner of the South. From Maryland to Florida, there is not a slave who does not have the idea of freedom quickened within him by the outbreak at Harper’s Ferry. Like the Druid stone which the united force of a hundred men could not move while a child’s finger, rightly applied, rocked it to its base, the dark system of outrage and

wrong which has stood for thirty years moveless against the political power of the North, against the warnings of an insulted Christianity and against the moral sentiment of the world, now rocks and trembles. As in the Swiss valleys, the first clash of arms brings down the avalanche.

"From the martyrdom of Brown dates a new era of the anti-slavery cause. To moral agitation will now be added physical. To argument, action. The dispensation of doctrine will be supplanted by the higher dispensation of acts. The appeal of the North will now be applied to the terrors as well as to the conscience of this great barbarism. Other devoted men will follow in the wake of Brown, but avoiding his errors, and will carry on to its full results the work he has begun.

"He a fanatic! He a madman! He a traitor! Yes, and the fanatics of this age are the star-crowned leaders of the next. And the madman of today are the heroes of tomorrow. This 'traitor' is the living American and carries the declaration of 1776 in his heart.

"I think the time is fast coming when you will be forced to do as he has done. A few years more will roll away, the avalanche comes down upon you all, and you will be compelled to take the very ground on which stands this high-souled and devoted man. The gallows from which he ascends into heaven will be in our politics what the cross is in our religion—the sign and symbol of supreme self-devotedness; and from this sacrificial blood the temporal salvation of four millions of our people yet shall spring.

"It takes a whole geological epoch to form the one precious drop we call the diamond; and a thousand years of Anglo-Saxon progress, every step of which has been from scaffold to scaffold and from stake to stake, have gone to the making of this shining soul. The Virginia scaffold is but the setting of the costly gem whose sparkle shall light up the faces of an uncounted army."

Reading the John Brown sermon of our minister with the history which so soon followed freighted our thought it is easy to slough away the phrases born from the excitement of the hour and view the utterance as a prophetic word spoken at a moment of crisis. He saw, as did a few other select spirits of the time, the tremendous bearing of the martyrdom of John Brown upon the struggle which was about to commence, and his intuitive mind read the event, not in the light of the past, but in the light of the future.

THE NEW MYSTICISM.

BY CURTIS W. REESE.

THERE is a spiritual flame in modern thought and life which, while differing radically from the old mysticism, may rightly be called highly mystical. In content this new mysticism is natural, in motive human, in goal worldly. It finds fuel in all human instincts, impulses, and emotions; in all worthy motives, causes, and goals; in all noble thinking, social living, and high aspiration. It sanctifies the sense, glorifies natural faculties, and identifies man with deific creative processes. It may be fanned into a brilliancy that will light and warm the world with a glow greater than any yet known.

Intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe is the essence and the heart of the old mysticism. But depth and intensity of feeling in regard to what is believed are made deeper and more intense by applying and testing the belief in actual conduct. The exultant thrill of enlistment and service in the nurture of abiding desires, in the struggle for the common good, in the constant renewal of idea motives and goals is the essence and the heart of the new mysticism.

From this viewpoint valid mystical experience inheres in free, experimental, purposeful living. It is only in such living that the greatest interest can be taken. It is only such living which produces the fine emotional thrill that satisfies and ennobles. If life is dull it is because it is only imitative of what has been done, or of what others are doing. When life is intelligently original, venturesome, and creative it is full of satisfaction and exultant aspiration.

The condition of the new mysticism is freedom. In all mystical writings is stressed the thought of freedom from everything except the super-spiritual order in which the individual seeks submergence. The new mysticism proclaims freedom of mankind from super-orders as well, and declares that the consciousness of such freedom is prerequisite to mystical experience of the finer sort. The con-

consciousness of intrinsic worth and of freedom in its nurture is conducive to soul serenity and spiritual poise. There is no true and abiding satisfaction apart from free experience. Coercion whether by associates, governments, or gods is depressing and devitalizing. Coercive measures in connection with sub-normals and ab-normals have a protective function, but with normal persons coercion has no spiritual value. Whether coercion be of a legal or a creedal nature, physical or psychological, it is to be regarded as only an emergency measure.

Only between persons who are equally free can true reverence exist. Where subservience and fear are there is no true reverence. The sense of reverence is of the essence of mysticism. Reverential mystical experience is to be found in the democracy of those who are equally free. I may fear a monarch, but I revere and love a brother. I may stand in awe before the unknown, but I revere and love the known. I may tremble before the thought of universal forces swinging and crashing through time, but I find rest and peace in the approval of the brethren and in the consciousness of work well done.

Two ministers spoke on kindred subjects on the same evening from the same platform. In their ecclesiastical associations one of them dwelt in a conservative, orthodox atmosphere, the other in a free and vital atmosphere. The one found it necessary constantly to modify and moderate his thought and his statements in order to meet beforehand the charge of liberality. The other was under no such compulsion. After due allowance was made for natural differences in temperament it was perfectly evident that the subserviency of the one had left its mark on both body and soul. The other gentleman, who had extraordinary physical difficulties which might well have led to depression, was the very incarnation of the spirit of freedom. The exultation and confidence of an unfettered experience was evident in every feature of his being. With masterly bearing he stepped out before the audience; and into my mind came the picture of a lion emerging from his native forest, head erect, sweeping his eye over the surrounding landscape.

Purpose is the dynamic of the new mysticism. Concentration and directness of purpose are conducive to spiritual serenity and power. A brilliant but unpolarized person is one of the most ineffective and pitiful of creatures. Many of the mystics of the old order seem to me to be without genuine purpose, unless the somewhat hazy desire to be absorbed in undifferentiated ultimate reality


can be called purpose. I do not see a sufficient amount of well-directed, worldly, practical, democratic purpose in the old mysticism to justify its existence. But wherever a person intelligently conceives and deliberately plans a long-run program in the direction of a goal regarded as attainable, in him is found ease and comfort and power. It is not distance from a goal but lack of a goal that utterly distracts a person. There is no doubt of Abraham Lincoln's desire to free the negro, but his definite purpose of preserving the union was a clear-cut goal that strengthened him through the awful days of the civil war. Purposes are the dynamic of personality.

Creative action is the method of the new mysticism. The consciousness of godhood inheres in creative action. Actually to bring into being a new thing or a new idea, or a new emotion is to demonstrate one's divinity. Unmeasured happiness surrounds new things. Witness the enthusiasm of a child over any one of its simple creations. Imitative religion not only is unmystical, it is positively deadening to all spiritual faculties. The devotees of ancient faiths who constantly repeat the sayings of the fathers and who go through mechanical religious exercises are administering an anesthetic to native spiritual potentialities. Religious forms and ceremonies should be constructed with the avowed purpose of providing facilities and tools of creative experience. This applies with especial force to schools of religious education. If youth be unhindered by the withered hand of the past it naturally tends to join forces with all positive processes in the attempt to create a new heaven and a new earth. As old things pass away, as all things become new, he who is conscious of having a part in bringing about this change shares in the universal elation.

The new mysticism is at its best in conscious committal and loyalty to worthwhile causes and goals. How the mind and heart and soul respond to committal and loyalty! Nothing is more regenerating and rejuvenating! A genuine committal loyally followed in actual experience thrills every fiber of one's being. It lifts one out of narrowness and selfishness. We hardly know our friends after their committal to a great cause. No longer weak, they are flaming evangelists. It is not my purpose to designate specific causes and goals which have magic power. In fact any worthwhile goal has magic power. Such goals are numerous and are capable of multiplying infinitely. One's cause may be temperamentally or rationally chosen. It may be the quest of God or of God's will. It may be the search for ultimate truth of empirical values. It may be the quest

of life's laws and methods, or of happiness for the human race, or of freedom and fraternity. It may be the building of the best little home that the world ever knew. But whatever it is the most valid of all mystical experience is committal and loyalty to it.

In a hospital in France a soldier boy beckoned for a physician. As the physician approached the boy said, "Doctor, did I make good for democracy?" "Yes," said the Doctor, "you made good." "But, Doctor, did I do my dead level best?" "Yes, you did your dead level best." And in the consciousness of having made good in his great committal, of having done his best, the soldier smiled serenely as he passed away. In noble living is a flame which not only lights the way of life but which also throws a radiance over the gate of death.





GUSTAVE FLAUBERT

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GUSTAVE FLAUBERT.

BY LEWIS PIAGET SHANKS.

THE centenary of Gustave Flaubert was worthily commemorated by his native city, Rouen. Time has changed the local viewpoint toward the prophet's fame which persisted even after the author's death in 1880. For although he died one of the unassailable glories of France, Norman thrift allowed his villa on the Seine, once the country-house of the monks of Saint Ouen, to be sold for a factory site; a huge chimney—ironic monument—now stands where *Flaubert* wrote *Madame Bovary* and *Salammbô*; a pillar of smoke replaces the gleam of the student's lamp which until dawn served to guide the belated fisherman to shore. Only the Louis XV pavilion on the river-bank is left, preserved through a national subscription by the piety of a second generation, to be made, some fifteen years ago, the "Musée Flaubert"; the little house where he lounged and smoked, musing perhaps on the Orient of his dreams, and which drew back his thoughts to his Normandy home from the far waters of the Nile, is become the shrine of a martyr to art, who left his mark upon the form of nearly all our contemporary novels.

Flaubert's birthplace has had a better fate than the manor at Croisset. We still possess the gloomy old Hôtel-Dieu of Rouen, where he passed his early years, a naïve, meditative child who would sit for hours with finger in mouth, rapt in reverie. His father, surgeon-in-chief of the hospital, was of Champenois stock, his mother Norman and herself the daughter of a physician who had married into a noble family. Here perhaps we touch the source of Flaubert's sensitive pride. But the Hippocratic stamp left only an analytic tendency; it was his brother, nine years older, who succeeded his father. In Gustave the genius of science was long to struggle with the spirit of dream, the Champenois exuberance to combat the melancholy, idealistic and obstinate Norman. Phy-

sically the latter element predominated; he looked like a young Viking.

It was this contrasted nature which made him love *Don Quixote*, read to him at nine, which lead him to plan stories based upon it, and plays which were acted on his father's billiard table. The first misspelled letter of his correspondence reveals the future writer, divided between imagination and analysis. "If you wish to join with me in writing", he proposes to a boy friend in 1830, "I will write comedies and you shall write your dreams, and as there is a lady who comes to our house and who always talks silly things, I will write them." But eager for self-expression as he was, little Gustave proved not otherwise precocious. He was nearly nine when he learned to read; his sister, three years younger, had to set the example. At school he did not lead his form, except in history and later in philosophy. Mathematics he never understood. He hated the fixed hours, the discipline; he was a born individualist. Boyishly, he boasts to a friend that he has not even tried to see the king, who visited Rouen in 1833. Of course this is a bit of borrowed Romantic liberalism; the Romantic tide has quite bowled him over. At thirteen he starts a novel in the style of Dumas, and bored by his chum's absence, writes: "If I didn't have in my head and at my pen-point a French queen of the fifteenth century, I should be completely disgusted with life and long since a bullet would have delivered me from this mad farce which is called life."

One smiles, for the contagion of romantic rhetoric is always humorous. But the disease itself was serious; French schools, naturally classical and then intent upon pleasing a reactionary bureaucracy, had forbidden their students to read *Werther*, *Byron*, *Faust*, *et hoc genus omne*. They had created a new sin, and rebellious adolescence never failed to take a new sin seriously. Long after, the novelist wrote: "I know not what schoolboys' dreams are now, but ours were superbly extravagant. . . . Whilst enthusiastic souls longed for dramatic passions, with gondolas, black masks, and noble ladies swooning in post-chaises amid the Calabrian hills, a few heroes, more sombre, aspired to the tumult of the press or the tribune, the glory of conspirators. . . . But we were not merely lovers of the Middle Ages, of the Orient, of revolt, we were above all things lovers of art; tasks ended, literature would begin; we ruined our eyes reading novels in the dormitories, we carried daggers in our pockets like Antony, nay more, through dis-

gust with life, B—blew out his brains with a pistol, A—hanged himself with his cravat; little praise was ours, certainly; but what hatred of all platitudes! what soarings toward grandeur! what respect for the classics! how we admired Victor Hugo!”

So Flaubert wrote novels and dramas at school, beginning at fourteen his twenty year apprenticeship for the writing of *Madame Bovary*. There are three volumes of these posthumous *Oeuvres de Jeunesse*; the first two, composed before he was twenty, show strange beginnings for the future precursor of Naturalism. Characteristic titles are *Loys XI*, *Rage and Impotence*, *A Dream of Hell*, *The Dance of the Dead*, *Agonies*, *November*; and hardly a page falls below the lurid promise of the captions. With adolescence the influence of morbid Romanticism becomes more than a pose; it colors his whole view of life with a melancholy and a feeling of moral solitude which his favorite Rabelais is unable to conquer except in moments of purely youthful expansion. With them combined in 1836 a passion for a lady ten years his senior, which is recounted in the Wertheresque *Memoirs of a Madman*. This unspoken adoration saved him from the venal loves of youth, and served in the plot of the second *Sentimental Education*.

Indeed the germs of nearly all his works may be found in the letters of this period and the Juvenilia. The mystery play *Smarh* of 1839 is a sketch for the *Temptation of Saint Anthony*; the very first letter reveals the interest in human stupidity which produced *Bouvard and Pécuchet*; *Salammbô* expresses his Romantic longing for the Orient and his love of antiquity seen in the essay *Rome and the Caesars*; *Madam Bovary* crystallizes the disillusion left by all his youthful debauch of Romantic dreams: “I have laid waste my heart with a lot of factitious things.”

One could hardly expect that such a boy would take kindly to the study of the law, which seemed to his family the most practical career for him. Worry over the matter affected his health; he was sent South with a friend of his father's, Dr. Cloquet. Two months were spent on this journey, which included the Pyrenees, Provence and Corsica, and which only intensified his desire for other lands. Back in Rouen he wrote: “A fig for Normandy and our fair France. Ah, how I should like to live in Spain, in Italy or even in Provence. . . . I think I was born elsewhere, for I have always had a sort of memory or instinct for balmy shores, for blue seas. I was born to be emperor of Cochin-China, to smoke pipes thirty

fathoms long, to have 6,000 wives, scimitars to chop off the heads of people whose faces I don't like . . . and I have nothing but huge insatiable desires, an atrocious ennui and yawnings without end."

Paris itself failed to distract him; the law bored him profoundly, and the vulgar gaieties of the Latin Quarter drove him to his room, to console his exile by copious letters to his sister.

To a friend concerned over his approaching examinations he replies: "Do I long to be successful, I, to be a great man? a man known in a district, in three provinces, a thin man, a man with a weak digestion? . . . All that seems to me very dismal . . . and were it only to be singular, it is a good thing now to leave all that to the scum, who are forever pushing themselves. . . . As for us, let us stay at home, let us watch the public pass from the height of our balcony; and if from time to time we are over-bored, well, let us spit on their heads, and then calmly continue our talk, and watch the sun setting in the west."

The expected happened. Flaubert was absolutely confused before the examiners; he collapsed utterly; and when after vacation the time came to return for a second trial, he was seized with that hysterico-epileptic attack which was to confirm his solitary misanthropy by making him withdraw from life. To lie for months in forced inaction, humoring nerves which at the least sensation "tremble like violin-strings", to be denied all excitement, all stimulant, even his cherished pipe, to endure the violent bleeding, starving and purging then used as treatment, was enough to make a sensitive youth irritable and to darken his outlook upon a world he did not fit. His nerves were unequal to life in the market-place. A need of avoiding all feeling—or shall we say the reality of his pain?—seems to have bred a disgust for Romantic subjectivity which gave him a more objective and intellectual taste in reading. His favorite books are now Montaigne, Rabelais, Régnier and LeSage; he adores Voltaire and has read *Candide* twenty times; he re-reads Tacitus and plans to re-read Homer and Shakespeare. He is growing up; the third volume of his *Oeuvres de Jeunesse*, written from 1842 to 1845, is a new, if abortive, attempt to write an objective novel (the first *Sentimental Education*); and its hero Jules shows us by what discipline Flaubert overcame his life of romantic subjectivity.

His sister married in 1845, and as all the family accompanied the wedded pair on their honeymoon journey, Gustave saw Provence

again and with it something of North Italy. At Milan, regretting the blue Mediterranean and longing for the East, his relapse into lyricism convinced him of the danger in travel for the young writer; his present duty was "to rid himself of everything really intimate, original, individual . . . to shut himself up in art and count all else for naught, since pride replaces all." His decision is made, and "unregretful of riches or love of the flesh, he has said to practical life an irrevocable adieu." Back at Croisset, he finds a new peace in his settled future, a calm exempt from laughter or gloom. He is "mature", and like a good workman, can now pound away at his anvil without care of the weather, confident that the will which has helped him accomplish this change is going to carry him further. He has learned "one thing, that happiness for men of his stamp lies in *the Idea* and not elsewhere." And with this he is advancing toward realistic objectivity: "There are actions, voices, that I cannot get over, and inanities which almost make me reel."

But his exasperated sensitiveness was not long allowed this escape into things external. Hardly had the family moved to Croisset, just purchased, when his father died, and three months later his sister Caroline, after giving birth to a daughter. Flaubert's grief was terrible, and his reaction upon it characteristic. A born pessimist, he notes his early prevision that "life was like a sickly smell of cooking escaping from a ventilator. One has no need to have eaten to know that it will nauseate. . . . My last misfortunes have saddened me, but have not surprised me. Without taking anything from my feelings, I have analysed them like an artist. . . . It is said that religious people bear the troubles of this world better than ourselves, but the man who is convinced of the great harmony, who hopes for the annihilation of his body while his soul will return to sleep in the bosom of the great whole . . . that man is tortured no more."

. It is not grief which has made him a literary Buddhist. It is his readings for the *Temptation of Saint Anthony*, begun in 1845. No less than Leconte de Lisle, Flaubert becomes infatuated with the Hindus, borrows books from Paris, quotes Sakya Mouni on the grief which comes from attaching oneself to others and the necessity of solitude. But at twenty-five he, too, would have been a saint had he been consistent. Buried in the history of religions, Greek, and Latin, striving to live in the antique world and "daily growing more devoted to the classics", he forgets that the death of his sister

and the marriage of his bosom-friend, LePoittevin, have left him undefended against the Cyprian queen. This young recluse was destined to love and to suffer, and it was Madame Louise Colet, met during one of the visits to Paris with which he broke the tedium of long stays at Croisset, who inherited the vacant place he had already begun to feel in his heart.

They met at Pradier's studio—a sort of artistic and literary salon, frequented by Flaubert since his student days. Madame Colet was a literary lady some ten years older than he, but still very beautiful; she knew every celebrity in Bohemian Paris; she was in fact a Romantic Muse. Within ten days she and Flaubert called each other thee and thou; repeatedly she sent him orange-blossoms in her letters, but he had the resolution to keep her a Romantic Muse, refusing to desert his mother still sunk in her double grief, in order to live with his lady in Paris. His work too held him at Croisset; indeed, he is soon writing her mostly at week-ends, "keeping her in the shop-parlor of his heart until Sundays come." Interrupted by only occasional visits to Paris and by his travels, their correspondence lasted for eight years; it is a curious mixture of wildly romantic love, merciless self-dissection, discussions of Art and literature or corrections of his lady's verses. Flaubert certainly loved her to adoration, but he always loved art more.

Within nine months occurred several attacks of his malady; *quibus nervi dolent Venus inimica*. In May 1847 his Parisian friend DuCamp took him away for a walking trip through the Châteaux-country and Brittany. This pilgrimage of three months was to be recounted by each in turn, chapter by chapter, in a semi-humorous journal, digressive and aggressive. Flaubert's half was published after his death under the original title: *Par les Champs et par les Grèves*. A mixture of impartial observation and pungent comment, with bursts of rhetoric worthy of Châteaubriand, its personal tone makes this volume dear to lovers of the real Flaubert, so carefully hidden in his acknowledged works. In these vivid pages, one feels the student, the artist and the lover of the past. At each castle or cathedral, he delights in reliving the days entombed there; like men and their passions, these relics are magnified for him by memory, completed by the death of those who made them shrines. There is a constant sense of reality, of exact detail, in the monument or landscape, but there is also a consciousness of

the ironic indifference of Nature to man's crumbling works, which suffuses the whole with restrained romantic feeling.

The following spring came the death of LePoittevin—his literary Mentor, a philosophical and lyrical spirit, to whose encouragement we probably owe *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*. Curiously, Flaubert's realistic books are always followed by romantic ones. After the first *Sentimental Education* and the Brittany journal, the Romanticist in him was eager to escape from contemporary life into the past, from the Occident into the Orient. A painting by Breughel, seen at Genoa in 1845, had revived the inspiration of his old mystery play; the lover of *Faust*, who at his first reading "had ceased to feel the world beneath him"—the Old Adam he had tried so hard to subdue—came to the front again. "What is natural to me is the non-natural for others, the extraordinary, the fantastic, the clarion voice of metaphysics and mythology." The subject moreover haunted him; it had to be worked out; only thus could he rid himself of its obsession. So Flaubert, who loved to repeat Michelet's motto: "Nothing tempting but the impossible," began this masterpiece of dream-literature, not to be published until 1874. He made the legend of Saint Anthony a vision of dying religions: all modes of life and thought and belief—all the gods from remotest antiquity to the modern divinity Science—pass before the half-dazed anchorite, a mad procession whose lesson is the vanity of all things beneath the sun. There was no action, and this version was much longer than the final one; it took Flaubert thirty-two hours to read it to Bouilhet and DuCamp, summoned to Croisset for the occasion.

Asked for their verdict when the last sitting was ended, his friends frankly replied: "We think you ought to throw it into the fire and never speak of it again." More alive to actuality than he, they knew that the book was twenty years too late: to begin publishing in 1850 with such a lyrical extravaganza would have been literary suicide. Flaubert, "plutôt vaincu que convaincu", sadly put the manuscript away. Concern for his health, much worse since the death of LePoittevin, now made his mother approve the journey to the East proposed by young DuCamp, and before the end of October the two friends set forth from Marseilles. From the start his letters are for his mother, not his mistress; there is something paternal in these letters, something of the son who later called her "ma fille."

The Eastern journey included Egypt, Syria, Constantinople, Greece and Italy. It was for Flaubert a real debauch of Romanticism, and he made the most of it. At Cairo he had his head shaved and adopted the red fez of the Turks, he tried to learn the cry of the camel, imitated the senile sheik and the howling dervish. He was tremendously impressed by the Pyramids, and the sight of the Sphynx gave him "one of the most vertiginous pleasures of his life." All this was of course to serve him later for the final *Saint Anthony*. They went up the Nile in a native boat, they saw the Red Sea, the Desert, the Thebaid. He took notes at first, but the wealth of material soon made him stop: "it is better to be all eyes." Yet gorged with colour and thrilled by an exotic existence, he did not get over the verdict on his *Saint Anthony* for nearly four months.

The travellers journeyed by sea to Beyrouth, and from there to Jerusalem, which as usual proved a disappointment. At Damascus Flaubert went to see the lepers, a macabre pleasure which profited him in writing the legend of *Saint Julian the Hospitaller*. At Constantinople, with his face turned homeward, he had wild longings to continue the journey which he himself had shortened, to see Persia, China. The Acropolis moved him more than Jerusalem, and "more sincerely." "Oh the Greeks!" he cries: "what artists! I am breathing-in the antique with all my intellect. The sight of the Parthenon is one of the things which have most impressed me in all my life. Say what you will, art is no falsehood. Let the bourgeois be happy, I do not envy them their stupid felicity."

Yet here too, as in the case of the Sphynx, his emotion wears him out. His aesthetic delight is followed by the same nervous depression: "For all your travelling, you get no gaiety from it." He must see Italy for its art-treasures; he will not pass that way again. But he is plainly sighing for the "concentration" of solitude, for his literary evenings with Bouilhet, who came every Sunday to Croisset for their literary holiday of reading and discussion and mutual criticism; he begs him for his latest verses; he is tormented by lyric desires for "style", which thrill him even to tears. Again he speaks of the Dictionary of Accepted Opinions, which he had planned with Bouilhet in Rouen; his eyes are sharper to catch the stupidities of life; travel has developed his contempt for men by a closer contact. "One takes a deal of trouble to see

ruins and trees, but between the ruin and the tree one finds something quite different, and from all that, landscapes and depravities, results for you a calm and impassive pity." It is easy to see that this voyage was a good preparation for *Madame Bovary*.

They returned to France in May, 1851, and after a visit to England with his family—it was the year of the first Exhibition—Flaubert set to work on his masterpiece. For him the subject was nearly two years old, if we are to believe DuCamp; why is it never mentioned in his travel letters? It had its origin in real life: a certain Delaunay, a medical officer in a small town near Rouen, had been ruined and betrayed by a worthless wife, who died a suicide. As the three friends sat silent in the garden of Croisset the day after the *Saint Anthony* was condemned, Bouilhet had suggested: "Why shouldn't you write the story of Delaunay?" And Flaubert had shaken off his depression and cried "What an idea!"

Thus goes the story in DuCamp's *Souvenirs*, often more picturesque than trustworthy. Be that as it may, Flaubert's originality is indisputable. It was he, and he alone, who made of the obscure medical officer's wife a world-type. For Emma Bovary is not simply a realistic heroine; she is as real as reality. She is not merely a woman, she is woman herself under more than one aspect, and her tragedy is the ever-recurrent tragedy of disillusion. Reflecting her age, she reflects one side of every age, typifies all those whom romantic literature has spoiled for living. She is a martyr to the ideal, a victim of The Book, unable to fight reality in the borrowed armour of poetry. *Madame Bovary* is more than the *Don Quixote* of Romanticism; it is the indictment of life against a large part of our fiction.

But the character of the book only increases our wonder at the miracle of its creation. How could it come from the pen of a Romanticist? Flaubert first denied, but in later life admitted the personal basis: "Madame Bovary, c'est moi." In fact all his youthful dreams are there, beheld as through the wrong end of a dusty, distorted opera-glass, reduced to the measure of the weak and futile woman they are to drive down to sordid adultery and defalcation and self-inflicted death. But the characterization is perfect; she is never Flaubert, never the genius; she is always the drifting dreamer; and though typical, she remains throughout an individual. That she is a grandchild of Cervantes' hero is proved by what Flaubert says in letters of this period regarding

the persistence of this early influence on the mature cast of his intellect. As for Sancho Panza, the novelist has given us in his stead a whole group of characters, all bourgeois, all profoundly trivial, yet so absolutely distinguished that some have passed into literature and are quoted like real persons. Herein lies the triumph of the book, which took five years to write, and the writing of which the author compared to playing the piano with balls of lead tied to his fingers. To inform with life his heroine was as nothing to this stupendous creation; the actor in Flaubert had to "palpitate with the emotions" of characters which at times actually gave him fits of nausea. The day he "poisoned" his heroine, he vomited twice, and could not get rid of the imagined taste of arsenic in his mouth.

To walk the hair-line between twin gulfs of lyricism and vulgarity—that is how the novelist expresses the difficulty of his task in a letter to Madame Colet. Unusually full until their separation in 1854, this correspondence certainly provided an outlet for the writer's personality; we know how many poets have been made objective by a satisfied passion. Flaubert is now conscious of his two literary selves, "one in love with rhetoric and lyricism" and the other "a digger and seeker after truth, who loves to give relief to detail, who would like to make you feel *almost materially* the things he is reproducing." There the conflict is stated, and the constant struggle involved in this project—a struggle which cries out from almost every page of the letters—shows the book is a veritable triumph of will.

The reward of this pursuit of reality was the author's indictment for writing an "immoral" book, his trial and condemnation to pay a sum far greater than the price for which he sold it, only 400 francs. It seems that Flaubert was largely the victim of a censorship irritated by the political attitude of the *Revue de Paris*, which first published the novel in 1856. More disgusted than ever, he again declared that the artist must hold aloof from the mob and write for himself alone. So, after correcting the *Saint Anthony*, he put it aside as likely to bring him into further trouble. Months before *Madame Bovary* was finished, he had been sighing for a romantic subject, something allowing free scope to his long-repressed love of colour. The letters show him reading for the *Saint Julian*, but that too is given up for the time being. Finally he announces: "I am going to write a novel whose action

will take place three centuries before Christ. I feel the need of quitting this modern world, in which my pen has dipped too long, and which moreover tires me as much to reproduce as it disgusts me to behold." The result of this was *Salammbô*.

We remember his first historical novel, and the queen of France who saved him from suicide. Then it was the later Middle Ages or the Renaissance which fired his inspiration; now, with those veins exhausted by a host of novelists, Flaubert, after Gautier, reverted to an age more remote and more exotic. Not history but the young science of archaeology pointed the way, and Gautier had been quick to follow with his splendidly plastic classical and Egyptian tales. Why not then a Carthaginian romance? The task was certainly hard enough to be tempting, even to Flaubert: if he had in Polybius an outline of his subject, the War with the Mercenaries, this bare skeleton had to be clothed with flesh and muscle, draped in barbaric colours, vitalized with Punic ferocity. What better field for a poetic imagination?

It was as a scholar however that the historian of Emma Bovary attacked the problem. He spent months in gathering material. In two weeks, for instance, he "swallowed" the eighteen volumes of Cahen's translation of the Bible, together with the notes, finding in them not a few precious details for costumes, architecture, musical instruments and habits generally. But the mass of the material used was drawn from the classics: Xenophon, Ælian, Pausanias, Athenaeus, Pliny, Silviu Italicus, Strabo, Theophrastus, Herodotus, Appian, Plutarch and the whole dusty ant-hill of modern archaeological research had to be ransacked; "one must be stuffed with one's subject up to the ears" in order to paint the local colour which comes without effort and "makes a book exude reality." Like *Madame Bovary*, the novel was to take more than five years of incessant toil, broken only by a visit to Africa in search of his landscapes—a journey which caused him to demolish as false the labour of months.

Salammbô has been called a magnificent failure, criticized as too remote, too barbaric, too full of archaeological detail, too lacking in plot despite the mysterious heroine added to provide a love interest. Something of all this is true; the author himself admitted that the statue was too small for the pedestal. But what a pedestal! Flaubert shows us a living Carthage, almost too real in its truculent splendour and cruelty, a Carthage built of gold and ivory

and blood, opulent, exotic, terrible as its god Moloch glutted with children's flesh. Gossip has it that Flaubert was trying, rhetorically, to reproduce the effect of purple, as in his previous book he had sought to render the colour of wood-lice. If gore unstinted will give purple, *Salammbô* fully attains his purpose. The book is an epic nightmare of horrors, with battles, massacres and tortures enough to prove a Freudian reflex to his self-repression; it escapes melodrama only by the muscular tenseness of its diction, the sheer force of a classic style. A masterpiece of scholarship and a triumph of imagination, *Salammbô* will always remain caviare to the general public; Flaubert himself said that he was writing for ten or twelve readers. Yet he obtained with it, in 1863 a *succès d'estime*.

The inevitable reaction followed, announced long before. "The deeper I plunge into antiquity, the more the need of the modern recaptures me," he wrote in 1859; even then he was "cooking up in his brain a mess of ordinary people." This literary ragoût was the final *Sentimental Education*. He did not again spoil things by giving himself a rôle; after twenty years that lesson was learned; indeed, his passion for objective facts and his desire for finality in externals made him plan to set forth the whole "histoire morale" of the men of his generation. For this picture of French society from 1840 to 1852 the scholar turned sociologist, demanding bits of personal experience from friends, spending months over books, newspaper-files and old reviews. The book is invaluable to the historian, but it took Anatole France, with his *Histoire Contemporaine*, to make such novels popular. Again the setting overshadows the actors; even the hero Frédéric, a weaker brother of Emma Bovary, fails to hold our interest; they are half-despicable nonentities, excepting Madame Arnoux who incarnates Flaubert's first love—the one really sympathetic figure in all his books. Characters and style alike are nerveless; the plot drifts aimlessly on the tide of events; one is crushed by the author's fatalism, overcome by the miasma of boredom reflected here from his weary days as student in Paris. His dislike for men was now become contempt, with dire results to artistic relief. Yet there are some who think this book Flaubert's best, because of its absolute reproduction of life in all its vulgar triviality.

Published in 1869, the novel's picture of '48 was soon forgotten in the stress of war and a greater revolution. The Prussian invasion made the writer a patriot; Flaubert in uniform drill-

ing a squad of militia is a pathetic figure dignified only by the tragedy he shared with France. "The Terrible Year" struck him down in his tenderest spot, his pride. "One cannot write when one has lost one's self-esteem." But he did write, mainly to escape the griefs already falling thick and fast upon him. In 1869 Bouilhet had died, his alter ego, "his literary conscience", and to the task of rewriting the *Saint Anthony* was added the duty of editing, with a preface, the poems left by his friend. Not long after the war other companions of letters followed—Jules de Goncourt, Duplan and Sainte-Beuve. In 1872 his mother died, whose self-effacing devotion had so long made possible his literary seclusion, who after his nightly debauches of composition, would keep the house quiet until he rose at eleven—his first unfailing morning visitor, come to sit a moment on the bed of her big boy and ask news of his work or sleep.

In 1872 also passed his brother-at-arms Théophile Gautier. Among the older generation there now remained only Tourgueneff and George Sand; after Bouilhet's death Flaubert had turned instinctively to the latter. He needed affection, and her generous heart, always in want of someone to care for, was quick to call him to its warmest corner. Her letters to him are admirable in affection and counsel; when she too died in 1876, he can only cry: "I have lost my mother a second time." After her death his literary letters are mainly to LePoittevin's nephew, Guy de Maupassant, whom Flaubert trained in his classic art and came to love almost as a son. But he clings most to his old friends, and one is glad that his sister's child, grown up in his home and loved and taught by him for many years, was to save him from the obligatory solitude of old age. When in 1875 this niece faced ruin through her husband's failure in business, Flaubert generously turned over his fortune, £46,000, receiving in return an allowance and a home with her. The needy novelist had to accept a sinecure as librarian to assure his modest luxuries.

The work of this gloomy decade shows no slackening in effort. Completely rewritten after much additional research, the *Temptation of Saint Anthony* failed to win the suffrage of the mob in 1874; two other dramatic ventures were no more successful. Flaubert now planned and began a work of satiric realism, *Bouvard and Pécuchet*. Finding this too difficult, he laid it aside in 1876 and wrote his long-projected *Saint Julian the Hospitaller*, a naïve

mediaeval legend inspired by a window in the cathedral at Rouen. After this short tale he returned to modern reality in a longer narration, *A Simple Heart*, the story of a poor rustic maid-servant, tender and devoted throughout a sordid life of toil, turning in love to all that surrounds her and sunk in her illusions to the end. A marvel of restrained pathos, the story shows that for once the novelist has listened to the good advice of George Sand. Next came the classically Oriental *Hérodiades*, with its vivid evocation of the past—a tale much admired and often imitated. It is a fine study of the opposition of races—the religious fanaticism of the Jews, the proud indifference of the world-conquering Romans; every figure of the story is living: Herod sated with vices, the wicked Hérodiades and her siren daughter, the fiercely vituperative prophet; the setting has a dazzling brilliance, a magic Syrian colour. These stories were published in 1877 under the title of *Trois Contes*. In artistry if not in significance the volume ranks with *Madame Bovary*; undertaken in a holiday mood, it shows what books Flaubert might have written had he developed the historical tale, instead of leaving it to his disciple and successor Anatole France.

His triptych finished, Flaubert returned to *Bouvard and Pécuchet*, the realistic satire in which he hoped to “spew forth his venom” upon a detested world of materialism. Taking as his heroes two middle-aged clerks, copyists both, he shows them spending an unexpected legacy in a mad attempt to satisfy their various desires for knowledge. Ambitious but inept, they “investigate” all the sciences, using stupid and contradictory texts; at each failure their curiosity turns to a new hobby, until, disgusted with the collapse of everything in their hands, they resolve to copy again as before. The two decide to set down (all) the silly and impossible things that books have shown them, for they hope by comparison to arrive at truth. This was to be the Dictionary of Accepted Opinions conceived by Flaubert in 1850, the book “which will make the reader no longer dare to speak for fear of uttering some of its platitudes.” It is a satire of human stupidity, nihilistic as all his books except *Salammbô*; after treating the vanity of religions, of romantic love, of modern politics, Flaubert wished to show the vanity of education made universal, the democratic dream; and for this monument to folly he read 1500 volumes and piled up a stack of notes eight inches high. Some think that this unique creation alone definitely proves his genius; others.

expanding a *boutade* of his own, that he had become "bête" by contagion. Obviously we cannot decide the matter, for this "book of his revenge" was destined never to be finished. The first half was not quite completed when the eighth of May, 1880, Flaubert fell dead of apoplexy at the foot of his desk, "hurrying desperately", as he tells us in his last published letter, and "weary even to the marrow."

He died a martyr to art, regretting like all old bachelors the children and especially the grandchildren foregone by his celibacy, confessing to George Sand the folly of his choice and its reason: "I was afraid of life." But this fear was reasoned, the effect of his malady; he was no weak character, like Amiel. Pride had early taught him how to overcome the timidity inherent in all imaginative natures. A mere boy, he cured himself of dread of the dark and dizziness when on a height—prowling in the school court-yard at dead of night, climbing steeples and walking on high balustrades. Even then Flaubert showed the will-power and virility which were to sustain him in his double battle with disease and with the muse. It is this which makes him, a grown man, keep at his Latin and Greek until he can read them, and which explains his victory over a natural lyricism. Will, supported by pride, gave him force to die a martyr to art.

His life has the unity of a great purpose. "I have always lived without distractions", he tells Louise Colet. "I was born with a lot of vices which have never put their heads out of the window. I am fond of gaming and have never touched a card. I like dissipation and I live like a monk . . . My life has never balked from the days when I could only write by asking my nurse for the necessary letters, down to this evening when the ink is drying on my corrections. I have followed a straight line, constantly prolonged and direct, through everything, and have always seen the goal retreat before me from year to year. How many times, between advances, have I fallen flat just as I seemed to reach it. Yet I feel that I am not destined to die until I have left somewhere a clarion style such as I hear in my brain, which may well rise above the voices of the parrots and locusts."

When he wrote this, he had not published a word. Yet he felt he was one of the Olympians. Before he died, he knew it. For twenty years he worked in obscurity, studying for hours each day at the fountain-head of antiquity, analyzing the great French writ-

ers to learn all the resources of his palette. It was the ideal which delayed him, not the conflicting forces of his environment and his literary heredity, confusing as they were. "My admiration of the masters increases as I progress," he tells us, "and far from losing hope at that crushing parallel, it strengthens on the contrary my unconquerable whim to write." He remembers the maxim on the identity of patience and genius, and cries: "Would to God that Buffon's impious speech were true! I should be sure to be one of the first!"

He knew all the martyr's joys. If he sacrificed all to his religion, he glimpsed in days of enthusiasm "a state of soul superior to life, oblivious of glory and happiness"; he strove to attain an aesthetic stoicism, and actually lived for days rapt in the world of his fancy. With all his vexations, he "would not exchange his life for anything." "I love my work with a love frantic and perverse as an anchorite's", he exclaims; begs his mistress to "save the essence of her passion for her poetry, for Art is great enough to use the whole of a man." Through Art he attains the secret of the mystics; "constant looking at the sky will give the seeker wings."

Critics have exaggerated the price he paid; it was only the price we all pay for the exclusive pursuit of a single end in a World of the Many. If his art, his solitude and his ambitions exasperated his sensibility, if he died a perfect misanthrope, content to be alone "because he then heard no stupidities", would he have found the pin-pricks of family life or the amenities of politics more endurable? He had a devoted mother, and he had friends to the end, for he was above all a friend; and they were always glad to receive him. But even in his last years, in his greatest literary loneliness, he refuses to visit Madame Sand in her lovely country-seat at Nohant, because he knows from experience that a visit would cost him three months of reveries, filling his brain with real images instead of the fictitious ones he had built up so laboriously. To regret that he never married may please the sentimentalist, but Flaubert knew that he was "a man-pen", destined to find ink "his natural element", that "thoughts and books and literary conversations of five and six hours with LePoittevin" were the things he best remembered, and that for him, as he superbly tells Colet, "living had no concern." He died a solitary, but not without love, and as he thought with gratitude of the masters whose silent company had helped to make him a master, so his tenderness often

went out to the strangers, to the unborn who were to share his dreams. He did not die childless; no artist can read his books and his letters unconscious of his kinship with that Don Quixote of Art. As Flaubert himself said: "A book creates for you a family which will never die; all those who shall live in your thoughts are like children eating at your hearth-stone."

THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE.

BY HENRY FRANK.

(Continued)

THE CELL:

Who me
From subterranean depths calls forth and asks
To ope my tiny lips?

BRAIN:

Sing, elfin Child,
Of living substance and its miracle
Of birth.

CELL:

E'en though infinitesimal,
Yet hath Nature reared in me,
Structures rare and magical,
Finer than man's eye can see.

E'en while yet Laurentian rocks
Cooled amid the fires of earth,
I, inchoate, in the shocks
Of flaming carbon, sought my birth.

Upward through Siluriam slime,
Coral and cretacious crests
(Wove of carbon, shell and lime)
Caught me in their ageing breasts.

Ichthyosaurs, whose lizard form,
Fish-like, clove the primal seas;
Massive birds, that vied the storm,
Sought me in the ocean's lees.

Mammoth forests, mammals vast,
Apes, prehensiled or long armed,
Harbored me from ancient past,
As life's stream my fellows swarmed.

Up from depths post-pliocene,
Time hath wove within my web,
Life's each changing, tragic scene,
As earth's tides did flow and ebb.

Prophesied in plasmic egg,
History confirms my fate;
None needs God for favors beg,
He cannot now His laws re-state.

Cells that lie in leaf or bark,
Leaf and bark alone produce;
Self-same insect, ape or lark,
Unlike cells cannot educe.

Each its kind must reproduce,
Moulded by the trend of time,
Urge resistless can induce,
But what chimes with Nature's rhyme.

Sprung from merging slime and sea,
Life thro me thus swift revealed,
Throbbing in a fluid free,
Shaped me in the soil concealed.

Up from protoplasmic yeast.
Primally alike, I ween,
Bubbles plant or man or beast,
Living fluid, red or green.

Each hath writ within itself,
Fate that fashions form and soul;
I, the inborn mystic elf,
Urge them on toward final goal.

Nature, nascent, wrought through strife,
Proving what best thrives is best ;
In the struggling march of life,
Conquering forms defied arrest.

Cells innumerable have thriven,
In the protoplasmic stream,
Each with primal impulse driven,
Far from Eozoic dream.

Fixed in fated, final form,
Each cell at its office works ;
Though in space a myriad swarm,
None its instant duty shirks.

Time was when uncertain fate,
Lingered in unshapen cells ;
Struggle, stress, contention, hate,
Destined each where now it dwells.

Magical the structures reared,
By these elfin architects ;
Castles, houses, with most weird,
Labarynthian effects.

Tiny, microscopic forms,
Genius, manifold, display ;
E'en in trampled, earthen worms,
Marvels lurk that men dismay.

Palpitant, each drop of life
Throbs with vast machinery,
Weaving like a shuttle rife.
Shapes past human mimicry.

Every form of mammal, plant,
Fibred flower, convolved-brain,
Slowly grows from substance scant,
Bit by bit and grain by grain.

We, the magic toilers are,
 Miracles of nature work ;
 Gods cannot create a star,
 But with powers that in us lurk.

Outwardly our form oft dies,
 Deathlessly our substance lives ;—
 Where Life's shuttle swiftly flies,
 There the essence of us thrives.

Life, 'tis ours to give on earth ;
 Dint of our mechanic toil
 Weaves, in planetary birth,
 Soul and sense, from inert soil.

Up from slimy "ooze" we climb,
 Ever on from mite to Man,
 Through aeonic gulfs of time,
 Seeking Nature's vaster span.

BRAIN :

(exultantly)

List, thou benighted Sponsor of the Faith,
 To knowledge falling from the lips of those,
 Who toil with indefatigable skill,
 And build the microscopic majesty
 Of Kingdoms, tho invisible, sublime,
 Inimitable and unparalleled.
 Thou prat'st withal of supersensuous soul,
 —A tenuous, sublimate, encompassing
 Entity—a substance, void of aught
 Substantial—essence superior to laws
 That reign in space—uncorrelated with
 Pan-Cosmic energies that surge from suns,
 Or spiral incandescent Nebulae,
 From chaos weave the planetary spheres,
 Or wake the sleeping buds on vernal boughs.
 Thou reason'st, 'sooth, "Mind is not chemic or
 Cohesive force combining molecules,
 Which shape the infinite phenomena
 Of rolling worlds ; nor is 't electric spark,
 Which from fused atoms confluent forms evokes ;

Nor magic Motion metamorphosed in
 The vital, throbbing cells, whose ruby breasts
 The stage become whereon enacted is
 The mirage and tragedy of Life."
 Hence Mind is other than aught manifest,
 Within all visible or viewless realms,
 Uncorrelated, super-spacial, free!!
 Thou pratt'st of an Architect of worlds,
 Though infinite, beyond Infinity.
 A Being compassing Infinity,
 Himself beyond an infinite universe!
 Such logic would befoul a sea of thought!
 'T is contradiction's very self. Or Mind
 Is all, or Matter: or, perchance, the two,
 Identical, are opposite sides of each.
 Diverse in function, once, inseparable
 In nature; in essence all identical.
 Whatever Mind may be, it must needs be
 Invisibly inwoven in visual forms,
 And one with Energy that moves the world.
 'T is inconceivable that Mind's a Thing,
 Apart and extricate from substance, which
 Is all-pervasive. If Matter be, 'tis Mind;
 Or mayhap—Mind is Matter's other self,
 Both immaterial and material,
 As sense-perceived, or felt insensible.

MIND:

Halt, thy too rapid speech! O Reason hear:
 This boaster claims machinery and mind
 Are one: The Thought which organizes is.
 The thing itself, self-shaped from shapeless mass
 Into organic grandeur. The Builder and
 The building are the same: The Clock creates
 Itself with genius increate. O Fie!
 O how has Logic fallen to base use
 And merged in mimic nonsense. 'Tis too true
 The age is all distraught, confused, by wild
 And senseless admiration of a false
 And boastful Science.

BRAIN :

'T is sad to hear thy groans.
These are the piteous grievings of an Age,
Though moribund, unconscious of its death.
If Reason grant I will my summons send
For still another witness who shall prove
That what prevails, and called the universe,
Was not directed to its end by some
Intelligence that played upon 't, as plays
With clay the potter. 'T is Man is self-deceived.
He, standing on the topmost summit of
Age ascending peaks, *chef d'œuvre* of Time,
Himself, the acme and supreme apex
Of Nature's moulding powers, motivated and willed
By conscious purpose, thinks that Nature is
Thus purposed by some pre-existing Mind.
He would the infinite confine within
The bounds and limitations of the laws
That operate within his narrow being.
Beholding stationary objects moved
By his initial impulse, he recks not
Of Motion beginningless, inherent in
The universal essence; knowing he
Discerns but objects moved externally,
He halts at thought of Builder dwelling within
The building of life evolving from itself!
He sees the *outer* world: 'T is Science casts
Its penetrating eye beyond the mist
Of momentary vision, weighs the stars
And suns upon its balances; dissects
Their vast anatomies, dissolves their beams,
And learns the secret of their origin.
The intimations of a buried Past
She scents, and, sleuth-like, trails the mystery,
Through cosmic labyrinths, till solved at last!
Behold her work: She causes the glistening sand
Upon the beach to ope its flinty lips,
And speak its truth; she makes the boneless worm
Its parentage reveal; the bell-domed flowers
Upon the sea, the urchins, starry-shelled,
And bony-shielded reptiles makes tell whence

They sprung, and from what fiery soils: and e'en
 The earth, prolific mother of all forms,
 Must needs divulge her inmost secrets; speak
 Her origin from flaming Nebulae:—
 She must again disport the fiery robe
 That once enveloped her; the plangent mists
 And watery envelope which once concealed
 Her mountainous breasts, that heaving bulged anon
 Above subsiding seas; she must reveal
 Whence soil and seed begun, and whence the life
 That surged and swelled in thousand rivulets
 From self-impregnant womb; she must give tongue
 To every leaf and pebble, to layers of dirt
 That stratify the globe; to fossiled stone
 And bones, the teeth of centuries have gnawed!
 The panorama of the world, the eyes
 Of Science survey with penetrating gaze:—
 Its cosmic transformations, tragedies;
 Its cyclic births and deaths, recorded in
 Millennial resurrections; its unbegun
 Beginning and its endless end. Bethink:—
 To listening ears of Science, Time narrates
 What countless centuries have left untold.
 This knowing, no more should humble Man, bewitched
 By sacred ignorance, belie the plan
 Of Nature, measured by his paltry powers.
 Man strives t' achieve by conscious will; therefore
 His limitations: Nature, self-evolved,
 Forges forth from Atom's unsensed throb,
 To crowning Consciousness in Man sublime!
 Hail, first-begotten, foremost offspring of
 Self-forming, self-evincing cosmos, speak!

*(slowly above the surf-laden surface of the waters, emerges the peak of
 a rising mountain. When the embossed knoll is well above the
 water's edge, the sea gradually stills, lapping at last in
 leisurely waves, and upon the mountain-top there
 appears the perfect shape of a human bust, as if
 cut out of the rocks of the peak. It represents
 the ideal Goal toward which all the
 manifold shapes and forms of
 Nature have been moving)*

FORM :

Naught but myself exists, nor can
E'en primal mists unshapen move
From primal urge to final man,
From flaming gas to stars above.

All energy seeks path in space;
Ultimate shape each motion takes;
No less the ray in rapid race,
Than wave, the tempest madly shakes.

The vapor floating in the sky;
The viewless germs that ride the air;
The flakes of snow that wayward fly;
By me are fashioned, frail and fair.

The cystalled grain, the fibred leaf,
The fronded fern, the crawling worm,
The wriggling sperm in neural sheaf,
Have struggled toward their final form.

I have not always been as now,
But slowly through millennial strife,
Time shaped the fashion of my brow,
And lineaments carved by struggling life.

I was not, ere all worlds began
Predestined and forethought by fate:
Or cast athwart the infinite span,
Full-formed in embryonic state.

None saw me, erst I trod the Void,
Or latent lay in Chaos wild,
Or, seized by Chance and oft decoyed,
Was toward some distant goal beguiled.

For none so rash to prophesy,
How sprung from far chaotic womb,
Each myriad possibility,
Would final form in time assume.

Behold the snow flakes on the pane!
Their sparkling crown and star-formed crest,
(From moisture fashioned grain by grain)
The plan of Nature well attest.

Ne'er Man's ingenious mind hath wrought,
Such magic as these vapors weave,
When frosts, which have their bosoms saught,
With chilling passion to them cleave.

The mists' white feet, in variant form
Flit vagrantly through frosted air—
Unlike in calm or gathering storm,
When skies are dun or sun is fair.

'T is chemic or electric touch,
The pulsive heat, or radiant sky,
The weight of gravitation's clutch,
Or cosmic stress, determines why.

I shall thus variously disport,
In multifarious moulds, the power
That reigns supreme at heaven's court,
To shape a star or humble flower.

Thus throughout the natural world,
All forms evolve from forces, welled
From primal source and onward whirled,
Till by conflicting forces quelled.

Naught pre-exists as final form;
No destiny foretold its end;
Else useless were the stress and storm,
That from eternity contend.

The stars whose constellations swing
Their pendulous orbits through the sky,
Heard not the morning angels sing
Creations hymn from thrones on high.

With cosmic and concussive shock,
 Their cataclysmic course they sought;
 Their whirling seas of fire did rock
 The world, as ruthlessly they fought.

Their breasts with titan blows oft smote;
 Their shaping forms to atoms crushed:—
 Restored, upon the heavens they wrote,
 Their fiery epic as they rushed.

Whence come, or whither fleeing, they
 Uncharted, knew not, nor shall know;
 But onward, through the stellar way,
 Their courses seek like whirling snow.

Thus, Whate'er in heaven or earth,
 Is cast within Expression's mould,
 Reveals the meaning of its birth,
 When read in Nature's tale, oft told.

Millennial epochs come and go,
 The stars repeat their ancient life,
 And cyclic resurrections flow
 From cyclic death and cosmic strife;

Still, whatsoe'er my changes be,
 I am eternal, infinite;
 The world's vast drama is of ME,
 And yields me homage requisite.

BRAIN:

Thus speaks the wisdom of the star and stone,
 Or crude and nebulous essence that once surged
 Through seas primordial, till shaped to worlds.
 And thus all substances, from ghostly rays
 And vanishing atoms, carve their native forms:—
 No less, impond'able than opaque things
 Leap from invisible sources of the air.
 O womb of infinite Fecundity:
 O, cosmic, procreant, all-filling Ether,
 Abysmal vista of Eternity.

Thou, too, by form immeasurable, art
 Encompassed, beyond the mental grasp of Man,
 As natural law and reason postulate.
 To Man the infinite is compassed by
 The horizon of his mental vision, which
 Fades in vague, vertiginous distances.
 Immeasurableness is not unmeasured, save
 By incommensurate minds. The sky-kissed mount,
 Whose hooded brow is studded by the stars,
 Is measureless to crawling worm; and, well,
 The gilded mote might deem the golden ray,
 In which it floats, immeasurable, if
 'T were conscious; forest monarchs would to grass
 Blades seem beyond the reach of rule or chart.
 In Nature, all is due proportioned and
 Perceived as relative.

MIND:

(angrily expostulating)

Ah, relative,

Indeed! But who ordains the appointed bounds
 Of relative function? Who hath swarmed the Void
 With fecund Forces that beget in womb
 Of Time, the diverse forms that Nature needs?
 Who hath these all-substantial worlds evolved
 From Naught? Who hath so armed the Atom's breast
 Protected, that it drives what it dislikes
 From its embrace, and what it likes attracts?
 Who first conceived of Form, while Matter was
 Invisible, chaotic and unshaped?
 Who carved the contour of the Universe,
 With matchless grandeur and sublimity?
 Who urged initial impulse on inert,
 And moveless Matter, whose inertia wells
 Within, and drives it on its endless course?
 Who twirled the spiral rings of Nebulae,
 And from their substance rolled the golden orbs,
 That glorify the amethystine skies?
 Who timed the clock-like movement of the spheres,
 And tonal rhythms of aerial waves?
 What, then, is Matter but the mould of form,

The Potter casts in matrix of the Mind?
 Without His conjuration, where were worlds
 And planets that populate the bluey Void?
 Speak, if thou canst, whence Matter, Force, or whence
 The electric clasps that wanton atoms bind?
 O, wondrous wisdom, crowning Nature's work!
 Came all by Chance, that specious god of thine?
 Or was't ordained by Him, the Infinite,
 From whose supernal Mind, the blending beams
 Of Wisdom and Intelligence pervade
 The visible and invisible paths of space?

BRAIN:

I previously have said, that Science sunk
 Its probing shafts into the mysteries
 Of Nature to such depths, already it
 Has reached the vanishing rim of substance and
 Ostensible reality, where sways
 Tumultuous Energy, unheard, unseen.
 Man, now, amazed, pursues the floating wraith
 Of Matter, past visual zones till it dissolve
 In Motion's vibrative, ethereal waves.
 Thou speak'st of Naught, whence sprung created worlds!
 That Nothing is, which lies beyond the reach
 Of human sense; yet 't is but nothing to
 The unperceiving sense. When substance fades
 Beyond the zone of sense, tho dissipant
 And swallowed by Vacuity, 't is not
 Dissolved to Nothingness, tho lost to sense.
 There is no nothingness, nor vacuum,
 In the far, abysmal depths of shoreless space!
 If Nothing were, then God were nothing, too;
 Or Nothing were true God. For how can Aught
 Exist in Naught, save as the Naught itself
 Become existent Aught? Be not befooled!
 If God made Matter, Himself, then, matter is.
 Else were He ignorant of what He made,
 And His omniscience were a vapid boast.
 The Universe is not a sphere, and bound
 In space, outside of which a God may live;
 'T is neither here nor there, but everywhere;

All-comprising, boundless, infinite, supreme!
 And God himself is therein full expressed,
 Or else unsaught by thought of rational Man.

And, prithee, what of Spirit? Knowest thou aught?
 Where is't? If insubstantial, where abid'st it?
 If not of Matter how shall Matter sense
 What is insensible? Impassable
 The gulf twixt Sense and Spirit if diverse
 And incommunicant each be. Thou, loud,
 Of Spirit speak'st; but Science, of Energy:
 In Nature both must be the same, the Source
 Primeval, whence from seeming nothingness
 Majestic grandeurs of the world unfold.
 Here then may reason rest at last in peace,
 Discerning harmony in human thought:
 Here found, at last, the final unity;
 In Nature and in Man, the conflict ends,
 And energy and spirit breathe as one:
 They are but breathing wave and waving breath,
 Eternal Motion whence evolves the world.
 Come forth, then, Thou eternal Source and speak:

*(over the entire globe a strong, stirring but evenly modulated breath of
 wind sweeps round, carrying with it all movable objects, yet not
 creating commotion, but rather a pleasing sense of intermin-
 gling harmony among the moving objects, while the globe
 itself revolves leisurely. Finally a zephyr seizes a mist
 upon the surface and whirls it slowly round and
 round in spiral form till it assumes a lofty
 graceful figure, whirling round in the
 gentle breeze, and lit with green and
 red and violet rays. The figure,
 MOTION, speaks)*

(To be Continued.)

A CRITICAL VIEW OF PROGRESS.

BY F. S. MARVIN.

Using as far as possible Mr. F. S. Marvin's own words, I have tried in a previous article¹ to sketch the development of the gospel of progress through science which he preaches. A critical history of its growth would be a very different thing, and something much needed. I attempted, however, simply to present this doctrine as it is conceived by those who believe in it. I do not know how real it may seem to the majority of informed and sober people. To me, I confess, it seems flimsy and shallow; yet its very confusion and self-contradictions make its adequate criticism a complex, difficult task. This task I do not now propose to undertake exhaustively; I wish merely to mention a few very simple considerations which such a criticism would have to include.

In the first place, Mr. Marvin pretends to write history, and to prove this doctrine by the sanction of historic fact. He candidly tells us, it is true, that while "the growth of a general or European frame of mind" is perfectly evident, still, "it is one thing to believe in and realize this, and quite another to trace its workings in the manifold difficulties and turnings of practical life." Yet he has an easy way of surmounting this and similar difficulties. His method is just to disregard everything that does not support his "strong clear clue." "We are surely justified," he says, "in giving the first place in our treatment to those sides of human nature in which the historic development is most marked." And again: "From tool to tool, from flint axe to steam-engine, is a striking, palpable measure of man's achievement from his earliest beginnings to our own days. This must not be understood to confine the idea of progress within the limits of the mechanical arts or to suggest that mechanical tools are the highest product of human intelligence. . . . But man's tool-making is so characteristic and progressive, it brings together

¹"Progress through Science," *Open Court*, February, 1922. Both articles form parts of a book, *Progress and Science: Essays in Criticism*, to be published in the early fall by the Yale University Press.

and exhibits in working order so many of his powers, that if we were isolating one aspect only of his activity, the series of his tools would best display the growth of mind." Mr. Marvin shows skill in achieving plausibility, but by this simple method one can make history "prove" anything one wishes. It has often been done; and accordingly the person who wants to be convinced rather than hypnotized must throughout Mr. Marvin's work rewrite it for himself as he reads. Evidently, these books are not "history" at all, though their disguise is singularly effective for capturing those who swallow propaganda whole.

A case in point is Mr. Marvin's treatment of religion. He is struck by the religious basis of ancient civilizations, such as that of Egypt, and he sees that the formation of strong and stable governments, extending over great areas, apparently had then to depend upon the development of the religious spirit. Accordingly he says that the religious spirit was valuable for the beginning it alone could make towards the organization of humanity for the conquest of nature; it alone was able to bring and hold together great societies around one centre of government, to inspire individuals with such passion for the social structure as to forget themselves for its sake. We owe, he continues, the same debt to Mediæval Christianity. At the break-up of the Roman Empire Christianity providentially stepped in, not merely to rebuild an old civilization, but to widen and strengthen its germ of permanent truth—that is, to implant in men's hearts the hope of a world-polity in which all humanity should be harmoniously united in the pursuit of a common social end. The consequence is that the Middle Ages, which apparently contributed nothing to progress through science, in reality gave us the very possibility of such further progress. It is true "that at the close of the Middle Ages man was not on the whole better equipped by his knowledge of the laws of nature than he was in the hey-day of Greek science. . . . But on the other side of the picture we see the social force and unity of the vanguard of mankind immensely strengthened by the process of these unscientific centuries; and this development was no less essential to the coming conquests of mankind than scientific knowledge itself." "The social unity of all mankind, the common action and purpose of the universe," we are told, "became articles of faith, guaranteed by the most powerful organization in the world." And mediæval Christianity culminated in the "demonstration" "that there is one principle which rules the heaven-

ly bodies in their certain courses and by the same law the souls of men. As surely as we see the former revolve in their orbits, so surely is mankind created to work together for the salvation of all." Thus the "ideal purpose" of the Papacy was "to bring together the two realms of man and nature under one Law of Love."

Mr. Marvin unobtrusively makes the transition from talk about the social benefits resulting from religious faith to talk about religion as being itself essentially socialistic propaganda. It is a remarkable transition, but the passages just quoted show that it has been made. Accordingly it is easy for Mr. Marvin when he reaches the nineteenth century to say that in this period, particularly during the last thirty years of it, there was real and great "religious" progress, and that it centered in "the growing devotion of religious people to good works, especially of an organized kind." "The progress of religion," he says, "consists essentially in bringing its conceptions more and more nearly into harmony with the highest moral ideas of mankind." Now "in our own and recent times both the public and the preachers are turning to the good will, the good life, the desire to help one's neighbors, as evidence of religion, apart from creed or formal practices. . . . The modern parish and diocese is a network of societies and agencies for improving the moral and social condition of its members."

Plainly here is falsification of two kinds. In the first place, Mr. Marvin misrepresents the well-known character and essential nature of mediæval Christianity. Christians did indeed preserve much of the old Greek and Roman civilization through the long period of barbarism and slow rebuilding; they did hasten the development of a new European civilization. Yet it can be said in a sentence that civilization was not the Church's aim. Whatever its failures and lapses, the Church did not aim at the creation of an Earthly Paradise. Often unwillingly and always with difficulty, the Church still did contrive to preach the depravity of the natural man and the sinfulness of all earthly and fleshly desires. Not social amelioration but the greater glory of God through the redemption of men's souls from temporal corruption was the Church's aim. Certainly a vague sense of human solidarity did arise in isolated instances from the reflection that God's grace might come equally to all men, irrespective of race or social condition, but this is a very different thing from saving that the Church taught as an article of faith "the social unity of all mankind." To recognize this it is enough to remember that

the Church never discouraged the private accumulation of wealth, that it never sought to relieve temporal injustice or oppression, that it never attempted to level social inequalities—that, in a word, it frankly left worldly affairs to the children of this world, being itself concerned with the totally different, eternal realm of the spirit. And so far as it failed of this general aim, failure did not come from any bias in favor of social amelioration.

In the second place, Mr. Marvin misrepresents the nature of religion itself. Did any man or woman—it may be asked, with no intention of flippancy—ever worship God in spirit and in truth for the sake of providing the children of the poor with pasteurized milk, or in order to found homes for orphans?—did any man or woman indeed ever worship God in spirit and in truth for the sake of making his neighbors across the street or next door more honest? A plain answer to this question puts the matter in a clear light. To any one who has known religion even at a distance the question will seem perhaps worse than absurd, yet it makes a fair summary of Mr. Marvin's assertions. The truth is that a religious person may partially express or give outward result to his religion through good works, even of "an organized kind." He may thus, for instance, help to support "fresh-air homes" for city children or, more questionably, he may see to it that his neighbors do not disobey the prohibition law or falsify their income-tax returns. But others may do these same things from quite other motives, from simple good will or benevolence, from devotion to efficiency, from the itch which allows no rest to the meddlesome busybody. Good works thus are not even certain evidence of religion, and are by so much the less religion itself. Religion itself is a condition of the inward man—an inner, personal experience in which the individual finds new life in the consciousness of the grace and the fatherhood of his God and in the assurance thereby given him of the eternal peace which passeth understanding. This means that essentially religion is not a social activity at all, and that, moreover, the very entrance-way to religion is a deep conviction of the relative emptiness of the mutable things of the outward world. This truth is as old and as generally known as it is fundamental; yet to many, perhaps to most, even the language here used will seem unreal. As far as this is so, if we are frank with ourselves we can only confess the obvious reason—that we are strangers to the religious experience. Perhaps some of us are unconscious strangers, if we have mistaken

for religion some meagre or pallid system of ethics. In either case such confession, however disagreeable, is at least serviceable to the cause of truth. And self-deception is the most innocent name one can give to all attempts at the transference of a creditable name to secular activities howsoever meritorious.

Mr. Marvin's treatment of the history of Christianity and of the nature of religion gives a new, rich meaning to two old-fashioned aphorisms by Benjamin Whichcote. "*Among Politicians*," Whichcote said, "the Esteem of Religion is profitable: the Principles of it are troublesome;" and "The grossest Errors are but Abuses of some noble Truths." These sayings are sufficient comment upon the nature of Mr. Marvin's perversion of truth in his well-intentioned effort to write history according to his own fancy. Yet in this quite as fully as in his general belief in progress through science Mr. Marvin faithfully mirrors a popular contemporary point of view. There is a connection here which will presently become plain. First, however, it is necessary to glance at several aspects of this general belief.

Knowledge, said Bacon, is power; we may command nature in so far as we learn her laws and obey them. Such knowledge, then, opens up to us stores of power, or material wealth, not otherwise obtainable, and from this profitable character of science has come its popular justification and its immense prestige. In considering this fact a remark made by Thomas Hobbes is worth remembering. "In the first place," Hobbes wrote, "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more." No one is likely to dispute these words, but they bring to light a problem. For the desire of power means primarily power for one's self, or at the very least power in which one can definitely participate. It is a common-place that we feel pride in our country's power so far as we benefit from it in material prosperity; that, on the other hand, our feeling tends to be one of resentment—making more or less violent "reformers" of us—in proportion as we are conscious of not receiving a fair share of the general wealth. This at any rate seems to be the very common rule. Moreover we want

wealth ourselves for our own private purposes, which are diverse. That is the fact which makes power a neutral thing, perhaps good for the individuals who fortunately possess it, but at least as likely to be evil in the long run for them, and altogether likely to be evil for the generality of mankind. For power always involves control over other human beings, the use of other men as instruments for one's own ends. This is the unescapable fact, though many habitually and conveniently forget it, no matter what the form of one's wealth may be, and, it may be added, no matter what the form of our political institutions. The demagogue proposes an easy remedy for the evils of power. He would simply make it "public," instead of private; and it is always possible that his appeal to the gullible will so succeed as to effect a redistribution of power from which the demagogue and his friends will benefit. But the very nature of material power is such that it can be made "public" in only a fictitious or verbal sense. A group of individuals must always control it, and in doing so must use other human beings as means to their own ends. Demagogues may be more conscientious and humane than other men, or they may not—but we have nothing save their own assertions for surety. A strong effort is apparently still on foot to convince the rest of the world that the new distribution of power in Russia is not succeeding. This may or may not be true; but the significant fact about the Russian experiment appears to be that already it has been discovered there that the sole condition of success is governmental compulsion to industrial work.² Granting that the government is composed of perfect and incorruptible beings, stable prosperity may thus in time result for the *community*. But prosperity conditioned by the tyrannical oppression of the individuals who make up the community can in the end prove only an empty mockery, no matter how widely it is distributed.

Mr. Marvin is more or less hypnotized by the contemplation of material power. He thrills with emotion whenever he speaks of its vast increase through science. This is, he says, "stupendous," which no one would deny. Yet Mr. Marvin is no sophistical advocate of the "public" control of power, nor yet is he blind enough to commit himself to the position that power is in itself a good thing. Concerning the latter, "it would be well for the world,"

² Since the above sentences were written it has become plain that even this measure has been unavailing.

he says, "if the unification of scientific theory had had its counterpart in the unification of sentiments and aims in life. But progress in inventions has been as fruitful in producing more and more effective ways of destroying the life and work of man as it has been in protecting and promoting them. One hopeful fact, however, may be recorded. Nearly all the achievements of science in fabricating weapons of destruction can be converted with little change into constructive channels. The process of manufacturing the most deadly explosives is near akin to that of producing the most effective fertilizers of the soil. Dynamite prepares the way for railroads as surely as it levels forts." This fact may be admitted; but in recording it Mr. Marvin quite begs the question which he himself raises, and we shall presently see that there is little enough basis for hope that men's aims will soon cease to conflict with each other. In fact the more perfect the unification of such sentiments and aims in life as Mr. Marvin has in mind, the more certain are future conflicts amongst men.

It must be remembered that the goal of our progressive humanity is "the fullest life of which the individual is capable"; in other words, the attainment of a state of affairs in which the individual may freely satisfy all his desires, which are assumed to be naturally good. They are also numerous. "Man is a great deep," wrote S. Augustine, "whose very hairs, O Lord, thou hast numbered and they are not lost in thee; yet more easily numbered are his hairs than his affections and the motions of his heart"—*et tamen capilli eius magis numerabiles quam affectus eius et motus cordis eius*. This is true; men's desires, free rein being given them, are inordinate; they endlessly grow in intensity and in number. Old desires increase through satisfaction and new ones are added to them. Periods of satiety and disgust do not retard their march. Every one knows that commerce finds its readiest and largest, if not always its surest, profits in novelties; and the rapidity with which fashions, not alone in clothes, alter themselves is proverbial. This "expansion of the spirit," as Mr. Marvin loosely and admiringly calls it, is a restless longing for change and new excitements which from its very nature can never be satisfied, for satisfactions do only increase it.

One may wonder if "progress" of this kind is worth our effort, and if its contemporary apologists are really understood by their energetic and unreflective disciples. Yet this is not the only fact to

be taken into account in understanding its nature. One of the remarkable and almost neglected results of the union of science with industry has been an increase—it is said of well over four hundred *per cent.* in a hundred years—in the population of the western hemisphere. As our power of satisfying our desires has grown, so has the number of those who insistently desire. The development of organized industry, too, has been to a great extent dependent on this increase in the army of workers. We may easily develop means of controlling our numbers, but, if our population becomes stationary or dwindles, so inevitably will progress through science cease or recede. From this there is no escape; the fact is only evaded, not met, by loose conjecture, which can derive no sanction from history, concerning man's boasted inventive capacity. This capacity is marvelous, but it operates within strict limits, of which requisite man-power is one. Furthermore, applied science has thus far contrived for a brief space, as such things go, to improve the material well-being of a large minority of the population of about half the globe. This material betterment has been extraordinarily great, but for it we have already paid a price which we are only now beginning to realize. Even Mr. Marvin admits that in the early nineteenth century "the condition of the mass of the people of England was probably worse than it had been at any previous period," and this is certainly not the darkest part of the story. Then and later, industry has succeeded only through oppression, through the degraded and ruined lives of the multitude; and the attention paid to material benefits has had its natural consequence in materializing, narrowing, and debasing the lives of rich and poor alike. Yet what we have paid in these ways is perhaps nothing to what we shall still pay. We entered upon a new period of payment in 1914, which will be with us for many a weary year. "Competition of riches," wrote Hobbes, "honor, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other." And as such competition brought on the war, so did exact science make it the most destructive and cruel struggle within recorded history. Its economic consequences are already seen to be of the most pervasively dangerous kind. Yet the sort of "progress" possible through applied science by its very nature promotes just such wars.

If the aim of making mankind more comfortable were attain-

able, and if the price paid for material benefits were not far greater than the benefits themselves, there would be still the question whether this would contribute, as Descartes and countless others have thought, to the real betterment of humanity. Perhaps this question has already been answered, but it deserves explicit recognition. Wise men of all ages have laid it down that real human betterment can come only through the development of our spiritual capacities, and that all other things should serve as means to this end. Without being more precise, we may accept this as a truism which no one can seriously deny. It is easy to see that a starving man's greatest need is food, and a freezing man's, warmth, and that without these and similar elements of material well-being a man cannot, if he would, cultivate his higher faculties. It is also easy to say in consequence that if men are once made sufficiently comfortable and given sufficient leisure they will all straightway turn to the cultivation of their higher faculties. That is the argument, and Mr. Marvin like the rest looks forward to the attainment in this way through science of the spiritual betterment of the race. But argument is too dignified a word for such reasoning. Patently nothing of the sort actually happens, nor is there any good ground for hope that it may. What does happen is that concentration of attention upon material well-being blinds one to benefits of any other kind. The power to secure material advantages breeds, as has been said, simply the desire for more. The "sufficiency" of which Mr. Marvin and others fondly dream is never achieved, because this desire is infinitely expansive and can never be satisfied. Yet as far as it is satisfied it inclines men to believe there is no reality or meaning in spiritual values. Their materialized lives are good enough for them. Any one who has never learned and relearned this from his neighbors—any person so singularly fortunate may find in the life of our age more general illustrations of compelling force, not to speak of the assumptions underlying the exact sciences. One of the most significant, if not the most striking, of these illustrations is the decline of liberal education, most notable in America, but beginning to be evident in Europe as well. Everywhere it is being supplanted by vocational and technical training which meets the irresistible demand for something "practical." Nor only this, but the subjects of study most profitably yielding themselves to philosophic treatment, and of the greatest efficacy for educating the

characters of men, are prevailingly taught in an illiberal manner, aped without discrimination from the exact sciences, by teachers with eyes only for facts to students with eyes only for trade values.

It seems to me that in the light of these considerations Mr. Marvin's loose talk about the unifying efficacy of science loses all plausibility. Men are not necessarily united or filled with brotherly love by being brought, physically, more closely together. This has been known indeed rather to kindle antipathies which, if repressed, sooner or later break forth with preternatural vigor. This at the most produces a dull uniformity of manner and appearance which bears no relation to the unity of which Mr. Marvin speaks. Nor are these results attained by teaching men the inter-relations of phenomena and so, amongst other things, taking their attention from their human problems while emphasizing their kinship with beasts. Again, the modern worker's realization of the dependence of others upon his execution of his task is not so likely to fill him with love of humanity as with the sense of power. In proportion as he realizes the necessity of co-operation amongst men he tends to turn that need to his own private advantage, holding up his industry or society at large for a higher material reward. No one blames him for doing this who does not also blame his employers, who are playing exactly the same game; but surely to the fact no one can be blind, and indeed there can be no reasonable expectation of a different state of affairs. Moreover, granting Mr. Marvin's claim that science has united us all in the common pursuit of "conquering" nature, this is a singularly different thing from that human unity which he ecstatically visualizes. From this unity of effort competition can never be eliminated because of the object of strife—and the greater the unity the greater always must be the competition. Material rewards are always either yours or mine, and we will only unite to share them in order to obtain an advantage over a third competitor. Chaucer's Pardoner long ago knew all about this, and his story does not grow old or stale. The only sort of common effort which promotes human unity, in any significant sense of the phrase, is strife after a spiritual reward, which alone is not vitiated by vulgar competition—which alone may be shared by all men alike without dimming its lustre or lessening its value for each one. Here alone the strife is not against one's fellows, but against one's self.

Indeed, Mr. Marvin is himself strangely conscious that science has not accomplished what he is so anxious to claim for it. As he somewhat ambiguously puts it in a passage already quoted, "the unification of scientific theory has not had its counterpart in the unification of sentiments and aims in life." On one occasion he throws out a hint that this defect will be remedied when the "humane sciences," slower in developing than the mechanical ones, shall have attained their full growth. Whether through wisdom or accident, however, he nowhere develops this hint. Instead, he finally puts all his eggs into another basket. It might be supposed that in his recognition of a need for an "unification of sentiments and aims in life" Mr. Marvin, whatever else he may mean by this phrase, means also that he perceives man's real trouble to lie after all within himself. It might be supposed that here he inconsistently recognizes the necessity of a regimentation of men's desires, of a self-discipline resting upon discrimination between good and evil in human nature. Such a reasonable supposition would, however, be far distant from the truth. The truth is that Mr. Marvin does in the end implicitly abandon the whole case which he so laboriously builds up for progress through science; he does admit that the power or wealth made available by science is in itself at least a neutral thing, constantly being turned to "unsocial" uses; and he does admit that science provides no check upon the "unsocial" use of wealth.

Yet he still maintains that the goal of progressive society is a condition where each individual may freely satisfy to the utmost his natural desires, and he insists—rightly, of course—that for the attainment of such an aim physical science is supremely needful. He is confident, however, that material wealth can easily be turned to purely "social" uses, and he consequently makes the condition of progress and its direct agent—not science—but social sympathy. He speaks of the two as if they were inseparable partners, though he is not guilty of actually confounding them with each other. "Side by side with the growth of science," he says, "which is also the basis of the material prosperity and unification of the world, has come a steady deepening of human sympathy, and the extension of it to all weak and suffering things. . . . Science, founding a firm basis for the co-operation of mankind, goes widening down the centuries, and sympathy and pity bind the courses together." The general intention of such words, at least,

is plain enough; yet it takes no great amount of reflection to see, even from Mr. Marvin's admissions alone, that science and sympathy bear no organic relation to each other except that of enemies. Vivisection is a fair example of what happens when they meet on common ground. But if the spirit of theoretical science is one from which all feeling is rigidly banished, it may still be claimed that the purpose of applied science is humanitarian in nature. It exists only to serve human desires; but on the other hand it has grown only because it is profitable. "Exploit" would here be a more accurate word than "serve." The transparent disguise of humanitarian activity has been insisted upon just to render the personal profit respectable. And that humanity has not yet quite sunk below the uneasy feeling that personal profit is, after all, ignoble is proved by the general boast of scientists themselves that they never derive such profit from their discoveries, but leave that for other men.

Aside, however, from the friendly relation between science and sympathy which Mr. Marvin characteristically implies, he finds definite proof of the increase and spread of social sympathy in state regulation of the conditions of labor, and, even more, in such organizations as the Boy Scouts, the Girls' Friendly Society, and the Student Christian movement—analogous, apparently, to our Y. W. C. A. and Y. M. C. A. He says that "such bodies are very characteristic of recent times; they are largely religious in spirit, and their religion has certain common features. . . . They are without exception humanitarian in a definite and formative sense. They all train their members to believe, and to act in the belief, that the good of others is our own good also, that we develop our powers by such action, and that this in fact is the nature and genesis of all true progress in the world. . . . It should be clear to the student of history that this expansion of the essential and immemorial principle of all morality is on a wider scale and affects more sides of life than anything we have seen before. . . . This fact of triumphant association is indeed so indubitable and so impressive that we might be inclined to rest in it alone as sufficient evidence of the progress of humanity."

This throws light on Mr. Marvin's attempt, already noticed, to identify religion with humanitarian propaganda. Like other observers, he has been impressed with the altogether remarkable force often exerted by religion in reshaping and even in quite

remaking the life of the individual. This compelling sanction he covets for the new gospel of social sympathy, and he seems seriously to believe that by using the name he can secure the thing. Of that we must remain at least gravely doubtful. We do not now have any hopeful facts from which to judge; the only really successful instances of co-operation which can be pointed out are those which directly minister to self-interest. Plainly these are not examples of the working of sympathy. Nor is it easy to see how sympathy, often weak when it does exist and always an extremely capricious emotion quickly spent in proportion as it is violently felt, can ever be so deepened and extended—indeed fundamentally remade—as to form a positive and efficacious guiding principle for society. Like other emotions, too, sympathy demands a concrete object; it tends to become vague and unreal as its object is distant or abstract. A man is aroused to violent action at the sight of a dog or a horse being cruelly treated; the same man reads of the massacre of fifty thousand Armenians without, as we say, turning a hair. He may murmur to himself a few biting words, but he is not actually moved. Those Armenians are concrete objects, but they are distant. By so much the less, then, have we any reason to expect men to feel active sympathy for humanity at large. Even granting that this emotional *tour de force* should become sporadically possible, it takes only a slight knowledge of the world for realization that sympathy is blind and indiscriminate. The truth is that inculcation of social sympathy opens the way for much fine talk unaccompanied by action—for sheer sentimentalism—and thus it is certain of popularity; but it leaves the individual and society quite unchanged, and so effects no positive result except its encouragement to self-deception. However, it is to be wished that we would sometimes ask ourselves if, supposing a condition of universal brotherly love were attainable, this would be a desirable state. No one can answer this question completely, howsoever gifted with imagination, because none can definitely picture such a state of affairs. I shall not here make the attempt; yet a few things are plain. Such a society from its very nature would be soft, spineless, and poor. It would be poor both spiritually and materially; with easy-going nonchalance it would neither penalize the slothful nor reward the industrious. It would be completely indiscriminate in all its judgments, the ooze of fraternal sentiment blurring every outline

and swiftly unmaking painfully built up standards of character. Indeed it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the relapse to savagery would be swift and complete. These are strong statements, but I can see no ground for assuming that such a society would retain the institutions on which civilization has hitherto rested. It could not do so but, more than this, it would not wish to. Those institutions rest at every point upon the recognition of actual differences amongst men which it would be a chief purpose of completely humanitarian society to ignore. Thus the institutions upon which organized community life depends would inevitably vanish. Further, I can see no ground for assuming that such a society would preserve any characteristics not demonstrably necessitated by a condition of brotherly love, and savage tribes now exist in which the social bond is extraordinarily strong.³ It is, however, important that we should not lose ourselves in necessarily vain dispute concerning the precise character of such a society, but that we should awaken to a realization of our almost total ignorance of the condition into which many "social reformers" of the present day would plunge us if they could.

Mr. Marvin, in a sentence already quoted, says that Darwin transferred the centre of our interest from the life of the individual to the growth of the species. This is likely to be long a source of confusion. We now talk in terms of the species and indulge in hazy visions of its growth, yet we continue to think and live as individuals. It has become the fashion, for instance, to regard society as an organism, a conception for which there is no justification in either science or reason, and one which lends a factitious interest to matters with which we can have no concern. Granting for the moment that Mr. Marvin's view of progress is sound, we can ourselves have no share in its fruition. We are but means to an end which is not realized in our own age or in the life of any individual. Yet so far as men take any active

³ Not without interest here are some remarks in Kant's *Idea for a Universal History*, a treatise with which Mr. Marvin plays fast and loose in an effort to pretend that it fully supports his own views. Kant writes: "Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities which set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his selfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men would have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, contentment, and mutual love; but all their talents would forever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence a greater value than that of their cattle." (The translation is Edward Caird's, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. II, p. 550.)

interest in this supposed process they do so because they conceive themselves as partaking in its benefits. Thus Mr. Marvin's view encourages men to entertain hopes which have no possibility of fulfilment; and the hopes, concerning as they largely do material satisfactions, encourage men to blame others rather than themselves and their own notions of the world for their inevitable disappointments. The one concrete result of this mischievous confusion between two opposed view-points which is now discernible is a fairly successful attempt to undermine such freedom of the individual as has thus far been painfully attained.

Here, then, are some of the considerations facing an ardent believer in "the evolution of that collective human force which is growing and compassing the conquest of the world," in "a common human society, working together for the conquest of nature and the improvement of life." These considerations suggest that while change is a constant characteristic of our material circumstances, and that while exact science enormously accelerates such change, there is nothing in the nature of "progress" in the process. They suggest that we completely pay for everything which we seem to achieve, and that, in this sphere, after all our exertions we end where we have begun. They suggest that humanity's true line of activity lies inward, not outward, where effective exertion is more difficult but yet more hopeful. One can picture the commanding officers of that army for which Mr. Marvin speaks: eager, well-meaning men and women, honest and conscientious according to their lights, industrious, cheerful, with the fixed professional smile of the "community expert," with the perfect bedside manner of the fashionable practitioner, living consecrated lives for the good of society and the welfare of all, so intent upon their sacred purpose that they have never had time or inclination to reflect upon their fitness for their self-appointed task—have never had time to look within themselves and so to learn the eternal riddles of human nature. One envies them their brisk self-confidence, one does not for an instant doubt their many and unusual virtues, yet one still asks, can these be truly the vanguard of humanity?

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT CHINA.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

(Concluded).

IV. HUAI NAN TZU TO CHU FU TZU (C. 190 B. C. to 1200 A. D.)

AFTER the Burning of the Books there was an almost immediate repudiation of the Ch'in tactics and in 205 B. C. the first Emperor was slain and the Han dynasty was established. Huai Nan Tzu⁵⁶ was a grandson of the Duke of Han, but having no political ambitions he became a devotee of the mystic lore of Taoism, writing a series of 21 essays with the general title of *Ta Kuang Shih—History of the Great Enlightenment*. Herein are discussed matters of the utmost diversity: legends, dialogues, Cosmic Philosophy, magic, government, agriculture, alchemy and ethics. The work is a good example of the openminded interests of the age and serves as a ready introduction to the versatile achievements of the Han period whose scholarship, now remembered as unique in devotion to study, was sufficiently solid and profound to give lasting prestige to Chinese civilization.

It was about this time that Buddhist influence was beginning to reach China, and especially Huai Nan's legends of the moon's inhabitants closely fit in with what the traveller Pao P'o Tzu⁵⁷ and the nature-lovers Chang Heng and Tung Chung Shu

淮南子 卷之八 ⁵⁶ About 190-122 B. C. He was also called Liu An. The term Huai Nan, representing the fief conferred on him by Emperor Hsiao Wen, was another name for its location near Heng Shan, the southernmost of the five mountains to the west of the River Hsiang in modern Hunan. Metaphysics and the elixir-search were his forte.

抱朴子 卷之八 ⁵⁷ Also called Ko Hung, and lived about the first part of the fourth century A. D. Some say that Ko Hung was his true name and that he merely assumed the title of Pao P'o (Beloved Reconteur) for more or less obvious reasons while wandering in search of the elusive formula of immortality. At any rate it is established that he was a poor but precocious scholar who became Magistrate of Kou Lou (?), perhaps the island Kowloon near Hong-

soon afterward openly admitted as coming from the hymns of the Hindus. This tinge of Buddhism also accounts for his modern editor, Wu Chin Chuang (1788), saying that Huai Nan Tzu's attitude and general procedure in philosophy were comparable to that of his famous successor Yang Hsiung; but it seems to me that the latter is far more direct and reasonable in argument.

This thinker,⁵⁸ also known by his literary name Tzu Yün, was a native of Ch'eng Tu in Ssu Ch'uan and, being unfortunate in having a faulty manner of speech which gave cause for much cheap mockery by his companions, he early acquired the modest habit of quiet meditation and amiable reserve, noting very keenly however the tendency of surrounding events. In his youth he was a precocious student of the Odes and later on studied astrology, mathematics, and the humanities under Yen Tsun, the leading Yih scholar of the Shu tribe. His most notable literary work, called *Fa Yen*,⁵⁹ was composed not so much out of regard for the Confucian discourses as has been claimed, but rather in order to show up the insincerity of the anti-Buddhist "quoters" and substitute instead the plain and honest motives supplied in the Dharmapada and its *Eight-fold Path to Freedom*. This work, first written between the years 3 and 6 A. D., and now edited with both Duke Wen's and Tai Chen's very learned commentary remarks, contains

kong, but soon tired of such an uneventful life while dreaming that a certain potion of cinnabar roots and pheasant claws constituted the elixir of life. It is said that he finally, at the age of 81, had a strange vision of being carried off to heaven like an Elijah, and immediately set to work, even at one sitting (?), supposedly before he should be carried away, and composed the reminiscences of his travels and experiences, dreams and hallucinations in a work called *Lives of the Immortals*. In this romantic work, however, he does seem to anticipate many of our modern theories regarding the tides, the origin of the moon, earthquakes, etc. One of the immortals here chronicled was Tung Chung Shu, above mentioned, a native of Kiangtu who became a minister under Emperor Wu Ti in the second century B. C. Pao P'o's account says that he was a most diligent student, pulling down the shade and never looking out the window for three years, whence he became a Hanlin doctor and a recognized authority on the "Spring and Autumn", both Confucianism and Taoism, and an able interpreter of the strange phenomena of Nature. He was thus a contemporary of Huai Nan Tzu.

揚雄子 ⁵⁸ Lived about 53 B. C.-18 A. D. Tai Chen's critical edition asserts many items of classical learning in contradiction to the claims of the Sung philosophers. It was first published about 1760 and is revised and enlarged with the Sung versions in a new edition (1893) of which I have a copy.

法言 ⁵⁹ A title which may mean either "Exemplary Words", "Legal Expressions" or "Meaning of Law". In view of the Buddhist temper of a great deal of Yang Hsiung's thought, I have favored the latter interpretation in a translation which I am now preparing.

13 sections dealing respectively with learning and conduct, our teacher Confucius, personal culture, inquiry into Taoism, inquiry into the supernatural, inquiry into intelligence, the rarity of clear-sighted observation, everybody in general, ancient wisdom, importance of improving the people, Yen Tzu, the princely man, and filial piety.

With a sense of eclectic moderation Yang Hsiung diverged from Hsün Tzu's premise of human depravity by insisting that the nature of man at birth is neither good nor bad, but partly both; and that, depending on environment and the sort of character we choose to develop, our lives become subject to the old adage "as the twig is bent so's the tree inclined." We have innate propensities for both good and evil deeds, and it is the function of intelligence to see that conduct has the proper expedient and that virtue is the more durable economy of life. Laws are intended as restraints on the one and aids to the other. One of the principal conclusions to be drawn from Yang's theory of Law is that God is not the creator of all things; so far as listening to human whims and wishes is concerned He is a fainéant Deity indeed, although as a resolute Judge and Sustainer of the Cosmos He is the active guiding force which keeps the ten-thousand-things in their proper order. Section 4 is especially good as an elucidation of Lao Tzu's original conception of T'ien as God, and Tao as the Reason which is the root of all intelligence both human and divine.

Closely following Yang Hsiung's influence as an eclectic of all the then existing philosophical hypotheses, comes the "prince of abundance" Wang Ch'ung,⁶⁰ one of the most able exponents of the I-Tuan or heterodox teachings. He was the author of the so-called *Animadversions, Lun Heng, or Critical Essays* (84 are now extant) on the most various of subjects all the way from considerations of God and the First Cause down to bodily vitality and how to be superior to the vicissitudes of life. In these discourses he adversely criticized Confucius and Mencius, blaming them for blinding men's eyes to the actual situation which makes ethics a daily necessity. He assailed the contemporary fashion of bigotry and threw panic into the camps of those whose orthodoxy was a mere policy, using always such exact and clear notes of opposition

王充子 ⁶⁰ About 27-97 A. D. Dr. Anton Forke has translated the *Lun Heng* into English, 2 vols.: Vol. I, *Philosophical Essays*, and Vol. II, *Miscellaneous Essays*; Berlin, 1911. See note 13.

that he is even to this day ranked along with Chu Tzu as one of the leading heterodox philosophers.

Like Yang Hsiung he emphasized the point, that it is the *manner of birth*, rather than mere heritage, which decides what proportion of good and bad there is in our nature, and that all that we do subsequently is no more than a development or exaggeration of whichever way the proportion happens to stand. A man with an evil disposition does nothing noble or benevolent even when in the most fortunate circumstances, and a man of noble character will do nothing mean even when such a course seems expedient. The only spiritual heritage at birth is bound up in the strength of pulse and the warmth of blood derived from our parents.

Likewise also, not a little knowledge of physiology seems to have given color to his notions about immortality, for we find him making an argument that a vital fluid, residing in the blood and, although not spiritual, yet sufficiently immaterial to survive the body's death, passes throughout all parts of the body (a clear anticipation here of Dr. Harvey's great discovery). This fluid and the body it animates are, we are told, mutually dependent for their proper functions and for the very (incarnate) life which those functions help to maintain. Thus, when the body fails at death, the fluid has no organ by which it may be sustained and its continued circulation secured, and accordingly the fatal rupture of their dual harmony renders negative any prospect of a personal immortality—that is, no manner of continuity in the form of life known as physical. In this way then, Wang Ch'ung denied earthly immortality, holding the reservation however that the Vitality (a material sort of spirituality) of the first natal conception is reclaimed at death by the world's First Cause, of which it is a part. While, as at birth, the individual soul or spark of vitality is indirectly derived from this First Cause for the sake of some certain desired accomplishment, so too at death it returns to its original source so that no part of the divine shall ever be lost. The body *per se* is of the earth earthy and remains so whether living or dead.

In this connection he further points out that God (the impersonal, vague and formless First Cause) has no direct power over the length of life of good and bad men, because this is a matter not of the divine but of the natural order; it is a physical not a metaphysical affair. It is for this very reason also that the so-called Divine Will cannot be discovered through divination, and proves secondarily that God is not, as cunning men pretend, so intimate

with nor condescending to the vanity of human wishes. These are some of the arguments by which Wang Ch'ung sought constantly and valiantly to free the Chinese religious mind from its slavery to tradition and futile ceremonials. He made a very able philosophical attempt to overthrow the anthropomorphic theism which had sapped the otherwise reverent intelligence of the sages, the manmade religion fostered by Confucius and put into such a bathos of intimacy by Wang's presumptuous critic of the third century, Ch'in Mi. And far above all vulgar or self-serving forms of worship, it was at the same time a failing yet worthy attempt to preserve the attitude, so highly representative of all honest religious conceptions, that God is our souls' most cherished original as well as our thirsting spirits' goal.

Buddhist writings were first officially introduced into China during the reign of Emperor Ming of the Later Han dynasty (c. 200 A. D.), although there had been numerous accounts of travellers both native and Indian for four or five centuries before this time which told more or less truthfully the deeds and doctrines of Buddha and the encouraging legends of Maitreya. The organized effort to carry on officially recognized propaganda did not mature, however, until (in 405) the 19th western patriarch of Buddhism, Kumarajiva,⁶¹ became state preceptor at the court of Yao Hsing of the eastern Chin dynasty. Among his indefatigable labors as linguist, tutor, philosopher, and interpreter of religious exaltation he either translated or caused to be translated the metaphysical appendices of the Tripitika and the Prajna Paramita (Wisdom's Highest Sublimation), a profound treatise on the Mahayana. Such a work, it appears, was a little precocious in view of the fact that Sanga Pala (c. 506) had not yet introduced his scheme for transliterating Sanskrit words into Chinese and Wang T'ung had not yet clarified the Chinese ethical atmosphere with his Discursive Opinions (Shen Shuo, c. 614). Nevertheless there were a few educated Chinese who were sufficiently openminded and aspirant

𣎵什 ⁶¹ Is the Chinese (Cantonese) pronunciation of the third and fourth syllables of his name and are said to mean "Young in years but old in virtue" or "Pliable but well-seasoned". He was about 40 years of age at this time and died in 412, seven years later. This famous Hindu devotee of the Mahayana, now called one of the "Four Suns of Buddhism", not only translated Indian works into Chinese, but found time and talent to compose also in his newly adopted language. One of such writings is called Shih Hsiang Lun "Discourses on Reality and Appearance",—not a few points therein anticipate Francis Bradley's work of 20 years ago.

to relish if not understand the ultra-Confucian conceptions which it contained, one for example being that of the *akānishta*, the 18th and last heaven in the Mahayana cosmogony, pictured as the ultimate goal of sentient desire and "a place where all the needs and aims and experiences of the human soul are sifted to the bottom to prove the degree of our spiritual purity."

Hence, by the time of Han Yü or Han Wen Kung,⁶² Buddhism had obtained a strong foothold in Chinese religious life, and thrusting aside the contention between Confucianism and Taoism, it was seeking to lead a middle way neither contra-ceremonial nor anti-mystic. At least it had so far succeeded in becoming a fixed faith that the "Literary Duke" Han was banished from his native state merely for having exhorted the people to "give up this new spoilation of heart," and return to the simplicity and substantial wisdom of the ancients. Realizing in more ways than one the story that he carried his studies far into the night by "burning candles to lengthen the shadow on the dial", he gave constant voice to the belief that the energy of life cannot be destroyed, but continues in various forms of both bodily and spiritual (i. e., disembodied) expression. It cannot abruptly cease functioning with the event of death, else there would be no disembodied spirits of past sages that care for the virtuous nor any as yet unborn spirits who, anxious for our welfare, await an opportune time to come back into the world and help in the proper guidance of the State.

It was a strictly spiritual economy which Han Yü brought to the rule of human life. Even departed spirits are often reincarnated to carry on the purposes for which their former life was inadequate; no moral distinction is found governing their immortality, because we find both good and evil spirits at work in the world. Even though the disembodied spirits have no form, color, sound or weight by which we can be sensitive of them, yet they make their reality manifest by either contributing to or detracting from the happiness of mankind, the good carrying on the benevolent office of making our sacrifices sufficient and acceptable to the divine patronage which is proven in our daily blessings of health, long life, prosperity and peace.

It was then one of the ironies of fate that he was banished

、韓文公 ⁶² About 768-824 A. D., a poet, statesman and "orthodox" (i. e. Confucian) philosopher of the latter part of the T'ang dynasty. His friend Tsung Yüan (773-819 A. D.) had been a Secretary of the Board of Rites before banishment, and this made Han Yü that much more stringent upon his Buddhistic heresy.

to the same barbarous region (Liu Chou in Kuangsi) that his subsequent friend Tsung Yüan had been banished to as governor. The latter was an able devotee of Buddhism, a poet, essayist and expert calligrapher. He was thoroughly set against the ephemeral glory of worldly power and prestige, but owing to the vast misery, injustice and misfit conditions in the world, he thought there was not enough evidence to warrant our belief in God. Han Yü was greatly surprised at the double heresy and in a friendly but by no means temporizing way rebuked him for it.

Han Yü is also a noteworthy name in the history of Chinese philosophy on account of his having developed another phase to the problem of human nature. His position however is somewhat of a take-off from Yang Hsiung's theory, in that he considers man's nature, both at birth and for the whole course of subsequent life, to be presented in three different degrees of moral suasion, whence the individual point d'appui may be either good, formative, or perverse when valued according to the ethics of their respective performances. Thus both Mencius and Hsün Tzu are once more criticized for partiality while an attempt is made to establish a more philosophical ground and middle course of conduct.

The Sung dynasty which ruled the north and south of China from 960 to 1278 marks was, even more than the Han, the high tide of eclectic scholarship. It was an age when clever and subtle commentators put Confucianism again in the ascendent, when historical research was the popular hobby and criticism enjoyed a patronage unknown in any previous age. It was during the fertile years of this long period that the Yih philosophy was given new and more virile exposition, that many doubtful points of classical literature were cleared up, and the psychology of thought and personality was first established as a department in philosophy. The achievements of this era were no mere rechauffe of what previous scholars had done; they were in practically every sphere of intellectual activity totally new departures and, being accomplished in view of the wider range of vision and piety, may also be considered a new departure in cultural devotion.

This memorable period had four leaders of thought whose work seems to have been pivotal to the whole course of Chinese religion and philosophy from that day to this. The first of these scholars was Chou Tun-I,⁶³ supposed to be a direct lineal descendant

of Duke Chou, but at any rate a man of the most varied and profound learning, an achievement for which he was canonized as Tao Kuo Kung or Prince in the Empire of Reason. That he deserved this posthumous honor is most clearly evident in the contents of one of his compiled works entitled *T'ung Shu* or *Book of Generalities*, a sort of encyclopedia of all matters dealing with the better understanding of Nature and the Yih hypothesis. It was a companion volume to his other great extant work on the proper interpretation of cosmogony called the *Design of the Supreme Origin* in which he brings rational processes of thought to bear on the numerous and conflicting theories regarding Reality, Life and the universal principles of nature. These two works constitute the second and first chapters of Yung Lo's encyclopedia of Sung metaphysics published in 1415 under the title Hsing Li Ta Ch'uan.⁶⁴

The title of this encyclopedia recalls that the philosophers of Chou's time were beginning to wax hot over which was the more fundamental principle Li or Hsing, Reason or Natural Essence. And it seems that the unique distinction of Chou was that he harmonized the two factions by his assurance that Reason is the cause while Nature is the means by which the Reality in the universe becomes manifest; Li serves as intelligent purpose while Hsing serves as practical method of realization, but both are inferior to the Infinite which functions as a sort of impersonal God. He then explains in not very clear language that the Infinite is the Supreme Principle, the Great Origin of all things.⁶⁵ The Great Principle moves and produces Yang (the male principle); finishing this motion the Great Principle takes a rest. While resting it produces Yin (the female principle), whence having completed the purpose of its rest it again moves, thus alternating male and female, positive and negative proportions. This is an endless process going on indefinitely and, being accomplished on an infinite scale, serves to maintain the equilibrium of the Cosmos, producing fire and wood (Yang), water and metal (Yin) at their proper periods. Heaven is active in that it is the scene or domain of the cause, while earth (both as globe and element) is passive or neutral in that it is the domain of effect. Though all this is an endless procedure for the sake of cosmic maintenance, it is yet the Great Extreme or Supreme

性理大傳太極圖
通書
⁶⁴ This phrase is the main title and the first two chapter titles of the encyclopedia "*Complete Rationale of Natural Dispositions*".

⁶⁵ 無極是太極大原

Principle in that nothing else is necessary. It is the ne plus ultra or all reality and life in the Universe.

Posthumous honor is also reflected upon Chou for having been the chief instructor of those famous brothers, Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I.⁶⁶ He seems to have received this commission through his friendship for their uncle, Chang Tsai, whose Buddhist and Taoist syncretism found expression in a formal treatise, called *Cheng Meng*, on the origin of the universe. The elder brother, Ch'eng Hao, soon retired from official life to a place called Kun Lo, where he found leisure to write the *Ting Hsin Shu*,⁶⁷ or Book of Fixed Purposes, while also using his influence as a Confucian expositor in resistance to the irreverent theories and radical innovations of Wang An Shih.⁶⁸ The younger brother, Ch'eng I, was a critical thinker fully the equal of Wang Ch'ung, and devoted practically all of his life to revising and explaining doubtful questions relating to the classics, especially the *Yih King*. While he was of an even more retiring nature than his brother, yet late in life he was persuaded to take office and, with this aid of his talented pupil, Kuei Shan Tzu,⁶⁹ succeeded in bringing Wang An Shih into disfavor and final disgrace. Before this final denouement when Wang An Shih had been urging men to do away with the sentimental scruples which so often retarded an otherwise economically supported government, his special target was the age-old custom of prizing benevolence and sympathy above all else of material welfare to the State. But Ch'eng Hao came to its rescue with the ably argued thesis that "Fellow-feeling and the equitable relation of one being toward another is the norm of the universe. If this norm is anywhere destroyed there ensues much lawlessness and discord."⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Lived 1032-1085 and 1033-1107 respectively. **程頤程顥二師** The elder brother is often called Ming Tao, "Illustrious Reasoner" and Shun Kung, "Unspotted Prince"; while the younger brother is sometimes called by his posthumous title, Cheng Kung, "Prince of Rectitude".

定心書 ⁶⁷ Many of its arguments seem to be veiled refutations of his uncle's book, especially its Buddhist features. Chang Tsai (1020-1076), however, carried his points over to Chu Tzu.

王安石 ⁶⁸ 1021-1086, was nominally a socialist-minded man, but has the native reputation for being a very irreverent and radically unscrupulous official. However, cp. Dr. H. H. Gowen's articles in the *Open Court* for Dec. 1913 and Jan. 1914.

龜山子 ⁶⁹ Also called Yang Shih, a native of Fukien, 1053-1135.

⁷⁰ **仁者天下之正理。**

失正理則無序而不和

The man, however, who took the whole panorama of past civilization in from one grand universal viewpoint was Chu Hsi or Chu Fu Tzu,⁷¹ the eclipsing follower of Chou-Tun-I, who was destined to become famous as one of the foremost interpreters, both pro and con of the Confucian Canon. With a keen philosophical insight he saw the limitations that were fettering the customary religious and philosophical notions of his contemporaries; so he boldly turned their anthropomorphic god into an eternal principle, one which was intrinsic and spontaneous, the ultimate law and sacred providence of the Universe. Thus he courageously departed from the finite and worldly God-conception of the Odes,⁷² and held instead that Li the great colorless, immaterial, governing principle of the Cosmos is God. No more the personal whimsatisfying deity of antiquity, who was now shown to be but a mere abstraction of human passions and characteristics, but God who had more to do with maintaining the universal order and guiding the destiny of things than with serving the petty desires and ambitions of human beings.

Chu Tzu was thus not so much atheistic as anti-theistic: he did not deny God's existence as an actual and determinable power in the affairs of the world, but he did deny and make heroic efforts to refute the man-made theism of the less philosophical Confucianists and Hinyana Buddhists. His doctrine of the deity thus harkened back to Lao Tzu's Tao, the principle of Reason and Righteousness in the Universe, which is manifested on earth as the forward evolution of life and the upward aspiration of virtue. His Li principle is hence no more than Tao or T'ai Kih, only it is put forth in a new development and a more up-to-date and illustrative manner of exposition. It might even be said that T'ien, Tao, T'ai Kih, and even Shang Ti (the Supreme Ruler) are but terms of equal potential which serve to express the immaterial principle (Li) which governs the motions of heaven, the earth, men, ani-

朱夫子

⁷¹ Lived 1130-1200. See my article, *Open Court*, March, '21.

⁷² Cf. notes 11 and 32. Even so great a critic as Tai Chen (1722-1777), the Imperial Librarian under the exacting Ch'ien Lung, even tho opposed to Chu Tzu's non-Confucian Mahayana sympathies when he wrote his essays on the Odes, yet acknowledged in his treatise on astronomy and the Yih calculus that Chu's attack on the man-made pantheon of the Odes was justified from a philosophical viewpoint. See also note 82.

mals, and all inanimate things.⁷³ And while thus governing the Universe in all justice and rectitude of law, it was yet not to be known by tangible definition, verbal predication or any other form of finite comprehension; human intelligence being capable only of witnessing its operation in and power over all the things of earth and sky.

Accordingly then, we find that Chu Tzu was not at all content with Confucius' and Mencius' dictum that we should accept unquestioningly the apparent conditions of existence as set upon us by heaven and earth. On the other hand, he sought with tireless energy a more reasonable answer to life's riddle; in the Yih King he proposed to find the secret of the cosmic structure and thereon to establish a systematic theory of rational cosmogony; in his own political treatise entitled Chin Ssu Lu⁷⁴ he tried to harmonize and simplify the popular digressions in governmental policy—one dealt with heaven, the other with earth and man.

His system from the standpoint of the one was drawn up on the following theses: Primary matter (ch'i), though subtle and ethereal, is yet passive and determinable; it is the receiver of the immaterial principle (li) which is eternal and intangible but yet requires matter for its place of manifestation and the organic means of its functioning. Though this principle is to be known, not through the sense-channels of ordinary empirical knowledge, but through the inductive interpretation⁷⁵ afforded by the Yih phi-

理論篇 ⁷³ Chu Tzu's theory of the relative position and importance of these terms in metaphysics is presented in his commentary edition of Chou Tun—I's "T'ai Kih T'u—Design of the Supreme Origin".

經義 ⁷⁴ Meaning "A Resumé of Recent Thoughts (on public affairs)". It was published about 1179 thru the influence and under the supervision of his friend and advisor, the historian Lü Tsu-Ch'ien popularly called Tung Lai Tzu (1137-1181) who wrote a history of the Sung period as well as critical commentaries on the Odes and the Yih which defended Chu's position.

⁷⁵ That the whole system of the Yih is an inductive calculus of natural phenomena is a proposition which has often been contested by both native and western scholars, especially those who prefer to value it from the standpoint of mythology, political history, or romantic anagoge. But as a simple hypothesis of cosmogony from a First Cause down thru derivative media to the multiple functions of the ten-thousand-things, it is really the reverse expression of what was the original process of thought. From any certain set of experiences or collection of data we always work back inductively toward the general principle or source before we turn around and claim to derive all the multiple functions from the original one. The Yang and Yin dualism of the Yih long anticipated the binary system of Leibnitz; its cryptic geology and meteorology arranged according to the 384 days of the lunar year inspired Dr. Reidel's *almanac* interpretation; and its synonymizing of

losophy, yet it is for man not only to be exemplified negatively in the mere animation of his physical life, but positively also in the striving of his mind and heart after truth and goodness. This truth and goodness should properly be conceived and valued as equal to the Li itself, especially when we look upon the function of the latter as proving an eternal and perfect power of justice whose benevolence is a real existent in the Universe, whence the Li become the lofty model of our conduct even though we do not often find it clothed in the worldly robes of a material habitation. There is only one thing which we can consider second in importance to the Li, and that is Ch'i the subtile primary matter, also called the aether, breath or spirit of organic life. Chu is thence very eager to point out its lieutenancy under direction of the Li by often remarking words to the effect that: "There is in the Universe a subtile aura which permeates all things and makes them what they are. Below it is shaped forth as land and water; above as sun, moon and stars. In man it is called spirit, and there is nowhere that it is not. Therefore you cannot distinguish what is existent from what is not existent in the Universe without first looking for the Ch'i and then for the Li which controls it. These two are the substance, the form and the principle of life; before heaven and earth they were, and after heaven and earth they shall survive."

Chu Tzu had a county home at Wu I amongst the hills of north Fukien, where he had many friendly bouts with Lu Tzu⁷⁶ on questions of education and philosophy. It was here that he wrote (c. 1172) his famous synopsis⁷⁷ of Ssu Ma Kuang's great historical

certain metonymous words with stroke-count symbols indeed affords a very complex lexicograph, showing that Zottoli and Lacouperie make far-fetched assumptions. It is most appropriately called a "universal book" in Chou Tun-I's analysis and Yung Lo's "Rationale of Natural Dispositions" (see note 66). Cf. note 25.

陸九淵 ⁷⁶ Is Lu Tzu's full name (Lu Chiu Yüan, 1140-1192), a native of Chin Ch'i in Fukien. He became governor of Ching Men in Hupeh about 1190, serving until he died two years later. Before this he had a country seat at Hsiang Shan (Elephant Mountain) not far from where Chu Tzu lived, hence he is known in literature by this home name, his collected writings being called Hsiang Shan Chi. He was a great controversialist and friendly opponent of Chu Tzu, teaching and writing on philosophy and education. His general theory in the latter subject was that all the paraphernalia and expense of external education are practically useless and can be readily dispensed with, while self-control and the development of one's personality (largely thru introspection and meditation, physical exercise and useful work) constitute the proper and only efficient means of true education.

通鑑綱目 ⁷⁷ Tung Chien Kang Mu—"Universal Mirror (of history) in General Outline". Shih Tzu of Mei Shan (latter part of the eleventh century) was also a learned commentator

work covering all antiquity down to the Sung dynasty. He also had a meditative retreat at the White Deer Grotto near Po Yang lake (where the 17th century philosopher Wei Hsi founded a school), where he wrote the *Hsiao Hsüeh, Little Learning or Juvenile Instructor*,⁷⁸ and where he is said to have "taken rest after arguing three days and nights with Chang Ch'ih⁷⁹ over the ethics and ritualism of the *Chung Yung*." But taking his just and exemplary record in official life as evidence, we can hardly think that he had any adverse motive in criticizing or reforming the Confucianism of his day. Even with all their Buddhist sympathies his efforts were far more successful both politically and philosophically than the attempt 30 years ago of his proud emulator, the Kuangtung scholar, Kang Yu Wei who, under the pseudonym of Chang Su sought to give the impression that he was superior to Confucius. At least Chu Tzu's position⁸⁰ in this regard is quite

on Ssu Ma Kuang's Mirror. I recently learn that the Newberry Library at Chicago, thru the Wing Foundation, has come into possession of a complete copy of both the Mirror and Chu's Synopsis.

小學集註 ⁷⁸ This is the title of my Copy in two volumes published by royal decree in Dec. 1908. The preface explains that Sheng Tsu Jen, the second Manchu Emperor, left a will expressing the desire for a new edition of Chu Tzu's book. Accordingly his successor, Yung Cheng the third Emperor, caused a new critical edition to be published in Dec. 1728 in one volume quarto. The present edition is a reprint in two volumes octavo. The last commentary note to the original preface says that Chu Tzu wrote this work in 1177 at a conservatory or studio called Hui An, whence he derived his *hao* name. This preface also explains that Chu Tzu is seeking to fill the gap between childhood's need of proper guidance and maturity's introduction to the "Great Learning"; and that his arguments are based on the six classics, the four philosophers (Confucius, Mencius, Tzu Ssu and Ts'eng Tzu), and the Sung conception of Hsing Li, or "individual nature-principle",—whence all the writings of his predecessors are to be valued as the progressive steps of a ladder leading up to wisdom and virtue. (Vol. I) Book 1 analyzes the education of boys and girls; book 2 explains the five ethical relations (between parents and children, ruler and officials, man and wife, old and young, and between friends); book 3 encourages respect for one's person, including proper care as to one's mind, conduct, clothes and food; book 4 considers wisdom and virtue as exemplified under the four great dynasties of antiquity (Shun, Hsia, Shang and Chou, c. 2255-255 B. C.). (Vol. II) Outward applications of these principles in (Book 5) good words, including both opinions and viewpoints, and in (Book 6) good deeds, including both practical and exemplary or heroic conduct. Pluquet's French translation of 1784 has been out of print long since.

張栻 ⁷⁹ A classical commentator of Ssu Ch'uan, also called Nan Hsien Tzu, a friendly opponent of Chu Tzu, lived c. 1133-81.

⁸⁰ Probably what may be called the actual situation of Chu's revision of the Confucian code is presented in two works by a thirteenth century scholar who can hardly be said to have favored his syncretist efforts. This scholar was Weng Meng-Te, author of the Yao Lun

effectually vindicated in an expository work, reputed to have been from his own hand, but published posthumously (c. 1270), entitled *Chu Tzu Yu Wei—A Defense of Chu Tzu's Discourses*.

(Critical Discourses) and the Chih Shih (Gathered Fruits). A defense of the classical attitude of both Ch'eng I and Chu Tzu, but an opposition to their mathematical and scientific theories, has been made by Yao Nai the famous Hanlin president, teacher of philosophy, and editor of original Taoism in Ch'ien Lung's encyclopedia. He tells us that Hsing Li as a term for psychology and metaphysical hypothesis in philosophical speculations, was first used by Ch'en Shun 1151-1216, a disciple of Chu Tzu. In this he is borne out by his famous contemporary, the Yih scholar Wu Ting (1728-1800) compiler of the textbook *Po Yih Hsiang Chi Shuo* (Variorum Commentary on the Yih Symbols) which embraced the different viewpoints and arguments, with commentary notes, of ten philosophers of the Sung Yüan and Ming periods.

THE NEW RELIGION.

BY CURTIS W. REESE.

SIGNIFICANT and unmistakable signs appear in increasing number on the widening horizon of the religious life. In content, outlook, and purpose religion is undergoing basic reconstruction. The chief and avowed purpose of religion is coming to be the building of personality and the shaping of institutions to this end. Consequently the terminology of the pulpit is changing. The nomenclature of supernaturalism, which connotes the submission rather than the expansion of personality, is found to be utterly inadequate to express and serve the new religion. Everywhere are to be found sermons, prayers and benedictions couched in the language of science, psychology and social well being. Temples, synagogues, and churches are examining their technical equipment and practice. Methods of organization and execution long familiar in the business world are being found effective in institutional religious procedure. Religion is being organized for greater human usefulness. The institutions of religion are forging their way into positions of social, moral and spiritual leadership, where they rightfully belong. In my opinion the world can never get along without religion, but it wants a religion whose impulses, worths, and ideals are suitable to the needs of the new age. The word "religion" remains, but its content is changing.

A word is a symbol of reality. This is true whether the reality be a perceptual fact or a conceptual theory. When reality changes, clear thinking requires that the old symbol be exchanged for another or that the change in content be clearly recorded. When a word symbolizes a movement with continuity of problem and of attempt at solution, the familiar symbol should be kept and its changed meaning recorded. Psychology is a case in point. Once psychology was the name of the science that dealt with the *soul*;

later of the science that dealt with *mental faculties*; then of the science that dealt with *states of consciousness*; and now psychology is the name of the science that deals with *behavior*. The old symbol still holds. Much more should this be true when the symbol is weighted with sacred associations and memories. Religion is a symbol which not only has continuity of problem and of attempt at solution but which is also surrounded with the most hallowed associations and memories. *Religion symbolizes the human attempt to come to terms with life*. This effort, whatever its content and object, is man's religion. This was true of the early attempts of man to relate himself to those instrumentalities and values that seemed to have significance for the welfare of the group, and it is true of later attempts to placate the personal gods in order to gain personal peace. While the content of religion has undergone a marked revolution we shall retain the term religion. My chief purpose, however, is not to justify the word but to record the modern change in its content.

The common denominator of the old religions is found in *man's response* to superhuman sources of fortune. This belief in and relation with superhuman sources of fortune is characteristic of the old religions. Without this psychological situation the old faiths cannot admit the religious validity of any human behavior. Hence the old religions have resulted in a servile psychological attitude.

This pathetic and tragic outcome of the old religions is now somewhat relieved by the new religion which is gradually growing into consciousness. Everywhere modern thinkers are finding the content of religion in human worths and its cosmic significance in man's co-operation with and control of the processes of life to the end that human impulses shall be completely realized. This new religion aims at the conscious experience of the fullness of life. It regards this as the aim and end of religion and of all social instrumentalities. In other words, the new religion stands for the complete and permanent satisfactions of the human life.

The object of the old religion is the superhuman unknown and the chief content of the old religion is the sentiment entertained toward the superhuman unknown. The object of the new religion is *life*, and its chief content is *loyalty* to life. In the old religion right and wrong are defined in terms of conformity to standards extrinsic to human life, in the new, right and wrong

are defined in terms of consequence to human life. The old religion is characterized by trust and receptivity, the new by aspiration and creativity.

The new religion may or may not have a theology but it needs a science of worths and values. Whatever theological significance is inferred from or attached to the new religion is functional, tentative, secondary. The old religion judges man by his contribution to the gods; the new religion judges the gods by their contribution to man. In the old religion theological beliefs are central and imperative; in the new religion theological theories are types of "spiritual short hand." In the old religion a theological revolution is spiritual treason, in the new religion a theological revolution is a change of mental attitude, a shifting of postulates, a minor part of the day's work.

According to the old view religion without superhuman objects of faith is impossible. But if religion according to the new view is the orientation of man to his values, the broadening of perspective, committal to concrete worths, manifestly theological convictions and philosophies of the ultimate nature of the universe are not prerequisite to the religious life. Religion is not constituted of theology or philosophy or metaphysics,—but it may use them as instruments in the enhancement of human life. Man may be utterly void of theology and yet be deeply religious.

In the theocentric world of the prescientific days man wanted super powers or beings whom he could placate and so secure special agency. But science has discredited special agency. It has found the universe to be a self-operating system. It finds ordinary cosmic events and processes routine and impersonal, and other things cared for by highly specialized parts of nature such as man. It regards order and purposes as self-existent. Reality is found, but its ultimate nature is not yet determined. Man's whole world outlook is vastly different from what it once was and it is still subject to change. Hence the new religion does not regard the acceptance of any philosophical hypothesis as religiously necessary.

Yet the new religion does need a science of worths and values. Such a science must be evolved through long experimentation, and must be radically humanistic—founded on human experience, true to human desires, and subject to human observance and control.

The new religion regards all the human impulses as valid and worthwhile and it seeks the complete realization of them all. Com-

plete permanent satisfaction of the human impulses is the aim of the new religion. There is no question of higher and lower impulses. None are mean and unclean. All are good and sacred. The new religion proclaims the democracy of the human impulses. Conflicts in the impulsive life are abnormalities due to the misunderstanding and misuse of the impulses. The well balanced, fully developed, and intelligently controlled impulsive life is the full life. Of all the needs of the race the greatest are for freedom from repression and oppression, and for committal to the fullest possible realization of life on the widest possible human plane.


The new religion is bound up with the full life. It is intimately concerned with all social instrumentalities; with education and politics, with science and art, with industries and homes. It seeks not only to interpret these but to guide them. It aims to see the social life in its fullness and to direct all social instruments and powers to the ends of human life, and to create new instruments and powers of life. The new religion regards the whole sweep of life—the sex life, the political life, the economic life—as within its province. It regards the whole world order as a religious order. The whole of life goes up or down together and none of it is foreign to religion.

Consecration to science is religious consecration, works of art are religious works, governmental achievements are religious achievements, social relationships are religious relationships, and moral victories are religious victories!

The new religion will use existing church organizations and machinery so far as they lend themselves to its purposes. It will reconstruct them where and when reconstruction is found necessary. And it will create new organizations and machinery as the needs demand. It will completely overhaul the forms of public religious service. It will make these forms re-enforce the forward-looking, creative tendencies of the participants and inhibit the backward-looking, imitative, dependent tendencies. The readings, hymns, prayers and benedictions will embody the contemporary values, interpret emerging goals, satisfy the intellect, and stir the social emotions. Where the symbols and imagery of the old rituals re-enforce credulity and dependence the symbols and imagery of the new ritual will re-enforce courage and imagination. The new ritual will not be less lyrical than the old but it will contribute more to the unification of experience. It will not be less reverent but

more inspirational. It will embody in its content not a world of caprice but a world of order. It will synthesize life and give dynamic and purpose to the whole of life. It will weave into the fibres of spiritual devotion all that is native to life.

In its wider significance, understood as loyalty to life and re-enforced with modern imagery, religion shall become man's supreme concern!



LAST SESSION OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

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THE WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE. ✓

BY ROLAND HUGINS.

AMONG the persons who in our time avow an interest in the establishment of a stable world peace are certain invincible optimists; and no matter how painful the immediate past or how sinister the present outlook they remain hopeful that the ancient evil of war will soon be eradicated. Persons of this disposition professed to see in the recent Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments and Far Eastern Problems, which convened in Washington on November 11, 1921 and concluded its labors on February 6, 1922, the beginning of a new era and a better order. They expected that the chosen representatives of the great world powers, spokesmen for nearly the whole of the naval and a large part of the military force now left in the world, meeting at once in the calm atmosphere of harmonious deliberation and in the after glare of the greatest armed conflict of history, could and would lay the foundation, or at least the corner stone, of permanent peace.

Now that the Conference is ended we see how distant its results are from expectations of these dawn-makers for the millenium. The speeches have been delivered, the resolutions have been passed, and the treaties have been signed. However satisfied the delegates may have felt as they sailed for home, surely they were not under the impression that they had just read the final obsequies over Mars. Great navies, though a little clipped, will continue to ride the seas. Vast colonial empires are still ringed with bayonets. There are today eight million men under arms in Europe and Asia, while Fear and Hate march along half the Frontiers of the world.

At the opposite extreme from the incurable optimists have stood groups of skeptics and scoffers. The radicals in America and Europe said before the Conference met that it must, of necessity, prove a failure. For what, they asked, is to be expected of politicians,—of the same governing classes but who lately maneuvered

the nations into war, and then imposed on them an infamous peace? Does one gather figs from thistles, or goodwill from diplomats? In this distain of the radicals there was, perhaps, an element of professional jealousy, since radicals have their own sovereign remedies, mostly economic, for the ills of society, and they look with suspicion on all other doctors of mankind. Yet the radicals were not the only skeptics. Since the Conference closed we have been assured by several men in public life that the Conference was a fraud or a fiasco. Senator Robert M. LaFollette, for instance, has said that the one primary object of the Conference was "to make the world safe for imperialism." He declared: "The ink is hardly yet dry upon the signatures of the delegates of the United States to new treaties and a new alliance which in many respects are more iniquitous and fraught with greater perils to the United States than was the treaty of Versailles. The 'four power treaty' is nothing more or less than a binding alliance with the three great imperialistic nations of the present time, which pledges the United States to place all her resources of men and money at their disposal whenever they are attacked." Another adverse opinion has been expressed by Norman H. Davis, Undersecretary of State under President Wilson. He thinks that the Conference has been "anything but an American diplomatic victory," and that the Chinese and Russian people will probably conclude that the United States has abandoned its "traditional friendship for them by entering into a pact with their oppressors." There is this to be noted about their hostile comments, both those quoted above and most others, that they come from irreconcilables and Democrats, and that in them may be heard echoes of long-standing political enmities. Furthermore the critics of the Conference concentrate on its **weakest aspects**: the four power pact and the Far Eastern compromises. What have these detractors to say of the ten-year naval holiday, of the restrictions on the size of war vessels, or of the return of Wei-Hai-Wei to China?

The truth is that both those who expected everything of the Conference and those who expected nothing of it, have been disappointed. The Conference accomplished something, and that something bulks creditably large considering the limitations under which the Conference worked. Land armaments were not under discussion. The territorial and economic maladjustments of Europe, Africa and the Near East were not on the agenda. And furthermore, two large nations, Germany and Russia, had no representatives

present. The Conference could hardly have been considered an attempt to examine and solve the whole problem of world peace. And more than all this, the Conference was intangibly but very definitely restricted by tacid assumptions, mental and moral, of its participants. The delegates certainly exuded a sense of superiority and self-esteem; as a group they showed an ethical condescension towards the rest of the world, and yet in national units they rather lorded it over one another. This attitude is admirably illustrated by the experience of the French delegation. The Conference cheered and complimented Briand for his sophistical defense of militarism in France, and then later united to denounce the perfectly reasonable demand of the French for ninety thousand tons in submarines—"the only naval weapon which the poor can afford."

I was present at the last session of the Conference, and saw the treaties signed. That morning, February 6, the small auditorium of the Continental Hall was crowded, for besides the delegates and advisory staffs and newspaper correspondents, about fifteen hundred spectators were packed about the hollow square of tables and in the galleries. The delegates signed in national groups, in alphabetical order: Americans, Belgians, British, Chinese, French, Italians, Japanese, Dutch (Netherlands) and Portuguese. The American delegation numbered four,—Hughes, Lodge, Root and Underwood. Hughes was easily the most distinguished looking man, American or foreign, in the Conference. Some of the countries had but one or two representatives, while the British had the most, a line of seven, headed by Balfour, and tapering off to the Indian, Saastri, in a white turban. The treaties to which the plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures that day were the five-power naval limitation treaty; the nine-power submarine and poison gas treaty; the nine-power general Far Eastern treaty; the nine-power Chinese tariff treaty; and the four-power Pacific treaty supplement, excluding the principal Japanese Islands from the scope of the pact. The four-power Pacific treaty had already been signed, as originally drafted, on December 13th. And a separate treaty on Shantung had been signed by the Chinese and Japanese on February 4th.

After the delegates, amid rounds of applause, had duly signed the documents, President Harding delivered the closing address. It was on the whole a felicitous and sensible speech, although fat with congratulations—congratulations to mankind in general; congratulations to the nations participating; congratulations to the American delegates; and, by implication, congratulations to the

Administration and the Republican Party. The President asserted: "If the world has hungered for new assurance it may feast at the banquet which the conference has spread." And again: "It is all so fine, so gratifying, so reassuring, so full of promise, that above the murmurings of a world sorrow not yet silenced, above the groans which come of excessive burdens not yet lifted but now to be lightened, above the discouragements of a world struggling to find itself after surpassing upheaval, there is the note of rejoicing which is not alone ours or yours, or of all of us, but comes from the hearts of men of all the world." It is unfair to reflect how reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson that last phrase sounds?

The sagest paragraph in the President's speech was perhaps the following: "It is not pretended that the pursuit of peace and the limitations of armament are new conceits, or that the conference is a new conception either in settlement of war or in writing of conscience of international relationship. Indeed, it is not new to have met in the realization of war's supreme penalties. The Hague conventions are examples of the one, the conference of Vienna, of Berlin, of Versailles are outstanding instances of the other." Historical retrospect of this sort brings to mind (though Mr. Harding may not have so intended) many sobering reflections.

The activities and accomplishments of the Washington Conference fall into four groups.

First, the leading five naval powers, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy agreed to suspend the building of new capital ships and other warcraft, except for purposes of replacement, during the next ten years; and furthermore fixed the ratios that their naval armaments should bear one to another.

Second, the four "Pacific Powers", Japan, Great Britain, the United States and France, negotiated an agreement to respect and safeguard their respective interests in the Far East.

Third, the nine powers represented at the Conference drafted several new rules of international law, intended to ameliorate the horrors of war.

Fourth, the Conference examined the territorial and economic situation in the Far East, principally and ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining a greater measure of independence and of self-determination for China.

These four sets of activities need to be considered separately, for the values of the resultant products by no means stand on a par.

The suspension of competitive naval building is the big outstanding achievement of the Conference, the one performance supremely worth while. The nations agree that during the next decade at least the race for supremacy on the seas shall be halted. They have struck an equilibrium, and allotted definite quotas of capital ships: to the United States 525,000 tons, to Great Britain 525,000 tons, to the Japanese Empire 315,000 tons, to France 175,000 tons, to Italy 175,000 tons, with auxiliary craft in proportion. They have decreed that no single ship in their navies shall exceed 35,000 tons. The gain in economy is patent, particularly in view of comparative expenditures, considering, for example, that a single modern battleship costs over \$40,000,000, whereas the great Capitol building in Washington cost but \$20,000,000. For nations struggling along under huge loads of paper bonds, barely able or unable to balance their annual budgets, to continue to throw huge sums into the bottomless pit of competitive armaments is a folly against which the taxpayers in all countries protest. Naval rivalry is extravagance on a colossal scale; and it is something worse; it is a direct incitement to war. In the years that preceded the outbreak of the world war in 1914 there were a number of armament scares in Europe. In 1909, for instance, a wave of hysterical suspicion swept England when it was learned that Germany was accelerating her naval program. We in America do not easily realize with what intense anxiety the rest of the world has watched the recent rush of the United States towards naval supremacy. Neither the British or the Japanese credit this country with purely unselfish motives: why should the Yankees want an overwhelming fleet unless they intend to dominate the trade, the shipping and the markets of the world? The fleet of the United States already stood, last year, almost equal to that of Great Britain; in five years it would have been superior; and in a long period of competitive building the wealth and resources of this country would have made American mastery certain. When, therefore, Mr. Hughes, on the first day of the Conference offered in the name of the United States to forego the advantages that fate had placed in American hands, a sigh of relief and satisfaction was breathed in all the leading chancellories of the world. The Japanese and the British in particular had received a concrete assurance that the United States had no aggressive designs, entertained no grandiose scheme for hegemony, and harbored no secret ambition to dictate world policies. And the American

plan for limitation went through, very little modified even in its details.

If the treaty for naval limitation was a victory, the four power Pacific Pact was a capitulation. Under its terms Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and France agree that in the event any controversy shall arise between them concerning their insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean they shall all consult together, and in the further event that their insular possessions shall be threatened by the "aggression" of any outside power they shall consult together to determine upon the most efficient method of defense. Although stated in cautious terms, this is a military alliance; it is intended to supersede the British-Japanese defensive and offensive alliance, by widening and strengthening that compact between the two great island empires of the East and West. If it is not an alliance, of what use can it possibly be to any of the four nations? And if it is an alliance what obligations does it impose on the United States? Obviously we are committed to back our Allies; to aid them in retaining their present possessions, particularly the island territories which they recently seized from Germany and from Russia; and to defend them from any foe that threatens their spoils. This pact was concluded in secret; it was not on the agenda of the Conference when it convened. But it seems almost impossible for imperial statesmen to meet in an international conclave without seeking to do something for their friend Status Quo. Alliances are the meat and drink of diplomats; and no conference is complete without some effort to link hands. Mr. Hughes and the other American delegates were led into the present attempt to fasten old world international politics on America by the argument that the British-Japanese alliance was impossible to break without its formal repudiation by one of its parties; and that therefore the only way out was for the United States and France to join the circle. President Harding misunderstood the scope of the treaty; and there has developed a determined opposition in the Senate. The treaty ought to be killed; but if it is passed, with or without reservations, it should be allowed to become a dead letter. It is an entanglement that answers no need of this country, and can only involve us in trouble that others may stir up in future years.

The nine powers at the Conference attempted to read two new rules into international law, the first prohibiting the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, and the second barring the use

of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases in warfare. Pious resolutions of this sort, passed in time of peace, undoubtedly express the conscience of mankind. The trouble is that in time of war conscience goes to sleep, and these rules seem merely to afford opportunity for mutual recriminations. The attempt to prohibit absolutely the use of lethal and other gas is a bold stroke; if it sticks it will be both a blessing and a marvel. In the past certain practices have been outlawed, such as the use of dum dum bullets, the poisoning of wells, the slaughter of prisoners and the bombardment of open towns. But these barbarous practices, however successfully carried out, could scarcely have much effect on the outcome of a whole campaign, whereas in the ban on chemical warfare we have an attempt to eliminate in its entirety a weapon and a method of modern warfare. In the hands of a war-mad humanity such a rule is likely to prove brittle.

Lastly, the Conference undertook to pour oil on the troubled waters of the Far East, and to solve the problems which imperialism has created in China and Siberia. For the future the promises are clear and explicit; the powers bind themselves to hold wide the Open Door, and not to acquire territory or carve out spheres of influence in China. Japan announced her intention of evacuating Siberia as soon as conditions warranted a withdrawal, and Mr. Hughes made it clear that he thought that the time to withdraw had arrived now. A few weeks before the Conference closed there was an outbreak of protests in the public press; Japan, it was said, had won a great diplomatic victory; she had made herself impregnable in Asia through the Agreement of the United States not to build fortifications and naval bases in the Far East; and she had conceded practically nothing in return. Prodded by these criticisms Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour employed their good offices with China and Japan; that is to say, they put pressure on them. At this stage of the negotiations one was reminded of the observation of the French philosopher: "What makes us so often discontented with negotiators is that they almost always abandon the interest of their friends for that of the success of the negotiation, because they wish to have the credit of succeeding in their undertaking." The outcome was a treaty between China and Japan, signed two days before the Conference closed, returning to China the former German leased territory of Kiaochow. In restoring the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and various mining properties in Shantung, Japan drove a hard bargain; it is expensive to be exploited. But

all the gestures were graceful, and to cap the ceremony Mr. Balfour offered to restore Wei-Hai-Wei, a British leased port at the tip of Shantung. Generally speaking the Conference left the position of China somewhat improved. We can scarcely dispute the opinion of Mr. Sze: "While certain questions will have to be settled in the future, the Chinese delegation wishes to express its satisfaction with the results of this Conference."

Taking the sum of it all, considering the things which this meeting of alien minds accomplished, the things which were left undone or done badly, and the things which were not even attempted, the world can be said to be further along than if the Conference had never been held. Americans have reason to be satisfied with the fact that under the leadership and initiative of the United States the costly and dangerous competition in naval armaments has been for the time being arrested, that international suspicions have been allayed, and that a friendlier spirit has been fostered among the great powers. That much the Americans achieved; and they paid for it with honest coin: the good intentions which lay at the bottom of their hearts.

NEEDED—A SUBSTITUTE FOR SALVATION.

BY T. V. SMITH.

CHRISTIANITY, like other great religions, arose as a doctrine of salvation, as a method of escape. The early church was, accordingly, solicitous not so much about the quantity of its membership as about its quality. Jesus himself laid the basis for the view that salvation is a prerequisite for membership in the divine community in calling upon men to make ready for the approaching kingdom. "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." "Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted. . . ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Proceeding upon this basis, the first organized Christian community admitted to its membership only "those who were being saved". Once within the fold, God and the church would provide for man's future; but let him who would flee the wrath to come see to it that he is purified upon entrance into the fold. It is useless for man to start unless he can really start new: only out of a purged past can grow a purified future. And so "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God". It is this insistence upon attending to the past, upon a genuinely new beginning, that has helped traditionally to set off the Christian church from other institutions devoted to human welfare.

Since, however, man himself has no available means of radically rectifying his past, of squaring his dead deeds with his living hopes, he must let God help him. Conversion becomes the mystic point of contact between God and man, the process through which man's extremity is made God's opportunity. The precise method by which this meeting of the human and the divine comes about has been ever obscure. Mystic experiences of similar great and unexpected perturbations of human nature have been the forms that have attracted most attention as avenues of grace. The church has never, it is true, been at one in the belief that such are the only

modes through which genuine conversion takes place; but because of the intrinsic mystery of such phenomena and the compelling conviction which they have left both upon those who witness and upon those who experience them, it is from these that conversion has derived its more or less standard form. John Wesley was truly representative in his conviction, arrived at through a rather careful survey of what he regarded as genuine cases of salvation, that "Sanctification is commonly, if not always, an instantaneous work". Even if such forms of religious experience had not from their mystery fixed themselves as norms, they would have done so from their priority. The founders of religions are usually either genuine mystics or persons of such temperament as makes them the subjects of experiences out of the ordinary. As Horace M. Kallen has observed: "Much of the authority of religion depends on the testimony of persons who have seen God *in propria persona*, in a direct intuition or perception, just as we ordinarily see chairs and the rest of the environment. Medicine-men, priests, prophets, saints, and mystics are the support. . . of human faith in the religious object, and the mystical experience is the *fons et origo* of the life of religious faith." Christianity, of course, is quite true to type in this regard, both as to the character of its founder and of its chief propagandist.

Adding, then, to its innate mystery its priority, one easily sees how the mystic or instantaneous type of religious experience comes to be regarded as the norm of conversion. The actual procedure through which this occurs has been so well described by Jonathan Edwards that I may quote his own words.

"A rule received and established by common consent has a very great, though to many persons an insensible influence in forming their notions of the process of their own experience. I know very well how they proceed as to this matter, for I have had frequent opportunities of observing their conduct. Very often their experience at first appears like a confused chaos, but then those parts are selected which bear the nearest resemblance to such particular steps as are insisted on; and these are dwelt upon in their thoughts, and spoken of from time to time, till they grow more and more conspicuous in their view, and other parts which are neglected grow more and more obscure. Thus what they have experienced is insensibly strained, so as to bring it to an exact conformity to the scheme already established in their minds. And it becomes natural also for ministers, who have to deal with those who insist

upon distinctness and clearness of method, to do so too." In this thoroughly intelligible way a very genuine, but very rare kind of experience early became the pattern of Christian salvation. The fixing of this pattern as to the *modus operandi* of God's initial and supreme grace has had three outstanding effects upon the nature and the growth of the Christian community.

First, it has lessened the membership of the church by putting as an indispensable test an experience that many have not had and that many apparently cannot have. That there are very few genuine mystics the novelty of them, when they do appear, fully attests. Psychologists are at one in believing, with James, that,—

"Some persons, for instance never are, and possibly never under any circumstances could be, converted. Religious ideas cannot become the centre of their spiritual energy. They may be excellent persons, servants of God in practical ways, but they are not children of his kingdom." Not only is it true that such a test of entrance excludes many individuals scattered here and there in every group, but it sometimes works to exclude certain entire groups. Consider, for instance, the mutual antipathy between St. Paul and the Greeks whom he met at Athens. St. Paul's own biographer indicates that the Greeks did not form any noticeable attachment either for St. Paul or for his doctrine. On the other hand, St. Paul shows unmistakably throughout his epistles by allusions to the Greeks as a class and to their philosophy that, while they had made an indelible impression upon him, it was not a cordial impression. Paul was proclaiming to the Greeks a way of life based upon and conditioned by a type of moral experience—initiated on the road to Damascus—that the wise disputative Athenians of St. Paul's day were not capable of having. The Greeks as a class were neither neurotic nor mystic by temperament. But one does not have to seek classes nor go as far as Athens to see the truthfulness of the contention that, if salvation must come through some sort of cataclysmic perturbation, there are men on every hand who will never become actual Christians, for the simple reason that nature has not made them potential Christians. Such men are found in every community, known and marked by all observers. Thomas Hardy, in his poem "The Impercipient", has eloquently voiced the protest that must rise up in the heart of this man, who has ever been noted only to be misjudged,—the man who is temperamentally unfitted for salvation.

"Yet I would bear my shortcomings
with meet tranquility,
But for the charge that blessed things
I'd liefer have unbe."

Remembering then how but yesterday in our own religious history many a man has suffered by having his utter incapacity so to be saved counted as downright unwillingness to be saved, well does Hardy at the close of the stanza, inquire:

"O, doth a bird deprived of wings,
go earth-bound wilfully?"

Secondly, the standardizing of conversion upon such a pattern has not only excluded many, but has tended to make of one kind those who have found membership in the church. On the whole, those who have found Christianity most congenial have been those who, like Jesus, tend to look away from earth and time for the values that invest life with meaning; not so much that the church has uniformly demanded other worldliness as that this standardized form of conversion itself has guaranteed easiest access to those who never feel fully at home in the world. The membership has tended rather strongly to be homogeneous. A selective conversion has worked to make this inevitable. Not only has the fact been true and been granted, but it is a fact in which the church has, in less commercial and intellectual times, found cause for genuine rejoicing: Jesus, that the religious treasures have been "hid from the wise and prudent, and . . . revealed . . . unto babes"; and St. Paul, that "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called".

Thirdly, the peculiar restriction that the form of conversion put upon membership has at times tended to make ambitious seekers belie their own experience. I do not for a moment mean to insinuate that hypocrisy has been often practiced as a means of admission to the church. But it is an undeniable fact (the technique of which is explained in the foregoing quotation from Jonathan Edwards) that if one wishes membership, he tends to force his experience to fit the standard of admission. If one be urged either by strong enough love of the holiness within the church or by fearful enough terror at the wrath without, to seek shelter within the sheepfold, he will, if the front door be too straight for him, climb up some other way; and yet he might conceivably be neither a thief nor a robber. There have been times in the history of the Chris-

tian church when men believed so vividly in the horrors of eternal retribution, for instance, that, since the church was held up to them as being the only available insurance, they would have taken the kingdom by force rather than be perpetually damned. Under such compulsion men have not infrequently *forced* their experience to fit that prescribed for admission. This prudent stretching of one's own experience to fit the model is not dishonesty; but it is perhaps not just the sort of honesty from which the church would most profit. The consequence of such indirection in admission has been that at any time in the church's history there have been a surprising number in the fold who did not feel entirely at home. The scriptures read to them talked in terms of a rapturous experience or a mystic appreciation of persons and processes that either dulled their ears through unfamiliarity or, what is more likely, let them see that they were not at heart nor had they ever been at heart what the apostles and prophets and saints before them had been. Moreover the equally highflown mystic color of the hymns and ritual so obviously connoted a disparity between their hearts and the heart of Christianity that a sort of divided spiritual self ensued. Such members sought admission to get the heavenly loaves and fishes or, what is perhaps more usual, to escape the horrors of the sulphurous flames of the fiery deep. They are afraid to get out; but they are not at ease within. And so, while this unhappy state may not lead to a real separation of the incompatibles, yet an invisible divorce is consummated in their hearts to render permanently impossible a wholehearted devotion to the Christian community. This load, like so much dead luggage, has also hindered the church itself; indeed it has at times rendered practically impotent what otherwise might have been a conquering church. But the situation has grown up from the fact that what the church has declared to be objectively true has been accepted as true by those who were temperamentally, if not congenitally, excluded from wholehearted membership by the standardized form of salvation on which the church unwittingly insisted.

The situation reflecting this threefold effect upon the church of its standardized form of salvation has perhaps become more acute in recent times than ever before. The prevailing symptoms may be summarized as (1) a static, if not actually declining, membership, (2) composed of a disproportion of women and a much smaller number of relatively otherworldly men, and (3) an unknown pro-

portion of both of whom have growing a feeling that they do not belong where they are.

How far the last symptom prevails, it is difficult to say; but it certainly is true that the interrogative form of the title "Shall we stay with the church", of a recent article in the *Hibbert Journal* by Professor Durant Drake, is indicative of the way the problem is being put by many men within the church. The problem suggested by the second symptom is widespread and everywhere noticeable. It is now admitted to be far easier to get money with which to do church work than it is to get men who will and can do the work for the church. Undeniably too a growing class of intelligent women, largely of the forward-looking type, are joining the men in their dereliction. Furthermore, the situation covered by the first symptom is truly alarming. Even in the most Christian countries a challenging majority of the adults are outside the church, and the majority is generally increasing.

Instead of facing this critical threefold problem rationally and making clearly thought out adjustments, the church has unwittingly floundered a long way from her ancient course in a blind effort to meet the unanalyzed demand made upon her. It is not always clearly recognized how far she has gone in this instinctive effort to adapt herself. Briefly, she has radically modified, if not tacitly renounced, both the content and the form of her fundamental doctrine of salvation. As to content, she has ceased unequivocally to declare that salvation is from a future fiery hell and its earthly counterpart, sin. That this is so, is clearly stated by the Reverend Henry Preserved Smith, an eminent Christian scholar and teacher, in a recent article in the *Hibbert Journal*, entitled "Religion and the Churches." He declares that though "the solemnly and officially declared end for which churches exist is the salvation of men from eternal damnation", nevertheless, under the pressure of such untoward times as this, "by its own profession the church invites men to accept salvation, yet all the while declines to point out the fate from which they need to be saved". And as to the form of salvation, the church strongly tends to leave the method elective by which men shall now enter her.

This is to say that the church, finding itself in the business of wholesaling a commodity for which there is a declining retail demand, began to do as other wholesale dealers and say to men everywhere: Since you will not buy upon our terms, we will sell upon yours. But what capitulation could the church make, even though

she were in the price-cutting mood? She had always repeated openly (and perhaps somewhat blankly) that salvation is free. Nothing can be reduced that is already free unless the conditions of getting to the free article be made easier. And this is what the church in recent years has proceeded to do, both as to the content and the form of salvation. Once even those who were eager enough to buy her wares to come to Jesus by night, were sternly rebuffed with the demand that they be born again. But now the church is frankly at sea as to a sincere answer to the question, What does your salvation save me from? and her answer to the question, How may I know my salvation (from whatever it may be) to be genuine? is too discursive to be intelligible. Social purposes for the future have usurped the early emphasis upon a rectified background, a new and holy foundation from which to proceed. In her dire need for children, the church has tended avidly to take all who would come, just as they are without one plea. She has gone out into the highways and byways of this rushing life to stop the financially prosperous and the intellectually aspiring in order to assure them that the purpose whereby they prosper and the spirit which they aspire are genuinely Christian save only in name. The Reverend Henry Preserved Smith has articulated this attitude of the modern church in accurate fashion. Says he: "Although some men decline to use the name of Jesus, they are in fact working out the grace and truth which has its fullest expression in him". Surprising as this announcement sometimes is to men outside the church, they nevertheless are assured that since they are already Christians at heart, only one thing they lack; i.e., come and ally themselves in form with the church to which they already at heart belong.

In dealing, then, with adults, the church has sought to recoup her increasing losses through making her salvation more attractive by dissociating it from the fiery fumes of an earlier period and by making access to it thoroughly easy. While doing this, however, she has, as a surer means of recruiting her ranks, turned increasingly to the education of children before they reach the apathetic years. The beauty of a quiet gradual growth into the kingdom rather than entrance through a catastrophic convulsion called conversion is emphasized. Children are from an early age subjected (in actual practice usually once a week or less) to rigorous training. If they ever become Christians, they do not know how or when. And many of them, like some of the adults, never come to feel at home even if they find themselves in the church; for those who wrote

the scriptures and the ritual and the hymns do not talk in terms that only once-born men fully understand. No system of pedagogy yet tried by the church can substitute for conversion. Indeed every method so far tried, instead of supplanting conversion, tends to make it imperative, if membership is to be conditioned by a genuinely changed heart.

The upshot of the matter is that at last the line drawn so deep by the early Christian apostles between the church and the world is almost entirely obliterated. Most of those outside the church are, according to those in authority inside the church, Christians, but do not know it; whereas most of those inside the church are, according to those outside the church, just like the latter but do not know it. And so it threatens to turn out according to the words of him to whom the church is pledged to pay heed that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it". Through seeking to save itself in the modern world, the church has become indistinguishable except in name from the world itself. The church seems face to face with a problem that may be put in this dilemma: If it insists that salvation means a wonderful and arduous release from devouring Sin and fiery Hell, it loses the world; for to the world, Sin is obsolescent and Hell is obsolete. If it does not so insist, it loses itself in the world. And whether the church lose itself by losing the world or lose the world by losing itself, does not materially differ; the loss is loss either way.

Needed, then, a substitute for salvation. It hardly seems likely that for so many centuries the church has wholly misread human nature and has completely misinterpreted human need. If it can be granted that there is a genuinely human need at which the church, however poorly, has aimed, then both for those who confess no need for such salvation as the church has to offer and for those who confess a need but cannot seem to lay hold upon the salvation, there is desperately needed an available equivalent or, if possible, a scientific substitute for salvation. But where shall we seek it, and what shall this equivalent be?

Let us first seek to understand the nature of the human need that conversion has served. So far as the actual human data are concerned, there is general agreement here among both theologians and psychologists: the need of conversion has arisen from a divided condition of the self. One set of impulses—variously designated in the aggregate as the lower nature, the carnal man, the flesh—

is so fundamentally contradictory to another set of impulses—variously called the better self, the spiritual nature, the inner man—as to make the soul a battleground of incessant internecine strife. Anything that either set of impulses points, the other forbids. Each wastes its energy pricking against the goads of the other. The unfortunate soul thus suffers division of its sovereignty among two mutually incompatible rulers, each bent upon thwarting the other to the unutterable woe of the soul. The greater the effort of one to act, the greater the effort of the other to obstruct action. The soul, becoming paralyzed by this unbroken impasse, calls out by day and by night: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death"?

Pitiable as is this state of the soul divided against itself, it is a condition that is completely authenticated and one that is widely prevalent. The inner division may only breed inefficiency and unhappiness, or it may become so pathological as to objectify itself into the world, incapacitating the person and leaving him either a neurotic or a lunatic. But whether it displays the more serious or the less serious form, here is an all too general human situation that cries to heaven for relief; for whether or no the dualism resulting from the hiatus of the self be but a microcosmic representation of the great cosmic gulf bordered by heaven on the one side and by hell on the other, there exists here and now a state well worthy of these words from one who has been initiated into the tragic meaning of such a condition.

"When I tried to be a god, Earth struck me down,
And now that I try to be Earth, it is a god that betrays me."

"The real sin is in being divided against yourself:
In wanting one thing and doing another."

Upon the reality of such a tragic human condition and upon its crying need for amelioration, the most conservative churchman and the most radical psychologist can agree. There seem to be so far but two general methods of attempting a cure for the divided soul.

The first is the traditional method of the church. We can well afford to steer clear of the cosmic significance that the church has historically affixed to the process. We can the better afford it since the church itself, being no longer certain of the verity of its ancient cosmic dualism, shows a growing desire to regard both heaven and hell as indigenous to earth and time. Caught in this

mood the church can the more readily agree with the psychologist that, be the future as it may, any relief here and now from the divided self would be a great salvation with most gracious immediate fruits of joy and peace and efficiency. Whatever more ulterior the church has actually saved men from heretofore it has sometimes saved them from this precarious condition of their own inner lives. In countless cases, when the soul had reached the end of its rope, in a moment of unreserved despair it has thrown itself back upon itself and in a mysterious manner more appreciated than understood, has come forth a united whole, a saved soul. The mystery of precisely what happens in this sudden relief of a divided self, traditional religion has not sought diligently to understand. It has found it more satisfactory to adore than to comprehend the process; and so it has covered a multitude of questions by simply saying that the process is the beneficent work of the Holy Ghost, directed by God, who moves in mysterious ways His wonders to perform.

That this method of treating a sick soul is often of therapeutic value no one will deny. Conversion has enabled more than one Jerry McAuley to leap in a single night from the gutter of habitual drunkenness to the highway of holiness. Beneficent though the method be, there is good reason for thinking that it works by repression and so does not achieve real unity of the divided self. Repression is the process through which an emotional idea is forced out of consciousness and pushed beyond the pale of memory because it does not harmonize with the dictates of the better self. Nietzsche, that keen student of humanity, was thinking of the fact when he said: " 'That have I done', says my memory. 'That have I not done', says my pride and remains inexorable. Finally memory yields." The reason for suspecting that conversion operates by means of repression will appear as we proceed. Let us think of conversions as being either temporary or permanent. The frequency of back-sliding following revivalism attests what a large proportion of conversions are of the temporary kind. Why do so many saved people backslide? It is because the salvation was a supplanting of oneself by another rather a welding of the two. The conversion method but supplants the lower self by a higher. Now psychologists well know that the dethroned self is not destroyed, but that, retiring to where the good self has been kept in subjection, it merely awaits the time when it may sally forth with its progeny bred in the darkness of outlawry, to reclaim its dom-

inance. In the bold imagery of Jesus, the evil self brings back with it seven spirits more desperate than itself to occupy the swept and garnished house. No wonder that the last state of such a man is worse than the first. As soon as the moral fervor by whose reinforcement the good self gained conquering strength somewhat wears itself out against the hardships of the world and the tiresome attempt to form new habits, the old self returns in a moment of temptation, and the saved man has backslidden. Jesus himself has beautifully referred to such a phenomenon in another figure: "And some (seed) fell among thorns; and the thorns sprang up, and choked them." The old impulses, though hidden, are still there and are veritable thorns ready to spring up and choke the plant of goodness. As long as both sets of impulses are carried in stock, it is not any tremendous gain to exchange, even though it be the better for the worse, for as soon as the stimulus is gone, the trade may be reversed. Conversion works both ways.

But not all those who find salvation through conversion thus fall away; for verily some seed fall into better ground and bring forth fruit, "some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, and some thirtyfold." Even upon the insecure foundation of repression one may, by constant repair, maintain a permanent habitation. But the process is costly and precarious, and the habitation, even if it remain, is not what one would desire. Even of those manifold cases of conversion that are permanent and continually bring forth good fruit to the end of life, there is pitiable proof that it is not usually the fruit of a self so united that it can throw itself with unreserved unity of front against the outer obstacles. Sad to say, there is both the outer obstacle to conquer and a hostile outpost within the very soul itself, of which enemies the latter is the worse. The self of repressed impulses may be but the "thorn in the flesh" of a St. Paul or it may be the demons that continually tempted the souls of the medieval saints or it may be something even worse than either of these. But such a prominent part does this struggle play in the autobiography of most of those who have not only been saved but who stay saved till the end of life, that the biography of saints, unless it be carefully expurgated, does not make the most wholesome reading available. It was from a man permanently saved that there issued first that memorable cry: "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." And while all the Christian saints have been able to join this original one in thanking "God through Jesus Christ our Lord" that

"with the mind" they could "serve the law of God", they have also been at one in bewailing the fact that at the same time "with the flesh" they have either continually served or have continually been beset with the wish to serve "the law of sin."

As tragic as is this truth, it certainly is not strange when one once understands the data involved. A typical conversion is a sudden supplanting of one set of impulses by another. As James says, "You must be nailed on the cross of natural despair and agony, and then in the twinkling of an eye be miraculously released." Whether this release prove temporary or permanent, it is actually attained by a process too easy to be sound. The impulses that form the bad self are no less genuine and no less elemental than those that form the good self. Instincts, crushed down, will rise again. The racial past has been too long and too important to be slapped out of existence in the twinkling of an eye. The race has worked too long and slaved too hard for its salvation to permit the individual to attain his unification by any royal road. It is easy to love and easy to hate, but not so easy to understand. But why trifle with understanding anyway, says religion, impatient at the slow way: simply identify yourself with what you love and as simply destroy what you hate. But hold! to murder is not always to obliterate. A set of impulses cast out of human nature by violence will, like the shade of Banquo, come back to plague the king. If the king rule ever with an iron hand, the ghosts of murdered selves may be able to work their plague only in troublous dreams which the pious usurper misunderstands; but let the tiresome watch be discontinued but for a moment,—few saints can be eternally vigilant,—and in will troop the murdered but living ghosts to expel and repossess. Even in salvation, nature sees to it that might does not make right. If love and hate were the only means, then must the bad impulses be taken by force. But between even love and hate there is mediation, the mediation of cool understanding. If, however, we ignore the long tedious way of intelligent unification and choose the shorter way of repression, we may produce a good man; but if so, he will be good through a constant ordeal so terrible as to be universally described in religious literature as a daily crucifixion.

Praise as much as we will the heroism of one who struggles against his besetting infirmity—and it has always been counted worthy of praise—we must admit that it is not ideal. The soul divided against itself cannot stand against its foes; it cannot even

successfully stand alone. Moreover, there is something both morbid and morally ugly in the picture of sainthood perpetually struggling against satanhood in the person of a single man. A constant terrible struggle between the flesh and the spirit seems to indicate that some one has bungled in dealing either with the flesh or with the spirit.

“Let us not always say
‘Spite of this flesh today
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!
As the bird wings and sings,
Let us cry ‘All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more now, than flesh helps soul.’”

The second method, then, of dealing with the divided self is, as Browning suggests, the method of unifying through a just organization one's total asset of impulses. It must proceed upon the ground that no human impulse is evil in itself; and it must see to it that the total organization called the self is of such a nature as to give healthful expression to all impulses. This is, of course, a difficult task; but it is precisely the task that analytic psychologists have not only undertaken but have been performing in recent years with marvelous results. The technical process is called Psychoanalysis. I cannot seek clearly to explain nor at all to justify psychoanalysis in this brief study. If there be among my readers those who still confuse psychoanalysis with hypnotism or any other form of suggestion, I can only beg them to inform themselves better before passing final judgment upon this paper. The increasing stream of scholarly books issuing from the press each year put explanation of psychoanalysis within reach of all. My purpose here is merely to indicate that insofar as salvation is from anything that the modern man understands or appreciates, it is conversion from the unhappiness and social inefficiency that grows out of a divided condition of the inner life. This condition psychology is coming to understand, and psychoanalysis is the method through which psychology is bringing all the technical information it possesses to bear upon the amelioration of such tragic conditions. The work so far done has put analytic psychology to its severest test, because in the main it has dealt with cases in which the divided self had become pathological. And yet in Morton Prince's classic of the inner life, *Miss Beauchamp*, who is possessed of more than five personalities, distinct and separate, is by his careful and patient art

made whole again. There seems no room for reasonable doubt that religion may learn something of vital importance from this new psychology.

At any rate while the church is not thoroughly certain which way to turn, it could hardly be amiss to investigate the claims that are being put forward by the analytic psychologist. "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good." In this spirit let the church choose its strongest men and send them to scientific schools to master the principles of psychology and the technique of psychotherapy. Let these men give to this healing art all the sympathy for which the church has become honorably noted. Let them bring to the technical perfection of science the completing counterpart of a universal benevolence, and with this equipment harmonized and completely unified by several years' study and internship let these men go out to become co-pastors with those who already minister in the churches. Let them minister to the youth in the name of religion such timely salvation as Walter Healy has given in the name of law to the youth of Chicago; let them give to young and old alike such attention as Pastor Oskar Pfister (through combining with his technically religious ministry his scientific therapy) has for years been giving his German parishioners. Let them furnish the best advice and treatment that the modern science of psychology can provide those whose mental conflicts are constantly leading to misconduct, to inefficiency, and to poignant unhappiness.

The church can ill-afford to neglect a thoroughgoing examination of any endeavor that claims such an intimate connection with suffering men. If the claims of psychoanalysis prove well-founded, it would be lamentable for the church later to have to recognize them after having withstood them as long as possible. Even if they prove futile, the church will in the meantime need a thorough knowledge of their ground for defensive and apologetic reasons, if for no other. This need is all the more pressing if the prediction made by Cyril E. Hudson in the July (1921) issue of *The Pilgrim* be true. Says he: "I do not think it possible to doubt that a great attack on the specifically Christian view of life is coming—and coming soon—from psychoanalysis (in the philosophic, not the therapeutic sense) and herd psychology. Out of an interest in apologetics, then, at any rate the church can well afford to pay heed to the perturbed words of the Anglican dignity (cited by Mr. Hudson in the same article), who, after a discussion of psychoanalysis

at Oxford, exclaimed, 'We shall all have to set up confessionals, else every one will be going to these doctors!'

There are two current tendencies in American Protestantism that prevent this proposal from being a radical one in any sense. The first is a tendency to revive the healing ministry of the church, and the second is the apparently growing friendly envy that Protestants hold for the Catholic confessional.

At different stages the Christian church has made pretensions to a healing ministry. Why this interest in the healing art has been intermittent is a question too intricate and complex to tackle in this paper; but it is enough here to note that now the interest is returning. No more concrete proof of this assertion is needed than the fact that a church that traditionally has tended to hold aloof from such matters has recently held under its auspices throughout America healing missions by a noted English churchman. The response to these missions has been so great and the results so satisfactory that the missions have been continued by local forces under church auspices after the original healer has gone on. Be the results of such efforts what they may, there is in the healing ministry a religious interest so large at the present time that organized attention is being paid to it. There have, on the other hand, always been Protestants who felt that the Catholic church has much beneficent influence through the confessional; and the Roman church by holding on to such a means of grace at considerable inconvenience to its priesthood shows its abiding faith in the service that is rendered through it. Every form of religion makes provision for the purging effects of confession in one way or another. And Protestant ministers (some of them openly) have now and again in modern times expressed a need for the formal confessional in their work.

Psychoanalysis is but the scientific method of putting into one the means for satisfying both of those felt needs in Protestant churches; for it has duly demonstrated its ability to produce rationally the same healing results that the church has at different times produced mysteriously; and it has equally demonstrated its ability to bring under technical and scientific guidance the balm to minds distressed that for so many centuries the Catholic confessional and Protestant imitations of it, have brought. Psychoanalysis offers, therefore, to the church a peculiarly attractive opportunity, through the time-honored custom of confession, to bring genuinely 'lost' men to spiritual health.

The church should certainly not be deterred from appropriating to itself this new technique by any fear of having thrust upon it gratuitously an alien metaphysics. It is true that some have from the beginning looked critically askance at psychoanalysis because of their aversion to Freudian theories; but only those have continued to do so that have shut their eyes to the merit of the new technique as a means of beneficent social and moral control. Many who have come to scoff at the Freudian metaphysics have remained to apply to human need the art, supplying whatever theories they themselves desired. According to the church, a tree is to be known by its fruits, not by its roots. Finding the fruits of psychoanalysis good, the church can supply whatever hypothetical roots satisfy it. There is no apparent reason why even the traditional terminology of the church cannot be used, if the church feels the necessity of thus assuring historical continuity. Surely the Holy Ghost who has often deigned to use the humble mourners' bench as a means of grace will not hesitate to make use of the wondrous mind of man. But no further suggestion is needed. For a church that has shown facile ingenuity in adapting itself to a round world after having been made for a flat one, or to a dynamic world after having been made for a static one, or to the service of man-the-product-of-evolution after having been made to serve man the center of the universe and the excuse for its existence,—such a dynamic institution as the Christian church has proved itself to be has, fear not, ample grace remaining for all future adaptation.

HOMER AND THE PROPHETS, OR HOMER AND NOW.

HISTORY AND HISTORICITY.

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST, M.A., M.P.D.

THOSE who serve Apollo in any age will body forth the ideal, but they may show the real, even when it is evil, to throw what is good into a more effective light, perhaps to introduce a contrast. So they may use the actual, or historic fact along with allegory or myth. Literal truth, of course, has nothing to do with Apollo, except as it carries ideal truth, a point which Saint Augustine appreciated when he said that he did not accept Christianity because of its historic facts, but because of its myths, meaning by that, the ideal truths that they carry. To him it did not matter whether the Bible stories were, or were not literally true, but it was enough that they carried the highest ideal or spiritual truth. The greatest poets, as Homer and Dante, have used historical material in their poems when this served their purposes, and questions of history and historicity become important in both only as throwing light on the poet's meaning.

As to Troy and Helen, all ages have had their doubts. The excavations of Schliemann proved that an ancient city existed in primitive times on the spot that he investigated in Asia Minor having located it by means of such points as he found in Homer's poems, the citadel, the river, the washingpools and the sea; but that it was called by the name *Troy* has never been proved.

As to the reasons for the destruction of that city, all ages have had their doubts, and the question seems to have been a live issue in the time of Herodotus (484-420? B. C.). When Herodotus visited Egypt, four centuries after Homer, he asked the priests of Memphis whether all that Homer told of the Trojan War was to be regarded as fable and received the reply that it was, for the sufficient reason

that *Polity*: First, that each science depends upon those below the series; second, that as one advances along the series the objects become more specific, complex, and less amenable to scientific measurement and prediction; and, finally, that the difficulties of sociology are due to the greater complexity of the phenomena with which it deals and the contemporary lack of proper investigation and measurement of these phenomena, rather than to any generic difference in desirable or possible methodology procedure.¹³

While Comte did not elaborate to any great extent the organic conception of society, still he may be said to have offered the suggestions for the later school of so-called "Organicists" and is notable for holding that the organic doctrine was no mere analogy but a reality. It is the individual who is an abstraction rather than the social organism. Coker has summed up in the following manner his organic doctrines to be found in the *Philosophie positive*: Society is a collective organism, as contrasted to the individual organism or plant, and possesses the primary organic attribute of the *consensus universel*. There is to be seen in the organism and in society a harmony of structure and function working towards a common end through action and reaction among its parts and upon the environment. This harmonious development reaches its highest stage in human society, which is the final step in organic evolution. Social progress is characterized by an increasing specialization of functions and a corresponding tendency towards an adaptation and perfection of organs. Finally social disturbances are maladies of the social organism and proper subject-matter of social pathology.¹⁴ In the *Polity* Comte elaborated the similarity between the individual and the social organism. In the family may be found the social cell; in social forces may be discerned the social tissues; in the state (or nation) may be discovered the social organs; in the various nations and races may be detected the social analogues of the systems in biology.¹⁵ The great difference between the individual organism and the social organism lies in the fact that the former is essentially immu-

¹³ Martineau, Volume I, Chapters I-II, particularly, pp. 1-10. Cf. G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of Science*. See the discussion of this classification by H. Spencer, *Classification of the Science*. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 45ff; L. F. Ward, *Sociology*, pp. 65ff.

¹⁴ F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, pp. 123-4. C. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 204.

¹⁵ *Polity*, II, pp. 240-242.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.

cate the bearing of this new social science upon the European society in the nineteenth century.⁹

The outstanding doctrines of Comte, namely, the classification of the hierarchy of the sciences with sociology at the head; the division of this subject into statics and dynamics; the law of the three stages of universal progress; and the conception of the organic nature of society, with its corollary of society as a developing organism, have been so often repeated in resumés of sociological theory that they have become common-places. Even a cursory reading of Comte's major works, however, is bound to impress the reader with the fact that he had much more to offer than can be intelligently summarized under the above heading. There are few problems in social theory or history that he did not touch upon.¹⁰

Comte's fundamental methodological position is that if human knowledge is to be extended in the future this must be accomplished through the application of the positive or scientific method of observation, experimentation, and comparison. Sociological investigation must follow this general procedure, with the addition that when the comparative method has been applied to the study of consecutive stages of human society, a fourth method, the historical, will have been constructed, from which may be expected the most notable results.¹¹ Nothing fruitful can be hoped for from the metaphysicians. Comte's strictures upon their methods and results are particularly vigorous and to some equally convincing.

Comte constructed a hierarchy of the sciences, beginning with mathematics and passing through astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology to the new science of sociology, which was to complete the series. The fundamental theoretical foundations of this classification

⁹ F. Alengry, *La Sociologie chez Auguste Comte*, pp. 389 ff., 435-Defourny, op. cit., pp. 350-54; H. Michel, *L'Idée de l'état*, pp. 8. For studies of Comte's thought see E. Littré, *Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive*; Depuy, *Le Positivisme d'Auguste Comte*; Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*; G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences*; and E. Caird, *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*.

¹⁰ An excellent attempt to estimate Comte's contribution to social science has been made in French by Defourny, op. cit.; and Alengry, op. cit. A more special treatment of his political theories is attempted by Fezensoc, *Le Système politique d'Auguste Comte*; and by Lepini, *Les Idées politiques d'Auguste Comte*. In German see H. Waentig, *Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für Sozialwissenschaft*.

¹¹ Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Comte*, Vol. II, pp. 257.

¹² *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 58-60, III, p. 446, IV, pp. 564, 646.

In Scotland also these are numerous, and in central and southern Europe many like structures are found, usually called *labyrinths*, and all so intricate as to justify the legend that it would take a long time to rescue a person imprisoned in them.

One of the most perfect is in Russia:

At Cnossus (Crete) the labyrinth became the national symbol and was used on coins:



OLD COIN OF KNOSSOS, CRETE.


In Rome, a Troy Dance was celebrated in very ancient times; and such dances must have been celebrated as early as the Seventh Century B. C., in Tuscany, of which fact the proof is a pitcher lettered in the earliest Etruscan and discovered at Tragliatella, an Etruscan village.




THE PITCHER OF TRAGLIATELLA.

The bands of decoration on the pitcher discovered at Tragliatella show (1) the escaping princess in company with her rescuer, (2) the labyrinth from which they are escaping, (3) a company of dancers moving before them joyfully in procession. Finally, (4) the labyrinth is labelled in Etruscan characters, *truia*, or Troy. This piece of pottery, then, justifies a conclusion that the story of the fall of Troy as Homer tells it was a Sun Myth in its origin, as scholars


had surmised, and the label on the labyrinth proves the connection of the name of Troy with the Sun Myth. But the pitcher of Tragliatella proves more than these points, for in another scene it shows a goddess in the act of giving an apple, a man receiving the apple,



RIDERS COMING OUT OF THE "TROJABURG."
After *Jahrbücher d. röm. Inst.*, Vol. LIII, plate L.



GROUP OF SEVEN DANCERS.
After plate L of *Jahrbücher d. archäol. Inst.*, 1881.



SO-CALLED JUDGMENT OF PARIS OF THE PITCHER.

and a woman whom he holds by the hand, the woman labelled *mi felena*, I AM, or *THIS IS HELEN*, leaving no doubt that the other figures are those of Paris and Aphrodite. It will be concluded, finally, that the maker of this pitcher drew his illustration before people


had forgotten the origin of Homer's story in the Sun Myth and the connection of the incident of the Apple of Love with the Sun Myth. It is clear from the discussion of the Trojan story in Herodotus that by his day many of the best informed people had come to regard the story of the abduction as actual fact, but questioned the place where it had occurred, and that a connection with the Sun Myth had been forgotten. Perhaps the Spring Dances had been discontinued in the course of the four hundred years that intervened, or their interpretation had been lost, as is common with festivals, especially before the art of writing has given them something of permanence. Also, Homer may have changed the meaning of the myth so much from its original that the connection was obscured, for his sad return of Helen is quite the opposite of the glad return of the Shining Sun Princess as pictured on the pitcher and in the dance. He shows Helen hated and distrusted for sharing the guilt of Paris, and probably the more active of the two, and the tempter, for in the illustration on the pitcher she is shown leading, and he suggests in her name that she is the seducer, by a pun on *ἐλαῖν*, the infinitive active from the verb *αἰπέω*, meaning *to lead by the hand, to seduce*. Ancient illustrations commonly represented this pair *hand in hand*, with Helen leading—early stories always represent the woman as the temptress, it seems, and all precedents would be broken if Paris were shown as leading.

As fact, or authentic history, then, the two main incidents of Homer, (1) the abduction of Helen and (2) the fall of the city which sheltered her, turn out to be more than doubtful, and to be, instead, such stuff as poets have always made their dreams of, myth, allegory, and high romance, in which can be expressed the loves, the hates and the aspirations of the times.

Is there nothing of historic value, then, in Homer's poems? Helen as a motive for a ten years' seige and the Apple of Love are not in themselves facts, but are evidence of the important facts (1) that the home and family relations were felt to be endangered in Homer's day by false, foreign gods who tempted people into evil ways, especially by Aphrodite, who was Ashtaroth of Israel, Istar of Babylon; and that (2) poets of Apollo in Greece, as well as Prophets of Jehovah in Israel, were teaching the people Wisdom as to Love and the Home, and as to life generally.

It is a fact, also, that the Windy Citadel where Homer localized his story existed as he represented it, and from Schliemann's discoveries there we can see the walls, the pottery, the jewelry and many

of the articles of daily interest in that prehistoric time. From Schliemann's discoveries at Mycenae, we believe that Agamemnon also was historic, and that he suffered such a death as Homer tells. The local traditions at Mycenae and the traditions that ran through history pointed Dr. Schliemann the way to Agamemnon's tomb, and what he found in the tombs that he unearthed at Mycenae was more than enough to justify the traditions that had lingered through the centuries. It is reasonable to believe also that a king of a neighboring island found his wife faithful to him when he returned from the war after long wanderings, thanks to the clever device she had used to put suitors off, and that she became as a proverb for her



ROCK SCULPTURES OF AUCHNABREACH, SCOTLAND.
After Sir. J. Lubbock and Sir J. Y. Simpson.

wifely fidelity. Such a death as Agamemnon's and such a device as Penelope's are distinctive, hard for a story-teller to invent, and more likely than not to have happened in such ancient, unsettled times and under such circumstances as the war brought about.

But the King whose body lay buried so richly at Mycenae until his tomb was opened by Schliemann cannot have been called *Agamemnon* during his life, and his Queen cannot have been called *Clytemnestra* when he married her, for these names are allegorical and apply to the events of their later life—Agamemnon can have been called by that name only after his death:

Clytemnestra, κλύτω μνηστήρ, I give ear to a suitor;

Agamemnon, ἀγάμος, a fatal marriage, a marriage that is no marriage.

Clytemnestra gave ear to her suitor, Aegisthus, and she made Agamemnon's a fatal marriage by killing him. The poet does not even mention the names by which this King and Queen were actually called in life, and these allegorical names became fixed upon them to the exclusion of the names to which they had answered, even in their home towns, where their tombs were called *Agamemnon's* and *Clytemnestra's* from Homer's day to Schliemann's. The use of these names is proof that the poet used his historic facts as a means to ideal truth, not for their literal value.

Still another fact that bears in upon us as we study the characters and the incidents of Homer is that Democracy was rising, and was near at hand. The first evidence of this is the many unusually horrible crimes ascribed to the members of the House of Atreus, to which Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Aegisthus belonged. An exactly parallel case is argued by Saint Augustine in the *City of God*, where he shows that the early kings of Rome did probably not commit the many unsually horrible crimes ascribed to them, but that at least some of the stories to their discredit were probably started as rumors against them by men of a rising republican party who distrusted kings and were ready to believe the worst against them. When the kings had fallen and the republican party prevailed, these rumors would be passed along as true history. It is a melancholy fact that much of the history that has been given to the world is of this untrustworthy kind, having been written by the victorious party to whiten its own cause and blacken its adversary's. We may well chew upon this profound comment of Saint Augustine's whether we ponder the legendary account of the House of Atreus, or that of Tarquin, or the equally untrustworthy stories that pass as actual history down to the latest times. Men and events should not be judged on the testimony of enemies alone. With this principle in mind, we conclude that the House of Atreus, which seems to have really existed, was probably not so bad as it has been reputed, but that a democratic party, which was forming, and which succeeded in abolishing kings in Greece shortly after Homer's time, made the worst of its members, probably assisted in this work by the great Ionian Bard, who pointed his moral and adorned his tale by painting the Mycenaean, or Spartan Kings into his story.

Homer might well take the hated House from Mycenae to pic-

ture baneful kings, driven to ruin, as an example of what kings ought not to be; he would naturally repeat all that had been told of them by their enemies, and even add artistic shadows of his own to heighten the effect. As his story was mainly romantic and allegorical, it would be nothing against him that he used his facts freely, his theme being general, *good and bad kings, good and bad homes, and good and bad men and women*. As with the names of the individual characters, the allegorical name of this house as a whole is notice on the part of the poet to his hearers and readers that literal truth, or history, is not his purpose. The name *Atreus*, derived from ἀτρός, meaning *baneful, driven to ruin*, like the names *Clytemnestra*



TROJABURG AT WISBY, GOTLAND.

After K. Braun's *Wisbyfahrt*, Leipsic, 1882, p. 120.

and *Agamemnon*, would not be used by their friends and supporters in addressing the Kings of this House, but might be used by discontented people murmuring against them, in secret so long as the kings continued to rule, openly as soon as the kings had been deposed, or driven out. Or, this name may have been originated by some person of a foreign or hostile State, to express his reaction to the Mycenaean House—so Homer might have originated it himself.

Homer certainly did not hold a theory that kings can do no wrong, witness his *Agamemnon*, *Menelaus*, and *Priam*; he did

believe that there might be wise and generous kings, witness his Odysseus, who may be taken as representing what the best king would be. Whether or not Homer believed in kings as an institution and preferable to judges, such as had ruled Israel or such as were to constitute the Court of Areopagus after his day, is another question.

Odysseus was a king who had the good of his law-abiding people at heart, as we realize when he cared for one of his men who was killed by falling from a housetop as a result of his drinking too much wine. The man was to blame himself for his accident, and it might be looked upon as a judgment of the gods upon him for his foolishness—persons who looked too much upon the wine when it was red were often punished for it in the Odyssey, as in the book of Proverbs. So this sailor was punished, and Polyphemus, and the men whom Circe turned into swine, "swine" being allegorical, as with us, for those who eat and drink too much. Though Odysseus was in no wise responsible for this foolish companion, he sailed far out of his way to return to the place where the accident had occurred so as to give the body the rites of burial, for the Greeks believed that if the rites of the dead had not been performed the soul must wander disconsolate, unable to attain forgetfulness by crossing the River. Odysseus protected his men well throughout the journey, counselled them well, and had uncommon patience with them, even with the one who was least wise and loyal and who seemed to be trying to start a mutiny against him. It was not his fault that none of his men returned with him when he finally reached home—they had fallen by the way through their own perversity, having, contrary to his advice, "devoured the Kine of the exalted Sun," that is, committed some sin against the god Apollo.

As Homer shows Odysseus, he is a King after the model of the King commanded in Deuteronomy XVII, "his heart not lifted up above his brethren," "not turning aside from the Commandments to the right hand or the left"; and of him Athene, Wisdom, might say, as was written of Abraham, "I know him, that he will command his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do judgment." His ideal as a ruler is that of the Judges and officers of Israel, expressed in Deuteronomy XVI, "They shall judge the people with just judgment," and in practice he is shown very deliberate and cautious in collecting evidence before he forms his judgment against evil-doers. He is even generous in giving the Suitors and the guilty servants a last chance to mend their ways. Where his people "do keep the way of the Lord," as his good slave,

the swineherd Eumaeus does. Odysseus is humanly warm and kind, "as man to man," and democratic if the fact of slavery could be forgotten—if he had lived in the time of Solon, the transition to a true Democracy would not have been so hard for him as for kings of the type of Menelaus and Agamemnon.

However, Odysseus was far from being democratic, and Homer shows just how far in the incident where men of the common people presume to voice their opinion on public policies when an Assembly has been called. As king to king, Odysseus has rebuked Agamemnon sternly and has opposed his policy, for Agamemnon has proposed to give up the siege and go home:

"Atreus' son, what word has passed the barrier of thy lips! Man of mischief, sure thou shouldst lead some other inglorious army, not be king among us. . . . Be silent, lest some other of the Achaeans hear thy word, that no man should so much as suffer to pass from his mouth. . . . And now I wholly scorn thy thoughts, such words as thou hast uttered, that thou, in the midst of war and battle dost bid us draw down the well-timbered ships to the sea, that more than ever the Trojans should possess their desire . . . and sheer destruction fall upon us."

All of the Chieftains, as well as the Kings, were permitted to speak their minds freely on this question, and even the youngest, Diomedes, opposed the king in the council, "where it is right to do so." It is clear that within that narrow circle, democracy had almost arrived.

But the common people were prevented from speaking and by Odysseus:

"Wherever man of the people he saw and found him shouting, he drave him with his sceptre and chode him with loud words: 'Good sir, sit still, and hearken to the words of others that are thy betters; thou art no warrior, but a weakling, never reckoned whether in battle or in Council. In no wise can the Achaeans all be kings here. A multitude of masters is no good thing. Let there be one master, one king, to whom the Son of Chronos hath granted it.'"

Among those men of the people whom Odysseus found shouting and silenced was Thersites, who was criticizing Agamemnon hotly and advising his companions to take him at his word and return home, his points against the king being that he was discontented though he lacked nothing, that his tents were full of bronze and of women captives taken by the army, and that he would "gorge himself with meed of honors" but would not give due honor to those who fought for him, as to Achilles and the common soldiers. These charges were all justified, as Homer's story shows, and from our democratic point of view and that of democratic Athens, Thersites was right in his opinion of Agamemnon and of kings in general. Perhaps this speech was the more irritating to Odysseus because it was true, and because it might, if followed by free discussion, lead

the army to give up the siege. His own motive was higher than that of Agamemnon, but he did not propose to discuss that matter, made no reply to the charges that Thersites made, and resorted to insults and blows instead:

"Looking sternly at him, goodly Odysseus came straight to his side and with hard words rebuked him: 'Thersites, reckless of words, shrill orator though thou art, refrain thyself, nor aim to strive singly against kings. For I deem that no mortal is baser than thou of all that with the sons of Atreus came from Ilios. Therefore were it well that thou shouldst not have kings in thy mouth as thou talkest, and utter revilings against them and be on thy watch for departure. . . . But I will tell thee plain, and what I say shall even be brought to pass: If I find thee again raving as now thou art, then may Odysseus' head no longer abide upon his shoulders, nor may I any more be called father of Telemachus, if I take thee not and strip from thee thy garments, thy mantle and tunic that cover thy nakedness, and for thyself send thee weeping to the swift ships, and beat thee out of the Assembly with shameful blows.'

"So spake he, and with his staff smote Thersites' back and shoulders; and he bowed down and a big tear fell from him, and a bloody weal stood up from his back beneath the golden sceptre.

"Then he sat down and was amazed and in pain with helpless look wiped away the tear. But the rest, though they were sorry, laughed lightly at him, and thus would one speak, looking at another standing by: 'Go to, . . . never again, forsooth, will this proud soul henceforth bid him revile the kings with slanderous words.'"

"The more 'tis the truth, sir, the more 'tis a libel," as Robert Burns wrote of a parallel case centuries later. The speakers who agreed with Odysseus that day that Thersites had "slandered" the kings, agreed on other occasions probably, and on the quiet, with Thersites in criticizing Odysseus. When they came to reflect on it, they would realize that Thersites had not been more "reckless in words" than Achilles had been in the Council, and that Odysseus himself had told Agamemnon truths bitterer than Thersites had spoken. Achilles had laid his hand on his sword to threaten the King, while he called him "folkdevouring king," making the same charge that Thersites made, and more vigorously, implying by this epithet "folkdevouring" that he stood with the people against Agamemnon. Not restraining himself from a feeling that majesty hedges a king, Achilles proceeded, "Thou heavy with wine, dog-faced and deer-hearted" (and this, in round terms, would mean *soft*, *brute* and *coward*), "thou shalt tear the heart within thee that thou didst in no wise honor the best of the Achaeans." Then he put his threat into execution by sulking in his tent and refusing to fight thereafter, although his services were sadly needed and many men of the Grecian army were to die because of his withdrawing. For this, Agamemnon did not punish him, and Odysseus did not punish him—only Apollo punished him, not because he had opposed the king, but because he had considered his own wrongs and his material reward rather than the high cause that his nation had espoused. The sons of

Atreus were given titular honor, and Homer calls Agamemnon "goodly" and "shepherd of the host" . . . where Achilles calls him "folk-devouring" and many incidents show what a baneful king he is to his people and his army, can it be that the poet uses "goodly" and "shepherd" in the spirit of Erasmus, with ironic praise of folly? Throughout the epics, he calls him also "baneful, driven to ruin," which would make him out to be a poor "shepherd," and far from "goodly"!

This incident of Thersites murmuring against the king and beaten for it, is evidence that a democratic spirit was rising in Homer's time, among the people, but was being repressed with violence. When Odysseus beat Thersites into silence, this was not refutation, though it might pass as such for the moment with thoughtless people, especially because the man who administered the beating held a reputation of being unusually wise and just, but as time passed those same thoughtless people would come to understand that Odysseus had prevailed by one of his many wiles over their spokesman, who had been right in the main, telling some wholesome truths about Agamemnon. At the worst, Thersites had been more nearly right than Agamemnon was, and showed a nobler spirit, though not appreciation of the great issues that Athene, and Apollo, and great Odysseus were fighting out at Troy.

As one reads this whole passage, one doubts whether Homer himself in his deepest heart was not with Thersites, although he admired Odysseus greatly and thought that one such king might redeem several of the type of Menelaus and Agamemnon. As between Odysseus and Thersites, Homer is doubtless with Odysseus, but as between Agamemnon and Thersites? . . . He pictured the sons of Atreus too well to let us think that he believed in monarchy under such baneful and ruinous kings. A rapid succession of blunders and conscious wrongs is Agamemnon's reign, with hardly a point to the good. He is incompetent, as he is generally unworthy. How demoralizing, for him to propose to the soldiers to launch the ships and return to Greece, before the matter had even been discussed in Council. How foolish, to call an Assembly late in the day, when the young soldiers would have dulled their judgment by heavy drinking! This, just after he alienated his foremost soldier by doing him an injustice, and that just after he had brought pestilence on his army by wronging a priest of Apollo!

(To Be Continued).

THE GREATEST FAITH OF ALL.

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

Think not, for thus may ye enter into temptation;
Beware of that which is new, for it is false;
Beware of differences, for they are of necessity wicked;
Be not yourselves; be ye pale imitations of others;
See truth, not clearly, but through the mist of thine own
pet system!

THESE might well be the accepted commandments of a new, yet an ancient faith. And the name of this religion is Conformity; its god likewise is Conformity. And it is and has always been the greatest faith of all, for there are none like unto it. All it needs is to rise to self-consciousness.

The religion of Conformity is bulwarked in the deepest recesses of the human soul; group psychology and the untutored psyche are its allies; men, far from being the truth seeker par excellence, bows down even to error in its great name and Conformity rules with a mighty sway those humans who are more gregarious than intellectual, more desirous of repose than of truth—and lo the name of these is legion. This faith should at once be nominated for the religion universal and all other petty systems dropped; indeed other religious efforts are not worthy of the name compared to Conformity. For the best that other faiths can do is partially to regulate a man's life in certain very limited and well defined spheres; Conformity is not only unlimited geographically and chronologically but philosophically and generally. It enters in as an element in every region of human activity and it is the real, fundamental religion of those who mechanically voice a thousand diverse creeds, dogmas, tenets and ideals. It is the faith which underlies all other faiths.

For a man may worship the great God Conformity in the manner of his dress, in the matter of his reading, in the way he sits down, in his selection of a political party or a religious affiliation or a secret order. Not one moment need he trust to his own resources. Not once need he think or solve a problem with his lagging intellect. For Conformity doeth all things well.

It is temeritous, it is literally foolhardy for a writer to attempt a critique of this religion, more powerful than any ecclesiastical hierarchy that ever graced this trifling planet. But I am by nature both foolish and honest and I am directed by an inner urge to examine the faith well knowing that I risk all popularity by doing so. In my heresy may lie the explanation for my failure as a writer; and I am doubtless doomed to fail more abjectly than did ever he who found his name upon the *index expurgatorius*, because Conformity is far more powerful and far more dangerous than the Papacy ever was in its palmy days. For Conformity is stupidly dogmatic and Rome has always been intellectually clever; Conformity plants its feet firmly upon the rock of reaction and impedes the wheel of progress to a full stop, while Rome has had the virtue of movement in some direction at least.

Conformity makes the cut of a coat more important than the cut of a character; it makes personal idiosyncrasies more important than personality; it makes a desire to believe the incomprehensible more important than a desire to be of use to humanity here and now; it makes opinions more important than facts and a disposition to agree about something more important than the character of the something agreed about. Conformity confronts and menaces the honest individual desirous of self-expression at every turn; lo it encompasseth him about with destruction and bringeth desolation unto him. So long as he is content to be like someone else, to ape some popular idol, to do as the "right-thinking" do, comfort and respectability are his. But let him once start to be himself just as honestly and sincerely as he can and immediately his pathway is strewn with stones by those who have been commanded to love one another. Perhaps they are to love one another, but not to love him. He does not have to be an iconoclast to attain the enmity of the Conformists; he absolutely does not have to be disrespectful towards the cherished beliefs of others. He has only to ask a hearing for some gentle examination of commonly accepted dogmas and taboos, and prison yawns for him. Let him, indeed, but retain upon

his head his straw hat later than the day ordained by Conformity for its removal to the ash-can and, in the words of the latter day prophet, "his name is mutt."

One night the eccentric Leo Ornstein played in a typical American city. The house was less than half full and the papers entirely ignored him the next morning. This did not happen because Ornstein is not a genius, for that he is, it was neither because this awkward, quick-moving fellow lacks musicianly ability, for this he does not. No. The cause was simply that he has offended the sacred taste of those who worship Conformity in music, i. e., those commonly called "music lovers." When he essayed the Allegro of Beethoven's "Apassionata" and the F sharp Major "Noctourne" of Chopin, he had done what was to them essentially nothing less than sacrilege. He had honestly and sincerely given his own interpretation to these works; but he had, in doing so, touched the Ark of the Covenant of Conformity's Jehovah, and he is henceforth eternally banished from the presence of conforming music lovers, and their illegitimate satellites who ignorantly conform to the taste of the Conformists. When there came the odd glissandos and the "monstrous cacophony" of Ornstein's own "Impressions of Chinatown", the orthodox who had come to revile ground their teeth in well simulated dismay, pursed their lips, shrugged their shoulders and looked at one another with horror—and worse emotions—in their musically cultivated eyes. So we children used to go to the "nigger church" to sit in judgment, though we in reality exposed our own selves to judgment for a shocking exhibition of discourtesy.

Moreover Ornstein added insult to injury; he played Cyril Scott. He might, with a little provocation, enter in upon Strawinsky and other heretical composers given their due by Carl van Vechten in his much needed *Music and Bad Manners*, and commended as antidotes for a concert stage which has become a museum of antiquated music. Ornstein is modern, he is different, he is honest; therefore he offends orthodox taste and Conformity weighs him in the balance and finds him wanting. This sacrifice he is called upon to make to the Unknown God, this penalty he must pay for the privilege of intellectual freedom. Beethoven himself paid that penalty in his day to some extent; Wagner paid it in his, and these saints, after due consideration to the devil's advocate, have been canonized and are now worshiped by Conformists; for the acerbity

of Conformity yields to the ravages of time and the world gradually moves slightly even here.¹

The religion of Conformity demands in one a certain semi-philosophical drift. It is lenient in a certain lightly shaded area just as all religions are lenient. Roman Catholicism, Protestant Episcopalianism, Unitarianism, even Baptism, all have this adumbrant territory of half-seeing leniency in the matter of what are called, rather disingenuously, non-essential truths! You can be a pantheist and remain a Unitarian; you can believe that Bishop Mannix of Australia is a vile traitor who consorts with Labor and remain a Roman Catholic; you can believe that Jesus Christ was born of woman in a decently prosaic manner and remain an Episcopalean; you can view Baptism rather as an initiatory rite than an admonitory sacrament and remain a Baptist. But you can ultimately reach a point where you will find yourself irrevocably without the pale; at this point you have offended absolutely and you are an outcast. By refusing to conform to "non-essential truths" you may become mildly unpopular and the brethren may feel called upon to work over you a bit; by refusing to conform to essential truths—which essential truths are ways of believing about infinite matters which are incomprehensible to finite minds—you become positively dangerous and manifestly unfit to associate with believers. You might—horror of all horrors—upset their convictions!

And so Conformity is to a certain extent lenient and tolerant. Certain considerations purchase indulgence; certain circumstances are extenuating. Only the general philosophical drift commonly, but erroneously, called "Christian" is necessary; for this drift is generally mildly religious and it is assumed to have something to do with the polyglot of religions united under the term "Christianity". In reality it is merely the philosophical adumbrations of the "right thinking" and it has little or nothing fundamentally to do with organized religion. It is hazy in spots. It is considerate under certain venial circumstances; but there is an irreducible minimum which Conformity imperiously demands and that is final. Moreover, Jew and Gentile, savant and moron, scientist and idealist,

¹ Confer—"Radicalism in Music" by Henrietta Straus in *The Nation*, January 5, 1921, wherein we learn of the august body of orthodox New York critics who seek to crush "to atoms the slightest evidence of heretical cacophany" represented by Block, Strawinsky, Propofieff and Ornstein. Even when the "dean" of critics castigated a work by Vassilenko thinking it was of Prokofieff he went his ignorant way undaunted! What matter ignorance in the good cause of the greatest faith of all?

capitalist and laborer are alike addicted to this universal religion and its creed is something as follows:

I believe in God. I do not know what I mean by this, but I believe in God and in cosmic evolution which moves progressively and regularly onward to eternal righteousness, justice, happiness—in short to the Utopia my “set” has in mind. In a vague sort of way I believe in religion and the church as having some vague kind of good influence and in so far as they do not irk men. I believe in the supernatural nature of matrimony, in the sanctity of womanhood, in the sacred privilege of voting, in the bad luck of thirteen and Friday, in “our” kind of government and the world should be made safe for something or other by my country. I do not believe in war, except when my country wages it, and is winning. I do not believe in inhumanity, except when my country practises it on a weak nation as a measure of discipline. I believe in the perniciousness of wealth when I am poor but in the sanctity of the sacred trust of riches when I acquire wealth. I believe in the rightness of everything “they” do for “they” form my criterion of taste. I believe in my country right or wrong. I believe in knowing the right people, in reading the right books, in hearing the right music, in attending the right church, in belonging to the right lodge and in voting the right ticket. I know the moral and the true at a glance. I strongly disbelieve in the differences in things, in the novel, the strange, the modern, in that which evidences true self-expression and in that which I do not understand; these things I dub heretical or dangerously radical and I hate them with a cheerful heart. I believe in my convictions as the last court of eternal verity and I shall neither read nor listen to anything calculated to change them. I believe that everything is for the best, unless I am getting the worst of it. Outside of these few matters go as far as you like for the sky is the limit. Amen.

This tentative effort must be excused for it is perhaps the first formal statement of the creed of Conformity. But the religion has not waited for this. It is already deeply entrenched. It needs neither to propagate nor to proselytize; it counts its devotees everywhere and in every organization; yet hundreds of thousands are not aware of the fact that Conformity is their god. In political parties, in secret orders, in religious sects, in agnostic debating places, in open forums and in closed clubs—there are its worshipers.

The leniency of this creed tends to universalize it. It makes a comfortable belief after all. For instance you may so modify and

attenuate your belief in God as to make it simply a pious hope that some obscure providential force moves esoterically and half-heartedly towards righteousness in this world. Of you may altogether question the theory of progress as Dean Inge has done, but pass muster by affirming an extraordinary faith in a personal diety or in things as they are. You may be the guilty defendant in a divorce case and yet remain within the pale provided your standing in the immortal order of Bradstreet is above reproach.

The devotees of Conformity are endlessly interesting in their myriad variations. They make up much of life's attractiveness and constitute a pastime for the dodderingly feeble minded like myself. Thus I have known Methodists who played a slashing game of billiards; infidel Jews (a double infamy most difficult to exercise) who lived placidly beneath the thumb of their female relatives; infidels who were perfectly immaculate Republicans; Roman Catholics who admired Ornstein; libertines who kept their "word of honor" like the most moral gentlemen. Here in each case we have a person who did certain things rationally and certain other things instinctively.

A man may, for instance, reason quite equitably about community charity, but may instinctively cherish a relative or a friend who is utterly worthless—because that is the thing usually done. He may rationally believe in communism or soviet government (and I flatter myself that I am one of the seven men outside the communist party in the United States who are aware of the difference between these two things) but he may go through the motions of greatly loving his sister simply because it is decreed by Conformity that he do so.

What "they" are doing is the Conformitist's greatest criterion. When a woman declares that she can no longer wear this hat or this dress because "they" are no longer wearing them, verily I say unto you let the man go forth that he may prepare a further sacrifice to the insatiable god Conformity, for his wife instinctively worships. So it is that the books read, the symphonies heard, the picture seen and the speakers listened to *must* be those to which and to whom "they" are now giving "their" attention.

Conformity always tends to remove from the proper domain of rational cogitation certain portions of life and experience. Viewed in one way it is a dead weight on progress; viewed in another it is

a pardonable time saver. It sets aside certain spheres where instinct shall rule supreme and where the intricate and tiresome processes of reasoning may be omitted. And I have no quarrel with Conformity wherein it is efficient. It does actually make it better for all of us to conform to the habit of not cutting one another's throats with insufficient provocation; I really do not feel that a man is justified for assassinating anyone—particularly a perfect stranger—except an inconsiderate cornettist or a Calvinistic parson. It is in all essentials better to meet an accidental collision with another while walking with a "beg pardon" than with a razor. It is more desirable to "line up" in the effort to reach the vaudeville box office window, the seats in a moving picture house or the door of the place where "they sell it" than to shove without discrimination or courtesy.

But as soon as Conformity begins to mean a dumb and unreflective desire to bow down; a tendency to do things with dogged and perverse animal instinctiveness; a supine desire to remain perpetually and utterly ignorant of all that militates against doing these things as "they" do them—then I dust off my battle axe and feel like going forth to combat. I do not say that Ornstein should dominate music, or Mencken literature or Lenin politics or Max Eastman morals. But I do hold that Ornstein is entitled to the same notice given other musicians; that Mencken should have his unbridled say without being calmed down as he always is, except in his own magazine; that Lenin should be given the opportunity for a social experiment which France and the United States a few years ago expected the world to give them; and that Eastman may indulge in common law matrimony without losing caste provided he goes at it honestly and in sincerity. In many matters Conformity is entirely intolerant and knows but one remedy for differences of opinion—repression.

That life carries anywhere I do not know. I have not met anything in my rather comprehensive experience which would make me dare to affirm so much. I have not met anything that would cause me to affirm or to deny God. Although I have read twice as much as the average Christian and twice as tolerantly as the average infidel, I must admit that I really know less than either. Moreover I have somehow constantly found that the people who know the most as Gospel truth are the most ignorant. This non-conforming skepticism makes one rather a spectator of life, yet it lends toler-

ance, humility and sophistication. Death of intellect is after all a matter of opinion largely based upon our respective beliefs about matters upon which absolute truth cannot be known. It really seems a waste of time for us with our small minds to try and explain the nature of this finite bridge of time, buttressed as it is, in the cloud masked realms of infinity. You are justified in saying that you do not think I have depth and in hoping that I may sometime see things as you do; you are justified in a polite effort to convince me. But, as I see it, no one is ever justified in making a paternal assumption of rightness, authority and verity and in demanding Conformity.

Upon him who dares to protest against the almost instinctive taboos of society there descends the consummate wrath of Conformity in all its violence. That his views are not adopted is a small matter; but that, for the crime of being different, he is not even vouchsafed a hearing is a heinous matter. While this is neither a squeal nor a wail of protest a personal allusion will best illustrate what I mean. I cannot protest because I have deliberately chosen unpopularity myself in order to safeguard my intellectual integrity. I trust that I am not as these Publicans here and I am very glad of the fact that I am not.

I happen to know the art of merely making money by writing and I have made it pay. But I turned my back on this. It suddenly dawned upon me that worship of Conformity could never produce literature and that it was a mean way of making a living which stifled the honest best that was in a human. And so I decided to write sincerely what I thought; to give expression to my version of the truth as experience gave it to my mind to apprehend. I became conscientious. I became honest. In doing so I very carefully and successfully prepared the skids into oblivion. I whittled away the Dr. Frank Crane in me; I sand-papered off the Orison Swett Marden; I collated and correlated experience as it came to me. I sought to discard my theories and to sit, as Huxley advised, like a little child in the presence of the facts of nature, innocent alike of preconceived notions and instinctive reactions. I endeavored, as Schopenhauer advises, to cease searching for the Truth I desired to find, but to interrogate facts as they actually exist.

My manuscripts were then interesting, clever, analytical and were sufficiently correct from a technical standpoint; they were even

described as "able." Numerous editors and experienced critics assured me of this and I see no particular virtue inhering in its denial by me.* But these manuscripts were continually rejected because they were not deferential to the religion of Conformity.

Just this week one of these efforts came back from the editor of America's most intelligent religious periodical. I was told that it was interesting, clever, analytical, able and technically correct; but the editor felt called upon to reject it because it did not teach that life "carries anywhere" as he "felt" that life "ought to do;" because it remained honestly, though affirmatively, skeptical and did not seek the "deeper depths" of deism, and because this demonstrated that though my "experience had gone deep," my intellect had not; further because, being written honestly as the writer saw life, it lacked what the editor called "core"—i. e., the unalterable essentials of the sacred creed of Conformity. For this very same reason, differently expressed, this manuscript had been rejected by a score of editors of widely different journals—conservative periodicals, liberal journals of opinion, radical weeklies, magazines of philosophy and essays, of futuristic art and free verse. It flies in the face of Conformity; it presumes to deal directly and naively with facts. Therefore editors find that they cannot cram it into their own rather cramped theories and categories, or that they dare not inflict it upon their Conformity-addicted readers.

These things—and others of diverse nature—are fact for that writer; they constitute truth as Experience has shown him truth. He even finds them adumbrant in many minds and half-expressed by many tongues. He writes of these various things honestly and sincerely as well as respectfully—yet none dare give him a hearing. The answer is—Conformity, the universal religion of the non-thinking mind. And yet he cannot cease to write the truth as he see it; he will not cease, despite rebuffs and contumely, and he will not simply because he must be honest. He is a nobody, to be sure. But think of the really good writers and musicians and artists and philosophers who are doomed to the lack of a hearing for the crime of being themselves.

Even science is not free from the ravages of this virulent

* I take the liberty of saying here that H. L. Mencken read this very Mss and described it without qualification—"It is good stuff"—although he is not in intellectual agreement with me. Any manuscript which, as to form, can suit so captuous, but so discriminating, a critic is not deficient in worth; that is all.

religion. Lavoisier met with its attacks; Darwin had it to fight; Samuel Butler was ignored and denied a hearing by the orthodox doctors; Benjamin Franklin ran into it. Today we see Sigmund Freud insulted and denied a hearing by those who simply will not see a novel or a different theory of psychology gain currency. Einstein runs the same gauntlet.

These men may not be right. Perhaps Freud and Einstein are altogether wrong. I only protest against this universal religion of Conformity which denies us the right even to see. It is the same faith which strikes at Dreiser and Cabell and Upton Sinclair for the crime of writing artistically as they see life; and it condemned Gustave Flaubert before them and thousands before him.

This is not to preach eccentricity for originality's sake or non-conformity as a virtue. Such vagaries end in mere absurdity. It means that Convention impedes the very minute it tends to make instinctive, actions which should be rational, and the very second that it tempts genius, or even talent, to mediocrity. The basis of ultimate and final authority should not be some artificial code, but the sincerity of the writer's inspiration. If his inspiration be sincere and honest at the moment of clairvoyance, the genius or the man of talent has given us a vision. He may at another moment be a libertine, a drunken roue or a Methodist preacher; he may be an agnostic next week and a spiritualist the week after. He may wear neither necktie nor socks and he may be both a communist and a Jew. He may assail our most cherished opinions and our most sacred fallacies. But let no rule of thumb silence him. Let not Conformity banish him to outer darkness. Permit him to state his case. The French Academy time after time has refused to investigate certain matters because they "seemed" worthless or injudicious. Instead, the man should be given a respectful hearing and the decision should rest with what is truly an enlightened public opinion.

One night Godowsky and Powell were to give a joint recital and Powell was compelled to cancel due to what later proved to be her fatal illness. In her stead appeared one of Auer's young pupils, Max Rosen. It so happened that Rosen appeared after the master had played his last group. Instantly the right thinking music lovers arose en masse and walked disdainfully out, reminding me of Christians departing from a speaker who sought to introduce reason into religion. One of these protesting creatures

remarked superciliously to me—"I just simply cannot bear that thing Rosen. He simply nauseates me." Some day, however, "they" will perhaps say that Max Rosen is a master of the bow. Instantly the right thinking music lovers will flock to hear him, say they knew it all the time and applaud him to the echo. Yet Max Rosen will never in the world be able to demonstrate that he is a great violinist unless he gets a hearing.

I can pardon a failure to understand, whether through ignorance or misapprehension. I can gladly pardon a cultured and intelligent difference of opinion which comprehends opposing opinion, recognizes its importance, but cannot adopt it. I can, in fact, pardon almost anything but a willful disposition to refuse to try and understand and to judge, none the less, by the standards of Conformity to some irrational taste or code. For this is the very essence of Conformity at its very worst and, though I am as a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal, though I give my manuscripts to be burned and roast myself as a heretic, I cannot conform. Nay, I shall not—so far as in me lies—bow down and worship the great God Conformity and I shall endeavor to act as I act and to do as I do for reasons reflective rather than for considerations instinctive.

THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE.

BY HENRY FRANK.

(Continued).

MOTION :

Let me my secret reveal ;
I long that the truth shall be known,
Though the ages have saught to conceal,
What so palpably Nature hath shown.

I never began, but have been
Eternally forging ahead,
To a goal no being hath seen,
Nor ever shall finally tread.

I was not on substance impinged,
When Substance lay silent and still,
Nor a corner of Nature twinged,
And aroused it with my will.

I was not by the hand of a God,
Or a push of titanic Might,
Smote with a terrible rod,
And urged to pursue my flight.

I was and have been and shall be,
Without end or beginning in time,
The Source when eternally
Flows Nature's unending rhyme.

I am the soul of all things,
And ever their spirit inspire,
With hope that forever springs
From yearnings that Godward aspire.

On, on, I urge them ahead,
Yet whither, I know not myself;
My feet with tentative tread,
Climb each dang'rous, rocky shelf.

I must go, I must go, I must go,
On the Stream of Eternity,
Whose waters forever flow
To a shoreless and mystical sea.

'Tis I that's the pain in th' heart;
The throb and the pressure of Will;
I smite with the Lover's dart;
'T is I give Life's first thrill.

I gather the atoms as one,
And congregate worlds in space,
From first scintilla to sun,
I am the Urge in the race.

I chisel and crystal the grains
Of sand that lie on the shore:
I build with infinite pains,
The structure of cell and spore.

I push the seed forward to soul,
That moves from mammal to Man;
O'er brains I rumble and roll,
Till thoughts in the mind expand.

Whither, oh, whither away?
I know not, and care not, no why!
'T is my fate to wander and stray,
Wheresoe'er the winds may ply.

I am the good and the bad:
I am love and hardship and hate:
The soul of the glad and the sad:
I am Destiny and Fate.

For of Motion, all things consist:
 Without Me the world were naught;
 Thou canst not my spirit resist:
 I shall determine thy lot.

BRAIN:

Behold the Truth, by Science first proclaimed:
 The Sphinx's riddle's solved; the crucial proof
 Attained: Creation ne'er began in time;
 Eternity is self-evolving: ever
 The Wheel of Being revolves unceasingly,
 Without beginning and without end! Solved,
 The mystery that so long darkened mind!
 Primeval Motion, increate, is source
 And Mother of all things, inert or quick.
 The vast phenomenal brood of Nature's spawn,
 Infinitesimal or infinite,
 Have, multifarious, sprung from Motion's breast.
 Here, then, inherent is thy God, innate,
 In very essence of the universe.
 With vapid, inane theologic tongue,
 Thou pratest of a God and Spirit vague!
 What knowest thou of either save in dreams?
 Thy gibberish but libels a sane God.
 Wrest Him from Nature's Whole, He hangs upheld
 By nothing—like a dangling root mid-air,
 Unsustained by native element,—
 A mythic Being in a maze of myth!
 Why seek Imagination's palate thus
 To tickle with a candied falsehood? Why
 Conceive of Spirit separate, discrete,
 A Thing apart, the Sense cannot partake
 A sublimate figment that confuses thought,
 When Nature hints that Energy, inwove,
 Innate, eternal, plies its ceaseless power
 Unbroken—

MIND:

Base blasphemer, atheist,
 And infidel!

BRAIN:

Withhold thy temper! Thus
Truth conquers not: by objurgations or
Abuse!

MIND:

Why, then, abuse the sacred Faith,
Despairing millions of the earth sustains?

BRAIN:

Truth, only, can sustain; all else deceives!
Behold, if Science speaks of God, she thinks
Of Nature's Drama, solemn and sublime:
The shifting scenes and climaxes of time:
She thinks of gentle breeze, or battling storm;
The placid meadows and the smoking hills;
The lightning's dart and thunder's roar in heaven;
The quake that cracks the jowl of trembling earth;
The comet's startling tail; the veiled eclipse;
She thinks of Seasons timed by heaven's clock;
Of atoms, ions that whirl in chemic glee,
Or clash in bitter strife for deadly power;
She sees again the cataclysmic rush
Of primal worlds from roaring, fiery mists;
The slow ascent of soils above the main;
The magic leap of life from slime of sea;
The clutch and clash of claw and wing in strife
For food, and mastery of fit and brave.
She contemplates defeat and victory,
The joy of birth, the tragedy of death,
The majesty of mind and thought's emprise;
And well she knows throughout it all there runs
The irrefragable Thread of Destiny!
When Science thinks of Spirit, 't is not a thing,
Personified; a Being flying round
The universe, to clothe itself, withal,
In dull disguises; or, with challenges
Defiant, mock the feeble flash of man:—
A supremely conscious, pre-existing Self
Which weighs all lesser selves in balances
Unequal! Such false, theologic thought,
Has Science scorned, Philosophy denounced.
They best conceive of Spirit as a Breath,

As infinite Energy surcharging space
 With ceaseless pulse of Cosmic Urge; a Breath
 That throbs in each iota, vibrant with
 Slight waves that time its being: Breath that moves
 In everlasting motion, and sustains,
 And bodies forth, the essence of all worlds.
 There is no Void whose vacuum expels
 This Spirit; no time it breathed not; nor await,
 Milleniums hence, its dire exhaustion and
 Quietus.

MIND:

Then is Spirit Motion; God
 Inert, base Matter, sooth! O shameless faith,
 O vulgar mockery! This heritage
 Of Death and dun Despair is all, alas,
 Proud Science offers to defeated Man!
 This matter, I manipulate and mould
 As I may choose; or trample 'neath my feet;
 That stinks in mire and vulgarises earth;
 A thing, unlike myself, I needs must use
 Yet hate; this thing, the God I worship and
 Adore! Let judgment smite thy pate and blow
 Most fit; or don the motley and the bells,
 Thou Fool, and dance in Court of Folly; but
 Thou can'st not Reason, with such theme convince.

BRAIN:

The vanity of vulgar ignorance
 In thy vain speech o'ervaults itself. Hear, then,
 O, Misinformed, how all unlike is that
 Thou hat'st, from what, myopic vision shapes
 To thy dull gaze! Come forth, Thou, that unborn,
 Most common of the commonest things appear'st.

(in a deep cave, bubbling slimy-mire boils and bursts forth. Great clumps of it rise and fall; it is seen gradually to form into soil and rock, and then submitting to intense rays of flame and currents of electricity, fuses and dissolves into invisible elements.

The elements dissolve into their atoms, and as in a Crookes' Tube the stream of violet-hued ions rush swiftly over the scene till finally they envelop everything, and at last they disappear as they merge in an atmosphere which dissolves from violet into an ultra ray beyond the power of the eye or microscope to witness)

MATTER:

If my essence to vulgarous vision alone be revealed,
 And unto the senses opaque and palpable seem,
 Man then discerns but the veils and disguises I wear,
 For my substance is further removed and deeper concealed
 Than vacuous figures that float and dissolve in a dream,
 And changeful as shapes of a cloud the winds shatter and tear.

II.

Unbegun, Like Motion, my being is ever extant,
 For Motion am I, and my source and myself is he;
 In Motion I live, and by motion express and reveal
 My infinite forms, my radiance brilliant or scant.
 In immediate, manifest stuff, I seem but to be,
 Transformed like the vapors the wintry frosts congeal.

III.

To sensuous Man I am aught that his senses compel:
 I play o'er his nerves as a wind o'er Aeolian harp,
 And tune his impression to rhythms of thought-changing
 Time.
 The colors, the senses discern and the heavens distil,
 Are my messengers smiting man's eyeballs, feebly or sharp;
 And sounds are the echo that falls from my swift movement's
 chime.

IV.

None hath yet found me, though oft have I lain in man's
 grasp.
 Ne'er hath eye seen me, nor hand ever touched nor ear
 Heard my innermost tone. Forever invisible,
 Yet I so palpable seem, men ponder and fear:
 For I'm That that men know not, though often they care-
 lessly clasp:—
 I exist in the clod though unseen and insensibly felt.

V.

Think not that MYSELF am the stone or the seed or the
 star;
 The bird in the bush, or flower, or swine in the mire;
 These are but masques of Myself which thy senses discern:—

I come from the Void and infinite distance afar,
Where Silence sits calm beyond the approach of Time's choir;
Nor heeds it, how sternly the wheels of grim Destiny turn.

VI.

I am brighter than light or the gleam of the fiery thread,
That betimes knits the cloud-rent heavens; more illusive than
mist,
That veils the face of the dawn: my essence beyond
The farthestmost reaches of sensible stuff, I tread,
With footfall softer than dew that the twilight hath kissed,
And my breath's more faint than zephyr's breath purring a
pond.

VII.

I am to man's senses but Nothingness; the approach
To my deep recess is through avenues Thought must con-
ceive;
More worlds have I reared than the genius of man ever
dreamed;
Man's mind, undiscerning, heeds not how the scenes encroach
On Mind's sovereign way, and suffer my sway to deceive;
For to Man what is real hath oft unreality seemed!

VIII.

Through millennial, myriad gradations, have I long traversed
My endless, aeonic unfoldment, from nebulous bits;
Urged ever by impulse eternal, Myself hath availed,
For the massive formation of infinite systems dispersed
Through the echoless, icy Void where sovranly sits
The celestial King, whence thro' Me light and life are en-
tailed.

IX.

Though blindly, through ages ascending with faltering wing,
I have flung afar on the Void Time's perennial forms,
Or of living or unliving things, that through aeons were
sprent;
For life is the climax of motion from vulgarer thing,
That arose more refined and complex amid clashings and
storms,
As onward I travelled toward Mind and the Soul's far ascent.

X.

From molecular movement hath Instinct by habit come forth :
 From instinct Emotion, and thence to the Mind's replete
 thought ;
 From Matter to Mammal, from Mammal to Man, and his
 frame,
 Undesigned, unforeseen, hath Progress, from far latent birth,
 Though empirical Nature oft failed, enduringly wrought,
 In sublime and increasing achievement, thro' glory and shame.

MIND:

(defiantly)

So, this is, then, the be all and the end
 Of Life's prophetic promise! This the blight
 That chills the heart of hope ; the damp upon
 The infant's brow, that hints of death ere life's
 Begun! This, the too furtive worm that gnaws
 The root and robs the blossoms of life's tree,
 Which leaves a stenchful rot where sunny fruit
 Should hang! O fie! What mockery and curse,
 That these few years should cling so fondly to
 Eternity, and, then, with ruthless scythe,
 Be smitten and thrown carelessly upon
 Time's rubbish heap! Is this the fruitage of
 Our sorrows and endeavors, trials and tears,
 That some sardonic Demon drag us here,
 To mock, with burning thirst, our passion for
 Eternal life, that ages cannot quench—
 Our hunger sate with venomous food? What use
 These years, if ere begun their virtue cease?
 Why buffet the untoward waves that halt
 From far Hesperian isles if reaching there,
 They vanish into mist? Why crack the jaws
 Of mountainous Ignorance which darkens earth,
 Or sink the shafts of Intellect with sweat
 And eager toil, if Knowledge be but hous'd
 In some worm-eaten brain that with it rots?
 Why should the soul be spangled with bright gems
 Of Friendship; why the pendants of fond Love
 Disport around the heart and fascinate

With promise of unending joy, if struck,
 Ere yet their novelty is worn, with blow
 That shatters them to naught? Why 'rich the mind,
 With galleries of thought and imagery
 Sublime, which oft inspired the heart of Man
 To deeds of sacrifice and heroism,
 If Mind at last dissolve like crumbling dust?
 Why round the heart do clinging tendrils grow
 When new-born babe the mother's suckling breast
 Exalts, if nevermore, when torn from her,
 She shall behold its face? Are these few years,
 Like column broken mid-way from its base,
 Or master-painting gashed with vandal blade,
 Or edifice consumed with roaring flame,
 From temporal ruin ne'er to rear again
 More noble structures, loftier columns, and
 Sublimier art, that shall survive decay?
 Then sits a Monster on the rim of Heaven,
 Who hurls us here to laugh at our dismay!
 Silence! thou seven-deviled Tempter, lest
 Earth gape with horror and dash thee into Hell!
 There is no Demon deeper-damned than he,
 Who seeks to blight the young and blossomed buds
 Of Hope with blasts of Doubt! Enough; O Judge,
 My pleas is ended; ended thus the shame,
 This Boaster's blasphemy would wreak withal!

BRAIN:

What lies beyond the rim of circling heavens,
 What dreams may be attained in yon dim realm,
 Whereof no proof is valid here, concerns
 Not rigid Science. She, too, mourns at the grave,
 And in the solemn sanctuary of
 Man's common woe, seeks soothing comfort here.
 And yet she scorns an idle fancy, fraught
 With vacuous promise. Her faith is fastened not
 To an unwieldy chain, whose rivets fix
 The shackles round her feet and stay her. She
 Tests dreams, which if but vacant bubbles prove,
 Howe'er their iridescence charm the eye,
 She casts aside, despite her appetite

For pleasure and achievement. Peace of mind,
To her, must be no bastard offspring of
False Hope. If gloom and shadow of the Grave
Shall be the everlasting shroud of life.
Beneath whose sable folds no memory throbs,
Calm Science will to simple truth submit.
If universal hope, which temporal life
Inspires here, which conscious thought conceives,
Imagination glimpse—shall prove vain,
Why seize a straw and think 't a succoring cable?
But if with palpable and ample proof
It be sustained—as ultra-violet rays
Which eye sees not, yet proof whereof is sure,—
None shall more cheerfully attest than she,
Who disemboweled Earth to read its past:
The stars dissected; the far-most impulse faint,
Which palpitates in Ether, seized on screen,
And forced it to divulge its chemic source;
Who caught on photographic plate lost worlds,
That flout, a myriad million miles away,
The naked eye of Man! She stands prepared
And unafraid to welcome Nature's facts.
She knows the universe is true, and lies,
An open Book, whose hieroglyphics must
By Man be patiently deciphered, ere
Truth's Riddle be disclosed and Knowledge served
By honest labor. For Truth's surety
Alone can final peace entail.

(To be Continued).

BISHOP BERKELEY'S ESSAY ON MORAL ATTRACTION:

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL SCIENCE ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY HARRY ELMER BARNES, PH. D.

I. INTRODUCTORY.

IT HAS long been recognized by historians of social, political and economic doctrines that the revival of natural science in the seventeenth century¹ had a remarkable influence upon the development of social, political and economic philosophy during the course of the next two centuries. The students in these fields were profoundly impressed by the fact that Newton, in his law of inverse squares or universal gravitation, had discovered what was believed to be a very simple formula for explaining the nature and movements of the physical universe. It was held that equally simple explanations could be found for social, political and economic phenomena. The English Deists and the French *Philosophes* contended that natural laws governed society as much as the physical universe, and they created the concept of a "natural order" to which, as the divine and physical norm, social institutions should conform.² In the field of political theory there developed the notions of the state of nature, natural law, the origin of society in a social contract, and the right of revolution.³ In economics this notion of "naturalism" was used to defend the economic aspirations of the rising commercial or middle class. In the hands of the Physiocrats and the Classical Economists it was employed to discourage and condemn all legislation limiting economic initiative. At first *laissez-faire* was utilized to secure free trade; later its chief use was to

¹ A. E. Shipley, *The Revival of Science in the Seventeenth Century*.

² See J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Oversea Expansion on England*, Chaps. vii-ix; O. F. Boucke, *The Development of Economics, 1750-1900*, Chaps. ii-iii.

³ W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*.

obstruct factory legislation.⁴ In the field of social philosophy at large, or what later became sociology with Comte, the chief result was to produce attempts to draw analogies between physical forces and laws and social factors and processes. Ultimately this type of thought led to such developments as Comte's *Social Physics*, Herbert Spencer's purely physical interpretation of social in Part II of his *First Principles*, and Professor Giddings' attempt to correlate physical and psychical factors in Book IV of his *Principles of Sociology*.

II. BISHOP GEORGE BERKELEY'S EXCURSION INTO SOCIAL PHYSICS, 1713.

It was in this field of social philosophy that Berkeley made his contributions. He was evidently profoundly impressed with Newton's law of inverse squares, and felt that he could apply its significance rather directly to social and moral phenomena. This essay is entitled "Moral Attraction," and shows the analogy between the operation of physical forces in the universe and the psychological attraction between individuals in society. While the attempt to correlate physical and social forces, or in other words to give a physical explanation of society, is very crude and elementary, still the effort is unquestionable and foreshadows the later work of Spencer and Giddings, in which this line of thought has culminated.

Berkeley shows how there is an attraction between all the bodies in the solar system, and, likewise, how in the minds of man there is a principle of attraction which operates in a similar manner and draws people into the various forms of society. In the same way, the nearer physical bodies are placed to each other, the stronger will be their mutual attraction, so also among men those most closely related or resembling each other are most strongly attracted to each other. But at the same time those physical bodies most remote from one another have an attraction for each other, though it may be imperceptible, and, if the stronger attraction of the bodies in close proximity were to be removed, then these remote bodies would be drawn together. So with men, if two who are different meet in a place inhabited by individuals differing from both more than they do from each other, then these two individuals will feel a mutual attraction.⁵

⁴ Boucke, op. cit.; Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, Books I, III.

⁵ As will be noted this bears a certain resemblance to Professor Giddings' theory of the "consciousness of kind," but Berkeley did not offer it as an explanation of society, but rather as a result of the social instinct, which he was content to explain by the theological assumption that it was due to divine action.

On the other hand there are centrifugal forces in the universe which prevent all the bodies in the solar system from uniting in one mass; similarly, in society, individual passions and desires tend to obstruct the perfect action of the social instinct.*

The attractive force in the solar system, he holds, cannot be explained in any other way than by the immediate action of God, and neither can the principle of human sociability. It does not originate, he says, from education, law, or fashion, but is an original gift of the creator. As the attractive principle of the universe is the key to the natural phenomenon, so is the social instinct the source and explanation of all the various actions of man in society which may be called moral. While Berkeley unfortunately stops short of trying to find a psychological explanation for the social instinct, the method which he introduces, the perception of the analogy between physical and mental forces, and the influence of the social instinct upon social activities makes this essay one of the most interesting contributions to social philosophy up to his time, aside from the theories of social genesis which had been offered by several previous authors. It thus seems that as early as 1713 there was a writer who has arrived at at least the rudiments of Prof. Giddings' famous contention that "sociology insists that one fundamental logic underlies the objective or physical, and the subjective or volitional explanations of social phenomena." Berkeley also foreshadows that emphasis on sympathy as a factor in society which was later in the century to be elaborated by Hume and Adam Smith.

III. TEXT OF BERKELEY'S ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL ATTRACTION.

The following is the significant part of the text of this important essay:

"I am a man, and have a fellow feeling of everything belonging to a man."

If we consider the whole scope of the creation that lies within our view, the moral and the intellectual, as well as the natural and corporeal, we shall perceive throughout a certain correspondence of the parts, a similitude of operation and unity of design, which plainly demonstrate the universe to be the work of one infinitely good and wise Being: and that the system of thinking beings is actuated by laws derived from the same divine power which ordained those by which the corporeal system is upheld.

* Cf. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Par. 271. And also Part II of the *First Principles*.

From the contemplation of the order, motion, and cohesion of natural bodies, philosophers are now agreed that there is a mutual attraction between the most distant parts at least of this solar system. All those bodies that revolve round the sun are drawn towards each other, and towards the sun, by some secret, uniform, and never ceasing principle. Hence it is that the earth (as well as the other planets) without flying off in a tangent line, constantly rolls about the sun, and the moon about the earth, without deserting her companion in so many thousand years. And as the larger systems of the universe are held together by this cause, so likewise the particular globes derive their cohesion and consistence from it.

Now if we carry our thoughts from the corporeal to the moral world, we may observe in the Spirits or Minds of men a like principle of attraction, whereby they are drawn together in communities, clubs, families, friendships, and all the various species of society. As in bodies, where the quantity is the same, the attraction is strongest between those which are placed nearest to each other, so it is likewise in the minds of men, *caeteris paribus*, between those who are most nearly related. Bodies that are placed at the distance of many millions of miles may nevertheless attract and constantly operate on each other, although this action does not show itself by a union or approach of those distant bodies, so long as they are withheld by the contrary forces of other bodies, which, at the same time, attract them different ways, but would on the supposed removal of all other bodies, mutually approach and unite with each other. The like holds with regard to the human soul, whose affection towards the individuals of the same species who are distantly related to it is rendered inconspicuous by its more powerful attraction towards those who have a nearer relation to it. But as those are removed the tendency which before lay concealed doth gradually disclose itself.

A man who has no family is more strongly attracted towards his friends and neighbors; and, if absent from these, he naturally falls into an acquaintance with those of his own city or country who chance to be in the same place. Two Englishmen meeting at Rome or Constantinople soon run into a familiarity. And in China or Japan Europeans would think their being so a good reason for their uniting in particular converse. Farther, in case we suppose ourselves translated into Jupiter, or Saturn, and there to meet a Chinese or other more distant native of our own planet, we should look on him as a near relation, and readily commence a friendship with

him. These are natural reflections, and such as may convince us that we are linked by an imperceptible chain to every individual of the human race.

The several great bodies which compose the solar system are kept from joining together at the common center of gravity by the rectilinear motions the Author of nature has impressed on each of them; which, concurring with the attractive principle, form their respective orbits around the sun: upon the ceasing of which motions, the general law of gravitation that is now thwarted would show itself by drawing them all into one mass. After the same manner, in the parallel case of society, private passions and motions of the soul do often obstruct the operation of that benevolent uniting instinct implanted in human nature; which, notwithstanding, doth still exert, and will not fail to show itself when those obstructions are taken away.

The mutual gravitation of bodies cannot be explained any other way than by resolving it into the immediate operation of God, who never ceases to dispose and actuate His creatures in a manner suitable to their respective beings. So neither can that reciprocal attraction in the minds of men be accounted for by any other cause. It is not the result of education, law, or fashion, but is a principle originally ingrafted in the very first formation of the soul by the Author of our nature.⁷

And as the attractive power in bodies is the most universal principle which produceth innumerable effects, and is a key to explain the various phenomena of nature; so the corresponding social appetite in human souls is the great spring and source of moral actions. This it is that inclines each individual to an intercourse with his species, and models everyone to that behavior which best suits the common well-being. Hence that sympathy in our nature whereby we feel the pains and joys of our fellow creatures.⁸ Hence that prevalent love in parents towards their children, which is neither founded on the merit of the object, nor yet on self-interest. It is this that makes us inquisitive concerning the affairs of distant nations which can have no influence on our own. It is this that ex-

⁷ It is this failure to attempt to explain the social instinct through the medium of psychology which separates Berkeley from modern sociologists.

⁸ Note the reversal of cause and effect, which is inevitable in case the social instinct is viewed as a metaphysical entity of special and original endowment. Most modern sociologists are inclined to believe that sympathy in part accounts for society.

tends our care to future generations, and excites us to acts of beneficence towards those who are not yet in being, and consequently from whom we can expect no recompense. In a word, hence arises that diffusive sense of Humanity so unaccountable to the selfish man who is untouched with it, and is, indeed, a sort of a monster or anomalous production.⁹

These thoughts do naturally suggest the following particulars. First, that as social inclinations are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and interest of every individual to cherish and improve them to the benefit of mankind; the duty, because it is agreeable to the intention of the Author of our being, who aims at the common good of his creatures, and as an indication of his will, hath implanted the seeds of mutual benevolence in our souls; the interest, because the good of the whole is inseparable from that of the parts; in promoting therefore the common good, every one doth at the same time promote his own private interest. Another observation I shall draw from the premises is, That it is a signal proof of the divinity of the Christian religion, that the main duty which it inculcates above all others is charity. Different maxims and precepts have distinguished the different sects of philosophy and religion: our Lord's peculiar precept is, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself. By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you love one another'.¹⁰

The March number of *The Open Court* contains an error, for for which we offer an apology. The author of "A Critical View of Progress" is Robert Shafer, of Wells College, Aurora-on-Cayuga, New York, and not as it reads "F. S. Marvin."

⁹ In spite of Berkeley's shortcomings in the matter of accounting for the social instinct, his method was in many other respects excellent; he endeavored to correlate social and physical forces and causation, and to organize about the social fact all the activities growing out of it. Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰ *The Works of Berkeley*, Fraser edition, Vol. IV, pp. 186-190.



CHATEAUBRIAND.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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SUPERNATURALISM AND SATANISM IN CHATEAUBRIAND.

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

“MILTON has converted many a man to Diabolism,” says Max Beerbohm in his recent story, “Enoch Soames.”¹ Among these converts must be counted François René, Vicomte de Chateaubriand. His return to Catholicism was not inspired by his mother’s death, but incited by Milton’s Devil. Chateaubriand himself, as is well known, attributed his religious conversion to his mother’s death-bed appeal to him to return to her faith. “Ma conviction,” said he, “est sortie du cœur. J’ai pleuré et j’ai cru.” This story, however, is the purest of his fictions. It is truthful only to the extent that he inherited from his mother the tendency towards Catholicism. The abruptness of his transition from the scepticism of his *Essai sur les Révolutions* (1797)—“a book of doubt and sorrow,” as he himself called it—to the certainty of his *Génie du Christianisme* (1799-1802) is a suspicious circumstance. The interval between “Quelle sera la religion qui remplacera le Christianisme?” (the title of the last chapter of the *Essai*) and his panegyric of the genius of Christianity was too brief. The fanatical Voltairian was too suddenly transformed into a fervent votary of the Catholic faith.

As a matter of fact, Chateaubriand remained the sceptic even while writing his *Génie du Christianisme*. This is shown by marginal notes to the *Essai* in the author’s own handwriting found by Sainte-Beuve in a copy which had belonged to Chateaubriand him-

¹ Enoch Soames is the most recent imitator of Theophilus, the ambitious priest of Adana, who, as is well known, was the first to discover that man could enter into a bond with Beelzebub. The story “Enoch Soames” first appeared in the *Century Magazine* for May, 1916, and was reprinted in Max Beerbohm’s book, *Seven Men* (London, 1919; New York, 1920).

self.² On the basis of this discovery alone our author's sincerity in matters of faith may well be called into question.³ This inaugurator of the religious reaction in France believed in nothing, as he himself repeatedly asserted, adding the words, however, when he recollected himself, "except in religion."⁴ But this position is an impossibility. One cannot be a believer in religion and a disbeliever in everything else. Faith in God implies faith in man; disbelief in man cannot be reconciled with belief in God.

No, this "restaurateur de la religion," as Chateaubriand was pleased to call himself, had no religion. Honored as he was as the latter-day apologist of the Christian religion, no man of genius of his day, Byron not excepted, had less of the Christian spirit. His Catholicism, if the hackneyed simile may be pardoned, was much like the play of *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out; it was a religion with the religious element wanting. Our defender of the faith remained virtually a pagan at heart—"an epicurean with a Catholic imagination," as Sainte-Beuve calls him. It was Chateaubriand's imagination rather than his heart that was touched by Catholicism. His creed was esthetical rather than ethical. His religion consisted in symbol and ceremonial rather than in faith and philosophy. He was attracted by the decorative shell of Christianity, by the pomp of its ritual, by the poetry of its legends, rather than by the truth of its dogmas and the power of its precepts. His argument and appeal in behalf of the Christian religion was not based on right and reason, but on sentiment and imagination. It was not the truth but the beauty of Christianity that our apostle proclaimed to his irreligious generation. His Christian apologetics did not spring from any religious convictions, but resulted from his esthetical sympathies. He viewed esthetically everything that had to do with Christianity—even Hell, as Professor Irving Babbitt has incisively remarked.⁵

² Cf. Auguste Sainte-Beuve, *Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire*. Nouv. éd. (2 vols., 1872), i p. 183; cf. also, i. 297; see also Georg Brandes, *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (English translation, 6 vols., London, 1901-5), iii. 78.

³ See, on the other hand, Georges Bertrin, *la Sincérité religieuse de Chateaubriand* (1900) and F. Saulnier, *Chateaubriand et sa foi religieuse* (1900). Reprinted from the *Revue de Bretagne, de Vendée et d'Anjou*, t. XXIII, pp. 325-40, 422-31. The abbé Bertrin's efforts to defend the sincerity of our author's Catholic convictions have been aptly called *bertrinades*. See also J. Croulbois, "la Religion de Chateaubriand," *Revue d'histoire littéraire religieuse* for 1901.

⁴ Cf. Georg Brandes, *op. cit.*, i. 12f.

⁵ *The Masters of Modern French Criticism* (Boston, 1912), p. 68.

I

Chateaubriand's advocacy of the Supernatural is no indication of his Christian beliefs, and far from being the consequence was rather the cause of his vindication of Christianity. Throughout his discussion he demands the substitution of *le merveilleux chrétien* for *le merveilleux païen* not on ethical but on esthetical, not on philosophical but on psychological, grounds.⁶ Chateaubriand follows Boileau in considering the marvellous machinery an essential element in epic poetry.⁶ He differs from him, however, in advocating the employment of the mysteries of the Christian faith, which this "lawgiver of Parnassus" has put under ban.⁷ Modern poetry and art must build, he argues, upon Christian theology, as the ancients built upon Greco-Roman mythology. A poet, according to his view, should draw his material from the religion of his own country and of his own period. Moreover, Christianity is richer, he holds, than Paganism in rhetorical means and machines. Our religion, with its great diversity of spirits—deific, angelic, beatific and demonic—is better qualified, he maintains, as an instrument of poetry. The Christian Heaven has a larger population than the classical Pantheon, and the Christian Hell is larger than the heathen Tartarus inasmuch as it has absorbed the Olympus also. {The angels and demons offer an especially fruitful field to the poet, who at will} can populate with them the earth as well as Heaven and Hell. The ranks of the supernal and infernal powers, moreover, can be endlessly extended by angelicizing and diabolizing our various virtues and vices. It should, furthermore, be remembered that with Chateaubriand as with Boileau the marvellous element is but an artificial embellishment, a rhetorical adornment, of an epic.⁸ The truth of the mysteries of the Christian religion is not involved in this discussion at all. Neither was Chateaubriand the first to rebel against the classical creed. Boileau did not have it all his own way even in his own lifetime.

⁶ The classicism of Chateaubriand has been well pointed out by Louis Bertrand in his Paris dissertation, *la Fin du classicisme et le retour à l'antique* (1897).

⁷ "De la foi d'un chrétien les mystères terribles
D'ornements égayés ne sont point susceptibles."

(Boileau, *Art poétique*, chap. iii.)

⁸ For a discussion of Chateaubriand's theory of *le merveilleux chrétien* the reader is referred to Hubert Matthey's *Essai sur le merveilleux dans la littérature française depuis 1800* (1915). Many details in our present discussion of Chateaubriand's esthetical theories have been drawn from this brief but brilliant survey of the Supernatural in modern French literature.

Already as far back as the seventeenth century the authority of this dictator of the French classical school was not left unchallenged. Many poets believed that an epic poem should "renfermer la théologie de la nation pour laquelle il est écrit." Chapelain, the formulator of the theory of the *épopée pacifique*, advocated what he called "poétiser à la chrétienne."⁹ It is now evident that Chateaubriand had but revived the two hundred years' quarrel between the "Ancients" and the "Moderns."

That Chateaubriand's appreciation of the poetic possibilities of Christianity had really nothing to do with his religious beliefs is proved by the fact that even in his earlier sceptical *Essai*, where the story of Christ is treated as a variant of the pagan myth of the death and resurrection of vegetation,¹⁰ he could see in the *Messiah* the sublimity of Klopstock's poetic tableau of the passion of Christ (*Essai*, chap. lviii). It was in the work of the great Christian poets of foreign lands,—Dante, Camoens, Tasso, Klopstock, Pope and Milton,—whom Chateaubriand studied in his exile, that he realized the beauties of Christianity and was struck by its literary availability. Our author was first attracted to the German poet, in whom he found the combination of sensibility with some measure of epic instinct,¹¹ but he soon transferred his interest to Milton, of whom he speaks, as M. Dupuy expresses it, "avec une vraie dévotion." Chateaubriand himself says that he lived for thirty years with Milton under the influence of his poetic inspiration, of his poetic vision. Milton above all others fired our poet with that great enthusiasm for Christian Supernaturalism which he expresses in his *Génie du Christianisme*. Throughout his argument for the superiority of *le merveilleux chrétien* to *le merveilleux païen*, Chateaubriand refers again and again to Milton. He had an unbounded admiration for *Paradise Lost*, that greatest of modern epics, finally translated it into French prose and published it with a preliminary *Essai sur la littérature anglaise* (1836).

"The finest thing in connection with this [Milton's] *Paradise*," says H. Taine, in his *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (1863). "is

⁹ In his own epic, *la Pucelle* (1656), Chapelain represents Satan as the inventor of gunpowder and owner of a cannon foundry. According to a plate in Iohanness Brantzius' *Artifices de feu* (Strasbourg, 1604), the Devil instructed Schwartz in the art of making gunpowder.

¹⁰ "La persécution, le martyre et la résurrection du Christ ne sont que le dogme allégorique persan concernant le Bon et le Mauvais Principe, dans lequel le Méchant triomphe et détruit d'abord le Bon; ensuite le Bon renaît et subjugue à son tour le Méchant." (*Essai*, chap. xlv.) A reconstruction of the ancient fertility ritual has been attempted by the present writer in his *Origin of the German Carnival Comedy* (New York, 1920).

¹¹ The reader will recall that when somebody once called Klopstock the "German Milton," Coleridge promptly retorted that Klopstock was a very German Milton.

Hell; and in this history of God the chief part is taken by the Devil." What fascinated Chateaubriand also in Milton's poem was the character of Satan. Our author praises the poetic personifications of evil in all Christian poems, but finds Milton's Satan the finest conception of all. He considers this irreconcilable and irremediable archangel an incomparable creation—a mighty angel fallen! The reader cannot but be affected by a sense of sorrow for this fall. Some of the most eloquent passages in the *Génie du Christianisme* treat of the empyrean rebel in Milton. In Chateaubriand's opinion there is no poetic character, ancient or modern, that equals this Devil. Contrasting Milton with Homer, he finds nothing in the *Odyssey* that can be compared with Satan's address to the sun in *Paradise Lost* (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. vi, chap. 9). "What is Juno," Chateaubriand asks, "repairing to the limits of the earth in Ethiopia, compared to Satan, speeding his course from the depths of chaos up to the frontiers of nature?" (*ibid.*, Pt. II, bk. iv, chap. 12). "What is Ajax," he exclaims, "compared with Satan?" "What is Pluto," echoes Victor Hugo, "as compared with the Christian Devil?" It was the Satan of Milton who revealed to Chateaubriand the poetic beauties of Christianity. Of all Christian supernatural beings it is the Devil who, as a poetic figure, is superior to all pagan divinities. The poetry of the Christian religion is mainly manifested in the Prince of Demons. The genius of Christianity is finally reduced, in its poetical aspect, to the Adversary. Chateaubriand, who throughout the book takes issue at every turn with Voltaire, seems to agree with his erstwhile master that the Fiend was the fount and foundation of the Christian faith. ("Cette doctrine [du diable] devient depuis le fondement de la religion chrétienne," *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, chap. iii.)¹²

II

The unique position of Chateaubriand consists not in the restoration of Supernaturalism but of Satanism. In his advocacy of *le merveilleux chrétien* he had a rival in Mme. de Staël; both he and she turned the eyes of their countrymen to Christian legend. Mme. de Staël, also, protested against the ban which Boileau had put on Christian Supernaturalism. But he differed from his brilliant con-

¹² Voltaire must have meant that from the old orthodox point of view Christianity was inconceivable without Satan. What need would there be for salvation through Christ if there were no Satan constantly plotting against man?

temporary and co-precursor of Romanticism in regard to the place of the Devil in French literature. Mme. de Staël, who borrowed much that was germinal from Germany, was unwilling to bring Mephistopheles over to her country. In contrast to Chateaubriand she believed that the Fiend would not fit exactly into French literature. In her essay on Goethe's *Faust*, she writes:

"La croyance aux mauvais esprits se retrouve dans un grand nombre de poésies allemandes; la nature du Nord s'accorde assez bien avec cette terreur; il est donc beaucoup moins ridicule en Allemagne, que cela ne le serait en France, de se servir du diable dans les fictions" (*De l'Allemagne*, 1810).¹³

The rehabilitation of the Devil as a puissant personage in poetry constitutes Chateaubriand's greatest contribution to posterity. It is the most striking literary phenomenon of the nineteenth century. Victor Hugo tells of the famous and indisputable apparition of the Devil in the rue des Bernardins in the last year of the eighteenth century (*les Misérables*, 1862). This marks the Devil's return to literary glory through the kind offices of our Christian poet. But although introduced from across the Channel, Diabolus seems to have taken out naturalization papers in France. He was made over by the writers of that country into their own image and likeness and dominated the literary movement of that period to such an extent that the terms "demonic" and "Romantic" came very soon to be wellnigh synonymous expressions.¹⁴

Les Martyrs, Chateaubriand's great Christian epic, was also written primarily in behalf of the Devil. The Preface maintains that the book is the result of the author's efforts to mold into poetical form his theories in regard to *le merveilleux chrétien* already advanced in his *Génie du Christianisme*. The book is offered, Chateaubriand claims, as the first illustration of his contention that "the marvellous of this religion might well contend for the palm of interest with the marvellous borrowed from mythology." This, however, seems not to be correct, as an earlier work, *les Natchez*, written prior to his theoretical book, already contains in part the Christian scheme of the Supernatural. *Les Natchez*, although published long after *Les Martyrs*, is now generally conceded to have been written

¹³ "The belief in evil spirits is to be met with in many pieces of German poetry; the nature of the north agrees very well with this description of terror; it is, therefore, much less ridiculous in Germany than it would be in France, to make use of the Devil in works of fiction."

¹⁴ On Satan as the patron of Romantic poetry and the ideal Romantic hero see the Introduction to the present writer's *Devil Stories: An Anthology* (New York, 1921).

much earlier.¹⁵ The truth of the matter is that neither of the two was primarily composed as an illustration of the availability of Christian Supernaturalism for poetical and fictional narration. They represent Chateaubriand's two attempts at writing an epic poem. In Milton's England he caught the epic mania and became obsessed, as Jules Lemaitre has put it, by "le préjugé de l'épopée."¹⁶ Chateaubriand would show that Voltaire was wrong in maintaining that "les Français n'ont pas la tête épique." Our author wished to give to the France of the nineteenth century what Voltaire, in his *Henriade* (1728), had attempted to give to the France of the eighteenth century—a great national epic. In further confutation of Voltaire, who had enounced the theory that Christianity was as much opposed to poetry as Paganism was favorable to it, Chateaubriand's poem was projected as a Christian epic. He first attempted to transform into such an epic *les Natchez* (originally a romance of American life, written under his American impressions in the manner of Rousseau and Saint-Pierre), by interspersing in it several passages of supernatural interferences in the manner of Virgil and Tasso. This attempt, however, turned out to be unsuccessful and was abandoned at the end of the first part of the book. He then extracted from it the two short stories *Atala* and *René*, which he sent out as feelers, and published also his great work, *le Génie du Christianisme*, in which he elaborated and defended his esthetic theories.

During a stay in Rome, Chateaubriand conceived the idea of making a second attempt at composing an epic. In conformity with the literary tendency of his day, of which he himself was the foremost exponent, he avoided contemporary events. Undoubtedly there was in this procedure also a great deal of caution. The subject which he selected for his epic was, however, not without bearing on the political situation of that period. As a matter of fact, the book was almost as much of a political pamphlet as his *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons* (1814). It is no exaggeration to say that *les Martyrs* is a *roman à clef*. The persecution of the Christians under Diocletian, which forms the historical background of this book, was a symbol of the sufferings of the royalists and Romanists under the Revolution. Rome stood for Paris and Hiéroclès for Vol-

¹⁵ The composition of *les Natchez* is mainly attributed to the author's second stay in London (1797-1800), although parts of this work may already have been written in Suffolk, as M. Anatole LeBraz, *Au pays d'exil de Chateaubriand* (1908), has shown plausibly enough. The book was left, its writer maintains, in a trunk in London, and did not appear until 1826.

¹⁶ *Chateaubriand* (1912), p. 177.

taire,—the bugbear of our Bourbonist.¹⁷ The infernal council represented the Convention. Just as Dante consigned personal enemies to his *Inferno*, so Chateaubriand placed his political opponents in his equivalent for Hell. The philosophers of the eighteenth century and the leaders of the Revolution figured in his book as the spirits of darkness. Chateaubriand hated the philosophy of the preceding century with its levelling tendencies and its belief in human equality. He was also full of contempt for everything connected with the French Revolution. We will not go very far amiss then if we say that *les Martyrs* was primarily written to credit the Devil with the rebellion against the Lord's anointed.

III

It is an interesting fact that the Devil generally comes into vogue after a war or a revolution. Each of the great poetic personifications of evil has appeared after a critical moment in the world's history, when the old order was disappearing to make room for the new. Periodical upheavals in the social and political world give men a renewed realization of the fact that a power of evil is always at work in the midst of them. This unifying, growing, begetting life-force has been personified in the human mind and is called the Devil. It is, indeed, strange that at the very moment when we cease to believe in the existence of the Devil, we have borne in upon us a new and appalling sense that all the attributes which go to form his personality are more rampant in the world than we in our former blindness had ever dreamed. Just when we have consigned Lucifer to Limbo and have lulled ourselves into the fond conviction that all is for the best in this best of all worlds, we awaken to a new and sudden realization of a unity in all the various forms and elements of evil, which seems to point to a personality if not to a person. "We may not believe in a personal Devil," says Mr. Stanton Coit, "but we must believe in a Devil who acts very much like a person." Victor Hugo, who, like most modern thinkers, was a Manichean, said: "It is certain that evil at one end proves the Evil One at the other" (*les Travailleurs de la mer*, 1866). It was the lesson that the French Revolution and its attendant Reign of Terror

¹⁷ Voltaire, the great champion of justice and tolerance, was conventionalized by the Catholic Church into Mephistopheles. The Jesuit Patouillet, a victim of Voltaire's scathing sarcasm, was of the opinion that his enemy was of diabolical descent. Joseph de Maistre, Chateaubriand's fellow-reactionary, called Voltaire the man "into whose lands Hell has given all its power"—"the ambassador plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Devil" (Albert Guérard, *French Prophets of Yesterday* (1913), p. 101.

taught the sceptics of the eighteenth century, and it was again the lesson that the devil-doubters of our own day learned from the recent war and its deplorable aftermath. This new realization of the Devil as the controlling power in the world's affairs takes form in the imagination of a Dante, a Luther, a Vondel, a Milton, a Goethe, a Chateaubriand, a Flaubert, a Victor Hugo.

It may also be noted in passing, that most of the re-creators of the Devil were exiled from their country or ostracized from the society of their class. We need but refer to Dante, Luther, Vondel, Milton, Byron, Heine, Lermontov and Hugo. Vigny voluntarily withdrew from his fellow-men into his "ivory-tower." Chateaubriand, in writing *les Martyrs* under the Empire, still retained the point of view of an *émigré*, that point of view from which his first romance, *les Natchez*, was written. These men, suffering banishment or imprisonment for their opposition to a tyrannical government, were naturally attracted to "le grand banni," who, in the words of Milton, "opposed the tyranny of Heaven" (*Par. Lost*, i. 124).¹⁸

"Pour comprendre un écrivain," said J. J. Ampère, "il faut comprendre son ciel," and, we might add, "son enfer." Chateaubriand's political views may best be inferred from his Heaven and Hell. In the administration of his celestial and infernal worlds the most outstanding feature according to our author is order. The Lord permits no disorder or discord even in Hell. No insubordination is tolerated in either the upper or the lower regions. The sin of the most profoundly corrupt spirit of the Abyss consists in nothing more than wishing to establish a different order of precedence in the court of Heaven. Chateaubriand pictures a disturbance during the session of the infernal council and calls upon the Lord to restore harmony among the spirits of darkness. "A terrible conflict would have resulted," he tells us, "if God, who maintains justice and is the author of all order, even in Hell, had not ended the turmoil" (*Martyrs*, VIII).¹⁹ In upsetting discipline in Hell and employing Heaven to re-establish it, our author lays himself open to an accusation of unfairness. The Devil is no Lord of Misrule. Hell may be a region of disorder as far as Heaven is concerned, but it is very

¹⁸ Moncure Daniel Conway, the well-known American demonologist, was an outcast from Southern society, into which he was born, on account of his anti-slavery propaganda. Paul Carus, author of *The History of the Devil* (Chicago, 1900), and former editor of *The Open Court*, was not American born. He had to turn his back on the country of conservatism and kaiserism as a consequence of his liberal religious views.

¹⁹ Cf. also Georg Brandes, *op. cit.*, iii. 149.

apparent that some sort of order must prevail among the infernal spirits. Milton also says:

"Devil with Devil damn'd
Firm concord holds."

(*Par. Lost*, ii. 496-7.)

If the demons cannot always control themselves in council let us not be too harsh with them; let us rather recall what Byron said: "Even saints forget themselves at times in council." The idea of a Tartarean tumult, by the way, is not as new as Chateaubriand would have us believe. Lucian set the infernal gods to quarrelling over the ferry hire in Hades. Moreover, the tumult in *les Martyrs* was really caused not by the devils but by the damned. The demons in council conduct themselves as gentlemen and reason like *encyclopédistes*.

Another characteristic of our royalist author is the fact that his Heaven and Hell contain many throned, crowned and sceptered spirits. Not only the monarch of Hell sits upon a throne and holds the scepter of Hell in his right hand, but his daughters, as the princesses of Hell, also have marks of royalty. The demon Rumor sits upon a throne, the demon Death wears on her head a sparkling crown, and the demon Night holds a scepter in her hand.²⁰ Royalty is highly respected in Chateaubriand's Heaven. Saint Louis is king in Heaven as he was on earth, and Queen Esther at the court of Heaven enjoys all the privileges of a royal visitor.

Chateaubriand's anti-revolutionary views may also be seen in that he places the poor man in Hell. He is proud of his achievement, and admits that the idea would never have occurred to him prior to the Revolution (*Martyrs*, VIII, n. 16e). "Here," says Jules Lemaitre, "is frankness with a rather Nietzschean hardness."²¹ Our author must have remembered well the frightful conduct of the Paris mob in the days of the Revolution and during the Reign of Terror.

It may also be noted in passing that when this religionist employs the Jew as an agent of Hell, he represents him as an unbeliever. He is a Jew who has renounced the faith of his fathers. In the Theophilus legend, from which this tradition may be traced, the in-

²⁰ It is interesting to contrast the despotic monarch of Hell in *les Martyrs* with the Devil who boastfully says, "I am a constitutional, democratic king," in a recent book, *De kleine Johannes*. The author of this new "Pilgrim's Progress," the Dutch folk-lorist and novelist, Dr. Frederik Willem van Eeden, who expressed in this book strong anti-Catholic views (cf. *The Open Court*, vol. XXXV (1921), p. 527), has just announced himself in his new book, *Significant Broodings* (1921), a convert to Catholicism.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 186.

termediary between man and the Devil is a believing Jew. The zealot in one religion prefers a zealot to a liberal even in an opposing religion. In his eagerness to point out the infernal connection of the unbeliever our author resorts to magic, a method which was already condemned by Chapelain as "la vieille mode."

IV

Following the lead of Milton, Chateaubriand represents the Arch-enemy of mankind as a fomenter of revolutions. Satan, it must be remembered, is still waging on earth the war he started in Heaven.²² Our author is deeply impressed by his discovery that Milton's Satan was the personification of the English Revolution. Moreover, Chateaubriand was keen enough to discern under the diabolical masks in the epic of the Puritan poet those energetic rebels, who, although defeated, refused to submit to the royal authority. The Frenchman must also be given credit for his critical acumen in observing that Milton himself was, in the words of Blake, "of the Devil's party."²³

"Nous sommes frappé dans ce moment d'une idée que nous ne pouvons taire. Quiconque a quelque critique et un bon sens pour l'histoire pourra reconnaître que Milton a fait entrer dans le caractère de son Satan les perversités de ces hommes qui, vers le commencement du dix-septième siècle, couvrirent l'Angleterre de deuil: on y sent la même obstination, le même enthousiasme, le même orgueil, le même esprit de rébellion et d'indépendance; on retrouve dans le monarque infernal ces fameux niveleurs qui, se séparant de la religion de leur pays, avaient secoué le joug de tout gouvernement légitime. et s'étaient révoltés à la fois contre Dieu et contre les hommes. Milton lui-même avait partagé cet esprit de perdition; et, pour imaginer un Satan aussi détestable, il fallait que le poète en eût vu l'image dans ces réprouvés, qui firent si longtemps de leur patrie le vrai séjour des démons" (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. iv, chap. 9).²⁴

²² "The Devil," says Anatole France, "is the father of all anarchy."

²³ "The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet, and of the Devil's party without knowing it" (William Blake).

²⁴ "An idea strikes us, which we cannot forbear to communicate. Whoever possesses discernment and a knowledge of history must perceive that Milton has introduced into the character of Satan the perverseness of those men, who, about the middle of the seventeenth century, filled England with mourning and wretchedness. You even discover in him the same obstinacy, the same enthusiasm, the same pride, the same spirit of rebellion and independence; you meet with the principles of those infamous levellers, who, seceding from the religion of their country, shook off the yoke of all legitimate government, revolting at once against God and man. Milton had himself imbibed this spirit of perdition; and the poet could not have imagined a Satan so detestable unless he had seen his image in one of those reprobates who, for such a length of time, transformed their country into a real abode of demons."

Already in his *Essai sur les Révolutions* our author had maintained that a revolution is under no circumstances to be justified. This partisan of potentates and pontiffs believed with the abbé Genoude that "la révolte n'est jamais permise." He shared the viewpoint of the Catholic Church towards the Revolution and all its works. Joseph de Maistre, his fellow-reactionary, also considered the Revolution a Satanic work. In the eyes of the Catholic Church France was possessed by the Devil of the Revolution. The priests taught the French peasants that the Constitution which confiscated their property was the diabolic masterpiece of the Revolution.²⁵ Victor Hugo in his royalist days also described the Convention as a creation of the Evil One (*Odes et poésies diverses*, 1822).²⁶

Satan in *les Martyrs* is not so much the fallen archangel of Christian tradition as the moving spirit of the French Revolution.²⁷ He employs many of the expressions of the revolutionary leaders. In his address to the infernal assembly we find echoes of the oratory of the Convention. Chateaubriand even goes so far as to put the revolutionary-patriotic hymn of his country, *la Marseillaise* (1792), one of the world's great martial songs, into the mouth of the Fiend. An anachronism of so conspicuous and disconcerting a sort does not in the least freeze this reactionary and royalist when venting his hatred on the Revolution and all its works. Perhaps in this respect the self-canonized *père de l'église*, as our author was pleased to call himself in a letter to Mme. de Custine,²⁸ is following the lead of the other Fathers of the Church in ascribing to the Devil a marvellous sort of prescience. For when the early Christian missionaries discovered that pagan beliefs and practices were similar to their own, they could

²⁵ The Catholic view of the French Revolution down to the present day may be seen in *le Diable et la Révolution* (1895) by that impostor Léo Taxil, a work dedicated to Pope Leo XIII.

²⁶ *Livre i, ode 4.*

²⁷ Perhaps Napoleon, whom he bitterly hated, also reminded our author of the leader of the insurgent hosts of Heaven. Napoleon was considered by many of his contemporaries as a devil in human flesh. Victor Hugo in his Bourbonist days pronounced Napoleon to be an emissary of Hell (see his ode "Bonaparte" in his *Odes et poésies diverses*, 1822). For Marie Louise, Napoleon was Antichrist (Letter of July 8, 1809). Mme. de Krüdener believed Napoleon to be the devil himself (cf. Brandes, *op. cit.*, iii. 188). Adam Müller in a letter to Gentz used Bonaparte as a synonym for Satan (*ibid.*, ii. 324). In comparing this world to the Dantean *Inferno*, Schopenhauer finds the only difference in the fact that on our planet man himself is the devil to his fellows ("homo homini diabolus"); and the arch-devils in this philosopher's opinion are those world-conquerors who get hundreds of thousands of men lined up against one another and then call out: "Suffering and death are what you are born to; now fire away at one another with musket and cannon!" "And," says Schopenhauer, "they do it, too."

²⁸ Cf. *Correspondance générale de Chateaubriand*, p. par L. Thomas (1912 seq.).

only explain the fact by assuming that long before the advent of Christianity the Devil had put Christian beliefs and practices into the heads of the pagans in order to confound the faithful. Justin Martyr thought that by overhearing the celestial council the Adversary learned the intention of the Almighty and anticipated them by a series of blasphemous imitations (*Apol.*, i. 54). In this manner was explained the similarity in creed and cult between Christianity and Paganism. Cortez, it will be remembered, also complained that the Devil had positively taught to the Mexicans the things which the Lord had taught to the Christians. If the Devil had wind of Christian rites and ceremonies centuries ahead, he might easily know in the third century what hymn Rouget de Lisle would compose fifteen hundred years later. And why, pray, not believe that it was the Evil One himself who put the *Marseillaise* into the head of the poet of the Revolution? Diabolus is known to have inspired the brain of many a philosopher and poet. Bruno and Servetus, it was believed, owed their scientific theories to the inspiration of Satan. Beelzebub, wishing to take vengeance on the devil-fighting knights of medieval days, whispered *Don Quixote* into the ears of Cervantes,²⁹ and Asmodeus avenged himself on the monks by inspiring Boccaccio with his *Decameron*. The Devil might very well have composed the hymn of that Revolution which he himself brought to pass.

The address of Satan to his companions at the infernal council is perhaps the most powerful passage in the supernatural portions of *les Martyrs*. The fame of Satan's oratorical ability renders further comment superfluous. Lord Broughman, as we know, recommended Satan's speeches to barristers and parliamentarians. The Fiend is even famed as a pulpit orator.³⁰ Satan's address in *les Martyrs* is the one original passage in a book which, by the admis-

²⁹ Charles Nodier speaks of Cervantes as "l'ingénieux démon qui assiste en riant à l'agonie de l'ancien ordre de choses et qui lui donne le coup de mort avec sa marotte."

³⁰ The Devil's speech to St. Guthlac, the Irish St. Anthony, is not, as has been somewhere stated, the only instance extant of a diabolical sermon. Satan is known to have occupied pulpits in many parts of Christendom. He is said to have preached a sermon, among others, in the church of North Berwick. Lord Morley recently told the French story of the monk who was a particular friend of the Devil. One Sunday morning the monk was too ill to preach, and as Diabolus chanced to appear in the sacristy, he asked that obliging personality to occupy his pulpit for the special edification of his congregation. The Devil preached a most masterly sermon, covering himself with shame and confusion. "How now?" said the monk when the Devil came down, "you have pretty nearly ruined yourself with that sermon." "Oh! dear no," answered the Devil, "no harm done, no harm done; there was no unction in it." (Quoted by Jack O'London in a recent number of the *New York Times*.)

sion of the author himself, is but a mosaic of quotations. "*Le Génie du Christianisme* est un tissu de citations avoué au grand jour," Chateaubriand admitted in a letter to M. de Marcellus. "Dans *les Martyrs*, c'est un fleuve de citations déguisées et fondues." Chateaubriand's lack of originality in the supernatural parts of *les Martyrs* as well as of *les Natchez* is now generally conceded. His borrowings have formed the subject of several critical studies,³¹ but the limits of this study forbid detailed consideration. Our author plucked plumes from all of his predecessors, but particularly from Milton. Satan and the other demons in *les Martyrs* have been conceived in slavish imitation of the English poet, the repeated references to Tasso in the notes to the book in question notwithstanding. For Chateaubriand, perhaps unwittingly, always attributed the influence exerted upon him to any but the right person.

The opening speech of Satan to the infernal assembly, though suggested by a study of the Pandemonium in Milton, reveals a modicum of originality on the part of his French follower. The Puritan poet, with all his admiration for the empyrean rebel, would never have thought of putting such beautiful words into his mouth:

"Dieux des nations, trônes, ardeurs, guerriers généreux, milices invincibles, race noble et indépendante, magnanimes enfants de cette forte patrie, le jour de gloire est arrivé; nous allons recueillir le fruit de notre constance et de nos combats. Depuis que j'ai brisé le joug du tyran, j'ai tâché de me rendre digne du pouvoir que vous m'avez confié. Je vous ai soumis l'univers; vous entendez ici les plaintes de cet homme qui devait vous remplacer au séjour des béatitudes. . . ." ³²

The other debates among the infernal spirits in council do not differ essentially from their models in Milton.

³¹ The first man to make an exhaustive study of Chateaubriand's plagiarisms was the Swiss Ernst Dick in his Basle dissertation: *Plagiat de Chateaubriand* (1905); *idem*, "Chateaubriands Verhältnis zu Milton" in *Festschrift z. 14. Neuphilologentage in Zürich*, 1910; *idem*, "Plagiat, Nachahmung und Originalität bei Chateaubriand," in *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift* for 1911. Cf. also W. Wright Roberts, "Chateaubriand and Milton," in *Modern Language Review*, vol. V (1910), pp. 409-29; A. Köhler, *Quellen-untersuchung zu Chateaubriands les Martyrs* (1913); A. T. Baker, "Milton and Chateaubriand," in *The French Quarterly*, vol. I (1919), pp. 87-104; J. M. Telleen, *Milton dans la littérature française* (1904); H. Matthey, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-21.

³² "Gods of the nations, thrones, ardeurs, generous warriors, invincible armies, noble and independent race, magnanimous children of this powerful country, the day of glory has arrived; we are about to reap the fruit of our constancy and of our combats. Since first I broke the yoke of the tyrant, I have endeavored to render myself worthy of the power which you have entrusted to me. I have reduced the universe to your control; you hear the groans of the posterity of that man who was to have succeeded you in the abode of blessedness. . . ."

As an imitator of Milton, Chateaubriand has been most successful in the expression of human emotions which he imparts to his Satan when this fallen angel descends into his doleful domain to summon the infernal council. Satan's pity for the sad plight of the spirits who fell with him and his compassion for man, to whom he must bring destruction, are lines in *Paradise Lost* which our author never tires of praising. The idea of the repentant rebel, to be sure, is not original with Milton. This is common in all forms of mediæval literature and may be traced to the apocryphal *Vision of St. Paul*. It is, moreover, of pre-Christian origin and was acquired by the Jews from the Persians from whom we have taken our Satan. The writer of the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (written between 30 B. C. and 50 A. D.) already represented the apostatized angels as "weeping unceasingly." In Satan's descent to Hell and in his address to his synod, Chateaubriand almost succeeded in breathing life into his Devil. Satan stands forth from the rest of the supernatural personages, who have not the slightest breath of life in them.

(To be Continued)

RUMINATIONS.

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

THE world over are social economists and political economists prescribing wise measures to prevent strikes, to ameliorate the condition of the workingman, to destroy pauperism, to protect capital, to safeguard public interests. One is loud in the praise of compulsory arbitration, another sagely suggests a combination of labor and capital (!) and still another sees a cure positive for all our social ills only in the public ownership of everything; and each is conscientiously assured, satisfied in his own mind and labors to convince his disciples that, of course, all the other economists are wrong. And most of them, as well as the general public, seem to believe that the conditions about us today are brand new and require drastic, immediate and extraordinary treatment, they sigh for the "good old times when things were differently regulated," when the iron heel of the trusts did not crush the laboring man, when the individual amounted to something, when there was a premium upon skilled labor, an incentive for a man to do his best, for then there was a future before him. Ah, "the good old times"! What a fascination in the retrospect, what a charm and, withal, what a mystery in those words! And, alas, we must also add, what a mass of plain myth there is wrapped all about them! As a matter of fact are we not, all of us, generally satisfied with that wrapping, the outer husk; how often do we get right into the kernel of those alleged good old times?

European economists seem even more perturbed over the condition of things in America particularly than are our own sages. They see nothing but dire social calamities ahead of us. In fact with them today America is the uppermost subject of discussion, (we might add, too, that we are a serious cause of worry to more than their economists; our political and commercial moves are watched with breathless attention) and in their press and upon their rostrums

the concensus of opinion is that we are in a very bad way indeed, that we have fallen from grace, that our wealthy class has profited immensely by the War, the hard luck of Europe, (and that we actually expect Europe to pay us something of what she owes us seems to be the worst offense) and that our people, our workingmen, our poor have been improvident with their high wages of war time and are now in worse straits, more downtrodden, ridden by the rich than the same classes have ever been in, anywhere before. And some of these men stand high in the learned societies of their several countries!

True, extreme poverty seems the harder to bear in proportion as the luxuries of extreme wealth increase, and, I grant you, that our wealthy class is extremely wealthy and luxurious. The contrast is a painful one, but it seems to be an eternal law here below; it is not a new condition. Degraded misery has ever been hidden behind the splendors of great cities. Yet New York and Chicago cannot hold a candle to London or Paris in that respect, or to any of the European metropolae of those aforesaid good old times for that matter. In all the latter the chief effort seemed and seems to be to thoroughly hide that misery, while, thank God! with us more earnest and intelligent efforts are being made than ever to not only bring that misery to light and alleviate it but, chimerical as it may seem, to destroy it root and branch, and those efforts are meeting with noteworthy success.

But the contention that workmen, the humbler class generally and particularly in our country are worse off than they ever were, and that social conditions are growing from bad to worse is a most cruel libel, unjust, untrue and shows an unfamiliarity with history that is astounding, or else a deliberate perversion of facts.

Never before, or elsewhere, has the workingman been freer from extraneous fetters, let us call them. He has placed himself voluntarily under certain restrictions of freedom, but merely to the end of improving his ultimate condition; the law, his employer hampers his actions but little: and never before have there been such opportunities for advancement, such material incentive for individual effort, for never before has it been possible for man to rise to such heights by his unaided efforts and force of character.

The good old times, pshaw, what delusions! Let us glance at them, those wonderful old times when all men were true and brave and free and when all women were beautiful and, oh, so virtuous. The histories and records that the economists have at their elbow,

but that they seem never to consult, are open to us, clear to any who will but read. We have been taught that poverty, the individual and accidental fact, is of all times and climes, but that pauperism is a creation of modern times; that formerly, while there may have been abuses, even violences, there was, nevertheless, a well established tradition, an obligation, that bound those in high places to protect, to help those in the lower ranks; the Christian ages gave the industrial classes absolute peace for centuries at a time, a fixity of wages and stability of occupation and a solidarity of interests that, one would suppose, assured a most heavenly and beatific state of affairs; peace reigned supreme, there was perfect harmony of interests, the classes knew no rivalries, or jealousies or hatred, for holy Church dominated all and her influence kept her children, employers and employed, masters and serfs, great lords and humble retainers, in the proper spirit of love and charity. Would that those good old times were still with us!

So much for the teachings; let us glance over the records of fact, the histories indubitable and clear, that all may read who will. Fortunately in European countries county and district officers used to keep very careful record of the doings and condition of the people, their ability to pay the taxes, police records of behavior, deaths, births and what not, an infinity of detail that has come down to us in very good shape; they used good paper and a fair quality of ink.

First let us turn our attention to the agricultural classes of old, later we will look at the industrial records of the times. We find that in entire sections of England, France and Germany, even as late as the early seventeen hundreds, when actual serfdom no longer existed, the common people had meat but three or four times a year, their bread was of rye and oats, husks and all, salt was a great luxury, small fruits and mean garden stuff formed the bulk of their food, the ground was worn out and they had neither the implements nor the fertilizers nor the energy to work it properly. "We must not be surprised," adds a high sheriff reporting to his king, "if people so poorly fed lack force; they also suffer from nudity, three-quarters of them wear half-rotten cotton clothing winter and summer; they lack the strength to work and have degenerated into mere animals not unwilling to be rid of life. Those we draw for the army will have to be built up for a year before they are *fit to fight*...."

The Intendant of Limoges, a district then of about 110,000 people, writes under date of January 12, 1692: "Last year was bad enough. now it is worse, already 70,000 of the people of this district

are reduced to beggary, those too proud to beg live upon herbs and roots." Another officer writes that in his district 26,000 people are begging their bread "not counting those too proud to beg" (?) and in Basse Auvergne "thousands are dying of hunger." All this is in France, thrifty, fertile France. Even in the very zenith of its glory under Louis XIV, when that monarch revelled in a very surfeit of splendor, grim hunger stalked about the country. In Germany it was even worse. England's evil days were not over either.

Some impute these vicissitudes of the inherent vices of the old regimes, the crimes of the rulers and the errors of their policies. Rather should we, with Haussonville and Privoff, attribute them solely to the state of civilization that then obtained, the insufficiency of means of communication, the lack of system and the ignorance of the people. Not only was each people but each little province and county absolutely dependent upon its own resources; if they failed, thousands must perish before supplies could be gotten from elsewhere and in fact they seldom *thought*, even, of drawing upon distant points until far too late. In those "good old times" the peasant's condition was "singularly precarious and in the periodic crises, of, alas, too frequent occurrence, he fell far below the minimum of well-being that is assured him today". And that was written fifty years ago, since when we have raised the possible minimum of the peasant's state several notches higher.

As for the craftsmen, the workers in cities, we have splendid records of their condition from the time of Julius Caesar, and I do not think our workmen of today would willingly step back into the condition of any antecedent period, though they have always been better off than the peasantry, the workers of the field. To take the casual reader back to Julius Caesar with me, however, might be something of an infliction—upon the casual reader—so we will but cast a sweeping glance over the period since the XIII century. Prior to that time, let me assure you, conditions were not one whit better than since. For centuries at a time they were far worse than anything that we know of in the past 500 years, so let us dismiss the dim past, assuming that the "good old times" do not antedate 1200.

About that time associations, unions, began to spring into existence and rapidly grew into considerable importance. The Church takes credit for their birth, or, at least, as their foster parent. As a matter of fact she violently opposed them at first; she was jealous of them as she always is of any growing power outside of her domination. She forbade her children joining them and hurled eccle-

siastical bombs at their leaders. The Unions grew, nevertheless; they took on a semi-religious phase, adopted patron saints and contributed to the support of the clergy and Mother Church, always a graceful yielder under stress of circumstances when opposition is fruitless, took them to her bosom and swore she gave them birth.

These societies did a great deal of good, they took care of the sick, their indigent, and unemployed, they promoted the interests of their members and gave men a certain solidarity theretofore unknown, but there was no harmony between them. It was a constant warfare between harness-makers and shoemakers, armorers and blacksmiths; every trade stood out against the other. Then there was strife and everlasting friction between employer and men. The unions though not organized for that end really were to the greater profit and advantage of the employers and the burthen of their support was upon the workmen.

Before these organizations sprang up there existed corporations, guilds of the different trades, associations of employers of labor. They established customs that the unions later adopted as laws of labor. Take but one for instance, apprenticeship, who was benefited by that? The unions bit at the bait imagining they would thereby restrict their numbers and consequently the competition in labor; the employer meantime got seven and even ten years of labor (that became skilled in two years) for nothing; yes, almost slavery! The two forms of organization began fighting within six years after the first union was established and the first recorded strife of importance was in "merrie old England."

The legitimate outgrowth of guilds and such associations of employers was a system of combinations, great manufacturing plants sprang from these, just as those plants were later merged, in our day, within still closer lines, trusts. It is all consistent with the very natural evolution of things. Up to that particular time each little employer had his little shop and little force of men, and competitions in prices and in qualities was "right livelie." Sully in France, Goeckel in Germany, and Smythe in England seem to have been the first to think of organizing such, for that time, mammoth establishments. These became privileged institutions, existing "under royal charters and enjoying rights," subsidies, immunity from taxes, etc., that simply wiped out the competition of the small fry. Around these factories were grouped the workmen, "articled" to *cach*, their very existence depending upon the prosperity of that factory. Whatever sentiment there may have been was entirely wiped out, no

more unions, trade banners, patron saints or special chapels, but just plain business, "get all that can be gotten out of them for as little as can be paid them" was the motto—in that I find but little difference twixt the old and the new times. In other words men became pieces of machinery, the wages being in lieu of oil, that was the sole difference; that time saw the birth of the proletariat as we understand the word.

Stringent laws protected these factories, for were not the garments, the baubles, the arms, the fripperies of their sacred majesties made there? Those factories were nearly all purveyors or makers of something or other to the king. Wages were fixed by law, the men were articulated, they had to work *here*, or nowhere else. When work failed, the manufacturer stopped pay, or course; if the workman had saved money from his starvation pittance, well and good; if he had not why, he could go into no other trade or district, he stayed *there* and begged or starved.

We find such records as these; one a petition from a state officer to the king begging for a *special* dispensation allowing the men of a certain factory district to go elsewhere and work, or else send on royal provisions, for since the factory had closed down "already twenty-eight deaths had occurred in one day; but two died of disease the remainder passed away by the act of God and *lack of food*." Another officer complains most bitterly that "he had tried to encourage 300 women wig makers to be patient, that the factory would resume work, or else they would be allowed to go to the next town and find other employment, but they paid no attention to him, insulted him, crying out they were hungry and wanted bread or work, not words." And still another writes he has not sufficient forces at hand to prevent frequent and serious *desertions* from a factory in his district. Then we find another petition to a king to force his court to wear a certain kind of point-lace, that since the fashion had been not to wear it 6000 women were thrown out of work, these might have to be allowed to go into other trades elsewhere and that would cause desertion and disorder on the part of the men, the husbands who were employed in the petitioners' cloth factory that then had many large orders ahead!

Another record is interesting; it is a redeeming one, it shows that in those days at least investigations resulted in something. Voluminous papers go to show that a certain factory employing 1500 operatives had raised the price of their goods nearly 100 per cent. Living had become more expensive yet, by misrepresentations it had

secured the right to reduce the wages nearly half and that blessed record shows that the factory's privileges were cut off and the patronage of the court withdrawn for four years!

What think you of men being articted to a factory from which they could not go farther than a league, and that for two years' period, under the pain of fine, imprisonment and even corporal punishment if the offense was repeated a third time?

And all this was in the good old times." Strange what a fascination the past has for us, what an irresistible tendency there is in us to paint it in brilliant colors and poetic terms. Disappointed with the present, fearful of the future, every generation seems to turn from its own bright sunlight to the past, seeking in the mists and uncertainties of yesterday to find that ideal to which the aspirations of man ever tend. But yesterday was no better than today. Suffering and strife have been of all times; that we have less of them than yesterday is very evident and we ought to be prayerfully thankful therefor. I doubt, however, if we owe it to the panaceas or nostrums of our economists. We must seek the cause elsewhere.

As a matter of fact—even if by the admission, we glorify the economists in conceding them if but the power of evil—I believe that much injury has been done the cause of humanity by the acceptance by not only individuals but even by states of the theories of Gournay, of Adam Smith, of Cobden and of Garnier not to mention the more recent authorities, such as the Professor of the Chicago University who, some years ago, discovered anew that Malthus was absolutely right and forthwith proceeded to study out some means of stopping the increase in our numbers. He found that checks must be put upon us. Not content with "race-suicide" or a "controlled" birth rate he felt that we had to be reduced rather in wholesale lots by "positive methods", wars, disease, and if necessary, immoral means as well as the privitive or preventive means. And now since the devastations of the Great War, economists of equal standing, authorities too, are seeking some means of increasing our numbers! Some suggest Government premiums upon large families and some German high-brows, noting the preponderance of women in the population, sagely advise polygamy.

One thing we have to thank the economists for. Their agitations of the labor and other subjects started the people to think for themselves, not necessarily along the lines laid down for them by the sages, but along reasonable, sensible ones, and the result has been to influence the state to tamper less with the subjects than it ever did

before. It keeps aloof from legislation directly affecting those conditions and enforces existing laws, anent them much as it would handle red hot coals. It realizes that it cannot prevent conflicts 'twixt labor and capital and endeavors only to keep those conflicts within the bounds of propriety.

As men are constituted today, and probably will be for several generations to come, such competition, rivalry and conflict are the inevitable consequences, accompaniments of industrial vitality. There where no such conflicts and rivalry exist, there will you find stagnation, decadence, a moribund industry.

The intervention of the state must perforce be measured most carefully, prudently and equitably, otherwise to attempt to regulate too much simply means spoiling it all, aye even self-destruction for that foolhardy state. But the state must intervene when one of the first principles of its very basis is involved, it must ever stand for the protection of the weaker, be it either side, in any controversy.

Some would have us cry for absolute liberty and liberty alone, and both sides to manage each its own interests as best seems. That cry of liberty is thrown at us from every corner, it seems to be the eternal refrain to every song. Yet, the game of "liberty" is a rough one; some of the players are bound to get hurt and the fatalities are not few. Absolute liberty means to let the great natural laws work out their own results. The law that seems to control the evolution of our material world is the "survival of the fittest", the everlasting conflict between the strong and the weaklings, resulting, of course, in the destruction of the latter. The chances are, therefore, that that very liberty, so insistently clamored for, works to the detriment, the undoing of the weak, though in it may also be found the weapons for their defense. But the state must not be constantly intervening in the vain endeavor to establish an artificial equilibrium. The moment it plants itself doggedly athwart the way of those natural forces and laws it but produces worse disorder than would they if left unopposed. Those laws, those forces, like electricity, may be gently guided, subjugated, carried into useful channels, harnessed for our use and greater good, and that is the province of the state in those questions: In times gone by, it attempted and alas, often today, it blunderingly attempts to handle them, so to speak, without rubber gloves, let alone any scientific knowledge of their power, nature and effects.

The sight of two great armies of Capital and Labor, ranged in battle array, face to face, is, I grant you, an alarming one. Seem-

ingly their constant and sole preoccupation is each other's destruction. It would also seem that there might be occasional armistice but never assured and lasting peace between them, and such cessations of strife occurring only when both needed time for the renewal of armaments or fresh drafts of men to continue the strife. To say the least it all does seem most senseless, nay, insane.

We used to think that preparedness for War rather discouraged actual belligerency, that the machinery was so appallingly effective neither side would really invoke its use but would take it out in talk. This was the general idea until the storm of 1914 since which we have come to the notion that preparedness begets war and our efforts are toward disarmament.

So with our economic struggle: both factions have precipitated trouble heretofore and upon very slight provocation. The experience has been costly, but it has been worth while. They have gauged each other's strength and increased mutual respect has been the result, greater concessions are made, arbitration is welcomed and the outlook for a better understanding is bright.

The great strikes of recent years have cost us billions of dollars of loss, upon the producer and upon the consumer and upon, in very great part, the laborer. Actual strife has been recognized as something not to be resorted to lightly. The handling of some of the more recent strikes speaks volumes for the steadiness and reasonableness of the labor leaders. Arbitration, adjustment conferences are becoming the fashion. In very many unions the blatant demagogue has stepped down and out, the leaders today generally are cool, sensible, business-men, gentlemen, the equals of any class in intelligence and real patriotism. All of which means another step toward better conditions. The more perfect organization of labor may impel some to make rash displays of their strength for a time, but better counsel will prevail; the more perfect and far-reaching the organization the quicker and surer will labor settle down into well defined and reasonable lines that will be accepted by all parties as standard.

On the other hand there is capital, proud, defiant, all-powerful, merging itself into trusts and threatening us with all sorts of dire calamities—if we are to believe our economists.

The history of great organizations, as that of great political parties, is written in few words. They grow and grow, absorbing all about them, their self-reliance and vanity make them top-heavy; they become unwieldy by their very size and inflation; there are

ruptures in the management, defections, personal jealousies, they split up into a half-dozen minor organizations and there is competition again. And later these contending forces, composed of new men with new ends in view, get together once more only to run over the selfsame course. History repeats itself. There are revolutions in our process of evolution, only today they usually are peaceful, figurative, commercial revolutions where they used to be bloody and real upheavals.

And there is where the government comes in with a judicious interference in "those things which conduce to the conservation of the entire commonwealth and must perforce modify those made for the welfare of particular districts and interests." If these combinations are hurtful—and it is generally conceded some are—and exist by reason of certain taxes or concessions created by legislation that has outgrown its usefulness, then, at the proper time legislation must remove those aids to those combinations, and, be assured, it will remove them. *Vox populi* is strong and will ultimately prevail, though certain gentlemen in Congress assembled may squirm mightily during the operation.

Things have a faculty of adjusting themselves or being adjusted at the right moment. This old world of ours is not such a bad place to live in after all, and we who live in this bright beginning of a new century have much to learn from the past, but nothing to pine for in those alleged good old times so much harped upon by certain of our economists.

Neither lord nor peasant, trust magnate nor laborer, has any right or reason to complain of the time he lives in, nor need he look back longingly at the times or conditions that are gone by. We have everything anyone ever had, and ten thousand times more to be thankful for. Rather let us look ahead, being the while content and appreciating and enjoying to the full our splendid advantages. And let us so sensibly arrange the education of our sons that they may be even broader minded than their sires, that they may forget that might was ever considered right, that they may awaken to the full realization of the true brotherhood of man and live to enjoy that peace that we and our father may have hoped for but that almost passeth our understanding.

HOMER AND THE PROPHETS, OR HOMER AND NOW.

HISTORY AND HISTORICITY.

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST, M.A., M.P.D.

(Concluded.)

That Thersites had dared to speak against the King showed a stirring of the spirit in Greece which was soon to result in the deposition of kings in Greece, a spirit that had been killed in the East, and that was crude and rude, but full of hope for the future. This we can readily see in the light of Athenian history following Homer, in which a wider and wider democracy led to the Golden Age, proving the truth that rule by a wise and just people is better than rule by kings. Was Homer blind to this hope? Did he put rock-bottom truths into the mouth of this bad-mannered, ill-tempered, bandy-legged and generally crossed and mal-formed commoner as a kind of last warning to kings to be worthy of their charge or prepare to descend from their thrones? . . . He had shown that the Council was wiser than the King and reversed his decision. . . . The day of the common man had not yet come among the Homeric Greeks, but it was far on the way when men even whispered such truths as Thersites had uttered, when a great poet repeated them, having shown them justified by the facts, and when men felt a stirring of pity for the poor wretch who had spoken, thought at first they laughed when they heard him ridiculed and saw him beaten, as Thersites had been by Odysseus. In this case, as always, the blood and tears of the martyrs is the seed that will ripen later on. A generation after Homer, Grecian kings were displaced by a Council of Judges (in Athens, the Council of Areopagus), and reading Homer with this coming change in mind we see the Homeric Council as the nearly completed first stage toward democracy. In Thersites,

we see the rise of the Mountain, which, under the guidance of Solon, a century later, will mark the completion of the next stage.

In an age when people had begun to criticize their kings, Homer's drawing of the sons of Atreus, Menelaus and Agamemnon, must have been a strong factor in the democratizing process, helping to disillusionize the people as to their "heaven-descended kings." If Grecian kings had been less like Menelaus and Agamemnon and more like Odysseus, the Monarchies might have lasted longer. If monarchies had continued, it is very unlikely that they would have sunk into despotisms like those of the East, for Homer's Odysseus would have served as the model to which the kings would have to approximate. Princes would consciously or unconsciously emulate him, knowing that their people would judge them according to how well or how ill they succeeded. Thus, Homer is seen to be one of the Bards that outranked kings, a truth-teller and leader of both kings and people to a higher life, under Apollo, and, thanks to Apollo, the dispenser of just retribution to all, from swineherds to kings, with no mitigation of judgment to kings because of their higher rank. Homeric monarchy was approaching democracy because, in the realm of the poet, where Apollo was king, a good and just slave, like Eumaeus, *ἐν μάτομαι*, Try-Well, the swineherd, is judged higher than the less wise and the unjust kings. Eumaeus does not take his servitude slavishly; but, in complete independence of judgment, guides his master and king, Odysseus, into the better way. Would he obey if his master commanded him to do an evil thing?

In the incident at the swineherd's cottage, where Odysseus visits him disguised as a beggar, Eumaeus says and Odysseus admits that piracy is wrong, though Odysseus, as well as the other kings, has waged piratical wars for profit. This speech of "noble Eumaeus," as Homer calls him, is both wise and just in what he says about the war-makers of his time, and what he says makes for peace among men:

"Reckless deeds the blessed gods love not; they honor justice and men's upright deeds. Why, evil-minded cruel men who land on a foreign shore, and Zeus allows them plunder, so that they sail back home with well-filled ships—even on the hearts of such falls a great fear of heavenly wrath."

The principle here stated is not limited in application to the pirates of the Mediterranean of ten centuries before Christ, but is general and applies as well to ultra-modern imperialists who wage war for commercial or financial advantage. Apollo through Homer, and Homer, through Eumaeus, here breathes spirit higher than

that of the Homeric age, a universal spirit that will find the fullest expression in the Beatitudes, eight centuries later.

Historically, this speech is seen to be very important. Odysseus, assenting to Eumaeus, became the ideal king for the coming generation and waged no more wars for plunder; and shortly after Homer the tendency to piracy was checked and the Peace Movement, if we may call it so, was strengthened by the formation of the Delian League, a league of the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, the Grecian Islands of the Aegean Sea, and Athens, named *Delian* in honor of Apollo, whose most sacred temple was then at Delos. Homer might well give Eumaeus the Swineherd higher honor than any other person in his story, for justice and peace among nations are the New Law that he is pleading for—the poet becomes so moved with enthusiasm telling the incident of Eumaeus that he abandons the narrative form and breaks dramatically into direct address as he proceeds: “Then, swineherd Eumaeus, you answered him, and said.”

In later Greece, also, the character of Eumaeus was greatly revered—he was one of those herdsmen wiser than kings, whom the foremost nations of that age were giving ear to as their moral and religious teachers.

Some centuries previous to Homer, Moses had lived as a shepherd with the shepherd Jethro, from whom he learned much of the wisdom of life, before he was ready to lead his oppressed people out of their bondage in Egypt, to found a just state under a New Law higher than that of the Pharoah—he had chosen the cause of the people though he had been reared in the Pharoah's household in luxury. So Zoroaster, the herdsman, was wiser than his Persian kings, and taught them and their people to build a juster State. So, shortly after Homer, Amos, the shepherd-Prophet, was wiser than his king and the moral voice of his people. In those centuries, the truth seems to have been breaking upon these foremost nations of the West that imperial despots had not been justified in their rule, but that Truth speaks through humbler men, good shepherds, good swineherds, good cowherds, as the case might be, all working men who wished to live in peace and establish justice among the people and among the nations. The dream was rising that a Prince of Peace might come—and the Persian Magi found Him among the shepherds.

As every year the tribes of Israel met at Bethel to hold their sacred festival, so the Grecian cities of the Delian League began

to hold a yearly festival at Delos in honor of Apollo—again we see a parallel, which indicates that the Greeks were probably considering their neighbors' institutions before adopting their own. These Delian Festivals gave expression and bent to the strong, sound, faith-inspired and very beautiful life of Apollonian Greece. Not only the men took part, but the women and children also, realizing doubtless that they could have such a life as Homer had pictured only if they maintained their ideals against those of the East. Homer's good women had been sisters in spirit to the Mothers of Israel, and their homes afforded mothers and daughters as well as fathers and sons an opportunity to lead life in much freedom, which the women of the East did not have.

An important historic fact that is very clear in Homer is that his good women, as Penelope, Arete, and Nausicaä, are not of the Eastern, but distinctly of the Western type, though perhaps more restricted than some of the women of Israel had been. In Israel, as early as 1296 B. C., when Greece was still under kings and before Troy had fallen, a Deborah could hold the office of Judge and act as advisor on public policies and as a leader in battle, and a Jael had a literal as well as a figurative hand in bringing the war to a close when she lured the commander of the enemy, Sisera, into her tent and drove the nail into his brain as he slept. The Homeric women do not seem to have done such things, but they had considerable power and influence even in public life. Cassandra was a true prophetess to her people under Apollo, warning them of the punishment that the righteous gods would send upon them for their act, and in later Greece the pythoness of Apollo became an institution, her prophesying a factor in public as well as in private life.

Above all, the character and activities of Athene, as personified Wisdom, would show that Grecian women were not regarded in Eastern fashion, as lacking in mental, moral, or physical power and independence, witness the regard that Zeus pays to Athene and her successful personal combats with Aphrodite and Ares, both of whom she overthrows on the battlefield. She is a wise counsellor in Heaven, as her worshippers, men, women, young men, and maidens, are on earth under her guidance. We may not always like her ways, particularly in the scene where she lures Hector to his death—the poet created her in the image of his age, when Jael also was greatly admired. Such a stratagem as hers was then regarded wise in war, as traps, ambushes, and all manner of deceit are still widely approved. But where Athene could rouse the world to war, and where

she could take part in combat when that was necessary, her main activities were in the home, where she taught women to employ themselves with the loom and the distaff and to care for the clothing and other necessities of the household, and men and boys to conduct themselves wisely. In their homes, Homeric women were not secluded, as were the women of the East, but lived very much as women of Europe now do, in the social life of the family, taking part in the conversation and other activities. Queen Arete walked unattended through the town, respected by all beholders, and she announced the decision on charities in the home when a suppliant made his appeal—that it was her custom to do so we learn from her daughter Nausicaä, when she told Odysseus how to approach her mother and gave him the needed clothing at the washingpool. The conduct of this maid is the final and convincing proof that the Homeric woman was free and worthy of her freedom. Nausicaä is as free as any girl need be, while her ideal, Wisdom Athene, is the extreme of independence, not exceeded by the modern bachelor girl.

In the Delian Festival, every member of the family took part:

"There in thy honor, Apollo, the long-robed Ionians assemble with their children and their gracious dames. So often as they hold thy Festival, they celebrate thee, for thy joy, with boxing, and dancing and song. A man would say that they were strangers to death and to old age evermore, who should come to the Ionians thus gathered; for he would see the goodness of all the people and would rejoice in his soul, beholding the men and the fairly cinctured women, and their swift ships, and their great wealth; and besides, that wonder of which the fame shall not perish, the maidens of Delos, hand-maidens of Apollo, the Far-Darter. First they hymn Apollo, then Leto and Artemis delighting in arrows; and then they sing the praise of heroes of yore and of women, and throw their spell over the tribes of men."

That nation will be strong in which the maidens are taught to sing hymns praising the God of Justice, "the Far-Darter," who shoots arrows of retribution to the farthest mark, and in which they sing also "praises of heroes of yore, and of women." Those at Delos must have included Homer's songs of Odysseus and Penelope, Telemachus and Nausicaä. So these would continue to throw over the tribes of men their "spell," Apollo's inspiration to the high life, conveyed to them through his poet, Homer.

Such a popular festival as this of the Delian League, in praise of the god of the sun and joy in all of the good things that he gives to men through the arts, poetry, song, the dance, athletics, must promote not only fellowship, commerce, and art, but freer social institutions, a stronger tendency toward Democracy in the State, and patriotism, the spirit which will safeguard the nation against attack from without. In spite of rivalries among themselves,

and hegemonies, the united Grecian cities of the Delian League preserved the Peace, and fostered the ideals of Apollo as against those of Baal and Ashtaroth, or Istar, who were now encroaching and threatening the States of the West. The lines were drawn and an Asiatic League was formed in opposition to the Delian League, comprised of cities along the coast of Asia Minor which held Asiatic ideals and served Baal and Istar. How much credit should be given to Homer for the Grecian ideals, and for the Delian League through which these were maintained against Asia?

The formation of these two leagues was a visible sign that war was on in the hearts and minds of the East and the West, and that the people on the frontier, at the lines of demarkation, were fully conscious of holding fundamentally different ideals. The East was an oncoming tide, which was to be stemmed if at all by the tribes of Israel in Palestine or by the Greeks united in the Delian League—by these, battles of greatest importance in the world's history were to be lost or won in the course of the three centuries following Homer.

We know the sequel. Israel, sunk in corruption except for the small "remnant" that her prophets rallied, was to be destroyed as a nation and carried into captivity by Assyria and Babylon; the Ionian units of the Delian League failed to support each other when the Asiatic armies made their attacks, and the Coast Cities and the Islands, one after the other, fell; only Athens was able to maintain her faith and keep her independence. The chances were hundreds to one against her, as they had been against Odysseus, but her hope was, like his, in the god of Justice because her cause was just. Athene was with her also, true Wisdom, "Wisdom in the scorn of consequence." She was strong with the greatest strength in the world, a great idea held with faith like that of a mustard seed: that the god of Justice will give help in what looks like hopeless straits. Their Homer had shown, as the Prophets of Israel had shown, the utter destruction of guilty men and nations and the salvation of those who lived the faith.

The East had begun encroaching before the time of Homer. In 876 B. C. an Assyrian army had penetrated to the Mediterranean Sea, laying Israel under contribution on the way. Israel was geographically near to the Ionian States, and it was easy for news to be carried from Israel to the Greeks of the Ionian Cities, for the land-route from Greece to Egypt passed over Palestine; and news was certain to be carried because Israel was the buffer-state, by

whose fall the Ionian States would themselves be endangered. In this early period, Israel would naturally exercise a very powerful influence upon her younger and weaker neighbor, through her superior institutions, experience, learning, religion and power, and this influence would be the stronger because of their common danger from the East. A few centuries later, when Israel had suffered the penalties of her corruption and Athens had reaped the reward of the Wisdom she had shown and the Justice she instituted, Athens would become a powerful influence upon restored Israel.

Following the Assyrian invasion, Israel fought a war with Damascus, also an Eastern State, and she came out of it with final success under King Ahab, who had strengthened his position by an alliance with Tyre, made by his taking to wife Jezebel, the daughter of the Tyrian king.

But now the East threatened Israel within her own borders through (1) the religion of Jezebel, whose gods were Baal and Ashtaroth, and (2) through her despotic methods of governing the people. King Ahab continued to support the Temple and the Prophets of Jehovah, but he also built a temple where the Queen might worship her Eastern gods and for the services of Baal he permitted hundreds of prophets of Baal to come into the land, who threatened the worship of the righteous God of the Fathers.

How the Eastern Queen took away the rights of the people is shown in the incident of Naboth's vineyard, which we will review briefly for purposes of comparison. Naboth was a humble subject of Ahab's, "humble," however not in the sense of "cringing," as will be seen. He owned a small vineyard near the royal palace, Jezreel, and this Jezebel wanted for her garden of herbs. But Naboth refused to sell his land, and even to trade it for a better vineyard, for it had come to him from his father, and he loved it. To the king, he persistently replied, "The Lord forbid it me that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee," a speech in which we see the former freedom of the people of Israel and the independence which they still felt under their kings. Naboth's refusal was not to end the matter. The spirit of the East spoke in Jezebel, and she said to Ahab, "Dost thou govern the Kingdom of Israel? I will give thee the vineyard of Naboth," and she summoned false witnesses and had Naboth tried and convicted on a charge of blaspheming God and the king. He was then stoned to death. Such events were very common in the ancient East, as today.

The Prophet Elijah came forth against Ahab and Jezebel, with

only the purpose of his righteous God to serve; and he appealed to the people. Against the "false god" of the neighboring nation, he thundered:

"How long will ye halt between two opinions? If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him."

The people finally rose in response to Elijah and killed all of the prophets of Baal; not one remained in the land. The rage of Jezebel against him forced Elijah to flee for his life and live in hiding, but after the death of Naboth he came forth again, and rebuked the King in the sternest and most public manner:

"Hast thou killed, and also taken possession? Thus saith the Lord, in the place where the dogs licked the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick thy blood, even thine . . . because thou hast sold thyself to work evil in the sight of the Lord. Behold, I will bring evil upon thee and will take away thy posterity."

Of Jezebel also he prophesied:

"The dogs shall eat Jezebel by the walls of Jezreel."

The fate that Elijah had prophesied came literally upon Ahab and Jezebel, and in 853 B. C. this baneful King and Queen paid the penalty for the injustice they had done to their humble subject—the loss of their throne, the destruction of their House, and their lives. To use a Grecian expression, *Ἀτῆ, Ate, folly, judicial blindness*, had been their undoing; they were *ἀτηρός, baneful, driven to ruin*.

This is the very expression that Homer used for the folly and injustice of Menelaus and Agamemnon, when he called them *sons of Atreus*. Had the Ionian poet heard about Ahab and Jezebel and the danger that Israel had been in through them from the "false gods" of the East and the despotism of the East? Homer was himself of their generation, or that just following . . . can it be that *Baal*, the Eastern War-god, is in a general and allegorical way Homer's *Ares*, the god of war, whom he shows as a perfectly despicable character, intriguing in secret with Aphrodite (the Eastern Ashtaroth or Istar), utterly without principle in his fighting, an abject coward who goes down in defeat when he is faced in combat by Wisdom, or even by the youngest of the Grecian warriors who has faith in his righteous cause? No temple was reared to Ares on Grecian soil; no wise hero or heroine in Homer's epics pays him reverence; and Menelaus, the king, who is said to be "dear to Ares," is a "son of Atreus" and the worst man whom the poet shows on the Grecian side. It is not possible that Homer, who so loved Eumæus and Peace, in an age when Grecian kings and their sea-rovers were still profiting by piracy, should also love Ares and give him public honor. He shows Ares thoroughly beaten at

the end of the Trojan war. . . . Is Homer not saying to his people in an allegorical way that the righteous gods of their fathers will help them in their wars against Ares if their cause is just? Is he not facing them with the question whether the Far-Darter, Apollo, shall be their god, or this false War God? Is he not saying, in effect, what Elijah had said to Israel:

"How long will ye halt between two opinions? If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him."

only paraphrasing "the Lord" with "the righteous gods," and "Baal" with "Ares and Aphrodite"?

Homer shows Ares as so contemptible that any person who worshipped him would deserve defeat, and any person who was "dear to Ares," as Menelaus was, must be the antipodes of Eumaeus, not blessed as a Peacemaker, but a man of violence and on the way to ruin. Was it not the final count against Menelaus as a man and a king that he was "dear to Ares," and not dear to Zeus, Athene and Apollo? . . . as if an Israelite had said of Ahab that he was "dear to Baal," but not dear to Jehovah?

Following this parallel in the cases of Ahab and Menelaus, we find on studying Menelaus that he is a much worse man than Ahab in various respects. Abroad, he has been a pirate who gained his wealth by despoiling cities with no high cause, while Ahab has fought on the defensive for his country; at home he conducts himself like a tyrant, or despot, where Ahab seems to have been kindly and indulgent to a fault. The incident where Telemachus visits Menelaus and Helen shows enough to tell the whole sad story of this baneful King's Queen, his servants, and his people. In a previous chapter we have spoken of the tragic situation of Helen—she might well wish that she had died, for the happiest occasion offers her no joy or honor. Today, if ever, Menelaus should be in a happy humor, for the occasion is the marriage of their daughter and the wedding feast is being held, but he is in a savage mood and rebuffs her cruelly when she tries to please him. To his servant, also, he shows a harsh humor, and his speeches reveal his despotic treatment of his people.

An attendant enters to announce that strangers are arriving and to ask whether they shall be given entertainment for the night or shall be *sent on for someone else to entertain*. Night is approaching, and if they are sent on into the mountains, it is most likely that they will be attacked by wolves, so this suggestion is heartless, and wicked. To a Greek with right feeling, who knew the danger, it must seem shocking, and impious, for Zeus commanded kindness to

strangers and wayfarers and was their special guardian—if these should die in the mountains Zeus would punish those who had refused them entertainment. In the scene where Eumaeus welcomes and entertains the beggar (who is Odysseus in disguise), Homer shows by contrast how even beggars ought to be received and cared for—Eumaeus entertains the beggar in the most generous way and invites him to remain as long as he wishes to do so. This servant of Menelaus was quite the opposite of “noble Eumaeus” in every way, and he might well have been named *Try-ill*, but bears a name more fitting than this, which fits his character exactly and is universally hated throughout the East; *Eteoneus*, derived from *ἔτης, citizen*, *ὠνέομαι, I buy, I farm public taxes, I bribe*. The inference is clear. Addressing Citizen Tax-Farmer, Briber, by this name, Menelaus shows that he knows his character thoroughly and employs him nevertheless. We must conclude that he employs Eteoneus to farm his taxes and to bribe for him. It is clear, also, that this bad servant is not only a hand for the king, to serve him in evil-doing, but that he is an active prompter to bad acts when it seems that they will be to the least advantage. He has grown so bold as openly and in public to make this proposal to turn strangers from the door when night is coming on.

A wise king would now point out the wrong in this suggestion, and Menelaus does this, though rather from the point of view of his own interest than from a high principle. He says:

“Only through largely taking hospitality at strangers’ hands we two are here, and we must look to Zeus henceforth to give us rest from trouble. No! take the harness from the strangers’ horses and bring the men within to share the feast.”

The wisdom and moderation of this part of his speech is not maintained in the rest of it, however, for “deeply moved,” he says:

“You were no fool, Boethoos’ son, Eteoneus, before this time, but now you are talking folly like a child.”

This statement is perfectly true, but in manner it is violent, and it is indiscreet. Such treatment as this will not open Eteoneus’ eyes to a higher view of life, as the talk in the Swineherd’s cottage would have done, and it will not fan the spark of his loyalty to his king. We may take it for granted that when the day of Menelaus’ trial comes this Tax-Farmer and Briber will not be standing devotedly at Menelaus’ side, as Eumaeus will stand with Odysseus, but that he will be hiding among those who seek their own safety, or will have gone over to the king’s enemies if that should seem to his interest. No one knows better than he the evil side of the king, there can be no ties of affection to bind him to this kind of a master, and neither

of them has high principles to guide them in life. In fact, if Eteoneus should adopt high principles, he could not in conscience serve Menelaus.

The approaching stranger happened to be Telemachus, and when Menelaus learned that this was Odysseus's son he unrestrained in his praise of Odysseus. Here, again, his speech was an offense, for Apollo commanded *restraint in all things*. Menelaus shows no fine discrimination and appreciation of the excellencies of his friend Odysseus, such as Homer shows in drawing his character, and we suspect that there really was not much friendship between them, for the gods that they served were too different—serving the same God is a stronger bond of attachment than being born of one blood. Speaking of Odysseus, Menelaus exclaims:

"I used to say that I should greet his coming more than that of all the other Argives,"

thereby doing something of injustice to his other friends, one must believe. He proceeds to tell, too warmly, that he would delight to bestow upon his favorite very rich possessions, some of which he ought not to consider his own to give away:

"I would have assigned to him a city, would here have built his house, and I would have brought him out of Ithaca—him and his goods, his child and all his people—*clearing its dwellers from some single city that lies within my neighborhood and owns me for its lord.*"

King Ahab had weakly permitted his wife to *clear one man from his land* after that man had refused repeatedly to take what looked to them like a just and generous offer, and Jezebel urged her personal need of that particular piece of land, but here Menelaus proposes to *clear out the people of a whole city*, just to show his regard for a favorite who has not even requested this favor, apparently without compensation to the people dispossessed and without proposing to consult their feeling in the matter. Would they not probably object to being *cleared out*, and reply to the king, as Naboth had replied to Ahab:

"The Lord forbid it us that we should give up the inheritance of our fathers unto thee."

On his part, Odysseus would certainly think twice before he accepted such an offer as Menelaus here proposes, giving up his little independent kingdom for rich dependence on such a king. If he did accept, he soon would rue the day, for out of hand a king's favor can be withdrawn as summarily as it has been bestowed, and to please a new favorite, the former favorite is likely to be "*cleared out*" with as little consideration as his predecessors were. No Eastern despot could be more harsh and autocratic than Menelaus as he

is shown in this incident. The poet reveals the instant, and the future immanent in it. Ahab's throne, his life, and the succession of his House were the retribution he paid for taking the land of Naboth: will this baneful and fated Menelaus pay less of a penalty if he disposes his people?

False gods and unwise and unjust kings are shown in Homer's poems, as in the Sacred Books of Israel for the period in which Elijah and Homer lived, we must here admit. If the exact date and contemporary events of Homer could be discovered, they might throw a light upon his myths which would show us other moral and religious values. Perhaps a rumor of a new invasion from the East had reached him; perhaps he saw that some of the Grecian women were weeping for Adonis, the mortal lover of Aphrodite, while they turned from the altars of Athene and Apollo, as women of Israel wept for Tammuz, dishonoring the righteous God of their Fathers. It seems clear that the poet's purpose was to strengthen his peoples' faith in Wisdom and Justice, and to weaken the hold of all that is ignoble, to body forth the ideals of the West as their best protection against those of the corrupted East. If his purpose was high and serious, he succeeded notably, for the Greeks themselves credited him with having named their gods and given them their attributes, and Solon molded their public policy in accordance with the Wisdom and Justice which Homer had taught them to trust.

The love of Wisdom and Justice, which Homer had strengthened, bore noble fruits in the course of the generation following him, besides those that have been noted. In 750 B. C. occurred the first captivity of Israel; in 753 B. C. the city of Athens deposed its kings. This decade, then, marks a turning point in the decline of Israel and in the rise of the Athenian Democracy.

Where Homer presents a parallel to Elijah in his choice of a theme and his attitude toward the Eastern gods and despots, so later Apollonian Greeks of the Delian League present parallels to the later Prophets. In 722 Israel was taken captive the second time and her people were enslaved; in 588 B. C., Jerusalem was taken, the city utterly destroyed and the people carried to slavery in Babylon. Attacks on the States of the Delian League now followed, with unvarying success by the East, until Athens turned the tide at Marathon in 490 B. C., where she is rightly credited with having saved the Western world. Throughout this period Homer's spirit had been marching on to victory after victory in the purification of the State and in the development of the Athenian Constitution, with-

out which the miracle of Athenian victory over Persia would have been impossible—that Constitution which is one of the noblest works of the human race, wise and just beyond that of any other democracy, and the foundation on which could be built the works of art and intellect that characterized the Golden Age. Throughout the period between Homer and Pericles the poems of Homer were the Sacred Books of the Athenians, sung at religious festivals, presented on public occasions, put into dramatic form for the religious stage, and made the subject of careful study by the young.

The internal transformation of the Grecian States into democracies, toward which we found strong tendencies in Homer's poems, made steady progress. While Israel was going down, in 753 B. C., as we have said, the question of royal authority was settled in Athens by a decree of the Council that thereafter kings should rule for a period of only ten years, and shortly after that they were shorn of their military power, the Council alleging that they were not capable of command and appointing a military leader to act under the Council . . . an Agamemnon would not again be able to give rash and dangerous orders to the army before he had discussed them with the Council, and his baneful and ruinous rule would last for ten years at the longest, during which the Council would continue to limit him at every turn. A further important change for the better was made in the Athenian Constitution when an Archon was chosen by the Council to take special charge of the interests of widows and orphans—to us who have Homer in mind, these will be seen as developments felt to be needed at that time, but a result also of the need of such as Penelope and Telemachus, as Homer had shown them. The discussion of a purely ideal case prepares the mind and heart to react rightly when an actual case occurs.

This limitation of royal prerogatives, ending in the abolition of the kingly office, and this first reconstruction of the Athenian Constitution in the Eighth Century before Christ, and immediately following, Homer were contemporary with great events and great prophets in Israel. The times were anxious, and the evils that should be corrected were denounced by great and earnest men. Fortunately, Wisdom was prevailing in Athens and with little or no violence changes were being made for the better as needed to approximate justice; but in Israel, for the most part, high and low had fallen into evil ways and the call of the Prophets to purification was not heeded. Injustice continued to prevail. This was the case when the Prophet Amos began his mission at Bethel, in 760 B. C.,

The Israelitish League of Tribes was holding its Festival in honor of Jehovah, with revelling and carousal as had come to be their bad custom of late years, this year with extreme abandon, for it was an occasion of peace with victory and Damascus had been defeated again. Pride and pomp and luxury were in full display, the prosperous were elated with a happy feeling that God was on their side, but they had not heeded the voice of Justice and the poor were poor as never before. It was now that Amos, the shepherd, thundered forth the wrath of Jehovah in a prophecy that took the form of a dirge. In the name of the Lord, he threatened the revellers at Bethel that unless they repented they would be delivered to defeat and slavery for the sins of the rich against the poor . . . the Assyrian army had recently penetrated to Lebanon. . . .

"Thus saith the Lord, for three transgressions of Judah, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof, because they have despised the law of the Lord, and have not kept his commandments, and their lies caused them to err after that which their fathers have walked:

"I will send a fire upon Judah, and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem.

"This saith the Lord; for three transgressions of Israel and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they have sold the righteous for silver and the poor for a pair of shoes."

The charges that Amos makes are definite, that the rich have profited in foodstuffs and manipulated the money market, the age-old methods of enriching the rich and "making the poor of the land to fail":

"Hear this, O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail,

"Saying, when will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may sell wheat, *making the ephah small and the shekel great*, and falsifying the balances of deceit?"

The only hope that the Prophet holds out to the nation is in its purification:

"Let Judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream . . .

"Hate the evil and love the good, and establish justice in the gate." . . .

This would be wisdom, and would still save the nation. In his denunciation Amos names the king by name:

"The high places of Israel shall be desolate, and the sanctuaries of Israel shall be laid waste; and I will rise against Jeroboam with the sword."

Under this denunciation the king did not try to silence the Prophet with blows, and he did not imprison him, as has been commonly done with unwelcome prophets, and as Jeremiah was beaten and imprisoned for foretelling his country's defeat; but Amaziah, a sycophantic priest who was an adherent of the king's, tried to silence Amos:

"Then Amaziah, the priest of Bethel, went to Jeroboam, King of Israel,

saying, Amos hath conspired against thee in the midst of the house of Israel: the land is not able to bear all his words.

"For thus Amos saith, Jeroboam shall die by the sword and Israel shall surely be led away captive out of the land."

Speaking to Amos, Amaziah advised him sarcastically to go elsewhere with his prophesying:

"Also Amaziah said to Amos, O thou seer, go, flee thou away into the land of Judah, and there eat bread and prophesy there. But prophesy not any more at Bethel, for it is the King's chapel and it is the King's court"

But Amos did not yield to the sycophantic priest, and repeated his prophecy with added emphasis:

"Then answered Amos and said to Amaziah, I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was an herdsman and a gatherer of sycamore fruit. "But the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and the Lord said unto me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel.

"Now, therefore, hear thou the word of the Lord: Thou sayest, prophesy not against Israel and drop not thy word against the house of Isaac.

"Therefore, thus saith the Lord: Thy wife shall be an harlot, and thy sons and daughters shall fall by the sword; and thy land shall be divided by line; and thou shalt die in a polluted land: and Israel shall surely go into captivity forth of this land."

Of the Prophets, Amos is in some respects of the greatest value to our study of Homer's moral and religious meaning, and his political tendencies, both those which we have seen in his epics and those which resulted later from the worship of Wisdom and Justice that he inspired. We note that Amos was a poor man and a herdsman, as Eumaneus was in the *Odyssey*, and that both had lived nearer to God as they tended their flocks than the men in the courts and the cities lived—we surmise that Thersites was not only a common man, but a herdsman of Argos, a man of the Mountain. In Athens, the protest from *The Mountain* was to continue, gathering strength, until it prevailed over *The Plain* in the Code of Solon, which we shall consider later.

Contemporary with Amos, Hosea (785 B. C.-725 B. C.) pled with Israel to stop polluting herself by the practice of Usury; and, following Amos, Micah (745 B. C.-525 B. C.) and Isaiah (750 B. C.-695 B. C.) denounced the corruption by mammon of kings, judges, priests and prophets. Both of these prophets foretold defeat of their country and both looked beyond defeat to a final purification and to the coming of peace:

"Thy princes are rebellious and companions of thieves: everyone loveth gifts and followeth after rewards; they judge not the cause of the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them.

"The heads thereof judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money. . . .

"Therefore, shall Zion for your sake be plowed as a field and Jerusalem shall become heaps. . . .

"And I will turn my hand upon thee and purely purge away thy dross. . . .

"And I will restore thy judges as at the first and thy counsellors as at

the beginning: afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness, the faithful city."

These prophets looked also to the coming of a Prince of Peace:

"And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The problems that were faced by Israel and by the Greeks of this period were clearly parallel, and with Wisdom and Justice they might have been solved by both of those foremost nations of ancient history. But there the parallel stops. Except for a small "remnant" the corrupted people of Israel did not rise in response to their prophets. Hosea's reproaches that they had sold themselves to usury went unheeded; the warnings of Amos met no response; no changes for the better were made; and the nation met the defeat that the prophets had foretold. In 750 Judah was captured and in 722 she was destroyed as a nation; Jerusalem was destroyed in 588, her people carried away as slaves to Babylon. In Athens, meanwhile, kings were deposed, and the first less effective period of reconstruction was followed by a very effective reconstruction under Solon, who was elected Archon and Legislator for Athens in 594, six years before the fall of Jerusalem.

Before Solon, Athens was still far from a democracy. Though she had deposed her kings and appointed Archons, she was an Oligarchy, controlled by nobles and rich men to their class advantage. Those who spoke against abuses were being imprisoned or put to death, courts favored the rich, land was monopolized, the people were very poor and many of them had been sold into slavery as debtors, rates of interest were exorbitant, and money was controlled by a small class of private citizens who made high profits at the expense of the community, as bankers do in modern times. Athens was on the brink of civil war, the men of The Mountain rising against those of The Plain, who were mainly business men.

Solon was chosen Archon and Legislator because he had come to be known as The Just, and he justified the confidence of those who turned to him, as is evident in his code:

¹ He repealed the laws by which men had been imprisoned for political reasons and set free political prisoners.

² Courts had been favoring the rich—he reformed them in such a way as to give judges a strong personal reason for judging justly. Aristotle considered this reform of the Courts the measure by which Athens became a democracy.

³ Land had become a monopoly in Attica, and much of it was heavily mortgaged at an extortionate interest. Solon set a limit to the amount of land that any one person might hold and cancelled the "mortgages" where extortionate interest had been collected from the people. He called this "the lightening of burdens," where others called it "repudiation," for he viewed the situation

from the angle of the peoples' rights and the wrong that had been done them. Grote says that he doubtless adopted this measure with the thought that it was right for the class which had profited greatly and unjustly as a class to suffer something of loss in the readjustment. In this cancelling of mortgages, Solon sacrificed his own fortune along with those of the rest of the mortgage-holding class. His action in this matter is the more creditable to him because he rose above the prejudice of his own class—he traced his own ancestry to the Kings.

⁴ Perhaps the most important thing that Solon did was to nationalize money; that is, to take it from the small class of men who were profiting privately by coining, exchanging and controlling it in amount as bankers are profiting in modern times by these operations. Solon put all of these operations in charge of the national treasury and turned all profits on them into the national treasury, to be used for the nation's needs. This broke the "money power" of that day and prevented the formation of a class of financiers who could dominate Athens as modern financiers dominate the modern world, and it also filled the Athenian treasury so that Athens was able to spend richly for public purposes, paying new issues out for public works—there was no problem of unemployment in Athens with such a money system. Also, without laying taxes on her people, she could build the ships to defend Greece and the West against the attack of the Persian Empire which was about to be made. If Persia had made her attack before Solon, she would have found Athens an easy prey, her discontented and poverty-stricken people rising against the rich who oppressed them, the nation as a whole poor and weak. On the foundation laid by Solon in Justice, Athens became very strong, and the spirit of her people rose to the new life that was opened to them. Art and thought were stimulated as at no other period of history. The rich did not lose opportunity under the laws of Solon, and all gained opportunity to distinguish themselves in other ways than money-juggling, in philosophy, in poetry, sculpture, architecture, drama, and statesmanship—Athenian statesmen considered the people rather than some moneyed group of citizens.

With such conditions as this code gave, it is not surprising that little Athens became the wonder of the ancient world and that her citizens produced works that have never been surpassed. If Israel had heeded her prophets and had empowered a Solon to correct the wrongs that the prophets had pointed out, breaking the money power which had corrupted her kings, her priests, her prophets and her profiteers, as Hosea, Amos, Micah and Isaiah testify that they were corrupted . . . it is useless to speculate on what she might have become in history. As it was, she became a perfect example of the ruin of nations so unwise as to permit injustice to continue, a warning which they must heed, or disregard at their peril. The parallels that we have observed leave little doubt that her peril had much to do, from Homer to Solon, with the thought, institutions and policy of the Greeks.

If a Solon had guided Athens always in Wisdom and Justice, she might not have declined. Folly led to her defeat when she had undertaken leadership among the States of Greece, used their funds for her own adornment, permitted slave-driving and heavy profiteering in wars, and in various other bad ways lost the spirit that would have saved her, that had first made her great. Her rich men came to care more for their riches than they did for their coun-

try and urged her into war after war to add to their profits, though always posing as patriots; and the admirals of her fleet sold out her interests for their own. Finally, when Rome came, on her career of conquest, the richest of the Athenians welcomed the Empire and fought for her because the Romans had promised support in suppressing slave-insurrections and in conducting business abroad. Ferrere says:

"Everywhere, even in the most distant nations, powerful minorities formed, that worked for Rome against old separating forces, against old traditions and local patriotisms alike. The wealthy classes were in a way wholly favorable to Rome."

So Athens passed from the spirit of Homer to that of degenerate Rome of the Caesars and Vergil. The imperial gods of devotion were now Ares, who was Roman Mars, and Aphrodite, Roman Venus. In turn, Athens became soon another perfect example of the nation so unwise as to permit injustice—a warning which others may heed, which they disregarded at their peril. Like uncorrupted Israel of Moses and the Prophets, the uncorrupted Athens of Homer's Wisdom and Justice is an inspiration and hope to the world: like Israel in her decay, she became a shaking of the head to the nations.



ANIMISM, AGLIPAY'S CULT, AND CHRISTIANITY'S ECLIPSE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

BY GEORGE BALLARD BOWERS.

THE religious conditions in the Philippines are unique. Missionaries claim the average Filipino is a Christian in every sense of the word. Filipino politicians have seized upon this assertion to prove that their people have Christian ideals and are entitled to be called Christians. Against the assertions of the missionaries and the politicians I shall set facts, leaving readers to draw their own conclusions.

Magellan discovered the Philippine Islands in 1521, a date marking the dawn of Christian influence in the Orient. In 1565 the first Spanish settlement was founded and, in 1571, Mohammeden Manila became a Christian capital.

The arrival of the Spanish missionaries was timely. The Mohammeden faith was already permanently intrenched in Mindanao and a Moslem ruler reigned in Manila. But it is doubtful if the Crescent could have survived even if the Cross had not been raised. The Japanese had already planted thriving colonies on Luzon to be destroyed when their rulers plotted against the Christian conquerors.

In those parts of the islands conquered by Spanish arms, the Moslem faith was supplanted by the Roman Catholic but Animism, the primitive Malayan religion, was more difficult to uproot; its priests, witch-doctors, continued in every community notwithstanding as they do to this day.

A moral code is necessary to modern culture; no people ever got any where without one and, upon its tenets, depended the grade of that civilization. The Moslem missionaries gave the Filipinos no moral code. Animism had none, a code was unnecessary; the spirits determine every act of the individual believer.

When the Spanish missionaries introduced their code, the

Filipinos made their first step forward. Catholicism became the state religion of the Philippines. When critics complain of its influence in the affairs of the Spanish government in the Philippines, let them bear this fact in mind.

During the Spanish regime, progress did not make such great strides as under the American tutelage. There was a very simple reason—slender treasury as now under the autonomous government. Neither the island of Mindanao nor the mountains of Luzon were conquered by Spain. For the same reason that the Spanish government was unable to cover the Philippines, the missionaries could not extend their influence. I have heard Americans visiting the Philippines and Protestant missionaries harangue of the wealth of the old missions, pointing out as evidence, the great piles of masonry crumbling in the weather. Such thoughtless ones forget that the four crumbling walls may have been the work of fifty years of the two or three generations of priests sleeping within.

When Dewey thundered at the gates of Manila in 1898, the Roman Catholic priests were in their parishes. Revolutionary leaders imported from Singapore were given American rifles to harass and drive into Manila the few outlying garrisons. Finding few Spanish soldiers, the insurgents set upon the defenceless parish priests, subjecting them to imprisonment and atrocities too harrowing to relate. The European priests had been the moral police of the islands. They had kept in check Animism and its witch-doctors. Moral regression followed the disappearance of the opponents of the UN-MORAL. Encouraged by bloodpacts of savagery and ceremonies brought back by the forces of revolt and the freedom of the witch-doctors, the people began to return to Animism. A few Malay priests had been left in the parishes but their voices were too weak to be heard above the tumult of revolt.

Civilization in the tropics is a delicate institution, requiring constant care and vigilance; the impermanency of things tropical makes it so. The material is as impermanent as the immaterial. Both must be guarded to avoid decay. One year a Philippine field may be green with corn while in the next it is a jungle of plumed cogon. Rivers change their courses with the season; in a single night the rivulet may become a raging torrent a mile wide. A day may change the green hill into a black seething crater-caldron. In a score of years a cove is turned into a harbor for a navy and within the lifetime of a man, a river may become a vast lake and a bay, and an inland sea. A night of rain may obliterate miles of roads

to turn the traveler to the jungle paths winding through creeks and over divides. Sometimes a storm of a single night razes ten thousand homes and lays low miles of cocoanut trees planted fifty years before.

Returning again to the historical thread—while the Spanish army was beleaguered in 1898 by the American, the Archbishop of the Philippines sent Gregorio Aglipay, a Filipino priest, to Northern Luzon to inquire into the welfare of the Spanish nuns and priests captured by the Filipino insurgents who, instead of helping the Americans capture Manila, had scattered over the archipelago to implant their authority so as to be better able to defy America once the Spanish had capitulated.

Aglipay forgot his mission when once within the insurgent lines. He cast his lot with the rebels already planning to turn against America. His short vision lead him to believe that the Roman Catholic Church organization was about to be disrupted because of its connection with the Spanish government at war with America. On this same ground the insurgents excused their atrocities against the priests and nuns. Technically the Church dignitaries were representatives of the Spanish government. The insincerity of the excuse will be shown later.

The Filipinos claimed that all their ills had been caused by the union of the church and state. Although a priest of the state church of Spain, Aglipay accepted a commission of general-chaplain of the insurgent forces. A few weeks later, he assembled a few Filipino priests within the rebel influence to nominate himself a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church, and after two months archbishop of the Philippines. The Roman Catholic Church was proclaimed the state religion of the Filipino Republic organized while the American army kept the Spaniards shut up in Manila. With a child-like confidence, Archbishop Aglipay forwarded his nomination to Rome for confirmation.

During the heat of the Spanish-American War, all Americans were ready to believe the Filipino complaints against the Spaniards. Soldiers of all nations speak a common language. On August 13, 1898, the Spanish military capitulated and on the day following, the Spanish soldiers were showing their volunteer enemies of the day before, the sights of Manila. Their mutual respect for each other was too great to permit even an ordinary street fight. Of course it was embarrassing for a volunteer captain from the mountains of Tennessee to have an old Spanish colonel to embrace him

like an old sweetheart but soon both nationalities understood each other. It was not long until the Americans had learned that the Spanish military and the priests had accomplished wonders with the slender resources at their disposal.

When the Filipino rebel leaders saw that the Spanish and American military were friends, they brought forward the claim that the Spanish priests had been their worst oppressors. Many Americans were ready to accept this claim, all but a few of the priests were prisoners of the Filipinos and the Roman Catholic Church somewhat unpopular because its authorities had been loyal to the Spanish government as the Episcopal Church in England is loyal to the English Crown.

It has taken years to convince Americans in America that the Roman Catholic Church was the greatest benefactor the Filipinos have ever known and that the charge that the church retarded education and progress is nothing more than the age-old custom of shifting responsibility to some other. No doubt that the Filipinos have since discovered that they themselves are to blame for their short-comings.

When the Filipinos openly revolted against the United States in February of 1899, Aglipay was already disillusioned. His betrayal of the Archbishop of the Philippines and his failure to secure the release of the nuns held in captivity, had lost him any sympathy he might have had from Americans.

With the disruption of the revolt against America, the Filipino State Church disintegrated. All but a few of its adherents crept back into their old fold.

Nothing more happened until 1902. The Spanish priests had been returned to Spain. Representatives of the American Bible Society and a few Protestant missionaries began to entice the people away from the only force that had stood between them and their old pagan beliefs. Their progress was slow and unsatisfactory. It was decided that the best way to strike the Roman Catholic Church would be to take up the renegade Aglipay with the idea that he would later deliver en masse his former adherents to the Protestant church. With Protestant advice and assistance, Aglipay was brought into prominence. He proclaimed himself pope of the Independent Filipino Church, popularly known as the Aglipayan cult. Aglipay denied to me that he was a pope but, nevertheless his photograph shows him garbed in a costume similar to that worn by the Catholic. He made a whirlwind campaign through the archipelago, appoint-

ing priests in every village. For a time it appeared that the Catholic Church was doomed to disappear both physically and spiritually.

As the Aglipayan church grew, plots against the government became more common but it was not until 1908 that the numerous local uprising were definitely traced to the new church. The names of the American advisors had served to disarm suspicion. Aglipay's secretary lead the famous Mandac revolt of 1908. For political reasons Aglipay himself was never tried but a number of his priests were given stiff sentences. Aglipay was compelled to move to Manila where he could be watched. He promised never again to incite an uprising against the government. Although he has kept his promise, his subordinates seldom pass-by an opportunity to incite sedition and fan race hatred.

The Aglipayan Church has many of the outward appearances of the Roman Catholic but its official rituals and teachings are little known to the millions who fill its churches for no other reason than its supposed loyalty to Filipino culture and beliefs as opposed to those brought by the white man.

When I last visited Aglipay in his Manila home, I found a pathetic old man whose face bore a wistful look. I went to get some first hand information of his aims and ideas as the head of the church. The old man had neither aims nor ideas but he presented me several rare books whose existence I found to be little known.

The first rare volume was *The Filipino Bible, the First Stone for a Scientific Genesis According to Corrections Made by Jesus Christ*. My copy has the official seal of Aglipay's office. This pathetic volume was adopted in 1908 as the official bible of the new church. It contains one-hundred-seventy-six pages with illustrations of church dignitaries running over the four pages of the covers.

The first one-hundred-twenty-four pages are a criticism of Christianity and its comparison with the folk-lore of the Filipinos. There is an attempt to prove to the reader that the Filipinos had a religion equal to Christianity before the arrival of the Spanish Fathers.

Several pages are devoted to a comparison of the Bible of Christianity with that made by the author, a Filipino named Reyes. A final thirty pages is devoted to a "Genesis" for the Filipino Church, copied from Herschel, Kant, Laplace, and Flammarion. It contains a picture of the canals of Mars, Halley's comet, the moon, and other illustrations to be found in any text-book of astronomy. The book

makes no mention of morals. I mentioned this phase to Aglipay. He explained that the bible was not yet complete but that he hoped to furnish me a complete copy incorporating my observations before he was called to the Great Beyond.

The second volume was *The Cathecism of the Independent Filipino Church*. My copy has a number of corrections made by the donor. The book contains one-hundred-fourteen pages. Many of the questions are quite unusual:

"Is God all-powerful? Perhaps, but we are not sure."

"Where did we get the pretended Trinity? From Plato."

"What was the famous theory of Darwin? Haeckel?"

"How will the earth end? The moon? The planets?"

Every question and answer is designed to weaken the faith of the Christian reader.

The third volume of interest is the ritual used by the priests. The second part is a mass service resembling that of the Catholic Church.

To illustrate how the organization of the Aglipayan cult was organized, I shall draw upon my own experience. In 1903, I was stationed in the island of Negros, Aglipay came there. In the town where I first met him, his party was given a dance. Aglipay did not dance but other priests of his party did. The dance lasted until morning. It was a funny scene, the priests dancing in their long black cassocks.

Aglipay appointed priests from every station in life to be assigned to the vacant parishes after three months training. Two appointed had been soldiers of my command. One a private was such a worthless individual that I refused to re-enlist him. I always refused him a recommendation, fearing he might use it to re-enter the service in another province. One day he informed me that Aglipay had promised him an appointment if he could bring a recommendation from me. After I had seen Aglipay's contingent at the dance, I did not have the heart to refuse my simple soldier. He was duly appointed and assigned near my station where I had a detachment of his former comrades. It is needless to add that I regretted my recommendation. He lead my soldiers into so much mischief that I was compelled to remove them to a station farther in the interior. The priest never lost his respect for me, always saluting me in a military manner. The second priest had been a corporal, a married man, made parish priest of the village in which lived the parents of his wife.

Of the many priests of the new church only a few possessed more than three months training, the exceptions would be those who had once been priests of the Roman Catholic church.

As explained in a previous paragraph, in my interview with Aglipay, I expressed doubt of the usefulness of his church in that it did not touch the morai life of the people. I mentioned the conduct of his priests. He explained to me his plans for betterment but I could not put out of my mind the fact that the prime object of his organization had been revolt.

After having read Aglipay's literature, I was at a loss to understand how he expected to teach the Christian code of morals and at the same time explain it away. It can not be done. The Filipinos are returning to Animism. The intelligence of the average Filipino is not such that he can view calmly the conflict of religions, the Catholic and the Protestant, each headed by aliens. What is the result of the conflict?

At the time of the American occupation of the Philippines, there was no island without its pope of Animism. At no time since the discovery of the archipelago by the Spanish was the island of Negros without a pope. America inherited Pope Isio who had an army of six thousand men with which he destroyed the Republic of Negros. He was finally subdued in 1908.

In Luzon there was Pope Felipe Salvador and the Colorum. In Leyte Pope Amblan ruled the peasants; in Samar, Pope Pablo; in Bohol, Pope Isco; and so on through the entire archipelago. Although the popes have been subdued or exterminated regression continues.

In 1915 the entire population of the town of Loang, Samar, stood in the streets ringing bells and beating tin pans to scare the dragon devouring the moon.

In a nearby village the people rioted because the new-comers had brought their grandfathers with them to their new home. The grandparents were the crocodiles infesting the river. The crocodiles had persisted in eating the old residents rather than the new. When I spoke to the new arrivals about the conduct of their relatives they disclaimed responsibility. I ordered a few sticks of dynamite thrown into the river. This brought relief.

In 1917 the din of bells and pans kept me awake in Sorsogon where I had gone to ascertain the causes of the severe epidemic of cholera. I was informed that the people were scaring away the evil spirits. In an adjacent town I found that the mayor had

prepared for the epidemic by compelling each householder to provide his home with a bamboo cannon for noise making.

In Laguna province I found the laborers of a large plantation planting rice with music and animistic rites. In the town of Tayabas every rice-farmer has an altar upon which he places rice as an offering to the gods.

Filipinos of the type now in control in the islands have always given as their reason for opposing the Catholic Church that the priests encouraged superstition. That such a charge was insincere, I shall cite as evidence only one of the many examples that came to my attention.

On June 8, 1910, a butcher of Santa Cruz, Laguna Province, cut a malauen tree for wood. The malauen generally has a black heart of irregular form. The heart of this particular tree resembled a triangle with one angle broken with a round figure, forming lines similar to the outlines of a picture of the Virgin. The circle represented the head and the triangle the vestments. While the butcher worked he was entertained by a crowd of loafers. One of the loafers remarked that the black heart of the tree resembled the Virgin Mary. It happened that the Aglipayan priest was passing. When his attention was called to the figure, he fell upon his knees in adoration. For a time the loafers thought the priest was suffering from the effects of too much wine. After some minutes of silent prayer he explained to the crowd that the figure was a miracle. He begged that he be given a block to be enshrined in the local church. During the excitement, the crowd forgot the remaining part of the log which the butcher carefully preserved and actually sold a block to a Chinaman for thirty dollars. The priest used his wits and a paint brush, the Chinaman's miracle was proven worthless.

The priest explained to his small congregation that he had found the miracle through a dream or vision. He assured his people that the picture would become more distinct each day and finally turn into a living image to become a Joan of Arc to lead the Filipino to independence.

A local artist joined church, his brush improved the work of the priest.

The local politicians of the anti-law and order clan joined in with the imposter to enshrine the block, mounted in a case costing more than three hundred dollars.

The fame of the shrine of the Santa Maria Malauen became

so great that the steamboat operating lake boats out of Manila was compelled to increase the number to five. Pilgrims to the shrine in Santa Cruz so increased the revenues of the church that the priest was able to build a large church and residence. A village sprang up around the church. More than one hundred small shops opened to sell lithographs of the miracle and food to the pilgrims.

A large pot of cocoanut oil was kept near the shrine to be sold to cure ills of all comers. Many stories of miraculous cures were circulated to be believed by the simple folk.

When the shrine was a year old, the Aglipayans prepared an annual celebration. During the week of the anniversary more than one-hundred-thousand pilgrims came to Santa Cruz to worship at the shrine.

On the evening of the anniversary of the discovery of the miracle, it was escorted through the streets with eight bands of music and ten thousand marchers. Thirty thousand spectators were in the street. As I was responsible for the order of the province of La Laguna, I became alarmed. The priest had announced that the miracle was to turn into a Joan of Arc on the eve of the anniversary, I decided that the imposters had gone far enough. I warned the priest and the local leaders as well.

Later I discovered that the local municipal council had voted the miracle the patron saint! The Patron Saint's Day is a legal holiday.

This is only one of many similar instances that came to my attention.

A number of years ago I had the opportunity to study the Ilongots for a period of six months. This small tribe inhabits the mountains east of the Cagayan river of Northern Luzon. They have been famous for the fact that they ate the heart of their fallen enemy instead of taking his head as the Igorots. Later upon my recommendation an effort was made to assemble the tribe so that its members might attend school and establish permanent homes. For a number of years I thought that I had been one of the first to make a detailed report of the Ilongot tribe. I chanced upon an old copy of a magazine devoted to missions to find that a Spanish monk had studied the tribe fifty years before. I said nothing to any one. I was chagrined.

In 1917 I was sent to inspect the work of the men in charge of the settlement projects of the tribe. Wishing to encourage the American in charge of the first settlement of my tour, I was very compli-

mentary of his work. I told him he was a great pioneer, but he laughed. I understood after he had lead me to a nearby hill and pointed out to me the ruins of a church and village. The Spanish had colonized the Ilongots years before to be driven out by the insurrection of 1896.

I continued across the island to a point near Baler to inspect another Ilongot settlement established but five years before. The report I carried informed me that the village I was to inspect contained one hundred and fifty houses. I finally located the town. All that remained to mark the settlement were twelve posts. The Ilongots had returned to the mountains. The American who had organized the village had gone. The wild men preferred the mountains to the village life. From my notes I might select a hundred similar cases.

I mention the incidents of the last paragraphs to illustrate a few of the difficulties to be encountered by him who would give the Filipino people the Christian religion. I have dealt only in facts, I leave the problems suggested to be solved by the missionary.

THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE.

BY HENRY FRANK.

(Concluded.)

MIND:

Then, e'en
Beside the Grave thou canst but mock the pain
That writhes and pales the heart with fear; if ask'd
The question which, unanswered, palsies hope
And saddens sorrow, thy answer is a sigh!

BRAIN:

What answer can more honest comfort give,
Till Truth shall unequivocally speak?
No bars are cast by Science across thy way:
Seek thou for Truth!

MIND:

All 's vain if this base life
Be all!

BRAIN:

Despair not. For a higher faith
Inspires the soul of Science than e'er yet
Regaled the heart of simplest sacristan;
Perchance, if Science cannot cheer the hope,
That casts a dubious radiance upon
Death's dusty darkness—like a spectral bow
That moonbeams sometimes cast on cloudy night—
She still begets a sturdier hope, which, sprung
From safer soil, shall safe fruition yield.
What though the goal is far removed on keen
Endeavor's track; what though with swiftest feet
We must needs fly nor seize th' inviting prize,

In full, but *ignes fatui* snatch betimes ;
 What if fruit's promised taste oft disappoints ;
 What though a dream inspires, which tested, fails ;
 What though sometimes the house of Theory's cards
 Is dashed by empiric's hand and Logic's frown ;
 What though false hope betimes, a glittering toy
 Bedangles luring to Temptation's void ;
 What though a promised mine of wealth, a vacuum
 Prove, and priceless ore but false pretense ?
 What though a thousand times cast down ; again
 We must needs rise and struggle on for Truth,
 That, buried, lies beneath the centuried soils,
 Or glimmers in a star's faint beam, or floats
 In vagrant vapor, or entombed in rock
 Awaits the blow that grants its spirit release ;
 What though, like sylph, among the forest's limbs,
 Truth flirts and flutters, inviting but to slip
 Our grasp, or teases with a perfume that
 Misguides us from its source, or blindly leads
 Into a *cul de sac* that halts our course ?
 What though thro' myriad mazes of conceit,
 She lead our wandering and bewildered feet,
 Or bandage our keen view with problems dark,
 That must be torn aside ere we advance ?
 You ask where is the peace in such pursuit ?
 Why follow mysteries that tantalize,
 Or seek unbottomed sea for treasures 'yond
 The reach of Man ? Because th' Impossible
 Suggests the Real. Because the searcher's zest
 Is, by th' Unfathomable, whetted to a keen
 And sharper edge, that failure cannot dull.
 Infinity invites to infinite
 Research, and prizes that abide.

MIND:

But vain

That search for, if it withers to the touch !
 Vain is the flower of Knowledge that shrivels in
 Death's hand !

BRAIN:

Nay heed! The individual,
 Achieving, may himself, like bubble, burst,
 And leave on ocean's breast no trace behind.
 Yet he, now vanished and invisible,
 Hath reared a monument, Time's hungry teeth
 Cannot devour. In character, in thought,
 In splendor of achievement, noble speech;
 In kindly act, and neighbored aid, defence
 Of Right and stern demolition of Wrong;
 In succor of the weak, and plaudits for
 The Brave; in courage on a thousand fields
 Where moral Valor called for volunteers;
 There glow the stones that shape his monument,
 Immortal as the Time-defying hills.

MIND:

But what of them whose deeds have cursed the earth
 With foul and devious ways, or murderous course?
 Who shall revenge their deeds?

BRAIN:

Their own revenge
 They wreak in memoried hate, and warning stern
 To those who would ape their acts. As rot their bones,
 So rots their memory in Oblivion's cave.
 In surging sea of human life each leaves
 Its momentary impress; some to stay,
 And some to disappear. The great who are
 Immortal are inwove in fabric of
 Mankind, that clothe with beauty and with strength
 Its stalwart limbs.

Have not the ages coined
 The sweat and suffering of human toil,
 And purchased thus each Epoch's waiting prize?
 The Earth, once niggardly and crude, now yields
 Exhaustless cornucopias of wealth
 To Man's compulsory, stalwart Will!
 Vast centuries ago lived he, who first conceived
 The cunning art that tickled sleeping soils
 With the plow's awakening edge? Lives he not still.

And hath long lived, in every plowman who
 For eager substance champs the idle earth?
 And he who, first on rugged stone or bark,
 Wrought forms that mimicked objects he observed,
 Lived not his soul in Angelo again;
 Did not Praxiteles his spirit breathe;
 Were not Murillo's brush and Raphael's dreams,
 His own returned to life and labor's love?
 Of him who first the vulgar symbols of
 Man's speech discerned and traced on sand or rock
 The magic semblance of Man's voice, lives he
 Not still in learning and in lit'ratures,
 In ponderous tomes of thought: in Homer and
 In Hesiod, Plato and Confucius, and
 In all the Great, have trod Parnassus' heights?
 And what of him who first entuned his harp,
 That lingers still in trembling lays of love:
 In Orpheus' and Anachreon's strains divine.
 In Sappho, Byron, Goethe, Shelley, Keats,
 And all whose music hath mellowed human hearts?
 Is not he immortal who inspires
 The race?

And he, who, first, thatched branches seized,
 Himself to shelter rudely from the storms,
 Lives he not still in architrave and arch,
 That glorify cathedrals, or in roofs,
 Whose humble gables have housed a myriad souls?
 Lives he not still in gorgeous temples, domes,
 In castled turrets, towering minarets,
 In stately structures that adorn the marts
 Of Commerce, and in architectural dreams
 Divulged in statant stone and steel? Is he
 Not deathless who enhances Progress thus?

MIND:

Nay, 't is but a pale and sallow ghost,
 To substitute for Hope's fair form! What
 Though millioned generations follow me,
 Upon this globe, inspired by my deeds,
 And I forever vanish, save in traces
 Of dim Memory—a filmy wraith

Of Thought, that Time shall dissipate? Does this
 Afford me comfort? If I, unconscious, live
 In other lives, but I myself expire,
 Of what avail are all my toils and tears,
 The strain of labor, the fruit of sweat, the woe
 That Disappointment wreathes upon the brow?
 If I live not, what care I who lives after?
 Though Shakespeare, once upon supernal heights,
 The wing'd Pegasus be-reined, and Bruno
 Peered through mystic depths of knowledge; Plato
 Vied with Olympian gods, and Socrates
 The masque of vapid sophistries exposed;
 Though Aristotle swept all fields of thought,
 And Copernicus traced the paths of distant stars;
 Though Grecian lore exalt Themistocles,
 And Rome the praises of a Cæsar sing;
 Though myriad voices laud a Luther brave,
 Or Britain, trumpet-tongued, of Cromwell tells;
 Though mankind, Washington shall ne'er forget,
 And Lincoln be by Freedom's votaries
 Forever hymned; and I were each of these,
 Or all combined, what comfort this, if I
 Live not?

BRAIN:

(derisively)

This is the native passion of
 Persistent life. We live and therefore wish
 To live, both now and on eternally.
 It is the craving of the self for self—
 Delight: it is the selfish egotism
 Of Earth's supremely egotistic god—
 It is the acme of self consciousness.
 He who lived midst swirl of dying worlds,
 That measure life by aeons as he by years,
 And yet whirl on toward Dissolution's maw;
 He whom dead worlds, bestrewn on vacuous skies,
 Remind of fate with seal of surety;
 While massive mists of incandescent worlds,
 Depicting cosmic slaughter, fall round,
 To suggest how suns and globes and stars,

And myriad constellations, swarming space,
Shall all dissolve—yet, is so spurred by love
Of conscious self, he clings tenaciously
To the last straw of sinking hope—is primed
For crass and painful disappointment, should
Convincing proof disintegrate his faith.
But if this, too, should pass like else earth-sprung,
(Time's product that like Time itself shall wane) :
If, 'faith, this earth-life be but flower and fruit,
Planted in æonie bowels of the Past,
Whose seed contains the innate worm of death,
That gnaws and gnaws and gnaws, till it devour
The last frail vestige of existence: 't were vain
To hope, in palpable defeat of hope!
If we live, we live—the Future's door is closed.
What is to be, no Pythoness reveals.
Though Fancy's gossamer threads may weave fair dreams,
And Imagination 'body, what Fantasy
Surmizes, of unexplorable demesnes,
The mind but plays with toys, that please and tickle,
When it thus assures itself of fabled hope.
So please we babes, not yet begloomed by dun
Reality, and charm them with sweet lies.
So they, whose brains vacated of sane thought,
Are lured by mintage of a mind diseased.
We know not what may be; the stars say not.
The Grave evokes no voice beyond its bars.
The rest is silence; and sacred is the spell.
But if we know not what may be; what is,
We know; and what has been is finally
Incarved upon the rocks of centuries.
The Future dreams; the Past is all achieved.
What we may, in unfrequented realms
Become, none ventures to foretell. But what
Portrait of ourselves the Brush of Truth
Paints on the storied canvases of Time,
Looms high in all the Halls of Memory.
One's self is one's monument! The deeds
We do alone commemorate our lives.
Achieve! Achieve!

MIND:

But if all yields to dust
And earth's itself consumed in final fires,
How useless is ambition, how inane
Achievement!

BRAIN:

Why, with nobler faculty,
Despise the humble labor of the birds?
They gather, mark you, rubbish of the fields—
A leaf, a snapped off limb, a casual thread,
A piece of paper, a breeze-blown string—and then,
With inf'nite patience, weave therefrom a rare,
Tho' miniature, house, in which the winds shall rock
The eggs they lay, and fledglings they shall rear;
Which labor, ended, the house, abandoned, may
Be food for shattering storms. Shall we decry
Their toils as fruitless, and their noble art
And cunning craft all vain because so soon
Destroyed? Yet, note, how Nature, honoring
The Present, drives, by sheer compulsion of
Instinct, all life to more abundant life.
The species of the birds and beasts abide,
Unhindered by the thought that Death awaits!
From moment unto moment the pulse of life
Throbs on—though individuals expire.
Though death pervades, immortal is the race.
Thus Man, unreasoning, his reason scorns,
And builds for waiting generations, who
Shall thrive on what his sweating toil achieves.
Shall eyes despaire and vengefully disgorge
Their straining balls, because the covering Blue
Withholds from them the myriad spheres that lie
Beyond their ken? Or shall the hand hew off
The shortened arm, that cannot reach the stars,
Or smite the thunderous clouds?

Nay, limit is
The father of the very madness that
Begets the glorious genius of mankind!
'T is challenge of th' Impossible that spurs
The mind to loftier endeavor; t' search

Unfathomable, super-spacial depths,
 Wherein the salient mysteries abide,
 Thrills the heart with passion, panoplied
 With hope of promised trophies; it impels
 The hungry soul to Fortune's ripened fruit;
 It lures the Intellect with splendid wreath,
 A promised crown—though Ignorance deride.
 'T is very scorn of mystery, that spurs
 The thought to action! Each generation toils
 For centuries yet unborn, and they, anon,
 Their brilliant heritage impart to those
 That follow them. Thus human life is thrilled
 To venturous deed, inventive thought, and vast
 Increasing splendors of renown. Why, then,
 Repine, though these few pregnant years of earth
 So soon into oblivious silence sink?
 The race still lives, and Life's inspiring still!

MIND:

I say no more; let Reason now decide.

REASON:

With patience and with pleasure have I heard
 Your several discourses and appeals.
 Mind truthfully hath plead, vast worlds beyond
 Are ever untraversed by human thought,
 And ever shall be; while Brain hath decried
 The frailty and uncertainty of Faith,
 Compared with usages of Knowledge brave.
 Profoundly conscious of its unique power,
 Intent on being, gifted with inner sight
 Into regions unfrequented by the thoughts
 That tenant th' ostensible houses of the Brain,
 Mind justly chafes at boundaries, the flesh
 Imposes, and dreams of realms whereto, alone,
 Its winged feet can fly whilst Brain still plods
 The sodden and necessitous paths of earth.
 Mind, life-conscious, dreams of life without
 An end, eternal, sublimite, and free.
 Dull sense it scorns, well knowing a better sense,
 Refined with spiritual vision. Thus pinioned for

Eternal flight, it seeks the aid of faith,
 And thinks itself immortal. Well it may!
 Impossible it should conceive a state,
 Unlike its conscious mood. Can Life know aught
 Of Death? Knows Light the Dark; can Substance feel
 Its shadow? Can aught its opposite discern?
 Light knows but light, and darkness, darkness; else
 Were Error truth, and falsehood fair. The dream
 Of life beyond the dusty House of Death,
 Is, therefore, justified by Life itself.
 Nor more is conscious mind unjustified
 In claiming thought itself immortal. For Thought
 Cannot conceive of Thought unthinking, chained
 In spiritual flight. Its feathered arrows reach
 The outmost distances, and far impinge
 On unsuspecting brains, which they impress
 Unwittingly with their intelligence.
 Invisible are thoughts; and, truly, Mind's
 More tenuous substance seems from substance free.
 Therefore, it challenges restraint, and feels
 Its habitation is not in this house of flesh,
 And spurns the flesh's power. Thus rightly, Mind
 May deem itself supreme, howbeit misled
 By supercilious pride. For it o'ermoulds
 The brain, and shapes anew its cells, that thought
 Devours; it rides the rivers of the blood,
 And charges them with new, invigorant life;
 It e'en may poise the nerves, the pulses calm,
 When feverish heat inflames; yea, some contend,
 It hath such potency that Matter yields
 To its invincible touch, when the temples cease
 Their throbbing, and sleep secures th' unwilling lids;
 At which strange times the body is as wax,
 To the controlling mind. What wonder Mind
 Conceives itself of super-sensuous stuff,
 And regal to all subjects else!

MIND:

O Joy!

O Gratitude! O noble Judge, be praised!
 The world is saved and mankind is redeemed!

ASON :

But pause—Were this the final word ; were this
 The end of knowledge, the spokesman, here, of Science,
 Brain, were humiliated and demeaned :
 Unsolved the Ages' Riddle of the World,
 And fear of the Unknowable remain,
 The last and palsying state of Man ! Mind,
 As Brain hath truly said, is moving stuff,
 Too tenuous and immaterial
 For eye's or instrument's detection ; yet
 Whose faintest glimpse the chemic plate may seize—
 Its ghostly substance imprison and proclaim.
 In essence, then, are matter and spirit, one :—
 Brain and Mind, a dual-faced shield.
 In Unity is ultimate and grand
 Superlative, of Life's ascending scale.
 'T is true, and here, perhaps, the Sphinx is slain.
 In all the universe is there but One :
 That One, the All : Diversity's a masque !
 Though Science yet but tentatively tread
 This perilous and unfrequented ground,
 She hath already glimpsed sufficient of
 The truth, to call for newer readings of
 The Sphinx's puzzle and Nature's cryptic Book.
 Here hints promised peace for conflict thought,
 And settlement of Problems, Time hath vexed.
 Mayhap, in this solution rests the place,
 Twixt sublunar and super-starry realms,
 Where Science and Philosophy, with Faith,
 Shall build an honester Religion, and
 Unfettering Mankind from fear of Truth,
 May usher in Earth's last, irenic Age.
 Then Unity shall be discerned throughout
 The infinite scope of seen and unseen zones—
 One life, one element, one law, alone,
 Shall then prevail, and Man, supremely dowered,
 Shall reign with sceptred Knowledge and Wisdom's crown.
 As for that last enigma whereat mankind
 So long hath shuddered, none finally has answered.
 Unwise the peering of the heavens, to seek
 The voice that thence shall answer. Man's faith is slight :

Yet while Disproof cannot a shattering spear
 Hurl at the heart of hope, Despair repines,
 Nor durst her gloomy locks shake threat'ningly.
 Faith oft hath falsely used this vital hope,
 Wherewith to chain the mind's aspiring course,
 And justly men revolt, preferring death
 To slavery. The better part is search,
 And silent waiting for the truth. Brain wins;
 For that, too soon the fog of faith bedims
 The vision of the intellect that peers
 Into unpathed abyssms of the world
 None but Nature herself can answer, true,
 The dread, detested Sphinx, mankind appals.
 Who heeds another's voice, though fair, is lost;
 Man's Mind with toil the shafts of search must sink,
 And who forestalls with faith, unprovable,
 Deludes the blind and shackles them with fear.
 As star, slow rising from horizon's skirts,
 Its far, cerulean path pursues, and glows
 Increasingly as 't nears the zenith's dome,
 To sink and rise again in morrow's dawn;
 To Truth from Ignorance ascending moves,
 Across the vaulted sky of doubt and search,
 Outshining Error's dimmer orbs, that pale,
 To its ascendant splendor and renown;
 And bides the day that yet a fairer Dawn
 Shall grant, to lift still darker veils of night
 From Error's potent reign and gloomy power.
 Truth's word is forward; she never strikes the knell,
 That tells the midnight of Man's final toil.

BRAIN:

(courteously bending)

I thank thee, Judge, and await the larger Age.

FINIS.



GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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A TWENTIETH CENTURY EMANCIPATOR.

BY J. V. NASH.

FOR many years I had been familiar with the name of Dr. George Burman Foster, the great Liberal religious thinker of Chicago, Baptist clergyman and Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at the world-famed University; now and again I had heard the rumbling of the distant thunder when the artillery of Protestant orthodoxy (whatever Orthodox private judgment or dissent may mean!) discharged its broadsides upon some outspoken questioning of traditionary concepts or some disturbing discovery by this daring searcher of the spiritual skies!

At last our paths met. In the summer of 1915 it happened that Professor Foster was in residence at the University and giving a course in the History of Religion. My interest in the subject of the course being naturally keen, I gladly accepted the invitation of a friend, who chanced to be registered in it, to visit the class. And so it came about that one afternoon I accompanied my friend to Professor Foster's class-room. The room rapidly filled and for some minutes we sat awaiting the great teacher's advent.

Almost as an apparition, he came. He was a large man, with something Lincolnesque in his tall, ungainly figure and the broad, stooping shoulders. For so massive a frame, he had—or so it seemed—very small feet, and touched them so lightly upon the floor that he made scarcely any sound as he walked along the corridor and entered the room. His figure was indeed an unusual one. His head would have attracted attention anywhere; it dominated and threw into the background, as it were, all else. There was a reminiscence of Cardinal Newman in that ascetic face, with its forward thrust, the prominent nose, the forehead with its crown of grey hair, the

beetling eyebrows, and the eyes with that far away look, peering one might fancy, into another world. His clothing was grey, like the locks thrown carelessly back from the sloping forehead. Grey, indeed, was the habitual tone of his external make-up: grey, the grey of eternity and infinity, it seemed naturally associated with him.

There was an air of hushed expectancy in the class-room as Professor Foster, with his curious, silent, tip-toeing tread, made his way up to the little reading desk, opened his portfolio, and sorted his lecture notes. Then he began his lecture. It was delivered in a quiet, even tone of voice, dispassionate and unperturbed; the voice of one who knew whereof he spoke, a master of his subject. In this lecture he traced briefly the history of the religious idea, showing its development in classic paganism, in Buddhism, in Zoroastrianism, and in Christianity. Though so quietly delivered, it was a remarkable lecture and made a deep impression upon me.

By a welcome coincidence, as it seemed, he brought into this particular lecture many of the Fosterisms which I had heard commented upon most frequently. For instance, he developed the famous Foster analogy between God and Uncle Sam. This had been a great rock of offense to the ultra-orthodox and naively devout, and had been severely criticised by them. His argument was, in brief, that just as the character known as Uncle Sam had been created by the imagination of the American people, as the personification of their patriotic spirit, and thus anthropomorphized their political ideal, so humanity, far back in the days of its early religious yearning, had created the spiritual personage known as God, who thus became the personification—the living symbol—of man's supreme spiritual values. The implication, of course, was that the ideals, the values, were the important considerations in both cases, and that the question of the actual, bodily existence of Uncle Sam or of God, did not in the least affect their usefulness to the group.

After having heard such a stimulating and thought-provoking lecture, I, *Oliver Twist*-like, wanted more. I visited the class a number of times that summer. In another lecture, he sketched the history of the sacred writings of India, the Vedas, showing how they had started as folk and hero tales, had been passed down from generation to generation, becoming embellished and elaborated with time, until finally the people ascribed a divine origin to them and they were held as inspired writings. The class was composed largely of mature men and women, most of the men appearing to be pastors from country towns, taking summer work at the university. At this point I recall that a member of the class—a sharp-featured, minis-

terial-looking individual, interrupted Professor Foster, and, in loud nasal twang, interrupted him thus: "Well, Dr. Foster, if that is true of the Hindu Vedas, what about the Hebrew Bible?" Smiles and significant looks passed among the class. But Professor Foster was not at all disturbed by what seemed to us to be a rather embarrassing question. With the same far away look in his eyes, he glanced up, and answered in the same quiet voice: "Oh, just the same thing, just the same thing exactly." Then he fumbled among his papers, picked up the thread of his lecture, and went on. The respect in which he was held by his students—perhaps, too, their appreciation of his fearless mental honesty—was evidenced by the fact that no one in that large class of mature men and women interrupted him to controvert his answer, deeply as it must have traversed the personal beliefs of some.

I have spoken about some of the sayings of Professor Foster which aroused criticism among the ultra-conservative. Perhaps nothing that he ever said aroused more bitter controversy on the part of this element than his famous challenge: "Liberty first, virtue second." It turned to scarlet the pallid cheeks of the disciples of Mrs. Grundy; many such, doubtless, were scandalized to the point of utter speechlessness. I confess that I myself was somewhat startled when I first heard it, but the more I have reflected upon it, the more I have realized the deep spiritual truth underlying the dictum. Can we have any ethical values at all, without liberty of choice or freedom of the will? Is the enforced, negative virtue of a Simon Stylites on his pillar, of an anchorite, a cenobite, in the desert, or of a "stationary," or again, of a convict in solitary confinement, to be our ideal, our model? In the allegory of the Garden of Eden, as told in Genesis, did not the Lord God place the apple on the tree, within the reach of Adam and Eve, and give them perfect freedom to obey or disobey the command to eat not of it? Certainly, the Lord God seemed to have instituted liberty first and to have desired that virtue should be the sweet fruit of it. A Prohibition Deity would have put up an iron-spiked fence around the tree. Personally, I can see no value at all in virtue anterior to and apart from perfect liberty.

From the foregoing, it may be easily inferred that Professor Foster had little sympathy with the Prohibition movement. Such was indeed the case. He did not care to associate himself with it. One day when he was down town, somebody pointed out to him a procession of Prohibitionists marching down Michigan avenue,

bearing placards and transparencies on which were inscribed slogans such as "Down with the Demon Rum," "Abolish the Whiskey Trust," "Make America Dry," etc. etc. "Ah," he commented, "but you couldn't get these people to march down Michigan avenue with signs reading 'Down with Unkindness,' 'Abolish Backbiting,' 'Make America Generous.' No," he continued, ironically, "they would hardly support a cause that did not promise them the pleasure of giving a jail sentence to those who do not share their opinions."

Professor Foster was one of the most intellectually honest and fearless men I have ever met. He refused to doctor, medicate, or sophisticate the truth as he saw it. It is true that he said: "In the pulpit I try to reveal my inmost faith, in the class-room my inmost doubt." But that was merely a matter of emphasis. In reply to a direct personal question, as we have already seen, he gave a direct, fearless answer without a moment's hesitation. His tone of voice was uniformly low; he seldom raised it. There was in it, however, a suggestion of the Southern drawl, which reminded one of the fact that he had been born in the Old Dominion and that the father of this apostle of spiritual freedom was a soldier of the Confederacy. In reply to a question, he would often give the answer in a terse, pithy sentence, with the characteristic Southern drawl, and with a certain emphasis on some word or syllable. An illustration of this occurs to me, but I must first resume my story by way of introduction thereto.

After having been personally introduced to Professor Foster, I made bold to leave with him one day to look over, a little paper of mine, dealing with some aspects of Modernism in the church of my own inheritance, the Roman Catholic. The result of this was an invitation to visit him at his home. Mr. and Mrs. Foster kept open house every Monday evening, at which times a remarkably cosmopolitan group, of various degrees of sophistication, assembled at the Foster home to discuss religion, politics, literature, and art. The catholicity of Dr. Foster's interests seemed to be without limit. I recall one such evening when a young radical poet, then little known but whose name is now almost a household word among literary folk, was the guest of honor and read from his verses. Professor Foster's sympathetic toleration of alien *mores* was strikingly exhibited at these soirées. I remember a certain highly cultured lady who was a frequent visitor at the Foster home, in company with her husband, a Harvard man and a distinguished architect. This lady was a Viennese and, in keeping with European custom, usually enjoyed a

cigarette with the gentlemen. Professor Foster, ordained Baptist clergyman though he was, never raised any objection to this practice. My own provinciality was such that I felt a certain uneasiness, and, in private conversation with Dr. Foster, I once alluded to the matter; but he passed it off with a laughing remark concerning the lady's nationality.

Frequently I formed one of the company at these Monday evening affairs, and thus had an opportunity of coming to know Professor Foster in a more intimate way than would otherwise have been possible. I have in mind one such evening when Professor Foster was feeling tired—he had been out lecturing the night before—and lay down on the couch, by the wall, having to double up his lanky frame in order to do so. Although weary, he listened alertly to the conversation. The question of evolution being under discussion, I said to Professor Foster: "If the theory of evolution be true, what becomes of Adam?" I settled myself respectfully to listen to a learned disquisition on Genesis in the light of modern exegesis and the higher criticism. But without a moment's hesitation, this laconic reply flashed back at me from the sofa, in that curious drawl to which I have referred, and with a loud emphasis upon the second syllable of the last word: "He's *eliminated*." Professor Foster then closed his eyes—having dismissed the subject with this terse answer to my problem—and the interrupted hum of conversation among the company went on as before.

Professor Foster's theory of religion, and the philosophy of it, centered around the word *values*. It was the inherent, spiritual value that gave validity to dogma and doctrine, which without it were sterile. Just as Professor James, through his theory that beliefs are of significance only to the extent that they have the potentiality to affect human action, formulated the Pragmatic philosophy, so it might be said that Professor Foster, through his insistence upon values as criteria, evolved a Valuistic—I coin the word—philosophy. Beliefs are of worth according to their power to give us spiritual nourishment and enrich our lives. That was his great contribution as a religious philosopher. He was constantly on a quest for "values," but he cared nothing for creeds as mere abstract theological propositions. "I am come," said Jesus, "that ye might have life, and have it more abundantly."

Although Professor Foster's youth had been passed largely out of doors, amid the mountain grandeur of West Virginia and the Blue Ridge, in his mature years he seemed to take little interest in

Nature. One day in early autumn I was with him in a party which went out to the Dune country of Indiana. The region is one which is full of thrills for the Nature enthusiast, but Professor Foster showed little emotion. I recall that we unpacked our baskets and enjoyed our little luncheon on the front porch of the clubhouse belonging to the Prairie Club, perched on the brink of the cliff and looking out over the broad expanse of Lake Michigan. Professor Foster gazed upon the sparkling blue waters of the lake spread below us, but he remained silent, the habitual dreaming, meditative, far away look filling his eyes.

Probably no other man of his day was assailed with such harshness by certain unthinking classes as was Professor Foster; yet he practiced forgiveness and forbearance more genuinely and more cheerfully than, I think, any other person whom I have ever known. He was most charitable toward the motives and acts of others, even, and notably so, in the case of those who disagreed with him most fundamentally. He tried always to look at a problem from his opponent's point of view as well as from his own. Indeed, his adversaries in debate used to admit that he stated their case better than they could do it themselves. It was seldom, if ever, that he criticised anyone; and if he did, it was usually in a playful way which left no sting behind.

One day the name of Mr. Mangasarian was mentioned in conversation. In answer to some question about this gentleman—an Armenian rationalistic lecturer of some note in Chicago—Professor Foster expressed the opinion that the great sway which he exercised over his audiences was largely due to his being “a natural born actor.” This was a penetrating analysis. I had on occasion attended Mangasarian's lectures and at once realized the truth of Dr. Foster's remark, casual as it was.

This Mr. Mangasarian, who had deserted the Presbyterian ministry, held a debate in Chicago some years ago with Mr. Algernon Crapsey, an Episcopal rector who had been unfrocked for heresy. The subject was the historicity of Jesus, Crapsey taking the affirmative and Mangasarian the negative side. I happened to mention to Professor Foster, one evening at his home, that I had been reading the report of this debate. With a twinkle in his eye, he observed that the only thing the matter with the debate was the fact that “neither of them knew anything about the subject.” Yet when Brother Crapsey visited Chicago shortly afterwards, Professor Foster entertained him as an honored guest at his home, extending to

him the hand of Christian fellowship denied to the deposed Anglican priest by his own denominational brethren.

Professor Foster suffered many heavy domestic afflictions, but he bore his cross and trod the road to Golgotha again and again with uncomplaining lips. The death of his son Harrison, who had been drafted into the army in 1917 and in the following January fell a victim to pneumonia in a Texas camp, was the last great blow of his life. He himself did not live out the year. Although, with heaviness of heart, he accepted the war in a genuine conviction of its necessity, he declared again and again, in addresses and letters to the press, that the war would be a failure unless it should not only guarantee the rights of small nations, but also assure social justice to the masses in every country.

Professor Foster was an optimist to the end. During the last year or two of his life, he held several debates with the brilliant barrister, Mr. Clarence Darrow, on such subjects as, "Is the Human Will Free?" and "Is Life Worth Living?" These debates were held before packed houses at downtown theatres on Sunday afternoons, under the auspices of Mr. Arthur M. Lewis's "Workers' University Society." At one of them, after Mr. Darrow had proved to his own complete satisfaction that life was not worth living, Professor Foster rose from his chair, slowly pulled himself up to his full height, and "floored" the cheerful pessimist by drily replying, in his accustomed drawl: "Well, if all you say is true, I can't see, for the life of me, what right you have to be here this afternoon at all—you ought to be out under the lake." And again, I recall the deep feeling with which, in closing his side of a debate, he quoted Henley's famous lines:

"It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll;
I am the master of my fate—
I am the captain of my soul."

The force of this fine affirmation was not weakened by Mr. Darrow's cynical if paradoxically witty retort: "You haven't got any soul, and you're not the captain of it anyway." Yet Mr. Darrow was one of Professor Foster's warmest admirers, and in a splendid public eulogy mourned his loss when he passed into the beyond. With an earnestness I shall never forget, Professor Foster asserted, in one of these debates, that notwithstanding all the sorrows that had been his, he still found life worth living, and would be willing to live his life over again, if thereby he might be of service to the world. .

Professor Foster's death, occurring as it did, when he was apparently just at the zenith of his career, and on the point of delivering a noteworthy series of lectures, by special invitation, at Yale University, came as a great shock to all. The death of his son Harrison, which I have already mentioned, and the illness of other members of his family, added to the loss of two children some years before, greatly weakened his vitality. However, he continued about his duties, holding his classes at the university, often hurrying out at night to bring a religious message to groups of eager inquirers, frequently securing a hearing among groups opposed to religion in any form, and filling pulpits in distant cities as special supply preacher on Sundays. Though living in Chicago, he was for a number of years the pastor of a Unitarian church in Madison, Wisconsin, making weekly trips back and forth between the two cities during many months of the year. Mrs. Foster used to relate how time and again he returned home late at night, tired to exhaustion, but brimming over with eagerness to tell about his experience at some workers' meeting out in the slum district where he had spoken that evening.

In the dark days of the fall of 1918, the deadly epidemic of influenza swept the country, taking a heavy toll of life. In November his old friend, President Van Hise of the University of Wisconsin, succumbed. Professor Foster was asked to conduct the funeral service. Although far from well, he responded to the call, and set out for Madison. It was a cold, wet day, the house where he was lodged for the night in the Wisconsin city was poorly heated, and he returned to Chicago with a severe chill. He kept up and about, however; on Thanksgiving day, the weather being fair, he even played a little golf, his favorite outdoor recreation. Shortly afterwards, his condition became such that he was obliged to go to St. Luke's hospital. Complications soon set in, with fatal issue, the immediate cause of his death being abscess of the spleen.

To the end he held the faith which he had proclaimed all his life. His last words, whispered to Mrs. Foster as she bent over the bedside, were: "Tell them I still am captain of my soul."

And so, on December 22, 1918, the great spirit of George Burman Foster passed onward: onward, one fain would believe——

"Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem."

The funeral was held on Christmas eve, in the Baptist church, to whose fellowship he had clung throughout the years with a pathetic devotion.

Early in January, 1919, a noble memorial service was held in

Mandel Hall at the University of Chicago. At about the same time a memorial meeting was held for the general public at the Garrick Theatre downtown. It is of the university service that I would speak here. A large oil portrait of Professor Foster, singularly life-like in expression, occupied the place of honor on the platform. A great concourse of friends filled the hall. One after another, distinguished colleagues arose and bore witness to their appreciation, from different points of view, of Professor Foster's life and work. Telegrams and letters from former students scattered all over the country, many in places of eminence, were read. One of the most notable tributes was that of Dr. William Wallace Fenn, Dean of the Harvard University Divinity School, one of the principal speakers, who declared that, in his opinion, Dr. Foster was without question, at the time of his death, the greatest theologian in America, if not in the whole world besides. In a subsequent letter to the present writer, Dean Fenn said:

"As I reflect upon him now and look at his photograph which hangs on my library wall, the sweet loveliness of his nature stands out more prominently in my memory than his keen and mighty intellect. That is as it should be, and as he would have it."

The immensity of the field covered by Professor Foster in the domain of religion—historically, philosophically, psychologically, and comparatively considered—was astonishing. That a single investigator could successfully have worked so vast an area seems well-nigh incredible. The Annual Register of the University of Chicago for 1917-18, the last full academic year of Professor Foster's life, credited him with the following courses of instruction:

1. Outline History of Religion.
2. Outline Philosophy of Religion.
3. Psychology of Religion, Individual.
4. Psychology of Religion, Social.
5. Religion of Primitive Peoples.
6. The Egyptian and Assyro-Babylonian Religions.
7. Religions of the Indo-European Peoples, Indian and Iranian.
8. Religions of the Indo-European Peoples, Greek and Roman.
9. Religions of China and Japan.
10. Epistemology of Religion—The Knowledge Problem.
11. Metaphysics of Religion.
12. History of Patristic and Scholastic Thought.

13. History of Protestant Thought Prior to Kant.
14. Kant's Philosophy of Religion.
15. Philosophy of Religion from Kant to Hegel.
16. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion.
17. Schleiermacher's "Glaubenslehre."
18. The Relation between Religion and Morality.
19. The Relation between Science and Religion.
20. The Relation between Religion and Art.

"The greatest living thinker in his line!" President Harper exclaimed enthusiastically when, only three years after the opening of the University of Chicago, he announced that George Burman Foster, a young man still in his thirties, professor in McMaster University, Toronto, had been secured as Professor of Systematic Theology in the Divinity School of the University. President Harper was seldom mistaken in his judgments, and the passage of the years increasingly confirmed the early estimate of Professor Foster's scholarship. Nor did his constantly growing reputation seem to change in the least his characteristic modesty and democracy. Whether we see him as the young Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of West Virginia, working his way through the seminary as a student preacher in the hill towns, or thirty years later, as the distinguished head of the Department of Comparative Religion at one of America's greatest universities, he is ever to our eyes the same figure, going his way quietly and unassumingly yet with the unconscious dignity which marked him as one of the world's elect.

He possessed abundantly not only the high respect but the deep affection of a host of friends drawn from varied walks of life. Students and colleagues, working folk and professional men, clergy and laity, orthodox and heterodox, conservative and radical, all alike revered the qualities of heart and mind which made him all that he was—all that he meant in their lives. The beloved Dr. C. R. Henderson, in one of his last addresses at the university chapel services, characterized Professor Foster, in the hearing of the present writer, as a man whose mighty intellect he admired and whose great heart he loved.

Professor Foster's literary fame rests largely on two noteworthy books published during his lifetime: first, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, a work of ripe scholarship, finely keyed together; and, second, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*, a book designed for popular reading. Although

both books have been criticised by some as destructive, what can be more truly constructive than to provide a solid foundation, cleared of rubbish, upon which the earnest spiritual truth seeker may construct his own edifice of belief? That was Professor Foster's purpose in both books. In conversation with him one day, on the steps of Cobb Hall, I recall his remarking, with reference to *The Function of Religion*, "I tried to give a minimum of hope that was sure, rather than a maximum that was not." His exquisite meditation on "Death," published in the volume of "University of Chicago Sermons," brought comfort to many bereaved by the losses of war.

At his lamented and untimely passing, Professor Foster left a large amount of manuscript, none of which he had had time to prepare for the press. This was distributed by Mrs. Foster among his various friends for editing. To Dean Fenn of Harvard went his miscellaneous sermons, to Dr. Douglas C. Macintosh of the Yale Divinity School a set of his class lecture notes on the interpretation of Christianity, now published by MacMillan under the title "Christianity in Its Modern Expression," to Professor George Herbert Clarke, of the University of the South, his papers on Nietzsche, while to the present writer's hands there came the notes of his lectures on Maeterlinck, Ibsen, and Bjornson. The world of thought will surely be the richer for the eventual publication of all of this material.

REMAKING OF MINDS AND MORALS.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

DEEP and interesting questions are raised by Prof. James Harvey Robinson in his new book, entitled *The Mind in the Making*.

It is highly probable that the author himself did not realize fully the nature and variety of the questions he indirectly and unconsciously recalled to thoughtful persons by the thesis and its treatment in the bold and suggestive volume. Doubtless he considered the issues he did discuss quite sufficient unto the day, or the element addressed by him; but the matters ignored, though clearly involved in the problem, will repay some attention and study. Indeed, they challenge such attention, and he who deals with them soberly and scientifically, not arbitrarily, may be driven to dissent from some of Prof. Robinson's propositions.

The quintessential thesis of the book is that the modern mind is not free or fit enough to cope with the intricate and perplexing problems, social, economic and ethical, that face it and imperatively demand solution. And the mind is not free or fit because it has not succeeded in emancipating itself from "lumber"—metaphysical, theological, historical, what not. It is, in other words, still enslaved and enchained by the dead Past, and does not clearly think of the present in the appropriate and real terms of the present. It still cherishes superstitious veneration for Old Masters, old notions, and lacks the courage to scrap them and build independently on the basis of facts and established principles of science. The modern mind persists in seeking light in the dust-covered volumes of Aristotle, Plato, St. Paul, St. Thomas Aquinas, or in vague biblical texts that each school interprets to suit itself.

Why not do what Dr. Johnson advised—clear our minds of cant and irrelevance, let the dead bury the dead, and use our own knowledge, our own experience and our own faculties? Why not go to

Nature and to Society as we ourselves see and feel them for necessary generalizations?

Such questions are decidedly pertinent—or, rather, they would be pertinent were the underlying assumption well-founded—namely, the assumption that the modern mind is unduly fettered by the past, or that it is afraid to face the facts of life, or that our conduct is governed by obsolete and irrelevant ideas against which our own independent judgment revolts when it gets a chance.

But the assumption in question is baseless. Humanity is *not* fettered by notions which it could shed at will as garments are shed. To the degree to which humanity is controlled by the past, that past has entered into the warp and woof of the present. Ideas men live by are not mere empty professions that could be renounced and made to give way to significant and vital ideas. It is true that there is such a thing as “lip service,” but the very fact that there is such a thing militates against the assumption that we permit antiquated and refuted precepts to shape our lives and govern our conduct. The phrase, Lip Service, implies a conflict between the code professed and code followed. In condemning lip service, or hypocrisy, we tacitly affirm that our actual conduct is controlled by newer principles than those inherited from the past.

It is not the staggering burden of past superstitions and past fallacies that prevents us moderns from standing up and grappling manfully with the problems of our own day. It is something wholly different. What is that something?

Prof. Robinson himself answers this question correctly, though he fails to draw the right inference from that answer. “We are,” he says, “always and at once animals, savages and children.” Exactly; that is what we are, and cannot help being. Our calamities and maladjustments, our fratricidal wars, our class and caste divisions, our cruelties and wrongs are all ultimately ascribable to our natures and minds. And we are born with certain traits and characters that are scarcely more subject to voluntary manipulation than are the properties of true natural elements. Human conduct is determined by human nature. If we are always and at once animals, savages and children, pray why complain of our conduct, and why quarrel with the inevitable?

If there is hope of healthier and nobler human relations, of a better society, of peace and concord, in the future, that hope rests on the fact that man, after all, is something more, at times, than animal, savage and child. He has glimpses, visions, impulses, as-

pirations, ideals that we call sublime or divine. We speak of our conscience, of the still small voice, of the categorical imperative, of our better nature. Surely, even the narrowest materialist or the most inveterate pessimist will not quarrel with Shakespeare's tribute to man—

“What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!”

The root of the difficulty is in the fact that man has too much of the ape and tiger in him and too little of the qualities that make for unity and the peace of righteousness. Not past “ideas”, but present passions, emotions, interests, prejudices, are responsible for the ills of the body social.

If the modern mind is not free or fit, it is because it is enslaved by irrational passions and habits, by ingrained and inherited antipathies, and by greed, envy, jealousy and fear.

This conclusion should be self-evident, but since many question it, let us consider the proof of it supplied by the familiar yet ever-striking contrast between the operations of the modern mind in the sphere covered by the exact or pure sciences and the sphere sought to be governed by the social and moral sciences. There is no complaint from any quarter that the mathematician, the astronomer, the physicist, the chemist, the geologist, or the biologist is hampered by past or present superstitions. The minds of the men and women who devote themselves to the exact sciences are fit and free. The scientists in their proper domain are not conscious of any pull from the animal, the savage or the child within them. Darwin, Huxley, De Vries, Mendell, Tyndall, Helmholtz, Pasteur, Mach, Einstein, to name only a few pioneers and leaders in science, did their work, and thousands of more modest workers in laboratories and libraries are doing their work, without any sense of subjection to or interference by the past.

It is only in the fields of economics, politics and ethics that we hear so much about the “dead hand”, the unfortunate influence of motives alien to our own true interests, the survival of puerile beliefs in an age of reason and science. Why this difference? The explanation is not far to seek. In dealing with economic and political questions the average person is almost invariably governed by his interests, his lower ambitions, his passions. He pays little or no attention to the principles of science, and he suspects that the self-

styled savants themselves are not free from bias and prejudice. Economics and politics affect the pocket, the love of power, the social standing of men and women. No one favors the Relativity theory because it will help him to make money, and no one opposes it because it will cause him to lose money. Is there life on Mars? The question will be answered eventually by evidence, evidence gathered and weighed without bias. How old is the earth? Is variation a factor in the evolution of species, or not? Are acquired characters inherited or not? The average person expects the men of science to solve these problems, and he expects to accept the solutions. Not so with protection vs. free trade, the gold standard vs. some other standard, or no standard at all, or public ownership of utilities, or compulsory arbitration, or the referendum and recall. All such questions as these arouse class, group and party passions. It is idle to appeal to scientific opinion; that opinion is rejected with contempt or indifference. Professors are sneered at as "theorists", and the "practical man" creates his own economics and politics as he runs.

Now, where, pray, in all this is there any subjection to the past? The subjection is of the less powerful to the more powerful motives, of altruism to egoism, of justice to self-interest, of ideas to fears and suspicions.

Prof. Robinson is aware of these facts and considerations. But he pleads for the banishment of all motives that conflict with the one proper and sane human motive, the steady promotion of the rational happiness of humanity. By all means, by all means. Let us strive to undermine and destroy those unworthy motives, but in doing so what shall we encounter? Mere notions bequeathed by the past? No, very lively and robust emotional factors functioning in the present. To narrow self-interest enlightened self-interest must be opposed. To provincial ignorance, breadth of view. To race and national antipathies, inter-racial and international ties and bonds of every kind and description. To fear of pecuniary loss, forms of mutual insurance and social assumption of risks incident to necessary but painful readjustments. To excessive and wasteful competition, intelligent co-operation.

Some time ago Mr. Elihu Root, a keen and experienced diplomat and statesman, asserted in a public address that "the world was full of hatred and strife and murder today because of the incapacity of millions of people in organized states to receive the truth that is being spread through all civilization and which is to be theirs in the

centuries to come—but which they are not yet ready to receive.” What can the lovers of peace, justice and human progress do meantime? Mr. Root answers: They must build character; they must exercise, and stimulate in others, the virtues that make human character—compassion, kindly consideration, willingness to make sacrifices or positive contributions to the stock of general good and the joy of life.

Who will, after due reflection on human conduct, past and present, seriously challenge Mr. Root’s diagnosis or remedy?

It is not enough to attack and correct false ideas, superstitious survivals, outworn creeds. It is even more important to attend to the emotions of men, as well as to their institutions and arrangements. International and inter-racial walls or barriers make for misunderstanding and distrust and antipathy. Intercourse, contacts, service in a common cause, the creation and development of institutions conducive to peace and mutual comprehension—these are the factors that will gradually free us of hate and strife.

If the foregoing be sound and true—as, in fact, it self-evidently is—let us inquire whether the great teachers and seers of the Past propagated doctrines or principles inconsonant therewith. If we have to repudiate and unlearn ancient precepts, let us make sure we are repudiating and unlearning the right—or the wrong—things. If we must cleanse and free our modern minds, let us take care we remove that which ought to be removed, not that which ought to be conserved and cherished.

Shall we, for instance, repudiate the Ten Commandments? Hardly. Shall we repudiate the Greek ideal of a sound mind in a sound body? Hardly. Shall we repudiate the essential teachings of Jesus of Nazareth—the gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven within ourselves, the gospel of human brotherhood and mercy? Hardly, again. Shall we repudiate the essential teaching of Gautama, that men, to achieve serenity and happiness, must lose themselves in something far greater than their egoistic interests? Must we repudiate the essential teaching of Confucius? Once more, hardly.

These teachings, indeed, have been commended to us by the most modern of the moderns—from Tolstoy, the Anarchist-Communist, and Ruskin, the “reddest of the reds”, as he whimsically called himself, down to Chesterton, Shaw, Wells, James and Bertrand Russell, and other Pragmatist and Neo-Realist philosophers.

It strikes one, on further analysis of the situation, that what we have to repudiate and unlearn is something that passes for *modern*

thought rather than for ancient. The gospel of the ruthless oppression of the masses, the "rabble", by the "supermen"; the gospel of brute force, of utter indifference to the fate of the weak; the gospel of a remorseless struggle for existence and domination, of the rejection of pity and sympathy as "slave ethics"—these are the teachings that, whether professed or tacitly acted upon by men innocent of philosophy, hamper and retard human progress, and continue to fill the world of hate and strife!

The truth is, the moral development of civilized humanity has not kept pace with its purely intellectual development. The intellect proposes, but the passions and emotions dispose. To perceive the right is one thing; to follow and practice it is another thing. Just as the average criminal knows and admits that murder, burglary, arson and forgery are wrongful and anti-social acts, which society properly forbids, and the only plea he is able to make is that his will was too weak to resist temptation, or to keep him on the path of virtue, so the vast majority of human beings perceive and concede that their conduct as neighbors, or citizens, or employers, or workers, or merchants, or professional men, leaves much to be desired from the viewpoint of their own professed ideal, but at the same time they plead that as society is organized they cannot be as just, as high-minded, as generous as they would like to be. They have a sense of weakness, of inferiority, of sin, of imperfection—and they have this sense because they "know better", because they have an ideal. The ideal belongs to the past, but it is the nobler part of the present.

Many have blamed modern Science in recent years for its non-moral, indifferentist attitude toward human happiness, its willingness to lend its marvelous resources to the forces of destruction. "Chemical warfare" is an instance in point. Submarines and flying torpedoes are another instance. Science, the indictment reads, shows the race how to commit suicide, how to ruin and wreck the structure of civilization so slowly and laboriously erected in the course of the ages. Why should not Science indignantly refuse to play so ignoble and vicious a role? Why should it not deliberately limit itself to construction and improvement?

The answer is clear and obvious. Science is an abstraction. It is the men and women of science who invent weapons and instruments of destruction, and they do so, first, because they are not mere or pure scientists, but nationalists, patriots, citizens or subjects as well, and they are told that patriotism demands of them loyal performance of such functions as "the State" may assign to them, and,

in the second place, because it is a fact that any weapon is utilizable in defensive as well as in offensive operations. The weapon itself is not criminal; the men who order its use may be criminal—or imbecile. Chemical warfare is horrible, but it may be resorted to, of course, to punish and repel brutal aggressors, enemies of human peace and happiness. The men of science cannot know how their inventions will be used. They may even be misled and duped by cunning politicians and diplomats in a given case and made to believe that they are rendering laudable patriotic and humanitarian service when, by ingenious inventions, they are helping to win a particular war. In our time of specialization, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a man of science to form opinions and judgments concerning complex questions in other fields than those they respectively cultivate. An excellent chemist may be a very poor economist or sociologist, and a good economist may be a most indifferent psychologist. To ask science to save the human race is, in effect, to ask hundreds of distinct groups of specialists to drop their several departments and work out solutions of the problems that lie outside of the spheres of most sciences—moral, industrial, political and social problems. The request would be absurd. Society itself must ardently wish to escape destruction, and to apply scientific discoveries constructively instead of destructively. That way lies salvation. In each community there will have to be, at least, a sufficiently strong and influential minority of lovers of righteousness to be able virtually to leaven the whole mass and to guide it toward the goal of the noblest and greatest of men since the advent of civilization. And neither the minority, the exceptionally gifted individuals, nor the mass should break with the Past—or *could* possibly break with the Past. We must conserve our social inheritance, for much of it is sound and wholesome, and seek to improve it only where it is manifestly obsolescent; improve it in the light that is ours, with the minds fashioned by the evolutionary process.

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DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF EXPERIMENTALISM.

BY T. V. SMITH.

TO interpret as sheer experimentalism any form of the state—and particularly the democratic form, which during the last century has, as Viscount Bryce notes,¹ been establishing itself as the universal norm—is of serious moment. The seriousness of such an interpretation grows chiefly out of the unique ubiquity of the political state: uncertainty in the ultimate authority infects with uncertainty all lesser associations. Man's fondness for absolutes indicates his dislike for contingency. With Luther, men turned from infallibility of Church to infallibility of Bible and from infallibility of Bible to guidance indeed more vague but hardly thought less infallible, an immutable Law of Nature.² Human nature seems such that it cannot stay content at its job until it feels its back against the wall of the universe. In order to tackle any problem with concentration and whole-hearted devotion, man needs some assurance that all other (potential) problems will for the time being stay out. The human terror at having too many things become problematic at once, has made men slow to welcome democracy and reluctant even after its coming to recognize it for what it is—a form of genuine experimentalism.

And so the implied guarantee *about things in general*, derived from the infallibility of king or pope or book or nature, has for long seemed to men ample compensation for the infinite trouble *about things in particular* caused by those who claimed the infallibility. So thoroughly does the "turbulency of the crowd" terrify even the crowd itself, in prospect or in retrospect, that for long men chose to bear the ills they had (under autocracy) rather than fly to those they knew not of (in an experimenting democracy). Hobbes' insight is essentially sound in that men do prefer *less* with more se-

¹ *Modern Democracies*, 1:3.

² Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, pp. 13-14.

curity for enjoying it, to *more* conditioned by continual uncertainty of tenure. Men will gladly exchange many "liberties" for a very little order, if they think that order cannot be had in any other way. This profound human desire for an absolute guarantee of the future, for infallible guidance, has had a marked influence on men's notions of how democracy is to justify itself. These notions may be grouped under three general philosophies of democracy.

The first of these philosophies has to do with the individual-as-such, his nature and his capacity; the second with the group-as-such, its nature and its capacity; and the third, with a combination of the two eventuating in a logic of scientific control.

I. *A Philosophy of the Individual.*

The individual-as-such—i. e., the individual guided neither by God from above nor by an immutable law of nature from beneath—has been universally adjudged impotent. "It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." On this conviction kings have appointed themselves keepers of men; on this conviction men have gladly suffered these self-appointed rulers. Had not inheritance provided tyrants, fear of the future would have raised them up. This inherited view of human nature, democracy has not entirely overcome, but has sought to reconcile in the curious notion that though a man as a man may be ignorant and fallible, as a voter he is wiser and more dependable. This faith may be based, as Bryce suggests,³ on the tacit assumption that to bestow the ballot, bestows also the will to use it, and that to establish a popular system of education, guarantees that suffrage will be used wisely. Or it may be based on the more naive view that when a mere man approaches the ballot box (which has gathered a kind of halo from current discussions of its purity, etc.), he somehow enters a sanctuary of authority from which he, like the Pope, speaks *ex cathedra*.

Whatever be its basis, it can hardly be doubted that this comforting faith is abroad in democratic societies. This view of the individual might possess some validity if on the ballot he as a voter were confronted with a sharp issue either alternative of which would lead to better results than he unaided could produce. This would, however, obviate the need of his voting at all. Moreover, no party is willing to admit that the issue on which the common man votes is not a live alternative, fraught with genuine significance to his country. No mystic faith can get more virtue out of a ballot box than party leaders and voters have put into it. If it is not in man that

³ *Modern Democracies*, p. 70.

walketh to direct his steps, then no electoral machinery can mysteriously endow him with power from on high.

II. *A Philosophy of the Group.*

But if reassurance cannot be found in the individual, let us seek it in the group. A group, it is argued, is more than an aggregation of individuals; and out of this "more" comes super-direction. May not the decision of twelve ignorant jurors be a wise verdict? The admitted fallibility of the individual is supplanted by a new kind of infallibility when many separate men become a group. The actual increase of power and wisdom, so this view would hold, corresponds in some mystic way with the *feeling* of heightened security which a gregarious animal feels upon joining his group. Decisions that would not inspire the isolated individual with confidence seem quite the inevitable thing when one is a member of a great group. This feeling of rightness and wisdom probably arises from the fact that a crowd is mightier and is therefore better able to enforce its desires than is the individual. But if we are to preserve any distinction between might and right, we can hardly take this as evidence of the wisdom or rightness of the crowd. Moreover, the crowd is more likely to be swayed by uncontrolled primitive emotions (the very antithesis of wisdom) than is the individual, as mob actions testify. This doctrine does not greatly gain in plausibility even when stated in the impressive terms of a "real will" which, whether men know it or can know it, coincides with the good of all, though it may override the concrete wishes of every member of the group.⁴ While, then, we may grant that a democracy may conduce materially to the feeling of security, it does not appear wherein it really has any assurance other than what Hobson has called "the hitherto baffling hope which has deluded several generations of democrats, the power of numbers."⁵ No more in the crowd-as-such, then, than in the individual-as-such, do we find any superior excellence of a democracy.

Indeed, it will be seen, I think, upon close analysis, that to the extent that democracy has emphasized either of the foregoing motives, it is not really democracy at all. People who emphasize either of these motives are in search of a new kind of Absolute. On the one hand, they are looking for a magic that will make the voter as

⁴ Hobhouse in *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* appears to me to do full justice to this view, both in his refutation and in his evaluation.

⁵ J. A. Hobson, *Democracy After the War*, p. 159.

voter infallible; they seek a substitute for intelligence. Either divine power or natural law must guarantee the outcome. Professor Croly has remarked that "the faith of Americans in their country is religious, if not in its intensity, at any rate in its almost absolute and universal authority."⁶ "The powers that be are ordained of God." The voter of the popular faith is but the lineal descendant of the king, and so the voter as sovereign can do no wrong either. Here, then, instead of one, we have many kings, each being the same sort of absolute sovereign as was the ancient king. It seems, on the other hand, that this same sanction is not lacking in the philosophy of those who find efficacy in the democratic group-as-such. The old adage expresses this truth literally, *vox populi, vox dei*, the first implication of which is the guarantee of infallibility. The upshot of both of these philosophies seems to be this: we do not want to go wrong, and consequently we cannot do so.⁷ But when we seek some rational guarantee of the validity of this naive but elemental logic, God or Nature seems the final sanction. Verily the soul of man will not rest until it rests in certainty. If this be in fact democracy, it is democracy made bearable by undemocratic blessings. It is democracy builded on absolutistic foundations.

On the contrary, we are coming to admit for the first time that democratic institutions must rest on democratic foundations; and a democratic regime must, if it be bearable at all, be rendered so by democratic assurances. If such foundations and such assurances cannot be found, then we must frankly resign ourselves either to despair or to absolutism once more. Our political theory cannot exist half slave and half free. This conviction brings us face to face with a third philosophy of democracy.

III. *A Philosophy of Scientific Control.*

This is the philosophy of experimentalism. Negatively put, this philosophy does not seek to read out of the individual-as-such or out of the group-as-such an infallible guarantee of success. It rests its case neither in divine guidance of king or of sovereign voter nor in any law of nature that pushes us up—willy-nilly—toward an inevitable goal. It is equally distrustful of any optimism the basis of which is laid in a hypothetical "real will" that may do violence to

⁶ *The Promise of American Life*, p. 1.

⁷ Cf. James description of the bases of selfishness: "Whatever is me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious; Whatever is mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must not fail." *Psychology*, I:318.

the "will of all" as it journeys to the Absolute, the reconciler of all contradictions. These are all would-be short-cuts to that Land of Promise whereunto there is in truth no royal road. Indeed, these remnants of absolutistic hopes are more than excrescences upon a genuinely democratic order; they are verily among the worst enemies of democracy. As Croly has vigorously declared: "To conceive the better American future⁸ as a consummation which will take care of itself,—as the necessary result of our customary conditions, institutions, and ideas,—persistence in such a conception is admirably designed to deprive American life of any promise at all."⁹ Such views are forces of retardation because they encourage a soft dependence upon mystic, if not magic, means; they encourage instead of a belief in the efficacy of human effort, indolence born of faith in a "manifest destiny;"¹⁰ they lead us to judge institutions, not by their results, but by their pretensions—a procedure that has been at the expense of mankind from the beginning; and, finally, such views give us the feeling of security without the security itself and at the same time cause us, in the enjoyment of the feeling, to neglect the attainment of genuine security in the only way possible, through intelligent and far-sighted control.

On the positive side, democracy as experimentalism makes it clear that, in whatever other sense equality prevails, we are at least all equally devoid of infallibility. Instead of an *a priori* deduction of inevitable goods, we have only our own confessedly imperfect instruments with which to brave the future. "Trial and error" is here king of all. Genuine democracy represents man come of age. He now must take himself for better or for worse. This is a game at which we must throw our cards—our lives, our honor, or sacred all—upon the table of contingency and look for no other sanction

⁸ Croly has elsewhere said that on the whole we "still believe that somehow and sometime something better will happen to good Americans than has happened to men in any other country". *The Promise of American Life*, p. 3.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 5. Cf. also J. A. Hobson, *Democracy After the War*, p. 162. "One of the most subtle defences of conservatism has been the modern notion, sedulously sown, that democracy was a process so inevitable and predestined in the evolution of society that no clearly conscious and purposive direction was required. . . . Democracy cannot be brought about by a drift or tendency of unconscious purpose; it needs conscious organization and direction by the co-operative will of individuals and nations."

¹⁰ Croly says (*ibid.* p. 4 *supra*): "The American calls his country, not the Land of Promise, but the Land of Destiny, and quotes H. G. Wells as saying: "When one talks to an American of his national purpose, he seems a little at a loss; if we speak of his national destiny, he responds with alacrity".

than that provided by the experiment itself. Democracy, like all things else, must submit to the test of time. "That such an experimental philosophy of life," says Dewey, "means a dangerous experiment goes without saying. It permits, sooner or later it may require, every alleged sacrosanct principle to submit to ordeal by fire—to trial by service rendered."¹¹ But the very danger of the challenge banishes fear and trembling and arms man with a new strength as he goes forth to work out his political salvation.

But since this philosophy confesses its only instrument to be experiment, trial and error, and since it proposes to apply this instrument to the state, upon which under our present system practically all our other institutions and cherished values vitally depend, it must be prepared to show evidence—if there be any—that its hit-or-miss experiments will not be more "miss" than "hit," that its trial-and-error will not be all error.

Briefly put, the answer to this legitimate and highly important question is found in the fact that man is a *learning* animal, that he can profit by past experience. This human endowment expresses itself in both passive and active adaptation to the environment (i. e., first in fitting man to his environment and then in fitting the environment to man.) This enables man constantly to change his mode of reaction to the changing world. There is nothing here of infallibility; so long as the future remains the future, it will remain contingent. Time is time, and the road in front is entirely open.¹² And herein is the element of risk, here is the genuine experimentalism. But in man's ability to learn is the ground for hope that his trial and error plan may be made to yield more successes than failures. And here the group fortifies the individual; here the individual enriches the group. For if we will avoid abstractions, we shall not contrast the individual and the group; but shall remember, as Professor Tufts has said, that we have "a social individual," "a society which reflects individuality."¹³ Through collaboration and comparison of experiments generalized conclusions can be had. Isolation of conditions can be effected, and improvement be made continuous, though the generations come and go.¹⁴ In the social nature of the individual and in his consequent ever-enlarging co-opera-

¹¹ *German Philosophy and Politics*, pp. 125-6.

¹² It is interesting to note that concurrent with the growth of democracy, new philosophies emphasizing the reality and significance of time—Bergsonism and Pragmatism particularly—have arisen.

¹³ *Philosophical Review*, 5:379.

¹⁴ As for technique, compare Will Durant's proposal for a Society of Social Research, in *Philosophy and the Social Problem*.

tion¹⁵ lies the possibility of intelligent control, both of mankind and of mankind's environment. It is in the concept of continuing and ever-increasing control that there is to be found a substitute for absolutism. Through a never-ending series of experiments so set as to eliminate the errors of the preceding ones, we can gradually approach as a limit, happier adaptation to and completer mastery of, our world.

Distrust of such a conception of democracy ought to be lessened by noting the fact that the suggestion really is that we apply science to the problem of government. If democracy is ever to be scientific, it must consciously and frankly become experimental. Science knows no Absolute; its progress is indeed in inverse ratio to the *a priori* element in it. It is an interesting fact that political theory is the last great interest of life to falter at the threshold of science. Why, even religion has entered the kingdom before politics! As was suggested at the beginning of this paper, the innumerable interests¹⁶ that the state includes has made political theory the citadel of conservatism. But as rapidly as it becomes indubitably clear that the security that absolutistic theories promise is false, so rapidly, it seems certain, will democracy, now spread throughout the world, seek the only basis that can promise well for the long future. Grief over loss of impossible infallibility or of specious certainty will in time be replaced by a new found joy in creating manifold new values in our human world. Experimental democracy means a turning at last from magic to a growing control of such means as can most surely realize whatever ends we set up as constituting the goods of life.

¹⁵ The need of and the progress of co-operation is suggestively sketched by Professor Tufts in his *Ethics of Co-operation*.

¹⁶ For the state, to which alone the term democracy has as yet been seriously applied, even in democratic countries tends to swallow up all other interests and organizations. To what extent this has come true, H. Hobson vividly shows. *Democracy After the War*, p. 160.

THIS THING CALLED CIVILIZATION.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

"The old, old urge, based on the ancient pinnacles;
lo, newer, higher pinnacles; from science and the
modern still impell'd—the old, old urge: *eidolons*."
—Walt Whitman.

AFTER three years of discussion over the negative findings which Prof. Babbitt has made against the naturalistic and pseudo-romantic tendencies in modern life, there is coming to be an irresistible query in many minds whether our boasted Civilization is anywhere near the real thing. It is so much a mere round-robin of subscribed deceit and subsidized debauchery, so much a vicious circle of publicity propaganda, smeer-culture and profit-squalor, that any sensible or sincere person has a perfect right to doubt the sumptuous sanity and the proffered prestige it is supposed to afford us.

To cheat oneself and neighbors is the ultimate procedure of "success." To make our friends the hirelings of our own self-advancement or petty ambition is the customary motto of political preferment. To anticipate the inevitable settlement with cunning spoilsmongers is the principal function of industrial courts and economic conferences. To shirk the holy duty of public trust and personal integrity, and force a selfish usury on widows, orphans, defectives, the aged needy and disabled veterans is one of the flagrant practices of professional parasites and others who falsely proclaim the credentials of organized charity. While to jerk and twist one's features in the aping of nobler emotions or in the mad nightmare of a hedonist's reckless life is what often passes for sympathy, pity or the amiable sociability of an inert happiness. It is certainly a bad mess of affairs when anyone has *cause* to become

sceptical about the supposititious principles, functions and durable values which idealists ascribe to Civilization.

But what have we failed to do that permits our affairs to become thus disarranged and cause us to thus grope about in the blear anxiety to avoid the pitfalls of our spiritual cavern? Why should we lose both the vision and the skillful practice of the beautifully good and true?—that principle which Ruskin once enunciated to the effect that

“Fine Art is that in which the hand, the head, and the heart go together . . . making a little group of wise men better than a wilderness of fools.”

One possible explanation is the following more or less subjective account. I have always felt but little confidence in the civilization of an age whose people could not be easily imposed upon. It is hardly less discouraging to have a jungle of ravaging knaves making our path of progress unnecessarily hazardous than to have a wilderness of fools so cowardly and unwise as to feed and succor them. For when a community, state or nation is composed of that ruling minority of individuals who are ever wary, sophisticated, unscrupulously cunning, and whose action-patterns are consequently the expressions of complex motives, how can it survive for long except on condition that the rest of the population remain gullible, myopic and misinformed? And even when it does survive for any comparative length of time, how can it result in anything but a commonwealth of mediocrity, obscurity and sterile civilization? The continued hegemony of the Few requires a certain proportion of exploitation, arbitrary control, injustice and clever propaganda to secure its power over the heterogeneous Many.

Thus then, except in sporadic individual cases of intelligent life, the general texture of Civilization is shoddy, faded and of ugly design. Times indeed do often change, but not the people or the actual code by which they live. The rhyomism of petty minds and purposes seems to be perennially in fertile flower and gives employment to the vigilant *weeder*s of a more thrifty and industrious field. Lacking initiative virtue and ethical hospitality, such a former age as our grandchildren will look back upon will be said to lack also generosity, sincerity, faith and unselfish love. It will probably be called the age of exploit, confusion and unrest that was concerned only in its attempt to *get by* on the least possible expenditure of honest thought and expression of moral energy. No wonder its so-called civilization is even now looked upon in various circles

as a questionable process culpable of many veiled devices set to trick and spoliage the keepers of her shrine.

It seems to me then that our only national safety, like our ultimate cosmic destiny, is assured to us only in the honest pursuit and ethical perfection of our moral capacity. We must educate ourselves to become keen purveyors as well as accurate surveyors of righteousness, sensitive alike to the close discriminations of justice and to the broad distinctions of honesty, kindness, public courage and private responsibility. For we are secure from future disaster only when we have actually and irrevocably destroyed all special privilege, all kakistocracy and economic tyranny; and only when our social institutions have been established on the fundamental principles of equal opportunity for all, the vocational recognition of genius and special types, the non-eligibility of mere fortune of birth to power and plenty, and the homogeneous (if not harmonious) placement of every form of creative capacity, executive ability or constructive skill. Spingarn has very ably shown us the utter antithesis between "the Seven Arts and the Seven Confusions" (New York, 1917) as well as the utter folly of trying to foist an economic yoke on genius and appreciative taste. But I think there is an *eighth art* that comprises the normal rational method of all honest civilizing processes, while there is also the correlative *eighth confusion* which results from an abnormal, foolish and misdirected cultural process. Our choice then is between just such an art and just such a confusion of human life. It is the Great Alternative which Charles Fletcher Dole sees at the foundation of Christianity.

I seldom lend so close an ear to the clamor of this boisterous world as I do to the thrill of a peaceful song, a bird in rapturous delight, or a woodsman whistling as he goes to work. It is to me a world that gives us more in proportion as we pay it less attention, and troubles us less in proportion as we accommodate ourselves with periods of repose and meditation. That is, we should be less concerned with worldly goods and more enamored of the sunny nooks and refuge of the woods. Only if we will, we can make of it almost over night a world, not of bustling self-interest and high-gear expedieny, but of music, virtue, wisdom, love, hope, science, religious devotion and (last but of equal importance) *sane conversation*. This is no distant or quondam possibility. It is an individual problem in *how* to keep one's balance and stay really civilized in the turmoil and ephemerality of this rancorous modern world. Howsoever we disclaim its general applicability, our ultimate

realization or failure to achieve an upright life proves that it remains a moral problem decisively immediate to our inward needs. That is surely one good reason why it demands our most capable and sincere attention.

In "The Summit of the Years" America's venerable philosopher and Nature-lover, John Burroughs, deplors this mad wrangle called modern civilization; our sophist paradoxes of power and weakness, longevity and race-suicide, social prestige and superficial ideals, prodigy-education and statistical smear-culture. He gives also a fine description of how we kill the spirit trying to save the soul. We certainly have sufficient evidence on hand to argue successfully that the world has gone mad over size-and-quantity measures of achievement; the sentiments of sanctity, sincerity, courage, and true noble quality being relegated to the dusty limbo of second-hand and third-rate literature. It is far otherwise than an auspicious religious sign when we find that people are overly devout only because they have access to the giant eight-foot Bible at Oxford or the Lord's Prayer which is engraved on a cherry stone at Pittsburg. The true and irredundant biography of humanity can actually and sufficiently be written into the space of a hundred pages pica. All over this amount is merely the fringe of a wizard carpet, beautiful perhaps but foolish and useless. Only an endless series, as it is today, of notes and indices, quotations and tables of contents for the information of babes and fools and knaves. Think then of the three million idle if not actually culpable repetitions in the Parisian Bibliothique—not to mention the thousand and two other vast collections scattered over the face of the earth! No wonder Christopher Morley, rehashing an old riddle, says that a book nowadays "is black and white, but seldom red (read) all over." And we are fast becoming inveterate triflers, not only in literature, but even in art, sociology, religion, science and philosophy.

This thing called modern civilization is certainly a far-fetched guess at the riddle of life. It really is, in its last analysis, an exceedingly awkward attempt to wear a starched collar on a work-shirt, to dance the Newport glide in logger's boots, leaving all the graceful charms of artistry to professional press-agents. The world, very much after the fashion of Schopenhauer's dictum, is a pendulum perpetually swinging between the extremes of culture and anarchy, religion and blasphemy, philosophy and folly. And yet the one extreme is as obstructive and disastrous in its *softness* and luxury-aims as the other is in its *hardness* and energy-values. The

real distinction is closer cut than that which only sees external aims and applications, and hence is moral and ethical in the principles which render the two sides distinct and antithetical. It is not so much a question of *how to interpret* religion and literature, as Matthew Arnold's "sweetness and light" would have us think. Quite possibly "mind and purpose ride on matter to the last atom," but this does not point out an adequate solution to the world's age-old problem of evil, nor does it offer any suggestions how to cure the raucous incorrigibility of those who persist in doing evil either openly or covertly. A good world must be rendered fool-proof as well as insusceptible to the seductions of evil and finite interest.

After looking, with J. M. Guyau, at Art from the sociological point of view, we have known for long that

"Life is that in which thought, action and will converge toward one end—*la synergie sociale*. But this is not enough. To this must be added the exaltation of the individual thru *la sympathie sociale*; the production of this being the supreme function of art."

And it is one of the primary functions of every real cultural process to be social in aim, not merely a private and uncommunicable activity. It must honestly *mean* to build up and control the relevant affairs of Civilization whether these be early or late, good or bad, valuable or vain. Because the moral and the ethical tendencies of any particular code of life are invariably reliable criteria of its worth and the degree of its ultimate practicability, we need not remain raw humanists, but should seek to refine our heritage from Nature into a spiritual reality. The only art that is more fundamental in skill and ideal action-patterns than are usually listed in the bare chronicle of man's civilization is the art of living. And there are, just as there have always been, but very few masters to guide us aright.

Knowing how to live is at once the specialty of wise men and the puzzling paradox of fools; for the latter seem always to either live without knowing how or else they know how but do not live according to their knowledge. And yet, to be honest, preserving one's even temper, reserving judgment, and being always amiably disposed—this is the fourfold passport to the exotic shore of normal living. The physical reflection of normal intellectual and moral life will always be a faithful reproduction of the original pattern, and anyone can readily see where the original fault lies whenever there is evidence of a physical or ethical deformity.

An honest mind will not pass impeachable judgments upon anyone or anything, nor be vexed with them only in reflecting on brawling reports, equivocal opinions, or base conjectures. A balanced mind will always keep to the normal level of thought and speculation, sensible of but not weakly susceptible to the influence of external circumstances. An ephectic mind will not run headlong into the myopic impasse of rash decision, for it is ever disposed to await the truth and treat its deliverances in a cheerful mood of cautiousness. Likewise too, the amiable mind will not desert its unique refuge of innocence and contentment, for it experiences the daily gratuities of calm discretion and hopeful courage. The one element most common to these four aspects of the normal mind, or rather the one reliable compository which settles them in anticipation of any possible disturbance or infirmity, is the nobler function of the heart, its pattern of persistent truth, its perennial prescription of capacity-culture or development of talent, and its implacable struggle against all manner of treason, stratagems and spoils. These are the necessary instruments to normal living; and yet there must be a sad minority who use them in daily practice, for it is getting to be a rare thing indeed to find anyone who is honest and liberal and cheerful at heart as well as in mind.

However, the criticism of others' conduct as being distinct from the similar tendency of our own is a truly risky business. Even when our own lives are actually set upon the estimable pedestal of probity and judicial discernment, we are taking chances with the *whole truth* of whatever we presume to judge. Especially when publishing a conception of how our neighbors ought to live, we are proceeding under the false impression of self-love and the egotism of presuming our own a normal capacity for pronouncing judgment upon the moral and intellectual responsibilities of others. Thus our own individual virtue and manner of living may be unimpeachable, but yet not a suitable or sufficient ground on which to dictate the conduct of someone else. What is measurable as limited good and what is indeterminate as variant evil are matters that we take exceptional hazard in attempting to decide from the ground of self-esteem alone. Our own merits and abilities may be sufficient to allow our critical function an adequate scope of action, but without benevolence and meekened sympathy our judgments are likely to result in little short of mere self-bias and automorphism—a truly ridiculous label on our decision.

Goethe had a rule from Wilhelm Meister that "every day we

should hear at least one little song, read one good poem, and look at one choice picture." This procedure, in distinction from what I have above named the moral course, is to lead the aesthetic life, and have those rarer qualities of intellectual power and artistic taste which will accommodate our sensitive appreciation of the finer forms of beauty and goodness which may be found here and there in the two great worlds of Nature and Human Life. Music, poetry, and painting are the three elder sisters of our creative genius (sculpture, architecture, design, creative prose and dramatic literature being others of the same family); and hence we do well to have an ear for the solace, the advice and encouragement they lend in our struggle against the uncouthness and vandalism of our awkward adolescence. Even in our later years they are of much practical counsel warding off ennui and pejorism. All these items might be considered as sidelights on F. W. Fitzpatrick's article on the "Evolution of Ethics" in *The Open Court* for January.

With peculiar regularity we find that the constant casuist cycle of opinion is to make inordinate claims and then fall into doubt over them. Habitual casuists are never tender-minded; they will unconsciously and, apparently, by second nature seek for specious irenics and apologies to cover every situation in which their acrobatic faculties place them. No social wrong, usury, hoax or out and out fraud seems capable of ruffing their well-oiled feathers. They have intellectual scruples and microtomic instruments aplenty, but none of conscience or moral principle. In any honest ethics the data of the "beyond good and evil" moralist are indeed meagre, for he is seeking to live beyond morality and cannot take a reliable back-sight testimony. Man's only defensible brief for civilization is the slight degree of progress he has made in fellowship and aspiration, not the vast material wealth and achievement he has so shrewdly made his own. If there is any lesson in history it is this: that man has found that worldly codes are vain, that selfish utility and indulgence are the idle maxims of half-wise dupes and hedonists, and that all this mass of would-be eternal values is but the mercury on our automorphous mirrors. Progress is change for the better, and Civilization is an illusion if it is not wholly melioristic.

There is a legitimate tho fragile support allowed to romantic morality by our highest ideals of justice, altruism, integrity and loyalty; but these ideals have a background of ethical promise and true expediency in our instinctive tribal nature, they are subjective first and adjectival afterward. The heroism of Gandhi and the

ruthlessness of his non-co-operators in contemporary India clearly illustrate the order in which a man's ideas and aspirations seek to become realized. Anyone having philosophical doubts regarding the *inherent* degree of a certain nation's civilization and wishing to prove his case one way or another, needs only to try to change the existent system of life. And there are usually more conservative elements present to offer reactionary proof than can be immediately discountenanced and set aside in favor of those more progressive.

Biologists agree that environmentally acquired traits of character cannot be transmitted to offspring, that they are not inheritable, altho of high survival value in the disposition of the individual. It would seem then that traits of character can only be developed *after* birth, and that what we really do inherit is nothing but bare tendency, a disposition to be of a certain type regardless of the fortunes and moral suasions of our subsequent surroundings. Still, contemporary moralists have a strange sympathy for the creed-shy caution of the modern sceptic's departure from Melanchthon's synergism (a departure which Guyau anticipated and sought to forestall)—holding that neither God nor man can have any lasting influence on meliorism to take effect in the external processes of Civilization, much less in the obstinate sphere of human appetite and material ambition. The mere desire for better conditions of life and civilized progress can in time be realized, but it should not be carried forward entirely naked of other considerations and have its bare limbs cramped and forced into some pet scheme of intellectual content or reified into some far-off theological purpose; for then it is liable to hatch up less scrupulous mischiefs if still a positive purpose or, if weak and grown negative, it is liable to become an illusory sentiment or an inert moral force making its devotees nothing but helpless and negligible social factors in the world.

It is significant that none of the modern *travailleurs intellectuels* are any longer dupes to such outworn intrigue as the sparkling wit and clever worldly wisdom of the "three literary madams" (the Mmes. Sevigne, de Stael, and Maintenon) whose slightest glance and expression of opinion could make or break a powerful statesman's reputation. And still, with all our intellectual freedom and social democracy giving sanction and support to practically every conceivable sort of initiative, this modern sophistication seems yet to be inadequate to save us from the corruption, fraud and injustice of a false civilization. Not since the precious days of Louis

Quatorze and the "grand age" which culminated in the deliberately immoral policy of Louis XV, the fanatical contest between Jacobins and Girondists, and the bloody denouement of Robespierre's triumph, has there been such an impasse of unrest, ethical malfeasance, and general debauchery of both public and private honor. One of the foremost contemporary causes of this deplorable condition is the too popular but fallacious idea that the very spirit and genius of human nature can be temporarily repaired, advertised with gaudy labels, and bought and sold across the bargain counter of ephemeral and foolishly mercenary motives. But human life is not an ephemeral commodity, else it would meekly submit to the wage-cuts and other economic trimming or jobbery administered by cold-blooded financial autocrats; nor can all the venality and commercial intrigue of a myriad spoliating schemers ever thus translate the value of our personal wills-to-live or the primal aim of our individual destinies. Such a vulgar and selfish plot cannot become a durable transvaluation because it is wholly unnatural, artificial and chimerical. And anyone so desiring is either a fool or a knave to seek solace in such sycophantic sophistry.

Civilization is that degree in the process of spiritual development which should guarantee justice, equal opportunity, education, eugenesis and proper moral heritage to everyone regardless of their material fortune or power; and any phase of life which presents characteristics of less moral or intelligent quality might very well be of a certain definable promise but should not be prematurely called *civilized*. One of the surest arguments for the notion that we have made progress during the last two milleniums is not based upon this or that compend of material advancement or mere external perfection, but on the obvious fact that at least *some* of the people of the world are awake and are exerting themselves to realize Aristotle's decision that,

"The State came into being that man might exist, but its end is that man might live nobly."

It is the gradual dissemination of this decision among the minds of modern people which makes them see their proper political (moral and educational) heritage, and appreciate the aspirational will that God has given them to fight for the actual and durable realization of this natural birthright in all its economic scope and social grandeur. And so it should be in a truly intelligent and progressive world. But until the general public, both communal and international, is brightened and ennobled with this conscious decision and

given signatory power over its verbal drafting and official presentation to the world, especially in its moral, educational, ethical and economic measures, we may only expect to continue our jungle-caveman mode of life and always have with us a vast majority of knaves who will derive an easy sustenance from those of us who are foolish enough to support them with the culpable mediocrity of our indifference and incapacity.

However, excepting as we let our attention dwell on the pejorative tendencies which nowadays seem so obstinately in the ascendant, there are still many items that encourage us to believe that the age of a normal world is at hand. There are new departures everywhere springing up to replace the old prejudices, giving brighter vision and exaltation to the mystic inner life of man. Justice and kindness, honesty and benevolence, political brotherhood and spiritual aspiration are the flaming watchwords. These are always the symptoms of an urge to progress, a thrust-bearing which takes up the strain of a direct conflict between an irresistible moral character and the mass inertia of an outworn age of circumstance and finite interest.

It is promised that men and women shall set up a co-regency of public and domestic honor, law and order, culture and freedom, wisdom and love which, when once firmly established, shall prove to be the most durable dynasty in all the archives of human history. Then shall the full significance of our social and political life flower into obvious prospects of moral culture and ethical achievement. And by becoming manifest to the multitude it will be afforded the rare opportunity of becoming realized on a universal scale. But can these promises, these high ideals for our moral future, be to any measurable or practical degree realized? And when realized, can they be economically applied to the social and political problems which are so absorbing and persistent today?

This present finitude which dims our vision and corrupts the contemporary souls of people cannot endure for aye, for it spells its own doom by its very mischief and limitation of function. We must somehow and sooner or later deliberately shuffle off this mortal coil of cumbrous ethical evasion, and set up instead the normal bisexual composite of moral government with its attendant complements of social equality, economic justice, educational reduction of delinquency and mediocrity, and the vocational recognition of genius and creative capacity. Surely we will some day recognize and advocate the now unborn principle of co-operative spiritual

effort and co-ordinated aspiration, using real efforts and real aspirations in solving our everyday problems. Surely we will some day pick out the kernel of truth which now nestles so snugly in the unnecessarily ponderous shell of our crusted ignorance. And in the digestion and assimilation of it into our general moral system we will probably begin to realize how long we have gone hungry for just such an occasion and just such a sumptuous repast.

Our moral life grows by means of justice and kindness, honesty and benevolence, culture and freedom, wisdom and love. So why should we not arrange our communal affairs so that our social or ethical life also would proceed according to a harmonious government by means of an equal dispensation of law and order, sincerity and service, industry and art, skilful thinking and honest manual labor? Why can we not recast this barbarous system now in ridiculous if not rancorous vogue? Is it really impossible or only difficult to start up a phoenix nation of real men and women who will live respectively according to the normal masculine and normal feminine principles of life, knowing no hermaphrodite illusion about soft foppery or hard androgyny, but resting content to be exactly as God intended them to be—complementary to each other? Can it be denied that we are already the dual vehicle in the world conveying justice and kindness, moral decision and cultural aspiration, brotherhood and constructive industry, wheresoever they have thus far been conveyed and the spark of divinity kept alive in human nature?

Such as these are our ultimate political questions; they have a vital bearing on the contemporary trend of Civilization, and the various manners in which we find occasion to answer them will certainly bear an equally various fruit in the ethics and morality of the future. The actual data on both our origin and destiny are very meagre and obscure. So, while science does not know and religion offers but little solace, we can at least exercise anticipation and hope, feeling that the Great Perhaps of Erasmus and Robert Burns is the last word in any valid confessional of faith in the hereafter.

SUPERNATURALISM AND SATANISM IN CHATEAUBRIAND.

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✓
BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN
(Continued)

[Chateaubriand falls particularly short of his models in the delineation of his supernatural beings. These are not persons but marionettes, manufactured out of the tinsel borrowed from the classical and Christian poets. Our author is especially unsuccessful in his descriptions of the demons. The illustrious painter of *Atala*, Chactas, René, Eudorus and Velléda could not paint the portrait of his infernal majesty. The Devil as the Deity in *les Martyrs* is but the grand "machinist" of the poem.] Chateaubriand aspired to surpass his models in the creation of Satan. "Dante," he asserted, "has simply made of Satan an atrocious monster, locked up in the center of the earth. Tasso, by giving his Devil horns, has almost rendered him ridiculous. Misled by these authorities, Milton had, for a moment, the bad taste to give the measurements of his Satan" (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. iv, chap. 9). Chateaubriand, for this reason, refrains from detailed description of the figure of his Satan. We learn only that "he no longer resembles the star of the morning, but is like a baleful comet" (*Martyrs*, VIII). Dante, however, meant his Dis to be nothing but a foul and frozen fiend—an object of horror and hatred.²³ Tasso's Pluto fully retains his imposing dignity notwithstanding the traditional horns. Milton describes Satan as a powerful giant, but enters into no details of his physical appearance, leaving them to the imagination of the reader (*Par. Lost*, i, 194ff.). But Chateaubriand's Satan is so far inferior to all of these devils that he can bear no comparison with them. Chateaubriand's Satan is so much below Milton's Satan that we blush to think how he could ever sustain a conversation with him or even appear in

²³ Cf. the present writer's article, "Dante's Devil," in *The Open Court* for September, 1921.

his company. It is only after a prolonged sojourn in the dread and dismal darkness that the Devil of Milton has become the Devil of Chateaubriand. The Devil of the latter is, indeed, the Miltonic Devil, "but oh how fallen! how changed!" (*Par. Lost*, i. 84). In Milton's poem, Satan is still full of the memories of Heaven. His recent fall has not deprived him of his celestial beauty. He is a stranger as yet to his new and nebulous surroundings, while in Chateaubriand's book several thousand years of reprobation have passed over his head. The long habit of criminal thought has effaced from his brow every vestige of his past splendor, and he now appears as black as the regions which he inhabits. He has neither the greatness of intellect nor the charm of personality with which he was clothed by Milton. We meet in *les Martyrs* no longer the proud and bold archangel who would rather "reign in Hell than serve in Heaven" (*Par. Lost*, i. 263).

Chateaubriand's Devil answers to both of his biblical names, Satan and Lucifer. Satan was not generally identified with Lucifer before the time of Anselm (1034-93). Among the early Church Fathers, Eusebius was the only one who applied the name Lucifer to the chief rebel. In medieval literature Lucifer and Satan are not blended, though they are thoroughly in agreement. Lucifer is the Prince of the Pit, while Satan is but a second rate devil as in the Latin apocryphal book *Descensus Christi ad Inferos*, which forms the second part of the *Evangelium Nicodemi* (third century). Satan is Lucifer's chief minister and bosom friend, a "clever rooster," as his master calls him. A sharp line of demarcation is drawn between the characters of these two devils. Lucifer is a weakling, a cowardly despot, and Satan is his strong arm. The arch-regent of Hell is nervous and timorous, sentimental and brutal, vacillating and temporizing, always whimpering and whining for his past glory. Satan, on the other hand, is bold and proud, ever optimistic, never regretful. He submits to his fate without a murmur. He is far manlier than his master and often upbraids him for his womanish manners. After the fall from Heaven, Satan marshals all his powers of oratory to cheer and comfort his crest-fallen and despairing lord.³⁴

The worst fault of Chateaubriand's Satan in contrast to Milton's is his lack of freedom of action. The two conceptions of the Devil, the Catholic and the Protestant, are well illustrated by these two authors. In Catholicism the dualism is less pronounced and

³⁴ On the differentiation of character and personality between Lucifer and Satan and the lesser demons, see the present writer's monograph on the Devil in the religious plays of medieval Germany (Baltimore, 1915).

the Devil less powerful than in Protestantism.³⁵ Milton's Satan, acting of his own free will, is really an epic, majestic figure, a Promethean character who vainly but valiantly opposes a power which he knows he can never conquer. Chateaubriand's Satan has no will of his own. He belongs, to speak in the language of the Church, not to himself but to God (Anselm, *De casu Diaboli*). The Adversary in *les Martyrs* is but a tool in the hands of the Almighty, who knows his plans in advance, overhears the discussions of his council and takes a hand in its deliberations whenever he deems it necessary.

Another weakness in Chateaubriand's diabolistic conception is the representation of Satan and his angels as writing in physical torments and frightful agonies. Thus Chateaubriand robs them of all dignity. In this respect our author follows Milton, whose devils also suffer from fire (*Par. Lost*, ii. 88). But this material pain is in Milton very insignificant as compared with the spiritual sufferings of the devils. It is the inward torment on which Milton lays chief emphasis, and this inner pain shows itself in the face of his Satan. "Myself am Hell," he cries in the anguish of his soul (*ibid*, iv, 75). What gnaws at his heart is not a serpent, but

"The thought, both of lost happiness and lasting pain."

(*Ibid*, i. 54-5.)

The pain of Milton's Satan is psychical rather than physical. His is the boundless horror and despair of one who has known "eternal joys" and is now condemned to everlasting banishment. Marlowe's Mephistopheles also complains of moral rather than material sufferings. His torment is to be hopelessly bound in the constraint of serfdom to evil. There is a suggestion of peculiar horror in the tortured protest which bursts from his lips when asked as to his condition:

"Thinkest thou that I, who saw the face of God,
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells,
In being deprived of everlasting bliss?
O, Faustus, leave these frivolous demands,
Which strike a terror to my fainting soul!"

Chateaubriand, moreover, on this point runs counter to the teachings of the Church. "The everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," is not to be lighted until the Judgment Day. Up to that time the punishment of the devils consists only in the

³⁵ The English reformer, John Wycliffe, in his *De dominio divino*, seems to imply that here on earth God must obey the Devil

fact that they must torment the souls of the wicked (*Book of Enoch*. x. 37). It is only the chief devil who was laid in everlasting chains by Christ during his descent to Hell, "as a special punishment for his audacity in tempting and persecuting our Lord on earth or for some other unfathomable intention of the Lord for the salvation of his Church and his elect" (Suraez, *De angelorum*; cf. also Gregory, *Moral. Lib.*, xxxv). The confinement of Satan, however, has in no way fettered his activity on earth. No matter how often the Devil has been bound and sealed in the lowest pit of Hell, his baleful influence on the affairs of men has never suffered any diminution. Satan apparently directs the work from his dungeon and despatches myriads of myrmidons to effect his will on earth. This conception of the imprisoned rebel, by the way, is a pre-Christian tradition. It may be found in many of the ancient ethnic religions. Ahriman, who fought against Ormuzd, was bound for a thousand years; Prometheus, who assailed Zeus, was chained to a rock in the Caucasus; and Loki, the calumniator of the northern gods, was strapped down with thongs of iron in his subterranean cavern.

Another serious deviation from tradition in *les Natches* is Chateaubriand's placing the demon Rumor at the southern extremity of our earth. To be canonically correct he should have domiciled her in the north. The north and not the south was looked upon as the Devil's special domain. It is described as the Devil's dwelling in the passage where the Lucifer legend first finds expression (*Is.* xiv. 13; cf. also *Jer.* i. 14f. and *Par. Lost*, v. 689). "The Lord," says Lactantius, "so divided the world with the Devil that *occidens, septentrio, tenebrae frigus* fell to the sphere of his Adversary." This accords with the saying, "ab aquilone omne malum." The good Goethe also said:

"The further northward one doth go,
The plentier soot and witches grow."

By taking up his sojourn in the north, Satan is but following his Persian ancestor Ahriman, who, as a winter-demon, had his habitation in the cold north, from whence he sent down hail, snow and devastating floods. The north side of a churchyard is considered unconsecrated ground and is reserved for suicides. As the entrance to a church is at the west end, the north is always to the left. For this reason the left has always been the seat of, and has practically become a synonym for, the Opposition. The Devil, like the traditional Hibernian, is always "agin the government" of Heaven or of earth. As a matter of fact, Dublin was by some demonologists con-

sidered to be Satan's earthly capital. The Scandinavian form of this name is Divelina. Burns had this fact in mind when he wrote:

"Is just as true's the deil's in hell
Or Dublin city."

Chateaubriand may have been thinking of the *daemon meridianus* of the Vulgate for Psalm xc. By this term, however, is meant the demon of middle age and not of the south. It was applied by Joseph de Maistre to Napoleon,³⁶ and recently served as title for a novel by Paul Bourget (1914).

The greater part of Chateaubriand's demons are but dull and dreary abstractions devoid of body and blood. Our author resorts to the simplest method of personification, in the medieval manner of the *Roman de la Rose*, which consists in writing an abstract noun with a capital letter.³⁷ In vain does he claim scriptural sanction and orthodox authority for his method of diabolizing our various vices. The objections which he raises against the physical allegory of classical mythology (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. i. chap. 2) hold just as well against the moral allegory of Christian theology. A personal devil is a lot more interesting than an abstraction. The Eternity of Sorrows our author considers as "the most daring fiction of *les Martyrs*." But Eternity of Sorrows is the counterpart of the Augustinian "aeternitas felicitatis." From the fact that Chateaubriand counts among his allegorical characters the demon of Labor, it would seem that he believes with the Arabs that Leisure comes from God and Labor from the Evil One.

. Allegory as a form of literature has long since passed away. Chateaubriand's allegorical phantasmagoria belongs to the antiquities which pseudo-classicism bequeathed to him. His devils even multiply with synonyms. There are two demons of Death: *la Mort* and *le Trépas*. This duplication is rather unusual. Hell is known for the precision of its distribution of labor. There is in addition an angel of Death. Our author puts an emissary of Heaven and one of Hell in charge of every natural act and of every human emotion;³⁸ and one must at times be a perfect connoisseur in spirits to know

³⁶ *Correspondance diplomatique* (published posthumously in 1860), ii. 65. Cf. K. R. Gallas, "A propos du titre *le Démon du midi*," in *Neophilologus*, vol. IV (1918-19), pp. 371-2. The writer of the note makes no mention of the passage in Joseph de Maistre.

³⁷ Cf. W. Wright Roberts, *loc. cit.*, p. 422.

³⁸ Contrary to popular belief, but in conformity with his esthetical views (cf. Matthey, *op. cit.*, p. 32), Chateaubriand maintains that, though leaving to Satan the power over most natural processes, the Lord has reserved for himself the storm and the thunder (*Natches*, X). He admits, however, that Satan

who's who. Uriel, the angel of Love, is supposed to be the antithesis of Astarte, the demon of Love. They are to be as far apart as Heaven is from Hell. In Chateaubriand's descriptions, however, the twain meet rather often. "The birth of Uriel, the angel of Love," we are told, "was coeval with the universe: he sprang into being with Eve, at the very moment when the first woman opened her eyes to the newly created light (*Martyrs*, XII). According to the rabbis, however, it was the Devil who entered the world at the same time as woman. He is believed to have issued from the aperture caused by the removal of the rib from Adam.

Chateaubriand's method of attributing sex to his allegorical characters, it must be admitted, bears the charm of novelty. The demon of Voluptuousness is a man, while the demons of Death and of Pride are women. We will not contest the quality of pride with the beautiful sex, but as far as Death is concerned we protest in the name of fairness. In our ignorance of the rules of personification we have always represented the Reaper as a member of the sterner sex.³⁹

Chateaubriand falls far short of his model, Milton, in his portrait of Death. In Milton's description of this demon all is vague, shrouded, confused, tremendous, terrible and sublime in the highest degree, while in Chateaubriand this demon is depicted in odious and hideous detail. Our author praises the manner in which Milton represented Death (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. iv, chap. 14). His praise is more apt than his imitation.

often unchains a storm against the will of God (*Martyrs*, XV) and even raises a hurricane (*Natches*, IX). In the popular mind, however, the wind and the storm have always been identified with the Devil. "We read in the Old Testament that the devil, by the divine permission, afflicted Job; and that among the means which he employed was a tempest which destroyed the house in which the sons of the patriarch were eating. The description in the *Book of Revelation* of the four angels who held the four winds, and to whom it was given to afflict the earth, was also generally associated with this belief; for, as St. Augustine tells us, the word angel is equally applicable to good and bad spirits" (Lecky, *Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*). This is the origin of the belief in the four chiefs of Hell. The medieval expression "faire le diable à quatre" is now easily understood.

³⁹ It must be admitted, though, that in the Basle *Dance of Death* (15th century), the figure of Death is feminine (cf. W. Vischer, *Ueber die Entstehungszeit und die Meister des Grossbasler Todtentanzes* (Basel, 1849). This may be due to the fact that in the temptation scene of the medieval mystery plays the Tempter usually appeared as a serpent with a woman's head. According to the Venerable Bede, Lucifer chose to tempt Eve through a serpent which had a female head because "like is attracted to like." Peter Comestor in his *Historia Scholastica* concludes from this fact that while the serpent was yet erect, it had a virgin's head. Ruskin shows an unfamiliarity with medieval literature and art when he states that the serpent in Paradise was for many centuries represented with the head of a man. In Grandchamp's painting of the Temptation, however, the serpent has the head of a handsome young man.

Nor has Chateaubriand equalled his master Milton in his delineation of the lesser lights of Hell. In *Paradise Lost* there is a distinct differentiation. The personality of each devil reveals itself. Satan is not merely a devil; he is the particular devil Satan. Beelzebub, we feel, is distinct from Belial, Moloch is not Mammon, nor is Dagon Rimmon. Milton's devils are not metaphysical abstractions. Even his allegorical figures are living symbols. His demons are not ugly beasts. They have no horns, no tails. Nor are they wicked men. But they act in a manner which men can understand. The Devil should not be human, but he must have enough in common with human nature to play a part intelligible to human beings. In the artistic treatment of diabolical material the chief difficulty lies in preserving the just mean between the devil-character and the imparted element of humanity.

\ Like their author, Chateaubriand's devils—and angels, too, for that matter—are lacking in humor; and humor is a devil's redeeming quality. We cannot warm up to Chateaubriand's demons. They leave us classically cold.

Chateaubriand's devils are like nothing upon earth. An exception is the demon of False Wisdom, whose prototype on earth is the eighteenth century *philosophe*. Chateaubriand claims originality for this demon. "It is true," he says, "that he has been better known in our times than in the past and that he has never done so much harm to men" (*Martyrs*, VIII. n. 27). He also boasts that the idea of the demon of False Wisdom as the Father of Atheism was original with him and was well received by the public. (*Ibid.*) In conformity with the orthodox view this reactionary to Romanism calls a deist an atheist. Similarly our great and recent Roosevelt called Tom Paine, "a filthy little atheist."⁴⁰ But whatever vices the demon of False Wisdom may have fathered, he is certainly innocent of the vice of atheism. Satan and his satellites are not and cannot be atheists. We know upon the authority of our Evangelists that the devils believe in God and "confess Christ" (*Mark*, i. 24; *Luke*, iv. 34). It would never occur to the Devil to deny the Deity. If he were to reason God out of existence he would have to apply the scalpel of self-obliteration to himself as well. The Lord is as neces-

⁴⁰ Dr. Frank Wicks, of Indianapolis, whom the present writer first heard refer to this passage in Roosevelt's *Gouverneur Morris* (1888), is authority for the statement that proofs of Paine's theism had been submitted by the Thomas Paine Association to Roosevelt, but that he refused to make a correction in subsequent editions of his book.

sary to Lucifer as Lucifer is to the Lord. Though they oppose, they complete each other. They are part and parcel of the great universal system. Wesley's famous cry: "No, Devil, no God!" may just as well be reversed: "No God, no Devil!" The words that Chateaubriand has put into the mouth of this father of Atheism were never spoken by any demon in time or in eternity. To apply to this atheistic devil the remark of the cook in regard to Tennyson's parents, "If you raäked out Hell with a smaäll-tooth coämb, you weänt find their like."⁴¹

VI

Chateaubriand's best and most successful diabolical creation is the demon of Voluptuousness. This demon is described as the most beautiful of the fallen angels after Lucifer. She left Heaven, she informs us, not from any hatred against the Eternal, but solely to follow an angel she loved. At last we find a sympathetic devil in Chateaubriand's Hell. The demon of Voluptuousness is, in the opinion of Jules Lemaitre, the charm and the grace of this insipid and sordid Hell. The author gives us a very sensuous description of this demon of Voluptuousness.⁴² He portrays her with such passionate concern that the reader is not at a loss where to find the author's sympathies. With what complacency does Chateaubriand put beautiful words into her mouth! Commenting on the speech of this demon, Jules Lemaitre exclaims: "Ah que le peintre de cet enfer aime visiblement le péché!"⁴³

"Dieux de l'Olympe, et vous que je connais moins, divinités du brahmane et du druide, je n'essaierai point de le cacher; oui, l'enfer me pèse! Vous ne l'ignorez pas; je ne nourrissais contre l'Eternel aucun sujet de haine, et j'ai seulement suivi dans sa rébellion et dans sa chute, un ange que j'aimais. Mais puisque je suis tombé du ciel avec vous, je veux du moins vivre longtems au milieu des mortels, et je ne me laisserai point bannir de la terre. . . ."⁴⁴

Chateaubriand tries to conceal his admiration for this demoness by referring to her as a member of the sterner sex. This, however,

⁴¹ Quoted in *Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir*. By his son (New York, 1905), p. 15.

⁴² A similar sensuous description is given in *les Natchez* of the demon Night, daughter of Satan.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁴⁴ "Gods of Olympus, and ye with whom I am less acquainted, divinities of the Brahman and of the Druid, I shall not attempt at all to conceal it; yes, I cannot bear Hell! You well know that I cherished no hatred whatever against the Eternal, and that I only followed an angel whom I loved in his

is an error of judgment on his part. He describes the demon of Voluptuousness as the most dangerous of the spirits of the Abyss. This leads us to suspect that this demon must be a woman if we agree with Daniel Defoe that "a lady devil is about as dangerous a creature as one could meet."⁴⁸ Her name, Chateaubriand informs us, was Astarte among the Phoenicians and Venus among the Greeks. Now both Astarte and Venus were goddesses. This demon could not have changed sex after entering Chateaubriand's Hell, inasmuch as the demon of Jealousy is represented as the son of this demon and of Satan (*Martyrs*, XIV). Our author is unfair to wish to monopolize voluptuousness for himself and for his sex.

The reason why Chateaubriand succeeded so well with the demon of Voluptuousness is because here he approached Greek mythology. It is rather strange that in this book, supposedly written to show the superiority of the Christian Supernatural, the devils are only interesting in so far as they represent Greek divinities. Our author was far more successful with the gods of the Greek Pantheon than with the spirits of the Christian Heaven or Hell. Whatever touches upon Hellenic mythology in *les Martyrs* is pleasing and charming; whatever relates to Christian Supernaturalism is heavy and laborious. This book, written, as its author claimed, to show the beauties of Christian legend, charms us only in so far as it is permeated with the Hellenic spirit. Chateaubriand pleaded the cause of Christian theology and won the triumph for pagan mythology. "Chateaubriand," as G. Pellissier says, "set out with a pilgrim's staff; this staff changed to a thyrsus in his hand."⁴⁹ We may well say of him also what A. Barine remarked in regard to Saint-Pierre: "He desired to open the door for Providence to enter; in

rebellion and in his fall. But since I have fallen with you from Heaven, I wish at least to dwell among mortals, and shall not suffer myself to be banished from the earth. Tyre, Heliopolis, Paphos, Amathus, demand my presence. My star still blazes upon Mount Libanus; there I have enchanted temples, graceful festivals, swans which bear me in the midst of zephyrs, of flowers, of incense, of perfumes, of fresh lawns, of voluptuous dances and of smiling sacrifices. And the Christians would snatch from me this trifling compensation for celestial joys, would transform the myrtle of my groves, which has given so many victims to Hell, into a savage cross in order to multiply the inhabitants of Heaven! No, indeed! I will this day make known my power. Neither violence nor wisdom is necessary to obtain a victory over the disciples of a severe law: I will arm against them the tender passions; this girdle assures to you the victory. My caresses will ere long have softened these austere servants of a chaste god. I will subdue the frigid virgins and will disturb, even in their solitude, those anchorites who think to escape my fascination. . . ."

⁴⁸ Cf. Thomas Wright, *The Life of Daniel Defoe* (New York, 1894), p. 336.

⁴⁹ *Le Mouvement littéraire au XIXe siècle* (8e éd., 1908), p. 61.

tact he opened the door for the great Pan." ⁴⁷ In *les Martyrs*, Chateaubriand represents Satan in the effort of bringing the old religions back to life. "He carries the fatal spark to all the temples, and lights again the extinguished fires upon the altars of the idols." Well, this is exactly what Chateaubriand himself did.⁴⁸ When he believed that he "raised the cross among the ruins of our altars," he placed wreaths of laurels upon the brows of the neglected Greek gods.

A further point must not be overlooked. In his great efforts to show the originality of his Hell, Chateaubriand maintains that it differs from all the hells of his predecessors by containing the Olympus. This claim stands perhaps unparalleled in the annals of literary history as a case of colossal self-deception. From St. Paul to Savonarola the pagan gods were considered as fallen angels. The Church Fathers were very explicit on this point. Tertullian states unequivocally that all the old gods were demons (*De spectaculis*). The Church regarded the gods of mythology as devils who beguiled men into worshipping them in the form of idols.⁴⁹ In literature as far back as the Middle Ages the name of almost every Greek and Roman god was applied to the devils. In the French medieval mysteries the demons often bear the names of classical divinities.⁵⁰ The *chansons de geste* called the devil Apollin (*Chanson de Roland*, l. 8) ; hence the line in Victor Hugo's *le Mariage de Roland*

"l'Archange saint Michel attaquant Apollo."

In Huon de Méri's *Torneioement Antechrist*, we find among the infernal barons Jupiter and Neptune together with Beelzebub. Dante and Tasso both drew upon Greco-Roman mythology to fill their hells. Milton, Chateaubriand's own master and model, places the "Ionian gods" in his Pandemonium (*Par. Lost*, i. 508 ; cf. also i. 738ff.). Chateaubriand needed, however, no foreign models for raising classical gods to demonhood. He could plead precedent in the poets of his own land. The pseudo-classicists Godeau and Desmarets already turned the gods of classical antiquity into demons by preserving their names and attributes. But there is yet another con-

⁴⁷ *Bernardin de Saint-Pierre* (1891), p. 133.

⁴⁸ Cf. also Bertrand, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

⁴⁹ "But the fundamental cause (*consummativa*) [of idolatry] must be sought in the devils, who cause men to adore them under the form of idols, therein working certain things which excited their wonder and admiration" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, ii. 94).

⁵⁰ H. Wieck, *Die Teufel auf der mittelalterlichen Mysteriesbühne Frankreichs* (Leipzig, 1887).

sideration. If the Greek gods are devils, and if the Greek gods are beautiful, it must syllogistically follow that the devils, too, are beautiful. If, furthermore, the demons are diabolized vices, it must necessarily follow that vices, too, are beautiful.⁵¹ This amounts to an esthetic appreciation of that which is morally condemned. Thus, we already scent in this first of Romantics Baudelaire's fragrant and flaming *Fleurs du Mal*. But of this later.

It must be admitted, however, that in his great eagerness to be original, Chateaubriand tried to outdo his masters and sank the very Olympic rock, together with its inhabitants, into his Christian Hell. But by placing the Olympus as well as the Tartarus in his Hell he robbed it of its terrors.⁵² The bright gods of Greece dispersed the gloom of his Gehenna. Chateaubriand followed his masters with a vengeance, indeed, and assembled in his Hell the gods of a goodly number of ethnic religions. To the Oriental and classical divinities that had been consigned to Hell by his predecessors he added characters of northern mythology as well. His demons are a truly cosmopolitan company. We find in his Hell, Belial of the Hebrews, Moloch of the Ammonites, Baal of the Babylonians, Astarte of the Phoenicians, Anubis of the Egyptians, Mithra of the Persians, Brahma of the Hindus, Neptune and Apollo of the Greeks, Teutates and Dis of the Gauls,⁵³ Odin of the Scandinavians and Erminsul of the Saxons. In *les Natchez* the ranks of Satan are swelled also by the divinities of the North American Indians. This motley assemblage of discarded deities brings chaos into Chateaubriand's descriptions of the infernal hosts.

Even the physical torments of Chateaubriand's Hell hold no great terrors. "Any great modern poet's notion of an everlasting Hell," says Swinburne, "must of course be less merely material than Dante's mechanism of hot and cold circles, fire and ice, ordure and mire." Our author did not feel the need of presenting a Hell less material than that of this medieval poet, whom he followed in this respect, not having found any descriptions of the agonies of the lost souls in Milton. Chateaubriand's Hell, taking it all in all, is indifferent and insipid and not at all to the taste of a modern man.

Still Chateaubriand was more successful with his Hell than

⁵¹ Cf. Jules Lemaitre, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁵² Cf. François Guizot, *le Temps passé (Mélanges de critique)* (1887), ii, 218.

⁵³ Teutates (Tuisto in Tacitus) was originally the god of the Teutones. He may even be identical with Dis. The Teutonic god of light became the Gallican god of darkness. In the history of religion the god of one people is the devil of another.

with his Heaven. His remark in regard to his predecessors, that they achieved greater success with Hell than with Heaven, holds good of himself also. He himself admitted that it is easier to conceive of eternal unhappiness than of endless happiness (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. iv, chap. 14). We can grasp Hell and even Purgatory but not Heaven. "Our imagination," says Anatole France, "is made up of memories." We can easily form a Hell out of the materials taken from earth, but we lack on our planet the stuff with which to construct a Heaven. It is Hell and not Heaven which is most real in the consciousness of man. We all know what Hell is, but when questioned in regard to Heaven we feel embarrassed to answer. The information is so scanty, as a brilliant French lady once remarked to Sainte-Beuve. It was Hell and not Heaven, which, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, had left deep marks on Dante's face. "There may be Heaven, there must be Hell," is the conclusion reached at the end of Browning's poem, "Time's Revenges." A further illustration of this idea is the legend of the three monks of Mesopotamia, who set out one day on a journey to the departed and who found Hell and Purgatory, but not Heaven.

VII

When not taken from Milton, Chateaubriand's imagery of Heaven is borrowed from the *Revelation of St. John*, but our author failed to adapt the ecstatic visions of Oriental imagination to the feelings of a modern man of the Occident. Julian Schmidt could get no idea of the Catholic Heaven from Chateaubriand's descriptions.⁵⁴ Lady Blennerhasset says truly: "Visions of Heaven have been denied to Chateaubriand."⁵⁵ No, our author has not succeeded in making heavenly bliss any too attractive. [Chateaubriand is a greater master in the description of an earthly than of a heavenly environment just as he is a better painter of earthly than of heavenly passions. Of all men, Chateaubriand was least fitted to offer a description of the regions of the blessed. One who claimed that he delighted in speaking of unhappiness ("Je me délectais à parler du malheur") could form no conception at all of Heaven.] He was certainly more in his element among the spirits of darkness than

⁵⁴ *Geschichte der französischen Literatur seit der Revolution* (Leipzig, 1858).

⁵⁵ Chateaubriand, *Romantik und die Restaurationsepoche in Frankreich* (Mainz, 1903); see also her essay on Chateaubriand in *Sidelights* (New York, 1913), pp. 212-45.

among the spirits of light. From his descriptions of the different sorts and degrees of punishment it would seem as if, to speak with Erasmus, he "were very well acquainted with the soil and situation of these infernal regions."⁵⁶

Chateaubriand lacked the qualities of a poet of the Supernatural. Only a great poet can leave with impunity the solid ground of nature and give solidity to the Supernatural. Our author was less fitted than many another of his day to do justice to his chosen subject. He wanted the soul of a mystic and was no symbolist. He possessed no sense of myth and mystery. "The taste of Chateaubriand," says G. Merlet, "was of a different school from his talent."⁵⁷ He had the taste but not the talent for the miraculous and marvellous. He was too much of the earth earthy to portray the Spiritual and the Supernatural.]

Chateaubriand achieved the antithesis of his purpose by his interjection of the Supernatural. He not only failed to show the superiority of the Christian to the classical Supernatural, but also spoiled the story. The Supernatural, which was designed to raise *les Martyrs* to a poetic dignity, impaired its value as a work of art. It does not add to the beauty of the book, but detracts from it.⁵⁸ Had it not been for *le merveilleux chrétien* this novel of the Christian origins would have been beautiful: A woman gladly abandons her father and her faith to follow the lord and master of her heart and after a long separation joins him in the arena of the gladiators, where a common martyrdom seals their virginal union. But Chateaubriand preferred to write an epos, and a Christian epos at that, and needed scenes of divine and diabolic interventions and of celestial and infernal assemblages.

But why call Heaven and Hell to witness? Chateaubriand supposes that the martyrdom of Eudorus and Cymodocée will bring about the triumph of the Christian religion. Consequently Heaven and Hell must be tremendously interested in this pair of lovers. Our author thus distinguishes from the vast number of Christian martyrs two persons whom nothing in the world puts in a class by themselves. Why, we ask, should Eudorus and Cymodocée have

⁵⁶ It may be interesting to note in this connection that after 1830 Chateaubriand bought a pavilion situated in the rue d'Enfer, which, however, as Professor Todd suggests, probably is more correctly spelled rue d'Enfert.

⁵⁷ *Tableau de la littérature française de 1800 à 1815* (1878), iii. 157.

⁵⁸ The English translator of *les Natches* (1827) very wisely omitted all supernatural parts. The English translator of *les Martyrs* (1812; new version, 1859), though including the "Christian marvellous," considered it nevertheless "tedious and misplaced and rather diminishing than increasing the interest of the story."

been chosen to make up the required Holocaust to the exclusion of all others? Indeed, in what respect do Eudorus and Cymodocée stand out above all other martyrs? Why is it that only through their martyrdom is the Devil to be put in chains? They do nothing that other Christian martyrs before and after them have not done. There is nothing in their characters, in their personal worth, in their sufferings, to explain the striking distinction made by the poet between them and all other martyrs.⁵⁹ Moreover, why should the merit of the martyrs be unequal? Within the bounds of human understanding we are not made to see what could fit certain individuals more than others for the work of the salvation of the Church. As a matter of fact, if we followed our reason we should say that Eudorus was less fit to accomplish this aim than most other martyrs. Even admitting that his repentance was sincere, a repentant sinner is not greater than a saint. "Le repentir sincère égale l'innocence," says the French proverb. Sincere repentance equals innocence, but does not surpass it.

Chateaubriand's great and fundamental error, from the theological point of view, is his effort to make of his Eudorus the equivalent of a second Christ. It has already been noted by his contemporary critics that in the colloquy between God the Father and God the Son, the question is of a new Lamb to wash away the sins of the world, of a new Holocaust chosen for the triumph of the Christian religion, of a new Host necessary to hurl Lucifer into the Abyss. It would almost seem, as Sainte-Beuve ironically remarks, that the author of the *Génie du Christianisme* had the presumptuous air of wishing to reform Christianity. Commenting on the death of the two characters, Chateaubriand says simply and solemnly: "The Host was accepted: the last drop of the blood of the righteous to make triumph that religion which was destined to change the face of the earth." Of whom does our author speak in such terms? Of Jesus Christ? Oh, no! Of a fictitious person by the name of Eudorus. But all the rivers of blood which have been shed by men and women who sacrificed their lives for their faith are, in the opinion of the Church, not worth a single drop of the blood of the Saviour. To hear and heed Chateaubriand we would say that the first and great Victim, which is none other than Jesus Christ, is no longer sufficient as a ransom for our sins. We know that the Son of God died for our salvation. We have been taught that by the fall of Adam man became the slave or subject of Satan, but was

⁵⁹ Cf. Alexandre Vinet, *Etude sur la littérature française du XIXe siècle* (2e éd., 1857), pp. 286f.

redeemed from bondage by the death of the Lord. It was not necessary for Eudorus to be torn to pieces by lions in order to fetter the Fiend. We know upon the authority of the Evangelist St. Matthew that Lucifer was put by Christ "in everlasting chains." The Devil's overthrow occurred on Calvary and not in the arena at Rome.

Did Chateaubriand really think that the Lord Jesus did not bring salvation to man? He was overanxious to show that his treatment of the Supernatural was in accord with the teachings of the Church Fathers.⁶⁰ But on this point he revealed an utter ignorance of patristic literature. The idea of salvation according to Irenæus, Origen and Gregory the Great is briefly as follows: All men, by reason of the Fall, became the rightful and exclusive property of Satan; and it would have been unjust on the part of God to take from him by violence that which was in reality his due. Satan, however, was willing to relinquish his claim to the human race on condition that Jesus should be given to him as the ransom price of humanity. But Heaven outwitted Hell in the bargain for man's redemption. When Satan got the price he found that he could not keep it. In demanding Christ as payment he did not know the dual nature of his prize; and, as Ruffinus puts it, in swallowing the bait (the humanity) he was tortured by the hook (the divinity) and was only too glad to relinquish both.⁶¹ Whether by fair dealing or foul, the fact remains that through the death of Christ man was redeemed from the power of Satan. Of course, we will leave this matter for the doctors of the Church to discuss, and we do not envy Chateaubriand in the least to have on his hands an affair with these learned gentlemen. All we wish to point out is that Chateaubriand erred grievously when he believed that Heaven and Hell were greatly concerned whether or not his lovers were happily united in the end.

Furthermore, Chateaubriand's reason for the persecution under Diocletian does not hold good in the face of facts. In vain does our author appeal to the authority of Eusebius, who explains the persecution as a visitation from Heaven for the sins of the Christians in their prosperity (*Martyrs*, I. 11. 2). Chateaubriand's own story

⁶⁰ Chateaubriand is so anxious to follow tradition that he has the Virgin Mary walk about in her body amidst the blessed souls in Heaven. It is on this point in particular that Jules Lemaitre (*op. cit.*, pp. 73f.), raised the laugh against him. Cf. Juan Manuel's *Treatise showing that the Blessed Mary is, body and soul, in Paradise* (14th century).

⁶¹ An excellent presentation of the evolution of the theory of salvation will be found in Hastings Rashdall's, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919).

of the Christians of those days, however, does not bear out their alleged prosperity and perfidy. Throughout the book we get a picture of the life of these early Christians wholly opposed to the affluence and apostasy with which they are charged. With the exception of Lasthénès, whom our author represents as the richest man in Greece, all Christians belong to the lowest classes of society. They are recruited almost wholly from the proscribed and despised of men (*ibid.*, V). We read of the evangelical poverty in which they live (*ibid.*, IV, XI, XII), of their innocent lives (*ibid.*, XIII), and of the bitter torments which they undergo for the sake of their faith (*ibid.*, IV, VI, VII, XV). They gather for worship at midnight (*ibid.*, V), have tombs for temples and wounds for treasures (*ibid.*, XVI). The Church had already suffered nine persecutions within the brief period of less than three centuries.⁶²

Moreover, the triumph of the Christian religion (the title of the book) consisted, according to Chateaubriand, in the adoption of Christianity by Constantine and the official promotion of Christianity to the rank of a State religion. But this triumph, which is in the form of a support lent to truth by a temporal and political power, cannot well be called the triumph of the powers of light over the spirit of the Abyss. Some of us would even go so far as to call this union of Church and State the defeat of the Christian religion. From the days of Constantine the religion of Jesus of Nazareth has been so linked with political and financial interests that its moral and spiritual power has been largely overlooked. The Church has become the handmaiden of the State and has been willing, sometimes, at least, to sponsor whatever the latter wished.

Furthermore, the imprisonment of Satan, which is supposed to have been caused by the merit of the martyrdom of Eudorus and Cymodocée, in no way changed the conduct of the men and women in Rome, or in the rest of the world for that matter. The Princesdom of the air does not seem to have been overthrown even by the vicarious death of Eudorus and Cymodocée, and has been in commission all the ages down to the present day, as recent events have conclusively proved. Even the ecclesiastics believe that in the eternal combat between the Deity and the Devil for the mastery of this

⁶² This does not mean, however, that there are not even nowadays men who hold the Devil responsible for the persecution of the Christians under the Roman emperors. A century and a decade after Chateaubriand (November 16, 1919), a clergyman in the metropolis of America said from his pulpit on a Sunday morning: "Working through Nero, Diocletian, and other emperors, the Devil deliberately and carefully planned literally to wipe from the earth all the Christians."

world the latter gradually has been gaining the upper hand. The *Malleus maleficarum*, a large volume written by two inquisitors under the papal bull against witchcraft of 1484 and published in Germany at the end of the fifteenth century,⁶³ contains the very singular avowal that the Devil is constantly gaining ground, or in other words, that the Lord is constantly losing ground; that Man, who was created to fill a vacancy in Heaven, is rather headed downward.

All this Supernaturalism is extraneous and extravagant in *les Martyrs*. Chateaubriand erred greatly when he believed that "the good and bad angels sufficed to carry on the action without delivering it to worn-out machinery." The supernatural agencies hinder rather than help the action; and instead of composing an epic, our author created a creaking work of pulleys and puppets. "In few pseudo-epics," says Professor Babbitt, "is the creaking of the pulleys with which this "machinery" is managed so painfully audible as in the *Martyrs*."⁶⁴ The interweaving of the spiritual with the material, of the superhuman with the human is as infelicitous as the mingling of earthly and heavenly passions. There is too much stiffness and awkwardness, too much pedantry and puerility, too many inanities and inconsistencies in his "merveilleux chrétien." It was too laboriously imagined and too coldly applied. His machinery of marvels is simply monstrous. We are irritated by the complexity of his supernatural characters. We are bewildered by the mazes of his mechanisms. We are dazed by the *mélange* of the different *merveilleux*: *merveilleux chrétien*, *merveilleux mythologique* and (in *les Natchez*) *merveilleux indien*. The incomparable absurdity of this farrago makes us at times nearly burst into laughter. A specimen from each of the two books will suffice to show the ludicrousness of this epic machinery: The demon Rumor in *les Natchez* quits her palace upon the command of her father, Satan, and sets out upon a secret mission. And what is the object of this flight through the air? What mighty empire is the demon thus charged to overturn? Hear Reader and marvel at this marvellous! Rumor goes "preceded by Astonishment, followed closely by Envy and accompanied by Admiration" to play the gossip in an Indian wigwam! Satan in *les Martyrs* mounts upon a chariot of fire,⁶⁵ places

⁶³ *Malleus maleficarum*. *Der Hexenhammer*. Verfasst von den beiden Inquisitoren Jakob Sprenger und Heinrich Institoris. Zum ersten Male ins Deutsche übertragen u. eingeleitet von J. W. R. Schmidt. 3 Bände. Kritische Ausgabe, Berlin, 1905.

⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁶⁵ It is, mind you, a real chariot with wheels and drawn by winged horses. But what is the matter with Satan's wings? Have they been so badly singed

at his side the monster whom he calls his son, and they both drive in state to the valley of the Alpheus to visit Hiérocès. And what, pray, is the aim of this journey? Never was a finer bit of bathos. The demon of Jealousy, disguised as an aged augur, approaches the bed of the proconsul of Achàia and touches his breast with a rod that he holds in his hand. And all this fuss, as Jules Lemaitre rightly remarks, to inspire in a man the most natural of sentiments!⁶⁶

Chateaubriand's efforts to make his supernatural characters act naturally are also absurd. Satan "borne down by the might of his crimes descends *naturally* towards Hell." We read also that during his physical contact with Velléda the language of Hell escaped *naturally* from the lips of Eudorus.

Chateaubriand's mystic notions of the workings of the universe may be characterized as too silly for words. How amazing must sound to a modern man the explanation of high and low tide which the angel of the seas gives to Gabriel! Our author here speaks after the heart of his yoke-fellow Joseph de Maistre, who wished that a scientist might come forward and credit the Lord and not the moon with the ebb and flow of the tide. What shall we say of Chateaubriand's cosmogony? Uriel, the angel of the sun,⁶⁷ informs in *les Natchez* the guardian angel of America how his planet was created. This star, he tells him, was not at all formed as men imagine, and then goes on to explain the origin of the sun: When the Lord thinks, his thoughts send forth beams of light throughout the universe. The child Emmanuel, playing one day with these thought-beams, breaks one of them; and out of a drop which he lets fall, the sun is formed. The sun-spots, this angel instructs us further, are caused by the shadow of his wings, which he spreads whenever a thought crosses the Divine intelligence: otherwise the universe would be consumed.⁶⁸ And this in the days of Laplace! Mr. John Foster in a review of

by cannon fire during the war in Heaven that they cannot bear him aloft? His means of locomotion may, however, be the result of his wish to counterfeit Christ, who has "a living chariot with wheels which hurl thunders and lightnings" (*Martyrs*, III). The tendency on the part of the Devil to mimic the Deity in every detail of his character and conduct has earned for him the appellation *simia Dei*. For the Evangelists, the wind is the proper vehicle of Satan and his angels. "Rain seems to have been commonly associated, as it still is in the Church of England, with the intervention of the deity, but wind and hail were invariably identified with the devil" (Lecky).

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁶⁷ In *les Martyrs*, Uriel resigned as guardian of the sun to take up his new duties as angel of Love.

⁶⁸ In *les Martyrs* it is the old Fiend himself who darkens the universe with his bat's wings.

les Martyrs said that its author "has introduced some of the most foolish extravagances that ever Popish fancy mistook for grandeur." **

(To be Continued)

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THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF HIGH PRICES.

BY T. B. STORK.

LIKE some elusive insect imprisoned in its amber, important truth may sometimes be caught up in hap-hazard popular saying. Flung out at random by some one, then adopted by all as expressing their own thought, it flies from lip to lip, gathering suffrage as it goes. Such is the now hackneyed saying that it is not the high cost of living but the cost of living high that is our present economic trouble.

It is the obvious that most easily escapes observation: we fear the black cloud on the horizon and stumble over the stone at our feet. So it is with the various economic phenomena that just now challenge our attention to such a degree that some thoughtless persons declare that the end of the world is at hand. At every surprising turn in the affairs of the world, there is always somebody to bring forward this suggestion with the air of uttering an entirely new and original contribution to the general stock. So far from solving our problems that oft predicted event might possibly be but the beginning of far more troublesome ones.

While it is certainly true that many of our high costs of living are the direct results of the war, an aftermath of bellicose follies, nevertheless many others are, to quote the popular saying, nothing more nor less than the cost of high living, a high living not to be depreciated or feared, but rather properly appreciated and understood as the mark of the industrial progress of the world, more particularly in prosperous and progressive countries like England and the United States, where it is most in evidence.

Imperceptibly but very surely there has been growing up in all civilized communities a great multitude of conveniences and luxuries that, small in themselves, have yet in the aggregate tremendous

economic effect. These superfluous appurtenances of living have encroached on the plain living of the olden time.

We all live, I will not say better, but more elaborately than ever before; we all expect and require in one way or another more things than ever before; that means more service from labor. The industrial world produces more for these requirements and is continually spurred on to produce more and more every year, while at the same time, by various inventions and devices, labor is made more efficient, more capable of answering these increased demands. I need not go back to ancient Greece, or still more ancient Egypt, to illustrate my thesis or contrast the highly differentiated costume of the average man of today, with his shoes and stockings, his collars and cuffs, his shirts and suspenders and garters, his collar buttons and shoe laces, handkerchiefs, neckties, scarf pins, coats, vests, trousers, watches, pocket knives, pencils, tooth picks, chewing gum, cigarette or cigar cases, match boxes, canes, umbrellas, overshoes, etc., with the simplicity of dress and belongings of even the kings of those ancient countries.

We, who are middle-aged, can get a sufficient contrast by recalling our own youthful days, when there was no chewing gum, no photo plays, no trolley cars, no telephone, no talking machines, no motor boats or cars, no electric torches, and the like.

Does the mention of these little superfluities seem puerile: beneath the dignity of grave discussion? Is it a small economic fact that fourteen million persons attend the "movies" every day in the United States? At even five cents apiece this would mean an expenditure of \$700,000.00 per diem, or, say for three hundred days of the year. 210 million dollars. Some half million of laborers, artists, etc., are employed, and 1,000 millions of wealth are invested in this apparently trifling appurtenance of everybody's living.

Or is it of no economic consequence that 50 million dollars is paid every year for such a trifle as chewing gum? This may seem small compared with the tobacco and cigarette bill of nearly three billions, or that of automobiles of two billions, but they all go to make the "demnition" total of some 8710 millions of money expended every year in the United States for what may be called the superfluities of living, the cost, in other words, of high living; that is, of living outside and beyond the mere necessities of food and shelter.¹

¹ The authority for these figures is the report of the Women's Activity Division of the Department of Justice, lately made public.

If we reflect for a moment on what a demand on labor and on produced wealth these figures import, we may perhaps become aware of one or two important economic truths: one, the impossibility of meeting the demand for these luxuries of living in the early days of primitive production when it was all that men could do by their labor, constant and unremitting, to keep themselves in life; in those days when eight-hour work was an absurdity, the real question was, not how many hours of labor were allowable, but whether any length of labor time would get food and shelter sufficient to keep the laborer in life. It was only when these difficulties had been surmounted by dint of the accumulation of what is called capital, and by the increased facility of production that accompanied it, that there was a surplus of labor left over from necessary production for the luxury production we have been discussing, the making of chewing gum, talking machines, cigarettes, etc., etc.

The other truth is that this great production of the appurtenances and luxuries that make high living acts as an automatic increase of wages to all. For these articles of luxury are made for sale, for exchange; they must be exchanged and used at once or not at all. They cannot be saved or stored for any time without losing their value. They must be used by everybody or their owner and producer would lose his profit. That means that everybody must perforce get the use and enjoyment of them. Chewing gum, the movies, even automobiles, would be of little profit if used only by a few millionaires: it is the use by the crowd, by everybody, that makes them economically possible. The production and use of these raise all wages automatically and of necessity: for they are the real wages of labor of which money is but the symbol.

Or to put it a little differently, high living costs and high wages in money are in part due to the ever increasing wealth of the industrial community. For modern wealth, unlike primitive wealth, depends for its existence on the use and enjoyment of that wealth by everybody. An increase of wealth in any community of necessity and automatically has the effect of ultimately increasing wages, because the great demand and consumption of wealth of every kind must always come from the masses of the people, the consumption of wealth by a Rockefeller, a Morgan or a Rothschild is negligible. It would never maintain the wealth of the world which can only exist by a perpetual flux of consumption on the one hand and reproduction on the other. It is the laborer, the wage earner, whose consumption of goods is the important factor in industrial society; it is

his use and enjoyment of increased wealth that alone can make that quantitative demand for goods which is necessary to sustain and continue the production of wealth. Hence, in part, the resulting higher and ever higher wages for labor and prices of goods.

How then does it happen that with this great increase in the number of useful, exchangeable things produced with less labor cost by reason of the use of machinery, improved methods and the like, the price in money should be constantly going higher? A bushel of wheat, for example, was never produced more cheaply than on our Western prairies, with their power plows, tractors, and threshers, and probably never sold higher in money since the time when Joseph put the money in his brethren's sacks in Egypt. And the penny a day of the Scriptural story makes a sorry contrast with the generous wages of the day laborer of the present century.

Perhaps we may be able to understand this better if we eliminate money and consider the actual fundamental transactions that take place in industrial society. Putting it in the simplest form, all industry of the modern sort may be said to consist in the making of goods by one man to exchange with the goods of another man. Now the value of the goods to the maker under these circumstances will depend on two elements: first, and most important will be the ratio of exchange, that is the amount of goods which one man will give for the other man's goods. This is expressed in its price in money and we say goods are cheap or dear according to their money prices, but of course in the last analysis the essential to the owner of the goods sold is how much can he get of the other man's goods for his own. And this will depend, not only on the price of his goods, but also on the price of the other goods which he expects to get for his own. It is plain that to double the price in money of both goods will not alter the amount for which they exchange with each other, the ratio of exchange will be the same. It is only when the price of one is raised in money without any corresponding raise of price in the other that the ratio of exchange, which is the vital point, will be affected.

But there is another element which enters into the value of all goods that depend for their value to their owner on exchange. This is the ease or difficulty of making the exchange. For it is evident that to make an exchange two things must be present: first, goods that are acceptable to the other or second party to the exchange, and secondly, goods in that other or second party's hands which are acceptable to the first party. There must be a mutual willingness to

exchange in other words growing out of this. The maker of goods can make no exchange except for such goods as present themselves; if there are no goods or goods undesirable to him, no exchange can take place. Every increase in the number and variety of goods offered will mean an increase in the possibility of exchange since that will increase the probability that each party to the exchange will be able to find desirable goods.

The use of money to effect these exchanges does not alter the fundamental principles that govern the transaction. It furnishes a convenient measure of the ratio of exchange of goods; that is, their price; and it also furnishes a medium of exchange; that is, it represents a something into which, if the owner of exchangeable goods can transform them, he will be assured that he may get any other kind of goods he himself may desire irrespective of any necessity to find some one person who wishes his particular description of goods. All owners of goods, that is to say, find money a desirable something into which to exchange their goods. Thus money facilitates exchanges between various goods by virtue of that confidence which each owner of goods has that with money he will be able to get any goods he desires. It represents the sum of all the possibilities of exchange possessed by all the goods in the industrial community. It solves for its possessor one and that the main difficulty of exchange; it finds for the maker of the goods a taker and a taker who puts at his disposal all other goods he may desire. It has a compulsory market and can always command a sale of itself for goods.

Of course the exchangeable power of money will depend for its value on the number of exchangeable goods made by the industrial community. Money does not make goods, but goods may be said to make money. Indeed it may truly be said that as the number of exchangeable goods increases, with that increase there will come an ever increasing ease of exchange for goods so that the value of money's exchangeability will constantly decrease as the exchangeability of goods increases. For one of the elements of money's value is this power of exchange and that will always be most important where there are few exchangeable goods; that is, where the difficulty of exchanging goods (or selling them) is greatest owing to their paucity. For every article offering itself in sale or exchange is at once a buyer and a seller; it buys the article given in exchange for itself, but it also sells itself for that article, and its ability to sell itself depends on the number of articles that offer for it, the greater that number the more saleable it will be.

Money grows, therefore, less important as the possibility of exchange increases and grows easier by reason of the presence of many exchangeable goods, for money represents and stands for instant exchangeability and its value depends on this power to effect exchange; where it is difficult to effect exchange owing to the paucity of goods, money has great value and the price of goods in money will be low owing to the difficulty of making exchange and the desire to do so. But readily exchangeable goods are equivalent to money for they possess that power of exchange which is money's distinguishing characteristic.

Thus there comes about that curious economic anomaly that where goods are most numerous and plentiful, say in London or New York, they are worth more in money than in places where they are scarce, contrary to the general rule that the more abundant an article is the cheaper in money it becomes. It all turns on this power of exchange which money possesses and which grows less important with the increase of exchangeable goods, thus diminishing the value of money in goods and increasing the value of goods in money as goods approach that degree of exchangeability which money possesses.

Readily exchangeable desirable goods are as good and sometimes better than money. In that economic chaos of Russia we are told that a famous surgeon accepted 40 pounds of rye flour for a surgical operation and signified his preference for linen, groceries, or wood, rather than money, for his professional fees. Ten pounds of potatoes he took instead of 100 rubles for a visit.

It was under this mistaken idea of the part played by money in business transactions that some historians have attributed the commercial quickening of Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries to the gold and silver brought chiefly by Spanish adventurers from the new world of America. Surely it is much more reasonable to suppose that the new articles of human enjoyment, the new exchangeable goods, tobacco, potatoes, maize, sugar, coffee, tea and the like brought into use and knowledge from that world stimulated new wants and desires, supplied new articles of exchange and so spurred the commercial and industrial activities of the whole population. A large amount of spending money with nothing new to spend it on would have little permanent effect on people generally compared with the presentation of all these new objects of use and enjoyment.

The single item of sugar may give some notion of what these new objects of enjoyment meant to trade. In the tenth and eleventh

centuries, used by Persian physicians as medicine; in the year 1920 it is estimated by Mr. T. R. V. Kellar of the trade paper "Sugar," that the consumption of it will reach a total of 16½ million tons. Even at 7 cents per pound, this calls for an immense sum of money for exchange, say roughly, about 2,310 million dollars.

What took place thus suddenly with the discovery of America and its new articles of commerce has been going on less spectacularly for centuries. New articles of human enjoyment multiply each year; new inventions, new devices of luxury, new comforts of life, are continually appearing. The increase in the money price of things and of labor, the depreciation in the value of money, if you choose to call it so, simply witness the greater ease of exchange which has come with the greater number of exchangeable goods, thus decreasing the importance of money in so far as it commands exchange. This has been a continuous and reasonably uniform process from the earliest times. At first it may seem a process of inflation, an unwarranted swelling of the money value of everything until we gain a right understanding of its cause, until we perceive that money is only the means of convenient transfer and in the transfer of measurements of relative value, that is exchangeable value of goods with regard to each other. Money apart from things loses all significance; its depreciation of the appreciation of things in it is merely a symptom of the gradually improving conditions for all. High living and its cost are signs of a healthy, vigorous industrial life, found only in prosperous, progressive societies so that a scale might be made of the relative prosperity of a given nation based on the price of goods and labor within its borders, the higher the one the greater the industrial welfare of the other.

It is undoubtedly this increase of goods that has thus put up the price of both goods and labor in money. The exact process may not be easy to trace; it is plain that an increase in exchangeable goods would make a demand for ever more and more money to effect their exchange, and the presence of these goods would make a strong bid for goods and for labor; for all goods are buyers as well as sellers, the more goods there are the greater competition will arise for both other goods and labor. Every species of goods is an effectual buyer of other goods and of labor; it cries out for its brother goods or for labor to come and be exchanged for it.

Another less constant but important cause of the gradual tendency of prices to rise will be found in the occasional disturbance of normal industry from pestilence, war, famine and the like. These

increase the price of labor, or of certain kinds of goods, and when former conditions return and the ratio of exchange is restored, it often turns out that this was accomplished, not by a resumption of the original prices, but by an increase in the price of other goods, thus restoring the former ratio but not the former prices. Of which the explanation may be simply a bit of business psychology that it is easier to restore the normal ratio by one man raising the price of his own goods rather than by demanding a lowering of the price of the other man's goods. Probably this method tended to conceal the real nature of the transactions and beguiled each into the belief that he was getting really more for his property than if the price had been reduced by way of restoring the ratio of exchange.

So of labor, not only has its money price gone up, but its real wages which are not money at all, have also been greatly increased. That all exchangeable goods are buyers of labor may have seemed an odd statement but it is only another version of the platitude that all wages consist in the last analysis of the various kinds of goods which the laborer consumes. Contrast then the innumerable things which the meanest day laborer now has for his consumption compared with, let us say, the penny-a-day man of the Scriptures. The actual amount of wages in money counts not at all in this computation. Picture theaters, trolley cars, telephones, telegraphs, tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, rice, etc., etc., are his every day. It is not to be wondered at that the price of labor in money should have gone up accordingly, yet the ratio of exchange, the actual exertion required of the present laborer is no greater, if as great, as that of his Scriptural elder brother. The labor cost of all goods having been reduced by inventions and economies of various sorts, the same amount of labor earns as its equivalent in exchange many more goods than formerly and it is not surprising that the real ratio of exchange between goods and labor having been thus changed, that the expression of it in money prices should also be changed and its value measured in money rise.

Nor does this increase of the money cost of things work any permanent hardship; for the real cost of things is the labor cost and the laborer, while paying more in money, gets all these new goods with no greater expenditure of exertion than before. It is a mere bookkeeping device, we might say, except for those who deal in money not as a medium of exchange, but as a commodity itself. In the artificial society of today there are necessarily such dealings by way of lending, by way of investment, in which the dealer has no


claim or property in goods, but only in money, and as money's only ultimate value consists in its command of goods, any change in this command will affect the dealer in money very seriously and may work temporary hardship and injustice to individuals, but is of no significance to the society as a whole.

The high prices which occur normally and distinct from the flurries of panic or war are simply marks of high living standards, of increasing prosperity, of an increasing abundance and variety of exchangeable goods, and need inspire neither present apprehension nor dismal forebodings of the economic future.

SOUL.

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID.

Does man alone possess that subtle thing
Thro' which he yearns for immortality?
The formless essence that is prayed to bring
Man's right to live throughout eternity?
Its attributes are marked in love and joy,
In friendliness, in offspring's gentle care,
In grief's distress, fidelity's employ,
In all that filial duty doth declare.
Is so-called instinct in the speechless brute
Less true in kind than man's intelligence?
Why one elect? the other thus refute?
Since all is but life's stored experience?
Distress and woe and love and joy depend,
In brute creation, on that 'prisoned wraith
In man called "soul," how then shall man defend
His single right to life-eternal's faith?
In what climactic age, as man evolved,
Did instinct cease, and soul become divine,
Immortal essence, from death's claim absolved,
As bursts the moth from fibrous fold's confine?
Nay; rather own thy kinship with the brute,
Thro' common claim for immortality
Than to that spark of life called "soul" impute
In form a want of continuity!





AUGUSTE COMTE.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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VERGIL'S CONCEPTION OF FATE. ✓

BY ARTHUR L. KEITH.

THE most casual reader of Vergil's *Aeneid* can scarcely fail to be impressed with the largeness of the part played by the idea of fate or destiny. Without a clear understanding of the poet's conception of fate, much of the real significance of his epic poem will be lost, for his idea of fate is intricately involved with the plot and character and thought. Vergil, as well as other writers, recognized the difficulty inherent in the definition of the idea. The contradiction between the fore-ordained and the freedom of the will may never be explained away. Cicero has told us (*De Div.* II, 8, 9): *anile sane et plenum superstitionis fati nomen ipsum*, "the very name of fate is puerile and full of superstition". The Homeric heroes acknowledged the supremacy of fate, yet played that they were free. And so we of this generation admit the existence of the inevitable laws that govern the universe toward its larger issues and yet pretend to believe that man's will is absolutely free. Vergil, like the rest of us, was confronted by the insoluble difficulties of the situation, and if the lines he draws are not always clear, the fault is not his own.

The idea of fate is prominent in Greek poetry from Homer down through the tragedians. There were formal discussions of the subject with which Vergil may have been familiar, though they probably did not greatly influence his own conception. His treatment of the idea of fate differs from that of the tragedians as far as day from night. Homer's heroes are conscious of destiny. On the other hand, Vergil's heroes are conscious of the invisible power of fate. Vergil's hero is forever under the

PLICIT obedience to the unseen power. The hereditary doom of Aeschylus's tragedies is far removed from Vergil's idea of fate. In the causes that lead up to the fall of Troy there may be a suggestion that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children but the suggestion is not developed. Indeed, Dido is broken by the fates not because she is the *descendant* of those who have outraged the laws of right but because she is the first queen of a people who were in the distant future to prove Rome's most formidable enemy. Dido's dying curse that entailed sorrow and suffering for later generations of Romans does not enter largely into the story of the Aeneid and even if it did, it differs in important particulars from the fatal curse of Attic tragedy.

We can hardly dismiss Vergil's indebtedness to the Stoic philosophy toward which he inclined in his more mature years. His Aeneas is so characteristically a Stoic that we must believe that the poet accepted somewhat of the Stoic attitude. His ascription of purpose and providence to fate represents an obligation to Stoic philosophers which must be recognized, yet in the working out of his ideas he has achieved a distinct originality. We feel that fundamentally his idea of fate was a development of the experiences through which he had passed, the events which he had witnessed, culminating in the establishment under Augustus of the world-empire. He had seen personal fortunes thrust aside by the onward march of stern events. Born in the village of Andes, near Mantua, he spent his youth in the innocent pleasures of that sheltered nook, but soon he was destined to be swept into the current of the great events of his age. Things which once seemed permanent proved transitory. His father's estate was confiscated and though it was later restored, Vergil learned through experience and observation that the course of events seemed to be determined by a power beyond himself. The civil wars of the past century must have profoundly moved him, susceptible as his poetic temperament was, and it would be strange indeed if he did not share in the general depression of the time. But when the clouds had lifted and Augustus was seen to have ushered in the reign of peace and order and prosperity, a new significance was attached to the power which before had seemed to act blindly and it was recognized that there was an intelligence in the unseen

AUGUSTUS
Augustus, it is easy to see that
uld have been quite different. He

felt with Horace that Augustus was the supreme gift of the fates to mankind.

This more hopeful conception of fate is somewhat related to Vergil's philosophical attitude toward the development of history. Differing from his contemporary Horace, he did not find his chief interest in the present. His vision extended far into the past as he traced the process by which from humble beginnings Rome had achieved her present greatness, and then this view reached out into the future of the empire to which had been established neither goals of history or seasons. This broad outlook of the poet is responsible in large measure for the idea of destiny as it appears in the *Aeneid*. The importance of the historical element in his conception of fate is suggested by a ready computation. Fate is mentioned more than four times as frequently in the *Aeneid* than it is in the *Bucolics* and the *Georgics*. These pastoral and agricultural poems are relatively independent of the idea of destiny that gives history its real significance. Thus from the poet's reflection on his own experiences, and from his philosophical attitude toward history, we may believe that his conception of fate developed, unaided in any great degree by the thoughts of his predecessors.

Consideration of this idea in Vergil may be limited to the *Aeneid* where we find its greatest development. Five times within the first forty lines we are confronted with the fates. They are directly mentioned on an average once in every seventy-eight lines, if we take the entire poem. But these figures do not give the whole truth. Even when not directly mentioned, the fates are omnipresent. In the background of every event, of all signs and omens, lies fate. Perhaps its universal presence may be regarded as its most outstanding attribute. The various incidents of the last night at Troy are big with fate. We feel that the serpents are directed against Laocoon by the unerring and invisible power. The wooden horse is clearly felt as an instrument of fate. Likewise, we see the guiding hand of destiny as Aeneas overcomes every obstacle in his journey toward the promised land. His adventures with Harpies and Cyclopes, his long dalliance with Dido, his bold defiance of the dangers of the lower world, and the wars he fought in Italy gain significance from the fact that they appear as incidents in the onward march of destiny. Omens and signs and dreams are but the visible indications of the invisible power. The

fire that played about the temples of Iulus is significant that his line is marked by fate. Omens which preceded Aeneas's arrival in Latium indicated that he was the man of destiny. The designs on Aeneas's shield represent the fates of the coming generations and as Aeneas lifts to his shoulders the fame and fates of his descendants we feel that the fates are always as near to their chosen people as the shield is to the hero who bears it.

This omnipresence of the fates is aided by their close association with the gods. This association is so close at times as to indicate that the poet aimed at no exact distinction. In some vague way they seem almost identical. A frequent recurring expression is *fata deum*, the fates of the gods. We also meet *fata Iovis* (4, 614) and *fatis Iunonis* (8, 292). Even when not related thus by the limiting genitive they are often almost as closely connected in other ways. The fates and the gods receive credit equally in many situations.

dum fata deusque sinebant (4, 651).

sat fatis Venerique datum (9, 135).

vel quae portenderet ira

magna deum vel quae fatorum posceret ordo (5, 706).

nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant stare (8, 398).

matre dea monstrante viam data fata secutus (1, 382).

cur nunc tua quisquam

discedit iussa potest aut cur nova condere fata? (10, 34).

It is not easy to disentangle fates from gods in these passages. Perhaps some of these instances represent Vergil's well known habit of duplication. There is practically no difference between *fata obstant* and *placidasque viri deus obstruit auris*, (4, 440). The poet aims at no nice distinction of responsibility.¹

There is no lack of situations that point toward the same identification. In the first book Venus reproaches Jupiter for changing his purpose in regard to the Trojans, and Jupiter in replying seems to identify his power with theirs:

manent immota tuorum

fata tibi (1, 257),

and then a moment later supplements with:

neque me sententia vertit. (1, 260).

¹ Such instances as these should aid the interpretation of *qui fata parent, quem poscat Apollo*, (2, 121): "for whom the fates prepare whom Apollo claims". Apparently, with the intention of es-

If Jupiter is only the agent carrying out the decrees of the fates, surely the many reproaches here and elsewhere heaped upon him are misplaced.

But in spite of this close relationship instances will be found, as noted later, where the gods attempt to thwart or to delay the fates. Jupiter, however, is an exception. His will and theirs accord entirely. The supreme divinity and the purpose of the fates may not collide. Yet the poet does not always clearly show which power dominates.

Sometimes Jupiter seems to be the author of the fates and to dispose them in his own way. Consider the following passage:

sic fata deum rex

sortitur volvitque rices, is vertitur ordo. (3, 375).

"Thus the king of the gods allots the fates and fixes the succession of circling events and this order revolves". This passage is not easy to interpret. The fates are not thought of here as persons but as lots to be drawn from an urn. True, Jupiter does not manipulate the urn or its contents in order to obtain a lot to his liking and whatever is "write" on the lot is "writ". There is plenty of room for chance but after all the general situation places Jupiter above the fates on the principle that the one who casts the lot is greater than the lot itself. A similar situation is found in 12, 725, where Jupiter holds the scales which decide the fates of Aeneas and Turnus. Here again he stands in the position of controller, though it must be admitted that after the eternal laws of gravitation or whatever principle is involved has been manifested, he has no choice but to comply. But some element of the willing, disposing power is Jupiter's. Compare 4, 110:

sed fatis incerta feror, si Jupiter unam

esse velit Tyriis urbem Troiaque profectis.

"I am harassed with uncertainty because of the fates, whether Jupiter wills the Tyrians and Trojans to have one city". This same power is implied in Venus's question:

Quem das finem, rex magne, laborum, (1, 241).

and Jupiter's reply:

Imperium sine fine dedi. (1, 279).

But on the other hand there are indications of the independence of the fates. Jupiter declares his own impartial attitude and leaves the responsibility to the fates:

Rex Iuppiter omnibus idem

Fata viam invenient. (10, 113).

True, Jupiter in his reply to Venus in the first book, as we have seen above, seems almost to identify his will with that of the fates, yet he reads the secrets of the fates from a scroll which appears to have been independent of himself. The *fates* also have some measure of will-power. This will may be exercised apart from the gods.

They call (*voco*), they allow and forbid (*sino, veto*), they demand (*posco*), they drag to and from (*trahunt retrahuntque*), they conquer (*supero*), they pursue and drive (*urgeo, ago, iacto*), and so on through a large variety of activities they appear as active agents.

It is evident that Vergil did not feel the need of differentiating clearly the functions of the fates and of the gods. The fates allow and forbid and determine, yet *sic placitum* and *dis aliter visum* are used of the gods. Perhaps it is safe to say that generally the idea of the fates in the poet's mind dominates the power of the gods, that the fates represent the eternal laws without author, without beginning or end, the ultimate, impersonal necessity, while the conception of the gods is more intimate, more personal and included within the larger idea of fate. Gods may be persuaded and implored, fate is *inexorabile* and *ineluctabile*. The only hope in the face of an adverse decree of fate is that a later decree of the same fate may counterbalance the effect of an earlier decree:

fatis contraria fata rependens. (1, 239).

But notwithstanding their independent volition, the fates are largely impersonal. Their great power and influence issue from abstract principle, not from personality. Parcae, as fates, represent a slightly closer approach to personification. They spin the threads of death for Lausus:

extremaque Lauso

Parcae fila legunt. (10, 814).

In the fourth Eclogue, 46, the personification is more evident:

*'Talia saecula' suis dixerunt, 'currite' fusis
concordes stabili fatorum numine Parcae.*

'Hasten, blest ages', the Parcae, harmonious in the immutable power of the fates, said to their spindles'. Fortune also lacks a definite personality. She may threaten (*minor*) and will (*volo*) and persuade (*suadeo*) and begrudge (*invideo*). She is *Fortuna omnipotens*, she is *dura*, but she is involved in no stories, as is

book, the crowning glory as the poet described the splendor of the Roman arms but in truth he felt a growing sadness at the doubtful again the beneficent . . . The unseen power was intelligent and *tu regere imper* ling was lacking which the poet fully sensed *(haec tibi erui* world was yearning. It is curious that that *parcere subie* applied before Vergil's generation had passed from an obscure corner of the Roman empire was The rema ne founder of the kingdom not of this world whose an epilog note is humanity. As Vergil was once thought to have cellus, th he dawn of this age, this new and spiritual kingdom may intensely borrowed something of Vergil's conception of a persist- to the cor leading to the final triumph of humanity.

The ed great. ach
the shield to
the suggest.
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wholly with pe re- is
signs on Aeneas's .. remark-
of a fate concerned was said
sonal note is completely on. The per-
representing peaceful subject. impropriety in
instrument of war. The shield may have fit in well with Vergil's it was an in-

purpose to depict the martial splendors of Roman history. Among the scenes represented are the story of Romulus and Remus and their foster-mother, the wolf, the seizure of the Sabine women with the subsequent war and treaty, the horrible punishment meted out to Mettius, the story of Porsenna and Cloelia, Manlius surprised by the Gauls, the story of the geese, and the hard lot of Catiline in Tartarus and the happy lot of Cato in Elysium, and finally the culmination of wars and heroes, Augustus in the triumph at Actium. The aftermath of peace of the other two great prophecies is not found here. Perhaps the poet was carried away with the general enthusiasm for the extraordinary event which secured the supremacy of Augustus and assured the stability of Rome, so that for the moment one could think of nothing but the splendid victory. Perhaps also the warlike shield and the warlike occasion render the peace motive inappropriate at this place. Weary as the Romans were with war they still loved to contemplate the wars with which their history was crowded and to believe that an all-powerful fate had de-

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fortunes is particularly appropriate for a great national epic, es-
pecially for that of Rome. In this circumstance lies the explana-
tion of the popularity enjoyed by the *Aeneid* from the very first
and the appeal of the poem was no doubt heightened by the fact
that the emphasis was not upon war itself but upon the justice
of the war and the peace for which war was a preparation:

iure omnia bella gente sub Assaraci fato ventura resident.
(9, 642).

In this conception of fate we hardly expect to meet the personal
note, but it is there as a strong undercurrent, and if the poet has
not put humanity first he at least compels its recognition. It was
the note of humanity which almost made the poet lose sight of the
imperial destiny of Rome as he arouses our sympathies for the
unhappy Dido. It was the personal note again when after rep-
resenting the long line of Roman heroes and achievements, he
fastens our thoughts upon the youthful Marcellus. For the human
lot there are tears and mortal things touch the

sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mort-

heart:
dio tangunt. (1, 463).

It may well be that as the poet described the splendor of the kingdom of this world he felt a growing sadness at the doubtful doom of human kind. The unseen power was intelligent and beneficent but something was lacking which the poet fully sensed and for which the world was yearning. It is curious that that need was to be supplied before Vergil's generation had passed away and out from an obscure corner of the Roman empire was to arise the founder of the kingdom not of this world whose dominant note is humanity. As Vergil was once thought to have forecast the dawn of this age, this new and spiritual kingdom may also have borrowed something of Vergil's conception of a persistent destiny leading to the final triumph of humanity.

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RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EARLY PERSIA.

BY CAPTAIN ELBRIDGE COLBY.

PROCOPIUS of Cæsarea writes in that book of his history of the wars which deals with the Persian campaigns:

But as time went on Kobad became more high-handed in the administration of the government, and introduced innovations into the constitution, among which was the law which he promulgated requiring that Persians should have communal intercourse with the Greeks. As a measure which by no means pleased the common people, they rose against him, removed him from the throne, and kept him in prison in chains.¹

In so writing Procopius not only lives up to his reputed fondness for strange tales, but also shows how partial historians can distort history by telling only a part of the truth.

The "law" referred to by Procopius was the doctrine of Mazdak, and it is our great misfortune that, as Reynold Nicholson has remarked,² none but hostile accounts survive of this interesting reformer. First among the annalists of these events were the Greeks, remote in time and place, and willing, in view of the intense Græco-Persian rivalry of the sixth and seventh centuries, to exemplify so easily the rottenness of the Persian rule. Cedrenus Georgius tells the incident thus:

Moreover Kobad the last son of Perozes began to use the kingdom very badly, a law even being promulgated which commanded that wives should be common to all. And so the Persians took the rule from him.³

Agathias, who was more nearly contemporaneous, but still wrote nearly a century after the events, says:

¹ *De Bellico Persico*, tr. Dewing, I, v, 1-2.

² *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. viii, p. 509. Cf. Brown, E. G., *Literary History of Persia*, p. 166: "Magian priests by whose hands the national chronicles were shaped."

³ *Historiarum Compendium*, ed. Bonn, p. 624.

Kobad⁴ . . . rendered himself disagreeable and unendurable to his subjects by changing the policy of the state and reversing customs established by holy wisdom. They say that he published a law to make women common, not following the intention of Socrates, nor Plato, nor to procure for his people the advantages which these philosophers believed one could get from such a community, but to give to all men an audacious freedom of enjoying whatever women pleased them, however else she might be bound to another by the laws of marriage. So they fell into the most shameful prostitutions which were authorized by this law. This much offended the people of condition who could not resign themselves to suffer this shame. Consequently this new ordinance was the occasion of a conspiracy against him and of the ruin of his grandeur.⁵

These accounts tell nothing of the doctrine save that part which refers to women, and attribute the downfall of the king purely to this circumstance. Agathias, it is true, does suggest something the religious basis of the new theories by the words "holy dom". But the similarity of the patent facts in the account is noteworthy, with respect to what they include as well as with respect to what they omit.⁶ This similarity is all the more remarkable in that, but a few lines previous, Agathias has said: "I do not agree with what Procopius has written concerning Kobad, believing that I ought to follow as more true what I found in "the chronicles of the Persians."⁷ Hence we must assume that "the chronicles of the Persians" accessible to Agathias differed little or not at all, concerning these particular events, in emphasis at least, if not in facts, from the Procopian account.

The essential characteristic of the Mazdakite belief, however, hinges about these words "holy wisdom", for it was in origin at any rate, religious.⁸ The "chronicles of the Persians" may have lied, but Persian tradition as recorded some centuries later by Firdausi pictures Mazdak as saying:

⁴ For divergent views concerning the previous conduct of Kobad, compare Agathias, IV, xxviii, with Tabari, *Chronique*, tr. Zotenberg, p. 151.

⁵ *Hist. Just.*, IV, xii, §§ 4-5. (tr. Cousin, p. 517).

⁶ *Jos Stylites*, ed. Wright, § 20, is equally guilty.

⁷ *Hist. Just.*, IV, xii, § 12. Elsewhere Agathias says guardedly: "Procopius has written very exactly what took place during the reign of Justinian" (i. e., 527-565 A. D.) and Kobad's deposition was in 498 A. D. The problem of sources is complicated not a little by the fact that Procopius, in speaking of Kobad, says: "The Persian accounts do not agree." (D. B. P., I, vi, 9.)

⁸ This is pointed out by Noeldeke as the chief thing distinguishing it from modern communism. ("Orientalischer Socialismus" in *Deutsche Rundschau*, Feb. 1879, pp. 284ff.)

I will establish this in order that the pure religion
May be made manifest and raised from obscurity.
Whoever follows any religion but this,
May the curse of God overtake that demon.⁹

Mazdak, whatever his origin,¹⁰ and whatever the origin of his principles,¹¹ was the one who popularized and made notorious the ideas which bear his name. He may have been a man of deep religious faith and austere life¹² trying to do the will of God¹³ and preaching his doctrine "not from any base or selfish motive but simply from a conviction of its truth."¹⁴ Yet, as Browne says, "the charges of communism and antinomianism, especially in what concerns the relation of the sexes, were those most frequently brought against Mazdak."¹⁵

That the incidental, rather than the fundamental, things were most frequently head-lined in all the accounts unjustly, is coming to be the final judgment of modern historians. Mazdak's own

⁹ *Shāh-nāmah*, ed. Turner Macan, Calcutta, 1829, p. 1613, q. Nicholson, op. cit. This religious character is not quite so plain, though, as these lines might indicate. Another translation by another authority reads: "I want to put in order these inequalities, so that purity (i. e., justice) may appear and noble things may be distinguished from base ones. He who does not become one of this faith (i. e., this new socialistic teaching) would, like a demon, be cursed by God." (J. J. Modi, "Mazdak, The Iranian Socialist," in *The Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, Bombay, p. 121). This commentator eschews the religious aspect almost entirely in extracting Firdausi and interprets Mazdak as a minister stirred to socialism by a famine.

¹⁰ Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508, says "son of Bāmdādh, probably a native of Susiana". The Pahlavi "Vendidad" and the "Bahman Yasht" (q. Modi, op. cit., pp. 117-119) agree on the phrase "Mazdak, son of Bāmdād." Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 154, says "man from Madharia named Mazdak". Mirkhond, tr. De Sacy, p. 353, says "a native of Persepolis" and is followed by Malcolm, *Hist. Persia*, i, 132. Tabari, t. Zotenberg, ii, 148, says "of Nishapur in Khorassan" as does Modjmelal-Tewarikh (q. St. Martin in notes to *Le Beau, Bas Empire*, ed. Paris, 1827, vii, 322. I have found no substantial warrant for Rawlinson's phrase: "Archimagus, or High Priest of the Zoroastrian religion" (*Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii, 5) nor even for Hodgkins'; "The reformed Zoroastrianism of Mazdak" (*Italy and Her Invaders*, iii, 488) unless we can so interpret Tabari. (cf. Note 20 below).

¹¹ Said by some to have been invented by Zarādusht, son of Khurragan, (cf. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508; Jos. Stylites, ed. Wright, 20; Browne, op. cit. p. 170). Noeldeke claims (op. cit., *Excursus IV*, p. 457) that "the teaching of community . . . can be found earlier even than Zarādusht." Modi, op. cit. pp. 128ff., finds a Chinese origin.

¹² This is Hodgkin's opinion (op. cit., iii, 488). It is also Noeldeke's (op. cit., p. 154 and p. 459) and Browne's (op. cit., p. 170).

¹³ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 154.

¹⁴ Rawlinson, *Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii, 5; Malcolm, (*Hist. Persia*, ed. 1829, i, 104) calls him "a religious imposter".

¹⁵ *Literary History of Persia*, p. 170.

testimony can never be obtained.¹⁶ The Greeks, as we have seen, played him up like a scandal dispatch in modern journalism. The Zoroastrians were even more unfriendly,¹⁷ and the whole Persian legend about him is tinged with intolerance.¹⁸ Nor is this otherwise than might be expected, knowing what we now do of human psychology and of human history as it is written on everything that touches religion. The Mormons of Salt Lake, the Jesuits of Elizabethan England, the Arians of the Sixth Century, and Mazdak of Persia have all been popularly described to us by their own inveterate enemies. Just as in the reign of John of England we must look with caution on the words of ecclesiastical chroniclers when they speak of a king who quarrelled with the Church, so with what concerns the Mazdakites, we must approach the records with reservations and seize with avidity on every favorable phrase and sentiment. Mingled with economic measures, with royal intrigues, with innovations in morality, there was in the theories of Mazdak a religious idea.¹⁹

This is the manner in which the scribe Tabari told of his ideas:

Among the commands which he laid upon the people and

¹⁶ "His book, a Pahlavi document, *Mazdak-nāmah*, known to have existed, is now lost".—Browne, op. cit., p. 169. Cf. the *Dabistan*, tr. Shea, 1843, i, 372.

¹⁷ "The intolerance of Zoroastrian priests" is mentioned at length in T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, London, 1896, chap. vii, pp. 177-184.

¹⁸ "Chosroes I (532-578 A. D.) gained the title of Nūshirwān (of immortal soul) by which he is still remembered as the kingly embodiment of virtue and justice, through his high-handed suppression of Mazdak, which in the eyes of the intolerant Magian priests, constituted his chief claim to 'immortality.'"—Browne, op. cit., p. 135.

¹⁹ Note how Bury (Later Roman Empire, i, 306-307) has avoided mention of religion and has used the phrases "naturally equal" and "contrary to nature", which might almost have been stolen from Rousseau, or at least from other philosophers like Helvetius and Holbach. The Oriental sources line up on this question as follows:

Macoudi speaks in a political frame of mind, mentioning a "revolt" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 124)

Mirkhond declares: "He pretended that his new faith was revealed to him by God". (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 125)

Alberuni calls him a pseudo-prophet (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 126).

The *Dabistan* recites his theories as applying only to members who embrace the same religion (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 128)

In the Pahlavi *Vendidad* he is cited as an example of an "impious starving heretic" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 117)

In the *Bahman Yasht*, his beliefs are "heresy", he is "opposed to the religion", and causes "disturbance among those in the religion of God" (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 118)

The *Dinkard* considers him an "apostate" and uses his name as synonymous with apostasy. (Modi. op. cit., p. 120).

earnestly enjoined was this, that they should possess their property and families in common; it was, he said, an act of piety that was agreeable to God, and would bring the most excellent reward hereafter; even if he had laid no religious commandments upon them, yet the good works in which God was well pleased consisted in such co-partnership. . . . They asserted that God placed the means of subsistence in the world in order that His servants might share them in common, but men had wronged one another in that respect. The Mazdakites said that they would take from the rich for the benefit of the poor, and give back to them that had little their due portion at the expense of those who had much; and they declared that he who possessed more than his share of wealth, women, and property, had no greater right to it than anyone else.²⁰

But this was not all. There were, it appears, if we pick up trifles here and there and put them all together, a few other elements to the doctrine besides the communism founded on religious theory. These, if we assume that hostile historians have

²⁰ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, pp. 154, 141. The ethical basis of the doctrine was summarized by Firdausi not unfairly in the *Shāh-nāmah*, ed. Macan, p. 1614, lines 7ff. as follows:

Five things turn a man from righteousness;

The sage cannot add to these five:

Jealousy, anger, vengeance, need,

And the fifth one that masters him is covetousness.

If thou prevail against these five demons,

The way of the Almighty will be made manifest to thee.

Because of these five, we possess women and wealth,

Which have destroyed the good religion in the world.

Women and wealth must be in common,

If thou desirest that the good religion should not be harmed.

These two produce jealousy, covetousness, and need,

Which secretly unite with anger and vengeance.

The demon is always turning the heads of the wise,

Therefore these two things must be made common property.

Tabari differs from Firdausi in the amount of emphasis placed upon the religious trend. Where Firdausi shows Mazdak in the beginning in a position of authority as king's minister suddenly devising new economic principles to meet emergencies thrust upon him by a famine which sends the populace to clamor at the door of the palace (q. Modi. op. cit., p. 120). Tabari says: "He pretended to be a prophet. He taught the old religion with this exception, that he abolished marriage and ownership in property, saying that 'the God of the Universe has given these equally to all men' . . . Kobad sent for him and inquired about it." (q. Modi, op. cit., p. 124).

Cf. also the accounts in Rawlinson (op. cit., ii, 5); Nicholson (loc. cit.) from whom the Firdausi is quoted; and Browne (op. cit., p. 170), who goes on to remark that Mazdak deserves some credit as an early instance of "that passion for philosophical speculation which is so remarkable a characteristic of the Persians, who have probably produced more great heresiarchs than any other nation in the world." (op. cit., p. 136). Noeldeke emphasizes the philosophical element of the doctrines when he says: "Mazdak lehrte, dass alle Menschen gleich angesehen sein und das es Unrecht sei, wenn der Eine mehr Gueter und mehr Weiber habe als der Andere." (op. cit., p. 458).

misplaced the emphasis,²¹ were not unimportant. Browne had pointed out that in the Pahlavi translation of the Vendidad, the words of the Avesta text: "The ungodly heretic who does not eat" are illustrated by the gloss "like Mazdak".²² And all the trustworthy evidence goes to show that Mazdak did preach the sacredness of animal life and forbade the slaughtering of animals for food,—though he did permit milk, cheese, and eggs,—and continually emphasized abstemiousness and devotion.²³ He also preached simplicity in dress—uniformity in dress we cannot find—and a separation of families so that at least the child should not know his father or the father the child.²⁴ This last may well have been cited by his enemies at the time, as an inevitable result of his suggestion regarding promiscuous intercourse, or it may have been founded on some ideal of state education such as Platon contemplated. Which, it is difficult to say.

But Plato, Sir Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and William Morris never created such a stir in the world with their ideal commonwealths, philosopher-kings, and social systems as did Mazdak. The reason is obvious. Mazdak converted a monarch, of all monarchs an oriental monarch, an absolute monarch who could impose his will upon the realm. That the lower classes should embrace the creed is not surprising, when we consider its promises; but that Kobad should become on his throne a disciple of such a teacher, is truly amazing. Mirkhond²⁵ says "that Mazdak claimed to authenticate his mission by the possession and exhibition of miraculous powers. In order to impose on the weak mind of Kobad, he arranged and carried into effect an elaborate imposture. He excavated a cave below the fire-altar on which he was in the habit of offering, and contrived to pass a tube from

²¹ Bury speaks only of the "community of property and wives" (op. cit., i, 306-7) and Hodgkin only of "rights of property both in jewels and wives" (op. cit., iii, 488). Though Rawlinson mentions other things, they are only as "added tenets" and his chief emphasis is on "property and marriage", on "adultery, incest, theft", and on "the appropriation of particular women by individual men." (op. cit., 11, 5-8).

²² Op. cit., p. 169.

²³ Cf. Rawlinson, ii, 5-8 who cites these among the "added tenets"; Mirkhond, tr. De Sacy, p. 354 and Modi, op. cit., p. 125; and Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 460, who says "Nach Biruni verbot er, das Vieh zu schlachten, bis es von selbst verendete; da klingt, als haben er Genuss des Fleisches crepiert Thiery estat was kaum richtig ist." See also Modi's translation, op. cit., p. 126.

²⁴ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142.

²⁵ Tr. De Sacy, q. Rawlinson, op. cit., ii, 5-6 and also Modi's translation, op. cit., p. 125.

the cavern to the upper surface of the altar, where the sacred flame was maintained perpetually. Having then placed a confederate in the cavern, he invited the attendance of Kobad, and in his presence pretended to hold converse with the fire itself, which the Persians viewed as the symbol and embodiment of divinity. The king accepted the miracle as an absolute proof of the divine authority of the new teacher, and became thenceforth his zealous adherent and follower." This, however, seems a trifle too unusual a tale for full credence as indicating the real cause of Kobad's acceptance of the new creed, and may be looked upon by a reasonably skeptical historian as an invention of a hostile chronicler, if not in its facts, at least in its complete results. Although Tabari says Kobad became a disciple of Mazdak "and followed him in all things",²⁶ it is a difficult situation to imagine. Noeldeke has suggested that the Mazdakite movement about this time lost its religious character, as any movement with such concrete applications probably would when taken up by the people. But Noeldeke²⁷ is the first commentator who has analyzed the political motives of the king, saying that Kobad espoused the cause of Mazdak because he found the nobility and the Zoroastrian priests leagued against him. They would of course have been leagued against him afterwards; but it seems much more reasonable to suppose that he supported as friends the many enemies of his enemies than that he deliberately made enemies for himself by espousing such a cause. It was under his patronage that the Mazdakites extended their name and their influence to the Mediterranean²⁸ and into Armenia.²⁹ It was because of his patronage of these theories that the nobles and the priests of Persia aroused themselves sufficiently to overthrow him and force him into exile.³⁰ But the purely political character of his adherence to these theories is even more strikingly illustrated by the easy manner in which in 502 A. D., after escaping from prison and obtaining aid from the Ephthalites, Kobad was able to return to the throne. He actually was reinstated by a man who killed many

²⁶ Tr. Noeldeke, p. 144.

²⁷ Nicholson (op. cit., p. 508) and Browne (op. cit., p. 170) accept this explanation.

²⁸ Cf. St. Martin's notes to Le Beau: *Bas-Empire*, vii, 338.

²⁹ Cf. St. Martin: *Reserches sur l'Armenie*, i, 328-329; and Lazare Parbe, *Vie de Vahan*, p. 47, q. Rawlinson, loc. cit.

³⁰ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142. This is the cause universally assigned. Cf. Procopius, Agathias, Jos. Stylites, Mirkhond, Rawlinson, Hodgkin, Bury, and Browne, as cited above.

Mazdakites.³¹ He actually announced that personally he held with Mazdak's doctrines; but officially he could not support them. Their political usefulness to him was over. That, it appears, is the only reasonable explanation.

The cautious historian must, however, always admit the possibility that chroniclers hostile to the theory have magnified all the unfavorable facts. When Rawlinson speaks of "the disorders of its votaries" and "extreme or violent measures" which had now "ceased to endanger the state",³² there is presented an unfavorable picture indeed. But it does seem that no inconsiderable eruption did occur. Says Tabari:

The mob eagerly seized their opportunity . . . and the Mazdakites became so powerful that they used to enter a man's house and forcibly deprive him of his dwelling, his women-folk, and his property, since it was impossible for him to offer resistance.³³

But even more conclusive is the indirect evidence offered in Kobad's son, Chosroës' later speech to the nobles and the priests after his coronation in 531 A. D.³⁴ "He dwelt upon their religion and the heavy losses they had incurred. The systematic regulations which he made for the purpose of compensating the sufferers, establishing the position of children of doubtful origin, etc., show that the social revolution must have developed considerably and that the upper classes bore the brunt of it."³⁵

Yet, the political character of Kobad's first adventure with the doctrine in 498 is illustrated not only by his political divorce from, and religious adherence to, Mazdak; but also by the fact that Mazdak himself escaped serious punishment. As Rawlinson says, "Mazdak was seized indeed and imprisoned; but his followers rose at once, broke open his prison doors, and set him at liberty. The government felt itself too weak to insist on its intended policy of coercion. Mazdak was allowed to live in retirement unmolested, and to increase the number of his disciples."³⁶ The politician was punished: the religious leader escaped. But his proselytizing was for many years probably of a purely religious character. Only when he sought again to secure

³¹ "Zarmihr, son of Sôchrâ, killed many Mazdakites and put Kobad back on the throne". Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 142.)

³² *Op. cit.*, ii, 13.

³³ Tr. Noeldeke, p. 141.

³⁴ Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 106ff.

³⁵ Nicholson, *op. cit.*

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, ii, 8, 13.

converts in high political circles did he meet determined opposition.

It seems that succession to the crown in Persia was not of a purely hereditary character. A contemporaneous traveller thus described the method of "election":

Some time after his accession the king chooses from his sons the most intelligent one, enters his name on a document, and keeps it in a sealed letter in his treasury without his other sons and the ministers knowing it. When the king dies, the assemblage [of princes and ministers] take out the letter, and he, whose name appears in the sealed letter cover, is to be raised to the throne.³⁷

Now, of the children of Kobad, there were three whose names figured prominently in those days. Of course, the brother, Zamasp, who had been king during the four years of Kobad's exile, was dead and therefore no longer an aspirant. Of the children, Chosroës was the favorite son and presumably destined for the crown. But the Mazdakites³⁸ had succeeded in converting Phthasuarsas and his sister Sambyke,³⁹ and naturally wanted Phthasuarsas to succeed. Their intriguing caused a crisis which ended in a wholesale slaughter of Mazdakites at the end of the year 528, or the beginning of the year 529,⁴⁰ regarding which the evidence is various. Malalas, first emphasizing the new spreading of the dogma, reports that:

The king, having called a meeting, was able to gather all the Mazdakites together with their bishops⁴¹ and gave orders to his army surrounding them, to kill them. And so the soldiers, in his presence, put to the sword all the Mazdakites with their bishop Indazar, and clergy. He burned all their books and issued a decree that any others found in the empire of Persia should be burned.⁴²

Theophanes' story is similar except that he says distinctly that

³⁷ Kentok Hori, "A Chinese Account of Persia in the Sixth Century", in *Spiegel Memorial Volume, Bombay*, 1908, p. 248.

³⁸ Confused with Manichees by Malalas and Theophanes. References under Note 39 show which is the correct name, now generally accepted.

³⁹ Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 460; Malalas, ed. Bonn, p. 444; Theophanes, ed. Bonn, p. 261; Smith's *Dict. Greek & Roman Biography*, iii, 719, q. Rawlinson, ii, 26; and Modi, op. cit., p. 124, note 2.

⁴⁰ Browne, op. cit., p. 172. Rawlinson, op. cit., ii, 26, says "about the year 523". Rawlinson's account is the fullest concerning the designs and intrigues on the succession.

⁴¹ Text reads "Manichees". For change see Notes 38 and 39 *supra*.

⁴² Malalas, "Chronographia", ed. Bonn., p. 444-445. This is related on the authority of Bastagarius "who after being baptized was known as Timotheus".

it was Kobad who ordered the event and gives the details concerning the Phthasuarsas intrigue. He attributes the initiative in the affair to Glonazes, an archmagus, other magii, and Bazanes, a Christian bishop. His account is very similar in respect to the burning of books and the hue and cry raised throughout the empire.⁴³

There has been an inclination among historians to show that Kobad embarked upon the extermination of his former co-religionists at the instigation of Chosroës.⁴⁴ In popular legend at least Chosroës is credited with this slaughter, by which he is said to have earned his title of Núshírwán, "of immortal soul". At any rate, the names of Chosroës and Mazdak are still linked as, respectively, "the Just King"⁴⁵ and "the accursed Mazdak".⁴⁶ According to the current account,⁴⁷ Prince Chosroës, after exposing the evil designs and juggler's tricks of Mazdak to his father Kobad, deceived the heresiarch by a feigned submission and fixed a day when he would make formal and public profession of the new doctrine. Invitations were issued to the Mazdakites to a great banquet which the prince would provide in one of the royal gardens; but as each group entered the garden, they were seized by soldiers who lay in wait for them, slain, and buried head downwards in the earth with their feet protruding. When all this had been disposed of, Chosroës invited Mazdak, whom he had himself received in private audience, to take a walk with him through the gardens before the banquet, and to inspect the produce thereof. On entering the garden, "Behold," said the prince, pointing to the upturned feet of the dead heretics, "the crop which your evil doctrines have brought forth." Therewith he made a sign, and Mazdak was at once seized, bound and buried alive head downwards in the midst of a large mound of earth specially prepared for him in the middle of the garden. This is the legend of Persia.

Now, there is here a contradiction, because some accounts

⁴³ Theophanes, "Chronographia", ed. Bonn., p. 261.

⁴⁴ Nicholson, op. cit., p. 508; Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 465. Cf. Sa'di, the poet:

The blessed named Núshírwán doth still for justice stand.
Though long hath passed since Núshírwán hath vanished
from the land (q. Browne, op. cit., p. 135).

⁴⁵ Browne, op. cit., p. 166.

⁴⁶ Browne, op. cit., p. 168, from a late 12th century Pahlawi manuscript of "Bahman Yasht", cf. Modi, op. cit., p. 118. Also *Dabistan*, q. Modi, pp. 119-120.

⁴⁷ Given in its fullest form in the "Siyásat-námah" of Nidhámú 'l-Mulk, ed. Schefer, pp. 166-181, trans. pp. 245-266. Here extracted from Browne, op. cit., p. 170.

credit Kobad with the slaughter of the Mazdakites and some Chosroës. But the contradiction can perhaps be simplified by recognizing that the extermination was attempted on a large scale on two separate occasions. The Byzantine Malalas speaks clearly of two different occasions;⁴⁸ and Browne resolves the difficulty by placing the first massacre in 528 or 529 and the second in 531 "soon after Núshirwán's (i. e., Chosroës') accession to the throne."⁴⁹ The words of Malalas, in his second passage, can readily be interpreted to refer to an occurrence after Chosroës' accession in respect to both date and circumstances. After speaking of Chosroës becoming king, he says:

During this same time the king of the Persians had tolerated the heresy of the Manichees spreading through his realm. The Persian Magi, since he opposed this doctrine, conceived a plan with the great men of the kingdom, for depriving the king of his rule and putting his brother in his place. And the king of the Persians, hearing this, cut off his brother's head.

I conceive that in this passage by "the king of the Persians", Chosroës is meant, since Kobad did not avert his troubles by killing Zamasp; by "Manichees", Mazdakites;⁵⁰ by "the Persian Magi", the Mazdakite heresiarchs, for the Greeks were inaccurate and very free in their use of ecclesiastical terms when referring to Persia, even calling Indazara a "bishop" when he was not a Christian even. Though not very specific in distinguishing between the two persecutions, Rawlinson, I believe, makes the same division and would place the second Malalas passage at the later date. Speaking of the accession of Chosroës, he says:

Zames, Kaoses, and all the other sons of Kobad were seized by order of Chosroës, and, together with their entire male offspring, were condemned to death. When Chosroës had by these means secured himself against the claims of the pretenders, he proceeded to employ equal severity in repressing the disorders, punishing the crimes, and compelling the abject submission of his subjects. The heresiarch Mazdak, who had escaped the persecution instituted in his later years by Kobad, and the sect of the Mazdakites, which, despite that persecution, was still strong and vigorous, were the first to experience the oppressive weight of his resentment; and the corpses of a hundred thousand martyrs blackening upon gibbets proved the determination of the new monarch to make his will law, whatever the consequences.⁵¹

⁴⁸ "Chronographia", ed. Bonn, pp. 444-445 and p. 472.

⁴⁹ Op. cit., p. 172.

⁵⁰ Cf. note 41, *supra*. This view is supported by Noeldeke, op. cit., p. 462.

⁵¹ Rawlinson, *Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, ii, 43, 101, who cites Mirkhond and Tabari.

And if we for the moment recall that Tabari is in other respects one of our best sources, we gain further credence for our distinction. Tabari's chronicle is a very condensed and much abbreviated document. Yet, he has an account of the slaughter within the reign of Chosroës.⁵² And another, Arabic source, al-Yacqubí, says that Mazdak and his master Zarátusht Khurragán were put to death by Chosroës.⁵³

To summarize briefly, then, we might well conclude that the whole Mazdak episode, from beginning to end, took place in the following stages:

(1) A religious movement popularized by Mazdak in the role of a vigorous social reformer.

(2) Kobad's conversion and his use of the Mazdakites as a political weapon which resulted in his fall. (498 A. D.)

(3) Kobad's return to power and his political rejection of the Mazdakites. (502 A. D.)

(4) New political ambitions of the Mazdakites culminating in the first massacre, under Kobad, possibly instigated by Chosroës. (528-529 A. D.)

(5) Accession of Chosroës and his purely political measures in exterminating the Mazdakites to make more secure his crown. 531 A. D.)

Beyond this there is little to say. The name and the influence of Mazdak still persisted, though in a very limited fashion in Persian social, religious, and philosophical history; but never again assumed much political importance.⁵⁴

⁵² Tabari, tr. Noeldeke, p. 154.

⁵³ Al-Ya qubí wrote about three hundred years after these events transpired. (Cf. references in Browne, op. cit., p. 169, note.)

⁵⁴ He was spoken of in philosophical treatises, and according to Biruni, his name turned up again two centuries later, when al-Mu-quanna, "the Veiled Prophet of Korassan" in 777-780 tried to make "obligatory for them all the laws and institutes which Mazdak had established." (Browne, op. cit., p. 318.) For details of the persisting re-occurrences of his name see Browne, op. cit., 312. Cf. also, *ibid.*, 247, 316, 323, 328, 382, 387, and a bibliography of the entire subject, p. 169. Among modern writers, not here quoted, who have treated of the subject are, Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury, v, 181-182; and Malcolm, Sir. J., *History of Persia*, ed. London, 1815, i, 132.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.

BY HARRY ELMER BARNES.

I. LIFE AND WORKS.

IT was one hundred years in May of this year since Auguste Comte published the famous prospectus of his comprehensive social philosophy under the title of *Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société*.¹ In the century which has passed many one-sided philosophies of society have been proposed and many incomplete schemes of social reform propounded. Many writers in recent years have, however, tended to revert to the position of Comte that we must have a philosophy of society which includes a consideration of biological, psychological and historical factors, and a program of social reform which will provide for an increase both in technical efficiency and in social morale.² Further, there has also developed a wide-spread distrust of the "pure" democracy of the last century and a growing feeling that we must endeavor more and more to install in positions of political and social power that intellectual aristocracy in which Comte placed his faith as the desirable leaders in the reconstruction of European society.³ In the light of the above facts a brief analysis of the political and social philosophy of Comte may have practical as well as historical interest to students of philosophy and social science.

Auguste Comte was born in Montpellier in 1798, and received his higher education at the *Ecole Polytechnique*. During six years

¹ See the brief article on this matter in the *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1922, pp. 510-13.

² See *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920, pp. 174-202; and G. S. Hall, *Morale: the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*.

³ For an extreme statement of this point of view see E. Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*.

of his young manhood he was a close friend and ardent disciple of the progressive French thinker, Henri de Saint Simon.⁴ In 1824 there came a sharp break which led Comte into a somewhat ungracious depreciation of his former master. They differed chiefly in the degree to which they placed confidence in the revolutionary philosophy and tendencies of the times, Comte being inclined to take a more conservative position than his teacher. Comte's earliest work of importance was the prospectus of his social philosophy which was mentioned above.⁵ In 1826 he worked out in lectures the first formal exposition of the principles of the Positivist philosophy in his own home, where he was honored by the attendance of such distinguished men as the scientist Alexander von Humboldt.

Comte's first great work—the *Cours de philosophie positive*—appeared between the years 1830 and 1842. From 1836 until 1846 he was an examiner for the *Ecole Polytechnique*. After his dismissal from this position he was supported chiefly by contributions from his disciples and admirers. His friendship with Clotilde de Vaux (1845-6) doubtless contributed strongly to Comte's eulogy of women which appeared particularly in his *Polity*. He founded the *Positivist Society* in 1848. Comte's last and most important work—the *Système de politique positive*—appeared between 1851 and 1854. He died in 1857.⁶

In the first of his chief works—the *Philosophy*—Comte worked out in more detail than in his earlier sketches and essays his main theoretical positions. These include the hierarchy of the sciences; the necessity for, and the nature of, sociology, with its two main divisions of social statics and social dynamics; and the law of the three stages of universal progress, with ample historical illustrations and confirmation. The *Polity* was a detailed expansion of his theoretical doctrines, and their practical application to the construction of a "Positive" or scientifically designed commonwealth. While many are inclined to maintain that the *Philosophy* contains all of Comte's important contributions to sociology, such

⁴ See W. H. Schoff, "A Neglected Chapter in the Life of Comte," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 8, 1896, pp. 491-508.

⁵ For a list of Comte's works see M. Defourny, *La Sociologie positiviste*, pp. 19-22.

⁶ An excellent brief survey of Comte's life is to be found in John Morley's article on "Comte" in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

is far from the case.⁷ Though the *Polity* is verbose, prolix, involved and repetitious, nearly all of Comte's chief postulates are developed in it with far greater maturity and richness of detail than in the *Philosophy*.⁸

II .COMTE'S GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

It is generally conceded by the foremost students of Comte's social philosophy that his chief contribution lay in his remarkable capacity for synthesis and organization, rather than in the development of new and original social doctrines. He derived much from writers on social philosophy from Aristotle to Saint-Simon. From Aristotle he derived his fundamental notion as to the basis of social organization, namely, the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts. From Hume, Kant and Gall he received his conceptions of positivism in method and his physical psychology. From Hume, Kant and Turgot he obtained his views of historical determinism, and from Bossuet, Vico and DeMaistre his somewhat divergent doctrine of the providential element in history. From Turgot, Condorcet, Burdin and Saint-Simon he derived his famous law of the three stages in the intellectual development of mankind. From Montesquieu, Condorcet and Saint-Simon he secured his conception of sociology as the basic and directive science which must form the foundation of the art of politics. Each had made special contributions to this subject. Montesquieu had introduced the conception of law in the social process, stressing particularly the influence of the physical environment; Condorcet had emphasized the concept of progress; while Saint-Simon had insisted upon the necessity of providing a science of society sufficiently comprehensive to guide this process of social and industrial reorganization. It was the significant achievement of Comte to work out an elaborate synthesis of these progressive contributions of the thought of the previous century and to indi-

⁷ Cf. L. Chiappini, *Les Idées politiques d'Auguste Comte*, Introduction.

⁸ This point has been especially stressed by Comte himself, and by G. H. Lewes and Frederic Harrison. For a vigorous attack on the value of the *Polity* see *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 8, 1896, p. 506.

while the latter is capable of immense improvement, if guided according to scientific principles. Another distinction is that the social organism allows a far greater distribution of functions combined with a higher degree of coördination of organs.¹⁶

Sociology, Comte defined specifically as the science of social order and progress, and, in a more general way, as the science of social phenomena.¹⁷ It is closely related to biology, the subject-matter of the latter being organization and life; that of sociology order and progress.¹⁸

Comte divides sociology into two major departments, social statics, or *théorie générale de l'ordre spontané des sociétés humaines*, and social dynamics, or *théorie générale du progrès naturel de l'humanité*.¹⁹ He finds that the underlying basis of social order is the principle which he assigns to Aristotle, though it probably belongs more rightfully to Plato, namely, the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts, the former takes shape in the specialization and division of labor in society, and the latter is realized through the institution of government.²⁰

The government principle in social progress is to be found in the law of the three stages of intellectual advance.²¹ Through each of these stages—the theological, metaphysical, and scientific—there must pass the proper development and education of the individual, the various realms of human knowledge, and the general process of social evolution. None of these stages can be eliminated, though intelligent direction may hasten the process and lack of wisdom retard it.²² Each stage is the necessary antecedent of the following one, and any period is as perfect as the condition and the time will allow. All institutions are, thus, relative in their degree of excellence and none can hope to attain to absolute per-

¹⁶ Martineau, II, pp. 258-62, 299-301; *Philosophie positive*, fifth edition, 1893, Vol. IV, pp. 469-81.

¹⁷ Martineau, pp. 140-141, 218, 258; III, pp. 383-5.

¹⁸ Martineau, II, pp. 140-141.

¹⁹ *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 430, 498.

²⁰ *Polity*, II, pp. 242-4.

²¹ Martineau, Vol. I, pp. 1-3, and Vol. III passim; see also L. T. house in *Sociological Review*, Vol. I, pp. 262-79. Comte possessed lost as great a love for triads as did Vico. Thus, he finds three stages of intellectual progress, three divisions of cerebral functions, three types of social forces, three grades of society, three social classes, three stages of religion, and three classes of regulating power in society.

²² *Polity*, IV, translated by Congreve, General Index, 1822, pp. 241, 360.

fection.²³ Objectively considered progress may be regarded as consisting in man's increasing control over the environment.²⁴ Again, progress may be broken up into three constituent parts, intellectual, material, and moral. Intellectual progress is to be found in the law of the three stages; material progress in "an analogous progression in human activity which in its first stage is Conquest, then Defense; and lastly Industry"; and moral progress "shows that man's social nature follows the same course; that it finds satisfaction, first in the Family, then in the State, and lastly in the Race."²⁵ In securing progress the desires and emotions are the driving forces and the intellectual factors are the guiding and restraining agencies.²⁶

While Comte's philosophy of history has been criticized by many for being too one-sided and merely stressing the intellectual factors²⁷ most of his critics have overlooked those passages in which he foreshadows Spencer and Giddings by describing the three great stages of human progress as the Military-Theological, the Critical-Metaphysical; and the Industrial-Scientific.²⁸

Comte laid great stress upon the family as a fundamental social institution and upon religion as one of the most important regulating agencies in society. While somewhat utilitarian in his attitude towards the social applications of religion, his exposition of the principles of the Positivist creed is developed in great detail in the *Polity*. His doctrines regarding the basic importance of the family and religion, appreciated by Ward, have been recently revived with a more scientific analysis and application by Professor Ellwood.²⁹

²³ Cf. Michel, op. cit., p. 432; Martineau, II, pp. 232-4. This doctrine of the relativity of the excellence of institutions was not, however, an original conception, as Dr. L. M. Bristol would seem to indicate, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 20-1, for it was perhaps the central feature of Montesquieu's philosophy.

²⁴ *Polity*, II, pp. 235-9.

²⁵ Ibid, IV, p. 157.

²⁶ Ibid, III, pp. 55ff. Cf. L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. VI

XVI.

²⁷ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 303-4.

²⁸ *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 17ff, 578-87; *Polity*, III, pp. 44-5 and passim. Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393-4. "Whatever addition it may receive, and whatever corrections it may require, this analysis of social evolution will continue to be regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect." Morley, loc. cit. Benn with undue enthusiasm declares it the best sketch of universal history ever written. — *Modern Philosophy*, p. 156.

²⁹ *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 74ff; *Sociology and its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 186-7, 356-8; *The Social Problems of 189f*; *The Reconstruction of Religion*.

Finally, as Lester F. Ward so clearly pointed out, Comte holds that the great practical value of sociology is to be looked for in its application to scientific social reform, and in his most elaborate work he develops at great length what he believes will be the ultimate type of social organization, if society is wise enough to study and apply the science which investigates the laws of its organization and progress.⁸⁰

II. SPECIFIC POLITICAL DOCTRINES.

1. *Sociology and Political Science.*

Comte makes no clear distinction between political science and sociology. Indeed, he seems to regard sociology as the perfected political science of the future. At the same time, he clearly differentiates sociology from the older political philosophy, as dominated by metaphysical methods and concepts. Sociology has nothing in common with the old *a priori* method that characterized the earlier political philosophy. It must be based on the assured scientific procedure of observation, experimentation and comparison.⁸¹ It is doubtful if Comte conceived it as possible that there could be a science of the state distinct from the general science of society.⁸² At any rate, his political theory is inextricably connected with his psychology, theology, ethics, and economics, which are included within his sociology. In general, Comte denied that the special social sciences were true sciences. He held that society must be studied as a whole by a unitary science—sociology.⁸³ Political science, to Comte, was that part of his sociology which was concerned with the history of the state and the theory and practice of its organization, but he rarely, if ever, treated these subjects in isolation, but dealt with each as a part of social evolution and organization as a whole.⁸⁴

2. *The Nature of the State.*

Comte's ideas concerning the nature of the state and its distinction from society, nation, and government are vague and un-

⁸⁰ *Polity*, passim, particularly Vols. II, IV.

⁸¹ Martineau, II, pp. 241-57.

⁸² *Ibid*, pp. 225-6.

⁸³ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 28.

⁸⁴ Martineau, II, pp. 210-22, 235. *Polity*, IV, pp. 558-60, General Appendix, 3rd part, "Plan of the Scientific Operation necessary for the Scientific Reorganization of Society."

certain. Comte was too much interested in the ultimate Positivist society of the future to devote much attention to an elaboration of the theoretical foundations of the contemporary national *bourgeois state*. This was, at best, merely a transitory form of social organization. "Between the city, uniting man and his dwelling place, and the full development of the Great Being around a fitting centre, a number of intermediate forms of association may be found, under the general name of *states*. But all of these forms, differing only in extent and permanence, may be neglected as undefined."³⁵ Comte's whole position would have made it hard for him to conceive clearly such an entity as society politically organized, as distinct in practice, at least, from its material and spiritual aspects. His own theory of society was so all-inclusive, with its mixture of family ethics, theological dogmas and economic arrangements with politics, that it was not favorable to clearly differentiated concepts in the political realm. The only point on which he may be said to be unmistakably clear is his dogma that there can be no fixed social relations of any permanence without a political organization, that is, a government. The first principle of positive political theory, he says, is that "society without a government is no less impossible than a government without society. In the smallest as well as in the largest associations, the Positive theory of a polity never loses sight of these two correlative ideas, without which theories would lead us astray, and society would end in anarchy."³⁶ When, however, Comte begins to discuss the governmental arrangements in his state or society he immediately introduces conceptions quite foreign to orthodox notions of governmental organization by his advocacy of increasing governmental rectitude through the influence of family morality, and by entrusting its encouragement and surveillance to the priests of the religion of Humanity. In short, it seems that Comte regarded the state as the organ for the direction of the general material activities of society. While this is the most frequent connotation of the term state, as employed by Comte, he often uses it in sense identical with the nation and with society in general.³⁷

Upon the question as to what constitutes the fundamental attributes of the state, Comte is a little more clear. In fact, he quite agrees with what are now considered the indispensable at-

³⁵ *Polity*, II, p. 241.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 224; Cf. *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 485-95.

³⁷ Cf. Chiappini, *op. cit.*, pp. 97ff.

tributes of any state or political society, namely, population, territory, a sovereign power, and a governmental organization. He is particularly insistent upon the territorial prerequisite for the state.³⁸ His belief in the indispensability of government has just been pointed out above. Finally, in his unequivocal statement of the necessity of adequate social control in any stable society and the recognition that political organization ultimately rests upon force, Comte makes it plain that he discerned the necessity of a sovereign power for the creation and maintenance of a permanent political society.³⁹ Comte also anticipated the modern trends in political science by stressing the importance of the psychological and economic factors in the state. He sums up his position on these points very briefly in the following passage: "When Property, Family, and Language, have found a suitable Territory, and have reached the point at which they combine any given population under the same, at least the same spiritual, government, there a possible nucleus of the Great Being has been formed. Such a community, or city, be it ultimately large or small, is a true *organ* of Humanity."⁴⁰ More than the mere statement of Comte's doctrines regarding the fundamental elements of any state, this passage is an admirable example of how he was wont to introduce into political thought highly visionary and figurative ethical and theological concepts.

3. *The Genesis of Political Institutions.*

A. Philosophical Analysis of Principles.

Comte treated the subject of the origin of society, state, and government in both an analytical and in an historical manner. In his analytical treatment he based his procedure on the Aristotelian dogma of the inherent sociability of mankind and declared the notion of a state of nature mere metaphysical nonsense, and the allied contract theory of political origins untenable.⁴¹ Man, he held, prevailed over the other animals because of his superior sociability, and in developing this important element of a social

³⁸ *Polity*, II, pp. 237, 241. For his excessive emphasis on this point he is criticized by Defourny, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-6, 301-2.

³⁹ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 247-9. See below, however, for an account of his failure to develop a theory of sovereignty.

⁴⁰ *Polity*, II, p. 241.

⁴¹ *Philosophie positive*, pp. 431-47; Martineau, II, pp. 157-8.

nature the prolongation of human infancy was perhaps the most important factor.⁴²

The unit of society, according to Comte, is not the individual but the family. The great function of the family in history has been to generate the basic elements which would ultimately produce the state. The growth and perfection of language was the main factor making it possible for the state to develop from the family:⁴³

A *society*, therefore, can no more be decomposed into *individuals* than a geometric surface can be resolved into lines, or a line into points. The simplest association, that is, the family, sometimes reduced to its original couple, constitutes the true unit of society. From it flow the more complex groups, such as classes and cities.⁴⁴

During the whole continuance of the education of the race, the principal end of the Domestic Order is gradually to form the Political Order. It is from this latter, finally, that the critical influence originates, whereby the family affections are raised up to their high social office, and prevented from degenerating into collective selfishness.⁴⁵

While society, in a psychological sense, is ultimately based upon the social instinct, grounded in sympathy and expressed mainly in the family, the wider and more highly developed forms of social organization, as exemplified by the state and society, are based upon the Aristotelian principle of the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts.⁴⁶ It is this coöperative distribution of functions which marks off the political society from the domestic association, which is based upon sympathy.⁴⁷ The great point of superiority of the social organism over the individual organism is that it allows of a higher degree of distribution of functions, coördinated with a more perfect adaptation of organs. The perfect distribution of functions and coördination of organs in society is the ultimate goal of social evolution, and it is in a study of the relation between these two principles that one is to look for the relation between society and government.⁴⁸ The

⁴² *Polity*, I, pp. 511-13. Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Bk. III, Chaps. i-ii; J. Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 340-44, 360-69.

⁴³ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 153, 183; *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 447-469.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 153.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 183.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 234, 242; *Philosophie positive*, IV, pp. 469-81.

⁴⁷ *Polity*, II, p. 242.

⁴⁸ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 469-81; *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 243-4.

reason for this is that too much specialization, while it leads to the development of a great skill and a high degree of interest in narrow fields, is liable to result in the disintegration of society through a loss of the conception of the unity of the whole and of the mutual relations between the individual and society. It is the function of government to coördinate human activities, and to guard against the dangerous elements in specialization, while, at the same time, conserving its beneficial effects.⁴⁹

In proportion as a distribution of functions is realized in society there results a natural and spontaneous process of subordination, the principle being that those in any occupation come under the direction of the class which has control over their general type of functions, i. e., the next class above them in the hierarchy of industrial differentiation. Government tends naturally to arise out of the controlling and directing forces which are at first centered in the smaller and functional groups of society. In the past, war has been the chief factor in unifying in one central unit this divided governmental power. Industry, however, is coming more and more to be the source of social discipline and governmental control.⁵⁰ "The habits of command and of obedience already formed in Industry have only to extend to public spheres, to found a power in the State capable of controlling the divergencies, and regulating the convergencies, of the individuals within it."⁵¹

This material basis of government in the principles of the division of labor, combination of efforts, and superiority and subordination⁵² harmonizes with the psychic characteristics of humanity, which leads some to command and others to obey. While it is necessary to recognize the almost universal desire to

⁴⁹ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 481-7; *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 243-4.

"Cette conception constitue, à mes yeux, la première base positive et rationnelle de la théorie élémentaire et abstraite du gouvernement, proprement dit, envisagée dans sa plus noble et plus entière extension scientifique, c'est-à-dire, comme caractérisé en général par l'universelle réaction nécessaire d'abord spontanée et en suite régulée, de l'ensemble sur les parties."

Philosophie Positive, Vol. IV, p. 485.

"Fidèle à la pensée de Comte, nous pouvons définir le gouvernement dans son sens général et propre, la force de cohésion sociale qui agit, ou mieux encore le principe de coopération mis en oeuvre." Chiappini, op. cit., pp. 102.3.

⁵⁰ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 487-93; *Polity*, Vol. II, 245-6. Cf. Spencer's doctrine of the military and industrial orders in society.

⁵¹ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 246.

⁵² Cf. the doctrine of von Haller and Simmel.

command, it is no less essential to observe that people find it very agreeable to throw the burden of expert guidance upon others.⁵³

But one must go beyond this fundamental analytical basis of the state, in the distribution of functions and the combination of efforts to construct a complete system of political philosophy. With this Aristotelian axiom must be combined the Hobbesian notion of force as the ultimate foundation upon which governmental organization rests. "Social science would remain forever in the cloud-land of metaphysics, if we hesitated to adopt the principle of Forces as the basis of Government. Combining this doctrine with that of Aristotle, that society consists in the Combination of efforts and the Distribution of functions, we get the axioms of a sound political philosophy."⁵⁴

To the doctrines of Aristotle and Hobbes, however, must be added the more specific notions of Comte himself. He finds that in addition to the requirements just named, there is demanded an efficient general regulating power or system of social control. "Close study, therefore, shows us that there are three things necessary for all political power, besides the basis of material Force: an Intellectual guidance, a Moral sanction, and lastly a Social control."⁵⁵ This regulating power is to be found in the religion of humanity and is to be administered by the priests of that cult.⁵⁶ There are, thus, in the perfect state three grades of society: the family based on feeling or affection; the state or city based on action; and the church based primarily on intelligence, but, in reality, synthesizing all three.⁵⁷ These grades of society correspond to, and have their basis in, the three fundamental powers or functions of man's cerebral system, which Comte took from Gall's phrenology and made the basis of his psychology and much of his social science.⁵⁸

This final element, the church, with its universal surveillance and guidance of all social activities, will make possible the dissolution of the great tyrannical states and the completion of the

⁵³ "Ainsi la spontanéité fondamentale des diverses dispositions individuelles se montre essentiellement en harmonie avec le cours nécessaire de l'ensemble des relations sociales pour établir que la subordination politique est, en général, aussi inévitable qu'indispensable. *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 493-5. Cf. *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 244. Cf. Giddings' theory of "Protocracy" in his *Responsible State*, pp. 17ff.

⁵⁴ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 247.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 249.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 249-50.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 250-1.

⁵⁸ Cf. Martineau, Vol. II, Chapter VI; *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 540-93.

social organism without any danger from anarchy or license.⁵⁹ In the place of the conventional political state, as it now exists, there is to be a group of cities united by the common religious tutelage provided by the worship of humanity as administered by its priests. Such political entities are, after all, as large as any which could be constituted without the entry of tyranny. Comte, thus, tended partially to revive the localism and municipal character of the Utopias of Plato and Aristotle, and, to a certain degree, anticipated Le Play and modern regionalism:

The foundation of a universal Church will enable the gradual reduction of these huge and temporary agglomerations of men to that natural limit, where the State can exist without tyranny No combination of men can be durable, if this is not really voluntary; and in considering the normal form of the State we must get rid of all artificial and violent bonds of union, and retain only those which are spontaneous and free. Long experience has proved that the City, in its full completeness and extent of surrounding country, is the largest body politic which can exist without becoming oppressive. . . . But besides this, the Positive Faith, with its calm grasp over human life as a whole, will be sufficient to unite the various Cities in the moral communion of the Church, without requiring the help of the State to supplement the task with its mere material unity.

Thus the final creation of a religious society whereby the great organism is completed, fulfils all the three wants of the political society. The intellectual guidance, the moral sanction, and the social regulation which government requires to modify its material nature, are all supplied by a Church, when it has gained a distinct existence of its own.⁶⁰

B. The Historical Evolution or Political Institutions.

In his treatment of the origin of the state from a historical point of view Comte reminds one of Hegel's narration of the successive migrations of the Weltgeist until it finally settled among the German people.⁶¹ Comte ranges over the history of humanity and traces the stages through which the race has passed in its preparation for the final goal of its evolution—the Positivist State. One considerable difference between Hegel and Comte is that Comte presented a much more accurate interpretation of the facts

⁵⁹ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 251-3, 304.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 251. This independence of the Church is possible only when its realm of domination is more extensive than that of the political group. *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 252-3.

⁶¹ Cf. Dittman, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und Hegels, ein Vergleich," in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Vol. 38, pp. 281-312; Vol. 39, pp. 38-81.

of history than Hegel and, when viewed in the light of his times, he is by no means so devoid of historical information as some modern historical critics might seem to indicate.⁶² He seems to have been acquainted with Gibbon and Hallam, for instance, and grasped the significance of many fundamental movements in history, particularly in the field of economic development, which escaped many later and more erudite "political historians." A comprehensive grasp of the vital factors at work in history is as essential to a true conception and interpretation of history as a detailed knowledge of the objective facts of history. Judged by this criterion Comte was no less of a real historian than many of the extremely careful and critical "political historians" of the nineteenth century.

It is beyond the purpose of the recent work to present in detail Comte's philosophy of history. All that will be attempted is a brief statement of his fundamental principles and a summary of the portions dealing with the evolution of political institutions. Comte's philosophy of history is based on as ingenious a system of triads as distinguished the work of Vico.⁶³ In the first place, social evolution, like social organization, is based on the tripartite functions of man's cerebral system—feeling, action and intellect. Feeling or emotion, which is the basis of morality, passes through three stages in which man's social nature finds satisfaction first in the family, then in the state, and finally in the race. Or, as he puts it in other words, altruism in antiquity is domestic and civic, in the Middle Ages collective, and in the Positive period it is universal.⁶⁴ Still another way of describing this type of evolution is to say that the sympathetic instincts of humanity advance through the stages of attachment, veneration, and benevolence. There is a close relationship between these different views of moral evolution, as fetichism, which founded the family, also developed the feeling of attachment; polytheism, which founded the state, fostered veneration; while monotheism, with its universality, favored the sentiment of benevolence.⁶⁵ Man's activational evolution proceeds

⁶² E. g. G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 585.

⁶³ One should look for Comte's philosophy of history, not exclusively in the last volumes of his philosophy, but in the third volume of his *Polity*, for he himself tells the reader (*Polity*, Vol. III, p. 5) that his complete theory is to be found only in that volume. For Comte's most compact summary of his philosophy of history see the *Polity*, Vol. III, pp. 421-2.

⁶⁴ *Polity*, Vol. III, pp. 154-60.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 156-7.

through the stages of conquest, defence and industry.⁶⁶ Finally, the evolution of the intellect follows the famous three stages—the theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific.⁶⁷ In this process emotion is the dynamic power, action the agent of progress, and intellect the guiding force.⁶⁸

Comte did not, therefore, as many writers would seem to indicate, base his philosophy of history exclusively on the single element of intellectual evolution. Even the law of the three stages of intellectual progress aimed at a larger synthesis, which would include material and spiritual factors, though probably the religious element played a predominant part in his scheme. His periods of intellectual development, in broad outline, were the theological, divided into fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism; the period of the western revolution from 1300 to 1800; and the beginnings of the positive period from 1800 onward. Each of these periods was further subdivided.

(To be Continued)

⁶⁶ Ibid, I, p. 507.

⁶⁷ Ibid, IV, p. 157.

⁶⁸ Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps VI, XVI. Social evolution, as a whole, is a combination of all three of these special types of evolution. Defourny well summarizes this point: "L'évolution totale de l'espèce humaine peut donc, en somme, se résumer sous cette forme: La civilisation a été successivement d'abord théologique, militaire, et civique; ensuite métaphysique; féodal, et chrétienne; elle sera enfin positive, industrielle, et universellement altruiste. Elle se caractérise à chaque époque à un triple point de vue, parce que l'homme est doué d'un triple activité cérébrale." Op. cit. p. 151. Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393-4.

MAN—THE TAMER OF CHAOS.

BY EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK.

[The essay which follows, is made up of gleanings from a manuscript left by Edwin Miller Wheelock at his death in 1901—a work evidently completed in 1874, and which must have been intended by Mr. Wheelock for publication in book form. The paper which appeared in the September issue, 1920, of the *Open Court*, under the title of "The Psyche—A Study in Evolution", was, in reality, gathered from the same source. Interspersed through the manuscript are passages from *Proteus*, a complete edition of which was published by the Open Court Publishing Company in 1910, and it might seem that *Proteus* was originally part of a more extensive work which the author had projected.

The preface to the manuscript bears the significant date of March 30th, 1874. That date marked the end of his connection with the Reconstruction Government in Texas, and brought to a close a war-career of absorbing interest—a career which had begun with his resignation of a Unitarian pastorate at Dover, New Hampshire, and his enlistment with the Northern armies in 1862, and which in its varied phases makes up a rare story of heroic and earnest action. The outline of that story, condensed from an unpublished biography, the present writer endeavored briefly to sketch in the *Open Court* for September, 1920, and in the issue of the same magazine for February, 1922, he dealt with the "John Brown sermon" of Mr. Wheelock—a noteworthy utterance spoken just before the execution of the great abolitionist and the prophetic character of which Von Holst deemed worthy of mention in his *Constitutional History of the United States*.

Edwin Miller Wheelock, on the active side of his career, was a soldier of freedom, whether in pulpit or camp, but on his reflective side he was a prose-poet, whose pre-occupation with the deepest problems of being has given to us a series of essays remarkable for their exquisite verbal beauty and high philosophic appeal.—Charles Kassel.]

CREATION moves through transformation on transformation, arriving at highest results without miraculous leaps or arbitrary shocks. Yet, in nature, from kingdom to kingdom and from

stage to stage, there is always an uplifting. The beginning of the animal is not the organic sequent of the vegetable kingdom; nor the viviparous animal of the oviparous, nor man of the Chimpanzee. At each stage, there is a lift between successive orders, a break in the level sequence, where plastic nature interpolates a new thought, and the *Praescens Numen* makes the bridge from kind to kind. The transition is not the measured increment of a progressive series, but a new inflowing of originating Spirit.

There are two kinds of Birth. There is the propagation of individuals of the same species on the same plane, which is ordinary generation; and there is the birth of species, or ascent from a lower to a higher plane, which is creation. In the former the all-fructifying Spirit acts through finite parentage; in the latter it operates directly through the matrices of nature, the Universal Mother.

If we trace any new type of being to its beginning, we find, of necessity, that it rests upon something both higher and lower than itself. On the natural side it has been evolved from something lower, as animal life from vegetable; and on the higher side from nothing less than the ever-brooding Creative Spirit. The creation of every new type of life, be it the human species or any other, has some lower nature on the maternal side and the all-vitalizing power on the paternal. Each new type of life includes what is below it as its basis and background, and something more; and that something more must come from above and beyond nature.

From this view-point of science, nature is seen as a vast system of evolution climbing upward, from the nebula to the mineral, from the mineral to the plant, from the plant to the animal, and from the animal to Man,—the glorious flower of the whole, for whom everything beneath serves only as root and stem.

The tendency of each type is not to change into the next higher, but to perfect itself after its own plan. The mollusk does not attempt to transform itself into a vertebrate, but it changes by degrees into a more perfect mollusk, and the branches it gives forth, whenever they reach their ultimate of progress, become extinct. The same holds good in all other types.

The starting point of every form of life is always from a prepared matrix. The sun was the matrix of the earth; the earth or mineral realm was the universal matrix of the vegetable

kingdom; this in turn was the basis of the lowest forms of the animal kingdom; these lowest forms furnished the matrices for those higher, and so on up to the highest. Man, the last creation, having the most complex organization, could only be formed from the highest animal form next below him. In the body of man all the organs of the animal creation find their completion, and every other brain is condensed in his. All inferior forms, animal, vegetable and mineral, are fragments, portions, prophecies of the grand type.

In previous chapters we penetrated, as with a mental telescope, the foregone ages, even into that voiceless eternity, when as yet time, and space, and nature were not. We beheld the birth of the Material Universe; matter evolved from the prior substance of Spirit and existing at first in the form of the rarest and subtlest ethers. We saw this grand *ovum*, or germ, fecundated by the Creative Spirit, developing into vast nebulae or nuclei, from which successively unfolded solar systems, planetary systems, flaming spheroids, geological epochs, mineral aggregations, plants in their regular order of ascension from lowest to highest, animals rising from the sponge and the jelly-fish, through sea-worms, fishes, reptiles, birds, and beasts, the diapason closing full in *Man*.

In the first dawn of being, vitality was united to matter; this vitality in each ascending period became of a higher and yet higher order,—the vitality of the mollusk, the fish, the reptile, the mammal, the responsible and immortal man.

From the first, Creation has striven to put forth the human form. Low down in the series we find animal forms with but a spine and head; then limbs and other organs begin to show themselves, one by one,—claws and fins shadowing forth the five fingers of man, and the approach to the human form growing more distinct, till man appears, with his dual nature, animal and spiritual, and rounds the full circle.

And all these changes are law-developed and law-governed, with no savor of chance or of miracle. By no miraculous, unlinked, and unrelated effort of divine power were they caused; the large analogies of nature all forbid. Nor yet did matter climb its spiral round from chaos to crystal, from crystal to plant, from plant to animal, and from animal to man, by the power of any laws inherent in itself. Life and its powers are spiritual, and it was spiritual forces that pushed each of nature's successive kingdoms into air and life. The worlds, with their contents, are out-

goings from God. It is the Spirit of God that tints the flower, that forms the fruit, that arches the firmament, that rounds and lights the star. It was the Creative Spirit, that, through the power of an upward attraction, drew the atomic particles into higher, and still higher, and finally into the highest forms;—the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, each growing out of the kingdom next below, with the Divine Spirit as its procreant and vitalizing cause.

The chain of Nature's being is continuous still. See her branches and families interweave. Thus, for example, we find bitumen and sulphur linking earth and metals; vitriols uniting metals with salts; crystals connecting salts with stones; and lithophytes joining plants and stones. Again, the polypus unites plants to insects; and the humming-bird insects to birds. The African vegetable serpent connects plants with reptiles, the tube-worm joins shells with reptiles, the eel forms a passage from reptiles to fish, the flying-fish unites fish with birds, the bat and flying squirrel link birds to quadrupeds, and the monkey gives the hand equally to quadruped and to man. Man by his physical nature is linked to the brute creation on the one hand, and by his spiritual soul to Heaven, on the other!

Nature discloses innumerable plants, rising step by step, the lowest interweaving with the lifeless mineral, and the highest piercing the domain of animal life. Above these are myriad animals, in regular lines of ascent, the lowest blending with the vegetable, and the highest stretching forth his hand to man. This is the grand ladder of progression, up which, from the lowest round, man has climbed to his kingdom. He seems, indeed, to halt midway between animality and divinity. He is semi-beast, demi-god. As Deity's highest personification on earth, he appears cut off from the animal world. But this is only an appearance, for the closest relations exist.

As life, in its climbing path, has left way-marks all along, from the simple cell to the most complex animal, so has it left traces at every step from the animal to the human being. As the crystal is but a mineral flower, and the plant but a vegetable crystal and the animal but plant with senses, locomotion, and nerves, so is man an animal in every respect; but in addition thereto he possesses a unique moral and spiritual life, in which consists his humanity.

The evolved man sits in the ear of nature, and hears the deep-keyed utterance and diapason of her communings. The crystal

privacies of space open to his gaze. He wins the Divine Secrets. He can approach undazzled the primal essence where suns, and stars, and galaxies roll out like sparkles from an eternal flame. He is omnipresent in the great circle of the Universe. He is the root and fibre whose bloom and fruitage is the world, and everything in nature, and each thread in the web of universal being. has its end in man's heart and brain.

Every animal of the barn-yard, the field and the forest has contrived to get a footing in man, and we may still trace the remains and hints of these relationships. His faculties reveal the animal kingdom through which he has arisen. The thin line of nervous matter of the Hydra and the Amphioxus, is a prediction of the convoluted brain of the mammal and of man. The proboscis of the elephant is but an extended nose; the wing of the bat but an altered hand; the shell of the turtle but modified ribs.

All life springs from the cell. The nebula of Chaos was the parent cell of the Universe. From its sheddings solar systems were born; whose cells floating away became planets. In minerals and crystals we again perceive laminæ or cells, but now they have advanced a step, they follow a definite line, and form beautiful geometrical figures. In the plant kingdom we have the constant germ or cell, but now metamorphosed into organs, performing distinct offices. Man, standing at the summit, has passed through all lower degrees of evolution, and it is, therefore, in human embryogony that we find unrolled the great panorama of organization.

The whole animal creation, from the mollusk to the man, have passed through the same gateway, and travelled the same path. The degree of development varies with the length of the path. The brain in all living beings is formed on one plan, and the process of growth is the same in each; but at a certain point the lowest stop. Others go farther before their development is arrested. Man, beginning at the same point, goes farthest of all. He ascends to and surpasses the highest, hence he is the most intelligent.

Birds have a third eyelid, which is of essential use to them, and is always present. In man the same eyelid is readily seen as a minute scale, of no possible use. In man there is a little cartilage, hardly visible, joined to one of the nostril-bones, and entirely useless. But in the horse these shut off the great cavity of the nostrils from foreign bodies, and in the whale they grow

to the size of bolsters, sealing the nostrils against a thousand fathoms of water as the animal plunges into the abysses of the ocean. In the grazing animals a strong muscle supports the head while eating. The same is found in man, but as it is not needed, it is only a thin white line of cartilage. As the organic remains in the rocky strata show the lines of the earth's progress, so these abortive and useless organs in man reveal the animal stock from which he was derived.

Man is the builded aroma of the world. The human body, as Pan's last flock, crops every nature that it touches. That which is scale in the fish, coil in the serpent, woolly or hairy coat in the quadruped, impenetrable mail in the pachyderm, becomes in man the four-fold clothing of the surface of his body. Nature is a force willed from the first to sculpture the images and paint the portrait of human attributes in plant, beast and bird; for the human is a traveling form, which reaches from man to God and involves all beings as it goes. Each mineral, animal and plant prophesied of man, and mollusk, sauroid and pachyderm were his heralds.

Man is the Microcosm. He is the embodiment of all the forms and forces of nature. He looks in all directions; he has relation to all beings and things; he can be acted on by all substances and forces. Every mineral, every vegetable, and every animal existence is contained in man, and draws its nutriment from the paps of his destiny. Humanity is built upon the kingdoms below, as coral continents rise into the red light of the sun. Plant and tree, knotty oak and nodding *weed*, dove and butterfly, rotifer and mammifer, are but so many steps of the Psychical essence on its way to man. Through geologic eras, with their million-yearred convulsions and slow adjustments; through a thousand dumb material forms, she has won her patient way.

The roots of man are deeper than can be told, and belong to the Immensities and Eternities. They reach down below the protoplasm and the granite, to that depth where the individual is lost in his source. For the creation, from the beginning, was in preparation of man. Long before he emerged into existence, the sun of a myriad epochs had decomposed the granite, soaked the land with light and heat, and covered it with plants and animals—the manufacturers of soil. Each particle of oxygen, each atom of lime waited for him, ready to obey his thought. The earth, the water and the air worked for him; the glacier and the frost

plowed for him. The huge mountain chains are but gases and fluid wind, which took form and solid mass to serve his turn. Humanity is the primal fact on this planet.

Nature is an outgrowth from man and takes his color and expression. Lands, seas and atmospheres are his sheddings. Stocks and stones are but the outer vegetation of the seeds of the soul. Each solar orb turns on the occult axis of spirit. Space itself has no existence; it is but a geometrical figure drawn by the finger of the Infinite. Man is the form for whose end all things exist. The end of nature is man and he is related to the farthest star. He is set by the Maker in the rhythm of His plan, receiving and transmitting the rush of Destiny.

When, in the immense day of creation, the hour for humanity struck at last, upon this crust of soil which the ages, and seasons, and forces had refined, man was placed to co-operate with sun and moon, rainbow and flood, to govern matter as the vehicle of powers higher than its own and as the organ of the Reason that made the world. In his ear the well kept secret of the Universe is whispered at last—that all things exist to moral ends and from moral causes, *and that it is for man to tame the chaos!*

Man is the bond where-with God has bound in one the sheaves of His great universe. Through him the very stones, or the horny nails and terminations of the earth, return to God; and the creation lives on the perpetual condition of spending alike its worlds and particles, its days and its very seconds, upon humanity. Not a stone, or a plant, or a living creature, but carries up its heart's thread into his loom, there to be wound into human nature, and thence forth to follow the lead of his own immortal destinies.

SUPERNATURALISM AND SATANISM IN CHATEAUBRIAND.

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

(Concluded.)

THE Supernaturalism in Chateaubriand's works conveys no illusion to the reader; it impresses him rather as singularly unconvincing. It is felt as a study in style, for which the author, as a matter of fact, recommends it, in his Preface to *les Natchez*. With Chateaubriand, as with all pseudo-classicists, the Supernatural is used merely as mythological trappings, as a rhetorical device for the embellishment of epic poetry. He himself did not believe in his own Supernaturalism, as is sufficiently evident from his farewell to the Muse in the conclusion of *les Martyrs*, a conclusion which was suppressed in all editions subsequent to the first:

"Fidèle compagne de ma vie, en remontant dans les cieux, laisse-moi l'indépendance et la vertu. Qu'elles viennent ces Vierges austères, qu'elles viennent fermer pour moi le livre de la Poésie, et m'ouvrir les pages de l'Histoire. J'ai consacré l'âge des illusions à la riante peinture du mensonge: j'emploierai l'âge des regrets au tableau sévère de la vérité."⁷⁰

This was the principal defect of Chateaubriand's Supernaturalism. Nodier, that schoolmaster of Romanticism, repeatedly said that two things were necessary for the successful treatment of the Supernatural in literature. The poet must himself believe what he says, and the reader must believe the poet. These two requirements are lacking in Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism. Dante, Tasso, Milton and Klopstock addressed themselves to readers who believed in their Supernaturalism as firmly as they did

⁷⁰ "Faithful companion of my life, in ascending to Heaven, leave with me independence and virtue. May they come, these austere Virgins, may they come to close for me the book of Poesy, and to open for me the pages of History. I have consecrated the age of illusions to the portrayal of lies: I will employ the age of regrets to the severe tableau of truth."

themselves. But Chateaubriand had no belief himself and could expect none from his readers. A belief in the Supernatural was very far, indeed, from the spirit of the dechristianized France of the early nineteenth century. Most of the ideas of his day in this sphere of thought were quite different from the views that the contemporaries of his master Milton entertained. The tremendous belief in the personality of the Devil that had grown up during the Middle Ages flourished just as vigorously in the middle of the seventeenth century. Milton himself fully believed in the existence of the diabolical beings whom he described. He was as firm, although not as fantastic, a believer in a real, personal Devil, as Luther, who lived in a constant consciousness of contact and conflict with Satan. We never think of doubting Milton. "As well might we doubt the reality of those scorching fires of Hell that had left their marks on the face of Dante; or of the awful sights and sounds that beset Christian on his way through the Valley of the Shadow of Death." Even Christopher Marlowe, in telling the story of the bargain between Faustus and Mephistopheles, believed that he narrated established facts. The conception of the Devil of a Milton, a Bunyan, a Marlowe still represents the seriousness of the medieval fear of Satan. These men lived in an age of faith in which angels and demons were not abstract figures, but living realities. In the France of the year 1809, Heaven and Hell had lost their "local habitation," and angels and demons were considered as figments of the human imagination.

Nor is the subject matter of Chateaubriand so well fitted for supernatural action as is that of Milton. Even an unbeliever will suspend his own opinions and follow the supernatural interventions in the lives of biblical characters. But it is a different thing to inject into historical events Heaven and Hell and all the powers thereof. How incongruous must appear Erminius in connection with Constantine; and how much more ridiculous must sound a reference to Louis XIV from the lips of that allegorical demon Rumor, a daughter of Satan! In *les Natchez* the Supernatural was more out of tune than in *les Martyrs*. The earlier of the two romances dealt with events of less than two centuries ago and not a century from the time of writing. In the later romance, on the other hand, the Supernatural would have been perfectly proper if the author had treated it as the belief of the men and women of that day and not as his own belief. But he offered this "merveilleux chrétien" in full faith and forgot the fifteen hundred years that separated him from the characters of the story. The Supernatural

which is employed in the novels of the past and of the peasantry in the nineteenth century is presented as the point of view of the characters and not of the narrators. Chateaubriand, however, puts the interventions of Heaven and Hell on a parity with the historical events. His superhuman agents claim as much reality as his historical personages.

The fact that Chateaubriand employs the Supernatural as poetic paraphernalia makes matters worse. Even the non-believer is displeased to find a temple of religion transformed into a store-house of epic bric-à-brac,—to see sacred symbols used as poetic props and pulleys. This sort of marvellous machinery is as forbidding to men of taste as it is shocking to men of faith.

The further fact that *les Martyrs* is written in prose is prejudicial to its Supernaturalism. In Greek verse, in Latin verse, or even in Milton's English, as George Saintsbury says, we could put up with this marvellous material, but not in plain French prose.⁷¹ Mme. de Staël had a clearer vision of the requirements of Supernaturalism in the literature of her day when she demanded verse for its treatment: "Il faut des vers," she wrote in her book, *De l'Allemagne*, "pour des choses merveilleuses." A demon who stalks in stately verse is endurable; one who talks in plain prose is wearisome. In Romanticism, which was primarily a school of poetry, the demon should have spoken in rhymed alexandrines. In the latter and prosaic half of the nineteenth century it was, of course, perfectly proper for the Devil to talk like the rest of us. Among his strong points is his adaptability to the morals and manners of each generation.

VIII

Chateaubriand failed utterly in his efforts to bring back Christian Supernaturalism. His supernatural apparatus was as antiquated as his Christian epos. Even this "enchanteur," as our author was called by the frequenters of Mme. Pauline de Beaumont's salon at the Abbaye-aux-Bois, could not bring the world again under the dead hand of the past. He did not understand that an epic poem cannot be produced at will. It is the work not only of individuals, but of times and conditions. The age had long passed for the writing of epics. A Christian epos on the morrow of the French Revolution! His period was critical, analytical, and even somewhat cynical. His theories found no adherents, and his Christian epics no imitators. You will look in vain throughout the literature of the nineteenth century for a work which contains a medley of the "mer-

⁷¹ *History of the French Novel* (2 vols., 1917-19), i. 30.

veilleux" in the manner of Chateaubriand. His contention that an artificial and rhetorical, a figurative and fictive Supernaturalism had in itself a poetic value and was necessary to the dignity of an epic poem, was disproved by his own works. His strictures upon a mechanical application of the "classical marvellous" were turned against his own exploitation of the "Christian marvellous." Chateaubriand's chief service lies in his unwitting application of the *coup de grâce* to the external conception of the Supernatural. He has proved that there is no intrinsic worth in mythological fictions, whether pagan or Christian. But his distinction between classical and Christian mythology would not hold water. He decreed the abolition of classical mythology, and literary history proves that he was wrong. The Supernatural, classical as well as Christian, was successfully used in the poetry of the Romantic period, but not as a stylistic embellishment. It was employed as subject-matter, and aimed to call forth a particular emotion in the reader. The symbolical Supernaturalism was especially in vogue during the past century. It adds to the intellectual emotion of a philosophical idea the esthetical emotion of a symbolical form.

Indeed, Chateaubriand himself admitted that his "merveilleux chrétien" was a failure. He knew that the supernatural passages were the weakest parts of *les Martyrs*, and realized that the merits of the work could not rest on its Heaven and Hell. "Neither the good nor the bad angels," he confessed, "will obtain mercy for the book." Its redeeming qualities he sought anywhere but in its marvellous machinery. The "merveilleux chrétien" is missing in his two short stories. The conflict of human passions in them is not overlaid by a contest of angels and demons. The religious emotion is nevertheless far better produced in them than in the greater works with all of their Christian marvels. The short pieces express very powerfully the Christian spirit. *Atala* and *René* have remained his masterpieces, while the more pretentious so-called epic poems, *les Natchez* and *les Martyrs*, were promptly forgotten.

Moreover, Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism is Christian in name only. He committed the error of imitating too accurately the classical mythology in the Christian, so that they are almost identical. His angels are for the most part the Greek and Latin personifications of natural processes. Virgil's gods of the sea are turned into angels of the sea. Uriel, as the angel of love, is the Greek Eros, and Gabriel, as the messenger of the Lord, is Iris. Chateaubriand realized later,—too late, indeed,—that what he

offered was not a Christian Supernaturalism, but a caricatured classicism, that he had only modified the old epic features of the *Aeneid*, instead of filling his poem with a faith which Virgil lacked (*Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, iii. 15). His was too superficial a conception of the Supernatural. He knew too well that the "merveilleux chrétien" does not mean to a modern man the description of Heaven and Hell. The marvellous element of Christianity is the Christian conscience, as it manifests itself in our daily lives, the Christian soul, as it reveals itself in acts of self-denial. The habitation of the spirits of good and evil is not in Heaven and Hell but in our own hearts. The conflict between God and Satan is fought within and not without us.

Of Chateaubriand's Christian Supernaturalism all that remains is his Satanism. The interest in biblical and medieval subjects which our author awakened among the Romanticists was confined almost wholly to "diablerie." Certain passages in his books inspired a few of the most beautiful Satanistic works of modern times. Alfred de Vigny derived his poem, *Eloa* (1823), from Chateaubriand, and suggested on his part Lamartine's *la Chute d'un Ange* (1838), Gautier's *la Larme du diable* (1839) and Victor Hugo's posthumous *la Fin de Satan*. In Lamartine's poem, however, the angel who became a human being through love of a mortal woman, soon loses contact with his former friends and takes up his abode among men. Flaubert's *la Tentation de Saint-Antoine* (1849) and Anatole France's *Thaïs* (1890), go back to Chateaubriand's description of the Thebaid. Little did this "avocat poétique du Christianisme" dream that all his efforts in behalf of Christian Supernaturalism would turn out to be only a "boost" for Beelzebub. In one important respect, Chateaubriand experienced the fate of his master. Milton started out, in his poem, "to justify the ways of God to men" (*Par. Lost*, i. 26), and ended by conferring lustre upon Lucifer. His French imitator set out with the intention of rehabilitating Christianity in the arts and in literature, and his work redounded to the glory of Gehenna. Of all his Christian Supernaturals it is Satan who appealed most strongly to his contemporaries. In the Romantic period the Devil became an absorbing and alluring character and has dominated most literary forms down to the present day. To call the roll of the writers of the nineteenth century who celebrated Satan in verse and prose is to marshal the names of almost all the makers of modern French letters. If we admit that the nineteenth century literature reached its highest perfection in France, it should

not be overlooked that this is at least in some degree due to the skillful exploitation in it of the fascinating Prince of this World.

IX

Chateaubriand's real Satanism must rather be sought apart from his Supernaturalism. The influence of Milton's Satan is not limited to Chateaubriand's spirit of darkness. It also extends to his human characters. Medieval legends inform us that persons who conjured up the Evil One often had trouble in parting with him when once he had answered their summons. Diabolus belongs to that genus of genii which, once having escaped from its bottle, refuses to return. Chateaubriand could not well rid himself of the Devil he had summoned. In vain did this Christian poet endeavor to paint his Satan in the blackest colors. The image of a bright and beautiful archangel would unfailingly emerge in a fascinating form and at the most unexpected junctures. The Miltonic Satan whom he so admired and whom he transplanted into his own literature and country, continued to be Chateaubriand's inspiration for the remainder of his life. Referring to the temptation scene, which was translated almost literally in the *Génie du Christianisme*, Sainte-Beuve asks:

"Ce démon, ce glorieux Lucifer, n'est-ce pas le même qui, avec tous les charmes de la séduction et sous un air de vague ennui, se glissant encore sous l'arbre d'Éden, a pris sa revanche en plus d'un endroit des scènes troublantes de Chateaubriand?" ⁷²

Satan dictated to our author many a phrase and fashioned many a figure more or less in his own image. The Devil is more cunning and crafty than this religionist was aware. The Evil One knows that humanity is on guard against him. To tempt man, Satan changes his name as well as his form.

The real Devil in *les Martyrs*, however, is not Satan or any other of the horned company that sit in the infernal parliament, but the wretched seducer and murderer of Velléda. Nor is Satan in *les Natchez* as much of a devil as René, the melancholy misanthropist, the social rebel and the unfeeling lover. René is the human incarnation of Milton's "great spirit inspired by melancholy." ⁷³ A

⁷² "Has not this glorious Lucifer, still gliding under the tree of Eden, with his charms of seduction and his air of vague ennui, taken his revenge in more than one passage of Chateaubriand?" *Causeries du lundi* (15 vols., 1851-62), ii. 157.

⁷³ Luther held that Satan was a mournful character and could in no way endure bright, cheerful music.

man solitary in his conscious superiority to his fellows, cursed with a mysterious sorrow wandering through many lands, vainly seeking happiness, is kin to the "grand solitaire désespéré" in Milton. How deeply Chateaubriand felt the melancholy of Milton's Satan may be seen from the following passage in his *Génie du Christianisme* (Pt. II, bk. iv., chap. 9):

"Satan repentant à la vue de la lumière qu'il hait parce qu'elle lui rappelle comme il fut élevé au-dessus d'elle, souhaitant ensuite d'avoir été créé dans un rang inférieur, puis s'endurcissant dans le crime par orgueil, par honte, par méfiance même de son caractère ambitieux; enfin, pour tout fruit de ses réflexions, et comme pour expier un moment de remords, se chargeant de l'empire du mal pendant toute une éternité: voilà, certes, si nous ne nous trompons, une des conceptions les plus pathétiques qui soient jamais sorties du cerveau d'un poète."⁷⁴

His doubt and disquiet, his disillusionment and despondency, his disdain and defiance, his disordered soul and embittered heart, his mournful and morbid temperament, his rebellious and restless spirit, his unbounded egotism, his outward coldness and inward glow, his weariness of mind, his weakness of will, his hatred of life, all these qualities stamp René as a demon clad in human flesh. Indeed René is, as his creator tells us, "possédé, tourmenté par le démon de son cœur."

In the person of René, who stands at the very threshold of the new age, the Devil cast his long dark shadows over the weary nineteenth century. With this character begins the cult of sadness, the poetry of complaints. From René may be said to spring the melancholy and misanthropy of Romanticism, already dimly discerned in Rousseau's Saint-Preux and Goethe's Werther.⁷⁵ René is the personification of the diabolical malady of the century—*la maladie du siècle*. The priest d'Aureville, a brother of Barbey, well understood this diabolic quality of melancholy when he termed it "la grande diablerie." In René we find the first and fullest expression of that world-weariness or *Weltschmerz*, as the Germans call it, which is gnawing at the heart of modern man.

In René may be discovered, furthermore, the origin of the

⁷⁴ "Satan repenting when he beholds the light, which he hates because it reminds him how much more glorious was once his own condition; afterwards wishing that he had been created of an inferior rank; then hardening himself in guilt by pride, by shame, and by even mistrust of his ambitious character; finally, as the sole result of his reflections, and as if to atone for a transient remorse, taking upon himself the empire of evil throughout all eternity—this is certainly one of the most sublime conceptions that ever sprang from the imagination of a poet."

⁷⁵ Cf. P. Hainrich, *Werther und René* (Greifswald, 1921).

"révolté" who feels a voluptuous joy in standing out against the world, in warring with the cosmos, in breaking all bonds of family and society. It must not be forgotten that the Romantic idea in France, as later in England, was at bottom revolutionary. It differed considerably from the moonshiny sort of Romanticism that we find in Germany. In this respect the later school called "Young Germany" more nearly corresponds to French Romanticism. All the French Romantics were members of the Opposition. Chateaubriand himself, who began as a bulwark of Bourbonism, joined the Opposition in 1824, when he was dismissed from office.⁷⁶ It was on this occasion that he threw off the mask which he had until then worn. His counter-revolutionary ideas stood, as he himself admits in his *Congrès de Vérone* (1838), against his own judgment ("contre mes propres lumières"). What Blake said of Milton is equally true of his French disciple. He, too, was "of the Devil's party."

In the character of René, Chateaubriand is the first to paint the man-demon found among many Romantic authors and in a number of their best creations. He is a man who, conscious of his own powers and of the loftiness of his own aspirations, looks down with disdain upon the masses of his fellow-men who lack powers and aspirations equal to his. The keenness and depth of his own ideas and sufferings lift him in self-appraisal above the masses of his fellow-men whose ideas and sufferings are on a lower plane of thought and emotion. This man-demon, never finding his counterpart among men, must needs content himself with the love of a tender, but shallow, feminine nature. The personality of a woman of this sort he absorbs almost involuntarily and becomes the cause of her moral anguish. He accepts love without loving in return and feels no pity for the sufferings which he inflicts on the woman who loves him. That is why vital contact with such a demoniacal nature is dangerous to a woman and is certain to lead to a bitter conflict. This conflict between a man-demon and a woman-angel finds its most beautiful symbolical expression in Vigny's poem, *Eloa*.⁷⁷

In the various aspects of his diabolical character René was imitated with many variations by the contemporaries of Chateaubriand. René sired the long procession of phantoms who struck terror into the heart of his own creator. Who can number all these sad and suffering, sentimental and sinning heroes of the Romantic

⁷⁶ Cf. Gustave Lanson, "la Défection de Chateaubriand," *Revue de Paris*, t. IV (1901), pp. 487-525.

⁷⁷ Demonic women of the type of Corinne and Lélia are few as compared with men.

School? Their name is legion: Obermann, Adolphe, Mardoche, Joseph Delorme, Antony, Didier, Hernani, Gilbert, Frank, Julien, Rastignac, and among women, Corinne and Lélia. They all call René father. Childe Harold also belongs to the progeny of Chateaubriand's hero. Manfred, too, as Cînédollé has aptly remarked, is but "a René dressed à la Shakespeare." It was Chateaubriand who created that Satanic character which is wrongly ascribed to Byron. Byronism was full blown in the work of Chateaubriand when Byron was still a school boy. The so-called Byronic pose was already assumed by René. Southey gave Byron too much credit in designating him as the coryphæus of the Satanic School. The laurels of Lucifer belong to the French poet. Chateaubriand, indeed, was the Sachem of Satanism rather than of Romanticism. What the Romanticists call the fascination of the Abyss is already contained in his writings. He poured the morbid virus into Romanticism. He developed in the Romantics the taste for the *malsain* and the *macabre*. From him they derived the tendency to gloat over decay and death. In Chateaubriand may already be discerned the prevailing traits of the Satanic School which is characterized by Brandes as "a school with a keen eye for all that is evil and terrible, a gloomy view of life, a tendency to rebellion," and "a wild longing for enjoyment, which satisfies itself by mingling the idea of death and destruction, a sort of Satanic frenzy, with what would otherwise be mild and natural feelings of enjoyment and happiness."⁷⁸ We need only point to Atala's dying speech with its Satanic lyricism or to René's letter to Céluta with its Satanic love of destruction and its sadistic lust for murder.

In Chateaubriand this Satanism received a Catholic coloring. He advocated a religion that should furnish occasion for esthetical joy and emotional pathos. He taught the Romantics that religion, far from being an obstacle in the way of sin, may, on the contrary, be found even an aid to the delight in sin. The horror of sin, he showed, added to the enjoyment of sin. It imparted to it a special flavor. This point of view is best illustrated by Stendhal's well-known story of the Italian lady who remarked one day: "Voilà un bon sorbet, néanmoins il serait meilleur s'il était un péché!" It is too bad that this good lady was not born a century later and in America.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, iii. 297; i. 39.

⁷⁹ A sherbet on the Continent contains alcohol. Professor Todd has called the present writer's attention to a similar story of a French lady who held up a glass of cool water with the remark: "How delightful it would be if it were only sinful to drink it!"

X

Chateaubriand's Satanic influence reaches down to the present day. All our modern devil-worshippers have stolen their firebrands from his Hell. His Catholicism threw the decadents straight into the arms of the Devil. "Sentimentalism in religion," says Professor Guérard, "is ever a dangerous thing, but when it is intensified in literature, it leads straight to the Devil."⁸⁰ Barbey, Baudelaire and Huysmans were directly influenced by Chateaubriand. Their writings may be considered the natural offspring of his *Génie du Christianisme*. It is from this writer that Barbey and Baudelaire derived their Catholic Satanism: the belief in Satan as the most essential element in the Catholic creed. René and his progeny were already "Diaboliques," and there are passages in the works of Chateaubriand worthy to rank with the rankest "Fleurs du Mal." "Hath not the author of René," asks Anatole France, "also sown burning words throughout the world?" Through Chateaubriand, Baudelaire, that singer of Satan, found his admiration for the Miltonic archangel, than whom he could imagine none more perfect in manly beauty. ("On conçoit qu'il me serait difficile de ne pas conclure que le plus parfait type de Beauté virile est Satan,—à la manière de Milton.") Baudelaire's worship of Venus also goes back to Chateaubriand's description of this demon of Voluptuousness. In his essay on Wagner's *Tannhäuser* (1861), Baudelaire writes:

"The radiant ancient Venus, Aphrodite, born of white foam, has not imprudently traversed the horrible darkness of the Middle Ages. She has retired to the depths of a cavern, magnificently lighted by the fires that are not those of the Sun. In her descent under earth, Venus has come near to Hell's mouth, and she goes certainly to many abominable solemnities to render homage to the Arch-Demon, Prince of the Flesh and Lord of Sin."⁸¹

But in contrast to Baudelaire, who was an ascetic, even a monastic, sinner, Chateaubriand lived the part he portrayed. This religionist not only painted Diabolism, but also practised it. René was beyond a shadow of a doubt the image of his creator. Chateaubriand himself said that a man paints only his own heart in attributing it to another (*Génie*, Pt. II, bk. i., chap. 3). He also realized that the Satan in *Paradise Lost* is but a fallen Milton. He liked to put himself into all of his characters from Chactas to Aben-Hamet, but he was most pleased to portray himself in René. It is in this character, to whom he has given his second Christian name, that Chateaubriand, with a fearful but fascinating truthfulness, has con-

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

centrated most of his soul, of his life and of his experience. All of his characters are victims of melancholy, but René is the best projection of his *moi mélancolique*. In René may be seen Chateaubriand's misanthropy, vaingloriousness and arrogance, his aloofness of soul, his egotism grazing the incredible, his self-idolatry bordering on insanity. Even in his death he wished to resemble the Promethean Satan whom he admired and imitated all his life. He asked to be buried on the storm-tossed promontory rock of Grand Bé, separated even in death from the masses of his fellow-men.

It was Chateaubriand himself, this arch-sentimentalist, who posed as a man burdened with a mysterious and apparently causeless curse, dragging himself wearily from land to land and from continent to continent, with the mark of Cain on his brow, leaving everywhere misfortune in his trail. "I drag my weariness painfully after me all day long," he bitterly complains, "and gasp my life away." "J'ai le spleen," he wails, "véritable maladie, tristesse physique." He regarded the belief in happiness as a folly and sneered at the love of life as a mania. In his biography of Rancé, written but four years prior to his death, Chateaubriand still speaks of his passionate hatred of life ("la haine passionnée de la vie").

In René is also painted the nostalgic and nympholeptic Chateaubriand who has written the most intoxicating phrases on voluptuousness and death.⁸² He revels in descriptions of fatal and carnal love, that of Chactas for Atala, of René for Céluta, and of Eudorus for Velléda. Such love between Eudorus and Cymodocée is finally illuminated with the halo of martyrdom. Chateaubriand's narration of this martyr's criminal adventures with Velléda in the presence of Cymodocée and her family was not necessary to account for the penitential severities imposed upon him by the Church.⁸³ Our author offers the psychological phenomenon of the delight obtained from treading on forbidden ground. The details of the physical union of Eudorus, this model of a martyr (another portrait of the author, by the way) with the distraught and wayward Gallican druidness given in the first edition of *les Martyrs* so shocked contemporaries that the paragraph was suppressed in subsequent editions.

⁸¹ Not only the goddess of beauty, but also mortal women, famous for their beauty, such as Aspasia, Lais, and Cleopatra, have, in consideration of this fact, been turned by the Catholic Church into demons, ladies of Hell. See also Heine's description of the Wild Army in his poem, *Atta Troll* (1842). "What glory for them!" exclaims Anatole France in *le Jardin d'Epicure*.


⁸² Cf. Jules Lemaitre, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

⁸³ This lack of tact is also noted in the author himself in the case of the English clergyman's daughter.

As a demonic lover, René is limned after the likeness of Chateaubriand, that eternal philanderer, as the late James Huneker called him.⁸⁴ This apologist of Christian morality and flower of orthodoxy was faithless to his own wife and engaged in a succession of intrigues with the wives of other men. It has taken volumes to tell of the love affairs which he carried on almost to the day of his death.⁸⁵ Chateaubriand was a votary of the beautiful Venus rather than of the beatific Virgin. The artist was converted, but the man remained the same. He remained René. Even if the author of the *Génie du Christianisme* changed his spots, he certainly never shed his skin. He may have professed Christianity, but he never practised it. Preaching the life of Jesus, he played the part of Don Juan. He followed the Prince of Pleasure rather than the Prince of Peace. The contemporaries of Chateaubriand were not blinded by his pretended piety. A vein of scepticism was surmised under the cover of his orthodoxy. "He hid his poison under the cloak of religious thought, and poisoned with the Host." ("Dans René Chateaubriand a caché le poison sous l'idée religieuse; c'est empoisonner dans une hostie.") This was the severe condemnation pronounced by his friend Chénedollé against the "restaurateur de la religion." Chateaubriand was never a believer and lacked the strength to remain a philosopher, just as he wished to be a Romantic and could not free himself from the fetters of pseudo-classicism. His brand of Catholicism was not in the least to the glory of God nor of His Saints. That is why this self-styled "Father of the Church" has not yet been admitted into the Catholic calendar. Perhaps the writer of this study, has unwittingly acted the part of the *advocatus Diaboli*.

⁸⁴ *The Pathos of Distance* (New York, 1913), pp. 311-19.

⁸⁵ A whole shelf might be filled with books on Chateaubriand the Charmer. See, among others, Francis Henry Gribble, *Chateaubriand and his Court of Women* (1909), and Dr. Portiquet, *Chateaubriand: l'anatomie de ses formes et ses amies* (1912). See also A. Bardoux, *Madame de Beaumont* (1884); *idem*, *Madame de Custine* (1888); *idem*, *Madame de Duras* (1898). Ch. de Robethon, *Chateaubriand et Madame de Custine* (1893); G. Mangras, et F. de Croze, *Delphine de Sabran, Madame de Custine* (1912); E. Biré, "Une amie de Chateaubriand: Madame Bayart," *le Correspondant* for 1901; G. Pailhès, *la Duchesse de Duras et Chateaubriand* (1910); A. Beaunier, *Trois amies de Chateaubriand* (P. de Beaumont, Mme. de Récamier, Hortense Allart) (1910); E. Sichel, "Pauline de Beaumont," *Nineteenth Century*, vol. LXXI (1912), pp. 1147-63.





EMPEROR KWANG-HSU,
Emperor of China in 1875.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF TANG-SZU-TUNG.

BY KIANG SHAO-YUEN

THE *Science of Love* by Tang-Szu-Tung hastened the modernization of China. Written by one who had labored and died for the cause of national readjustment and reconstruction, the book could not fail to exert great influence upon the nation. The cause it advocated had grown increasingly powerful. The nation was in the critical period of transition.

His book quickened the coming of constitutional and democratic government. It voiced the necessity of a revision of traditional morality as the basis of industrial, economic, political and social reforms. It justified the adoption of scientific education and scientific culture. It emphasized the unity of human life; and corroborated the efforts to realize this unity by the abolition of distinctions and the erection of a social life based on the principle of equality.

The new spirit that appealed to the future instead of the past—the spirit that had faith in progress—was immensely reinforced by the array of facts Tang-Szu-Tung presented. The dawning upon the Chinese mind of a new internationalism was hastened by his appeal for the sharing with foreign nations of commercial, political, intellectual and religious life.

Influenced by the best Christian missionary work, he made a synthesis of the Christian gospel of “love” and the message of certain Chinese teachers, such as Methi (b. 500-490, d. 426-416 B. C.) who had stressed “all-inclusive love”. Following this thread, Tang-Szu-Tung separated from Confucianism the ethical system based on the “five relationships” which he thought inferior to the ethic

of "love"; placed the emphasis upon the idealistic aspect of Confucianism; and thus opened the way to a reinterpretation of that religion, such as would make it accord more with the demands of new China. In similar fashion he marked out a new path for the development of Buddhism, more in tune with "this-world". Thus, he abolished the ancient incompatibility of religion and life, married the struggle for secular achievement to the struggle for religious emancipation, and identified the two goals, though, as might have been expected, he retained certain traditional elements, reference to which will be made later in this essay. What is clearly apparent is the modernization of both Confucianism and Buddhism.

The Science of Love is one of the most widely read and discussed books in Modern China. Factors in its popularity are its boldness of speech, its originality and depth of thought, its powerful pleading for reformation and progress in the name of the old ethical and religious system of the land (Confucianism and Buddhism). The fact that its author was immolated resulted in making his name known to all intelligent Chinese, in making him beloved by all progressive Chinese. Prohibition of the reading of his book by the Manchu government only gave it additional prestige. Ten years ago, to have failed to read it was disgrace for an educated Chinese. The writer of this essay remembers—as a child of thirteen—receiving advice from his brother as to "what to read"; the second volume on that prescribed list was *The Science of Love*. It appeals to various classes for various reasons. A Buddhist finds the author preaching Buddhism, bringing its meaning and message to a new public. For a reader without Buddhist sympathies, there is stimulation in the polemic against the virtues of frugality or of chastity. A Confucian finds in it a new way of interpreting his system. An anti-Confucianist is intrigued by Tang's criticism of traditional Confucian morality. The opponent of Christianity is disarmed because Christianity is treated as *a* religion, not *the* religion, and as a religion which serves the same function as others, viz., the overthrowing of boundaries and inequalities; moreover, here he finds rejected the Christian dogmas of original sin, final judgment, the "soul". The radical finds the book palatable because it undermines those pillars of conservatism—caste morality and absolute monarchism.

That Tang's reinterpretation of Confucianism and Buddhism has been accepted by some sections of these faiths in China, is

evidenced on every side. Reformers are re-making and developing the ancient faiths according to Tang's prescription.

* * * * *

We pass on to describe the man and his history.

Tang-Szu-Tung was born at his father's house in Peking in 1865, the year of Lincoln's assassination. In company with his two elder brothers, he began at the age of five years his education under a tutor. Seven years later, his eldest brother, his second sister, and his beloved mother, died within five days. Later, his father's concubine treated him very harshly and from his thirteenth to his nineteenth year he went back and forth from Hunan, the original home of his father, to Kanshu, in which province his father was a district mayor.

His physique was remarkable. He enjoyed sports, taking keen delight in boxing, riding, and the use of bow and arrow. During one winter, he traveled on horseback for seven successive days and nights, a distance of 1600 lis in snow-covered solitary mountains, with one soldier as body-guard. At twenty, he served for a short time in the Chinese army in Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang, "The New Territory"). During the next ten years, he traveled extensively in northwest and south China. The year 1893 found him in Shanghai, where he first came in contact with western scientific progress. (Naïvely delighted he had his "picture" taken in company with two friends). There also he obtained many Chinese books on western science, history, politics and Christian literature, the Bible included.

The next year, when he attained the age of thirty, the Sino-Japanese War began and Tang's period of extensive traveling within the Chinese Empire and his intensive study of literature came to an end. But before this period closed, and in spite of his constant moving from one place to another, he had composed a great number of essays and poems which he preserved and edited, evidently with a view to future publication.

The next two years witnessed a complete change in him. He was "born again". Heretofore, although the son of a provincial governor, and not without some realization of the burning needs of his country, (he had some leanings to a military life), Tang had devoted himself largely to the study of commentaries on Confucian classics, philology, literary and historical criticism, archeology, and the cultivation of the art of writing essays and of seal-

carving. His interests had been catholic in the extreme; embracing almost all lines of study known to the Chinese scholars of his day. Tang was a model of the "Old Learning".

The conclusion in 1894 of the Sino-Japanese War, with its peace treaty that gave Formosa to China's victor Japan, awakened all thinking Chinese to the importance of occidental physical sciences and practical arts, and to the power of strong organization. Thousands of young men applied themselves with genuine earnestness to the study of these subjects; they saw the blood dripping from the wounds of the nation; many were those who felt the national humiliation and sought for retaliation. Amid this national awakening and universal demand for "New Learning", Tang, now a man of thirty-one, pushed aside his copious notes of ancient inscriptions and octavo volumes of commentaries and "complete works" of literary men, and occupied himself with Newton's three laws of motion, with Kepler's whirling solar system, with the Magna Charta, and with algebraic equations. He gathered about him a number of men in his father's home town, and organized them into a society for the promotion of learning. They held frequent meetings for discussions of current problems and for mutual encouragement, moral and intellectual.

In the same year, the famous Self-Defense League was formed, led by Kang Yu Wei. The league was dedicated to the reformation of China along educational, industrial, economic and military lines, to be carried out by the government through the agencies of newspapers and pamphlets and lectures. Two branches were maintained, one in Peking, the other in Shanghai; and enlightened patriots flocked there from all parts of the Empire. Tang went to Peking via Shanghai with the purpose of meeting this group of advocates, especially their leader, Kang Yu Wei. Arriving at Peking, he found Kang had already left for Kwangtung; but Kang's pupil, Liang-Chi-Chao, welcomed him and poured into his eager mind the Master's system of teaching, and outlined a programme of reform constructed with reference to present needs, planned in the hope of a grander and ever-perfecting future, and set in the back-ground of naturalistic idealism.

Kang was a Confucianist and kept referring his ideas to Confucian classics, thereby giving them a Confucian sanction and form. He was also familiar with Buddhist philosophy. Kang's inspiring thought was eagerly accepted by Tang-Szu-Tung, whose mental hori-

zon was greatly widened, his life given a more positive tone, and his thought a new line of development.

The next year was one of intensive study in the city of Nanking, interrupted only by a few short trips to Shanghai to help the propaganda. Both Confucian and Christian literature, but principally Buddhist works borrowed from the famous Buddhist layman Yang Wen Hwei, were studied, side by side with Chinese books on physical science, western history and western government. Considering the short time and the wide variety of subjects, his accomplishment is remarkable. *The Science of Love* his most important writing, was produced within this year.

During the first of these years, the three highest officials in his native province Hunan, with the active support of the gentry, attempted to carry out in that province all the new projects suggested by the reform party. A large number of vigorous and enlightened men, among whom were Liang Chi Chao and Tang-Szu-Tung, were called to the provincial metropolis to open up new enterprises. Tang proposed and organized steamship navigation, the opening of two mines, the building of a railway connecting Hunan and Kwangtung, a civil service school, a military training school, and a citizens' voluntary Defense League. In addition, he formed a society for the Promotion of Learning of South China, and became its President, and as such, its chief lecturer. This society functioned in two ways: first, in conducting frequent meetings of responsible citizens for the discussion of questions and projects in which the welfare and interest of the community were involved, intending it to be the embryo of a municipal council; second, in arranging public lectures to disseminate knowledge and to inculcate patriotism in the mind of the masses. The great social and commercial activity in the Empire and in other great nations, and the interpretation of the meaning of such activity; the function and nature of government, the responsibility of citizens towards the nation and their community, the challenge of the present deplorable conditions of the nation and the call for devotion and sacrifice, were the themes of these lectures.

Upon a special recommendation, Tang was summoned the next year to the imperial court by Emperor Kuang Hsü. Kuang Hsü became Emperor in 1875 when but a mere boy, and until 1889 was a mere figurehead, the power being in the hand of his aunt, the Empress Dowager. Even after the latter year, intrigue in the

imperial family strained the relations between the Emperor and Empress Dowager. But Kuang Hsü saw in the face of constant foreign oppressions and national humiliations the pressing need of reforms. In 1898 he began to give vent to his progressive ideas, and issued edict after edict making sweeping changes in the old regime, such as the modification of the examination system, the establishment of modern public schools, and the reorganization of the military system. Most of the edicts may be traced to the pens of a number of young men whom the Emperor, following the advice and recommendations of one or two high officials, had raised to more responsible positions. The most famous of these reformers were Kang Yu Wei, now a "practice secretary" in Tsung-li-Ya-men, Liang-Chi-Chao, now the chief of the Bureau of Translation and Publication, and four others, Tang-Szu-Tung included, now raised to the fourth rank of officialdom and appointed practice secretaries in the Keung-Chi-Chu. Fear of the Empress Dowager prevented the Emperor's putting them into higher and more responsible positions. Yet through a genuine desire to carry out reforms and to build around him a party of choice and able men whom he could trust, he put these obscure and subordinate officials into higher positions so that he could consult with them personally and frequently.

But the time was not ripe for reform. Kuang Hsü's shrewdness was of no avail. Discontent was generated by reactionary officials, both Manchu and Chinese. The Emperor's efforts to explain through edicts the need and purpose of reform availed nothing. The Empress Dowager left the Summer Palace and came back to seize the reins of government; she was supported by all the conservative officials in prominent positions, and by the army. A coup d'état took place September 22, 1898. The Emperor was confined. The Dowager was installed with ceremony. An edict was issued that same day for the arrest of Kang Yu Wei, and the news reached Tang as he was entertaining a visitor, Liang Chi Chao. Tang asked the latter to go to the Japanese minister at Peking to see if something could be done to save Kang, and himself waited in his residence for the military authorities to arrest him. Not being molested that day, Tang took the opportunity the following day to deposit with Liang Chi Chao at the Japanese Legation the MSS. of his writings and his family correspondence. These are his words to Liang: "If none goes away, the future of our cause is for-

feited; if none lingers and suffers death, there would be nothing to pay back the debt we owe to the good Emperor. The fate of our Master the Nan-hai (i. e. Kang Yu Wei) is still unknown. Let you and me divide the work among us; you carry away with you the burden of our cause, as Chen-Yin carried the orphan, and I will shed my blood here in my birthplace". They embraced each other and parted henceforth.

Tang went back to his residence and discussed with a spadassin some scheme to free Emperor Kuang Hsü. For three days nothing could be done. On September 25th three Japanese liberals called on Tang and urged him with all kinds of arguments to flee from Peking to Japan. But Tang stood firm on his decision to stay. When they continued to urge him to leave, they heard him saying, "In every nation on the earth, no Reformation has ever been accomplished without the shedding of blood. So far in China the shedding of blood for the sake of Reformation is unheard of, and that is the reason why the country is still in the grip of conservatism. I shall be the first one to die for the reformation cause!" The next day he was arrested. On September 29, 1898, he and his five colleagues were publicly beheaded. They are the "Six Martyrs of the Year Wu-Hsu", whom the Chinese will remember for all ages to come.

It was the Manchu Empress Dowager who put him to death; it was the unripe and evil society which killed him through her. But he died for the cause of bettering Humanity through bettering China, and it was his philosophy which inspired him to live a life of noble endeavor and to die a martyr's death.

* * * * *

Before analyzing in detail *The Science of Love*, it will be well to recall the spirit and the form of its author's thought.

As to the spirit, Tang never lost the sense of his painful childhood with its tragic bereavements. This affected his thought as profoundly as his sympathy for his nation, his hatred of its sordid life, of the evil and choking oppression of effeminate Manchu rule, of the conservatism and inertia of its civilization, and the tyranny of other nations. His passionate desire is to serve men, to reform his nation, to lift the Chinese life to a higher level, to create brighter and happier families in a free atmosphere, to unite not only his own nation but all nations, to break down all walls and barriers which divide men from each other, in family life, social and po-

litical life, in international life. Tang's passion is to baptize the world with one pervading love. His dynamic hope is the Buddhist hope of Perfection in the Mahayanic form—a hope be retained because he had identified it with secular human achievement and social progress. In the light of this hope he sees a strong, prosperous and free China; a blossoming, healthy, spontaneous Chinese life; a united, harmonious and co-operative humanity. This is the spirit which animates his work.

The form of his thought has the following content. His cosmos is a vast realm of thousands of atomic, rising and disintegrating worlds, looked at through both Buddhist vision and astronomical telescope and biological microscope. His Man is flesh, bones, organs, cells, plus a Christian soul interpreted to mean Buddhist Bodhi. His instruments are (i) for struggling Mankind; politics, religion, and learning; (ii) for struggling individuals, Love untainted by the sense of distinction of whatever kind, and Science which analyses in order to show that distinction do not exist and to support the ethical feeling and practice of universal Love.

Tang's keywords are: Love, unity, equality, breaking inequalities, no distinction of self and others, action, courage, striving, forward-moving, fearlessness.

What is *The Science of Love*? In its fifty sections readers will find a series of vigorous and interesting discussions of various kinds of problems touching the Chinese life. In order to grasp the significance of the book, it is necessary to discern the underlying purpose and spirit which gives the seemingly loosely-connected sections a singular inner unity. Then, approached from the standpoint of the author, it will reveal itself as a personal confession of faith or a religious interpretation of life, written with two objects. First, it is an intellectual articulation of, and religious justification for, the necessity of cultural changes in China. The reasons for change are the rise of a new and more vigorous civilization in the West and a rising nation in the East; the corruption of Chinese government in the hands of Manchu victors; the demonstrated weakness of the nation in dealing with other nations; the rise of new international and economic conditions. All these dangers call for radical readjustment of the life of China's age-long civilization if the downfall of her culture and national life are to be averted. Second, it is written to call out loyalty, to give direction and courage, and to instill new hopes in the nation's sons who are now summoned to

face the new perplexing situations. It calls them to take up the responsibility for the building up of a free, reformed, and pro-



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gressive nation, secure in the international life, forming a part in the international order, and, after security is achieved, paints

the vision of nations and races marching together to the goal of an elevated, harmonious and peaceful state of human life.

Of the twenty-seven propositions given at the beginning of the work, which is but a medium sized volume, divided into two parts, twenty-four aim to set forth the various aspects of the author's conception of life and the universe. The remaining three name the Chinese and foreign (Confucian, Christian, Buddhist) classics and books and also modern sciences whose mastery is considered by him to be absolutely necessary for its classification of mind, for penetrating the mystery and meaning of life, and for an understanding of right conduct in life, or in his own words, for "the practice of the Science of Love". The preface, written after the completion of the work, states his life experience, his dominant desires, and the sources and form of the interpretation itself.

Tang's philosophy declares that:

(1) There is one all-pervading and omnipresent substance, which he calls ether. This ether is the basis of all things, whether organic or inorganic. Its manifestations in nature at large are electrical waves, force and atoms; in Man, physical body and Consciousness having its seat in the brain. Since Ether is one, the Universe with its manifestations, its infinite numbers of vast solar systems and minute particles, is one. Everything is it, therefore everything is I. The most subtle manifestation of Ether in Nature is Electricity and in Man neurological Consciousness. Indeed, neurological consciousness is but form-possessing electricity, and electricity formless-consciousness. Now, if we have demonstrated the brain as that which makes us conscious of the unity of our organs and parts and limbs as one body, we must further seek to know that Electricity in the same manner connects all organic and inorganic beings into one body.

(2) Since the whole universe, in virtue of the one absolute permeating Ether as its basis, is one body or organic being, and since a perfectly healthy body is concerned with, sensitive and responsive to, whatever happens to all other parts of the body, we therefore should be concerned with and respond to whatever happens to our fellowmen, nay, the whole animate creation. In other words, since there is free communication or mutual response in all parts of a healthy body, there should be in the same manner free communication or mutual response between all human beings. That we human beings have failed to realize our unity with the

whole universe and have been egoists, each minding his private interests, in ignorance or even at the expense of the interest of others, is to Tang-Szu-Tung a tragedy and an abnormality; all the castes and classes we set up, all the distinctions we carefully make, and all the cruelties we heartlessly tolerate and indulge in, are, in his words, self-mutilation similar to the cutting up into small pieces of one's own body. All insensibility to the pains and needs and cries of others is—to this sensible soul—self-paralysis.

(3) The virtue (the only virtue we need to cultivate) is Love—Love that knows no differing or opposing interests, that is the realization of our unity with all, of our literal oneness with all. Tang-Szu-Tung is not the first Chinese thinker in history to emphasize Love, but he is probably the first to reduce all virtues into the one virtue of Love. The main categories of cardinal virtues in Chinese ethics are the triple Wisdom, Love and Courage, the five virtues of Love, Justice, Propriety, Wisdom and Faithfulness, and also the category of Loyalty (to Emperors), Filial Piety, Purity and Fidelity (of women to men).

Tang argues, however, that Love, psychologically, is the only original virtue. He sustains his thesis in this way: Love is knowledge or Wisdom embodied in actions; Love produces Courage which is demanded in actions; Love calls out co-ordination and co-operation which are the essence of Justice; Love gives rise naturally to Faithfulness, and ends in actions we call Propriety; hence Love is everything; Wisdom, Courage, Justice, Faithfulness, and Propriety are only the effects of Love.

Further, he argues that Love is the only primal and final Virtue. Loyalty (of subjects to rulers), Filial Piety and Fidelity (of women to men) are, in contrast, but artificial, impartial virtues. This he proves as follows: Love is owed to all by all and claimed by all from all; but when Kings, fathers and husbands came along to claim the right of taking love without the desire to give it, the right of being served without the wish to serve, they distorted Love, and reduced it to these partial and artificial virtues of Loyalty, Filial Piety, and Fidelity. The result was slavery and selfishness. Hence Love is the first and the last virtue, free and yet binding; all else is bondage. "Therefore" says Tang, "all founders of religion, Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus, speak only of Love; when they refer to other virtues, they are simply employing

"names"¹ already formed and social usage, in order to make clear the application of Love and to help men to come into harmony with ease. Could anything hold a position equal with Love?"

(4) What is Love? In a universe in which Love prevails, all beings are equally concerned with the weal and woe of all others, as parts and limbs in a healthy body are concerned with the welfare of each other and ever ready to come to the relief of each other. The medical name of bodily paralysis in Chinese is "no-love". So Tang comments, "when there is no-Love, the parts of a body are like separate territories to each other. So when there is Love, separate territories must belong to each other like the parts of a body. Even when separate territories are made to belong to each other like parts of a body even that is not the highest realization of Love. For are not separate territories throughout the universe actually one body?"

More concretely, Love means, and demands as its one essential condition, free and unrestrained "Communication", that is giving and taking. Communication is fourfold (a) Communication between the Nation, i. e., China, and surrounding nations, which Tang claimed to have been hinted at in the classic Spring and Autumn; (b) communication between the ruling and the ruled; (c) communication between the male and the female. These two he claimed to have been implied in the Classic of Changes; and (d) communication between one's own self and others, which he found clearly taught in Buddhist sutras.

The present writer likes to think of Tang-Szu-Tung's "four communications" and one Love as an important step in the advancement or growth or expansion of Chinese ethical thought. It is evident that they are, on the negative side, the beginnings of modern Chinese criticism of, and revolt from, traditional Ethics; and, on the positive side of the process, the first step towards establishing new political, social, sex, and international morality. His "Communication between the ruling and the ruled" is a cry for Constitution and Parliament, a protest against Manchu despotism, and an anticipation of political democracy in present-day China.

¹ The conception of "name" is a very important one in historical Chinese philosophy. An adequate treatment of it is a task that falls outside the present essay. Suffice it to say that Tang is the first Modern Chinese to repudiate this conception with the instrument of Taoistic and Buddhistic logic; he recognized the havoc it had wrought in Chinese family, social and political life.

His "communication between the male and the female" is a voice raised against woman seclusion and an anticipation of the present Woman Emancipation Movement. His "communication between the Nation and surrounding nations" vindicates international commerce in China, and China's closer intercourse with other nations, urging her to struggle for her rightful place among the nations of the world. The following words of Tang may be quoted in this connection:

"When they (i. e., other nations) have attained greater prosperity than we, we are to learn from them; when they are in greater turmoil than we, we are to save them. It is possible for us to share with them a common learning, a common government, and a common religion. What arguments then can be advanced against such a small institution as international commerce?"

(5) Although Tang makes much of the "communications" between ruler and ruled, male and female, nation and nations, he has no conception of these distinctions as eternal and alterable. That would be to argue merely for amelioration. He is too conscious of the evils that caste has brought upon China. He protests against the accepted standard, category, and content of morality. That is not to say he proclaimed openly the abolition of monarchy, or the reorganization of the Chinese family on the basis of equality and freedom. But he prepared the way for this generation, by his polemic against traditional ethics, the foundation of that which existed, the absolutism of which had been unchallenged. He did denounce the three categories of Ruler and Subjects, Father and Son, Husband and Wife. He reduced the ethics of the Five relationships to that of the last one, Friends and Friend, arguing that the ethics of the first four Relationships must be subsumed under this one category. These are his words: "We all indulge in discussing Reform; yet we allow the Five Relationships to stand unaltered. In my opinion, so long as the ethics of the Five Relationships are not removed, all great principles can have no soil for germination. How much more is it so with reference to the Three Categories?"

Having regard to the fact that even today, as in Tang's time, Chinese leaders assert the possibility of introducing occidental mechanical arts, the factory system of production, large scale commerce, scientific education, while they wish to preserve the old Chinese ethics and the social arrangement which these ethics

sanction, Tang's pronouncement is truly remarkable. Were all other elements left out of *The Science of Love*, this insight would win for the book a unique place in the history of Chinese thought.

Again, though he made no suggestion of a concrete world organization, he has the vision, already hinted at, of a Humanity realizing its unity, sharing a common Learning, Government, Religion. "The principle of the Classics of Spring and Autumn is", he writes, "that the world is one family. There are natural geographical units; but there should not be separate peoples. We live on the common earth; and nothing will keep us permanently divided into nations. Nations will lose their power of control over men. When this comes to pass, where will the power of control be? It will be invested in no other than Learning—Learning as that into which all powers flow, and are absorbed!"

Finally, several quotations may be made to bring out the meaning of "communication between one's own self and others". In discussing the time-honored Chinese notion that men's craftiness in dealing with each other is silently brewing a great calamity, which if not averted before its ripening, will eventually fall upon the community, Tang offers "compassion", a term used by Buddhists as the solvent or antidote. "When Compassion prevails," he says, "I will treat all others as my equals and thereby be relieved of any fear of them; others will treat me as their equal and be relieved of their fears of me. Then Fearlessness will exile Craftiness. One of Buddha's epitaphs is 'the Great Fearless'. His ministry of saving me is through the offering of Fearlessness". After a few sentences, Tang continues, "Let those who desire to avert the great calamity by the power of mind, make the vow that he will labor not only for the salvation of China but for the wholesale salvation of even the most secure and prosperous occidental nations, and in addition, of all animate beings. For his spiritual power can not be increased if his mind is not fair."² In the 49th section he discusses the relation between personal salvation and cosmic salvation, i. e., the salvation of others, in the following words: "But if the labor for cosmic salvation is not preceded by that for

² The idea of salvation of all animate beings is in effect the intensification of the Confucian doctrine of extension of Love to men as well as animals, and is originally tied up with the Buddhist scheme of salvation. The Christian limitation of soul to human beings alone is so un-Buddhist and un-oriental that Tang devotes a whole section in his book to its repudiation.

personal salvation, one will find his Wisdom insufficient for practical purposes and at last the bankruptcy of his power of saving others. If he should be from the very beginning absorbed in the labor for personal salvation, he would have to struggle on in entire negligence of the welfare of "natural beings", which is evidently in contradiction to his original purpose. . . . Shall we give priority to the task of personal or of cosmic salvation? I reply: the difficulty arises from a false distinction of self and other selves. Listen! The truth is this: In the light of the vision that there is no self outside other selves and no other selves outside one's own self, personal salvation and cosmic salvation are identical."



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Here it is obvious that Tang assumes the Buddhist Vidjñānāvaśīdī psychology as the basis of his theory as to the relation of self and selves; also, he accepts the Buddhist mental discipline which aims at the destruction of Mana-consciousness as the ultimate means of arriving at that state of mind in which all ideas of difference and distinction between self and not-self disappear. To explain at length the elaborate system of Buddhist psychology is outside the range of this paper.

(6) But, in spite of his recommendation of the fanciful Buddhist mental discipline as the method for reaching that sublime

state of mind in which one understands all and loves all; in spite of his exaltation of Love over Knowledge; Tang has ample reason for assigning to Science a place—a very important place in Man's struggle for the embodiment of love, or, better, for the knowledge of Love. He welcomes Science not merely because it gives us power of control over nature and enriches our material life, but because, to his way of thinking, it leads to the highest wisdom. Let us see how he justifies himself here.

By recognizing Ether as the one all-inclusive and all-pervading spiritual substance, Tang is incurably a Monist; he conceives existence as one absolute existence. When a man fails to realize this living truth concerning existence and becomes self-centric, he views and measures all things surrounding him with reference to himself. Hence, such a person minimizes or magnifies things which are smaller or larger than his thought of himself; he names things which are contingent to, or farther away from him in space as near or far; and in time as present, past or future; his "self" is but a little drop in the ocean of existence; the rest is "not-self". Woe to him! His consciousness will be full of false distinctions—bigness and smallness, longevity and shortness, now-ness and then-ness, here-ness and there-ness, self and not-self; his mind will be disturbed by false fears and hopes; his Love will be limited; his life will be made miserable by clinging to, by exclusive engagement with, petty things and selfish plans.

The road to the Temple of Absolute Existence is paved with bricks of non-distinction. None who sees the Universe as distinct and separate blocks—this block and that block, I-block and you-block; none who views the Universe as pieces, or heaps of pieces, nearer and farther; none who views the Universe with diseased and short-sighted eyes can command the vision of the grand whole. Throw away distinctions! Then you will understand and Love. "In order to break distinctions", Tang writes, "we must first of all build up Science. But in order to do this, we must in turn discriminate distinctions. . . there is neither this nor that; this is but that and that is but this; it matters not whether it is or is not known; there is nothing to be known—this is what I call the breaking of distinction." To elucidate Tang's thought here, a passage preceding that just quoted may be given: "All these distinctions are endless deceptions. The occidental science serves remarkably as the key to unlock the whole mystery: what expands can be con-

tracted, what is invisible can be made visible, what disappears can be collected and preserved, what is extinct can be revitalized; sound and light are intangible, but can be caught as if they were substantial; matter is impenetrable, but can become transparent. If the study of sound, light, chemistry, electricity, gas and kinetics, are pursued with ever greater success, all distinctions will probably be undermined".

He concludes his argument thus: "That which attempts to discriminate distinctions is what is called in the Occident Logic, and is just that method of argumentation employed by Kung-Sun-Lung and Hweh-Shi, and Logic is what a seeker of truth should start with. From Logic proceeds Mathematics which is the application of the principles of Logic to the study of figures". (He is thinking of geometry). "Further, from Mathematics comes Science which is the application of both Logic and Mathematics, and is the instrument of a seeker in the next stage. When Science has been pursued to its completion, and the breaking up of all distinctions accomplished thereby, then a seeker obtains the consummate truth".

Evidently, Tang surrendered to the Buddhist doctrine of One Absolute Existence and No-Distinctions because of its ethical idealism. He embraced Western science because it abolished the closed Universe of fixed and irreducible categories and set up a fluid, therefore more acceptable universe. Here is a Chinese instance of absolute idealism which leaves room for change. Regarding Love as the law of life demanded by one Absolute Existence, and "Learning" as the means of realizing that Existence, hence of gaining vision into the inner necessity of Love, Tang's own name for his work is *The Learning of Love*. Wisdom gives the true Knowledge, it is the rationale of Love—this is the essence of the teaching. The present writer translates the title of the book as *The Science of Love* because Tang identifies Science and "Learning" in the preface, and in the body of the work (p. 12a, part 2) speaks of Science as the "substance" of "Learning", and of the successful completion of Science as the consummate stage of a "learner".

(7) What saved Tang, in spite of his Absolutism, from accepting a static view of the universe, with its corollaries of acquiescence in what exists and submission to evil, was (in the present writer's opinion) the urgent need of radical changes in Chinese national and social life, the new strength of the idea of progress conferred by evolutionary and experimental science, (which came to

him from afar), the ancient emphasis upon full, rich and creative life embodied in Confucianism, and, finally, the cosmic emotion—cosmic compassion, the courage of cosmic revolution—in Mahayanic Buddhism.

Tang's view of the constitution of the cosmos has already been delineated (see p. 9). We should add to that Tang's conception of Ether as a flux of "minute coming-into-existences and ceasing-to-be's", a term employed in Buddhist philosophy. The contents of this flux are so minute that they cannot be divided any farther, but as processes they spread out, durate and lengthen into the one eternal substance Ether, a substance that is, in his Buddhist terminology, "neither - coming - into - existence-nor-ceasing-to-be". Thus our author identifies Being and Becoming, and has found that wisdom of "eternity amid changes and immortality in life" which is, according to one distinguished European theologian, the essence of religion.

From this view of the make-up of the cosmos, several very important conclusions are drawn. They are:

(a) "The Oneness of Present, Past and Future".

Under this head, the 16th proposition stated at the beginning of *The Science of Love* is explained. This proposition reads: "There is Past, there is also Future, but there is no Present: both Past and Future are, however, Present". This inference about Time was to be expected. Since the duration of minute-life processes is continuous and all-a-piece, the natural and inevitable corollary is that you cannot cut the duration into unconnected pieces, saying, "this is what comes first, this is what comes after; or this is the precedent, that is the consequent". There is but one Duration. Further, the duration is made up of life-processes following each other so very rapidly that when, and even before, one can ever seize a moment and name it present, it has already been overtaken by the oncoming moments and relegated to the Past. Therefore be cheerful: the Future is ours already; there is but one Eternal Present.

(b) "The harmony of one and many".

All the world-systems in the cosmos, and all living beings in the thousands of world-systems are in the same cosmic stream and have their place in the same duration. "Should all living beings converge in me, I am not made a bit larger; should I be distributed among all living beings, I am not made a bit smaller", says Tang.

This rather mystical utterance points only to the fact that since I and all others are in the same cosmic stream, I am not alone, not small, can not keep myself within narrow personal limits or consider myself to be without others. Because of the cosmic life which is in all, one is not a grain bigger or smaller than others.

(8) From the conception of a universe in flux, and of a cosmic present being relegated to a past, Tang easily justifies dynamic change as the law of growth, in both group and individual life. Lao Tze's doctrine of inaction and Chinese conservatism, both historical and contemporary, are forcibly attacked. Words and phrases torn from their context in Confucian classics, Buddhist Sutras, and Christian bible, are quoted in support. Dynamic character, forward-striving life, changes and improvement in the life of the nation, are demanded by the new combination of circumstances. Insofar as Tang contrives to make Confucianism and Buddhism support and justify measures of reconstruction, and to find in their ancient ethical and religious teachings justification for the endeavors of the new age, he is bringing Confucianism and Buddhism in line with the new life and is pouring his new wine into old bottles.

(9) Tang's prediction of the destiny of our planet is an interesting blending of Confucian hope and Buddhistic vision with his own slender scientific knowledge. Here it is clear that his mind and outlook are by no means purely "scientific". He had received little scientific training, and moreover, science, in his time and even today, cannot provide direction for all departments of our complex life. Where the self-conscious human spirit questions ultimate things our immature science is silent as to the answers. Imagination, tradition, preconceived ideas, strong desires, announce conclusions which it were better for some to accept. Tang's view of the future of humanity is colored, notwithstanding his knowledge of scientific facts and acceptance of scientific method, by Buddhist notions. He is still indelibly a Buddhist.

(a) He accepts the theory of Evolution,³ and the ascending course of human history. The golden age is yet to come; it is not in the past. In the face of hindrances to progress, the disorders attending reforms, he calls for patience, for courage, and the "long

³ The term "Evolution", though not found in *The Science of Love* appears in a letter written by him to a friend. The First Chinese work on Evolution was published two years before Tang's death and he must have read it.

view". "We should think in the terms of thousands and tens of thousands of years, and not be peering at history through pin-holes", he says in one passage.

(b) The third and last period of human development, the period of Great Harmony or the Period of Universal Peace so-called in Kung-Yang's commentary on the Spring and Autumn, is the period when wars, rivalry, jealousy, anguish, hatred, selfish desires, and poverty will have ended; boundaries, distinctions, classes will have vanished away; freedom, equality and universal fraternity in one great human family will have been established. There will be no kings or emperors, or even *the* emperor, but a world-wide democracy; no religious Lords, or even *the* religious Lord; no religion; because every man and woman will have grown to the full stature of his or her being, and will embody all the qualities and excellences found in the "religious lords". "Fathers will have no need of practicing paternal care and sons no need of filial piety; elder brothers and younger will forget about their friendliness and respect, and husbands and wives their unison". Tang means that all our distinctive virtues are born of and sustained by a divided human life where segregations and groups obtain—born of and sustained by wall-civilization; and therefore will lose their significance and meaning when human life becomes one and cosmic consciousness supersedes group-consciousness. Paternal love, filial piety, and the other (Chinese) family virtues will be meaningless when Humanity becomes one big Family, just as Patriotism will be out-grown when Humanity becomes one Nation. The fanaticism that offers human lives on the altar of abstract, divisive ethical qualities or virtues, will be no more. Says Tang, "Those who wish to produce perfect nations will have to perfect the world; and those who wish to produce perfect families will have to perfect society". He also knows that "when nations are most perfect, there will be no nations; when families are most perfect, there will be no families".

But before this third and final stage is the Second Period of Human Development or the Period of Rising Peace, which Tang allows The Book of Changes to foretell—a period when "all nations on the earth will bow before one King and the followers of all religions before one "religious Lord". Here he is merely relating the opinion of an anonymous person and does not stop to expound it. Elsewhere, however, he sets forth plainly his own opinion that Buddhism, because of its consistent emphasis upon absolute equal-

ity in human relations, and its indication of the ideal state of affairs to be worked out by the human race, will be the religion which will enjoy a limited period of universality till it is lost in the Ocean of Perfection.

(c) Tang knows that in the distant future our earth will gradually change its shape and contour, lose its fertility, its moisture, its life, as a consequence of the cooling of the sun; that it will dissolve into particles which will form new planets. What then for him is the ultimate destiny of Man and his civilization? According to the Mahayanic Buddhist faith, our lives do not originate from Mother Earth; the Earth receives its life from us imperfect and deluded beings. We who have failed to realize the eternal Truth, who live in the prison-house of the "eight-consciousnesses" or "consciousness-bodies" of our own making, have brought the Earth and indeed the whole manifested Universe into existence. Therefore when we have by mental and spiritual discipline dispossessed ourselves of the illusory real "consciousness-body", the earth will vanish with us, its magical makers. We sustain and nurture the Universe in which we transmigrate, and from transmigrations suffer (samsara). The cessation of the Universe is to be coveted—it is our only task, our religious task. The earlier it is accomplished, the better. Thus, Buddhists may be said to be the most radical revolutionists extant; they plot for the life of the cosmos, crying "Down with Everything, including Ourselves!" Tang is still a Buddhist. His initiation into the mystery of Science has not alienated him from Buddhist Dharma. He would not have been disturbed by Bertrand Russell's pessimism in *A Free Man's Worship*.

Buddhism in the future may be willing to give credit to Tang-Szu-Tung for his identification, or still better, synchronization of the period of the greatest possible human achievement on earth with the period of emancipation or salvation of all men. For his scheme implies that secular achievement and religious duty—secular quest for finite progress and happiness, and religious quest for eternal truth and perfection—are no longer conflicting and mutually exclusive claims but are made one. "Mundane dharma" and "supermundane dharma" are identified, a Chinese Buddhist would say. Each step made in human progress is a religious gain; every discovery in Science and every effort to realize a world-organization bring nearer salvation.

Tang makes his Man, since emerging from lower forms in the ascent of his destiny, pass three stages. They are the three Confucian epochs or periods of human development, two of which we have discussed. The other which is the first period is that of Turmoil and Discord. Tang had in mind no doubt a synthesis of the Buddhist prospect of Salvation and the Evolutionistic prospect of progress.

A few more sentences will round out the philosophy of Tang. In all probability, he had heard of Malthus' theory of population. But he seems not to have been worried by it. Scientific agriculture will make the soil more productive. Chemistry will prepare artificial food first from the chemical compounds found on the planet and then from the air. Anatomy and physiology will change man's organism to fit it to live on air, like the Taoist ascetic does. They will further "drain away the gross matter of human bodies and retain the subtle—decrease the body and increase the soul". (Note the influence of Christian dualism here). Finally, with the aid of eugenics⁴ which improves the racial stock generation after generation, a new race of human beings will emerge as the old race emerged from lower forms of animate life. The new men will embody the accumulated "spirit" of their predecessors as men in the present form embody the accumulated "spirit" of the past evolution. They (the new men) will "use exclusively Intelligence and Force, and possess soul and no body"; they will find it possible to "dwell in water, fire, wind and air, and fly back and forth to the stars and suns and will suffer no harm even when the earth is completely destroyed". Again, in his own words, "when the karma of finite beings ceases, that of the earth also ceases; when the body of finite beings is removed, that of the earth is also removed". "All finite beings will have attained Buddhahood". Universal emancipation through civilization; individual salvation through social progress; realization of Truth through enrichment of finite cosmic life; destruction of life through its enrichment and perfection; religious attainment through scientific control; impartial love as life discipline and analytical Science as intellectual discipline in the realization of the oneness of cosmic life—these are Tang-Szu-Tung's noble though rather fanciful aspirations.

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⁴ What Tang calls the *Science of Improving the Racial Stock* is probably eugenics if this science was then known to the Chinese.

It may not be amiss to close this essay with a few criticisms of our author, first emphasizing the fact that Tang-Szu-Tung's constructive work is not vitiated by his adherence in some respects to tradition.

He retained many Buddhist ideas, such as Karma, transmigration (samsara), existence of the universe in consciousness (vidjnanvada), and Buddhahood. For these he had no other support than tradition.

He read into Confucianism modern ideas, showing that he had but a slender grasp of the historic method.

He is pre-religious-historic in his notion that Jesus, Confucius, and Buddha are the Nirmanakaya ("manifested bodies") of one Dharmakaya; and that the three religions represented are revelations of truth, each adapted to the time, culture, and mental capacity of its respective age.

He had no historic understanding of any of these three religions, as a consequence of which he entertained the vicious idea that one historic religion, which he happened to find existing in his society, and which was flexible enough to be re-interpreted, (i. e., Buddhism) should be the world-religion. Such an idea engenders religious jealousy and rivalry.

THE "LAW OF PROGRESS".

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

SOME time ago I prepared for a certain newspaper a series of sketches illustrating parallels in the rise and fall of ancient Republics. The purpose of that paper's editors was, I suppose, to call the attention of its readers to the pitfalls into which those Republics stumbled and to thereupon build editorials warning its constituents that "like conditions beget like results", that "history repeats itself" and that we were surely plunging into the same maelstrom that engulfed nations that were once great. Howbeit, the points brought forth in these notes provoked some discussion in which I read an oft repeated reference to the "law of progress", a term that grates abominably upon my nerves, a rasping misnomer.

Now I would like to leave the question of whether we are on the road to a downfall like that of the Roman Republic or not to some other time and spend a little while glancing over what we know of that alleged "law of progress" that we have heard about and lived with upon more or less intimate terms since our school days.

The gathering of the authorities was a most fascinating pastime, placing their opinions before you is merely to translate and edit that great mass of data into "readable length", therefore is the task an easy one, a light vacation labor, and if I make it readable I am then well repaid for the work.

The best sign of progress is that there is much talk of progress. True, it is an often misapplied term and one used thoughtlessly: few could really define in what progress really consists. Still it is well that the word should be upon every one's lips, it expresses a tendency toward something on the part of every mind. Garrau aptly puts it that "you may be quite certain of the mediocrity of

an artist who is satisfied with his picture, who thinks it finished and does not desire to add to it, the insufficiency of a virtue that does not wish itself more perfect, likewise you may attest that an age when people do not aspire to higher and better things than they have, that age is a retrogressive one and had better be wiped off the records". This striving, this hope, this effort toward progress is at once the blessing and the danger of our time. Some there are who, in the name of Progress, would have us break our necks to reach a certain point; others in the name of that same Progress would convince us that the surest way of advancing is to go backward. Over-zealous as some may be the movement they impart to a period is a benefit. It persists, forms itself from these implications and divergent tendencies and becomes salutary and corrective.

To claim, however, that there is a "law" of progress is forcing a point. There may be such a law, and some of the higher authorities implicitly believe there is, but if there is it certainly has not been made manifest. What are the conditions of progress? Even if these were determined there would still remain the necessity of establishing their relative importance and the precise role each plays in our affairs. What is the object of human development. Is it striving for the happiness of the individual? Or do we each fit in a little cog and by our presence there are turning the great wheel in some one direction, toward some development of purpose that we, alas, are still ignorant of?

From the earliest time man has had a vague consciousness of a faculty of progress which would lead us to believe that it is one of the essential and distinctive characteristics of our species. This has been more or less developed and understood. In China and in India you will find that idea in its lowest developed state, while in Greece and Rome of old it was carried to excess. You will find in the most ancient classics a mass of peculiar notions wherein life, progress, is compared to certain astral revolutions, and periodical evolution of the seasons, the working of a wheel always coming back to the point from which it started. We think our scientists and philosophers have done some wonderfully original thinking, take for instance our theory of evolution; go back to Maximander and you will find that that philosopher claimed that the action of the sun upon the earth when the latter was covered with waters, induced evaporation in the form of pelicles, matrixes containing

minute form of imperfect organisms that, later, developing by degrees, gave birth to all forms of living things; according to him our ancestors were aquatic animals that, living in muddy waters grew accustomed little by little to living upon the land as the latter was formed and were gradually dried out in the sun. If that is not full-fledged evolution, what is? With the Roman poets the idea was well developed. Take Virgil or Horace, how frequently they touch upon the glorious ascension of humanity from savagery to civilization; but they likewise invariably comment upon the decadence of that higher civilization into a posterity more vicious than any of its ancestors.

With the writers of prose, Cicero, Aristotle, Seneca, the idea of progress was something more definite. Seneca, for instance, claimed that nature would always have some new and better secrets to reveal to us but that it would do so gradually and only in the long run of human generations. He deplored that the philosophers of his time thought themselves initiated into the full truths while he could see that they had barely reached the gate of the temple.

The idea of progress was but slowly developed in Pagan times.

With the advent of Christianity the idea germinated into stronger life. All the preceding ages were but a preparation, a gradual upbuilding of thought, for the coming of Christ. After him the world was to go on to the day of final judgment, when the perfect life should at last be reached. The middle ages were not particularly propitious to the high understanding of the term "progress". The authors of that time are interesting, however, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Joaquin de Flore, John of Parma, Gerhard Amaury of Chartres voiced the sentiments of the times. The general notion was that time was divided into three epochs; the age of the Old Testament or of the Father, when all was in preparation, when God manifested his omnipotence and governed by law and fear; the age of the New Testament or the kingdom of the Son, when he revealed himself through mysteries and the Sacrament and the third age, or the government of the Holy Ghost, in a time to come when we will see truth face to face without symbol or veil. You will find the same ideas in Campanella, Paracelce and Dante. It was from that form that the notion of progress passed from the Middle Ages to the period of the Renaissance, the 16th century. It was then that great men, Bodin, Bacon, Descartes and Pascal divested it of its mystic character, secularized

it, attempted to determine its elements and follow it in its most diverse applications. That idea has kept on growing in importance until it contaminates all the ideas and speculations of the modern mind. In the 18th century it became known as the "Law of History"; in the 19th century it implied the study of nature and under the name of evolution "it pretends to contain the formula of universal existence."

What will we do with it in the 20th century?

I have before me Marcelli's, Flint's, Rougemont's and Cousin's writings upon "progress"—Garrau calls them the "vestibules to the science of progress." They all endeavor to prove that there is an edifice, yet one may well doubt its existence or feel that it is but an imaginary cathedral that hope has pictured in our minds. How many formulas have been given us and how many systems, and not one that has not been proven erroneous and swept aside by some successor possessing still greater assurance?

Cousin's theory was a most attractive one. His idea was that progress was but the successive appearance upon the stage of history of three ideas that are the very foundation of reasoning; the idea of the infinite, that of the finite and that of the relation between the infinite and the finite. The Orient of long ago was the expression of the first; Graeco-Roman society was the development of the idea of the finite and modern civilization the expression of the relation of both. A theory that would be well enough if man was but reason without heat radiation or activity but there is nothing in it to explain the numberless forces living and complex, instincts, desires, passions and sentiments.

Schelling, Krause, Savigny and Spencer compose another school, and in fact St. Simon, Fourier and Azais may be said to be of the same school though they indulge in more metaphor than do the others who claim for their deductions scientific precision. One group asserts that the different forms of the ascension state are determined by gravitation, by contraction or by expansion—no two of them agree upon which force it really is. Whereas the Spencerian claim that the governing class, the commercial class, the libraries are to the state as the nervo-muscular, circulatory and nutritive systems are to the body of a vertebrate. Garrau rightfully claims that to get down to absolute precision is to ignore the apparent conditions that distinguish physiological phenomena from moral and social phenomena. To pit the latter's theory against

Spencer's theory we must observe that the animal and plant life, properly placed, would increase and multiply to an alarming, if not fatal degree; their development follows but one route, irrevocably outlined and whose final term is simply the realization, in the individual, of the type of the species. Without conscience and without choice does the tree project its branches towards the light; the growth of the human species towards improvement is invariably the result of a voluntary effort and the recompense for something well done. The growth of humanity is not as with animal and vegetable life along set lines, toward a result that cannot but be attained; many directions are possible; there is a capacity for decadence as well as for progress. In animal life different organs are harmoniously developed and upon that harmony depends the life of the individual. Imagine a vertebrate living with a rudimentary heart and a full-grown brain. If we admit, analogically, that nations are but organs of one vast body, humanity, then the case is presented to us of certain organs in their first stage of development, certain others reaching the final heights of evolution and still others retrograding; infancy, adolescence, full virility, middle age, senility, all in the same body—is the animal Garrau presents to us built upon Spencerian lines; a strange animal indeed.

Prejudice is certainly a funny thing. One of the brightest writers of fifty years ago, Conrad Hermann, of Leipzig, followed along the same lines of thought as the others we have just noted, but embellished his theory with more detailed particulars. He is specific. Youth to him is the exuberant energy whose expression is in art; riper age, distinguished by more sober judgment, practical, is the age of industry; and then follows the profound meditations of old age finding expression in the sciences—the highest form of life. He contends that Germany has reached the most exalted point attainable and that it is rank foolishness for any other nation to aspire to reach or supersede her. Haeckel following the same line of thought tells us in all seriousness that the Indo-Germanic race is the one that has gotten the furthest removed from the original form of man—monkey. Fortunately for us who have a little English blood in our veins these high authorities admit the English to a little participation in these Germanic advantages, but the Latin races are absolutely beyond salvation!

Is it not sufficient proof that these deductions are necessarily chimerical and that the attempt to compare the phases of our

individual existence to the phases of the world's existence are futile when we realize that we have absolutely no knowledge of how old the world may be? We have a faint idea of the term of its existence in the past, but how much longer is that existence to continue? Is the earth young or is she old, are we reaching senility, or are we in the first stage of adolescence?

Lasaulx is without doubt the one philosopher who has given most precision to the theory that pretends to find in the life of nations the phases of human life. Naudin agrees with him. Independently of all human intervention many species of animal and plant life have died a natural death. Some have been destroyed through the agency of some external circumstance, but even in the human species certain races are in a process of extinction, not by any violent destruction but by the gradual weakening of the generative faculties and weaker and weaker resistance to the general causes of dissolution. They perish, "as a dying leaf upon the tree drawing no further sustenance from the trunk that has nourished it". Their conclusions are risky, however, when they apply this process to nations. True, each nation has in itself a certain amount of vital force that it expends more or less in the course of its evolution. This outlay of strength and force follows in certain channels, in one it gives life to a language, in another it is religion, the arts, philosophy, a system of government; and all these are organs to the same laws of increase and loss of force as they are to the varied expressions of that force. "Nations that have escaped destruction by external causes seem to be condemned to die of old age. Many have disappeared; Greece and Rome succumbed less to the blows of their enemies than to the crushing weight of their old age. Nor genius nor virtue can reanimate these bodies whose vital force has been sapped away," says Naudin.

A fascinating theory I grant you, but is it a tenable one? The individual by the act of his conception receives the force of a limited life; that life is spent, used up in the cycle of succeeding years, but what are the limits of the vital force of a nation? As a matter of fact we may say that a new nation is born every day. The energy that animates it is being renewed man by man, generation by generation. The generation that passes away leaves behind it good works, a heritage of art, of science and of progress that nourishes the next, which in turn will add to that heritage, an en-

tailed fortune to succeeding generations. Has there ever been a nation that actually perished of old age?

If the existence of an inherent force, a vital energy, in nations is not sufficient to account for progress, how much less reason is there to seek that cause in extraneous impellants! How about the influence made upon our affairs by our rotation about the Sun, magnetic currents, gravitation and the other theories of Hegel, Michellet and of Lasaulx who would have progress, liberty, civilization marching on from the Orient to the Occident? In the name of Heaven, what connection is there between the planetary movement controlled by mechanical forces, and the progress of liberty? Then too, where is the beginning of East and West? For our convenience we have placed it somewhere, but as a matter of fact in such a theory as this what account is taken of the American continent; is it East or West; is it progressive or retrogressive?

My favorite author—Garrau, thinks with many of the later English and Italian writers, that the action of the climate, the production of the soil and the relative altitudes of habitation have a much more direct influence upon humanity than any of the above cited alleged influences. They are certainly less contestable arguments. Montesquieu and Buckle have opened the way to an almost limitless calculation, one might call it along mathematical lines and with some degree of accuracy between these causes and effects. No one can gainsay that these conditions modify life in their vicinity: they exercise a very great influence upon the economic state, politics, society, of a nation. Given the nature, the number, the intensity of these causes to your specialists, metallurgists, chemists, physiologists, ethnologists and political economists can figure out pretty accurately the nature, the tendencies, the life of a people. Who has not observed that in a country where external nature is gigantic, somber, terrible, the inhabitants are paralyzed, superstitious, sensual weaklings, and yet, as Flint says, in India for instance, it is not nature that is too big as much as it is that man is too small. Place men there of another calibre and that very nature that dwarfs the one class will be subjected and made use of by the other.

Heredity?

Bagehot sees in it the essential conditions for the development of nations. One of the strongest inherited traits in man is the belief that might is right and the resorting to that argument upon the

slightest provocation. War is another name for that inherited trait. Some claim that war is progress. Each battle, they say, is a step in civilization. Not so; at first war was but a struggle of barbarians to remain barbarians; later it was used for as unholy ends and with as little benefit to its users. Were not the wars of Napoleon distinctly disadvantageous to Europe and well nigh destructive to France? What about the others, what about our Great World War? Some good may have come from some war, as an incidental auxiliary it may have helped progress in upsetting the barriers that separated people, in mixing races, in eventually propagating new ideas, but war has never been the immediate real cause of one iota of progress.

How can heredity be a part of a "law of progress"? It cannot but make like from like and it is so dependent upon environment, education and other externals that it might as well be eliminated from our consideration. A man may receive from his parents a lively, restless imagination. With it he has an equal chance of becoming a great artist or a superstitious fanatic. What we inherit is as a piece of rough stone, "it may be carved into the semblance of a god or of a beast". Bagehot sees in heredity the principal agent of progress; Edgar Quinet sees in it a reactionary force!

Any influence heredity may have upon the human race would hardly justify its elevation into a prime cause, creative, as it were, of the *law* of progress. Perhaps humanity is still too near infancy, sciences that seem indispensable auxiliaries to history are too young yet that a definite theory of progress may be possible. That theory may be a dream and hope far off, a conquest reserved for the later days of our species.

Herbert, Schopenhauer, Renouvier, Bonillier, Flaxman, Derward, Ford-Smith, have said their little pieces, but remain unconvinced, skeptical, still gropping in the darkness for the Law of Progress.

Perhaps we strain at the word "law". The word, I submit, means the constant communication, necessary between two phenomena, of which one is the antecedent of the essential condition of the other. With this acceptance of the word can there be a LAW of progress? No, such a law would impose itself, of absolute necessity, upon all phenomena it governed. Now, necessity excludes liberty; and the facts of history are the product of a free

agency. Either must we set aside the question of the law of progress or cease to speak of liberty.

This question has a religious phase. Quatrefages, Berger, Bunsen and Fancello enlarge upon that aspect of the matter. The notion of God, of religion, is essential and distinctive of the human species, therefore, it alone of all the animals is progressive. This idea man has of God, the primordial and constant force that moves nations, the living breath that inspires humanity towards truth and justice, gives birth perforce to a language, social or political constitutions, civilization. Progress is a fact. That, like all other facts has a law, but that law has nothing in common with the laws that govern astronomical, physical, chemical and vital phenomena. It is a law that does not compel, it escapes the inflexible rigidity of mathematical formulae. It is for humanity the obligation instinctively felt at first as a necessity, subdued later on as a dignity and duty to feel about in every direction towards an ideal of beauty, of truth, of happiness and of perfection. However, that ideal may be disfigured by ignorance or superstition no individual of the human race is absolutely devoid of it. It is the beacon that lights men on coming into this world; to us belongs the duty to gather, to concentrate and to fortify its rays, ours the task to establish the direction in which these rays shall shine that we may feel developing in us, through their beneficent heat, a stern sense of duty that enables us to accomplish the noble and sacred work of Progress. Neither fatality nor nature can relieve us of that task, for Progress is precisely the triumph of moral reason and liberty over Nature and Fatality.

GAUTAMA, THE BUDDHA; JESUS, THE CHRIST.

BY DON WILLIAM LEET.

THE infinite Compassion of the Buddha, the flaming Love of the man of Nazareth, is an old new quality common to all Social Reformers or Saviors, a selfless emotion which by its beautiful might makes irrelevant and trifling distinctions between persons expressing it.

Yet contrasts between these great lovers, Gautama and Jesus, are marked.

Who was Gautama? A man living 500 years before the Christian era who after spiritual apprenticeship, fasts and questings, became the Buddha, Enlightened, and preached a doctrine which transformed India of that time into a heaven of blessedness and harmony,—a doctrine which as its founder prophesied endured for 500 years.

Who was Jesus? Some say he was the Maitreya, the future incarnation or expression of the Buddha—the next Buddha, Arimadeya. This is unlikely since Gautama's dispensation yet has 2500 years to run and since Jesus was not the Buddha type. Buddha had his Judas, who the Burmese call Dewadat, who even claimed to be the real Teacher and who tried in various ways to betray and destroy Gautama. Some hold Jesus to be the expression of this man, since the religion sprung up from Jesus' works has endeavored unceasingly to betray Buddhism. The Siamese speak of the evil Dewadat as the God of Europe and the cause of all the evil in this world. In truth, the mission of the white-skin has been one of conquest, pillage, and destruction. In contrast to the more loving Oriental, his life has been as that of a carnivorous animal, murderous, cruel, vindictive, wantonly destructive of all life—animal, vegetable and mineral—heedless of others' good and hence of his

own. The Chinese spit after the white man passes and say that they can smell the cadaver about him.

Others believe Jesus was the Hindu Krishna, who was born of a virgin in a cave, announced by a star, hidden from a massacre of innocents, and who later performed miracles, raised the dead, healed the sick, championed the poor, and so forth, conforming to details common to all so-called "avatars". Others maintain that there is no more relationship between one avatar and another than there is between one man and another. "Who is My mother and who are My brethren?"

Be that as it may, both Buddha and Christ, the Anointed, lived in eras when many gods were worshipped, when symbols for *being* were popular.

"Come unto Me. I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet he shall live", said Jesus.

Verily one is the savior of oneself; what other savior should there be? A man pays in himself for the evil he has done, and in himself is he purified. The good and bad are purified by oneself; no one can purify another", said Buddha.

Both were attesting one Power, yet their expression of It were as black and white. Christ, the mystic: "I and my Father are one. I that speak unto thee am He."

Buddha, the philosophical monist: "Self is an error, an illusion, a dream. Ye that are slaves of the I, . . . receive the good tidings that your cruel master does not exist!"

"I am the light of the world. Ye are from beneath; I am from above: ye are of this world; I am not of this world."

And in one of the Buddhist scriptures it is written, "It is bootless to worship the Buddha. The earth and the Buddha are alike in themselves inert".

Jesus, living on the fringe of the Occident, knowing that the hideous tide of Western materialism was too strong to stem, turned revolutionist to denounce all materiality violently within Judaism. Buddha's revolt took the form of an abrogation of Brahminism itself and all current Hindu religions to found a completely new cosmology and movement of which "a little thereof saves from much sorrow".

Jesus, knowing that it was too late to accomplish brotherhood (although he could not refrain from declaring it), expressed his activity in acclaiming the Kingdom, the Father, the Spirit.

Gautama held that Spirit *could not be spoken of*; he refused to define Nibbana, and confined his activity to the presentation of an ethical-social program with rules to be followed as the only practical way for Society as a whole to attain a harmony with "the Law."

Jesus was a mystical poet and a metaphysical doctor. Buddha was (in active life) (since he refused to speak of the One) a social reformer. He presented four Noble Truths,—that misery is the essence of and inherent in all component existence; that a cessation of this "life" is the only possible remedy for suffering caused by what we might call Desire; that destruction of Desire only can be achieved by an ineffable Nibbana; that such a realization is possible by following a "Noble Eightfold Path" of right or whole belief, aims, speech, action, means of livelihood, thought, effort, and meditation. Here was a delineation of an empirical system without a god or Savior which actually was adopted with complete success (so far as systems go) by a Society finer, kinder, and more simply profound than any we even dream of today, a Society which as a result of the teaching of this *Dhamma* still persists after 2500 years in Ceylon, Bali, Burmah, and parts of China.

"Love one another", said Jesus.

"Refrain from all hatred; generate good; cleanse your own thoughts," this is the teaching of the Buddhas".

"Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you".

Buddha said: "If a man foolishly does me wrong, I will return to him the protection of my ungrudging love. The more hate that comes from him, the more shall be love that goes from me".

"Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart".

"The man of restless mind, of passions fierce, with eyes only for the pleasing—craving in him grows great: He forges a heavy chain".

"Thou shalt not steal".

"The member of a Buddha's order should abstain from theft, even of a blade of grass".

In forgiveness, Jesus taught: "I say not unto you, until seven times: but until seventy times seven", and Buddha: "Though a man with a sharp sword should cut one's body bit by bit, let not an angry thought arise, let the mouth speak no ill word".

"A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another", said Jesus.

"For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time", said Buddha, "hatred ceases by non-hatred: this is an old rule".

Always behind the simple command of Gautama was a continuation, a signpost pointing to a plan of self-salvation more detailed. "Who here has forsaken all lust, who is vowed to the homeless life, who has dried up the craving for existence, who is done with delight and underlight, come to coolness, rid of the bases of being—" And then followed a great metaphysic, an intricate instruction showing how to demolish "the bases of being", a logic, ethic, and yoga that cut deep into esoteric thought. There were thinkers to be upset intellectually as well as the simple folk to be guided and the indolent to be appeased: Buddha had to be all things to all men to establish the Law over the immortal Vedas!

The time seemed short to Jesus who made his life a rich rebuke to current materiality and who was concerned with the soon-coming end of this world and a subsequent entrance into "the Kingdom of Heaven".

Buddhism, on the contrary, was willing to take the material illusion less hastily, declaring that while we might progress into "Heaven" there were innumerable heavens and hells in the world-system (that is:—the subjective thought-system) and that to attain to any of them (there were instructions for that too) only could be to prolong the illusion, Nibbana being an undefined, utterly beyond the pairs—good and non-good, desire (love) and hate, pleasure and pain, bondage and liberation, and so forth. Gautama Buddha was the supreme teacher of the Way, but there had been three Buddhas before him in the present world-period and an indefinite number in the unceasing (for the fettered) revolutions of the great world-wheel of life and death.

"Put away anger, lay aside pride, pass beyond all fetters. Whoso clings not to the constituents of existence, to nothing whatsoever, suffering comes not nigh him".

Miracle working was considered "clinging to the constituents of existence" and perhaps the most obvious difference between Jesus and Buddha was that the latter declared himself absolutely against the working of miracles. These tricks with nature were always common to Hindu civilization and did not signify any particular spirituality; if Hindus had allowed themselves to judge their god-

men by their works they would have had a galaxy of false prophets. Buddha's chief objection to tricks or nature feats was that they were a far less efficient and lasting method of teaching than the concrete word-thought-action propaganda. He was more practically concerned with the progress of mind and the practice of training it to free itself from itself and the trammels of matter.

Yet to those who feared extinction he declared, "It is true that I preach extinction, but only the extinction of pride, lust, evil thought and ignorance; not that of forgiveness, love, charity, and truth". His tremendous compassion for all suffering, in man, the animals, and down to the last atom, led him to seek a means of wholly eliminating it. Jesus' love seemed more immediately concerned with the salvation of *humanity* by a release into heaven, a method certainly obtainable at least in some degree by the power of miracles. It was in this way that Jesus could "save" the world. Buddha held heaven to be only a partial salvation and therefore to be foregone. Yet he never would define his end:

"If any teach Nibbana is to cease, say unto such they lie;

If any teach Nibbana is to live, say unto such they err". (J. 1. 1)

Knowing that even God-consciousness subtly implied a lack of it, he only could indicate that truth was beyond utterance. On the contrary, Jesus drew many parables of "the Kingdom of Heaven" and spoke constantly of "the Father".

Buddha saw the trinity—ignorance-activity-spirituality, inertia-flux-balance, birth-fruition-passing on, the embassy-the Word-the Father—repeated ceaselessly, a game played on creation as if it were its essence as it is indeed the essence of suffering. It was this illusion that he warred against,—the inability to unite the three into a realized one. Again, Jesus was more opportunely concerned with lifting men out of the second to the third, from blind activity to spirituality, from the world to the Father. Jesus' love was immediate; Buddha's compassion was calmer, more thoroughly Oriental, for it recognized that the whole trinity (including spirituality) had to be surmounted, that the seeds of hell itself were planted in heaven.

It was for this reason that the disciples—if they could be called such—of the fourth Buddha understood him so much better than the disciples of Jesus understood their preceptor; it is for this reason that the line of Buddhas is so distinctly separate from the more populous line of savior-avatars.

Jesus may have used "the Father" as a blanket term for the unification of the three states of being and introduced "Heaven" only to popularize the inexpressible. He may have incorporated ignorance-activity into one concept, eliminated spirituality or the third state entirely, and contrasted his (devil) concept with his Truth. This, however, is improbable and perhaps impossible since his characteristics were so meticulously similar to all other world-saviors, since if he had meant this his terminology could no longer have been that of a mystic and qualified dualist, since he held Heaven and the end of the world so seriously, and since he felt his mission to be for eternal salvation (with the unsubscribing damned), whereas Buddha had nothing to do with the saving of souls, holding them to be unreal, and projected a frankly temporary, practical doctrine of selflessness, non-killing, non-hatred, and the rest.

Difficult as it is to draw distinctions accurately between two prophets living so far in the past and themselves 500 years apart, easy as it may be to declare superficially the parallelism of the good brothers, it is nevertheless apparent that on the questions of divinity, vicarious sin expiation, social reformation, the Absolute, and miracle mongering, there were sharp differences between them.

Jesus was one with the Father—Buddha would not discuss It; Jesus was somehow suffering for the whole world—Buddha's last words were "work out your own salvation with diligence"; Jesus presented a general pacifist ethic—Buddha was far more detailed in mind-salvation instruction; Jesus promised a heaven for the elect and a contrasting punishment—Buddha tried to dispel the illusion of heaven *and* hell; Jesus performed miracles in order to make the world more like heaven—Buddha refused to employ or to allow his pupils to employ such means of teaching, always throwing the individual's salvation back on the individual himself.

Like Krishna, Jesus claimed Godhood—Buddha declared himself merely a man and hence a figurehead. Jesus declared himself the only-begotten son of God (at least it is so presented)—whereas Buddha was active in demolishing beliefs in *long lines* of avatars.

In short, Jesus was another Osiris, Horus, Indra, Prajapati, Mithras, Attis, Dionysus, Montezuma, Quetzalcoatl, a bonafide "savior", a redeemer (as all Sun-gods had been), a Presence and a Life that men thought they in some manner had lost, and therefore worshipped. Buddha, unlike all avatars, holds a unique posi-

tion as the one enlightened teacher presenting a salvation solely by oneself, a simple instruction of how without saviors to attain this, and a repudiation of all divinations and god-spells (gospels). Buddhism never has been a religion but an ethic, the one movement that (while it remained Buddhism) never has taken life, animate or inanimate, nor subscribed to the outward symbol trumpery that is the very groundwork of all "religions".

Jesus' suffering and resurrection was the sign of all men coming to God, the proof that death would be swallowed up in victory. But this conquest of death indicates a fear of it (which accounts for the crucifixion) and Buddha saw this as another illusion in time and progress which had to be passed beyond,—that the birth-death-resurrection unit had to be balanced equally and then melted into an undefined. Here was the whole distinction between Greek and Hindu Monism, or, more exactly, between two stages in the Oriental initiation. At the earlier stage, if death had not been wholly embraced, the novitiate had to die. Again,—to say God is Love shadowed a smaller love to be transformed; to refuse to say—indicated either a *thorough* at-one-ment with "Love" or an honest materialism.

Yet as Kabir says,

"No avatar can be the Infinite Spirit
For he suffers the results of his deeds."

"Why callest thou Me good? there is none good but One, that is, God." But then again comes the "I and my Father are one"!

Other prophets who were not concerned with salvaging the world or reforming Society said what apparently neither Jesus nor Buddha dared teach. Vasishtha declared "The wise man knows no bondage or liberation, nor any error of any kind: all the three are only in the conceptions of the ignorant."

Krishna taught Arjuna "He who thinketh It to be a slayer and he who thinketh It to be slain; both of these know not, for It neither killeth nor is killed. Neither is It ever born, nor doth It die. He who knoweth It to be imperishable and eternal, unborn and unchanging, whom and how can that man kill or cause to be killed?"

And Sankaracharya: "There is neither death nor birth, neither bound nor striving for freedom, neither seeker after liberation nor liberated—this is the absolute truth."

But the truth that even the teacher and disciple are dreams—

lies—impermanent sections of cosmic emotions—karmas—is rarely ever accepted by teacher and disciple.

Indeed, it is the peculiar characteristic of the Savior-Teacher type, lost in ecstatically sorrowful spacial love-forest, that its clinging to illusion to destroy it, its compassion for the apparent reality of matter, should be immense,—that the Master ever should postpone his own “freedom” in order to “help” others to freedom. So Buddha declared that until the last atom went into Nibbana before him, it was not for him. The type does not see or rather *realize* an Absolute in which all qualities (including non-good, murder, destruction, and the evil-suffering attributes) are one; it does not see error dispelling itself (and hence a fixed postulate perfect per se) but rather sees itself descended willingly to abet error’s elimination. Others than avatars *the saviors from salvation*, may have uttered higher truth or seen only one inexpressible in Christs or Buddhas, but theirs has not been the compelling sympathy of the Savior-Teachers. The world still seems to need its kings of humanity, its princes of love.

Perhaps the comparison between Gautama and Jesus is unfair for, whereas we have authentic stone-tablet records of the life and sayings of Buddha, the Jesus we know apparently was foisted on the Occident by the Roman Empire out of a political necessity arising from the threatening growth in Rome at that time of Mithraism, which became so popular a religion (sculptural evidences of it still remain in England) that it had to be suppressed by physical force and perhaps by *imitation* of its baptism, eucharist, twelve disciples, cave birth, and so forth, all current in the religion of Mithra (and many others) and possibly available in a newer (by 600 years) less dangerous *priestcraft calling itself Christianity, one of a number* of small priest-cults, persecuted and (being weaker-willed and more compromising than other *minority* Christian groups) no doubt willing to be subsidized (like the majority-socialists!) even if some facts and ethical standards had to be distorted and denied, and to become a Church,—which itself became thoroughly corrupt, “excommunicating”, and “church-like” by the time of the Nicaean Council, 325 A. D.

Even if there had been little or no bases of fact in the Christian cult *as a whole*, the current common avatar (Christ) life was widely known and easily available (even in the form of an antique Babylonian Mystery-play in the crucifixion scene of which one

player, usually taken from a gaol, had to die in actuality) ; there was an abundance of pre-christian gospels and sayings practically identical with "Jesus" to draw upon ; and the numerous sects of Gnostics, Therapeutie, Essenes, all of whose teachings were of the same mould, easily could have supplied a "demand" for gospels, as Edward Carpenter explains in his *Pagan and Christian Creeds*.

At any rate, if there was a real man, Jesus, His teachings certainly must have been far more full and complete than the story we have to draw upon. It is quite probable that "Christos" was originally a derivation of "Krishna" and that "Jesus" never lived, but that a certain Apollonius whose life paralleled the gospels account of Jesus, and who went to Egypt and India for instruction, was the physical basis for the Roman Christ-myth. For Europeans in those days, a "religion" was as necessary as an "Art" is to us ; both can be sops to man's spirit and convenient preservers of bourgeois and class-ruled governments.

All this, however, does not invalidate the variance between two great Orientals, a philosophical teacher who reformed Society, and a religious mystic yet unnamed who condemned it and who probably had to amend his words to suit an Occidental (pagan) civilization decaying with undue rapidity.

Indeed, all Buddhas and Christs only appear in decadent ages, and are at best only symbols of the One-prophets of a Golden Age (just as that age is itself a symbol of *That* beyond ages) in which there shall be no need of Buddhas, when every man will be his own Christ. This, granted that Buddhas or Christs, the apparent writer or the reader, ever exist at all.

"MOSES" AND OTHER TITLES.

BY A. H. GODBEY.

MORE than a thousand years of Hebrew life in Palestine have left to us but a few fragments of its literary product. We hope the spade in modern Palestine will yet recover much. What remains to us, in the Old Testament, refers to various ancient sources of information. It would be presumptuous to assume that all sources are named in the fragments remaining to us. We are compelled by their own testimony to admit the composite character of some of this surviving literature. We find mention of the following lost sources of information:

- "Book of the Wars of Yahveh"—("the Lord"), Num. xxi. 14.
- "Book of Jasher", Josh. x. 13; 2 Sam. i. 18.
- "Book of Constitution for the Kingdom", 1 Sam. x. 25.
- "Book of the Acts of Solomon", 1 Kin. xi. 41.
- "Book of Visions of Iddo the Seer", 2 Chr. ix. 29.
- "Midrash on Iddo", 2 Chr. xiii. 22.
- "Book of Iddo the Seer on Genealogies", 2 Chr. xii. 15.
- "Book of Shemaiah the Prophet", 2 Chr. xii. 15.
- "Book of Nathan the Prophet", 2 Chr. ix. 29; 1 Chr. xxix. 29.
- "Book of Ahijah the Shilonite", 2 Chr. ix. 29.
- "Book of Gad the Seer", 1 Chron. xxix. 29.
- "Book of Samuel the Seer", 1 Chron. xxix. 29.
- "Book of John, Son of Hanani", 2 Chr. xx. 34.
- "Burned Book of Jeremiah", Jer. xxxvi. 4-23.
- "Memoir on Amalekite War", Ex. xvii. 14.
- "Book of Isaiah upon Uzziah", 2 Chr. xxvi. 22.
- "Book of Chronicles of Kings of Judah", 1 Kin. xiv. 21; xv. 7,
etc.
- "Book of Chronicles of Kings of Israel", 1 Kin. xiv. 19, etc.
- "Book of Chronicles of King David", 1 Chr. xxvii. 24.

"Book of Kings of Israel and Judah", 2 Chr. xxxv. 27; xxxvi. 8.

"Midrash on the Book of Kings", 2 Chr. xxiv. 27.

"Copy of this law in a Book", Deut. xvii. 18; 2 Kin. xxii. 8.

What is the value of these lost sources? With regard to extant fragments, we are familiar with rational arguments designed to prove the inspiration and ethical value of the scriptures as a whole. The same critical process must be equally reliable for any given fragment. If we decide that Tobit is not worthy to be ranked with Deuteronomy, we may with equal certainty conclude that all portions of Deuteronomy are not equally valuable; and so far any other portion of the Old Testament. If a rational examination of a small section is impermissible, a rational argument for the inspiration of the whole is worthless. We thus assert that all claims of inspiration and special revelation must appear before the bar of rational inquiry and investigation, and accept the decision of that tribunal. Failing this, Romish tradition, Moslem and Buddhist legends and claims, and pagan rituals and mummeries, being equally dogmatic, would be entitled to equal credence. Like the myriad gods assembled in the Roman Pantheon, mutually multiplying each other with the stony stare of unrecognition across the empty spaces, all claims of inspiration would prove mutually destructive. Survival of the fittest must surely be determined by the ability to give a reason for the hope that is within.

Now we have asserted our rational competency to pass upon the relative inspiration and credibility and didactic value of the extant fragments of Hebrew literature, by assigning certain portions of it to the Apocrypha. But what rational conclusion is possible as to the value of the above-mentioned lost literature? Can we, ere its recovery by the spade of the explorer, confidently and dogmatically assert the finality and superiority of all that is extant, when it so often cites, or appeals to the authority of that which is lost? That the thoughts of men as a whole "widen with the process of the suns" does not adequately answer the query.

And what of other prophets mentioned here and there in the Old Testament, of whom no known writings remain to us? Was there ever any written collection of their sayings? No one knows. Temple schools were everywhere in Babylonia; how much writing was done in "schools of the prophets" in Israel? No one knows. Did Elijah and Elisha write anything? What is the curious "writing of Elijah the prophet" to Jehoram, long after Elijah was

dead? (2 Chr. xxi. 15.) Shall we acknowledge a case of "spirit-writing?" or conclude there was a second Elijah? or has the Chronicler credited to Elijah a denunciation that really came from a later prophet? or recorded Elijah's letter of rebuke, specifying the wrong King?

And what is the precise significance of the titles cited above? In answering this question, no problem of Higher or Lower Criticism is involved. It is wholly a matter of dictionary; or correctly understanding ancient oriental idioms and colloquial expressions. Without this preliminary knowledge, any discussion is sure to err—one may be fundamentally wrong from the beginning. To know in advance what ancient people meant by some terms they used daily may prove disastrous to hobbies, orthodox or heterodox, but the truth is more important to us than any hobby.

But in presenting this preliminary truth, there are some disadvantages. The best informed reader of English has not at hand the necessary data for first hand knowledge and decision upon this point. If in addition to the Old Testament every one had at hand the other "Sacred Books of the East", as in English translation, and quantities of the ancient literature of Israel's neighbors, (the amount available now is many times the Old Testament in volume) he would soon observe some vital facts. But the average reader is compelled to be content with the information given him by the expert linguist, archæologist, and orientalist, just as he has to be content with Peary's Poles. The archæologist or comparative religionist himself knows this, and is sometimes sensitive at having to state dogmatically facts highly displeasing to some fervid theorist.

What do such terms as "Book of Iddo the Seer", "Book of Samuel", "Code of Hammurabi", "Books of Moses", mean? The average modern western mind, of moderate information, at once thinks of personal authorship. *But the idea of personal authorship or of "literary property" is not in the ancient world*, and such construction of ancient idioms by the modern Western mind is wholly astray at the outset. We have vast and varied bodies of ancient literature in our possession to-day; ballads of various nations; the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle; The King Arthur Legends; Mahabharata; Babylonian Chronicle; songs, prayers, "divinely authoritative" rituals, royal records, legends, myths, medical books, contracts, epics, royal inscriptions, legal codes and decisions, etc. We find variant versions of the same legend, song, or ritual; we

have combinations of two or more in a later version. *We do not know the author or compiler of any ancient song, code, ritual, royal record, or legend; nor of any revision or combination; nor will we ever know.* We are in the realm of the nameless. Only in the case of personal letters, legal decisions, or business contracts of the ancient Orient do we know names of authors. There is no notion of personal title to any other sort of literary production. This is true of old English ballads, the Teuton's *Nebelungenlied*, the Eddas of the Norseman; of Assyria or Babylonia; of Egypt or China; Palestine or India. We will never know the authors of the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, nor of its component sections; of the Rig Veda songs, nor of the Atharva magical rites; of the Creation and Flood legends of Babylonia; of Ishtar's descent; of Orphic hymns. All ancient sacred literature is "inspired", or "found" somewhere; a wandering mediæval French minstrel was merely a "troubadour" or "finder", not claiming like the Greek bard to be a *poiêtês* (poet) or "maker". Such still is the Arab minstrel. The very latest version of this "inspired" or "found" literature claims the authority of "the fathers" or of antiquity, just as some modern pious dogmatists do. Personal authorship is never claimed.

Then what do popular titles mean? An Assyrian royal inscription may begin "I am Esashaddon, the great King, the mighty King", etc. But the average Assyrian king does not appear to have been able to read or write. In England, William the Conqueror and William Rufus, illiterate, were succeeded by Henry Beauclerc, or "Fine Scholar"—he could write his name. What happened in Assyria was that royal scribes prepared such account, as unknown monks in England wrote the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and like Hebrew scribes wrote like Chronicles. If satisfactory, the King accepted it as his own. There lies before me a letter from an Assyrian architect saying they are ready to put in place the record of royal achievements and if the copy sent to the King is satisfactory, the architect hopes the King will return it at once. We do not know who wrote that chronicle any more than we know the writer of Anglo-Saxon or Hebrew chronicle, but because of its subject matter we may conveniently speak of it as "an Esarhaddon inscription".

So we speak of the "code of Hammurabi", or "Laws of Hammurabi" as the Brahmin speaks of "Laws of Manu", and the uninformed at once think of personal authorship. Hammurabi did

not write it, nor personally revise it, probably not even one paragraph of it. There was an older Sumerian code, fragments of it are extant, and comparison is easy. When this West Semitic adventurer seized the reins of political authority, he found this ancient code, backed by the cult of the sun god at Sippara, Larsa and Harran, so strongly intrenched in life and custom that his kingship depended upon his announcing his humble acceptance of the sun cult and code and its jurists. The Semitic scribes and jurists prepared him a Semitic translation and revision of it which we now have. But neither they nor their successors called it "Laws of Hammurabi"—that title is our invention. They called it *Inuma ilum sirum*. Both this title, and fragments of the code were known to us before De Morgan discovered the nearly complete code at Susa twenty years ago. It had been growing for ages.

But what does *Inuma ilum sirum* mean? It shows us one way of referring to a document in the ancient world. The words are "When the exalted god" and are the opening words of the Prologue. We follow the same method still ourselves, in referring to a popular hymn. So does the ancient Oriental. In a Babylonian ritual we may read: "Here sing, Bel, Bel, in the morning"; or, "Sing, O Sheep of Life, O Pure Sheep," etc. The church of Rome habitually cites all Papal bulls the same way, e. g. "Unam Sanctam," etc.

The ancient Hebrew scholar did the same. His entire ritual compilation he called *Torah*, "instruction." The first section is *Bereshith*, "In the beginning." The second, our "Exodus" is *Shemoth*, "names" (These are the names). Next is *Wayyikra*, "and he called", (And the Lord called unto Moses.) Numbers is *Bammidbar*, "in the wilderness", (And the Lord spoke unto Moses in the wilderness). Deuteronomy is *Debarim*, "words" (These are the words.) For century after century the Hebrew scribe thus cited them the titles not suggesting any personal authorship.

The second and popular method of reference is to refer to any composition by naming its subject matter, or some unique feature of its contents. A royal inscription is about a King—not by him. *Seven Voyages of Sindbad the Sailor* are not written by him. The *Books of Samuel* recognize him as the key personage of the epoch, but are not written by him. An old woman, greatly pleased with a sermon I preached long ago, always referred to it as "That 'ere frog sermon", from a tree-frog illustration I used.

In the same way I find the Moslem named Suras or chapters of the Kuran. One is "The Cow", another "The Table", and so on. If I said to a Moslem scholar "It is said by the Cow" he would understand. If he discovered that I thought a cow wrote it, he would think me crazy. I pick up the Brahmin *Satapatha Brahmana*, and find a certain section referred to as "The Barren Cow", and soon I turn to the "Authorless" Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, and find like nomenclature. I turn to Moslem or Romish compilations of saint lore, and find it is not written by said saints, but about them; I turn to Babylonian ritual that was dominant in Palestine long before the Hebrew, and find "The Lifted Hand Series", "The Eastern Demon Series", "The Water Sprinkling Ritual", "The Effusion Rite", etc. And so I come to understand that Samuel, Judges, Ruth or Kings, or Iddo the Seer, may contain much about such persons, but nothing in the colloquial fashions of the time would warrant the occasional modern western assertion of personal authorship.

But it will be recognized that only the scholar of the ancient world could use the first method of reference, naming the openings words of any composition. The second method is necessarily the popular one. So Jewish scholars who translated their literature into Greek conceded something to popular necessity, and in their compendium of fragments of ancient law used Greek titles suggestive of some feature of each section: Genesis, "Beginning"; Exodus, "Going Out"; Leviticus, "Levite Ritual"; Arithmoi, "Numberings"; Deuteronomy, "Second Law" (Mistranslation of "copy of this Law" in Deut. xvii. 18). But in the Hebrew text the scholar's mode of entitling was retained; and in neither is there suggestion of personal authorship.

As above stated, Jewish scholars called the whole group Torah; the masses find it easier to recall the most prominent figure in the compilation and say "Moses." Their speaking thus was originally parallel to our referring to "the Britannica," or "the Comericana"; an easily understood reference to their compendium of ritual and moral prescriptions. Even so late as Christ's time the Greek idea of being a "maker" (poet) has but partially prevailed, and the compromise with the notion of the divine authority of the past results in much pseudœpigraphic literature, presenting current Pharisee opinions under the names of Enoch, Esdras, Solomon, the Sibyl, Baruch, etc. All of this had to be duly "discovered" somewhere, as it was composed and published.

There is no clue anywhere to the actual personal authorship. In the same way some devout Brahmins, after the Sepoy rebellion failed, undertook to bring out a new edition of Manu, embodying modern English ideas. It was still Manu. No Brahmin could have gained acceptance for it by putting his own name to it; the past is the only admissible authority; as with Rabbinism in Christ's time, claiming only expository authority, however novel their fantasies.

Popular crediting a law or quotation to "Moses" then in earlier days did not imply personal authorship. Such is not the mode of thought of the time. That is a later notion from western influence, and misunderstanding of ancient colloquial usage. One unaware of ancient literary habits may rush into print to demonstrate the inspiration and inerrancy of his own ignorance.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.

(Concluded).

BY HARRY ELMER BARNES.

In the period of fetichism, or what would now be called animism⁶⁹ the family or private society was instituted and with it that fixity of residence which made the later development of the state possible.⁷⁰ In the first polytheistic period, that of theocratic or conservative polytheism (i. e., the period of the great oriental empires), the great political contribution was the founding of the city (i. e., the state) and the development of the institution of landed property. Its great defect was the attempt to found a church before the civic life had been perfected.⁷¹ Another unifying and disciplinary feature of this period was the wide development of the caste-system.⁷² In the next period, that of intellectual polytheism (i. e., the Greek age) there were no important political contributions except in a negative sense. The service of the Greeks was intellectual and was rendered by freeing humanity from theocratic influences. National solidarity was impaired by the attacks of the Greeks upon property and upon caste without providing other unifying influences, and their political life was mainly the rule of demagogues. If the Greeks made any political contribution at all it was in repelling the Persian advance.⁷³ In the Roman period, or the age of social monotheism,

⁶⁹ L. T. Hobhouse, "Comte's Three Stages," in *Sociological Review*, 1908, p. 264. For Wundt's arguments supporting fetichism as the most primitive cult see his *Volkerpsychologie, Mythos und Religion*, Vol. II.

⁷⁰ *Polity*, Vol. III, pp. 91-2, 118-23.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, Vol. III, pp. 156-161, 171-8, 201-2.

⁷² *Ibid*, pp. 171-2.

⁷³ *Ibid*., Vol. III, pp. 216-31.

there were several phases of political progress. The most important was the development of the conception of "Fatherland," which Comte defines as "the permanent seat of all those moral and intellectual impressions, by whose unbroken influence the individual destiny is moulded."⁷⁴ "Nothing is so well adapted to consolidate social ties as their habitual consolidation around a material seat, which is equally appropriate to relations of Continuity as to those of Solidarity."⁷⁵ The world is, thus, indebted to Rome for the first definite step taken towards sociocracy.⁷⁶ Again, Roman law tended towards sociocracy, since, to a considerable degree, it substituted social sanctions for supernatural sanctions in the administration of its law.⁷⁷ Finally, when Roman warfare was transformed from conquest into defense, it resulted naturally in the transformation of slavery into serfdom and of the Empire into small-state systems, thus opening the way for the development of feudalism, the germs of which are to be found in the cession of Roman territory to barbarian chieftains.⁷⁸

The next period was that of the defensive monotheism or the Catholic-feudal transition—the period of the establishment of the Church, as contrasted to foundation of family and state in earlier periods. "The distinguishing feature of medieval civilization was the two-fold nature of the aims in view and the combination of two heterogeneous elements for its attainment."⁷⁹ The general purpose of the period was to systematize life, and this, the work of the Church, failed for the most part. The special purpose of the age was the emancipation of women and laborers, the work mainly of feudalism, and this was, to a large degree, successful.⁸⁰ Since the religion of this period was universal and political power local, there resulted the indispensable separation of church and state. At the same time warfare was finally transformed from aggressive to defensive.⁸¹ Mariolatry, with its idealization of woman, was an advance towards sociolatry or the worship of humanity.⁸² Great steps in advance were taken with the separation

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 305-6.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 307.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 306.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 311.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 336, 350-1.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 353.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 353.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 387-8.

⁸² Ibid., p. 409.

of employers from employed, the rise of the gild corporations, and the emancipation of the serfs.⁸³

But, in spite of these important contributions, it was not for this period of defensive monotheism to inaugurate the Positivist régime. Another period, that of the "Western Revolution" had to intervene. This corresponds to the metaphysical period of mental development. The eight main forces operating to bring about this revolution were: the influence of women; scientific advances; modern industrial improvements; art; the development of the state; the decay of the Church; the work of the legists; and, finally, the negative contributions of the metaphysicians.⁸⁴ In this period industry became consolidated, as employers and employed united in their mutual interest against the other classes. Government, in turn, began to patronize industry because it recognized that its development was essential to the furnishing of the wealth needed for maintaining military activities. This reacted upon the rulers by making them responsible administrators of the public wealth. This double process marked the real entry of industry into western politics as the chief end of the modern polity. Civilization, hitherto military, now became progressively industrial in character.⁸⁵ The whole period, and particularly that of the French Revolution, was one of disintegration and of preparation for Positivism.⁸⁶

In the preliminary work of the next or Positive period, important beginnings had already been made before Comte. Condorcet had laid the philosophic foundation for sociology. De-Maistre renewed the veneration for the best elements in the Middle Ages. Scientific advances had been made by Lamarck, Bichat, Broussais, Cabanis, and Gall. Comte discovered the two fundamental laws of sociology, and his system, which was too intellectualistic in the *Philosophy*, was well-rounded on its emotional side by his friendship with Clotilde de Vaux, and appeared in a more complete form in the *Polity*. On the intellectual side, then, everything was ready for the institution of the Positivist system and, strangely enough, at just this same time the *coup d'état* of 1851 had revived the institution of the Dictatorship, which was the great preliminary step in the political field preparatory to the inauguration of Positivism, and Comte himself stood ready to as-

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 412-13.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 434-446.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 487-9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 423-4.

sume the office of supreme pontiff of the new religion.⁸⁷ Psychology and history had, thus, conspired, through man's fundamental mental make-up and the struggles of ages, to render the Positivist system as inevitable as it was desirable. In this last stage of social evolution "Family, State, and Church are finally to be distinguished and harmonized, or fixed in their proper organic relations to each other, so as to preclude forever their warfare or intrusion upon each other's provinces."⁸⁸

4. *Forms of the State and the Government.*

As to the forms of the state and government, while Comte was familiar with the conventional Aristotelian classification, it was regarded by him as of minor importance and superficial significance. To him there were only two fundamental types of society, state, and government—theocracy and sociocracy.⁸⁹ The former was the government of theologically oriented priests, in which the temporal power was subordinated to the spiritual. The latter was the condition to be reached in the Positivist state, where spiritual and temporal power were to be separated and properly coördinated, and in which social organization was to be based on the principles of Comte's sociology. It has been the problem of the greater part of human history to effect the transformation from the former to the latter.⁹⁰

5. *Sovereignty.*

In a system of social control like that proposed by Comte, in which authority was to be divided into moral, material and intellectual, each to be enforced by separate organs, and in which the latter, while the most important, was to be administered through persuasion and suggestion, it is easy to see that there was no place for any such concept as that of political sovereignty in its conventional modern sense.⁹¹ Probably the directors of material activities, that is, the leaders of the employer class, came the nearest to having sovereign power of any of Comte's proposed governing agencies; at least they were to possess the functions of ordinary civil government. As far as he discusses the problem of sovereignty he seems to mean by it participation in government.⁹²

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 526-30.

⁸⁸ Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 35. For Flint's rather unsympathetic treatment of Comte's philosophy of history see his *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, 1894, pp. 575-615

⁸⁹ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 344.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, *passim*.

⁹¹ Cf. Chiappini, *op. cit.*, pp. 97ff.

⁹² *Polity*, Vol. I, pp. 106-110.

The nearest he gets to a positive theory of sovereignty is his approbation of Hobbes' doctrine that government has an important basis in force.⁹³ He says, in speaking of popular sovereignty, that the Positive theory on this point separates the elements of truth from those of error in the metaphysical doctrine. He here accepts two different conceptions of popular sovereignty: one a political connotation, applicable in special cases, and the other a moral interpretation suitable in all cases. By the political application he means that the voice of the people should be appealed to in cases which concern the practical interests of the whole community and are intelligible to the masses, such as declarations of war and the decisions of the law-courts. On the other hand, it would be manifestly absurd to have the whole people decide on questions of particular interest requiring special and trained judgment. The moral aspect of popular sovereignty consists in the proposition that the efforts of the whole of society should be centered on the common good, that is, "the preponderance of social feeling over all personal interests."⁹⁴

6. *The Positivist Scheme of Social Reconstruction.*

It is difficult to grasp the full meaning and significance of Comte's theory and plan of social organization without a preliminary statement of the historical background of Comte's doctrines. He was witnessing the disintegration of the old social order, as a result of the French and Industrial Revolutions, and was keenly conscious of the evils of the new, though still transitional, society. Quite in contrast to Say, Bastiat and the French optimists, Comte joined with Sismondi in condemning the new capitalistic order. His indictment of the new *bourgeois* age is well stated by Levy-Bruhl:

Comte saw the bourgeoisie at work during Louis Philippe's reign, and he passes severe judgment upon it. Its political conceptions, he says, refer not to the aim and exercise of power, but especially to its possessions. It regards the revolution as terminated by the establishment of the parliamentary *régime*, whereas this is only an "equivocal halting-place." A complete social reorganization is not less feared by this middle class than by the old upper classes. Although filled with the critical spirit of the eighteenth century, even under a Republican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy, by means of which the respectful submission of the masses is insured, while no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders. This is hard upon the proletariat,

⁹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 247-9.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 106-110.

whose condition is far from improving. It "establishes dungeons for those who ask for bread." It believes that these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely "encamped" in modern society without being properly settled in it with definite and respected rights. The capital which it holds in its hands, after having been an instrument of emancipation, has become one of oppression. It is thus that, by a paradox difficult to uphold, the invention of machinery, which *à priori*, one would be led to believe, would soften the condition of the proletariat, has, on the contrary, been a new cause of suffering to them, and has made their lot a doubly hard one. Here, in brief, we have a formidable indictment against the middle classes, and in particular against the political economy which has nourished them.⁹⁵

Yet, the problem is not one of capitalism, as such, or its abolition. It is not the industrial or financial technique of the new industrial order which is at fault, but the failure to develop a new industrial and social morality which could exert a proper control and discipline over the modern industrial system:

That there should be powerful industrial masters is only an evil if they use their power to oppress the men who depend upon them. It is a good thing, on the contrary, if these masters know and fulfill their duties. It is of little consequence to popular interests in whose hands capital is accumulated, so long as the use of it is made beneficial to the social masses.

But modern society has not yet got its system of morality. Industrial relations which have become immensely developed in it are abandoned to a dangerous empiricism, instead of being systematized according to *moral* laws. War, more or less openly declared, alone regulates the relations between capital and labour.⁹⁶

What is needed, then, is a new industrial and social morality, to be inculcated through the Positive educational system. This will be far more effective than state socialistic schemes and paternalistic legislation. Comte's scheme of social reconstruction was, thus, one which rested more on a moral than a political basis. The socialization of the modern order "depends far more upon moral than upon political measures. The latter can undoubtedly prevent the accumulation of riches in a small number of hands, at the risk of paralyzing industrial activity. But these tyrannical proceedings would be far less efficacious than the universal reproof inflicted by positive ethics upon a selfish use of the riches possessed."⁹⁷ "Everything then depends upon the common moral education, which itself depends upon the establishment of a

⁹⁵ Levy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, pp. 320-21.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 328-9.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

spiritual power. The superiority of the positive doctrine lies in the fact that it has restored this power."⁹⁸ "Once common education was established, under the direction of the spiritual power, the tyranny of the capitalist class would be no more to be feared. Rich men would consider themselves as the moral guardians of public capital. It is not here a question of charity. Those who possess will have the 'duty' of securing, first, education and then work for all."⁹⁹ In turning now to a more detailed consideration of Comte's scheme for a new social dispensation, it must be borne in mind that his chief aim was to develop a new social morality, believing that this would be the only force adequate to solve the problems of modern industrialism.

Comte's theory of social reconstruction, like his doctrines of social organization and his philosophy of history, rests ultimately upon the three-fold divisions of the human personality into feeling, action and intelligence. In the first place, one must turn to his analysis of the social forces. They are: (1) material force, based on action and expressed in numbers and wealth; (2) intellectual force, founded on speculation and expressed in conception and expression; and (3) moral force, based on affection and expressed in command prompted by character and obedience prompted by the heart.¹⁰⁰ It is the supreme task of social organization, as well as its chief difficulty, to combine these forces in the right proportion without the undue predominance of any one.¹⁰¹

In the state one finds that the fundamental social classes are founded on this same general principle. "In the smallest cities capable of separate existence, we find these classes: the Priests who guide our speculation; the Women who inspire our highest affections; and the practical Leaders who direct our activity, be in war or in industry."¹⁰² The agency needed to connect and harmonize these three fundamental orders is to be found in the mass of the people or the Proletariat, "for they are united to the affectionate sex by domestic ties; to the Priesthood through the medium of the education and advice which it gives them; and to the practical Leaders through common action and the protection afforded them."¹⁰³

Every social class, except the women, should be divided on an

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 331.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁰⁰ *Polity*, Vol. II, pp. 225-8.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 224, 228.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 291.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 292.

hierarchical basis according to the principle of importance and specialization of function. "Our ultimate state will exhibit a classification of society more distinct than any we know in all sides of human life. From the High Priest of Humanity down to the humblest laborer, society will show the same principle at work distributing ranks: generality of view decreasing as independence of life increases."¹⁰⁴

The directive power, or what might perhaps be called the function of government, in Comte's state was essentially to be centered in the priests of the Positive religion and in the leaders of industry. His scheme of social, economic and political reorganization was derived in its major outlines from Saint-Simon. The temporal and military power of the past was to give way to the principle of *capacité industrielle*, as applied to the material government; and *capacité positive* as applied to the intellectual direction and moral surveillance.¹⁰⁵

The most important class in the Positivist state was to be the priesthood, or those distinguished by positive capacity.¹⁰⁶ At the outset it should be understood that Comte's priests were not theologians, but sociologists. They were to be the scientific directors of society, selected for their special talent and their immediate and extensive acquaintance with those sociological principles upon which enlightened social policy depends. They were to interpret to man the religious, or rather sociological, doctrines of Positivism, of which the principle was love; the basis, order; and the end, progress.¹⁰⁷ Aside from special training, the priesthood must be eminent for the qualities of courage, perseverance, and prudence.¹⁰⁸ Of the organization of the Positive priesthood, which Comte describes in the most minute detail, only the most general outline can be given here. It suffices to say that there were to be some twenty thousand priests for western Europe, presided over by a High Priest of Humanity with his headquarters at Paris. He was to be assisted by seven national chief priests, and this number was to be increased to forty-nine at the final re-

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 266. There are here certain anticipations of the modern socio-political theory of the functional reorganization of the state. Cf. F. Pécant, "Auguste Comte et Durkheim," in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Oct.-Dec., 1921, pp. 64ff.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Chiappini, op. cit., p. 18. "En dernière analyse, les princes de la science, ou sociologistes, et les princes de la finance, ou banquiers, seront les chefs de gouvernement. Defourny, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Chiappini, op. cit., pp. 134ff.

¹⁰⁷ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 286.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 343.

generation of the world and its conversion to Positivism. The remainder of the priesthood were to be local priests and vicars attached to the local temples, which were to be distributed in the proportion of one to every ten thousand families. The priests were to be paid a fixed salary, so low as to preclude pecuniary reasons for desiring service in the profession.¹⁰⁹

It is rather difficult to say just what Comte considered the fundamental function of the priesthood, as he enumerates in various places several "supreme duties" of this class. It seems, however, that he regarded their duties in general to comprise the following. They were above all to be the systematic directors of education.¹¹⁰ They were to judge of the worth of each member of society and try, as far as possible, by means of suggestion and personal opinion, to have him placed in society according to his merits and capacities. This, Comte admits, is a rather difficult achievement, as one can hardly judge of the capacity of an individual until his career is over, but the priesthood should do its best to arrive at a correct preliminary estimate.¹¹¹ Again, the priests should foster the feeling of continuity between different generations and of solidarity between the different social classes by teaching men their relation to nature, the past, and to other men.¹¹² Then, the priests should be the general moral censors of the community, using the force of their opinions in keeping men aware of their social duties and obligations, and warning them, in case of deviation.¹¹³ Finally, they should be the general fountain-spring of useful social and scientific knowledge and advice.¹¹⁴ In short, the priests should constitute the ideal aristocracy of intellect, being not unlike the philosopher kings for whom Plato had longed.

The priests should not, however, assume to possess an iota of temporal power. It was the mixture of spiritual and temporal power which was the great defect of antiquity, and it was the great contribution of Christianity that it had separated the two. The powers of the priesthood were, rather, to be employed in the following extra-legal manner. In the first place, they were to exercise their influence through the medium of their teaching and preaching. Then they were to give a proper direction to public opinion. Again, they might give their formal condemnation to any

¹⁰⁹Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 222-225.

¹¹⁰Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 337-9, IV, p. 64.

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 266-70.

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 262, 289-90.

¹¹³Ibid., pp. 338ff.

¹¹⁴Ibid., ppp 309-10.

act. Finally, they were to have a most important consulting function in all affairs of civic life. They might suggest action by the "secular arm of the law," but must never undertake such action on their own responsibility and initiative.¹¹⁵ It seems that Comte, like Jefferson before him, relied upon the principle that the people would sufficiently admire and respect superior intellectual and moral ability to insure their willing submission to the guidance of the priesthood—a noble theory, but something which history has thus far shown to be hopeless in practice.

The material or industrial power, as well as the actual functions of civil government, were to be divided among the classes of employers, subdivided into bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists, each arranged on an hierarchical principle and all possessing "capacité industrielle."¹¹⁶ As the most influential and least numerous of the employer class, the bankers were to possess the most authority.¹¹⁷ The general principle of concentration of power among the employers is that there should be a single manager for the whole field of industry which one man could personally direct.¹¹⁸ While the employers have the legal right to fix their incomes at any figure they may deem desirable, still they will be checked in excessive consumption by their greater need for, and desire of, public esteem, and it is a function of the Positivist priests to make the wealthy realize their social responsibility.¹¹⁹ In this manner Comte hoped to assure both industrial efficiency and social justice. In their relations to their employees the leaders of industry should always keep in mind the two following principles: "that everyone at all times should be the entire owner of everything of which he has the constant and exclusive use;" and "that every industrious citizen shall be secured in the means of fully developing his domestic life."¹²⁰ As to the transmission of wealth and industrial function, each individual has the right to nominate his successor seven years before the date of his expected retirement and to submit this nomination to the judgment of public opinion. Free testamentary disposition of wealth was to be allowed in all cases.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 262, 339-42.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 336-9; Vol. IV, p. 71.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 71, 301. On this basis American society has at present made progress towards the Positivist era. See the speech of Senator R. M. LaFollette in *The Congressional Record*, March 14, 1921.

¹¹⁸ *Polity*, Vol. II, p. 338.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 328-30, 335-6.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 334-5.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 330-1, Vol. IV, p. 291.

In regard to moral authority in the Positive state, Comte held that domestic morality should be guided by the women and public morality safeguarded by the priesthood.¹²² The moral influence of woman was to be insured by the Positivist rule of indissoluble monogamous marriage and perpetual widowhood.¹²³

With respect to foreign relations in the Positivist society, Comte held that they would be largely eliminated upon the adoption of the Positivist religion, with its universal priesthood and its tendency to dissolve the greater nations into non-tyrannical city states.¹²⁴

In the matter of individual liberty and the principles of state interference Comte erected no constitutional barriers to tyranny. The individual had to rely upon the heeding of the moral exhortations of the priesthood by the governing class. Again, the individual had no private sphere of rights which was free in any sense from invasion by some organ of the directing power of society.¹²⁵ Duties, rather than rights, were the central feature of Comte's political philosophy. In fact, the individual, as such, was practically ignored and all attention was centered upon the social organism. Even universal suffrage and parliamentary government were condemned.¹²⁶ Comte, thus, solved the problem of the reconciliation of sovereignty and liberty by failing to provide for assurance of either.

In this way Comte proposed for a theory of the state a rather curious combination of religious and intellectual idealism with benevolent, though partly non-political, paternalism. This, more than anything else, separates the doctrines of Comte from those of his successor in the field of sociology—Herbert Spencer.

7. *Public Opinion and Social Control.*

Comte laid considerable stress upon the value of public opinion as an effective agent of social control. He held that it was practically the sole guaranty of public morality, and maintained that without an intelligently organized public opinion there could be little hope of any extended reform and reconstruction of social institutions.¹²⁷ The requisite conditions, he says, for the proper

¹²² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 255-6, 338ff.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 187-196.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 251, 304.

¹²⁵ Chiappini, *op. cit.*, pp. 64f, 186. "Cette substitution des devoirs aux droits est vraiment l'idée centrale du système politique d'Auguste Comte." p. 46.

¹²⁶ Cf. Chiappini, pp. 107ff.

¹²⁷ *Polity*, Vol. I, p. 111

organization of public opinion are: "first, the establishment of fixed principles of social action; secondly, their adoption by the public and its consent to their application in special cases; and, lastly, a recognized organ to lay down the principles and to apply them to the conduct of daily life."¹²⁸ The workingmen's clubs, which were then flourishing in the first flush of enthusiastic beginnings (i. e. during Revolution of 1848), Comte looked upon as likely to be one of the great instrumentalities in getting rules of social conduct adopted by the public.¹²⁹ But, to be effective, public opinion must have an able and recognized organ of expression, for its spontaneous and direct enunciation by the people is rarely possible or effective. Once more Positivism could come to the rescue, with all the needed apparatus for an effective public opinion. Its doctrines supplied the proper rules of social conduct. The proletariat furnished the necessary dynamic power. The priest-philosopher-sociologists of the Comtian régime offered an unrivalled organ for the proper expression of public opinion. All three requisite conditions for healthy public opinion were then in existence, but not yet in a proper relation to each other. The progressive step which was needed was a "firm alliance between philosophers and proletaries."¹³⁰ Finally, according to Comte, the influence of public opinion will probably become increasingly greater in the future. "All views of the future condition of society, the views of practical men as well as of philosophic thinkers, agree in the belief that the principal feature of the State to which we are tending will be the increased influence which Public Opinion is destined to exercise."¹³¹ When it has become the great regulator of society it will eliminate revolutions and violent disputes by "substituting peaceable definition of duties."¹³²

It is perfectly obvious that in a state, like that designed by Comte, with its hierarchical arrangement of governmental agents and its hereditary transmission of them, there could be no such institution as the modern political party. The nearest thing that could be possible would be a group of agitators attempting to direct public opinion in some definite manner.

8. *The Nature of Social and Political Progress.*

In regard to the nature of social evolution and the laws gov-

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 114-15.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 117-20.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 110.

¹³² Ibid., p. 120.

erning its progress, Comte was about midway between the positions of Spencer and Ward, though the latter regarded him as the founder of the principle of "social telesis." He held, on the one hand, that the general tendencies of social evolution and the fundamental lines of its progress were subject to invariable laws and confined to certain fixed stages which could not be seriously altered by human interference. At the same time, he maintained that social development might be slightly modified and considerably hastened by the intelligent co-operation of mankind, based upon an understanding of the great laws of social evolution, that is, Comte's philosophy of history. All schemes of social reform, to be successful, must be in harmony with the general march of civilization and not too far ahead of the conditions of the time. It is the function of social science to gather together all of the relevant facts concerning the course of social evolution in the past, so that the political and social policy of the present may accord with what seems to be the universal laws of development. While society need not blindly obey the laws of social evolution, but may hasten progress by intelligent action, still nothing could be more foolish than to imagine that social systems can be reconstructed in a day by the drawing up of a new constitution. Comte defended his own proposal by contending that they were not his own arbitrary propositions of reform, but merely a statement of the teachings of history and social science as to the evolution and future state of society.¹⁸⁸ Some of the more significant of Comte's remarks on the above problem are the following:

It appears, therefore, from the preceding remarks that the elementary march of civilization is unquestionably subject to a natural and invariable law which overrules all special human divergencies. . . .

Political science should exclusively employ itself in coördinating all the special facts relative to the progress of civilization and in reducing these to the smallest possible number of general facts, the connection of which ought to manifest the natural law of this progress, leaving for a subsequent appreciation the various causes which can modify its rapidity. . . .

But society does not and cannot progress in this way (i. e. by making constitutions for social reform as in the French Revolution.) The pretention of constructing off-hand in a few months or even years, a social system, in its complete and definite shape

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 234-5, IV, pp. 536, 558-61; General Appendix, third part, "Plan of the Scientific Operations necessary for Reorganization Society." 1822.

is an extravagant chimera absolutely incompatible with the weakness of the human intellect.

A sound political system can never aim at impelling the human race, since this is moved by its proper impulse, in accordance with a law as necessary as, though more easily modified than, that of gravitation. But it does seek to facilitate human progress by enlightening it. . . .

There is a great difference between obeying the progress of civilization blindly and obeying it intelligently. The changes it demands take place as much in the first as in the second case; but they are longer delayed, and, above all, are only accomplished after having produced serious social perturbations more or less serious, according to the nature and importance of these changes. Now the disturbances of every sort, which thus arise in the body politic, may be, in great part, avoided, by adopting measures based on an exact knowledge of the changes which tend to produce themselves. . . .

Now in order to attain this end, it is manifestly indispensable that we should know as precisely as possible, the actual tendency of civilization so as to bring our political conduct into harmony with it.¹³⁴

9. *The Social Environment and Social and Political Theory.*

That there is a very intimate relation between the type of social and political system and the political theory of the period was one of the fundamental theses of Comte's philosophy of history. Scientific views of society could hardly be expected in the theological period. Comte states this very clearly in the following passage: "Short as is our life, and feeble as is our reason we cannot emancipate ourselves from the influence of our environment. Even the wildest dreamers reflect in their dreams the contemporary social state."¹³⁵ His best review of this point is probably to be found in his history of the attempts to found a scientific science of society before his own day.¹³⁶ The bearing of the social and political ideas of his time upon Comte's writings is evident throughout his works.

10. *Summary.*

Comte's sociology has been called by some writers a "prolegomenon" to the subject.¹³⁷ Similarly it would not be inaccu-

¹³⁴ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 536; 558-60. For Ward's appreciation of Comte's beginnings towards a doctrine of social teleosis, see *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. 1, p. 137.

¹³⁵ *Philosophie Positive*, Vol. II, p. 11; cited by Bristol, op. cit. p. 12.

¹³⁶ Martineau, II, pp. 197-208.

¹³⁷ E. g. Defourny, followed by Bristol.

rate to declare that the same relationship exists between his theory of the state and that of most later sociologists. The main doctrines of Comte along political lines which suggest subsequent developments are the following: (1) the sociological view of the state, and the thesis that political activities and institutions must be studied in their wider social setting and relationships; (2) the organic theory of the state, later developed by Spencer, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Fouillée, Roberty, Worms, and others; (3) the more universal sociological doctrine that the state is not an artificial product of rational perception of its utility, but a natural product of social necessity and historic growth; (4) the theory that the only rational limits of state activity are to be determined by a study of sociological principles and not by an appeal to "natural" laws; (5) a proper recognition of the all-important function of the broader social and extra-legal methods of social control—a line which has been exploited by such writers as Professors Ross, Cooley, Giddings and Sumner; (6) a recognition of the necessary conformity between measures for social amelioration, the fundamental characteristics of human nature and the principles of sociology—a matter to which sociologists are constantly calling the attention of the social economists and philanthropists; (7) a synthetic view of the historic process through which the present political organization has been reached, particularly suggestive for its emphasis upon the transition of the state from a military to an industrial basis—a view made much of by Spencer and later writers.


Comte's immediate influence, however, was not great and his devoted followers few. Except for Littré and his French disciples and Frederic Harrison and his group in England the Positive social philosophy was not enthusiastically adopted. But a few years after the publication of the *Polity* Darwinism made its appearance. This, together with Spencerian evolution, turned sociology in large part either into the social Darwinism of Gumpłowicz and his school or into the much less fertile field of the biological analogies developed by Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Worms and others. Spencerian sociology lent its great prestige to the defence of *laissez-faire* and to the denunciation of "social telesis." French sociology after Comte developed chiefly in the more restricted fields of social anthropology and social psychology. Sociology in America was, for the first generation, based either on Spencerianism, as with Giddings, or upon the German *Klassenkampf* doc-

trines, as with Small and his school, or upon the French social psychology, as with Ross. Only Lester F. Ward took Comte seriously, and Ward diverged so widely from Comte in his system of social philosophy that most of his readers forgot his tribute to the Frenchman. Finally, the well-nigh complete *bourgeois* domination of western society tended to discourage the cultivation of the doctrines of a writer so critical of unregulated capitalism as Comte. Whether doctrines akin to those of Comte will have any considerable vogue in the construction of future plans of social reorganization is a problem of prophecy and not of the history of social theory, but it seems safe to say that no less comprehensive scheme will be adequate to the reorganization of the social order.

INFINITY.

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID.

From mites in myriad clans arrayed at will
Upon the ample form of parasite so small
That countless millions of its kind, in feeding, fill
With but e'en slight annoyance, faring all,
Some microscopic germ whose dermal fell
Their habitat became, as nature's due,
And each an organism, with function's cell
And gland and duct and sinew moulded true—
To mighty suns whose changing paths extend
Through nameless billions of the leagues of earth,
Described in space in orbits without end,
And each a universe in fiery girth,
And each with all its wondrous starry train
Of suns and systems still of other suns,
A minute fleck of star mist in the chain
That swings in service to more distant ones—
Still thought wings ever outward on its way,
Nor gains the merest factor in the quest,
About whose base equation might array
The first crude figment of a finite rest.



THE RUINS OF PETRA.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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PETRA.

BY ROY PETRAN LINGLE.

"It seems no work of man's creative hand,
By labor wrought as wavering fancy planned;
But from the rock as if by magic grown,
Eternal, silent, beautiful, alone!
Not virgin white, like that old Doric shrine
Where erst Athena held her rites divine;
Nor saintly grey, like many a minster fane,
That crowns the hill and consecrates the plain,
But rosy-red as if the blush of dawn
That first beheld her were not yet withdrawn;
The hues of youth upon a brow of woe,
Which man deemed old two thousand years ago.
Match me such marvel save in Eastern clime,
A rose-red city half as old as Time."
—From Burgon's "Petra".

PETRA, or Wady Musa, was until recently one of the three "forbidden" cities of the world; the others being Mecca, also in Arabia, and Lassa in Thibet. It is the most extensive of the rock-cut cities like Machu Pichu in Peru and the cliff dwellings of China and the southwestern United States. Among these Petra is unique in its contacts with ancient civilizations and with the leading western oriental religions. Cave-dwellers and sun-worshippers, priests of Baal and Hebrew prophets, Greek pagans and Roman patriarchs, Christian iconographers and Mohammedan iconoclasts have in turn shared its glory or menaced and massacred its inhabitants and destroyed their works.

With an origin before the dawn of history, with an impregnable location, in its transition from wealth and power to utter desolation, in mystic beauty, fearful prophecies, strange legends—Petra is matchless. Yet, hidden away and lost to civilization for over a thousand years, it has been almost forgotten because of this delitescence.

On a straight line half way between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Akaba, the northern finger of the Red Sea, in the wildest part of the Arabian desert, rise the Sacred Mountains of Edom. Their peaks first appear as a castellated mass of minarets, domes, turrets and other fantastic outlines, like an oriental Garden of the Gods. Yet even the pinnacles are smooth and round, softened by a diaphanous veil of light. The colors range from snow white to purple, yellow, and rose—the predominant hue. In the crimson heart of this glowing mass lies the ancient city.

The rocky ramparts, abrupt on the outer edges, are further guarded by a natural barbican of rugged pinnacles and deep fissures surrounding the stronghold. From the east, through the bewildering maze, winds a stream fringed with wild-fig trees and oleanders, leading past the rock-cut tombs of the valley to the labyrinthine entrance of the city. Plunging past the octagonal portals, the waters rush under the ruins of an arch through a hidden entrance in the towering cliff. This is the Sik, a narrow *crevasse* in the mountain. Away back in the remote past some great cataclysm, or convulsion of Nature, must have split this passage. Through it flows the water from the spring Ain Musa. Tradition links this fountain with the name of Moses. The Koran calls it the "water of strife" or "well of judgment", where Moses struck the rock. Another Mohammedan version, doubtless arising from the crimson coloring of the stream bed, identifies it as a fountain flowing with blood which Moses miraculously changed to water. According to this legend, the cleft itself, several miles in length and in places almost a thousand feet deep, was opened by a single stroke of the magic rod. Hence the name Wady Musa, or watercourse of Moses. It forms the most original and tortuous approach to any city in the world.

Down through this narrow Sik, or shaft, the only natural entrance to the impregnable mountain fortress, men came before the dawn of Time. The population in 2700 B. C. has been estimated at a quarter of a million. Forty thousand people were said to live in one rock wall, like bees in a honey comb. Traditionally first were the Horites, or cave dwellers. Then in historic times came the Edomites—the sons of Esau—a proud and warlike people. Red Edom, under its great Duke Iram, was a terror to the ancient world thousands of years before the modern "Reds". The Children of Israel, seeking the Promised Land through the Wilderness, were refused passage by the Edomites. (Deut. ii, 4-8). The

Hebrews buried Aaron on Mount Hor, fifteen miles away, (Numb. xx, 23-29) and the forced detour protracted their wanderings many years. During the wars of that ruthless strategist, Joshua, the Edomites remained unconquered. Joshua's power over the sun failed to daunt the Sun-worshippers, and the priests of Baal defied the Israelites from the High Places. But one Biblical account records the slaughter of ten thousand of the children of Seir, flung by order of Amaziah from the cliffs to the plain below. (2 Chr. xxv, 12-13). The city itself is mentioned at least eleven times in the Old Testament, usually under the name *Sela* or the "rock-cleft." (Cf. 2 Kings xiv, 7; Isaiah xvi, 1; and in revised version Isaiah xlii, 11; Judges i, 36; 2 Chr. xxv, 12-13; Obad. 3). The region was cursed by the Hebrew prophets with hearty unanimity.

These prophetic denunciations, in retaliation for the churlish inhospitality of the Edomites and their aversion to Hebrew rule, are among the most savage vaticinations in the Bible. Joel, Amos, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Malachi and Isaiah predicted its utter desolation. Obadiah wrote "The pride of thine heart hath deceived thee—thou that dwellest in the clefts of the Rock, whose habitation is high; that saith in his heart, who shall bring me down to the ground? Though thou exalt thyself as the eagle, and though thou set thy nest among the stars, thence will I bring thee down, saith the Lord." (Obad. 3). And in time, conquered by David and other Hebrew warriors, the proud and powerful Edomites disappeared forever from history.

Their remnants were supplanted by the Nabatheans, originally a nomadic Arab tribe. The newcomers encouraged commerce with outside nations. As traders they were world-famed. The Greeks called the region Idumea and re-named its chief city Petra or the "Rock". Petra became the center of caravan trade, a metropolis of the desert, with routes leading to Egypt, Eastern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Palestine. The rock city formed a safe deposit vault for priceless treasure. Caravans from Petra to Leuce Como on the Red Sea were vast as armies. Camels filed through the narrow gorge laden with frankincense, myrrh, silver—all the spices, incense, dye-stuffs, fabrics and precious stones of the Orient. One may imagine the relief of the desert travelers, plashing safely through the cool waters of Wady Musa, in the deep shadow of the cliffs, after escaping the burning heat and roving pirates of the desert.

For centuries fabulous wealth poured into this narrow valley, scarcely a mile square even with its lateral clefts. Kings, queens and conquerors entered to gaze upon the rock-cuttings and inscriptions of the Nabatheans and to revel in their pomp. The King of Arabia issued from the gloomy gorge at the head of fifty thousand men to lay siege to Jerusalem. Secure in power and wealth, the Nabatheans forgot the curse hovering over Mount Seir, or only laughed at the fanatical Hebrew prophets.

Again came a change. The Romans, relentlessly pushing back their boundaries, attained the utmost confines of their domains. Under the Emperor Trajan, in 106 A. D., Cornelius Palma, Governor of Syria, conquered and organized the province of Arabia Petræa. Petra reached the zenith of its glory. The Romanized population is said to have numbered two hundred and sixty-seven thousand. The indomitable Romans pushed three additional roads over the ramparts through rock portals into the heart of the city,—one leading south to Egypt and two north to Palestine and the Hellespont. In lines sweeping grandly and imperturbably over Syria, the basaltic blocks and milestones still remain as monuments to the engineering skill that joined Arabia and Britain, the farthestmost limits of Imperial Rome. Aqueducts conveyed the water down the now-paved Sik. On the plain arose temples, a forum, baths, palaces, arches of triumph, in all varieties of classic architecture. Taking their cue from the Nabatheans the Romans continued the rock-cuttings. Tombs, temples, palaces and treasure vaults grew in the marvelously colored rock walls. These still remain, long after the structures in the valley have toppled and crumbled into ruin. The most beautiful mural monuments of Petra date from the Roman occupation. An altar niche in Al Deir—"The Convent"—gives proof of Christian worship. Evidences of the strength of Christianity in these regions are remarkable. Presumably the persecutions of Diocletian drove many exiles from Rome to the provinces. But again the veil of mystery covers the possible greatness of Petra as a Christian outpost.

As a center of wealth and luxury, however, the city could scarcely be surpassed. Rome and Athens, in their days of grandeur as world capitals, rest secure in fame by their contributions in art, law and philosophy. Petra, remote and unsung, shared in the classic culture. A Greek amphitheatre, seating five thousand persons, is carved at the base of a cliff in strata of rose, purple and saffron sandstone. Around and above are hewn the tombs of the

dead. In this appropriate setting an audience might witness the tragedies of Sophocles, Aeschylus and Euripides and solemnly meditate upon the immanence of death; or riotously applaud the comedies of Aristophanes, Plautus and Terence to forget the tragedy of life and the inexorable fate that overhung the city.

After the Second Century A. D. the history of Petra is shrouded in obscurity. No written records from the Third, Fourth and Fifth Centuries have survived. Priceless manuscripts must have been lost or destroyed during the abandonment. Judging by sculptural and architectural remains, a literature and philosophy second to none may have been denied the world. As for the final calamity, in the words of John Masefield, "None knows what overthrew that city's pride." (Sonnets in "Enslaved").

From comparative history we may conjecture the bare outlines of Petra's fate. With Goths, Vandals and Huns ravaging the Empire, the Roman legions were withdrawn, as they were from Britain, to protect the Eternal City. The incense-route had shifted. Palmyra had become the objective of caravans. Lacking protection and commerce, the Romanized inhabitants were harassed by the fierce Arab tribes. Their ultimate fate is veiled in a terrible mystery. *Not even the relics of the dead remain.* The desolation may have been gradual. But possibly a sudden catastrophe overwhelmed the population. The absence of written records supports the latter hypothesis. Ingenious besiegers may have cut off the water supply from above. The very strength of the city may have proved its weakness. Caught like animals in a trap, starved and thirsting in the midst of wealth and splendor, the survivors may have been wiped out or captured in a final desperate battle. Probably not all were lost. Traditions account for descendants in Syria and Italy, thence scattering through Europe. Fascinating and fantastic, as the city itself, is the theory that with the decline of power and the encroachment of enemies, came a Great Fear, born of the Biblical curse. The Christianized inhabitants may have fled in panic terror. Whatever the cause, we only know that "they are gone; ay, ages long ago."

How the shade of grim Isaiah must have exulted, after the lapse of long centuries, to recall his curse on Idumæa:

"From generation to generation it shall lie waste. . . . He shall stretch out upon it the line of confusion and the stones of emptiness. . . . All her princes shall be nothing. . . . And thorns shall come up in her palaces, nettles and brambles in the

fortresses thereof; and it shall be an habitation of dragons and a court for owls." (Is. xxxiv, 10-13).

Daniel might also be pardoned a complacent chuckle for his prediction of the transitory Roman dominion: "And he shall plant the tabernacles of his palace between the seas in the glorious holy mountain; yet he shall come to his end and none shall help him." (Dan. xi, 45). The "glorious" land of Daniel included Edom and Moab. (Dan. xi, 41).

The Abomination of Desolation had come to pass. For over thirteen hundred years Petra was almost utterly lost to civilization. Only the Crusaders, battling Saladin around Kerak and Shobek to the north, for a time occupied this strategic point. The attitude of Islam supplemented that of the Hebrew prophets. The Koran recognized Petra as a sacred and mysterious, if not a holy city. The most solemn interdictions against habitation seem to have been placed upon it by the Mohammedans. Nomadic Arabs, discovering the hidden entrance, gazed in awe upon the ancient wonders. Once outside, the more intrepid were often baffled in attempts to return. Legends grew of a wondrous enchanted city, appearing and vanishing like a mirage. (Iliowizi, *The Weird Orient*). Coupled with these were awe-inspiring tales of the dire fate of beholders. A religious or superstitious veneration hallowed the place. It was known, but not inhabited, by the desert tribes. It became a city of mystery—a City of Dreadful Beauty,—like a desert Medusa, itself turned to stone. It meant death or worse to the profaner. Even today the bolder guides will offer to show only by night what they dare not reveal by day. There are legends of treasure still buried or hidden among the ruins. Petra has never been thoroughly explored.

In 1811, Burckhardt, a Swiss traveler, crossing the desert wilderness, stumbled weak and weary upon this refuge. He immediately knew it for the long lost city. The fierce and greedy Arabs stole even the rags that bandaged his bleeding ankles. Burckhardt escaped with his life,—to die only a few years later. Following him came Irby and Mangles; then Laborde and Linant, who made a hasty survey-map but were driven out. John Stephens, an American with a special permit, was the first to spend a night among the ruins. He died shortly afterward. Other travelers, misinterpreting the prophetic words of Ezekiel, "Thus will I make Mount Seir most desolate, and cut off from it him that passeth out and him that returneth," (Ezek. xxv, 7) were deterred from

the journey by what they considered a divine threat. Then, too, the route over the desert was long and dangerous. The Arab tribes were fierce, fanatical and extortionate. The indomitable Kitchener, with Hull and Armstrong, failed to penetrate the valley in 1883, but viewed its beauties from the ramparts. Undaunted by prophecies and perils, perhaps twenty white men and six white women have left records of visits to Petra during the nineteenth century. The number who perished in the attempt is unknown. Colonel Libbey of Princeton was one of the last desert travelers to force his way past the threatening guardians of the Sik.

In 1904 the Hedjaz Railroad to Maan, constructed by German engineers, part of the Turkish-German dream of a pan-Islamic Empire, brought Petra within thirty miles of civilization. In 1917 General Allenby also opened up the region with an Egypt-to-Palestine road. Now Petra is comparatively accessible. Under a friendly King of the Hedjaz, travelers may be assured protection in the future.

Those fortunate few who have visited Petra say that its strange beauty can never be pictured or described. The Roman roads, High Places, Citadel Rock, sandstone walls honeycombed with tombs and temples are all cut in strata of the most marvelously variegated colors. Such monuments as the Rainbow Temple, Corinthian Tomb, Al Deir, and the Amphitheatre are matchless combinations of the handiwork of Nature and of man. Of the Khaznah Firaun, or Treasury of Pharaoh, its hundred foot sunlit façade looming up through the darkness of the Sik, John Stephens wrote:

"Even now . . . I see before me the façade of that temple; neither the Coliseum at Rome, grand and interesting as it is, nor the ruins of the Acropolis at Athens, nor the Pyramids, nor the mighty temples of the Nile are so often present in my memory." (*Arabia Petrea*).

William Libbey describes this rock-cut cameo in the gateway of the mountains of mystery: "Carved with matchless skill, after the conception of some master mind; gathering the beauties of the stream, the peerless hues of the sandstone, the towering cliffs, the impassable ravine, the brilliant atmosphere and the fragment of the blue sky above,—it must have been enduring in its effect on the human mind. We saw it in its desolation, a thousand years after its owners had fled, after a cycle of storm, tempest, flood and earthquake had done their worst to mar and disfigure it, and

we must confess that its impression upon our hearts and memories is deathless." (*The Jordan Valley and Petra*, Vol. ii, p. 94).

Petra has been almost neglected in art and literature. Even Jules Guérin's richly tinted paintings from Egypt and the Holy Land fail to include the Khaznah Firaun. Literary men and artists never visited Petra during the nineteenth century. A few have heard of the place. Edgar Allen Poe mentions the glories of Petra in his critical review of Stephens' "Arabia Petræa". And another American poet, Whittier, celebrating "The Rock in El Ghor, writes:

"Dead Petra in her hill-tomb sleeps,
Her stones of emptiness remain; .
Around her sculptured mystery sweeps
The lonely waste of Edom's plain.

From the doomed dwellers in the cleft
The bow of vengeance turns not back;
Of all her myriads none are left
Along the Wady Musa's track.

Unchanged the awful lithograph
Of power and glory undertrod,—
Of nations scattered like the chaff
Blown from the threshing-floor of God."

This place may have been the inspiration of Kipling's City of the Desert in the words of Dick Heldar:

"What do you think of a big red dead city built of red sandstone on honey colored sands? There are forty dead kings there, each in a gorgeous tomb finer than all the others. You look at the palaces and streets and shops and tanks and think that men must live there. Then evening comes and the lights change until it's just as though you stood in the heart of a King Opal. Then the night wind gets up and the sands move, and you hear the desert outside the city singing 'Now I lay me down to sleep.' And everything is dark till the moon rises." (*The Light that Failed*).

John Masefield must have had in mind the cities of the Arabian desert, perhaps Petra, when he wrote the sonnets in *Enslaved*,

It is strange that so little is known of a spot so intimately connected with the history of mankind and of Christianity. As the Abomination of Desolation it was denounced, shunned and hidden for ages. But there was a glorious promise for the future. Isaiah also wrote of Idumæa, "The desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose; . . . and a highway shall be there, and a way." (Is. xxxv, 1, 8). Its further destiny may be hinted in Matthew and Mark at the time when "The abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place." (Matt. xxiv, 15) (Mark xiii, 14). The holy cities of Rome and Jerusalem have been justly famed in hymn and story. Petra needs no praise but knowledge. It stands absolutely alone and incomparable, as the strangest, most mystically beautiful place in the world: "a rose-red city, half as old as Time."



ISLAMIC INFLUENCE ON JESUIT ORIGINS.

BY DUDLEY WRIGHT.

THE story of the origin of the religious confraternity known as the Society of Jesus, or the Jesuits, is one that is generally overlooked in favor of the history of the developments of the Society, to which feature historians have always paid considerable attention.

In 1521 Ignatius was wounded in both legs when defending Pampeluna against the troops of Francis I. The reading of the *Flowers of the Saints* during his convalescence led to his conversion and he resolved to devote the remainder of his life to the service of God. His first idea was to become a kind of religious Don Quixote and make war against the Moors of Catalonia and Aragon, where, at that period, the Mohammedans were very numerous, commerce being in the hands of the Jews and Mussulmans. The Moors and Moriscos were not then assimilated with the Jews and placed under the surveillance of the Inquisition: they could meet together without fear of disturbance, provided they exercised prudence and tact. The incurable lameness of Ignatius, a permanent result of the conflict in which he had been engaged, rendered the accomplishment of this aim impossible and he then announced that he had received from God a special mission to undertake the conversion of the Mohammedan peoples and particularly those resident in the Holy Land. He was on his way to the Shrine of Our Lady at Montserrat to ask a blessing on his enterprise when he encountered a Saracen of lofty mien, one who had put on a thin mantle of Christian profession in order that he might remain unsuspected and unmolested in Spain. As the twain travelled together, the farther the Moor got from the town and the ears of inquisitive listeners the more pronounced became his expressed contempt for the Christian faith, until presently he uttered

an insult to the Virgin Mother of Christ. It was then that the warrior spirit in Ignatius was aroused and the Saracen, perceiving this, fled at a gallop. Ignatius, hand on sword, hesitated as to whether he should follow and slay the blasphemer, but left the decision to God and was taken on the road to Montserrat. It is asserted by some writers, although there is no proof, that the Saracen was a member of one or other of the Mussulman secret societies then in existence. It is, however, by no means improbable as the operations of these societies were very widespread and the membership in all countries where Mohammedans dwelt a very large and secret one.

At Montserrat Ignatius lighted upon a copy of the *Spiritual Exercises* of Garcia of Cioneros, a collection of mystical meditations and ascetic rules. This work, in combination with the rules and practices of various Islamic secret monastic societies, then in full swing, formed the basis of the more famous volume, the *Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius*. It was while he was at Manresa that he conceived the project of his Company or Society and that there germinated in his mind the idea of founding within the Catholic Church, conformably with its dogma and discipline, an association which, whether intentional or otherwise, was founded on the model of the Islamic societies, then a very powerful factor among the Mussulmans.

Points of resemblance between the Society of Jesus and the Sanusiyya Order have been noted, but it was impossible for the former to have been founded upon the latter, seeing that the Jesuits came into existence in 1540, whereas Sanusi, the founder of the Islamic Society which took his name was not born until 1791. There were, however, in existence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries numerous Islamic congregations or societies, the majority of which are still in being, whose constitutions and rules bear, in many ways, a striking similarity to those adopted by Ignatius.

The Kuadryas, established in Asia Minor by Sid Abdel Quader, date from twelfth century. The descendants of the founder introduced the Order into Spain, where it made rapid progress. After the taking of Grenada, the majority of the Spanish members fled to Morocco. Nevertheless there remained some who crossed the peninsula until the Inquisition, in 1524, was charged by Charles V, with their pursuit. Then there were the Kadelyas, an Order founded by Sid-Abou-Median, who was born

in Seville and who distinguished himself as a professor in the Universities of Seville and Cordova. The third Sheikh of the Order, Sid-Abou-Hassan-Chadely, was a man venerated throughout Islam and particularly renowned throughout Spain and the north of Africa, in which countries were various groups more or less attached to the primitive organization.

The Qalenderis was an Order founded by Qalender Yusuf Endelusi, a Spanish Moslem, who died A. D. 1323. Nicholas Nicholay, who visited Constantinople in 1551, describes the Qalenderis as glorying in chastity and abstinence and living in little "churches" called Tekyes. Tekieh is, however, the Turkish name for the monasteries in which the Dervishes, or Islamic monks, live. There were twelve of these Orders originally, the earlier ones dating from the time of Mohammed and his immediate successors; to-day, in spite of the suppression and decay of many, they number thirty-three. Qalender required of his proselytes purity of heart, spirituality of mind, exemption from all worldly defilement, and that they should travel constantly teaching the tenets of the faith as they interpreted them, living wholly upon alms. They were also required to practice acts of severe austerity, in order that they might attain to heavenly favor and, more especially, to a state of ecstasy and illumination.

After recognizing the impossibility of becoming an active warrior in the cause of the Catholic Church against the Mohammedans, Ignatius devoted all his energies to the furtherance of his spiritual mission in the Holy Land and the cause of the early hostility to the Society which he afterwards founded, was the settlement of its members in countries other than Palestine. Father Genelli, in his *Life of St. Ignatius of Loyola*, says that:

"Everything tends to show that Ignatius, in making the journey to Jerusalem, had no other object than to take up his abode near the sepulchre of our Lord, and there labour to extend the Kingdom of Christ and to make war upon His enemies. It was not then a simple pilgrimage that he was making, for the East had been his first thought after his conversion. He had the idea of at once establishing, on the spot sanctified by the presence of our Lord in the flesh, a Society of Jesus, composed of apostolic evangelical labourers, whose spiritual welfare in the midst of the children of Mohammed should pave the way to new triumphs of the Catholic Church. This was, without doubt, a noble conception, which the swords of the Christian chivalry of Europe had not

been able to realize by the efforts of Catholicism of centuries. That this was the real design of St. Ignatius is proved by the pains he took to gain a footing in Palestine. . . . To the last years of his life he thought seriously of securing at last an entrance for the Society in Jerusalem."

When Ignatius left Manresa in 1523 he undertook a voyage which is passed over by many historians of the Society. It was to Palestine in general and to Jerusalem in particular. Father Dominic Bonhours, in his *Life of St. Ignatius*, tells us that in the early days of his conversion he did not desire to make this pilgrimage to do honour to the places consecrated by the presence and blood of Jesus Christ, but that "he undertook it at the time (doubtless after contact with Moors or Moriscos at Manresa) with the desire of working for the salvation of infidels".

These "infidels" were, of course, the followers of the creed of Mohammed. During the two months of his sojourn in Palestine he endeavoured to approach the Mussulmans and even ventured into the secret meetings of the Islamic confraternities, open only to the initiated. Henin de Cuvilliers says that he was nearly murdered. At any rate, his zeal for proselytising was so untimely that the Franciscans, the guardians of the holy tomb, called upon him, under pain of excommunication, to renounce an enterprise which aroused the fury of the Mussulman societies against the Christians, and to return to Europe.

Ignatius obeyed and returned to Spain. He went to the University of Alcala, which Cardinal Ximenes had founded for the Moriscos and for the instruction of missionaries who were to labour for the conversion of the Moors. The Inquisitors by this time, however, had concentrated attention upon Ignatius and, having surveyed his apostolate, they suspected him of being a "Mahometiser". They demanded his arrest, which they secured, and he was detained for several days in the dungeons of the Inquisition. On his release, Ignatius decided that he would go to Salamanca, which he did, but new suspicions arose and for the second time he was arrested at the instigation of the Inquisitors. His close connection with the Moors, his unusual interest in the Islamic faith and in Mohammedans generally had made him suspected once again of Mahomedanism. This time he was detained for twenty-five days and it is not known on what terms he was able to secure his release on this occasion, but immediately

on attaining his freedom he went to Paris and at Montmartre he definitely founded the Company of Jesus.

Ignatius did not abandon his project for the conversion of the Mohammedans. Don Pedro de Zacata de Bermeo, the commander of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, endeavoured to promote the interests of Catholicism in the Holy Land, and particularly those of Ignatius and his followers. He addressed himself to Pope Julius III, from whom he obtained, in 1554, a Bull authorizing him to found in the name of the Society of Jesus, three colleges in the East, which should belong to that Society—one at Jerusalem, one at Constantinople, and the third at Cyprus. In anticipation of the Bull, Ignatius, in 1553, had sent Simon Rodriguez with a companion to Jerusalem, to wait there until a favourable opportunity presented itself for establishing the proposed college. Rodriguez went no further than Venice where he fell so sick that he was utterly unable to continue the voyage. The provisions of the Bull were never acted upon and the scheme fell through. Although Ignatius continued to speak of the conversion of the Mohammedans as his chief mission, his actions now began to suggest the growth of a wider alternative.

It is in the organization and rules governing the Society of Jesus that the influence of the Islamic confraternities is seen. One of these societies is known as the Order of the Kheloua, a word which means "retreat" and the members make this devotional act a special feature of the Order. Before initiation into any of the Islamic societies in existence at the time of Ignatius, however, a retreat of from thirty to forty days had to be undertaken by every candidate. Concerning this M. A. le Chatelier writes:

"Mussulman doctors compare the initiation and the Keloua to a poison, deadly if it is taken in too strong doses at the beginning, but which can be assimilated by progressive usage. The Keloua, which, at the beginning, lasts for one day only, is, by degrees, prolonged through weeks. The initiate ought then, in order to isolate himself, to remain in one room of his dwelling, or in the cell of a zawiyah, or in a cavern, or in the depth of a forest. Whatever, however, may be the place of his retreat, he ought to speak to no one during his retreat, except to the Sheikh, or Moquaddim, the representative of the Sheikh. If he wants anything he will make demands by signs or in writing. His abstinence during the day must be absolute, but may be broken at night, though only in order to take the quantity of nourishment

strictly necessary. The hours of sleep are rigorously limited. Vocal prayer—the repetition of the same formulæ up to one or two thousand times—and meditation ought exclusively to occupy the adept, to whom, in certain approved cases, the reading of certain books may be permitted as an assistance, as a means to the desired end. Outside the time devoted to reading the candidate ought to ‘close his eyes in order to illumine his heart.’”

In the Society of Jesus a retreat of from thirty to forty days is similarly demanded. The novice ought, according to the *Exercises of St. Ignatius*, to employ the first week in the purification of the mind. During this week he is deprived entirely of the light of day, save for reading and eating. He is prohibited from indulging in laughter or in any conversation which tends to laughter. He sees only his director and speaks only to him, who fixes for him his fasts and labours. For four hours in the day and one hour in the middle of the night he is absorbed in meditations on death and hell. The same formula of prayer is repeated innumerable times until a condition of vague unconsciousness is reached—the same as happens with the Mohammedan initiate.

Attention is directed in both the Mohammedan and the Ignatian societies as to the posture of the body during prayer and meditation and the gaze has to be directed to and kept fixed upon a certain point.

St. Ignatius prescribed a special method of prayer, which he set out in the following words:

“The third method of prayer is that with each breath or respiration one is to pray mentally, saying one word of ‘Our Father’ or of any other prayer that is being recited, so that one word only is said between one breath and another; and in the length of time between one breath and another, one is to look chiefly on the meaning of such word, or to the person to whom one recites it, or to one’s lowly estate, or to the difference between such high estate and such reliance of man.”

This practice was known to the Moslems of the ninth century. The Kadriyas, in particular, had the practice laid down in their rituals of praying “in measure” or “in time”, that is to say, of giving to each respiration or breath one of the names of Allah, or one of the attributes of God, forcing themselves to hold the breath for as long time as possible on the name or attribute and the great care is never to have more than one name or attribute uttered between two breaths.

In the *Exercises of St. Ignatius* great attention is paid to what is called "the application of the senses". The first point is to see the person with the sight of the imagination, meditating and studying in particular their circumstances and gathering some fruit from the sight. The second is to hear with the ear of imagination the things that they say, or may say, and reflect upon them, then wisely to gather some profit. The third is to smell and taste the infinite fragrance and sweetness of the Godhead of the soul and its virtues, reflecting inwardly and gathering thence some profit. The fourth is to touch with the touch of imagination, to embrace and kiss the place where such persons tread, always contriving to gather profit thence.

This was a practice with both Gnostics and Mussulmans, who sought "to see, touch, hear, feel, and taste the object of their meditations", for example, "Paradise, the place of eternal delights, which God has prepared for prophets and believers" or "the torments of Gehenna, or Hell". Thus Ignatius said: "In the first place I see with the eyes of imagination those immense fires and the reprobate souls enclosed within the body of fire. In the second place I hear by the aid of imagination the groanings, the cries, the blasphemies against Jesus Christ, our Saviour, and against all the saints. In the third place I imagine to myself that I inhale the fumes, the sulphur, the stench of a sink of vice, and of putrefying matter. In the fourth place I imagine myself to taste bitter things, such as tears, sadness, the raging sea of conscience. In the fifth place I touch these avenging flames and force myself lively to comprehend how they surround and burn the souls of the reprobate."

The Kadriyas had, and have, five tests for every initiate after emerging from the retreat. They were: 1, serving the poor in imitation of the "saint" who founded the Order, who walked along the streets carrying a leathern bottle filled with fresh water and offering a drink to the poor people and weary travellers; 2, making a pilgrimage to Mecca or to the tomb of a Sheikh venerated in the Order; 3, performing domestic duties for a period; 4, teaching the Koran to the people; 5, serving as preacher for a stated period. The Jesuits have precisely the same tests after the candidate has been accepted and when he has passed satisfactorily through the retreat. He has: 1, to serve the sick poor for a month, in memory of the sojourn of St. Ignatius at Manresa, where he tended the infirm and pilgrims; 2, to make a pilgrimage

to some sanctuary selected for him; 3, to engage in menial work allotted to him at the seminary; 4, to teach children; 5, to preach as directed.

In the Islamic Orders promotion is at the will of the Sheikh; in the Society of Jesus it is at the will of the General or his representative. The General can retain a member of the Society for any period he wills in any class, or reduce him to any position, even the lowest, he has already passed through, or he may promote him to the highest grade. In Mussulman confraternities the authority of the Sheikh is absolute. As guide he takes the place of Mohammed and the candidate takes an oath that he will obey the Sheikh as he would obey God. The rule is absolute despotism. By the constitutions of the Society of Jesus the same despotic principle prevails. The General must be obeyed as God would or should be obeyed. The candidate for admission into Islamic Orders in existence in Ignatius's day, when he was accepted, handed over to the Sheikh all flocks, goods, and property that he possessed. Likewise all that the Jesuit owns passes, on his admission, into the exchequer of the Society. The Mussulman in the hands of his Sheikh is told to be as a body in the hands of the washer of the dead. The Jesuit is told that he must permit himself to be moved and directed by his superiors just as if he were a corpse.

In this adoption, or adaptation, of the Islamic monastic constitutions by St. Ignatius a criterion was set for what became, in after years, a not uncommon practice of Jesuit priests engaged in missionary labours. In the work issued under the initials "B. N." entitled *The Jesuits, their Foundation and History*, published by Burns and Oates), we read (p. 371, vol. 1):

"The Jesuits, as has been seen, had made an attentive study of the peculiar character of the Chinese, had come to the conclusion that the chief obstacle preventing them from embracing Christianity was an intense attachment to certain national customs. . . . They . . . finally adopted a rule, which has since been given by the Holy See to Vicars-Apostolic in foreign missions, that the missionaries were not to oblige the people to change their ceremonies, customs, or manners unless these were contrary to religion or morality."

Then there is the case of Father Robert de Nobili, an Italian of Roman birth and a nephew of Bellarmine, who is described as "one of the greatest of Jesuit missionaries", whose career cer-

tainly is of singular interest. The following description of the methods he adopted for the conversion of the Brahmins is taken from the work quoted above:

"He resolved to become a Brahmin himself, and to renounce all intercourse with Europeans and with members of the lower castes. By this means alone could he hope to gain an influence with those whose welfare he had at heart. . . . He announced himself to be a Roman Rajah, or noble, and a Saniassi, or one who had renounced the pleasures of the world, two perfectly accurate statements. He separated entirely from the other Jesuits, who, by mingling with the Pariahs, had lost caste in the eyes of the higher classes; and having adopted the language, costume, and manners of a Brahmin, he retired to a hut built of turf, and surrounded himself with a mysterious prestige well calculated to excite curiosity and interest. One of the chief crimes of the Europeans, in the opinion of the Brahmins, was their use of meat and strong liquors, and Fr. de Nobili conformed himself strictly to the mode of life observed by the native doctors: rice, herbs, and water were his only food once in twenty-four hours; his solitude was only broken by visits from the Brahmins; prayer and study were his constant occupations. By degrees his patience was rewarded. Attracted at first by his retired and mortified life, the Brahmins were fascinated by his learning and especially by his perfect knowledge of their Vedas or sacred books. Gradually he led them to the clear understanding of the Catholic faith and conversions became numerous among the class in which the truth had hitherto encountered insuperable opposition."

Nobili was afterwards authorized by a Bull from Pope Gregory XV, dated 31st January, 1623, to pursue the course he had hitherto followed, which Bull justified him in all that he had done. One of the chief accusations against him had been that he allowed his disciples to paint a mark on their foreheads, made of a certain paste called sandal, and to wear cords or girdles composed of 800 yellow threads. The Bull decided that both those customs, being regarded merely as distinctive marks of nobility, might be allowed to the Christian Brahmins, on condition that the cords should be blessed by a priest and received from his hands. The Pope, after careful examination, was convinced that to abolish these practices, puerile in appearance, but in the eyes of the natives invested with extraordinary importance, would have been to render their conversion well nigh impossible.

This imposture continued throughout the seventeenth century and on the death of Fr. de Nobili in 1656 it was claimed that he had made 100,000 high caste converts and that one of his colleagues had made 30,000 converts. Benedict XIV, by his Bull of 12th September, 1744, authorized the Jesuits to have two classes of missionaries, one for the nobles and one for the pariahs.

Then there is the case of the Norwegian Jesuit Nicolai, who presented himself to the Protestant clergy at Stockholm and said that having spent some years at southern universities, he would like a place as professor in the new college they were forming. He asked them to recommend him to the king, which in time they did and he secured the appointment. He had been sent from Rome with instructions to act as he did. He seems to have held the chair of Lutheran theology for a considerable time until, eventually, he became rector of the college.

Not only is the historical connection between Islamic monasticism and the Society of Jesus demonstrated by their likeness one to another, but their actual relationships are such as to prove the filiation possible, and, further, the hypothesis fits in with all the ascertained relevant facts.

EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL QUALITIES.

BY SANFORD A. MOSS.

OUR young tom-cat caught a mouse this morning! This is not an article on nature study, so I will not dwell upon the way he tossed it about, and scampered around the kitchen. He did just what other cats do always under the circumstances, and this is the point I do want to dwell upon. Our cat never had lessons in mouse-catching and never acquired from external sources any information as to what to do when a mouse became an element in his environment. What then is this internal thing called "instinct" which resulted in his doing what other cats always do? I am going to try to give a partial answer to this question, with which I hope the reader will agree. Then I will extend the discussion to human qualities in a way which I also will try to make satisfactory. I will finally draw some resultant conclusions as to the foundations of human society which, while they may not be wholly new, are not as current as I think they should be.

We must, of course, dig a little into the details of this phenomenon of nature which we call "instinct". Merely knowing of it and giving it a name does not count for much. The physiologists have done enough to make it certain that the cat's instinct is connected in some way with its brain. We can therefore make a good beginning by consideration of the "matter" of which the brain and nerves are composed. In order to begin far enough back in this study of "matter", let us start with any piece of "dead" matter, say a lump of coal.

Its properties seem fairly simple to our understanding, so that it furnishes a good object with which to make comparisons.

The physicists tell us that the lump of coal is composed of molecules, atoms and electrons, and that it is held together by cohesion and burns because of the chemical affinity of carbon and oxygen.

Furthermore, there are vibrations of these molecules, atoms and electrons, due to temperature and radiation, so that really our piece of coal is far from dead. On the contrary, the electrons are whirling around and the molecules bearing back and forth in a most lively way.

But as the physicists well know, they have only begun to scratch the surface of knowledge about such a piece of matter. They have only recently begun to know a little about electrons, radio-activity and the like.

In what way do the carbon molecules differ from the oxygen molecules and what is the origin of their "love" or affinity for each other and what is a molecule, anyway? The physicists themselves know little more about this than a high school freshman who has flunked in his "physics".

Hence we shall have to agree that even such an apparently simply thing as a lump of coal is really complex, infinitely beyond our moral understanding.

So our analysis of details can only go so far as to note that there are things called atoms and molecules which, for some reason or other, have all sorts of powers of attraction and aggregation. These unite elements such as carbon and oxygen, and to hold together mobile drops of water, so that they become solid ice, and draw together falling particles of ice so as to form the beautiful hexagonal snow crystals, and react in many other such ways.

When certain combinations occur of such molecules of certain highly complex forms, we have what the biologists call a "cell". The particular form of affinity which makes them aggregate or "grow", we call "life". We need not here consider whether or not this "life" involves anything beyond the physical and chemical aggregating forces such as cohesion, crystallization, chemical affinity and the like. But whatever it is that makes cells multiply, they do form trees, bacteria, sea-anemones, starfish, and animals. Why they do this we understand no more and no less than we understand the lump of coal.

Our lump of coal responds to external influences in many well-known ways. Thus, a piece breaks off if it is shipped, the

volume expands slightly due to rise of temperature and there is a sound wave transmitted through the entire lump and into the surrounding atmosphere if the coal is struck. There is a chemical combination called combustion if there is contact with oxygen at a certain temperature, and so on.

We may call such effects "reaction to environment". So also a cell or aggregation of cells reacts to environment. With simple cell aggregation such as in trees, and low forms of animal life, the reaction is merely local. The tree exudes sap if cut, the low animal retracts if touched, and they both absorb nourishment from their surroundings if the necessary chemical reactions occur properly. The cat's bones are somewhat similar cases.

The biologists distinguish forms of life reaction to environment, of successively greater complexity. The simplest is the local effect already mentioned. Next there is intervention of a complex cell system called a "nerve" so that an environment effect at one place causes an effect at some other place. Next there is the local "ganglion" or nervous center which receives "afferent nerves" of simple type from various nearby points and sends out "efferent nerves". And finally, there is the system of the cat with which we started off, where there is a central brain which receives afferent nerves from senses of different kinds and sends out efferent nerves to muscles of different kinds. The system of most mammals is like this in a general way.¹

We shall later return to the discussion of the reactions of the cat's brain cells. We will stop now with the generalization that our tom-cat has a system of senses with nerves going to a brain and nerves coming from it to muscles. These nerves, brains and the like, which are the seat of the cat's instincts, are all composed of cells with chemical affinities, molecular properties, and all sorts of such actions. They react to environment just as do the successively simpler organizations down to our lump of coal, but in ways billions and trillions of times more complex. We say we understand the properties and reaction of the lump of coal, and in the same sense

¹ In the *Monist*, January, 1921, I have tried to demonstrate that man, as distinguished from animals, has a nervous system of a still higher grade, with the addition of a "memory organ", which stores records of past environments, which are recalled by associations of present environment, so that the next effect produced on the brain at any instant is due not only to the existing environment as transmitted to the brain by the senses, but also to past environments recalled from the memory by associations due to the present environment.

we understand the reactions of the cat's sense, nerve and muscle system.

We can pause for breath after this rapid excursion through matters which have taken years for development by physicists, chemists, biologists and other scientists. We have collected enough data on points usually agreed upon, to enable us to start on the cat's instinct.

First, what do we mean by "instinct"? We have already skimmed over the mechanism which is concerned with instinct, consisting of the senses, afferent nerves, brain, and efferent nerves. By the operation of this mechanism, when the cat which is furnishing our text, saw or smelt or heard the mouse, it pricked up its ears, sought a favorable position, crouched, and at the proper instant leaped, stretched out its claws and captured its prey. All of these actions followed the perception of the mouse, and I need not expend any philosophy on the point that the perception and subsequent action had the relation of cause and effect. Neither need I spend any time in proving that the entire mechanism between perception and action exists within the cat's body. There are no waves or psychic influences or any other agencies whatever outside of the cat's own skin, which have any part in the performance. The entire drama (the mouse would call it a tragedy) of the capture, comprised the cat, the mouse and the forces of nature immediately adjacent, such as gravity, temperature, radiation, and the like.

Physiologists understand the sense mechanism fairly well and are quite certain about the pulses already mentioned from senses to brain and back again from brain to muscle. They are also quite certain that something goes on in the brain which, upon receipt of the incoming pulses, acts in some way or other to send out the outgoing pulses. This something is the "instinct" toward which we have been leading. With the data we have been collecting in the rapid trip we have just completed thru realms of physics, biology and what not, we ought now to be able to show just how instinct operates. But, alas, we are far from being able to do this completely because physiologists do not yet know the details of the brain cell processes. But between the physiologists and psychologists, we do know a great deal, however.

For one thing, we cannot escape the conclusion already mentioned that instinct is purely a matter of brain cell reaction. The

brain ends of the afferent or incoming nerves deliver their pulses to the adjacent brain cells, and some sort of cellular effect occurs in the midst of the brain and in turn the brain ends of the efferent or outgoing nerves are affected and their pulse started. While the action is so wonderfully complex that we can have no conception of the details, we are forced to conclude that for every possible combination of incoming nerve pulses, due to environment effects on the senses, the brain cells produce such reaction as to send out a consequent or corresponding set of outgoing nerve pulses which make the muscles perform the action which matches with the environment. We have already discussed the molecular and atomic reactions of dead matter, as well as the claim of the school of vitalists that the cat's cells are subject to "vital forces" beyond the attracting and aggregating forces and the like, of dead matter. But whatever is the cause of these reactions, the cat's brain cells certainly do react to the incoming nerve pulses, which are produced by the environmental effect on the cat's senses caused by the mouse, and as a result, outgoing nerve pulses are produced which result in the muscle movement which effect the capture.

The cat's instinct, then, resides in the configuration or quality or other properties of its brain cells, which make them react to given nerve influences in a definite way.

We define "instinct" therefore as a reaction or other such effect which occurs in brain cells when an afferent nerve pulse is received from senses, and which serves to send forth a corresponding efferent nerve pulse to muscles.

This is, of course, no explanation of instinct, but it is a distinct clarification of the idea. Furthermore, it is the first step in that complete explanation for which all biologists strive. We do not have the overwhelming mystery of the behavior of the cat as being possibly the result of influences from supernatural beings, as supposed by the Egyptians or being due to a supernatural soul transmigration from some previous being, or as being due to influences from the moon or stars.

We have, on the other hand, localized the reasons for the cat's behavior as being due to reactions of atoms and molecules of life cells of a certain group called the brain, definitely located within the cat's skull. We still have the overwhelming mystery of the nature of the reactions of the brain cells, but these are identical with or allied to the reactions of the atoms and molecules of the

lump of coal, so that we have some complete or partial analogies to guide our analysis of the cats' instincts.

Another evidential matter is the fact that our particular cat caught its mouse and played with it afterwards in much the same way as does your cat or any of the cats we knew in our childhood. These cat actions the reader knows perfectly well from personal experience. We also all know how they differ from dog actions under similar circumstances. The theory of instinct which has been given explains this adequately. The same sort of brain cells grow up inside the skulls of all cats, and the reactions of these cells must be the same.

The hypothesis that the reactions of the molecules of the lump of coal are a similar sort of thing to the reactions of the cat's brain cells, is important enough to warrant a little further discussion.

A simple oxygen molecule is bound to react in a definite way in an environment comprising high temperature and carbon molecules. The point we seek to make is that in a similar sort of way the vastly more complex molecules of the brain cells, and the incomprehensibly complex aggregation which constitutes the cell itself, and the trillion times more complex aggregation of cells in a section of cat brain, will react in a perfectly definite way to any given environment of pulses from sense nerves so as to send an exactly resultant pulse along muscle nerves.

Molecules, like the simple aggregations of a few elements such as carbon and hydrogen, are more complete than the oxygen molecule. These have certain properties and do certain things under given environmental conditions of a much more complex nature than oxygen reactions.

Such reactions give us the various effects produced by chemists and engineers. The carbon in steel is arranged so as to give it various properties; and thereby bridges, automobiles and skyscrapers are produced. The lump of coal is manipulated so as to make the atoms of carbon and hydrogen associate first into coal tar and then into dye-stuffs with all of the colors of the rainbow, or into explosives used to charge bombs.

The biologists tell us that molecules in living protoplasm are much more complicated aggregates of carbon, hydrogen and other atoms, than the molecules with which chemists and engineers deal. Their reactions are therefore correspondingly complicated. A cell is a complex organization of several different types of matter, each

portion containing countless molecules. Hence the parts of the cat's brain which receive the pulses from the sense nerves have countless possible kinds of reaction corresponding to the different kinds of effect transmitted from the senses. A single carbon atom such as in the lump of coal has a few simple reactions when subjected to certain effects. We can conceive a numerical calculation of the greater number of reactions which a brain cell can have, based on the permutations and combinations of the effects due to its billions on billions of atoms, combined in many ways in countless molecules of many different types, and these further combined in all sorts of living matter forming cell nuclei, cell walls and other kinds of brain cell substance.

Simple reactions of living matter have been studied by biologists and the exact occurrences analyzed under the name "tropism". Light, heat, stimulation and other environmental effects make simple aggregations of living cells perform definite actions which are well understood in many cases. There are increasingly complex reactions of living matter in plants and trees and in the cells of the cat's muscles and stomach. Finally, when we come to the cat's brain cells, the complexity is past all understanding. In the ascending scale from the oxygen molecule, through more complex chemical compounds, through simple life cells, and more complex ones in various parts of the cat's body, and finally to the cat's brain cells, there is never any point where anything occurs that cannot be referred to increasingly complex reactions of matter.

Ever since alchemists tried to find the Philosopher's Stone, finite hands have made all sorts of combinations of matter, and have recombined systems so as to initiate all sorts of reactions. The alchemists themselves made sulphuric acid and many kinds of simple chemicals. Their successors, the modern chemists, make tri-nitro-toluol and coal tar colors. But no finite hand has ever created an atom of the things we know as matter, nor a bit of the other thing we call energy. The philosophers called "vitalists" therefore maintain that there is a third thing called "life" which endows matter and energy with properties not otherwise possible. However, we need spend no time on this problem, but can confine our attention only to the reactions of life calls such as in the cat's brain, without inquiry into the distinction, if any, between life processes and the reactions of non-living matter. They are all reactions of one sort or another and it is not our present purpose to

distinguish between the sorts. The cat stopped for no philosophy as to why he acted as he did when the mouse appeared, and we can watch him do it and trace the affair back to brain cell reaction, without going back any further, as to the ultimate how and why the brain cells came to be and to react.

The common way of starting a discussion of "how life cells multiply", is to begin with the growth of crystals. There often has been given the description of how the molecules have an affinity or love for each other in certain ways, so as to build up an aggregation with the characteristic structure. Thus certain salts crystalize out of a saturated solution, or ice crystals form in slowly cooled water. Unfortunately, I cannot here keep on with the concrete case of a lump of coal, in order to fix attention in this matter of crystallization. The molecules of carbon in the lump of coal do form crystals, but if I knew how to describe the action, I would be manufacturing artificial diamonds instead of writing this article.

The complex molecules of living matter aggregate and grow in much more complicated ways than do crystals, and furthermore, have the marvelous faculty of reproduction, whereby a new organization is started, which aggregates and grows in the same way as the parent. But we have no intention of going into the biological details of how a tom-cat will transmit his instincts to his kittens.

There is one point which we do want to make, however, and that is that the kittens, in common with all other reproduced offspring, differ slightly from the old cats. This is a sudden plunge into the midst of evolutionary theory, but we have no space for the details. The various schools of evolution are having a merry quarrel about the exact reason for the "variations" or slight differences between the old cats and the kittens, so that we laymen had better steer clear of this particular point. There are, however, certain things upon which the various evolutionists do agree, in between the times when they are disagreeing. Fortunately, therefore, an author may assume that his readers nowadays, will also agree on the general principle of evolution.

Instead, then, of the allegory in the first chapters of Genesis we have the statement that all life has grown up from more elementary forms. There are differences in successive generations of offspring, such as to better and better fit them to survive amidst their environment. So have successive generations of plants, ani-

mals and all living things acquired coverings, frames, internal organs and means of reproduction which fit the individual and the race to survive.

The reason then, why our tom-cat has claws and teeth and a furry tongue is because the possession of these things has assisted survival.

One purpose of this article is to convince the reader that the instincts of the cat, mouse-catching and otherwise, are just as much a part of the cat's evolutionary heredity as its claws. The brain cell formation which, when subject to the environment of the mouse, reacts so as to make the claw muscles move in a certain way, is a physical thing of exactly the same sort as the claw itself. The shape of the claw, its sharpness and hardness, we call a physical formation. The shape of the cat's brain cells, which react so as to make the claw move in a certain way, when subjected to a certain nerve pulse stimulation, is a physical formation of exactly the same nature. Thus far the reader will probably go with me without question. I hope the evidence I have already submitted will insure this. The point which I hope the reader will concede also, is that the cat's instincts, since they are things of the same nature as its physical qualities, are transmitted by the same evolutionary laws. This is really not violently novel. It is not difficult to conceive that only those cats survived who had brain cells which reacted so as to move the claws and do the other mouse catching acts. Just as the claw mechanism was evolved through countless generations of cats, so as to have a shape well suited to catch mice, so the brain cells whose reactions served to move the claw muscles, were evolved also. This aspect of evolutionary theory seems very important and very evident to me, and yet it is dwelt upon but little. Darwin himself gives scant attention to this point. So far as I know, the Mendelian experimenters have never devoted any attention to transmission of instincts. Yet there must be Mendelian transmission of instinctive characteristics just as of physical characteristics.

While nothing probably has been actually recorded for cats, there are certainly records for some breeds of dogs, showing that rat catching ability is hereditary. This means not only inheritance of the claws, muscles and other obvious physical configurations which make efficient rat-catchers, but also inheritance of the brain cell configurations called "instincts" which give reactions which

properly operate the obvious parts. Many breeds of dogs have perfectly good paws and claws for catching rats, but do not have brain cells which react so as to operate the paws and claws in a way which makes for success. We must conclude then, that instincts are due to brain cell configurations which react in definite ways as the result of sense and nerve influences and that these configurations are evolved in exactly the same way as are the cells which produce protective colorings, sense organs and other elements in the theories of "Survival of the Fittest".

We have concentrated attention upon the effects which the brain cells at the ends of the cat's afferent nerves, have upon other brain cells as the beginnings of its efferent nerves. However, while the initial configuration of these two molecular organizations is possibly the principal thing, there are many other agencies in the cat's body which affect the condition of these cells and their reactions. The blood, digestive juices, glandular secretions and the general physiology of the cat all have some influence on the general way in which the brain cells react, but we have neither space or knowledge to go into such details. We generalize, by saying that the cat's instincts are due to its physical organization as evolved by the law of the survival of the fittest.

Of course the reader has long since penetrated the innocent little camouflage I have adopted of using our tom-cat as a means of fixing the attention in the matter of instincts in general. The human animal has a set of instincts of exactly the same kind as the cat. Due to these, the new born infant makes its discomfort and hunger known by cries, or suckles when there arrives a combination of hunger and opportunity. As the infant matures and becomes an adult, there are many other things which it does as a matter of instinct with the same sort of brain cell reaction as in the case of the cat. There also may be things which a human being does which may not be a matter of instinct. Some would include in this category, so-called reasoning and will power. Such things are not our present subject. There are, however, enough human actions to occupy our attention, which I hope to show are plainly matters of the same sort of hereditary transmission of brain cell configuration as those which govern the cat's instincts.

A good example of an instinct common to man and many animals is the one of "self preservation". We include a vast complex of heterogeneous brain reactions in this category. The reader

has a good general idea of the matter and can take the detailed analysis for granted without being bored here by it. One of the first things to appear, as animal life has evolved from lower to higher forms, is retreat in the face of danger. The tiny kitten with no actual experience with dogs will back into a safe place and arch its little back in a most ludicrous way at the approach of a dog. Similar instances could be tabulated without number culminating in the efforts at self-preservation of an unreasoning human infant. If the infant is in a safe and comfortable situation it rests quietly and mayhap coos with pleasure. But if it is placed in an uncomfortable or dangerous situation, it struggles blindly until accidentally extricated by its own efforts or by some adult attracted by its lusty cries. All infants who did not have such protective instincts were evolved out of existence when our race was in its early wild state.

Similar sorts of instincts keep us alive in our adult period. We have instinctive fears and struggles in the face of real or fancied dangers. A sleeping person will struggle to extricate himself from an uncomfortable situation with no knowledge of the matter when he awakes.

There are a great many other instincts of animals and humans which have not the immediate effect of those cited above but which make for preservation in the long run. An animal prepares a lair or cocoon in summer which protects him in winter, birds build nests and squirrels store nuts. Men build houses, lay in coal for winter, serve an apprenticeship at a trade, save up for old age, and do a quantity of similar things covered by the term "provident".

Some people lack such instincts and so much of our poverty arises. The African savages are at one extreme in this matter and the prosperous Anglo-Saxon middle class is at the other, and there are all grades between. There is obviously an inborn difference in the mental characteristics of various classes, so far as providence for the future is concerned. I hope I have given enough evidence to prove that this is due to a difference in physical configuration which cause different kinds of noses, hair or skin pigment.

The grasshopper, who in the fable, sings all summer and the ant who stores for the winter, have the same inborn differences. Each reacts in a way which has been evolved through countless generations to fit its own race to survive.

This instinct of self-preservation of course has a certain ele-

ment of selfishness. In order to preserve its own personality and its own kind, each individual is, upon occasions, more or less indifferent or even antagonistic to other individuals or other races.

It would seem that a certain amount of selfishness is necessary for self-preservation. However, there is one unselfish instinct necessary for survival. This is the one which leads to mating, and to care and nurture of the young. Female chickens, dogs, birds and many other animals will reverse their usual instinct to seize food, in order to benefit their young. Man has similar instincts, developed much more highly, however. We have love and marriage and great sacrifice for the sake of offspring. Most parents will protect their children at any cost. Yet this is not inevitable and there are frequently fathers, as well as mothers, who lack the usual parental instincts. We call such cases abnormal. They are clearly due to a difference of brain structure from the usual type. Such a difference should obviously evolve into rarity, and this has actually occurred, since these cases are known to be "abnormal".

Most human animals, particularly females, at all times have instincts which lead them to protect children. A little girl plays with dolls and a grown woman with live babies. On the other hand, most other female animals only nurture young for a period after they have been mothers. Any young ones, whether of her own litter or not will be nursed by a female mammal for a certain time. At other times, they wholly ignore young. Carniverous males will freely attack the young of other species but instinctively leave unharmed the young of their own kind. All of these instincts obviously have been evolved and any race whose individuals do not possess them, obviously will not survive.

Mankind has many attributes beyond the instincts of animals, which of course, help in determining his relations to others. Among these are habit, reasoning ability, will and power to follow precept and example. The explanation of these attributes has been a matter of philosophical discussion for centuries. There are the "mechanists" who believe that everything we do is a matter of cell reaction and the like. These reactions are immensely complicated perhaps, but still, they believe, differ only in complexity and not in kind from the reactions of crystals or plants.

There are other philosophers, whose views are shared by the majority of people, who hold that in addition to the cell structure of the brain, with the reactions which we have been discussing,

there is a "personality" or "soul" with will-power of a non-mechanical kind. We do not need here to take sides on any of these points. In any case, the exact configurations of the brain cells have an appreciable influence and we need not agree on the exact extent of this influence. The particular kind of action which occurs in any case is still largely matter of the fundamental brain formation, regardless of the kind of philosophy we hold. If a brain lacks those qualities which tend to make the individual considerate of others, we say he is born selfish. We know well that people are born misers, spendthrifts, "poor white trash", laggards and so on. These things are all to some extent matter of a physical brain, regardless of soul, will or reason. There must exist therefore some fundamental brain formation which enables exercise of reasoning, will power, or attention to precept from others. In other words, whether or not human beings have any mental power beyond purely mechanical results of cell reaction to environment, these powers are, more or less, dependent upon the existence of a physical brain with a definite cell formation which has been evolved on the basis of the survival of the fittest.

We make the hypothesis therefore that *the ethical and social qualities which we possess are due to evolution, and are such as have made our race survive*. The exact combination of selfishness and altruism which the average human being possesses is such as has kept the race in existence, and enables it to evolve from lower forms. Of course the evolution is still in process and those social qualities are sure to become more predominant which best assist survival.

It will be worth while to consider a few more examples of this fundamental premise. Certain animals and a few abnormal men cannot tolerate others, even of their own kind, and have what we call ferocious "instincts". It is obvious that a race with such characteristics cannot survive. On the other hand, most if not all races of animals which have survived, do not usually attack their own kind. However, most animals will attack their own kind if their personal privileges are encroached upon. Obviously, individuals which would passively submit to encroachment would be soon evolved out of existence. On the other hand, a certain amount of aggressiveness and desire to seize what is needed for existence, is also necessary for survival. Thus has been evolved the compromise

already mentioned between selfishness and indifference to others, which governs the social relation of most animals.

It is to be noted that what are called "abnormal mental characteristics" such as idiocy and insanity are simply extreme variations in the physical configuration of the brain. They are the same kind of variations as give evolution in general. In this case, there is a form of "unfitness". Such variations automatically evolve themselves into rarity and this is the reason they are unusual or abnormal. Evolutionary theory tells us that variations are always occurring for better or for worse, in shapes of paws, claws and physical characteristics in general, as well as in those physical configurations of the brain which give mental characteristics.

As already noted, most animals passively tolerate others of their kind and actively and unselfishly assist young of their kind under certain circumstances. Observation shows that most humans go much further than this and often unselfishly assist adults of their own kind, as well as other animals. If a healthy animal has a comfortable lair safe from the elements, and a sick one approaches, it is at least unusual, and perhaps unheard of, for the strong to give place to the weak, at the expense of his own exposure to the elements. Yet occurrences such as this are normal for human beings, and in many ways we have practice of the "Golden Rule."

Now it is not inevitable that a human being should practice the Golden Rule. Animals do not, and savages do so, to a much less extent than a modern Anglo-Saxon. In many cases, there is more toleration of others with neither friendship nor animosity. There are, however, some selfish persons who are not merely indifferent towards others, but positively hostile. In cases where it adds to their own comfort, they try to get what they themselves need even at the expense of others. There are at a further extreme, cruel persons, who discommode or torture others without actual gain to themselves, but merely because they have pleasure in seeing others suffer.

After all of the discussion above, I hope it will be agreed that the various kinds of attitudes towards others are matters of fundamental arrangements of the brain cells, as transmitted by heredity. In other words, one is not selfish because he wants to be or because

he wills to be, but because his brain has an inborn twist in that direction.

There are, as already remarked, many parts of the physical organization which participate in the action of the brain, such as the glands and digestive juices. We always refer to every part of the physical system, which influences the brain when we briefly mention "brain configuration".

It has also been noted that the actual brain reactions are affected by an individual's experience, and by the precepts he has received. However, as has been pointed out, there remains always a large influence due to the inherited brain configuration, and this is the thing we are here discussing.

Due primarily to an evolved brain configuration, and secondarily, to environment and experience, human beings of a race grow up with certain ideas of "right" and "wrong". Some races have strongly defined instincts regarding lying or stealing, which is easily developed by precept into a definite code of morality. Others have less pronounced instincts in this direction, but of sufficient strength to be developed by precept into a similar code. Still other races and individuals are deficient in these particular instincts, so that they never see impropriety in fibbing, or appropriating property of others. A similar situation exists with regard to selfishness and altruism, care of the aged and sick, and many similar ethical and social attributes.

As far back as our knowledge of the human race goes, many of these criteria of right and wrong have been said to have come from supernatural sources. I have no intention of controverting any present day ideas in this matter. I believe it will be freely admitted, however, that many such ideas of ancient races, have really not been supernatural, but have grown up through purely human agencies, notwithstanding ideas to the contrary, at the time. No God or other supernatural agencies ever made it "right" to sacrifice human beings, or even animals, or to burn widows on funeral pyres, or, coming down to our own Christianity, to burn and torture people for witchcraft and heresy.

Many types of religion, ancient and modern, teach morality and altruism, and much of the progress of mankind in ethical directions has been due to religious influences. Here again, however, there must also be an hereditary factor. The fact that an individual or race will attend to ethical teachings of a religion is

due to the sort of fundamental brain configuration of which we have so often spoken. The conclusion which I hope to draw is that ideas of right and wrong are matters of the same sort of instinct as led the tom-cat to catch the mouse, and are therefore matters of brain configuration as evolved by laws, such as that of survival of the fittest.

Much as we may hate to admit it, many races have survived whose instincts have led them to think it right to war on other more peaceful nations and take land and goods from them. Most other races think it right to defend themselves from such warlike ones.

It is desirable to develop further the point already mentioned, that there is always a great influence upon a given individual, due to environment, and to example and precept from parents, associates, teachers and preachers. Thus a neutral person may under differing circumstances become either a moderately truthful person or a moderate liar. On the other hand, there is a type so well known as to have given rise to the popular term "natural born liar". Such a person under differing circumstances would become either a moderate or a great liar. In other words, the fundamental characteristics are greatly modified, restrained or developed by circumstances, environment, will-power, reason, precept and perhaps other things besides heredity. The fact that these things can have an influence is more or less of an hereditary trait. However, the exact relation between influence of hereditary and of other things has involved a great deal of biological discussion, and I have no intention of dragging it into this article. I have no doubt that it will be admitted that heredity has *some* influence on the moral characteristics of an individual, and that is enough so far as this article is concerned.

A kitten may become a ferocious alley cat of ugly mien, with one eye out and with ears and tail chewed off, ready to fight for its life under most adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the same kitten could grow up to be a children's pet, fat and lazy, spending its days basking in the sun and preening its handsome fur, with practical loss of the mouse-catching instinct with which we started. In both cases, however, the inherited brain configuration has a great influence in spite of other circumstances. So it is with human mental characteristics, the evolved inheritances plays a great part, but other things are modifying factors.

One very important instinctive brain configuration possessed by

many animals including man, is the one which gives the inclination to follow the leader. This is axiomatic in the case of sheep. In the case of humans, we call it "custom". We very often have a conflict between this general instinct to follow custom, and an opposing individual instinct. This general instinct to follow custom is probably the means whereby various types of individual instincts which have enabled a race to survive, are made use of by other individuals who may not possess the original instincts. On the other hand, custom also often tends for a period to preserve things which do not on the whole assist survival. Evolution teaches us, however, that in the long run, even such things will be eliminated. But in whatever way it acts, the instinct to follow custom is due to a brain configuration which has its effect in common with many others in determining the evolutionary development of our race.

Another characteristic of the brain configuration of animals and men is the ability to form habits. Here again there must be a fundamental ability to form the habit. Only certain types of dogs can be given the habit of herding sheep, and only certain men can learn to juggle balls.

Many physical characteristics are inherited which are neutral so far as survival is concerned. It is probable that a sharp thin nose or a broad flat nose, or blue or green eyes are matters of development. A similar situation must exist with many mental characteristics. However, if I list some mental characteristics which appear to me to be non-essential, I might offend a reader who may have some, which he thinks are essential. I will escape this difficulty by letting the reader supply his own list.

The evolution of mankind itself makes changes in essentiality of characteristics. When our ancestors lived in woods and caves, those who had instincts which made them successful fighters, hunters and fishers were the ones which survived, while those who had characteristics, which nowadays make them mechanics, engineers, chemists or the like, did not get on so well. Existing vestiges of the early instincts of the race are shown by those who hunt, fish or engage in athletics for sport. We would now have vastly greater abilities in physics, chemistry and engineering if they had always been as important factors in survival as they are today. But so far as social and ethical qualities are concerned, there has been no such change. It has always been as important for survival as it is today, that members of a race should assist each other, and should not lie

or steal. The ethical instincts we have are therefore of very early origin.

It is possible to classify the ethical instincts possessed by various kinds of living things. Plant and low forms of animal life have no ethics whatever. They have tropisms or instincts which tend to preserve themselves and propagate their kind with complete disregard of the rest of the universe. They nourish themselves regardless of whether or not they deprive other living things of nourishment.

Next comes those animals which tolerate others of their kind under most circumstances. They may deprive some others of food or even devour others, but usually respect certain or all of their own species. Next are animals which unselfishly nurture the young, but merely tolerate others. The highest degree of all comprises those who assist others. Human beings possess this instinct to some degree or other. Perhaps dogs possess it to a slight degree.

The way in which there are transmitted those social characteristics which assist survival, is well known to us through the story of the evolution of paws, claws, and other purely physical characteristics. For some reason or other, a variation from the usual brain configuration occurs. Such things are now occurring all of the time. Many individuals have criminal instincts, are kleptomaniacs, or otherwise possess something which we term degeneracy or deficiency. On the other hand, there are geniuses, philanthropists, and many who possess special skill or other unusual qualifications not in an evil direction. But these two types are only manifestations of differences. If those things we call "evil" would assist survival, they would be the normal things. The fact that they seem evil to us is because they do not coincide with the brain configurations, which have been the normal ones to survive. And so these "evil" instincts, since they do not assist survival, are not propagated and die out as often as they accidentally occur. The other "good" instincts do, however, propagate themselves, and when one accidentally occurs, it tends to become permanent.

The way evolution acts with physical characteristics is so well known, that I need spend no further time on the identical actions with mental characteristics. Of course our race is evolving all of the time, and those ethical and social characteristics which best fit us to survive ultimately are being approached as the centuries go by. A century or two is nothing to Nature, as she evolves char-

acteristics, both mental and physical, so that we see no rapid change. I think, however, that we can see ethical changes in historical times, and on the basis of these, make some predictions for the future.

Our race has certainly become more observant of the golden rule. One prominent change is in the matter of cruelty. Public sentiment has so evolved that there is a great decrease in the matter of torture and infliction of pain upon persons who may be for any reason in the power of others. It also seems self-evident that the instincts of the human race as an average have evolved within historic times in regard to slavery, unjust imprisonment, and similar matters. The present inhabitants of the globe differ greatly in all such instincts. Some races deem it cruel to destroy any animal life, and even go to the extreme of having two little stilts on each shoe to avoid crushing anything under foot as far as possible. A second class comprises those races or individuals who will not knowingly make animals suffer, but are willing to kill them for self-protection or food. Those of a third class go further and in addition will hunt and fish for amusement even when they do not need food, but will not wantonly be cruel to animals.

These two latter classes include such instincts as are considered normal, while the next two classes are considered abnormal. Those of the fourth class are indifferent to the sufferings of animals, while those of a fifth class find pleasure in the sufferings of animals and even of human beings. It seems to me that evidence can be given showing that the human race is evolving in this matter. Perhaps, we are approaching the second class above mentioned.

Another matter in which the human race is evolving at an appreciable rate is in the matter of superstition. We all have certain beliefs that this or that theory is truly based on more or less reliable evidence. We now know that many once firmly held beliefs were really false. We know of the falsity of the astronomical beliefs of those who tortured Galileo, of the beliefs in mummies of the Egyptians, of the beliefs in witchcraft of the Puritans, and of the beliefs in their Gods of the early Greeks. Present day normal beings do not believe in the supernatural origin of dreams, nor in lucky charms, love philters, fortune telling and astrology.

We are evolving so that we fix our beliefs more and more on definite evidence, and less and less on insufficient evidence or "faith". We may be sure that this evolution will continue. Many religious beliefs now considered as matters of life and death, or

even as matters of eternity, will be found false by the human race evolved in time to come. This is not necessarily because of any intrinsic tendency of the human race toward truth, but solely due to the fact that in the long run those who have such brain configurations as enable them to weigh evidence and assign natural occurrences to their true causes, are better fitted to survive than those who are deluded by superstition. One who believes it unlucky to go under a ladder because he has been told so, and perhaps has seen a few accidental instances, has a brain configuration less adapted to survival than another who can analyse cause and effect so as to realize that there can be no natural law connecting the ladder with succeeding occurrences.

Slight accidental variations in brain configurations of successive generations are just as likely to give instincts in one of these directions, as in the other, but as with every variation, those which tend to cause proper analysis of cause and effect, survive by natural selection, and those which tend toward unreasoning superstition are gradually evolving themselves out of existence.

Another matter of brain configurations in which I hope we are going through visible evolution, is the matter of "war". Certain races think it right to attack other more peaceful nations and to take land and goods from them. Many think that war is a "biological necessity". Others think that it is proper for so-called civilized races to impress their "culture" on so-called barbarians by warlike means. Other races or individuals do not think it right to make offensive war, but do think it right to defend themselves. It seems to me that this is the state toward which mankind is evolving. The warlike races and individuals are probably being eliminated by effect of their own instincts. Some people claim that they will not provide for their own defense from warriors. They will probably be eliminated also.

Therefore, as in all of the other cases we have considered, each being has a fundamental brain configuration which largely determines his ideas and actions in the matter of war. We cannot say that anyone's ideas are intrinsically right or wrong, but only that those ideas which best assist survival will be the ones to persist.

It is probable that there has been an evolution within historic times in the matter of individualism versus socialism. Our present average instincts are such that all attempts have failed to substitute pure socialism for the competition of individualism. Never-

theless, the most advanced races have a good measure of association for public good, in the way of roads, postoffices, schools and Government activities in general. We will probably have evolved to degrees of socialism now impracticable in the course of some thousands of years. It must be remembered always that an individual must possess enough selfishness for self-preservation. We are evolving toward the best balance of selfishness and altruism.

We may conclude then that anything which will be good for the human race as a whole will inevitably become a predominating characteristic, be it physical or mental. Those mental, social or ethical characteristics which best assist survival, are the ones which will necessarily persist. Hence those whose fundamental brain configurations are such as to make them think that those characteristics which are going to survive, are "right", are the ancestors of the future races. There is no other criterion of "right" and "wrong". We have come a long way from the catching of the mouse to this conclusion and it will be well to make a brief resume of the individual steps.

(a) Molecules and atoms, in both "dead matter" and in living cells, have all sorts of reactions, which cause them inevitably to do definite things under given environmental conditions.

(b) The reactions to environmental conditions, of organized beings such as animals and men, are in many cases due to "instincts" which are similarly due to reactions of certain brain cells upon other ones.

(c) The "instinct" or particular kind of reaction which occurs under any given environment is due to the quality or configuration of the brain cells and related parts of the animal organization.

(d) The brain and other qualities or configurations which determine instincts in animals, are inherited from parents just as are purely physical characteristics, such as paws and claws.

(e) Physical characteristics are transmitted from parents to offspring with slight irregular differences or variations.

(f) Such of these differences as make the offspring better fitted to survive, become permanent characteristics of the future race, and we have evolution.

(g) The brain and other configurations which determine instincts are transmitted by the same laws of evolution as are physical characteristics.

(h) Therefore the instinctive action of animals, including human beings, are such as have been evolved by the law of survival of the fittest.

(i) The relations of animals and men one to the other, i. e., their social qualities or ethics, are determined largely by instinct, and hence these qualities have been evolved by the law of the survival of the fittest.

(j) The social qualities which are best adapted to give survival to the race as a whole, will be the ones to persist. The individuals whose brain configurations are such as make them believe those things are "right", will be the ones to perpetuate the race.

What is "good" for one individual is "evil" for another. What is "right" for man's actions toward animals is "wrong" from the animal's point of view. Hence there can be no fundamental criterion. The only thing we do have is the definite law of evolution, that the fittest will survive.

(k) Altruism, observance of the golden rule, and elimination of cruelty of all kinds, are the sort of qualities which will best assist survival of human beings, and we can therefore be sure that evolution will slowly but surely advance such qualities, and gradually eliminate antagonistic ones.

Normal civilized beings now regard as "right" many such qualities which appear to assist survival. Hence the progress of the human race is certain to be in the direction of many of the ideals of present normal civilized beings. This is not because of the intrinsic Right or Beauty of such ideals, but by virtue of the slowly working, but inevitable laws of evolution.

THE CHALLENGE OF ASIA.

BY HERMAN JACOBSON.

THIS is the white man's world. He owns it. He inhabits two-fifths of it and lays down the law for nine-tenths of it. His armies master the continents. His navies circle the seas. His flags wave from pole to pole.

He outnumbers every other race. He has doubled his population in the eighteenth century and tripled them in the nineteenth. Two hundred years ago he made up a bare hundred million. To-day he makes up more than six hundred million. In 1700 A. D. he totaled ten per cent of the human race. Today he totals thirty-five per cent. If all men—whites, blacks, browns, yellows, reds—were mustered on a single field more than one in every three would be white.

He is the world's master—infallible, invincible, secure—as secure as have been the countless races before him who have once shaken this earth with their ephemeral joys.

But since the Russo-Japanese war, and especially since the beginning of the Great War, Asia has begun to challenge his mastery.

The Russo-Japanese war has sent a tremor of surprise down the spine of Asia, reverberating throughout the "color" world, which till then had stood in awe and fear of the uncanny wisdom and power of the white man: He was not invincible! Liliputian Japan, a mere suckling at the breast of the white man's civilization, had sent reeling the war-inveterated white giant who had bullied all Asia and had sprawled out, dog-in-the-manger fashion, over half the white and yellow men's worlds.

Indeed, even the white man himself was thrilled. He had found his peer. He shook his hand with a profusion of respect; flattered him, made much of him; invited him to table and led him to the seat of honor.

The little yellow man was perplexed: "We have been sending him our works of art, our silks, our joinery, and decorations for generations, but he still regarded us as mere barbarians. We show ourselves at least his equal in scientific butchery, and at once we are admitted to his council tables as civilized men. . . . The imbecility of white wisdom!"

Then came the Great Disillusionment—the World War. That monstrous fratricide exposed all the weaknesses of the white man, showing him up at his worst. Among other things, it brought home to Asia the fact that the white man's most cherished treasure—his Science—was a double-edged weapon in the hands of a spirited youngster at the height of his pugnacity. She had been led to believe that that instrument was for the purpose of creating beautiful and necessary things. Now she saw him cut his own throat with it.

Unlike in America, in Asia the stupendous catastrophe was not minimized by distance. The hundreds of thousands of Asians, whom Europe had imported to assist in her self-annihilation, understood the significance of the struggle better than we did, better than Europe. They were outsiders and had no occasion to be swept off their feet by the emotion of the moment. They understood at once that no matter who came out victorious, the fight would knock to atoms the whole economic, physical, moral, and cultural life of the white man's home-land.

After the carnage, Asia watched Europe's convalescence. And she saw that recovery would not be so soon—if at all.

For, among many other things less possible of exact calculation, the Great War cost the white man three hundred and fifty billion dollars, "a figure too overwhelming to carry conviction." More, all the machinery of production and exchange were in a heap. Her whole financial system was represented by a vast sea of banknotes—some genuine, some spurious, but all worthless. All Europe was living by the beggar's staff. Even the countries which emerged least damaged—the countries which won the most signal victories had to turn themselves into vast charity institutions, doling out free rations on an international—wide scale.

More frightful yet was the physical collapse. Even before the war, factory production, accompanied by long hours indoors, underfeeding, poor housing, had sapped the strength of her manhood. One-third of the English people, among the sturdiest in Europe, could not qualify physically for military duty. The

Great War killed off nearly ten million and maimed nineteen million more of the most fit. The least fit survived—to reproduce themselves and their unfitness. To these must be added the twelve million children which would have been born under normal circumstances, as well as the tens of millions that were born of mothers whose constitutions had been too shattered by the roar of cannon to grow up fit—if they grow up at all. Millions more were carried off by typhus, influenza, and other plagues. There are today fifteen million adult women in Europe doomed to a life of celibacy, for there are no husbands for them. As a result of moral and mental distress, physical shock, and world-wide insecurity, millions of married women in Europe have been rendered sterile.

More. Asia sees a bloodless generation growing up in Europe. A writer with the Hoover Mission says: "I visited large country districts where ninety per cent of all the children were rickety and where children of three years are only beginning to walk . . . tiny faces with large dull eyes overshadowed by huge, puffed, rickety foreheads; their small bodies just skin and bones. . . ." The investigation commission of doctors appointed by the medical faculties of Holland, Sweden, and Norway, reported: "Tuberculosis, especially in children, is increasing in an appalling way, and, generally speaking, malignant, . . . assuming unprecedented aspects, such as have hitherto only been known in extreme cases. The whole body is attacked simultaneously, and the illness . . . is practically incurable. . . . It appears in the most terrible forms, such as glandular tuberculosis, which turns into purulent dissolution."

In a word, Asia sees that Europe is face with the zero hour, "the first cold flicker of the dawn for the signal to go 'over the top.' The people behind the trenches are now going 'over the top.' . . . An extraordinary tremor has run through the spinal marrow of Europe. . . . She recognizes herself no longer. . . . The rolling of the ship was so heavy that the best burning lamps have been upset." (Paul Valéry).

On the other hand, the least informed knows that rejuvenescent Asia, with her teeming millions and vast spaces, containing more than half the human race, is today a mighty giant ready for a race after a long rest. From the white man's war, she has suffered not at all. Japan is dazzling the world with her powers of assimilation and initiative. Her industrial, literary, philosophic,

commercial, scientific, and agricultural achievements have become the marvels of our day. China is not far in the rear of Japan. And India is just now holding the earth breathless. It is thus safe to say that if Asia continues at her present rate of progress she will be in a generation or two where Europe was in 1914. Then, if not superior, surely the equal of Europe, she will demand a Day of Reckoning.

The feeling of Asia on this point is best expressed by a Central Asian of great vision and powerful intellect: "Hatred universal reigns from the Siberian tundras to the burned south of India. We hate the European because we consider him an intolerable barbarian, who bullies where his wheedling is unsuccessful. We hate him because . . . he is tortuous and cannot speak the truth; because he prates about his new-found hygiene, but is personally unclean compared to the majority of Asians. We despise him as a hypocrite who ships whisky, rifles, disease, and missionaries in the same mixed cargoes. We despise him because he is a recent parvenu. We are convinced that in spite of his present leadership in mundane affairs, he is our inferior physically, morally, and mentally."

With this Day of Reckoning in view Japan has turned herself into a veritable Prussia; and is rapidly adjusting her present strained relations with China. Pacific China has begun to study the manuals of arms which in the ages past her military leaders have composed, and which the greatest European soldiers—Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Hindenburg, etc.—have used with success. India has entered upon a career of passive resistance which threatens to become more potent than the pagodas of arms of the whole Western world. In Central Asia and in Mongolia, whether at the camp fire at the end of the caravan's day's journey or at the feet of the itinerant story teller in front of the mosques in Bukhara—the tale is heard again how mighty Attila had shaken the white world like a reed; how Genghis Khan and Tamurlane had lorded over two continents and had kept the white man in humble subjection. All Asia—in fact, the whole "color" world—is being welded together by the most potent of all life forces—Self-preservation.

At any rate, a Race War is no less possible in the near future than the Great War was quarter of a century ago. Many, many wise men showed then that a big war in Europe was impossible—religious and moral ties; mutual sympathy, understand-

ing, blood-relationship; socialism, unionism, internationalism; finance and exchange; immigration and emigration; music, art, letters—would make war in Europe impossible, we were assured by the optimist. Then all these theories went up in smoke.

Yet the causes for a Race War are today far more numerous—with practically none of the preventive factors—than were the causes for the Great War twenty-five years ago.

Of course, the members of the "Rocking-Chair Fleet" will shout: "Let her come! Let John Chinaman and his crew put up their dukes! We will show them who is who!"

Mr. Swashbuckler is always certain who is to come out victorious. When the Russo-Japanese war broke out General Kuropatkin shouted: "Me yikh shapkami zakinnim!" (We will shoo them off with our caps.) But the man who investigates, thinks, and weighs, is not so sure. Professor A. E. Ross, one of the foremost social students in America, says:

"To the West the toughness of the Chinese physique may have a sinister military significance. Nobody fears lest in a stand-up fight Chinese troops could whip an equal number of well-conditioned white troops. But few battles are fought by men fresh from tent and mess. In the course of a prolonged campaign involving irregular provisioning, bad drinking water, . . . loss of sleep, exhausting marches, . . . excitements and anxiety, it may be that the white soldiers would be worn down worse than the yellow soldiers. In that case the hardier man with less of the martial spirit might in the closing grapple beat the better fighter with the less endurance."

It is worth recalling that this is just what happened during the Russo-Japanese war.

* * *

Above all else, while considering the Asian problem we must not allow our minds to become befuddled by the base propaganda which would lead us to believe that the Asian is a barbarian, inferior to ourselves morally, spiritually, and mentally. Let us keep before us the fact that it was Asia which has given the world all the basic discoveries, without which the greatest part of our civilization were absolutely impossible. Among many other things, China has given us the water-wheel, the cart-wheel (without which practically none of our machines, from the simple pulley to the locomotive, would be possible), the science of irrigation, bridge-building, finger prints, bronze-casting, porcelain-making, printing,

paper-making, gunpowder, the compass, silk-culture, etc. In political life, the Chinese are in some respects our superiors even today. They know nothing of racial prejudice, religious intolerance, nationalistic fire-eating. They have outgrown them thousands of years ago. When all Europe was torn to pieces by religious bigotry, inquisition chambers, witch-burning; when the sole object of government in the white man's world was the gratification of the vicious caprice of the governors—China held in her dominion all sorts of races, religions, and creeds, exercising herself almost always prudently and equitably. Her officials got into office by means of competitive examinations, which we are copying in the best ordered departments of our own government. And popular opinion among us to the contrary notwithstanding, her literati officials have not yet been matched in honesty and integrity.

If we are ever to solve the Asian problem, let us not forget during moments of self-exaltation that it was India which gave us the decimal system, our algebra and most of our geometry, without which no mathematical science—the bedrock of our material civilization—were possible. With all our achievements in architecture, what have we to match the Taj Mahal, perhaps the most noble monument to human building ingenuity of all time. It was India that taught us our knowledge of anatomy and much of our physiology. India has fathomed the mysteries of the circulation of the blood a thousand years before Harvey saw the light of day. In the realm of abstract thought, remarks Professor Rawlinson, "There is scarcely a problem in the science of ontology, psychology, metaphysics, logic, or grammar which the Indian sages have not sounded as deeply and discussed as elaborately as the Greeks." The reader who would dwell on the poetic fervor and intellectual magnitude of the Persian need but think of the Tent Maker, Omar, whose verses—*Rubaiyat*—shall endure as long as human tongue utters speech.

Last, let us not forget that it was Asia which gave the world her greatest religions. Confucianism, Buddhism, Zoroasterism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Christianity—they all hail from Asia.

Under these circumstances, is the Asian to be reproached if he remarks: "We look with a smile at the paralyzing feeling of superiority of the European. . . . We know how very recent is the present European hegemony, how shallow, how tinselly, how altogether parvenu. . . . We smile when we are called 'barbarians.'"

Let us be frank, the best of us, are full of the prejudices of barbarians when dealing with Asia. From childhood on, we are taught the dark side of Asia. We grow to manhood with no other knowledge or understanding of her than that her inhabitants are barbarians, heathens, idol-worshipers, and what-not, most of whom, like so many sheep, owe us their wool. All we know about them is that they are ignorant—though there is not a Chinaman, assures us Mr. Hyndman, who does not know how to read and cast accounts—superstitious, filthy, lazy, vicious, criminal—yellow devils who spend their worthless lives smoking opium and cheating white men—the best of them fit only to bake our beans and make our beds.

On the other hand, the white man forgets that he really is an upstart. The average European, even the cultured one, often thinks of his greatness—his science, his art, his hygiene; his whole culture—as reaching back to the day of creation.

In reality nothing is further from the truth. Before the Reformation the life of the average European was but a step above the life of the barbarian. Shakesperian England, to mention one illustration, consisted of clusters of filthy hamlets dignified by the name of towns, where plagues, due to an unmentionable lack of sanitation, periodically carried off half the population. The pedestrian paddled through the streets knee deep in mud. The crowd was often entertained by gallants pommelling each other over the heads to hasten a decision as to who had the right of way afforded by a couple of brickbats in the middle of a mud-puddle at the street-crossings. Even in London, the world's metropolis of our day, the visitor of a hundred and fifty years ago was warned to "hug the wall," meaning that if he ventured within throwing distance from a window, he ran the risk of having a slop jar emptied on his new silk hat. Our standards of comfort, of wealth, hygiene, were undreamed of by the European of two hundred years ago. His chief asset usually consisted of a huge pile of manure decorating the front entrance of his house. He lived with his pig and his horse under the same roof—as he still does in many parts of Europe. His political life consisted of his own total exclusion from any participation in the affairs which governed his world. The vast majority of his governors were men who bought their way to office with money, blackmail, or both—and were not ashamed of it. (Think of Francis Bacon.) The slightest concession of freedom was wrung from his governors

only at the threat of immediate hanging. One needs not stretch his imagination too much to catch a peep of the Europe of two or three centuries ago as a vast penal colony where the inmates lived solely for the glory of the king and the priest.

Our apologists have succeeded in making us believe that our ill-treatment of Asia is due to her senseless determination to remain in isolation. From the child in the grades to the writer of our encyclopaedias, we have all been painstakingly rehearsed in the myth of Asia's stubborn opposition to our Promethean efforts to bring her Light, and her refusal to accept it—her determination to stay in Darkness. If this were true we would have reason to rejoice. The fate of Prometheus is no longer visited upon the bearers of Light. Prometheus illuminates the earth with his torch and the children of darkness are chained to a rock, a vulture devouring their entrails. Christ is in His Kingdom and Satan is on the Cross. Truly, the Messiah is at hand!

But is this really the case? Well, let the reader think the matter over.

So far as this point concerns Asia, Professor Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Chinese scholar of great erudition, challenges: "Can the combined intellect of Europe and America point to a single period of Chinese history in which the country was closed to foreigners? Is there a 'Cycle of Cathay' during which the Chinese refused to receive new arts and sciences from outsiders?" Then he proves that China had intercourse with Byzantium, Rome, Western Europe, Africa,—with the whole known world. He further shows that China never knew what it meant not to tolerate strangers. From time immemorial there lived in China Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, etc., etc. And none ever met with a lack of toleration. Indeed, the very word toleration, which, in the West of even our own day, presupposes the privilege not to tolerate if those in power so choose—has no existence in China.

The reason Asia refused to deal with the modern European is to be found in the fact that from the moment he landed he proved an arrogant trouble-maker, in spite of the fact that he was most hospitably received. He sent armed bands into the interior and hunted and victimized the inhabitants, selling the women into a life of shame and the men into slavery. He set afoot a multitude of intrigues and waged wars to gain concessions to sell poison to the people, (the Opium War) and put up signs on the parks he chose to frequent: "No dogs and Chinamen admitted." In fact,

even the best of his immigrants proved not altogether desirable. Asks Mr. Hyndman: "What would be the fate of a body of Chinese propagandists who occupied themselves in London in publicly denouncing the faith of common Englishmen, and wax insistent upon pointing out what seemed to them the absurdities of the Trinity."

* * *

Confronted with the possibilities of such a monstrous catastrophe as a Race War is sure to precipitate, even if we came out victorious, the white man must turn about in search of something that promises to halt it. For at best, such a war would thrust us back to the plane of the cave men.

The first thing to do is to begin combatting the hate literature among us. Hate literature may help win wars but it does not help win peace.

The next thing is to take some of the billion and a quarter which we are now annually appropriating for armament, get a few great philanthropists to contribute liberally, and set afoot a campaign of education along the following lines:

Put a chair on Asian affairs in every university and a brief course in every high school—the courses being prepared by a joint commission of whites and Asians; launch a number of publications of a popular nature dealing with the life of Asia, past and present; put out a few million feet of film picturing their life honestly and truthfully and sympathetically; organize a few groups of liberal and broad-minded men of both sides to co-operate in curbing the greedy aggressions of their respective trouble-makers—and a new understanding and a new sympathy will arise between the "color" world and the white world in the course of a single generation.

Those who think this too optimistic and too easy, need but think of the fact that it was really "Education" that "won" the Great War. There is no reason why we should not be able to put forth as much effort in time of peace as we have put forth in time of war, if need be, to prevent war—war more certain and far more catastrophic than all previous wars combined.

There are a few who insist that a clash is imminent, no matter what is done to prevent it. They assure us that the Asian problem can be solved by no amount of sympathy, understanding, and education. They point out that the whole problem is based on the difficulty of finding room for the eighteen million new

mouths which yearly come to the world's dinner table. Those left without seats have no choice but start a fight during which they hope to grab a seat. "The enemy of the dove of peace is not the eagle of prey nor the vulture of greed; but the stork."

These people must be shown that the problem of finding room at the world's dinner table is far from serious. In fact, it is no problem at all for the present. Statisticians have shown that even if both production and the present rate of increase in population remain the same, there is room enough and food enough for the next two hundred years. The United States alone could easily support, under existing conditions, more than two hundred million people. Siberia could support twice as many; while she at present contains only about twenty million. The unoccupied tracts of Central and South America, Canada, Australia, etc., are equally spacious. In fact, the problem of finding room at the world's dinner table may be dismissed even if everything remained the same.

Whereas in reality the present rate of production is bound to increase and the rate of increase in population is bound to diminish. In the past fifty years Swift's dream of two blades growing where one used to grow has been surpassed twenty fold. Again, half a century ago not one man in a hundred knew anything about the secret of directing the flight of the stork. Today from five to ten per cent know all about it; and their percentage is constantly on the increase with the increase of intelligence.

For the past few decades we have been living by the jingo dictum pronounced by Kipling:

East is East and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet.

If we are to save ourselves from the consequences of this barbarian dictum we must adapt the more noble one pronounced by Goethe:

Who himself and others knows
. . . is rightly guided;
Orient and Occident
Are no more divided.
Proper it is through both to roam
And in either feel at home.

HOW THE RABBIS REGARDED THE COMMANDMENTS.

BY JULIUS J. PRICE.

FOR the bulk of the Jewish nation, the law was and is the formulation of all religion: it was and is the supreme guide of life; and as being for the Jew the articulate expression of the divine will it was and is the final appeal in all matters of religious life and practise. As the law did in the past so also does it in the present represent the essence of Judaism and as it formed part of the background and of the basis of the newer teachings which were to come, it is important that some insight into the Jewish conceptions of it and of the individual attitude of the Jew towards it, should be illustrated by citations from the Talmud which is based on it.

The influence and power of the law was largely due to the fact that from earliest childhood its practical carrying out was witnessed in the home; the husband taught his wife, the father his child, the master his servants, the precepts of the law and the need of observing them. The commandments seemed to be spoken to the individual soul. "I am the Lord thy God." Each of the assembled Israelites at Sinai was but one among many myriads, and yet he was alone—alone with that voice. "This commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. But the word is very high unto thee in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."

The law does not require the belief of man in certain speculative or supernatural theories; such hidden things belong to God, man's happiness consists in following the commandments of the Lord. There is an equal law for everybody; for the free born and for the stranger, for the free man and for the slave. *Lev.* xvix. 33-34, "And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye

shall do him wrong. The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the home born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt. I am Jehovah, your God." And again, *Num.* ix. 14, "And if a stranger shall sojourn among you and will keep the passover unto Jehovah, according to the Passover of the statue of the Passover, and according to the ordinance thereof, so shall he do; ye shall have one statue both for the sojourner and for him that is born in the land." Nobody is above or beneath the law.

Israel was to be the priestly people; the sheltering ark in which the pledge was entrusted contained a true knowledge of God and was the positive and preserved. With the divine promise that made Israel the elect of all nations, there is transmitted to them the moral and spiritual equipment which justifies its fulfilment.

The Jewish law was to bring true happiness to all men, hitherto a barren wish. The Torah prohibits the shirking of man's duties to his fellow men, or his sinking in the barren attempt to obtain salvation by castigating the flesh. On the contrary Judaism is impregnated with the spirit of optimism and joy of life.

Fidelity to the law and steadfastness in the knowledge and service of Jehovah was to be the strength and the noblest feature of the Jewish people. Nothing could better express the firm determination to cling unswervingly to the ancient traditions than the words of Mattathias, the first of the great Maccabæan leaders; "If all the nations that are in the house of the king's dominion hearken unto him, to fall away each one from the worship of his fathers and have made choice to follow his commandments, yet will I and my sons and my brethren walk in the covenant of our fathers. Heaven forbid that we should forsake the Law and the ordinances. We will not hearken to the king's words, to go aside from all worship, on the right hand nor on the left." Or better still at the time when Pilate set up the Roman eagles with the images of the Emperor in Jerusalem, the Jews crowded to Cæsaræ and remained for six days in supplication before the prætorium; on the seventh day the procurator surrounded them with his troops and threatened to move them down; but they threw themselves down on the ground, bared their necks and called on Him to kill them rather than impose on them a breach of their law. This spirit was typical of hundreds of thousands of other Jews, who

willingly laid down their lives rather than swerve from what they believed to be the right path. As a result then of Israel's great fidelity in the law and its careful adherence to the commandments "The Holy one—blessed be He!—Was pleased to render Israel meritorious, therefore He multiplied unto them the Law and the precepts, as it is said (Isa. xlii:21), "The Lord is well pleased for His righteousness' sake. He will magnify the Law and make it honourable." Rabbi Samlaii explains that six hundred and thirteen commandments were communicated to Moses—three hundred and sixty-five negative, according to the number of the days of the year, and two hundred and forty-eight positive, according to the number of members in the human body. Rav Hamunah was asked what was the Scripture proof for this. The reply was (Deut. xxiii:4), "Moses commanded us a Law." Torah, Law by gematria, answers to six hundred and eleven. "I am" and "Thou shalt have no other," which were heard from the Almighty himself, together make up six hundred and thirteen . . . David reduced these to eleven, as it is written (Psxv. 1-5). . . . Iraiah reduced them to six, as it is written (Isa. xxxiii:15). . . . Micah reduced them to three, as it is written (Micah vi:8). . . . The second Isaiah again reduced these to two, as it is said (Isa. lvi:1). "Keep judgment and do justice." Amos reduced these to one, as it is said (Amos v:4). "Seek ye me and ye shall live". But to this it was objected that it might mean "Seek ye me by the performance of the whole and entire Law; "but it was Habakkuk who reduced all to one, as it is said (Hab. ii:4), "The just shall live by his faith."

It was a custom with the people of Jerusalem when a person went out of his house on the Feast of Tabernacles, to carry a palm frond in his hand; when he went to the synagogue, he still carried it with him; when reciting the Shema or repeating the usual prayers, he still retains it. When called up to the reading of the Law, or when a priest had to lift up his hands to bless the congregation, then, and then only, did he lay down the palm fond on the ground. When he went to visit the sick or to comfort the mourner, he carried the palm with him; when, however, he went to the Bethhamnidrash (academy or lecture hall), he sent it home by his son or some other messenger. Well, what is the import of all this? It is to inform us how heartily the people of Jerusalem observed the precepts. Resh Lakish says, "Even over the transgressors of Israel the fire of Gehinnom will have no

power." This is argued a fortiori; if the golden altar, which was overlaid with gold no thicker than a denar and the wood under the protection of the gold resisted the influence of the fire for many years, how much less will the fire of Gehinnom have power against the transgressors of Israel, who are as full of precepts as a pomegranate is full of pits: as it is written (Cant. 1v:3), "Thy temples are like a piece of pomegranate." Read not Thy temples, but read the empty ones; even they that seem to be empty of any good are nevertheless full of good works, as a pomegranate is full of pits."

The school of Shammai say, "He who, having eaten, and has forgotten to return thanks, must go back to the place where he had eaten and there return thanks; "but the school of Hillel say, "He may return thanks on the spot where he called to mind his omission." . . . The latter observed to the former, "according to your words, if one has eaten on the roof of a palace and has forgotten to return thanks he must go back to the roof of the palace and there make up for his omission." The school of Shammai replied to the school of Hillel, "According to your words, if one have left his purse on the roof of a palace, will he go back again to the spot and fetch it? If, then, he returns for his own honour, how much more ought he to return for the honour of Heaven?" There were two scholars, one of whom by mistake followed up the rule of the school of Shammai and he found a purse of gold; the other intentionally followed out the rule of the school of Hillel and he was devoured by a lion. Rabbah, the grandson of Channah, was once travelling in a caravan and having finished his meal, he forgot to repeat the usual thanks on the spot. "What shall I do?" said he. "If I were to tell them that I forgot to repeat the thanksgiving and must therefore return to the place where I had my meal, then they would say, 'Repeat it here, for wherever thou sayest it, thou sayest it to God, who is everywhere.' It is therefore best that I should tell them that I have forgotten a golden dove and must go back and fetch it and ask them to wait here for me." He went and returned thanks upon the spot where he had taken food, and there he actually found a golden dove. But what made him say a golden dove? Because the community of Israel is compared to a dove, as it is written (Ps. lxviii:13), "Ye shall be as the wings of a dove covered with silver and her feathers with yellow gold." As a dove finds no deliverance but by means of her wings, so like-

wise Israel are not delivered from persecution but by the practice of the commandments.

All precepts which Israel has performed in this world will appear in the next, and smite the nations in the face, as it is said (Deut. iv:6), "Keep therefore and do them, for this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations." Scripture does not say "before the nations," but "in the eyes of the nations", which teaches that the precepts will appear in the world to come, and smite the nations on the face.

Rabbi bar Rev. Josi expounded (Prov. vi:23), "For the commandment is a lamp, but the Law is a light. "The Scripture compares the former to a lamp and the latter to a light, which is to teach thee as a lamp shines only at night, and only for an hour or so, so also the commandment is a protection only during the short time in which it is being performed; but as the light shines all day long, and continuously, so also is the Law; it protects those that study it for ever, for the same Scripture says (ibid., ver. 22), "When thou goest it shall lead thee, when thou sleepest it shall keep thee and when thou awakest it shall keep thee," in the right way; "Where thou sleepest," in death, "it shall keep thee" in safety, and preserve thee unto eternal life; "and when thou awakest," at the resurrection of the dead, "it shall come with thee," and for thee it will be thy mediator and intercede on thy behalf, that thou mightest live forever in glory. There is a parable: It is like to a man who travels along a road in a very dark night and is in fear of thorns, of thistles, of ditches, of wild beasts and highwaymen. Having a lighted torch, he is safe from thorns and thistles and also from ditches, but is still in dread of wild beasts and highwaymen, and in doubt as to the road on which he travels. When the morning dawns he is safe also from wild beasts and highwaymen, not free from anxiety as to the road, for he may be going the wrong way. Once having reached the well-beaten track, he is safe from all danger and free from fear and anxiety.

While all Israel on leaving Egypt were busily engaged in spoiling the Egyptians of their gold and silver, Moses was engaged in the performance of the precepts, as it is written (Prov. x:8), "The wise in heart will receive commandments."

Every precept fulfilled in this world goes before and anticipates in the world to come the man who did it, as it is said (Isa. lviii:8), "Thy righteousness shall go before thee." And he

who commits a sin in this world, that sin folds itself round him and goes before him to day of judgment, as it is said (Job. vi:18), "They are folded round as leaven round the heart of a cabbage, by the paths of their way; they go to nothing and perish." Rabbi Elzer says "the sin he has committed is to him like a dog."

Rav. Tuvi bar Kisna asked Rava: "We are taught that he who observes a precept shall receive favour from above; this implies that he who does not observe a precept shall not receive a reward; but we are also taught that he who is passive and commits no sin, a reward is given to him, as if he had actively observed a precept?" Rava replied, "If one is exposed to sin and he resists it, then only is he rewarded as if he had actually performed a precept, as the case of Rabbi Chanina bar Pappa will illustrate. A Matrona (A Roman Lady) solicited him to sin but he in order that she should take a dislike to him, uttered a name (a cabbalistic formula) and at once he became covered with boils and ulcers. But she as quickly cured him by witchcraft, and he ran away and secreted himself in a ruined bath, into which when even two entered at daytime they were injured by evil spirits that haunted the place; but they injured him not. On the following morning he was asked by the Rabbis, "Who protected thee?" He replied, "Some dignitaries of the emperor watched over me all the night." They remarked, "Probably thou wast tempted to an immorality and wast thus rescued therefrom for we are taught, He who is tempted to an immorality and is rescued from it, a miracle is performed on his behalf."

It is Rabbi Jacob who says that there is no reward in this world for the performance of a precept, for tradition teaches that Rabbi Jacob said, "Every precept recorded in the law, by the side of which a reward is expressly attached, the bestowal of that reward depends not on this life, but on the life hereafter, i.e., at the revivification of the dead. For instance, with regard to the precept (Deut. v:16). 'Honour thy father and thy mother', the reward expressly attached to its is, that thy days may be prolonged and that it may go well with thee.' By the precept, 'Let the dam go' (Deut. xxii:7), the reward is stated by the side of it, 'that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days'. Now a father says to his son, 'Go up to the tower and fetch me a brace of young pigeons.' He goes in obedience to his father and does 'let the dam go', and takes only the young in fulfilment of the precept, as the law directed him; but on coming

down from the tower, he falls and is killed. Where is the good and the long life promised as a reward for the fulfilment of these two precepts? It is plain, therefore, that there is no reward in this world, but in the world which is perfectly good and without end. The remark arises, 'Perhaps this never happened.' 'Rabbi Jacob witnessed the fact', is the response. 'Perhaps he intended to commit sin, and he was punished.' 'God does not reckon and punish and evil intention a sinful act.' But 'Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord, that delighteth greatly in His commandments' (Ps. cxii:1). In His commandments but not in the reward of His commandments; and this it is that we are taught, "Be not like servants who serve their master on condition of receiving a reward, but be like servants who serve the master without the condition of receiving a reward."

Both the new as well as the old commandments demand rigorous observance. Rava has expounded what is written in Cant. vii.13, "the mandraks give a smell", as these are the young men of Israel that have never tasted sin. "And at our gates are all manner of pleasant fruits;" these are the young daughters of Israel that tell their husbands, etc., etc. "New and old which I have laid up for thee, O my beloved." The community of Israel said before the Holy One blessed by He—"Lord of the universe! I have imposed upon myself many new decrees, besides the old decrees Thou hast imposed upon me, and I have observed them." Rav Chasda asked a certain disciple of the Rabbi's, who was making up a Haggada before him, "Hast thou not heard what the meaning of "New and Old is?" He replied, "The meaning is, the 'New' are the light, and the 'Old' are the 'weighty' commandments." "What!", asked Rav Chasda, "was the Law given twice? But let me tell thee the 'Old' means the words of the Law, and the 'New' means the words of the Scribes. Give heed, my son, to the words of the Scribes more than to the words of the Law, for the words of the Law consist of positive and negative commandments, the transgression of which is often punished by the infliction of stripes only, but whosoever transgresseth the words of the Scribes is always guilty of death."

Be swift in the performance of a light precept as in that of a weighty one, and flee from transgression. For the fulfilment of one precept leads to the fulfilment of another and one transgression leads to another so that the fulfilment of a second precept is the reward for the first and one transgression is the recompense for

another. "Flee from that which is ugly and from that which is unsightly in appearance"; therefore, the sages say, "flee from a light sin, lest it induce thee to commit a weighty one; pursue a light precept, that it might induce thee to perform a great one." But for the transgression of a light or weighty precept a like punishment is decreed, for the Rabbis inform us "The ministering angels said before the Holy one—blessed be He—"Lord of the universe! why didst thou decree death upon the first Adam?" He replied, "Because I commanded him a light precept and that he transgressed." They further asked, "And did not Moses and Aaron, who kept the whole and entire Law, also die?" He replied unto them (Eccles. ix:2), "There is one chance for the righteous and the wicked," etc.

Rabbi Akiva says, "Whosoever associates with transgressors partakes of their punishment, though he has not transgressed like them; and whosoever accompanied those who perform a precept, though he himself does not do like them, he partakes of their reward."

"Since scripture punished as sinners those who associate with sinners, how much more will it reward those who associate with them that fulfil the commandments, as if they themselves had actually fulfilled them." And Scripture considers him who causes another to fulfil a commandment as if he himself had fulfilled it, as it is said. (Exod. xxvii:5), "And thy rod wherewith thou smotest the river." Did Moses smite the river? Was it not Aaron that smote it? (Exod. xvii:5). But this is to tell thee that who so causeth his companion to fulfil a commandment Scripture considers him as if he had himself fulfilled it. Rabbi Yochanan says, "Every woman who solicits her husband to fulfil the precept (par excellence) will have sons whose equals were not found even in the generation of Moses."

What is the meaning of "that thought upon His name?" (Mal. iii:16) Rav Ashi says, "It means if a man purposes to do a commandment, but is forcibly prevented doing it, Scripture counts it as if he had actually performed it. But if one has kept himself from the performance of a precept and has engaged himself in the commission of a sin, his wife will finally die of the plague, as it is said (Exek. xxiv:16), "Son of man, behold I take away from thee the desire of thine eyes (thy wife) with a stroke." Yet Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said, "Sin committed with a good motive is better than a precept fulfilled for a bad motive."

Tradition records that Rabbi Simon ben Gamliel said, "All those commandments which Israel have accepted with joy such, for instance as circumcision, as it is written (Ps. cxix.162), 'I rejoice at Thy word as one that findeth great spoil'—are still observed by them with joy; but all those commandments which they have accepted with ill-will—such as the prohibition of incest, as it is written (Num. xi:10), 'Then Moses overheard the people weep throughout their families', i. e., about the prohibition of consanguinity—are still observed by them with ill will; for there is not a marriage without some quarrel connected with it." Rabbi Simon ben Elazer said, "All those commandments upon whose account during their interdiction by the government, Israel have laid down their lives, such as those relating to idolatry and circumcision, are still scrupulously observed by them; but all those commandments for the observance of which they would not have had to forfeit their lives at the time the interdict was force, such as that relating to the phylacteries, etc., are still but losely observed by them."

Regarding the relative values of the precepts, the Rabbis say "Visiting the sick has not limited measure." Rav Joseph thought that its reward was commensurate, but Abaii said to him, "Is there, then, a limited measure to the reward for the performance of any other precept? For we are taught: Be diligent in the performance of a light precept as of a weighty one; for thou knowest not which of the precepts has the larger reward." But the meaning of this is, said Abaii, "Visiting the sick has not limited measure; even those of exalted station in life should visit those who are of low estate." Rava said, "No limited measure means to visit even a hundred times in a day if needs be." Rabbi Acha bar Channina says, "He who visits the sick takes away a sixtieth part of his illness." "If that be the case," observed Abaii, "let sixty visitors go at once and they would raise him from his illness." Rabbi Acha replied, "It means the sixtieth part according to the tithing scale of Rabbi, and the visitor must have been born under the same star which was in the ascendant when the invalid was born."

Rabbi Meir says, "Great is the precept of circumcision, for there is no one who has engaged himself in the performance of the commandments as our father Abraham did, and yet even he was not called perfect, but on account of circumcision, as it is said (Gen. xvii:1), 'Walk before me and be thou perfect;' and

immediately after it is written (Ibid. ver. 2), 'And I will make my covenant (of which circumcision is the sign) between thee and me.' Again, great is the precept of circumcision; for in weight it is equal to all the commandments recorded in the Law; for it is said (Exod. xxxiv:27), 'After the tenor of these words (of the commandment) I have made a covenant the sign of which is circumcision) with thee and Israel.'"

It is a precept binding upon a debtor to pay his debts.

With regard to entering and leaving the synagogue, it is said that he who comes out of the synagogue should not make long steps (as if glad to get away quickly from the place of worship). Abaii says, "This is said only with reference to coming out from the synagogue; but with respect to going into it, it is a commandment to run, for it is said (Hosea vi:3), 'Let us run on to know the Lord.'"

Rabbi Illaa said in the name of Rabbi Elazer ben Rabbi Simon, "It is lawful for a man to prevaricate or quibble in the interest peace, as it is said (Gen. 1, 16, 17), 'Thy father did command before he died,' etc." Rabbi Nathan said, "To quibble is a command; for it is said (1 Sam. xvi:2), 'How can I go? If, Saul hear it, he will slay me, and the Lord said, take an heifer with three and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord.'"

The Rabbis differentiated between the precepts that were binding upon men and women. We read "All precepts concerning a father toward his son are binding upon men only, but not upon women; all precepts concerning a child's duty towards his father are obligatory both upon men and women. (This is a Mishna—it is thus explained in the Cemara:) The Rabbis teach, "A father is bound to circumcise his son, to redeem him if he is a firstborn, to instruct him in the Law, to provide him with a wife, and to teach him a trade;" some say "he is to teach him also to swim." Rabbi Yehudah says, "He who does not teach his son a trade teaches him as it were to rob."

The precept "Be fruitful and multiply" (Gen. i:28) is obligatory on man only, but not on woman. Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah says, "It is obligatory upon both for it is said, 'And God said unto them, be fruitful and multiply.'"

A hundred Mizwot ought to be fulfilled by the Israelite each day, and seven ought to surround him constantly like guardian spirit. But there are, however, several classes of individuals who are exempt from these commandments, viz.: Professional writers

of holy books, phylacteries and Mezuzahs (i. e., doorpost charms), as also the vendors of such articles, their agent, and every one that deals in the sacred trade, including the sellers of purple and wool for fringes, are exempt from reading the Shema, from repeating the usual prayers, from wearing phylacteries, and from all the commandments recorded in the Law. This corroborates the words of Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, who used to say "He who is engaged in the performance of one precept is free from the performance of another." The Rabbis also relate that, "A deaf-mute, an idiot and a child, are free from all the precepts contained in the Law." "He who has a corpse before him is exempt from reading the Shema, from prayer, from the phylacteries and from all the commandments mentioned in the Law." A mourner, however, is bound to observe all the commandments mentioned in the Law, excepting phylacteries, for they are named a "Tire" an ornamental headdress, as it is said (Ezek. xxiv:17), "Bind the tire of thine head upon thee."

Tradition teaches that Rabbi Simon ben Gamliel says, "For the sake of a living child only a day old the Sabbath may be desecrated, but it may not be desecrated for a dead child; no, not even for David the King of Israel." In the former case the Law says, "Desecrate one Sabbath for the preservation of the child, in order that he may observe many Sabbaths afterwards"; but in the latter case the Sabbath is not to be desecrated, for when a man dies he is exempted from the commandments; and this is what Rabbis Yochanan said (Ps. lxxxviii:5), "'Free among the dead' i. e., when a man is dead he is freed from the commandments."

Each prohibition inculcates its individual meaning, viz.: the suppression of sensuality, of selfishness, the consecration of life and especially the sentiments. The following extracts from the Talmud will well illustrate the above contention: (a) "He who obliterates one letter from the written name of God break a negative command, for it is said (Deut. xii. 3, 4), 'And destroy the names of them out of that place. Ye shall not do so unto the Lord your God.'" (b) "He who has intercourse with a female slave is guilty of breaking fourteen negative precepts, and shall be cut off by Heaven. He is guilty because (1), 'Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with diverse seeds'; (2), 'Thou shalt not plough with an ox and ass together'; (3), 'Thou shalt not wear a garment of diverse sorts, etc., etc., etc. . . . He who marries a suitable wife, Elijah will kiss him and God will love him; but he who

marries an unsuitable wife, God will detest him and Elijah will chastise (55) him." (c) Rabbi Akiva says, "He who marries a woman not suited to him violates five negative precepts: (1) 'Thou shalt not avenge'; (2) 'Thou shalt not bear a grudge'; (3) 'Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart'; (4) 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself'; (5) 'That thy brother may live with thee.' For if he hates her, he wishes she were dead and thus (virtually) he diminishes the population." (d) "He who is party to a quarrel breaks a negative command, for it is said (Numb. xvi:40), 'Be not as Korah and his company.'" (e) Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says, "He who partakes of anything belonging to the avaricious breaks a negative precept, for it is written (Prov. xxiii:6, 7), 'Eat thou not the bread of him that hath an evil eye.'" etc. Rav Nachman bar Yitachak says, "He breaks two negative precepts, 'Eat thou not' and 'Desire thou not.'" (f) Rava said, "He who discourses common talk (that is, converses upon any other subject but Scripture) transgresses a positive precept, for it is said (Deut. vi:7), 'And shalt talk of them.' 'Of them,' but not of other matters."

THE FINAL QUEST.

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID.

On a day at last, when the sun is low,
And the shadow creeps from the wooden glen,
In the friendly mist of the shrouded glow,
I shall slip away from the haunts of men.

With the eager zest of a wond'ring child
That is told of the lovely land of Nod,
I shall enter upon the trackless wild
Of the outer vales of the realm of God,

On the final quest of a human soul
Thro' the mystic maze of eternity,
With an unmarked staff and a creedless scroll,
And a faith untaught of a sophistry.

I shall meet, perchance, in some flow'ry way,
With the friends I loved that are gone before,
In the heritage of a deathless day
With its joy unending forever more.

Or, perhaps, to find that the soul but clears
For its swift return to enrich some birth
With the spark of life to endow its years
For the cycled way in the mortal earth.

But if endless sleep be the goal at last,
In oblivion heav'n must be as sweet—
With the journey done, and the fretful past
Blotted out from Elysium's peace, 'twere meet.



Walt Whitman

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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"DEMOCRATIC VISTAS."

BY JAMES N. WOOD.

JUDGMENT on national and world questions is astray, because a popular criterion does not harmonize with sound deduction. It is unfortunate that prosperity in a material sense is the prevalent standard of right opinion. An uncertain quantity at best, it sometimes accompanies a nation for a space on a downward path; it may be the very precursor of a ruin the imminence of which it effectually conceals. The nineteenth century suffices to confirm these reflections. It looms like a golden epoch in the life of man, yet under its spell more was done to lower the morale of the race than was accomplished during many prior centuries, though the latter are now popularly referred to in a derogatory sense. Compare modern policies with those of Europe, as late as the seventeenth century. Going on to the middle ages, the contrast is even more striking. The type of man then guiding administrative affairs was sharply distinct from his prototype of the present. It is true that Science groped in almost impenetrable darkness, and Philosophy saved itself from extinction only by recourse to the mask of scholasticism. None the less, there was a spirit abroad that compensated for misfortune so direful. Men were not afraid of life. Resolution was nurtured by ardor, uncertainty and risk. If the colossal industrial fabric reared by the modern was unknown, ignorance was balanced by sublime faith in craftsmanship. Even this was esteemed secondary to the development of manhood. The stress of life compelled it. Men recognized definite principles which, although reaffirmed by later science, have been made almost impossible of execution by the pressure of democracy. The breeding of superior men. What antagonism the expression now gives

rise to! From the conscious and the unconscious there ascends the spontaneous envy of trivial minds. Derision meets it in the political world.

Why, then, were peoples so handicapped by lack of the material discoveries that subsequently altered man's very relation to nature? Why, it may well be asked, were they of the past able to survive the sacrifices incident to the struggles that history tells of them? After all, the late war was not the greatest ever waged, unless numerically. Consider Germany at the end of the Thirty Years War. Devastated and more than decimated—even tottering on the verge of barbarism—it found a force within itself too vital to weaken, and that carried it through shadow undismayed, to stand again among the nations, even though it had faced the apparently irretrievable. The more picturesque Crusades—superficially so futile. How astounding was the persistence with which Europe sent host after host to certain destruction. Conceive the same races, in an equal space of time, patiently plodding on, satisfied to accumulate riches. Is it believable that their chronicle would be the vista it now is to those who prefer to think of man as something more than a peasant, peacefully tilling his fields? That which was great in the past was achieved when life was difficult; when fortitude and independence refused to shrink from reality.

Yet even then Europe was moving downward, checked in the descent by the steadfast resistance of a few, reluctant to compromise with destiny. The deep psychology of that tragedy is not to be written here, it is noted as a manifestation of that prepotence that sustained the guardian of civilization throughout her bitter periods. What is it that lifts sublimely from the mists of war and ruin that have mingled so often beneath her sun and sky? What else but wounds healed quickly, daring renewed at secret springs; faith, mocking at time. Is the meaning obscure? It is to those minds only that have surrendered to what is least in the modern outlook. Europe is great by reason of her past, and this greatness maintains because she still has within her breast the qualities that live wherever the will is in flower. Throughout her stormy life there have been at hand sons of her own troubled existence, born of generations undaunted by fate. The implication is one far from a popular diction, one that speaks lightly of attributes not akin to service, sacrifice, humanitarianism. Why, humanitarianism is something brought forth by man's very weakness. It is the confession of descent from heights once nobly scaled. Civilization nurtures this master fallacy,

that the struggle of life is to attain common comfort. It longs for regions where no mountains are, but only the dreary wastes of a flower-swept expanse, and its fatuity has led it to worship strange demons, in place of the august genius of a fairer time. These dreary shades accompany it as it plods on towards an ever-receding morrow, listening to plaintive melodies unknown to Pan. All that is noble is evil—and joy is sin! To escape the torment of a mind beset by jeering phantoms, it literally tears its soul asunder, a sacrifice given for a moment's respite from gloomy inhibitions, whispered from highest heaven and wailed from deepest hell.

It is this hidden strength that America does not reckon with, unable to comprehend its basis. Europe has gulped her share of modern folly, and paid more dearly for the indulgence than has America, guarded by sea and circumstance. In spite of it the power to resist has lingered, replenished by a blood more virile and austere. From it has come an ever-verdant youth, the indomitable intrepidity that sustains her in trial, and the everlasting fortitude that still assures her supremacy in the world. For the mind capable of balanced judgment the span of American history, as brief as it has been, contains a record that reveals innate weaknesses and the force of tendencies that add to the difficulty of future liberation from the thrall of a galling pettiness. There is a contradiction, too, that cannot be overlooked. The western world is an outpost of European civilization, and still far from having one of her own creation. This outpost is composed of lesser units than those assuring the integrity of the Continent.

In the search for evidences of will-strength on this side of the water there is discoverable only one struggle worthy of consideration, the Civil War. In it American met American, and if method was naive, if action lacked technique, it showed both hardihood and tenacity. It was a contest that had laurels for both, marred only by a spirit of malignant littleness which made clear the presence of deep-rooted disease. But after the subjugation of the South, what remained of the conquered? A single war, apparently, had swept its best components into the limbo of the forgotten. Nearly sixty years have passed since that tragedy, but no sign comes forth that the stricken region has even begun to rise from the stroke of a single defeat. Those who gave it distinction and, on field and in cabinet, for a spell rivetted the gaze of the world, have gone. In their place parade a sorry crowd of itinerant politicians and babbling messiahs who lash fantastic flocks into frenzy over maudlin

issues. Groups they are so devoid of self-control that society, to protect itself from their murder lust, has had to take from them everything that stimulates imagination. In prior days the profound influence of a superior caste was enough to hold in check this yearning of a poltroon to run amuck. Imagine Caucasians so doubtful of themselves that they are seriously jealous of an inferior race, the latter made confident by the ascendancy of a residuum, the origin of which it comprehends. This unlucky insight inspires reliance in an overcast future. In reality, there would be some basis for their illusion if they were faced by no other than the degenerate offsprings of the overseers, but time has already marked the empire they covet for an heritage to other races, more ably equipped. The evidence is on every side, to be observed by those who can perceive and reflect without passion.

Chattel slavery, to the extent that it can be instanced as a probable cause of southern decline, offers little to one seeking to be its apologist, nor is this because of any ill effect the system had on slaves. It must be admitted, rather, that they had much the best of it. Contrary to the flamboyant tales once popular in the north, their lives were idyllic. The sounder basis for criticism lies in their influence on the white race, for their presence encouraged a fatal languor. Only supreme greatness can endure slavery. Then, the negative mental sphere of the lower orders of the whites. It is hard now to make clear the extent of the distance that separated superior and inferior. The southern aristocrat must be viewed as a kind of exile, conscious of better antecedents, but whose aids and environments were leagued against him. The puzzle that faces the man of thought is the lack of intellectual vigor during this slave epoch. This phase has been neglected by critics, too deeply absorbed by economic aspects. The plea of climate must be dismissed, peremptorily. The tropics have shared in the upbuilding of the masterpieces of genius. Slavery was always present. To extend the range of vision, but only parenthetically, the relations of the sexes in the south did not even effect the production of erotic poetry, so prevalent under different skies and similar conditions. Evidently there was a fundamental error here, but of this more presently.

It remains true, even though the truth is sinister, that the slave owner had that treasure, leisure, in abundance. Many were highly educated—and along classical lines. Latin and Greek writers were read in the originals. European literature was favored. The basis of their intellectual outlook was sounder than that of the north. Yet

they languished. Only one poet to be taken seriously, Lanier. Poe was southern only in name. Richmond looked on him as a weird sort of evil genius. There is something uncanny about the attitude towards him there, even yet. Nevertheless, he was read and admired. Groping through much shadow, it is hard to escape believing that, in some way, he had violated a secret unwritten law, the nature of which is unknown to this day.

It was in political fields that intellectual capacity preferred to display itself. This was not illogical. The south was always on the defensive. Its record as a home of statesmen is high. Their acumen more than matched the talent of New England, and for a long while, but statesmanship involves war. Here, the southerner found his hands more often tied. Surrounded by enemies in territory of his own, another era might have dawned for him. He yielded to temptation and necessity, accepting a property contest which finally destroyed him. The odds were beyond all reason. He was faced by the world. The modern demanded the extirpation of every trace of the past.

The loss to American blood, to that fundamental principle of superior descent without which no nation can be great, was the real disaster of the conflict, for the obvious reason that there was little of it to lose. The carnival of blatant illiteracy that followed includes a blurred page in the public archives, doubly so because its significance escaped even the few intelligent among the victors. To the south, the consequences were evil beyond description. To replace the gentleman, there appeared a generation who aped recollection, the ass regnant in the lion's skin. There was an utter lack of comprehension of the basic differentiating quality that marks the superior man, boldness of attitude towards the difficult. The new custodians resorted to the most ignoble expedients to maintain a position thrust upon them by event. From this plague the south has never recovered. The condition grows worse instead of better. It is now the favored land of any fanatic who prates of slave morality. An eager populace responds to propaganda superficially puerile, but so insidious in effect on meager intellects that the influence of the few remnants of brighter days is effectually paralyzed. In a fool's paradise the wise are silent.

Suppose the south had not lost, what then? Once, this possibility was held up as an awful example of what fiendish scheming might have led to. There was a popular tale to the effect that the object really behind foreign sympathy was a baleful plan to divide

the Union, for the purpose of weakening it, and by such means eventually securing possession. It does not sound altogether improbable, although ignoring the importance of rivalry among the very powers in question. The breaking away of Dixie would have been followed by other schisms, with little doubt, but whether this would have involved evil in the long run is quite another matter. The American is so accustomed to thinking of his country in terms of territorial bigness that his idea of merit has come to be linked with the concept of size, the result being hopeless materialism. It is a foregone conclusion, therefore, that he will not relish some observations on what might happen if division ever broke up the ill-balanced hegemony in which he exists.

The reason why Europe has been so fruitful of strong, individualistic types is, in part, due to her national alignments. It is true that these have persisted by reason of ultra masculine units among her populations, but nationalism has reacted favorably to the influence. Americans often lament that war has accompanied this status, both in past and present, but the viewpoint is at once shallow and insincere. Europe has been the fecund source of powerful blood lines, and these have fortified the descent of other and inferior races. The direct origin of the eagle strain among men is a mystery, both to science and psychology, the latter being included after due reflection over the progress of a novel and subtle analysis. In a minor degree, the principle works among all peoples. Without it, decline to barbarism, or to that slavery signified by fear and submission to standardization, follows swiftly. Those who rejoice over the weakening of this force are blind to the conclusions of history. The unity of Europe would be a calamity unparalleled in human annals.

The appearance of new instrumentalities in war, the scope of modern conflicts, furnish the possibilities of many things on the American continent that another generation would have refused to admit as even conjectural. After all, cut off from a few states along the Atlantic seaboard, and perhaps including the lake region, what would the rest of the United States amount to? Nothing. And this will be the foundation of any aggressive military policy on the part of future external enemies.

It does not seem likely, at least within any reasonable period of time, that division would threaten the United States from any internal source. The character of the population is favorable to long-continued national integrity. It is impossible to conceive an

individual strong enough to coalesce a following with the object of disrupting the confederation of states. It is true that, on occasion, threats are made—but these never rise beyond veiled hints. Such mutterings have come from the West during agrarian uprisings, but no one takes them seriously. The American system of welding recalcitrant will forces operates admirably. The population, as a whole, is composed of docile classes, and the few capable of ill find fortune so easy of attainment that they are satisfied to leave the state alone. The conspiracies spoken of at times by the police in connection with socialist agitation are, of course, intended solely for the large part of the population that made Barnum famous.

But in war anything can happen, and, as ought to be evident now, to the most dense, it can happen fast. It would be from this direction that disaster might come. Successful invasion would make disruption not only possible but extremely probable. It is from this point of view that the subject is here considered. The result, however, might be far different, in the long run, from what the invader had expected.

Once set in motion, the impulse to divide would spread. This conclusion is based on the heterogeneous nature of the American population, and the antagonisms already existent between parts of it, antagonisms repressed by the overwhelming force of the collective state. A nation composed of New England, the Middle Atlantic states and, possibly, Virginia, would compose a formidable aggregation, one comparing favorably with the greatest of the Continental powers. Another might be built up from the states adjoining the Lake region and the headwaters of the Mississippi, while that river, itself, could become the line between a powerful group on the seaboard and an agricultural empire in the Middle West. A northwest power is conceivable on the Pacific coast, but whether or not this would include California is problematical. The latter state is extremely potent and might prove equal to maintaining her own independence. A Gulf Empire readily defines itself, but it would require alliances, at least for a time, by reason of the elementary character of the inhabitants of that section. Louisiana would necessarily constitute its head. As to the west in general, it must be borne in mind that vast stretches of it are worthless, and always will be. Irrigation is limited by the rainfall in the Rockies. The American Desert contains large areas that would not even respond to it. The labor required to make habitable important sections of the

west would built up half a dozen Hollands along the rich savannahs of South Carolina, Georgia and the Gulf States.

It is plain that a collection of nations is not beyond the scope of the imagination, and the American continent may be the scene of strange developments, some day. Independent nations may rise and fall; genius, ever alert, may build again a federation like that now existing, but under a more patent imperialism. It would be during the stress of differences brought about by the relations of such independencies that populations would become more distinctive and individualistic, the net effect being the development of races having stronger characteristics than those now dominating the American possessions. This is an observation worthy of a separate notation. The defect of the American system is the effectiveness with which it annihilates individuality. This is evident everywhere. There is not a fusion of races in a melting pot, as has been claimed, but a breaking down of spirit that levels all. This favors weak types, and it is the prevalence of these that strikes the intelligent foreigner when he travels among us. As a rule, he is much too clever to allude to it. Americans love praise, and they are surfeited with it. None the less, the possibility of a weakening tendency evidently worried the founders of the Republic, themselves men of remarkable foresight. The long discussion of federal powers as against those of the states, no doubt included verbal allusions to it. It was feared that the invasion of state boundaries would favor their disintegration, leading finally to Federal autocracy. That this apprehension was well founded events have abundantly confirmed. Absolute jurisdiction on the part of the national government is too near at hand to be disputed. Political strife, in the immediate future, will be between sections, each intent on supremacy.

While the outline hazzarded in this running glance at the probable, or improbable, future, has been confined to groupings in which specific states were named, it should be remembered that present nomenclature is adhered to to make more evident a general idea. In point of fact, the condition conjectured might follow lines entirely beyond the range of contemporary foresight. Names count for little, save where they link memory to splendor or sublimity. Athens spells intellect in culmination; Rome is another word for grandeur. Some humble American hamlet may be all that passes to immortality.

The great delusion is believing that man himself is less than the environment in which he acts. It is the individual who per-

sists. The glory of his deeds, his thoughts, it is these that live. Empires rise and fall, their memory is lost, but something has been added to the sum of human powers, a word here and there in the flight of time.

The progress of America is conceived as something that will efface many in a commingling, this leading to a novel race. Because progress and futurity are terms so commonly used, they have come to mean something near at hand. If it be true that a bizarre population is to some day merge into a racial type, the date must reach beyond the shadowland of present dreams. A thousand years would be a trifling interval with which to cover it. That such a race will never appear at all is infinitely more probable. The dominance of a cross which will include a limited number of strains, gradually fused into one, is more within the limits of anticipation, because more remote from the impossible. Vastness of empire has never, of itself, indicated greatness. It has been the means by which a relatively small part displayed its majesty. A race deficient in numbers, but intense in spirit. Transient though their cycles have been, it is their record that passes on from age to age, to daunt the little and inspire the bold. ✓

SOCIAL IDEALS AND HUMAN NATURE.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

IT will not do for philosophers and seers to gallop away from the position assumed by the average body of human beings in a community. If the plain men and women, the majority of a given society, are left far behind on the road to the Ideal, what happens is that the Ideal remains a paper scheme, a pleasant dream, while the plain, matter-of-fact people who live and work and play in the world as it is know not of the Ideal, or, if they hear of it from authors and preachers whom they can understand, treat it as something so remote and Utopian as to have no bearing whatever on actual conduct.

Sociologists and moralists are beginning to appreciate this sobering truth. They are beginning to reckon seriously with the plain man, to put him into their equations, to test their doctrines and proposals by asking whether they fit his mind and character. Ours is a Pragmatic and Behaviorist age, though many of us are not ready to accept either Pragmatism or Behaviorism as the last word of science and philosophy. The desire of the philosopher to "re-construct" his whole system in order to establish close contacts with, and claims upon, the plain man is at times pathetic. But if philosophy is to be of use and service it must be vital and significant to the plain man—that is, the plain man who stops to think about philosophical issues and seeks to grasp them.

It is in this commendable spirit that philosophers and sociologists are now attacking the problem of Social Reform and endeavoring to vindicate it against the charge of Utopianism or repugnance to essential human nature. And it is in the same spirit that efforts are being made to prove that reforms deemed by many "radical" and revolutionary are, in point of fact, entirely consonant with average human nature and the practical reason.

We shall briefly discuss here two books that are symptomatic of the tendency just alluded to and interesting on other accounts as well. One is Professor John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*, and the other Professor Arthur J. Todd's *Theories of Social Progress*.

Professor Dewey is a philosopher and one of the most distinguished living exponents of Pragmatism. He is known as an advanced liberal. Professor Todd is a sociologist and a social worker with a decided leaning, philosophically speaking, toward Bergsonian and post-Bergsonian anti-intellectualism.

Let us see how much aid and encouragement each of these thinkers affords the advanced progressive schools of reform, on the one hand, and the deeply-perplexed plain man on the other—the man who is naturally conservative, who knows that the present social order is full of defects yet hesitates to condemn it and embrace a nebulous and revolutionary paper alternative for it.

Professor Dewey has no faith in social nostrums or panaceas. He is practical in his idealism, for like a true Pragmatist he has little use for an ideal that is divorced from reality and that seems to offer one a Sunday consolation, sentimental and sterile in character, for the troubles and disappointments of the rest of the week. For Professor Dewey there are no "ideals" to be realized, no one knows how, in the dim and distant future, but problems of the present to be discussed and solved in the present, so far as possible. He is an opportunist in the true and right sense of the term—one who believes in making the best use of immediate opportunities in the light of reason. He does not believe that any institution can be successfully defended against attacks by asserting that it is rooted in human nature, or that a proposal involving radical changes in institutions is disposed of by affirming that it conflicts with human nature. It is natural for men to act, says Professor Dewey, but it is not natural for them to act in a given, fixed way. War, for example, is not necessarily inevitable because men are restless, combative and covetous. They have fought and still fight for certain causes that seem to many of us irrational or that, if rational, can now best be served by conference, conciliation and arbitration. But it does not follow that men must continue to fight instead of settling disputes by submitting them to impartial tribunals. Men no longer fight duels, but they are as combative and suspicious as ever. They fight in a different way—that is all. There are substitutes for war, and their use does not spell violence to human nature.

Another bold example given by Professor Dewey concerns private property and what is called capitalism. There are thinkers who dismiss Socialism, Communism and like radical schemes by saying that they are severally incompatible with human nature. Men, it is claimed, desire to own things, and will not work, invent and plan if they are deprived of the incentive to toil and hard thinking found in private property and in the possession of economic power. But, objects Professor Dewey, is not our conception of ownership and possession too narrow, too inelastic? Would not human nature be gratified as much as it now is, or as it ever has been, by a different industrial system, provided it offered ample scope for leadership, for distinction, for "possessive use" of wealth? If productive work is so uninteresting and unpleasant, says Professor Dewey, that men must be bribed or artificially induced to engage in it, then the conclusion is that the conditions under which work is now carried on irritate and frustrate natural human tendencies, and our question then is this—Under what arrangements and relations can work be made as agreeable as, say, scientific research, exploration, painting, writing books, composing music?

The question concerning the alterability of human nature, Professor Dewey holds, is almost invariably irrelevant. As a matter of fact, even in animals instincts are less fixed and infallible than an outgrown psychology has assumed, while the human being "differs from the lower animals precisely in the fact that his native activities lack the complex, ready-made organization of the animals' original abilities." Inertia, stability and permanence belong not to human nature as such, but acquired habits and customs, to modes of thought and feeling. It is very difficult to bring about radical social changes, because legal, political and economic institutions are shaped by objective conditions, by environmental factors, and by habits of thought formed under the influence of those forces and agents. A revolution may wipe out legal codes and institutions, but it does not seriously affect ways of belief and mental habits. "When general and enduring moral changes do accompany an external revolution, it is because appropriate habits of thought have previously been insensibly matured."

In fine, it is idle and unphilosophical to urge, or oppose, a reform on the ground that it harmonizes or conflicts with human nature. We do not know what "human nature" is. We cannot arbitrarily assign limits to it. We cannot say, "This is impossible" or "This is imperative" by reason of the given and constant factor.

human nature. A thing seemingly impossible may be made possible by creating new habits of thought, by changing ideas, by readjusting superficial relations. Slavery was at one time considered natural and ineradicable. Slavery has been abolished, but servility, docility, dependence have not been abolished. Those who defended slavery on biological and psychological grounds gave that term too narrow a definition. They overlooked the elasticity of human nature, the possibility of domination and government of men in ways less gross and coarse than slavery.

Our arguments, then, pro or con a reform in any direction should be addressed, as common sense always has addressed them, to two things—Reason and Conscience. Every human problem is at bottom a scientific problem. We note a maladjustment, a source of friction and waste and pain, a situation that disturbs and offends many of us. Several remedies are proposed, some of them moderate and some radical. How is a choice to be made? In the case of an individual patient the advice of the best physician, or a group of eminent physicians, is usually followed. Where the patient is the body social and political, “the doctors disagree,” and there is no way of determining which of the groups offering diverse remedies is the wisest and most authoritative. What, then, do we do? Why, we continue the discussion, we seek to convert one another, we write books and articles, we construct planks for party platforms and consult the voters. We gradually attract adherents to our respective programmes. Finally, some school or party, or some combination of school and parties, carries the day and secures the opportunity of applying its remedy. This remedy meantime has been modified by criticism and perhaps by limited experiments. Reason, conscience, fear, sympathy and other factors have contributed to the result. The rejected alternatives proved to be repugnant to habits of thought, to certain feelings and ideas, to “the spirit of the age.” The formula “contrary to human nature” would not cover the case.

Hence, the men and women who desiderate an important reform, while justified in ignoring sweeping and empty assertions of opponents who claim an intimate knowledge of human nature, are by no means justified in assuming that there are few difficulties in the way of radical social alteration. On this latter point Professor Dewey is clear, emphatic and wise. To quote:

“The force of lag in human life is enormous . . .

“Political and legal institutions may be altered, even abolished; but the bulk of popular thought which has been shaped to their pat-

tern persists. This is why glowing predictions of the immediate coming of a social millennium terminate so uniformly in disappointment. . . . Habits of thought outlive modifications in habits of overt action. The former are vital; the latter, without the sustaining life of the former, are muscular tricks. Consequently, as a rule, the moral effects of even great revolutions, after a few years of outwardly conspicuous alterations, do not show themselves till after the lapse of time. A new generation must come upon the scene whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions.

The Lenins, the Trotskys, the Bela Kuns, the Haywoods and other worshippers of Force in reform; the intolerant fanatics who believe themselves to be infallible and entitled to impose their ideas upon "ignorant, backward majorities" and "perverse, doctrinaire minorities" alike might ponder Professor Dewey's words with profit. Bolshevik methods are condemned by the entire human record—including the record of all great upheavals and revolutions. Bolshevism reckoned without the mental habits and the material conditions which militate against its success—even a partial and slight success. The same remark may be made respecting that strange Italian essay in revolutionary communities, the famous "lock-in" of the metallurgical workers. Though the government remained passive, the adventure failed dismally—the workmen were not prepared to take over any industry, operate it efficiently, sell the product and pay themselves living wages.

Now, these two illustrations from current experience re-enforce Professor Dewey's argument. Communism may or may not be repugnant to that uncertain quantity of uncertain quality, human nature, but it incontestably proved to be repugnant to the mental habits and the complex of conditions of contemporary Russian and Italian life. For scientific as well as for practical purposes, this conclusion is all sufficient.

Let us now turn to Professor Todd's work and inquire into the bearing of its review of theories of social progress on the radical reform movements of the day.

Human nature, Professor Todd holds, is "infinitely diverse and infinitely malleable, infinitely sensitive to change." We are a bundle of potential selves. The real human self is social; it is built up of social experiences; social life furnishes not only the mold but the very materials that are poured into the self for the casting of a social self. We are all part and parcel of one another. We can modify our dominant self by efforts of the will, and social educa-

tion, including discipline and fear or dislike of censure, may and do give us the will to modify ourselves. But what is the aim, what the intended effect, of social education? The answer is, to civilize and socialize the individual. More definitely still "social education aims to create social solidarity by means of a social type marked by service rather than exploitation." Harmony, peace and co-operation are, and have for centuries been deemed possible and desirable. When we speak of progress we mean advance toward harmony, peace and co-operation. We are dissatisfied with present conditions, and we are certain that this discontent is "divine"—or rather rational and creditable. We seek improvements and feel that they are within our reach, provided a sufficient number of a given society desiderate and long for them.

We say that we have a social ideal, but what we mean is that we have a difficulty, or a set of difficulties—a problem to solve, in short. The first question is, Is the problem soluble or insoluble? If insoluble, the discussion ends. If soluble, then the next question is, How?

If we believe in social progress; if we believe, not that some force not in or of ourselves makes for progress, but that we ourselves, because of our intelligence, our adaptability, our power of self-control and of control over the environment, are able to remove the difficulties we are troubled by in industry, politics, social relations, etc., and establish a far more satisfactory state of things in those realms; if we believe that the individual and the body social can reconcile their differences and live in greater harmony, each serving the other and each helping the other in freedom and peace to make life better worth living, then we are philosophical optimists and practical meliorists, and it is both our duty and privilege to work for progress.

If there be any value in a general statement of the end of human progress, which is doubtful, Professor Todd offers the following formula: "Reconciling freedom of individual will with evolution of society, the identification of man individualized and man socialized."

Is there any evidence that man and society have been moving toward this goal? Certainly, answers Professor Todd. The march has not been steady, and at times it seems to have been arrested altogether, or even to have taken a backward direction. But on the whole, if we take definite standards and measures of value and apply them to human history, we cannot fail to conclude that man

and society have not unsuccessfully adjusted many serious differences and removed many obstacles in the way of individual expansion and social efficiency and co-operation.

Human nature has made past progress possible and has conditioned it and even imposed it. The same human nature will impose, insure and condition further progress. Crime, poverty, cruelty, injustice, oppression are severally symptoms of discord and mal-adjustment. Man is not yet adapted to the social state; the state has not learned to respect and to make the best use of the individual and his faculties. Harmony will not be achieved in a century, perhaps not in a millennium. But it will be achieved gradually, if at all, and many of us—a constantly increasing number, happily—are making “the goal of human progress” our individual goal. That is, many of us are earnestly grappling with the questions which divide modern civilized society, cause waste and trouble, breed animosity and hatred and lead to international and internecine warfare in various forms. We have as yet little agreement respecting the remedies to be applied, the preventives to be adopted, but deep study, thinking and discussion will sooner or later evolve a substantial consensus of opinion in the premises.

Why are we interested in the questions that are connected with the “goal of human progress?” Do we expect personal benefits from the efforts we are making? Are we selfish or unselfish in making those efforts?

The answers to these queries are important, for they are bound to throw light on the general and abstract question of human progress. But too often the answers given are superficial, dogmatic, narrow. Men are not governed by simple or single motives. They do not know where self-interest ends and altruism begins. They are not certain altruism is free from a touch of self-interest. All that we can know and need to know is that all sorts and conditions of men are co-operating, for various reasons, or without any definite conscious reason, in the search for the solution of the complex of social problems we identify with human progress. Some men are selfish, or think they are. Others are disinterested, or think they are. Some are curious and intellectually interested in those problems, while others reveal an emotional interest in them. Some are in love with their own ideas on the subject and persistently press them on the community. Others maintain an open mind as to particular ideas, but are willing and anxious that the search and discussion shall continue till solutions are found.

We are what we are. We have made progress because of our qualities, and in spite of *some* of our qualities. We shall continue to make progress, and with the same qualities and propensities. "Human nature," to repeat, does not obstruct progress, but, on the contrary, invites and demands it, but what in a given case is in line with progress and what not, is a question intelligence and reflection alone can answer. It is, first and last, a scientific question, and facts, experiments, more facts and more experiments will eventually enable society to settle it. It will not be settled by "the superior few," by benevolent and tyrannical majorities. The plain man will have to be reckoned with and consulted; he will have to be—not perhaps fully converted by elaborate arguments and demonstrations, but certainly favorably impressed, interested and rendered tolerant and open-minded in regard to the proposed reforms. The function of the advanced minority is to lead, not to drive. The plain man has boycotted reform as he has boycotted philosophy. Neither seemed meant for him. Both *are* meant for him—if they are meant for life; if they are to be of service to humanity. "Democracies," said James Bryce, "are what their leaders make them." This is true, for no society can dispense with initiative, foresight and vision, or with the leadership of those who possess these rare gifts, and no society ever does dispense with them for any considerable period. But the leaders in modern society, if they aspire to enduring influence, must beware of intellectual arrogance or tactless claims to superiority and privilege. They can only mold and make society by winning its sympathy, affection and confidence. They can make it, especially, by enlisting the younger elements and giving them new ideas and new mental habits. Philosophers and reformers are first of all educators and should act as competent educators do. Coercion, fanaticism, supercilious airs, contempt for the students have never made an educator or school successful. Education, not force, is the means to social progress, as it is the means to the popularization and dissemination of sound philosophical ideas.

WHITMAN AND THE RADICALS AS POETS OF DEMOCRACY.

BY CATHERINE BEACH ELY.

THAT the oratorical young radicals are the literary offspring of Walt Whitman is frequently claimed by themselves or their friends, yet their verse diverges considerably in its national aspects from his. Most of the bitter-end radical poets are of foreign origin or have expatriated themselves, which may account in part for their out-of-tuneness with race and national solidarity. They differ from Whitman in their theories of government and consequently in their attitude toward Democracy and Reconstruction. Whitman was no pacifist. His verse is the song of a renewed Democracy which he believed was to arise like a Phoenix from the devastating flames of the Civil War—

“A new brood, native, athletic, continental.”

He passed through the ordeal of the Civil War; he summoned America to the conflict—

“Long, too long, America,
Traveling roads all even and peaceful, you learned from joys and
prosperity only;
But now to learn from cries of anguish, advancing, grappling with
direst fate and recoiling not.”

The radical poets may pride themselves on their red blood, but they have not been as a group especially martial. In quite un-Whitmanesque vein are Ezra Pound's lines:

“Sing we for love and idleness,
Naught else is worth the having.

“Though I have been in many a land,
There is naught else in living,

"And I would rather have my sweet
Though rose leaves die of grieving

"Than do high deeds in Hungary
To pass all men's believing."

Whitman's voluntary sacrifice and suffering gave him the right to speak with authority. Both as an active force and as a sensitive poet he wove into the tissue of his own life the agony and triumph of the Civil War. His unstinted labors among the wounded permanently affected his health and exhausted his financial resources:

"The fractured thigh, the knee, the wound in the abdomen,
These and more I dress with impassive hand (yet deep in my breast
a fire, a burning flame)—
I sit by the restless all the dark night, some are so young,
Some suffer so much, I recall the experience sweet and sad."

Yet as the strong man and the lover of life he responded to the mighty panorama of war:

"To hear the crash of artillery—to see the glistening of bayonets
and musket barrels in the sun!
To see men fall and die and not complain!"

The young radicals, however, did not seize with avidity the opportunity offered by the recent world conflict for displaying their virile manhood. Although Carl Sandburg sympathized in the down-with-the-Kaiser angle of the war, these lines show him viewing the scene not amid the din of battle, not at the bedside of dying warriors, but from behind a newspaper.

"I sit in a chair and read the newspapers.

Millions of men go to war, acres of them are buried, guns and ships
broken, cities burned, villages sent up in smoke, and children
where cows are killed off amid hoarse barbecues vanish like finger-rings of smoke in a north wind.

I sit in a chair and read the newspapers."

Whitman's profound feeling for Lincoln was one of the main-springs of his poetic destiny. It breathes in the following forward looking tribute:

"This dust was once the man,
Gentle, plain, just and resolute, under whose cautious hand
Against the foulest crime in history known in any land or age,
Was saved the union of these States."

But with scant ceremony Sandburg shovels Lincoln and Grant into the tombs along with all the rest of us and leaves us these:

"When Abraham Lincoln was shoveled into the tombs, he forgot the
copperheads and the assassin—in the dust, in the cool tombs.
And Ulysses Grant lost all thought of con men, and Wall Street,
cash and collateral turned ashes—in the dust, in the cool
tombs.

Take any streetful of people buying clothes and groceries, cheer-
ing a hero or throwing confetti and blowing tin horns—tell
me if the lovers are losers—tell me if any get any more
than the lovers—in the dust—in the cool tombs."

To the old-fashioned patriot that was Whitman, the battle flag
was a glorious symbol:

"——— for the soul of man one flag above all the rest,
Token of all brave captains and all intrepid sailors and mates,
And all that went down doing their duty."

But Vachel Lindsey, the modernist, makes the battle flag stand
for perdition rather than the passion of patriotism:

"All in the name of this or that grim flag,
No angel-flag in all the rag-array.

"Banners the demons love, and all Hell sings
And plays with harps. Those flags march forth today!"

After a great crisis nations are confronted by problems which
put to the test every ounce of force and wisdom which they pos-
sess. This herculean task of reconstruction—the gathering in of the
aftermath of war was Whitman's theme. He was no advocate of
easy makeshifts:

"Now understand me well—it is provided in the essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary."

But there was no pessimism in his idea of the forward march of history:

"Roaming in thought over the universe, I saw the little that is good steadily hastening toward immortality,
And the vast all that is call'd Evil, I saw hastening to merge itself and become lost and dead."

T. S. Eliot's song of history has a quite different timbre. With the extinguishing pessimism often characteristic of the radical school in literature, he snuffs out the spiritual meaning of the past and gives us fate mocking the human race.

"History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions,
Guides us by vanities.
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions
That the giving famishes the craving. Gives too late
What's not believed in, or if still believed,
In memory only, reconsidered passion. Gives too soon
Into weak hands, what's thought can be dispensed with
Till the refusal propagates a fear. Think
Neither fear nor courage saves us. Unnatural vices
Are flattered by our heroism. Virtues
Are forced upon us by our impudent crimes.
These tears are shaken from the wrath bearing tree."

Whitman believed in the progress of the race through the travail of a just war into the fruition of free institutions. The strong full current of his verse is the song of Democracy:

"To thee, old cause,
Thou peerless, passionate, good cause,
Thou stern, remorseless, sweet idea,
Deathless throughout the ages, races, lands,
After a strange, sad war, great war for thee

(I think all war through time was really fought, and ever will be
really fought, for thee),
These chants for thee, the eternal march of thee."

He paints the ideal democratic community—the free city in a
free land:

"Where the citizen is always the head and ideal, and
President, Mayor, Governor, and what not, are agents for pay,
Where children are taught to be laws to themselves and to depend
on themselves,
Where the city of the faithfulest friends stands,
Where the city of the cleanliness of the sexes stands,
Where the city of the healthiest father stands,
Where the city of the best-bodied mothers stands,
There the great city stands."

He realized that Democracy must have as its threefold basic
support these pillars: Brotherhood, Good Government and Religion:

"My Comrade,
For you to share with me two greatneses and a third one rising
inclusive and more resplendent
The greatness of Love and Democracy and the greatness of Re-
ligion."

In contrast to Whitman's lofty conception we have Sandburg's
jocular and rather simian hobnobbing with the masses:

"Oh, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs, under my bony
head, under my red-valve heart—and I got something else;
it is a
Man-child heart, a woman-child heart: it is a father and mother
and lover: it came from God-Knows-Where: it is going to
God-Knows-
Where—For I am the keeper of the zoo: I say yes and no; I sing
and kill and work: I am a pal of the world: I came from
the wilderness."

Such posturing seems clownish in comparison with the surge
of Whitman's verse, the sweep of his vision, for Whitman appar

ently foresaw and comprehended the strange phase of history in which a later generation was to struggle. The measure and ultimate goal of the World War—through the Armageddon of 1914-1918 to the abolition of war, through a healthy nationalism to a sane internationalism—is here projected in lines which compass the possibilities of the present moment:

“Sail, sail thy best, ship of Democracy,
Of value is thy freight, 'tis not the present only,
The Past is also stored in thee,
Thou holdest not the venture of thyself alone, not of the Western
continent alone,
Earth's resumé entire floats on thy keel, O ship, is steadied by thy
spars,
With thee Time voyages in trust, the antecedent nations sink or
swim with thee,
With all their ancient struggles, martyrs, heroes, epics, wars, thou
bear'st the other continents,
Theirs, theirs as much as thine, the destination-port triumphant;
Steer them with good, strong hand and wary eye, O helmsman,
thou carriest great companions,
Venerable, priestly Asia sails this day with thee,
And royal, feudal Europe sails this day with thee.”

It was given Walt Whitman to express the spiritual mission of America:

“The measured faiths of other lands, the grandeurs of the past
Are not for thee, but grandeurs of thine own
Deific faiths and amplitudes.”

There is more swagger in Alfred Kreymburg's flamboyant but rather uninspired picture of America:

“Up and down he goes
With terrible, reckless strides,
Flaunting great lamps
With joyous swings—
One to the East
And one to the West—
And flaunting two words

In a thunderous call
 That thrills the hearts of all enemies:
 All, One; All, One; All, One; All, One!
 Beware that queer, wild, wonderful boy
 And his playground—don't go near!
 All, One; All, One; All, One; All, One;
 Up and down he goes."

"Up and down," "up and down," whooping and gesticulating, "he goes," but is Mr. Kreymburg's lusty, symbolical youth getting anywhere?

In Whitman's verse we have not only that love of the soil and the masses which rather incoherently characterizes the humanitarian radicals, but also a wholesome patriotism constructively expressed. Whitman's conception of Democracy has scope and dignity: it does not boisterously slap the crowd on the back nor merely protest petulantly against economic evils. The kernel of his genius is health and will-power. There is nothing mean spirited or shoddy in his point of view. It is otherwise with the radical poets—although like a quagmire at night they occasionally dart phosphorescent beauty of thought and doctrine, yet do they on the whole express too much bad taste, futility and pessimism. We have Whitman's conception of practical Democracy over against the vague, sentimental socialism of the radical poets.

The feverish atmosphere of these confused songsters is not the medium in which our nation can best gird up its loins for the tremendous tasks of reconstruction and international co-operation. Here is Whitman's call:

"Poets to come! orators, singers, musicians to come,
 Arouse, for you must justify me!"

Of course there are radicals and radicals—not all of them are perfected cynics like Ezra Pound, albeit quite a bit of their hurrahing for the masses veils the primping of the intellectual. Certainly Pound's lackadaisical coquetting with his own verse is no adequate response to Whitman's impassioned plea:

"Come, my songs, let us express our baser passions,
 Let us express our envy for the man with a steady job and no worry.

You are very idle, my songs;
I fear you will come to a bad end.

"You stand about the streets, you loiter at the corners and bus tops.
You do next to nothing at all.
You do not even express our inner nobility.
"You will come to a very bad end.

"But you, newest song of the lot,
You are not old enough to have done much mischief.
I will get you a green coat out of China
With dragons worked on it.
I will get you the scarlet silk trousers
From the statue of the infant Christ at Santa Maria Novella,
Lest they say we are lacking in taste
Or that there is no caste in the family."

If the radical poets are to voice the present reconstruction period with as much authority as did Whitman that of the sixties, they will accomplish it not by cynicism or ranting nor by a mere affectation of Whitmanism, but by getting down to the bedrock of a practical democracy based on past achievements and consecrated to future progress.

THE NEW LITERATURE OF APPROACH.

BY ROLAND HUGINS.

FACING REALITY. By Esme Wingfield-Stratford. New York: George H. Doran Company.

MANHOOD OF HUMANITY: The Science and Art of Human Engineering. By Alfred Korzybski. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

THE MIND IN THE MAKING: The Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform. By James Harvey Robinson. New York: Harper and Brothers.

PUBLIC OPINION. By Walter Lippman. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

A NEW literature of ideas is coming into being. It embodies itself in a stream of books and articles, ever growing in volume, calling on humanity to revise its point of view, and to meet a changed world with a mind reborn. It demands a fresh vision and a fresh start. It seeks, indeed, to work a mental revolution on a grand scale. And it takes itself with immense seriousness.

Nearly every separate specimen of this literature of orientation differs widely, in superficial aspects, from all other specimens, for the reason that the several authors come to the social problem with different cultural backgrounds. Some of the writers are historians, some psychologists, some engineers, some journalists. But whether they profess to speak for history, or science, or the world of affairs, they arrive at curiously similar conclusions. The truth is that a certain well-defined stock of ideas circulates through our post-war world, and in this stock all of our intellectuals trade. Before we look at individual books, let us examine a number of the ideas common to all, or to most, of them. The more important of the current conceptions are these:

First, That something fundamentally wrong marks and vitiates our civilization. The very bases are insecure. This social and moral bankruptcy of the world is treated as a self-evident assump-

tion rather than as a thesis to be proved. And indeed to most minds the calamities of the war and its aftermath make the assumption entirely plausible. Pessimism is fashionable. Chronic critics of the social order, who have been uttering doleful prophecies for years, now go about with an air of smug dissatisfaction. The most resolute optimists show that they are disturbed and perplexed by giving vent to angry denunciations. Nearly everyone admits the need of some sort of reconstruction; and of course this attitude of mind affords an excellent opening for the revisionists.

Second, The human race is in its infancy. Beings that may be called human or at least anthropoid, have existed on this planet for approximately 500,000 years, for the most part in a state of untrammelled savagery. If you construct a racial time scale, the whole period of civilization looks about as wide as a wafer laid on top of a flag-pole. Why be surprised at any lapse on the part of creatures with such a lineage? Somewhere in all of us crouch a barbarian and a beast.

Third, Within the period of civilization itself, and particularly within the last few centuries, scientific and mechanical progress has far outstripped social and political progress; the one has raced ahead at accelerated speed, while the other has lagged behind or stood still. This generalization was clearly enunciated by the Victorians. But it was given demonstration and emphasis by the war, when the whole range of scientific invention was utilized in the art of killing. In political philosophy and ethical practice we have improved little on Aristotle, whereas Aristotle's physics and zoology are as obsolete as the bow and arrow.

Fourth, the mind of man, and hence man himself, is held in bondage by delusion and ignorance, and needs release. We have not faced reality. We are so busy rationalizing our prejudices that we cannot see things as they are. We cling to superstitions and to conventional modes of thought. We have failed to comprehend the real nature of Man. We have not learned to make our intelligence our guide.

But lo, the enlightenment cometh!

For example, here is Dr. Esme Wingfield-Stratford. In a long book of caustic comments entitled, "Facing Reality," he finally comes to the pith of his matter in a chapter on "Reality and the Social System." He says:

"It is no part of my purpose to enter into competition with those who offer patent devices for making new worlds out of old.

Soviets and national guilds, the reform of the tariff and the resuscitation of the manor may or may not have their uses—that is a matter for inquiry—but they are not, and cannot be, panaceas. Society is too complex to be put right by any formula.

“The only way of salvation is to reform the thought that gives birth to the institutions, to forsake the unreal for the real, the formula for the reality. To change the visible order is merely to regild or dye red the surface, but change the spirit and all the rest follows.”

Well, suppose we did change the spirit, what then would happen? Obviously, says Dr. Wingfield-Stratford, many ‘pleasant things. “It would be seen how that which binds us together is of infinitely more importance than that which separates us. War between class and class and nation and nation would appear as insane and wicked as a mutiny on board a sailing vessel rounding Cape Horn in a gale.” We would conserve our natural resources. We would make machines our servants, to do the dirty work of the world. We would make work a pleasure instead of a drudgery. Does all this sound rather thin and general? “We have made no attempt,” declares Dr. Wingfield-Stratford, “to formulate a programme for the social reformer, or to give more than the barest hint of the difficulties and dangers that beset him. This is an age that cries out for a formula as an earlier generation for a sign. But before any sort of programme can avail there must come a change of spirit . . . If once men were enabled to turn and see themselves as they really are, comrades and fellow soldiers in a struggle to which the greatest wars of history are but the bickerings of children, if they could realize how fatally they are even now wasting their opportunity, and how near their criminal blindness has brought them to the brink of ruin, they would turn with such earnestness and unanimity to the task of their own salvation that the details would soon become clear. It is, in the deepest sense of the word, religion for the lack of which we go blind.”

Alfred Korzybski, in his “Manhood of Humanity,” has endeavored to “approach the problem of Man from a scientific-mathematical point of view.” He writes with a lively sense of the importance of his message; he is continually urging the reader to realize that what he is saying is “exceedingly important,” “very momentous” or “of mighty significance.” He seems oblivious that for the most part he is dressing up old theory in new terminology. Here is his thesis: that plants are chemical-binders, or energy-bind-

ers, that animals are space-binders, and that men are time-binders. Time-binding is "the human dimension." It is "the power to roll up continuously the ever-increasing achievements of generation after generation endlessly." It is "the peculiar power, the characteristic energy, the defining mark of man." Advancement in the physical sciences, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and astronomy, leaps ahead by "geometrical progression," while advancement in the social sciences, ethics, jurisprudence, economics, politics and government, creeps along by "arithmetical progression." Heretofore the real nature of man has not been understood. He has been regarded either as an animal, or as a monstrous hybrid between an animal and a supernatural spark, or divine soul. But the real nature of man is now clear. He is a time-binder. This opens up, so says the author, the science of Human Engineering.

"The ethics of humanity's manhood will be neither 'animal ethics' nor 'supernatural' ethics. It will be a natural ethics based upon a knowledge of the laws of human nature. It will not be a branch of zoology, the ethics of tooth and claw, the ethics of profiteering, the ethics of space-binding beasts fighting for 'a place in the sun.' It will be a branch of humanology, a branch of Human Engineering; it will be a time-binding ethics, the ethics of the entirely natural civilization-producing energies of humanity. . . .

"In humanity's manhood, patriotism—the love of country—will not perish—for from it—it will grow to embrace the world, for your country and mine will be the world. Your 'state' and mine will be the Human State—a Co-operative Commonwealth of Man—a democracy in fact and not merely in name. It will be a natural organic embodiment of civilizing energies—the wealth-producing energies—characteristic of the human class of life. Its larger affairs will be guided by the science and art of Human Engineering—not by ignorant and grafting 'politicians'—but by scientific men, by honest men who *know*.

"Is it a dream? It is a dream, but that dream will come true. It is a scientific dream and science will make it a living reality.

"How is the thing to be done? No one can foresee all the details, but in general the outline and process is clear. Violence is to be avoided. There must be a period of transition—a period of adjustment. A natural first step would probably be the establishment of a new institution which might be called a Dynamic Department—Department of Co-ordination or a Department of Co-operation—the name is of little importance, but it would be the nucleus

of the new civilization, helping and protecting the people in such co-operative enterprises as agriculture, manufacturing, finance and distribution. . . .

"The outline of the plan is vague; it aims merely at being suggestive. Its principal purpose is to accentuate the imperative necessity of establishing a national time-binding agency—a Dynamic Department for stimulating, guiding and guarding the civilizing agencies, the wealth-producing agencies, the time-binding energies, in virtue of which human beings are human. For then and only then human welfare, unretarded by monstrous misconceptions of human nature, by vicious ethics, vicious economics and vicious politics, will advance peacefully, continuously, and rapidly, under the leadership of human engineering, happily and without fear, in accord with the exponential law—the *natural* law—of the time-binding energies of Man."

James Harvey Robinson thinks that the history of thought furnishes the clue for which the world is searching. He tells us, in "The Mind in the Making," that we must rely on Intelligence. For centuries organization has been tried, moral exhortation has been tried, and education has been tried. And they have all failed. Our hope lies in the application of Intelligence to social, political and economic problems with the same open-mindedness, courage and thoroughness with which it has been employed in the study of natural phenomena. It is fear, he says, that holds us back.

"If we are courageously to meet and successfully to overcome the dangers with which our civilization is threatened, it is clear that we need *more mind* than ever before. It is also clear that we can have indefinitely more mind than we already have if we but honestly desire it and avail ourselves of resources already at hand. Mind, as previously defined, is our 'conscious knowledge and intelligence, what we know and our attitude toward it—our disposition to increase our information, classify it, criticize it, and apply it.' It is obvious that in this sense the mind is a matter of accumulation and that it has been in the making ever since man took his first step in civilization. I have tried to suggest the manner in which man's long history illuminates our plight and casts light on the path to be followed. And history is beginning to take account of the knowledge of man's nature and origin contributed by the biologist and the anthropologist and the newer psychologists."

Professor Robinson sketches the history of the human mind, treating, in his successive chapters, the savage mind, the beginning

of critical thinking in Greece, our mediaeval intellectual inheritance, and the scientific revolution of the last three hundred years. Every living man and woman, he contends, is a depository and epitome of all this past. "In all our reveries and speculations, even the most exacting, sophisticated, and disillusioned, we have three unsympathetic companions sticking closer than a brother and looking on with jealous impatience—our wild apish progenitor, a playful or peevish baby, and a savage. We may at any time find ourselves overtaken with a warm sense of camaraderie for any or all of these ancient pals of ours, and experience infinite relief in once more disporting ourselves with them as of yore. Some of us have in addition a Greek philosopher or man of letters in us; some a neoplatonic mystic, some a mediaeval monk, all of whom have learned to make terms with their older playfellows."

Exactly how we are to shake ourselves free from our hampering heritage Professor Robinson does not make clear. At least he has no concrete measures to urge. "I have no reforms to recommend, except the liberation of Intelligence, which is the first and most essential one." And again: "It is premature to advocate any wide-sweeping reconstruction of the social order, although experiments and suggestions should not be discouraged. What we need first is a change of heart and a chastened mood which will permit an ever-increasing number of people to see things as they are, in the light of what they have been and what they might be."

What, indeed, shall we do about it? Well, there is Intelligence! We can cut loose from "the trammels of the past." We can "endeavor manfully to free our own minds and then do what we can to hearten others to free theirs." We can "proceed to the thorough reconstruction of our mind, with a view to understanding actual human conduct and organization." Although this is the sum of the advice Professor Robinson is prepared to offer, he, for one, thinks it is highly inspiring.

Walter Lippmann also pins his faith, in "Public Opinion," to "the intelligence principle," but he comes at his conviction by a route of his own. With the aid of psychology he analyzes the news and the reactions of the mind to the news. He endeavors to demonstrate that the pictures in our heads fail to correspond with any degree of accuracy to the actual environmental world. We tend to throw all the information that reaches us into rigid stereotypes. Some of these stereotypes are loaded with preferences, according to our moral codes. We adjust ourselves to our codes and adjust

the facts that we see to that code. We have our blind spots; we are led astray by allegories. At any rate the facts elude us, though only the facts can set us free.

"It is because they (the people) are compelled to act without a reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers and churches make such small headway against the obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and three-legged calves. This is the primary defect of popular government, a defect inherent in its traditions, and all its other defects can, I believe, be traced to this one."

Mr. Lippmann puts little reliance in current programs. "No electoral device, no manipulation of areas, no change in the system of property, goes to the root of the matter. You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not provide a way of overcoming the limitation of individual experience. There are systems of government, of voting, and representation which extract more than others. But in the end knowledge must come not from the conscience but from the environment with which that conscience deals. When men act on the principle of intelligence they go out to find their facts and to make their wisdom. When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and only find what is there. They elaborate their prejudice, instead of increasing their knowledge."

In this situation, Mr. Lippmann has a single suggestion of his own to offer. He would like to have intelligence sections attached at each of the Federal departments, and elsewhere, whose business it would be to ascertain the facts impartially and expertly, and publish them to the world. But he sets no great store even by this proposal. "It would be idle to deny that such a network of intelligence bureaus in politics and industry might become a dead weight and a perpetual irritation. One can easily imagine its attraction for men in search of soft jobs, for pedants, for meddlers." For "there are no fool-proof institutions." However, "if the analysis of public opinion and of democratic theories in relation to the modern environment is sound in principle, then I do not see how one can escape the conclusion that such intelligence work is the clue to betterment. I am not referring to the few suggestions contained in this chapter. They are merely illustrations. The task of working out the technique is in the hands of men trained to do it, and not

even they can today completely foresee the form, much less the details."

But this is not quite all, for "here, as in most other matters, 'education' is the supreme remedy." . . . "He (the teacher) can, by the use of the case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his information. He can teach him, for example, to look in his newspaper for the place where the dispatch was filed, for the name of the correspondent, the name of the press service, the authority given for the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was secured. He can teach the pupil to ask himself whether the reporter saw what he describes, and to remember how that reporter described other events in the past. He can teach him the character of censorship, of the idea of privacy, and furnish him with knowledge of past propaganda. He can, by the proper use of history, make him aware of the stereotype, and can educate a habit of introspection about the imagery evoked by printed words. He can, by courses in comparative history and anthropology, produce a life-long realization of the way codes impose a special pattern upon the imagination. He can teach men to catch themselves making allegories, dramatizing relations, and personifying abstractions. He can show the pupil how he identifies himself with these allegories, how he becomes interested, and how he selects the attitude, heroic, romantic, economic which he adopts while holding a particular opinion. The study of error is not only in the highest degree prophylactic, but it serves as a stimulating introduction to the study of truth."

And here, encased in the elaborate armor of his skepticism, Mr. Lippmann leaves us.

The several books I have selected for inspection by no means exhaust the list, but they will serve, perhaps, to indicate the content of the new literature of approach. In this literature we find the same general ideas elaborated from several different angles. We find the same alarm at present conditions, the same insistence on the need of a fresh start, and the same lame and impotent conclusions. For the weakness of all these approaches to the social problem, through history, evolution, mathematics, psychoanalysis and what not, is that they remain only approaches. Their advocates exhaust themselves in explaining their points of view. These writers, when we meet them, bow graciously; they explain that we are surrounded by unprecedented dangers; and they promise that with their guidance we shall find a way out. They start off at a brisk pace, and we

follow them hopefully. They appear to be going somewhere. But their destination proves to be their starting point. They march around the social problem, pointing out various battlements in that hoary edifice; but into the problem itself they do not attempt to find an entrance.

On the perplexities of the present hour these vague philosophers do not shed a ray of light. It would be possible for two intelligent men, holding exactly opposite views on current issues, to read any one of these books and agree with it heartily, and still find their respective convictions undisturbed. Whether prohibition is a blessing or a blight, whether trade unionism is a social good or a social peril, whether Russia's experiment in communism should be encouraged or killed, whether the world war was a conspiracy by Germans or an explosion of European imperialism, whether America should cancel the Allied debts or press them—on these burning questions the advocates of enlightened approaches afford us no guidance. In fact, they appear consciously and timidly to skirt controversial issues. More important than this avoidance is the absence of any new synthesis, any new social concept, which will cut across the old alternatives and unlock the creative energies of mankind.

One wonders if H. G. Wells is not the originator and fountain head of this sort of discussion. For many years he has been stating the human problem in eloquent terms, and urging noble attitudes towards it. He did not even refrain from turning his "Outline of History" into a pamphlet and affixing to that huge shaft a little spear-head of social gospel. He achieved, it is true, only anticlimax. He is like a playwright who promises to show us a glimpse of the millenium, and then exhibits a backdrop on which is painted a pale suburban paradise, where mechanical marvels have sweetened work and abolished dirt, and where all human passion is dead. It would be much more candid to run mankind into the ditch, and leave it there.

There is, oddly enough, an evangelical strain in most of these writers. They exhort us, they ask of us a change of heart, or a change of spirit, and they stir in us pious resolves to lift our eyes and hearts. They draw heavily on underlying ethical assumptions which they do not pause to examine. Possibly the true prototype of this literature may be found in those books and tracts, common a decade or two ago, which sought to review social problems from the point of view of Christianity. These discussions often posed the question: "What would Jesus do?" The answer was, in general,

the application of more love, charity and good-will to the muddled affairs of men. It always remained a little vague and uncertain exactly what Jesus would do in some exigencies; for example, in a transportation strike, where love, charity and good-will are entirely lacking, or in a war, where love, charity and good-will are regarded as treasonous. But these books undoubtedly did a definite, if limited, good. In the particular persons who read them they released, for the time being, a kindlier attitude toward their fellow-man. And so this new literature of orientation carries a similar emotional release. The persons who read it are put, for the time being, in a more liberal and tolerant frame of mind. That constitutes at once its merit and its appeal.

But such is not the object to which the authors address themselves. They are, they say, aiming at the head, not the heart. They would transform our ideas. They profess not to be preachers but philosophers. If we meet them on that ground, we must pronounce a harsher judgment. Of what value to thinking is it to be swamped in a sea of pretentious phrases? "The liberation of intelligence," "the intelligence principle," "the science and art of human engineering," "time-binding capacity," "facing reality," "things as they are," "the real nature of Man." All this is jargon, for it lacks substance, and is linked with ludicrously puerile proposals. It is, in short, a new form of cant.

What the world needs and what the world thirsts for is not phrases and attitudes, not the right words to weave a spell, but a program: a program on which men can agree and which will lead them out of the wilderness. Professor Robinson has permitted himself to say, at one point in the book considered above, "We are in the midst of the greatest intellectual revolution that has ever overtaken mankind." That, unfortunately, is precisely what is not taking place. There is no great movement in the realm of ideas. We have no new illumination. The old liberalism is dead. Science remains what it has always been, a tool. The twentieth century is barren of great and creative ideas in politics, economics and sociology. For the time being we must get along as well as we can with the aid of our common sense.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONCEPT.

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

A HIGHLY intellectual gentleman of Ceylon prides himself mightily upon the fact that he and others of the Muslim faith worship Almighty God alone, while Christians and Buddhists worship mere men like Christ and Gautama. A Buddhist of that same island finds the iron-clad caste system, with its miserable unfortunates of the Radriya grade, quite the right and proper thing. Both the Muslim and the Buddhist united in thinking the Christian just a little indiscriminate because he makes most of his converts among the members of this lowest class.

Then again an African black finds in his fetish all possible means to salvation and can die with placidity and promptitude if he happens to eat taboo. These things are too common among the heathen and pagan peoples to require comment. They are so common as to be uninteresting; we really expect no more than credulity and superstition from those unblessed by our own religion—whatever that religion may be—because religion is an extremely arrogant thing.

But a certain negro Methodist of the American South has more faith in his rabbit's foot than he has in the ministrations of his Christian clergyman! And a certain well educated American lady undergoes much real anguish because when she dies and reaches heaven she fears she will be confronted by her husband and his first wife. And a certain other American lady, apparently of sound mind, finds actual horror in the thought that her son believes Jesus Christ was born quite as naturally and as orthodoxly as he was himself.

Then a certain man of mental processes commonly deemed rational honestly believes he will go to hell when he dies unless he has been completely immersed in water under certain

specified extenuating circumstances. And a certain rheumatic gentleman finds it impossible to derive benefit from the treatment given by a sanitarium supported by a sect who keep Sunday Sabbath because such "ungodliness" shocks his moral and religious sense. And the good people in the sanitarium are constrained to save his soul from perdition because he does not keep "God's holy Sabbath" but celebrates Sunday, the day appointed of Beelzebub.

In spite of all the discussions of religion and the explanations thereof (and there have been enough, in all conscience, as witness the appended desultory book list) it does not occur to me that anyone has dwelt upon the simple peculiarity of the fact that there is such a thing. Of course, a Christian can be brought easily enough to see the peculiarity and the futility of any other religion and, sad as it is for the Christian to contemplate, other religionists see the direct opposite. But who has been impressed with the peculiarity of religion as a whole?

Truly the practical sway of purely speculative ideas is a marvel to consider. Is it not odd that this man should be saved throughout eternity by immersion while that one has purchased bliss by a bit of foot washing; this one, again, appeases the wrath of God by serving him on Saturday, that one achieves peace and rectitude by believing that evil is immaterial and sin is a delusion. Buddhist monks fare forth in yellow robe with begging bowl; Muslim pilgrims swarm into Mecca; the shrine of Benares is full to overflowing; Spanish priests smoke and idly purvey obscene jests; and a large American congregation of intelligent people mumbles over in unison the obsolete prayers of an ancient Hebrew race addressing an avenging Jehovah, or praises, by word of mouth the absurd acts of a group of so-called prophets who were more nearly whirling dervishes than anything else, or voices the metaphysical subtleties of a complicated scheme of salvation (from what?) with all the assurance in the world.

It is odd; it is peculiar, and it is interesting. It is a phenomena of such ubiquity that its importance is seldom rightly estimated. Certain types of mind recoil as if from something disgusting, or they ignore these "silly" manifestations altogether. I contend the very universality of this peculiarity makes such indifference narrow.

And by "peculiar" I do not mean anything necessarily derogatory or disparaging; I mean, in fact, to imply that the peculiarity lies in the consideration that these purely speculative over-beliefs have the everyday sanction and authority that they do. It is easy

enough to imagine a man believing theoretically in almost anything. Very many people believe sincerely in free love—except in so far as concerns their own family. But to think that practical people can take matters so highly speculative and metaphysical as the immaculate conception, the doctrine of the trinity, or predestination, and can strive to guide their lives by them is more peculiar, in reality, than the fact that certain other people can find practical solace in the theory of evolution or the molecular hypothesis. The only difference is that the sanction of religious speculation is a matter of much longer standing and it is so much more inflexible than the sanction of scientific speculation.

Moreover, for all its vain and airy theorizing, there is more of a tendency for science to ground somewhere; it quite frequently grounds in concrete fact; it produces a strictly terminal experience and gives rise to truth, something religion can scarcely be said to do quite often enough. Nor could we imagine a respectable scientist standing on a street corner surrounded by a small and discordant brass band and celling down the wrath of Einstein lest his hearers save themselves by believing in the theory of relativity; while at the opposite corner stands the latter-day disciple of Euclid calling down judgment upon his head for teaching these new and heretical doctrines.

It is most peculiar that in this "material" day and generation men can cordially and solemnly hate each other because certain of them believe that Jesus was born quite like Gautama; and there are millions who hold that it is wrong to believe that Gautama was born naturally. The probabilities certainly lie in the direction of natural birth for both of them, though the truth can scarcely be ascertained with sufficient exactness at this late date. But of what consequence should it be anyway?

It is of consequence because, after we get to believing a certain way, it wounds our pride to see others indifferent toward the beliefs which do so move us. Men of fact have hated each other over science. Arrhenius, Van't Hoff and Ostwald (for supporting the former two) knew the bitter hatred of the chemically orthodox. Mme. Curie's demonstrations of chemical action within the atom met harsh words. But a very little study of such facts will bring out more facts and the consequences of such beliefs are immediately important. As Lytton Strachey points out in his *Eminent Victorians*, Florence Nightengale's theory that open windows tended to cure disease wrought havoc and death when applied rigorously.

as she had it applied in tropical climates; but the consequences were immediately apparent and the application of the remedy ceased; the application of a theological remedy is seldom stopped regardless of consequences—aside from the fact that the consequences, if any, are often so remote and metaphysical as to be inconsequential.

A scientific case more comparable is that of the theory of evolution; regarding this Samuel Butler, G. K. Chesterton and others have called some quite prodigious names. Here again we are in the presence of a theory which, at this late date, it is—humanly speaking—impossible to verify and of which the consequences are slight. Investigations of chemical action within the atom are capable of verification in a way that evolution can never be proven. However, even evolution is worn more lightly and pressed less arrogantly as a universal nostrum than is the average religious speculation. Ordinary practical people seldom hate each other violently about it and have sectarian squabbles over it, whatever a few erudite bigwigs may do. The peculiarity of religion is that its imponderable speculations have such immediate practical weight and authority as they do.

But, though religion is evidently odd, the question remains—what is religion? After having read numerous answers to this question one is bound to conclude that religion is almost anything you like. In its protean roles it is, in truth, so varied that it is, practically speaking, nothing at all. It is doubtful if there exists anything in religion which cannot be resolved into something else.

For instance, religion partakes of philosophy, and parts of it are very good philosophy at that. Religion is in very large measure psychology, as James showed in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, and as many other later works have demonstrated. Religion is also science; not very good science, perhaps, but yet science none the less. Then again we go over into pathological manifestations and find religion tending to fuse with medicine and taking its place among the healing arts. As Swisher has demonstrated in *Religion and the New Psychology*, the root origin of all religions is sexual and so, in a refined and sublimated sense, religion is a sexual manifestation. In modern life fashionable Christianity is often a mixture of leisure-class society and sociology, mixed with convention and custom and punctuated weekly by Sunday morning disquisitions on ethics and morals or lectures upon philosophy and current topics. There is much in Veblen's "vicarious leisure" theory which aptly explains a great deal of religion. Finally religion is something to which the

worshipper brings whatever especially interests him and cheerfully dedicates it and himself to his fellows, whereupon he is prepared to vindicate his beliefs.

There is everywhere a basis of myth, superstition, sexuality and folk-lore; and in all instances there is a tendency to refine away grossness as those who hold to the religion themselves become more refined and intellectual. The ignorant Roman Catholic or Buddhist literally worships his icons and images; the negro Protestant of the American South has scarcely emerged from fetichism. But the intelligent Catholic, Buddhist or Protestant is very far away from either idolatry or superstition. None the less he has selected from his faith certain beliefs for his own personal possession which embrace the things he holds sacred, the things he is prepared to vindicate and the things he would, if possible, impose upon all men.

Speaking very broadly, however, it may be said that religion is composed of pathology and spirituality. And there is much more pathology than we are accustomed to suppose, although this ingredient is not always present. A neuropathic type of mind (and such types exist in millions) takes up religion for reasons that are largely pathological; a more rational being takes it up because he must do some service to intangibles and choose to do that service via religion. Some religious people are both pathological and believers in service to intangibles; but all religious people—indeed all people—believe in spirituality, but all believers in spirituality, or ideals, do not become religious.

Of religion as a pathological manifestation I can speak as an expert; I have been a psychopath and have been addicted to that kind of religion. In my own case, very singularly too, I emerged from neurosis during the critical period of a very dangerous illness, when suddenly there came to me the strength and the decision of character to accept an agnostic attitude towards problems of the universe too stupendous for human solution, and this returning strength of will naturally marked the return of mental health and, in my case, the subsidence of religion. When actually facing death I found that the metaphysical speculations of five neurotic years upon matters philosophical and religious amounted to nothing at all, while a consciousness of the fact that I was fearfully tired and that death meant rest was more than all else on earth. Where death led I cared not at all; of my fate I never thought; the past was irrevocable and I was ready to leave it without whimper and without apology; I was tired and merely wanted rest.

Anyone wishing to make a study of the processes of psychopathic religion might well read Dreiser's *Genius*. If a person can withstand Dreiser while he tells a four hundred page story in more than seven hundred, he or she will find Eugene Witla going through precisely the type of religious manifestation which is grounded in acute or threatened or partially sublimed neurosis.

It must be remembered that pathological religion is not confined to actual psychopaths; it much more frequently attacks mere neurotics who continue in a condition of pale pink nervousness all their lives and make the most fervent religionists. This type of religion springs from a great questioning and a great fear characteristic of the pathological condition of the patient.

We are in this great, far-spreading universe and we do not know why; we see manifestations of power which overwhelm our senses, and we tend to be afraid. The mind with psychopathic tendencies feels that it must somehow resolve the riddle of the universe and find shelter from this great fear. The solution may come by thinking out some complete system of philosophy and abiding thereby; this will both solve the riddle and offer companionship in a lonely and indifferent cosmos.

But not many people are so stable or so intellectually bold as to think for themselves. Self-consciousness and all it entails is a late development; it is a thing which does not bother the lower animals. Herd instinct and the thing called crowd behavior are powerful agencies. It seems much "nicer," much easier, much more conventional and much pleasanter just to adopt some creed already thought or imagined out by others, to drop into this intellectual haven and to live dumbly thereby forever. This solves the problem; no religion and no sect is so poor that it cannot present a solution for the problems of infinity if you care to adopt it. Let a man but decide which will bring most lasting satisfaction and he can ignore all else and be happy. Nor for that do I blame him. He has a right to such security if he fancies it. He has a right to postulate a nice, kindly, old gentlemanly God or any other kind he wishes.

He also has a right to try and verify his belief, just as the scientist has a right to verify the ionic hypothesis. But I part company with him where his vindication sets in. So long as he says "I will so to believe," I agree with him and we can both be happy; but as soon as he says "Thou also shalt believe as I do," I question his authority as well as his courtesy. And it is the psychopathic religionists who are militant. They have adopted a belief which,

since they have managed to make that much of a decision, ministers to their shattered nerves and brings peace; they then feel impelled, like all neuropaths whose symptoms have been relieved by some agency or other, to press their theological nostrum upon healthy humans who live untroubled by psychopathic riddles and fears.

It is naturally the psychopath who "gets converted"; his doubts at end and his fears opiated, he feels saved from something and determined to save other people who are not desirous of being saved from imaginary disasters. Should the psychopath chance upon some minister of iniquity who lacks the consciousness of a "conviction of sin," he gets nasty. He gets nasty because it always nettles a psychopath to see some one treat with indifference a matter he regards as tremendously important. He desires also to missionize the "heathen" and to convert the Jew, regardless of the fact that each race and clime has its own religion and its own psychopaths ready to do propaganda work. He is not amenable to reason; a psychopath never is. But once give him normal health and he is likely to recover from religion. On the other hand, let him remain slightly neurotic for life and he will doubtless be religious for life also.

The other type of religionist is more rational, and also more polite. I have spoken of this type as "spiritual," in that they take up religion as a method of service to intangibles. It has long been my opinion that such service to intangibles is an eradicable human trait and an underlying cause of much religion. I do not remember having seen my idea really expressed by anyone except Thorstein Veblen in whose *The Nature of Peace* I came across it most unexpectedly.

It requires considerable courage to quote Veblen. In *Orthodoxy* G. K. Chesterton speaks of the sleeping sickness caused by big words; he demonstrates how a sentence composed of small, everyday words will almost compel you to think, while a sentence made up of big words give a pleasant, soothing effect, but cannot arouse cerebration. Veblen's style, then, is a continual opiate. Nevertheless he says this all in one gigantic sentence:

"In point of fact, and particularly as touches the springs of action among that common run that do not habitually formulate their aspirations and convictions in extended and grammatically defensible form, and the drift of whose impulses therefore is not marked or deflected by the illusive consistencies of set speech—as touches the common run, particularly, it will hold with quite an un-

acknowledged generality that the material means of life are, after all, means only; and that when the question of what things are worth while is brought to the final test, it is not means, not the life conditioned on these means, that are seen to serve as the decisive criterion; but always it is some ulterior, immaterial end, in the pursuit of which these material means find their ulterior ground of valuation."

I have studied this Teutonic verbal landslide long and carefully and I have about concluded that Veblen means to say: Crass materialism is not everything. Every man has higher, non-material ideals as well. I believe this. I believe it is true of every man that he must somehow serve some ideal end. He may deal in political Utopias and become a soapbox orator; he may specialize in altruism and take pride in his high moral character; he may think to aid humanity by composing music, writing futile essays, painting cubist pictures or tracking down tri-nitrotoluol; he may seek to lift himself above the herd and go in for self-culture; or he may just "get religion." Then again he may do a little of several of these things, partaking of religion or not as best pleases him.

Not all people who feel spiritually inclined become religious. Custom makes a good many of them discharge their idealism in that direction, and that is why they can be so immune to morality, honor or decency in non-religious matters; pure deliberation brings others to religious conclusions. At any rate, they make a better, saner type of religionist than do the psychopaths, and had any world religion remained in their hands, it might have hypnotized the universe eventually. However, the psychopaths are more numerous, or more boisterous, they are childishy reckless and inherently militant—so that makes a different story.

In conclusion, a word from Martin's *The Behavior of Crowds*: "But when one's beliefs or principles become ends in themselves, when by themselves they seem to constitute an order of being which is more interesting than fact, when the believer saves his faith only by denying or ignoring the things which contradict him, when he strives not to verify his ideas but to 'vindicate' them, the ideas so held are pathological. The obsessions of the paranoic are of this sort."

Religion, based upon the principles outlined above, exists, and it is going to continue to exist; it is neither wise, necessary or just to suppress it or to call it names. I have no more partiality for *The Truthseeker* and *The Menace* and *The Dearborn Independent* than

I have for a psychopathic religionist or an advocate of Blue Sunday. Both types are endeavoring to vindicate something. A pathological atheist is quite as sorry and detestable a spectacle as a pathological Swedenborgian; the rantings of Ingersoll sound as ridiculous as those of some backwoods Methodist preacher. Cocksurety regarding the problems of infinity is an absurd pose on the part of a biped parasite who might be annihilated from the universe by a minute deviation in one of its apparent rules.

But what I do protest against is the arrogant sanction of divine authority claimed so often by religion; this, again, is not an objection to religion as such; it is purely an objection to an assumption of absolute, autocratic authority upon insufficient evidence—I care not whether it be invoked by an infidel, a political theorist or a religionist. I protest against the attitude which says, “I am right! I *know* that I am right! I shall be vindicated and I shall either convince you or call you names.” That kind of paranoia should be eliminated or confined in the proper institutions; it should be put where it can do no harm just as quickly as possible. For a finite mind cannot be either absolutely right or absolutely wrong about the problems of infinity; the idea is unreasonable. It can only seek to verify its conclusions and should face the universe and humanity in a spirit of open-mindedness and deepest humility.

A PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE.

BY SIDNEY HOOK.

PRAGMATICUS:

Good morning, Universalus, I have been impatiently awaiting your arrival. We left our discussion suspended in mid-air yesterday and I am being consumed with eagerness to unburden myself of some additional thoughts which have crowded in during the interim.

UNIVERSALUS:

Pray, proceed, my dear Pragmaticus, I find your impetuous attacks upon my philosophic attitude delightfully stimulating even tho they do not carry conviction.

PRAGMATICUS:

We had agreed in our previous discussion that moral and social influences were instrumental in determining what systems of apparently pure thought were to be identified with or converted into social apologetics. The fact that some of these grandiose systems were not so immaculately free from contact with ordinary affairs has suggested grave doubts in my mind concerning the utility of abstruse philosophical thinking in general. The trend of the times indicates that the mental energy frittered away in attempting to discover the elusive "eternal verities" or in inventing fictitious, if not altogether mythical, cosmologies, brings no countervailing returns. Hence, I am constrained to deny that philosophy has any other task than to serve as the handmaiden of social thought.

UNIVERSALUS:

That is a rather startling conclusion and I am at a loss to ascertain how it follows from your premises.

PRAGMATICUS:

I have just been reflecting on the historic problem of philosophy and on the attitude which the resolute school of pragmatist thinkers have adopted towards them. I am in complete accord with their admirable analysis and summary of what the Freudians would be inclined to call the "repressed complexes" of the great idealistic systems of the past. I maintain with them that the superiority of the contemplative to practical knowledge in the transcendentalists arose from a desire to express in their conception of perfect Ideality, the opposite of those things which rendered life so harrowingly tragical and so insufferably meaningless. These tendencies in their thought can be traced to an aesthetic isolation from the capricious and disconcerting flux of life. Philosophers have fled to a *tour d'ivoire* to spin intricate cobwebs and dreams of gossamer which must be brushed from the sleep-laden eyes of men if they are not to go astray in the maze of their own perplexity.

UNIVERSALUS:

The colors in which you paint the picture, my dear Pragmaticus, are too sombre and forbidding. I grant that the net result of technical philosophical thought has been as negligible as you say, but nevertheless, a misdirected bent does not imply misdirected motive. Neither have you considered the importance of philosophical thought as an aspect of irrepressible intellectual play. No, no, you have not shown cause why thinkers should leave their temples on the heights to descend amidst man and his lowly cares.

PRAGMATICUS:

I have not finished. Such philosophies as I have described have necessarily been static, worshipping things as they are, lacking any fundamental conception of change. Their subject matter has been pure Being—that can be cognized in scarecrow form only after being negated by or identified with Non-being. In such muddy rather than deep waters have philosophers cast their lines.

UNIVERSALUS:

Not so fast my friend. What I say in exception to your *ex cathedra* utterances may not vitiate your conclusion but

for the sake of historical accuracy I wish to point out that what you and the entire pragmatic school in the person of Prof. Dewey denominate as abstract staticism did not exist as completely as they would have us believe. As little as I agree, from my neo-realistic standpoint, with their doctrine of internal relations, I nevertheless, to do them justice, cannot but point out that the fundamental idealistic conception in the philosophy of Leibnitz or Hegel permitted of some development and gradation. That this development and gradation were simply an evolution of the given, that this coming and going viewed alone were incomplete and in a sense "unreal", does not affect the reality of the change when interpreted as a gradual assertion of the ideal embodied in repressive matter. In every system the ideal is either made synonymous with or the determining limit of the real. In fact, I cannot decide which is the greater error; to accept as you do all change as reality, or to call all change partial reality. This is one of the many points of contact between pragmatism and orthodox Hegelianism and makes more pointed the casual observation of a learned scholar that "the pragmatists have not been the only ones to curse their mother".

PRAGMATICUS:

I will not argue the question for I desire to impress upon you the notion that philosophy must cease being dialectical and become experimental. Its justification should consist in its ability to induce genuine and beneficial change. It must as Dewey says "cease being contemplative and become in a true sense practical". Philosophy would then be squarely confronted with the great moral and social problems of the day. Its subject matter would be the specific situation. Its solutions would be definite, applicable to the world around us; it would rationalize the possibilities of human experience. Philosophy would worship at the shrine of humanity not at the sepulchre of disembodied thought. What think you?

UNIVERSALUS:

This outburst of moral enthusiasm is highly creditable, Pragmaticus, but you have not made explicit all the implications of your position. First of all you state with a glibness born of a desire to believe it so, that all idealistic systems have

merely represented an attempt to work over a hostile world into more congenial colors and have never sullied their purity by dabbling in the mire of social facts. And yet the pragmatists never tire of pointing to the Hegelian philosophy as the ideological prop of the Prussian bureaucracy, as counsel for the defence of the Prussian State. I mention this to call your attention to the fact that almost every philosophy has treated more or less cursorily of the problems of contemporary society while delving into deeper questions of existence and knowledge. Were philosophy to readjust itself to your eloquent plea that it devote its energies primarily to the solution of pressing social and moral problems, then philosophy would no longer be philosophy but a phase of social science. I would in addition ask you whether you have strictly delimited yourself when you speak of philosophy being operative or practical? To respond, as others have done, by saying that the connotation of "practical" includes all forms of human activity indicates a mindful and hopeless inconsistency or an unavailing dodge, for then the very philosophizing which you so vehemently decry, appears as an irrepressible activity of the human mind, and therefore, practical.

PRAGMATICUS:

I had thought that I had threshed this matter out with you and made it understood that by practical and practical goods I do not mean merely that which ministers to the body but that also which causes the spirit to flower—that which breathes upon the spark of divinity causing it to light up and illumine the hidden recesses of our mind and the dark places of the earth.

UNIVERSALUS:

Ah! my dear Pragmaticus, even Aristippus, the Cyrenean, placed the pleasures which attended the use of his physical and intellectual faculties on the same plane. He did not truly distinguish between them. But tell me, pray, what affairs of the spirit would your philosopher ponder over when war and classes and capitalism have all been abolished? When the crying social evils stalking thru the world have been laid low? *What you call spiritual today is a transparent disguise for what you deem just!* But after justice? What then? Do you begin

to understand? "What care I", cries the philosopher who is not an incurable optimist, "whether humanity labors in travail or lolls in ease, whether humanity prospers and multiplies or ignominiously perishes, unless I can discover some vestiges of meaning in the maelstrom of existence, unless I can discern unity of plan or purposes in this unordered, incomprehensible, essentially mystic, universe"? What significance does activity hold for me if the earth can be resolved to be only a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Are you already aware of the relation subsisting between consciousness and the Cosmos, between value and existence that you seek to pour a bounding, erratic reality into arbitrary moulds? When you, Pragmaticus, saying half in jest and half in earnest that you are not so finely grained, classify man on the basis of his origin, differing from the rest of animallom solely thru a superior adjustment or reaction to tangibilities in a grossly material environment, we refuse to lower our brows in acceptance of the unwarranted inference that the past must determine the sum total of our future activity. You must permit us to traverse our weary way detached from the meaningless immediacies of your life.

PRAGMATICUS:

Ah, friend, yours is a futile and thankless task. To your questions there are no answering. Just like Andrayev's "Anathema" you crawl upon your belly to the outermost limits of reason only to be crazed by the torturing silence of the impenetrable and the unfathomable. Are you not deterred by the very uncertainty of your quest and the barrenness of achievement?

UNIVERSALUS:

True philosophy is uncertain. It does not seek exact knowledge yet in its pursuit of the "magic stone" it gave to a work-ridden world astronomy, mathematics and more recently psychology. "The value of philosophy is, in fact", says Bertrand Russell, "to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. . . . while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are; it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled in the region of liberating doubt. . . . and in a life where there is no peace but a constant strife be-

tween the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will, it enables us, if our life is to be great and free to escape this prison and this strife”.

PRAGMATICUS:

And is there no place for a suffering humanity in these beautiful and yet demoniacal aspirations of yours?

UNIVERSALUS:

Do not believe, Oh dear Pragmaticus, that we are unmoved by the call of our flesh. We cannot but relegate these things, however, to their proper place in our scale of values. Perhaps it is true that philosophers have not concerned themselves overmuch with practical affairs. But will matters be remedied if the priests of the sacred flame are driven from their high places into the maelstrom and mob? Have the pseudo-philosophers of the market place, amidst the din and pandemonium, shed any but a lurid propagandist light on the moot questions of the day? Your end would be better served, Pragmaticus, by leaving the philosophers to their own purposes. Yet do not forget, that when you are smugly complacent in a well ordered world, the poignancy of the mental struggle for the solution of problems still unanswerable, will remain with us. And tho our efforts go uncrowned with success and we be ever fitfully chasing the joy of discovery—a cup to be sought for but never to be tasted—we will seek personal fulfillment singing with Swinburne over our thoughts, comparing them with

“Leaves, pale and sombre and ruddy
Dead fruits of the fugitive years
Some stained as with wine and made
Bloody and some as with tears”.

PRAGMATICUS:

Well, Universalus, if we cannot reconcile our temperamental differences at least we can heed the tolling of the dinner bell and sit down to a light repast, requitting ourselves with talk for the foaming nectar which unkind powers have dashed from our lips, with their meddlesome amendments.

TWO ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGE OF JESUS.

BY WILLIAM WEBER.

(Continued)

THE Cleansing of the Temple has a double aspect. It was, on the one hand, an attack upon the chief priests and their allies, the scribes. On the other hand, it was a bold stroke for the religious liberty of the people. From both sides there must have come an answer. His enemies could not simply ignore what happened. Unless they were ready to accept the Galilean as their master, they were compelled to think of ways and means by which to defeat him. At the same time, his friends and admirers would discuss his valiant deed and formulate certain conclusions as to his character and authority, the more so as the chief priests themselves had first broached that question in public. Thus we may expect a twofold answer to the challenge of Jesus provided the Gospels have preserved a complete account.

The story of the Cleansing of the Temple is not continued at once. It is followed in all four Gospels by a rather copious collection of sayings of Jesus. Especially the Synoptists represent him as teaching in the temple as well as on his way to and from that sanctuary. Those teachings consist of three groups. The first comprises parables and sayings which are found in one Gospel only. The second contains discourses vouched for by two of the Gospels. The third belongs to all three. The first two groups may be put aside without any further examination because they do not form part of the common Synoptic source. They may be very important as far as they hand down to us genuine words of Jesus; but they cannot be classified as sources as to what actually occurred during the last days before the crucifixion. The third group demands a closer study. It may be an integral part of the oldest Synoptic writing to which the Cleansing of the Temple has to be assigned. It contains the following sections: (1) The Tribute to Cæsar (Mt. xxii. 15-22), (2) The Question of the Sadducees (Mt. xxii. 23-33),

(3) The Sonship of the Messiah (Mt. xxii. 41-46), and (4) The Destruction of Jerusalem, the Coming of the Messiah, and the Lesson from the Figtree (Mt. xxiv. 1-51).

The last three sections fit hardly into the situation which Jesus had created by cleansing the temple. The problem proposed by the Sadducees was a trick question, designed to cast ridicule upon the Pharisaic doctrine of the resurrection. One imagines to behold them grinning sarcastically while asking their query. But after the cleansing of the temple the Sadducees did not feel like playing with Jesus. Besides, the answer, put into his mouth, might have been returned by any Pharisee as is proved by pre-Christian, apocryphal writings of the Jews. Judging by the Gospels, Jesus did not make special efforts of either ratifying or rejecting the Pharisaic resurrection doctrine.

The question whether the Messiah is the son of David bears likewise the imprint of unmitigated Pharisaism. The Pharisaic Christ was not merely a lineal descendant of King David. The Book of Enoch identifies him with Enoch, the scribe of righteousness. We read there, lxxi. 13 f.: "The Head of Days came—to me and greeted me with his voice and said unto me: Thou art the Son of Man and thou art born unto righteousness and righteousness abides over thee and the righteousness of the Head of Days forsakes thee not." Also Noah was identified with the Messiah, as we may learn from a fragment of a Noah Apocalypse we possess in En. cvi.-vii. That was the Jewish way of expressing the idea of the pre-existence of the Messiah. Therefore even a Jew who had never heard of Jesus, might have asked the question of Mt. xxii. 42 ff. The proper Pharisaic answer would have been: The Christ is not only the son but also the father of David. For the royal forebear of the Messiah was himself the offspring of one of the earlier incarnations of the Chosen One of the Most High. Not the slightest trace of any relation of the question to the circumstances under which Jesus labored at that time can be discovered, nor is any attempt made of solving the riddle. We may thus consider it as one of the problems of Jewish theology which were discussed in the schools of the scribes who employed something resembling the Socratic method for prompting the correct answer, which had been memorized by their students together with the question.

The destruction of the temple may have been foretold by Jesus. But it did not require any prophetic gifts, not to speak of Messianic

powers, to foresee that event. Any intelligent Jew who realized the tremendous strength of Rome and was familiar with the stubborn longing of his countrymen for recovering their national independence, could predict a Jewish rebellion and the subsequent destruction of Jerusalem and the temple. Of course, such a Jew must either doubt the power of God or the worthiness of his nation.

The signs of the coming of the Messiah cannot be ascribed to Jesus. He was conscious of being the Messiah himself. His coming into the world was an accomplished fact. His kingdom was established. Henceforth the world could only further or hinder the gradual growth and development of the dominion of Jesus Christ. The Christians adopted indeed very early the doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ. But in doing so, they confounded the ideal conception of the kingdom of God as cherished by Jesus with the Messianic expectations of the Jews. Because the Jewish apocalyptic descriptions of the coming of the Messiah had not been realized by Jesus, they concluded he was bound to return a second time in order to fulfill those prophecies. They even put such apocryphal prophecies into his own mouth. That has been done, at least, in the passage under discussion. It was a reactionary step undoing the work of Jesus to a large extent. But that is no reason why we should insist upon perpetuating that fatal error and assigning the doctrine of the Second Advent to the founder of the Christian religion.

The question of the Pharisees: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not?" calls for special attention. It is the first of the four sections mentioned above, which occur in all three Synoptic Gospels; and it seems to be connected with the account of the Cleansing by a casual tie. The interviewers are clearly enemies of Jesus. They hoped he would declare no true, law-abiding Jew ought to pay taxes to a heathen ruler. If he had given such an answer, he would have branded himself as a rebel and been treated accordingly. Since Jesus was arrested apparently not long afterwards and crucified by order of the Roman governor, the pericope seems to stand in the right place.

The only thing which, in my opinion, opposes that simple explanation are the terms "the Pharisees" and "their disciples with the Herodians" of Mt. xxii. 15 f., and "certain of the Pharisees and of the Herodians" of Mk. xii. 13. Luke reads: "the chief priests and the scribes (with the elders)" (Lk. xx. 1). The mortal enemies of Jesus are "the chief priests and the elders of the people" in Matthew, and "the chief priests and the scribes" in Mark and Luke. The

Pharisees are not mentioned at all in the Luke account of the passion of Jesus and appear in Mark only in the pericope of the Imperial Tribute and in Matthew there and xxvii. 62. That seems to assign our story to a different source, and that impression is not weakened by the word "Herodians," which occurs only thrice in all the Gospels. The unexplained entrance of the Pharisees and the Herodians is under these circumstances rather strange. The former might be the scribes, but that would not account for the presence of the latter. Moreover, after the temple had been cleansed, the chief priests assumed the leadership. The scribes would therefore do hardly anything without their advice and consent. But our sources have nothing to say of a conference for that purpose.

The Luke version does not present that difficulty. For the phrase, "with the elders," may be dropped as a gloss derived from Matthew. But that raises at once the question whether Luke or Mark and Matthew have preserved the original text. It is easy enough to understand why the appellation of the men who interviewed Jesus about the imperial tax might have been altered in Luke so as to identify them with the enemies of Jesus in the principal source. But it is absolutely impossible to explain an uncalled for introduction of entirely new terms in the Mark and Matthew versions. They must belong to the source from which the pericope has been derived, and that source cannot therefore be identical with the oldest Synoptic account of the suffering and death of Jesus.

That compels us to turn our attention to the term "Herodians." Some exegetes have seen in them a political party that wanted to restore the kingdom of Herod the Great and reunite all the districts subject to him under the administration of one of his descendants. The members of that party were called Herodians. The chief objection is the silence of our historical sources as to the existence of such a political party. Those scholars seem to be unacquainted with the government of the Roman Empire. Under the emperors there existed no political parties which exercised or strove to exercise influence upon the administration of the empire. Especially the imperial provinces were governed by the emperor directly. The inhabitants of such a province were never asked whom they wanted for governor, or where their boundary lines should be drawn. Sometimes it suited the emperor to entrust a whole subject nation to the care of a native prince whose loyalty had been tested. Sometimes he deemed it wiser to split up an unruly people into small administrative groups in accordance with the rule *Divide et Impera*.

The real identity of the Herodians is easy enough to determine. The word, to use a Latin term, is a *nomen gentile*, denoting descent or relationship. In classical Greek such nouns were formed only of names of countries and towns outside of Greece. In Latin the ending characteristic of a *nomen gentile* is added especially to names of places and ordinal numbers to express to what a thing or a person belongs. Thus *montanus* is what belongs to or what is characteristic of a mountain; *primanus* is a soldier of the first legion; *Caesarianus*, which corresponds directly to *Herodianus*, denotes during the imperial period a certain officer of the emperor. Therefore, *Herodianus* in our passages must mean an officer of Herod, the tetrarch of Galilee and Perea. Such officers may have made common cause with the Pharisees against Jesus and may have been at Jerusalem on account of the passover. But all the Gospels fail to name them among the mortal enemies of Jesus. Herod himself is represented as having recommended his acquittal. For Pilate declares: "I, having examined him before you, found no fault in this man touching those things whereof you accuse him: no, nor yet Herod: for he sent him back unto us; and behold, nothing worthy of death hath been done by him. I will therefore chastize him and release him." (Lk. xxiii. 14-16.)

Under these circumstances we have to turn back to Mk. iii. 6, where the Pharisees and the Herodians are reported to have plotted together against Jesus. There the story breaks off abruptly. For we are not informed of any steps taken by the conspirators against Jesus, although it is said they decided to destroy him. The parallel accounts of Mk. iii. 1-6, namely, Mt. xii. 9-14 and Lk. vi. 6-11, are left incomplete at exactly the same place. Mk. xii. 13-17, Mt. xxii. 16-22 and Lk. xx. 20-26 cannot belong therefore to the last days of Jesus. They are the misplaced conclusion of the Cure on the Sabbath, which aroused the deadly resentment of the scribes and Pharisees. The officers of Herod were the proper persons to take part in the interview of Jesus. It took place in Galilee where the tetrarch was responsible for the strict observance of the Roman law. If Jesus had declared in their presence the imperial tribute was against the law of Moses, as they very likely had been led to believe by the Pharisees, it would have been their duty to arrest Jesus on the spot and bring him before the tribunal of the tetrarch.

The clash between Jesus and the Pharisees may be called the prelude, while the conflict with the chief priests is the finale of the great drama. Both run along parallel lines. The Pharisaic attempt

of having Jesus convicted for opposing the rule of Rome, has its counterpart in the crucifixion, which was brought about by the chief priests. Thus it could happen that a compiler of apostolic memoirs might insert the episode of the Imperial Tax into the story of the decisive battle after it was separated by some accident from its original context.

We are now enabled to decide with certainty what the continuation of the account of the Cleansing of the Temple must have looked like. The original story of the passion cannot have contained longer discourses of Jesus; it was only a short review of the leading events. Jesus is represented as the man of deeds, not of words. After he had bearded the lion in his den, there was no time left for discussing religious problems. The chief priests and the scribes, retiring before Jesus and the multitude, did not depart for their homes and wait several days before they could make up their mind to hold a common meeting in order to decide what they ought to do. They went at once to a place where they could discuss a plan of action. That meeting is described in the First Gospel as follows: "The chief priests and the elders of the people were gathered together unto the court of the high priest, who was called Caiaphas; and they took counsel together that they might take Jesus by subtlety and kill him. But they said, Not during the feast lest a tumult arise among the people." (Mt. xxvi. 3-5.) The passage joins directly Mt. xxi. 46. Mt. xxvi. 1-2 belongs evidently to the compiler who inserted Mt. xxii.-xxv. That is indicated by the clause, "when Jesus had finished all these words" (verse 1), and by the particle "then" at the beginning of verse 3. According to verse 2, the meeting of the enemies of Jesus as well as the cleansing of the temple took place two days before the passover. But that date is supported only by the Second Gospel (Mk. xiv. 1) and has not been derived therefore from the oldest Synoptic source.

The corresponding statement of the Second Gospel is: "And the chief priests and the scribes sought how they might take him with subtlety and kill him. For they said, Not during the feast lest haply there shall be a tumult of the people." (Mk. xiv. 1-2). Luke reads: "And the chief priests and the scribes sought how they might put him to death; for they feared the people." (Lk. xxii. 2.)

The three accounts come evidently from a common source. Still there are certain differences. The Matthew version reports a regular meeting at the court of the high priest, which is not mentioned in the other Gospels. The consensus of Mark and Luke proves the

original text to have read: "And the chief priests and the scribes sought how they might kill him." The two verbs "kill" and "put to death" of Mark and Luke, respectively, are only different renderings of the same Semitic verb. The sentence "for they feared the people," in Luke, states why they wanted to put Jesus to death. They were afraid the whole nation might believe in him. The words impress one as being the original text because the statement of the first two Gospels offers some difficulties. In the first place, it does not explain why they wanted to kill Jesus, but only why they intended to do so with subtlety. In the second place, the words "not during the feast," if understood as an adverbial phrase of time, have no meaning at all. As a matter of fact, Jesus was crucified during the feast on the fifteenth day of Nisan, and still no tumult arose among the people. It looks to me as if "not during the feast" were correlated to "with subtlety" and denoted, not the time when, but the place where. In that case, "during the feast" is an error of translation for which the Greek interpreter of the Semitic text is to be held responsible. It ought to read: "not in the temple." The Greek noun for "feast" stands in the Septuagint for two Hebrew nouns. It expresses fifty-eight times the one and thirty times the other. The latter signifies either "an appointed time" or "an appointed place," and the appointed place may be the temple. (Hebrew English Lexicon by Brown, Driver & Briggs, p. 417.)

The Johannine parallel to the council of the chief priests and the elders of the people is found Jn. xi: 47-50. It is separated from the Cleansing of the Temple just as the corresponding Synoptic accounts by copious insertions derived from other sources. It is related to Jn. vii. 38 and 45 ff. to judge by the term, "the chief priests and the Pharisees." In its present shape, however, it has nothing to do with the Cleansing of the Temple. For the reason why they wanted to kill Jesus is because he had raised Lazarus from the dead.

Yet that explanation is fraught with serious difficulties. The miracle itself offers the greatest objection. The enemies of Jesus could send to Bethany and verify the report brought to them by eye witnesses in all its details. The ancient world believed that such deeds could be done. Many persons were credited with supernatural gifts and highly honored and rewarded by their followers. The chief priests and the Pharisees might be insanely jealous of the influence which Jesus, the worker of wonders, obtained over the people; but at the same time they were bound to cherish a wholesome respect and fear of him. For Jesus would not hesitate, as they

had to take for granted, to turn his supernatural powers against them if forced to defend himself. Even at that age, self-defence was recognized as the first law of nature. An individual able to call back to life a putrid body might easily turn living bodies into corpses by a mere word of his mouth if anybody should prove bold enough to lay violent hands upon him.

Such a consideration compels us to study the story of Lazarus (Jn. xi. 1-46) with great care. The narrative is not distinguished by literary skill and fluency. Even the opening sentence, "Now a certain man was sick, Lazarus of Bethany, of the village of Mary and her sister Martha," hardly fits into the given situation. Martha and Mary are designated afterwards the sisters of Lazarus; Martha calls him "my brother" (verse 21), and Mary does the same thing (verse 32), and Jesus speaks of him as "thy brother" both in his interview with Martha and with Mary (verse 28 and 39). Still verse 1 by itself alone does not indicate such a relationship between Lazarus and the sisters. It looks almost as if the original beginning of the narrative had been lost and replaced by notes taken from the Third Gospel.

Verse 2: "And it was that Mary who anointed the Lord with ointment and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick," is likewise hard to account for. The anointing of Jesus by Mary occurred, according to our Gospel, quite a time after the raising of Lazarus from the dead and is related Jn. xii. 1-8; and it is not exactly customary in historical writings to refer to happenings before they have taken place.

Also verse 5: "Now Jesus loved Martha and her sister and Lazarus," is open to criticism. After the message of the sisters, "Lord, behold, he whom thou lovest is sick" (verse 3), there is no need for such a statement. Besides the Greek verb for "love" in verse 5 is not the same as that employed in the rest of the narrative (see verse 2 and 36).

One is tempted to reject all those verses as glosses. But as soon as they are dropped, the narrative is left incomplete. Even the omission of verse 5 does not improve the text unless the clause, "when he heard that he was sick," at the beginning of verse 6, is stricken off simultaneously. It is merely a repetition of what is said before in verse 4.

All these blemishes, however, may be characteristic of the style of the author. For their elimination would render necessary a re-writing of the whole introduction. They would mark him, not as a

person who tells a familiar story, but as one who evolves awkwardly a fictitious narrative out of his own mind and finds it quite a task to get his proper start. One even might suspect him to have based his account upon data borrowed from Luke, namely, the pericope of Martha and Mary (Lk. x. 38-42) and the parable of Lazarus (Lk. xvi. 19-31).

The list of objectionable features is by no means exhausted. When the disciples warned Jesus not to go to Bethany because the Judeans might stone him (verse 8), he is reported to have replied: "Are there not twelve hours in the day? If a man walk in the day, he stumbleth not because he seeth the light of this world. But if a man walk in the night, he stumbleth because the light is not in him" (verse 9-10). The words are very likely a genuine saying of Jesus. But as long as the exact circumstances under which they were first pronounced are unknown, it is impossible to determine their true meaning. Even in an allegory "stumble" cannot denote "be stoned to death." In order to avoid murderers, traveling by night is often safer than traveling by day. If "the light of this world" is the sun, the closing words, "the light is not in him," have no meaning. Even if we suppose Jesus to have intended to say: A man who walks in the light of righteousness, need not fear an attack of the wicked, Jesus would be contradicted by common experience if he spoke of personal violence. Thus Jn. xi. 9-10 must be a fragment of some discourse of Jesus which the writer of our pericope thought proper to add to his story.

Verse 11-14, the disciples are described as more than commonly stupid. They fail to understand their master's announcement: "Our friend Lazarus is fallen asleep; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep." For they return the silly answer: "Lord, if he is fallen asleep, he will recover."

Verse 24 Martha declares: "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." Jesus corrects her in verse 25 f. by saying:

"I am the resurrection and the life:
He that believeth on me, though he die,
Yet shall he live;
And whosoever liveth and believeth on me
Shall never die."

The statement is not less beautiful than true and evidently a genuine word of Jesus. The parallelism of members, expressing the leading thought in two ways, cannot be overlooked. But we inquire in vain

how it could apply to the case of Lazarus. He had died, and the life that was given back to him was not the life of which Jesus speaks. The former was the animal life of the body, the latter is the spiritual life of the soul. The one is transient, the other permanent, or eternal. As a matter of fact, Jesus in the just quoted words controverts directly the Pharisaic doctrine of the resurrection, which is put into the mouth of Martha. The Pharisees believed that all who died were dead and had to stay in Sheol until on the last day of the present world, the first day of the kingdom of God would dawn. Then the pious in the nether world would arise from the dead and enter together with the living elect the heavenly kingdom. As Jesus held a different idea of the kingdom of God, he also cherished a different conception of the resurrection. He was not waiting for a bodily resurrection, but identified "the resurrection" with "the life," that is to say, with the life everlasting. Those who believe in Jesus live forever in spite of death; and those who thus live in Jesus never die.

Verse 33 we are surprised to learn that Jesus "groaned in the spirit and was troubled," or "was moved with indignation in the spirit and troubled himself" because Mary and her friends were weeping. We are not told why he was indignant at their tears. According to verse 35 he wept himself. He certainly could not be moved with grief and compassion. For he had come to raise his friend from the dead and restore him to the bosom of his family. The groaning of verse 38 is just as much a mystery as the first. It looks almost as if the narrator deemed it wise to equip Jesus for the occasion with a few juggler's tricks.

Such observations make our pericope appear, not as one organic whole, but as a patchwork quilt. That in turn suggests a comparatively late origin and a probable dependence of the composer upon the before named Luke passages.

The story represents Jesus as most deliberately planning and executing a great and undoubted miracle in order to convince the people that he was "the Christ, the Son of God, even he that cometh into the world" (verse 27). When he heard the news of his friend's sickness, he said: "This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified thereby" (verse 4). He waits purposely for two days (verse 6), that is to say, till Lazarus had died (verse 11 and 14), before he set out on his journey to Bethany. For had he arrived there while his friend was still living, he would have been obliged to cure him at once and thus missed the

opportunity of demonstrating his power over death. That is implied in not less than three passages. Both Martha and Mary greet Jesus with the identical words: "Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died" (verse 21 and 32). And verse 37 we read: "Some of them said, Could not this man, that opened the eyes of him that was blind, have caused that this man also should not die?" Thanks to the delay of Jesus, he found at his arrival that Lazarus not only was dead, but also buried for four days (verses 17 and 39). As a result decomposition had advanced, as was proved by the smell that arose from the tomb. The Greek verb, translated "decay" in the American Revised Version (verse 39), means "to smell," that is, "to smell sweet" as well as "to stink." Lazarus without doubt was dead, and no mortal man could have called him back to life. Martha indeed has supreme confidence in Jesus and confesses: "Even now I know that whatsoever thou shalt ask of God, God will give thee" (verse 22). Nevertheless she does not comprehend the true significance of the promise of Jesus: "Thy brother shall rise again" (verse 23). Verse 40 Jesus appeals to the faith of Martha: "Said I not to thee that, if thou believedst, thou shouldst see the glory of God?" When the stone had been removed, Jesus offered thanks to God because He had heard him. In doing so, he also stated: "because of the multitude that standeth around I said it, that they may believe that thou didst send me." The result came up to his expectations. For we learn, verse 45: "Many therefore of the Judeans, who came to Mary and beheld that which he did, believed on him." But not all believed; for "some of them went away to the Pharisees, and told them the things which Jesus had done" (verse 46). Jesus had decided beforehand to make use of the death of Lazarus for performing a miracle that would establish his Messianic character beyond the possibility of a doubt.

The word for "miracle" in John as well as in the Synoptic Gospels is "sign," or "sign from heaven" (Lk. xi. 16). The term is used quite often in the Fourth Gospel. But right here a fundamental difference between the Fourth Gospel on the one hand and the Synoptic Gospels on the other hand ought not to be overlooked. The Jesus of the former does many signs in order to make the people believe in him. He also teaches, but his miracles are much more important. The Jesus of the latter refuses expressly to perform a miracle for that purpose and confines himself to proclaiming the law of the kingdom of God and exemplifying that law by his own conduct. He does not even tell the people who he is, and forbids his

disciples to inform them that he is the Messiah. He evidently wanted the people to judge and decide for themselves, without being prompted by others.

The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, of which we were reminded as a possible source of the story of Lazarus, is a protest against the demand for a sign. The Rich Man had realized in Hades his mistake and desired to save his brethren from having to share his terrible fate. The terms "rich" and "poor" are used in the parable, of course, in the same Ebionitic sense as in the Beatitudes and Woes of Lk. vi. 20-26. The one class of people trust and obey God, and the other do not. The Rich Sinner implores Abraham to send Lazarus to his brethren that they might be converted. But Abraham declines to grant that request. If the brethren want to be saved, they have to listen only to Moses and the prophets. If they do not care for the word of God, as revealed by his great servants, they will not be persuaded even if one should rise from the dead to bear witness of the hereafter. Belief in God and His righteousness is a moral act. Unless it guides and controls man's conduct, he does not believe in God. For it is not identical with being informed and certain of the existence of God. For such a faith even the devil possesses, if he is the Miltonic leader of the host of fallen angels who enjoyed personal intercourse with God before they rebelled. According to the Book of Job, Satan has access to God even now (Job i. 6 ff.). In the case of religion, seeing is not identical with believing. That is also illustrated by those witnesses of the raising of Lazarus from the dead who could not denounce Jesus quickly enough to his mortal enemies. Thus the answer of Abraham is absolutely true and applies, as a matter of course, to all religious teaching, that of Jesus not less than that of Moses and the prophets. It is easy enough to see why Jesus refers to the Old Testament. The parabolic character of his tale demanded that. Besides, the parable was addressed without doubt to those Pharisees who insisted on a sign from heaven. Jesus desired very naturally to direct their attention to their own experiences with unbelievers.

The parable of Lazarus therefore demonstrates in comparison with the story of Lazarus that Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels is guided by a higher and truer principle than in some portions of the Fourth Gospel. What he strenuously objects to in the former, he volunteers to do in the latter. That contradiction cannot be smoothed over and leads to only one conclusion: Jesus did not raise Lazarus from the dead. We have only the testimony of the Third Gospel

for the genuineness of the parable. But that testimony is corroborated by the refusal of Jesus to prove his authority by giving a sign from heaven, which is recorded in all three Synoptic Gospels. The story of Lazarus, however, which, according to the Fourth Gospel, records the greatest and final Messianic deed of Jesus, is nowhere else alluded to in the whole New Testament. It was put together by a party familiar with our present Luke, who attempted to compose a life of Jesus, not as he knew it to have been, but as he imagined it ought to have been. He resuscitated the Lazarus of the parable, after giving him a home at Bethany and two sisters, Martha and Mary. Bethany was suggested as the scene of the miracle by Mt. xxvi. 6 and Mk. xiv. 3. The place had to be near Jerusalem so that the Jewish authorities might learn at once what Jesus had done.


Since the historical Jesus did not raise Lazarus from the dead, Jn. xi. 1-46 cannot account for the resolution of the chief priests and the Pharisees to kill Jesus, which is a well established historical fact. That is indicated also by the term "Pharisees" of verse 46. The agents in verse 47 ff. are "the chief priests and the Pharisees." Jn. xi. 47 ff. may therefore be connected directly with the account of the Cleansing of the Temple just as the corresponding passages of the Synoptic Gospels. The statement, "for this man doeth many signs" of verse 47, has been added by the compiler. The original narrative reads: "Therefore the chief priests and the Pharisees gathered a council and said, What shall we do? If we let him thus alone, all men will believe in him; and the Romans will come and take away both our place and our nation. But a certain one of them, Caiaphas, being high priest that year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all nor do ye take account that it is better for you that one man should die for the people than that the whole nation should perish."

The passage offers no special problems. "Thus" in the clause, "if we let him thus alone," is significant. It refers to the fact that they had been unable to do anything against Jesus. What is said about the Romans is correct. They were the masters of Palestine and did not shrink from the task of regulating the internal affairs of the Jewish commonwealth whenever necessary. They even deposed and installed high priests, although, according to the law of the Jews, that office was held for life and descended from father to son. The Romans demanded that the high priest should assist them in controlling the people; and if he could not or would not do that, he had to make room for a more adroit and pliable successor. (Ant. xviii. 2, 1.) If the Jewish nation as a whole had accepted the lead-

ership of Jesus and thrown off the yoke of the priests and the scribes, the Roman governor would not have taken the part of the latter. He had no use for the Pharisees; and even a superficial investigation would have exposed the abuses of the chief priests. While the Roman governor might extort all the money he could from the Jews, he would not permit the priests to impoverish his subjects. Moreover, it would have been an easier task to govern the Jews when led by Jesus than under the control of the rapacious priests and the fanatical scribes.

The proposition of Caiaphas was the answer to the question, "What shall we do?" and ended the discussion. Those who were present at the council realized it was a battle for life and death between them and Jesus and that they had either to kill him or surrender everything they possessed and prized. The usual translation of the words of Caiaphas: It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not," sounds rather awkward in English as well as it does in Greek. It is an unskillful attempt of rendering to original Semitic text. Hebrew lacks the comparative and superlative degrees. These ideas are expressed by the construction of the sentence. The Semitic construction of the statement points to a Jewish-Christian author and demonstrates the old age of the whole paragraph. It ought to read in English: "It is better for you that one man should die for the people than that the whole nation should perish."

(To Be Continued).



EMILE BOUTROUX.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE COMMON GROUND OF LIBERALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM.

BY C. O. WEBER.

DESPITE the issues of "fundamentalism" waged in the Baptist Church and to a lesser extent in others, there are propitious signs that we are once more to have a religion of the spirit in place of a religion of the word. Strange that the church should ever entertain the dangerous fallacy that the theological formulation of ideals in language is to realize them in fact. While for the most part the energy of the church has gone into a vain attempt to express the most sacred attitudes of life in the dialectic of theology, her spirit has found no other exercise than the rather flaccid one afforded by oyster suppers and the sale of haberdashery. The church has fallen into discredit to the extent that she has been satisfied with the role as conservator of doctrine. It cannot be denied that the church has devoted much of her interest to the development of an elaborate theology to justify the crude, mythological aspects of her faith. And it is a theology well calculated to exasperate the man of thought and to leave the mind of the average layman with the vague notion that Christianity is nothing more than some sort of "manifesto of piety" whose essence consists in its opposition to the other manifestos of Buddha and Confucius. Thus, the church has degenerated to the role of protectionism. Then, singularly enough, as though aware that all of her theological learning is as a card-board structure built on quicksand, she urges that religion must be accepted on faith, as though faith signified an intellectual suicide for the sake of some good that cannot be attained otherwise. With her cloak of infallibility torn to shreds by higher criticism, with a top-heavy theology which few understand, and which none in their hearts believe except those who are graciously predisposed to be convinced, with a rule of faith which, as someone observes, possesses the doubtful virtue of "being useful be-

cause it is incredible", the church has indeed fallen into bad straits. It has been aptly stated that it were as though a moss-grown orthodoxy, seeking compensation for its incapacity to learn, devoted itself to a grim determination not to forget. The shell of theology which religion unwittingly entered has become a prison house. Men turn from the church because they reject the three-story universe which theologians discuss so profoundly. This is the natural result of the attempt to make the Bible, which is a literature of power, into a literature of knowledge.

But it appears that another era is upon us when we again see many things "as through a glass darkly." From all directions come prophesies of "the religion of the future" and the prophets of the new do not often employ the traditional epithets. Indeed, the Christianity of today is following two tendencies, and examination will show that both of them are headed towards religious bankruptcy. On the one hand, the Catholic Pope has reaffirmed the eternal truth of catholic supernaturalism with all of its paraphrenalia of beads, censors, crosses, chasubles and holy water. Masses are still as real in their efficacy as inferno is real in its terrors; and purgatory and paradise still hold forth their promise. On the other hand, the "liberal spirits", such as Charles E. Eliot and Abbe Loisy are waxing eloquent about what they call the "new orthodoxy" and "the religion of the future." The inner content of their religion appears as a simple piety in place of the angels, devils and saints of Catholicism.

True religion, it would seem, should sanction both an object and an attitude of loyalty toward it. Yet religion threatens to break asunder with Catholicism holding blindly to the object while the liberals take possession of mere loyalty—of mere attitude without any object whatever. This development was foreshadowed by the recent furore in philosophy concerning the merits and demerits of pragmatism. Scholastic theism in general and Hegelianism in particular have sought to compel belief in the tenets of religion as a rational necessity. The pragmatists in general with William James in particular have sought to justify religion solely on the strength of its practical necessity. Thus, a faith so highly rationalized and generalized that it fails to satisfy anyone in particular, as an average coat would fail to fit any man, has been opposed to the theory that "the axes of reality run solely through the egoistic places."¹

¹ Citations from James are taken from his *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

It is instructive to note the diverse views of God that are held by these opposed views. The God of absolute idealism, whom James terms a "metaphysical monster" is replaced by a "pallid adumbration of a spiritual universe" with which we need to establish "union or harmonious relation." Then, as though realizing the thinness of this concept, James sanctions the "overbeliefs" which will give more objectivity to this too highly attenuated a bit of empiricism, which, however, "is objectively true so far as it goes."

Thus, the spiritual universe of James is only able to get content by an injection of the overbeliefs that are purely individual in their origin. He even volunteers such an overbelief of his own in which he attributes to the spiritual reality, which remains after rejecting theological trappings, *goodness* and *personality*. These overbeliefs he admits to be "somewhat of a pallid kind" as is fitting to a philosopher. Thus, the spiritual universe of James free from all overbeliefs is not one whit better than the "metaphysical monster" he condemns, since both alike are conceived to satisfy theoretical interests. It can become dynamic only by the addition of the overbeliefs and these are by hypothesis the additions of individual human beings. In this view, religion becomes *true* in more than a metaphysical sense only by becoming of practical value. This in none other than the philosophical version of the tendency of the present day prophets of whom I have already spoken. Schleiermacher's conception of religion as predominantly a volitional and moral experience with a reward all its own, is a typical exemplar of the liberal tendency.

In seeking to resolve these oppositions we may proceed in two ways. If our bias is historical, and our attitude conservative, we are inclined to declare that when religion becomes detached from such conceptions as that of God and His Divine attributes, it ceases to be religion, though it may lay claim to be an ethical system. If our bias is for individuality and progress (understood to mean *change*) we will declare against this conservatism that it is an unbecoming Chinese ancestor-worship or a stubborn nominalism which forgets meanings in its excessive devotion to conceptualism.

If, with the "fundamentalists", we seek to determine what religion is by discovering the "essence" or common element that the religions of the past have exhibited, we engage in a futile undertaking. There is no agreement among those considered competent in this task that have enabled us to say with certainty what

the content of religion is or what its true symptoms are; and Emile Boutroux has well observed that from the viewpoint of psychology the essence of religion is no other essence than ignorance. If we are to seek for the "essence" of religion, we should begin by purging the word of a certain fixed bias that lurks in it. Heretofore it has been assumed that the essence of religion consists in some *belief* that all religions hold in common. In this case, they were possibly doomed to failure at the very outset for it is conceivable that the essence of religion may not at all inhere in some rational belief; and, indeed, comparative religion presents us with an array of types—some affirming God and some denying him; some affirming an after-life, others denying it; some with well defined moral codes, others without them.

Fortunately, there is an entirely different viewpoint from which we may approach religion; and this viewpoint, I think, will end in something other than the barren results of the ordinary method of comparative research. It is clearly set forth by Emile Boutroux in the article already referred to. Of the attempt to comprehend religion in terms of a concept that will exhibit the common characteristics of all religions, Boutroux speaks as follows:

"To content oneself with this concept in deciding whether religion subsists or is to subsist, is to regard existence, pure and simple, as adequate without enquiring into its quality.....We must note that both in everyday life, and in philosophical reflection, we have constantly to deal not with concept but with idea. When we speak of the future of art and science, of democracy, and socialism, we are not thinking of them as actually given or presented, or as they would be defined in a logical generalization: we assuredly have in mind the thought of what science and democracy can and ought to be, to attain to full realization, i. e., not the concept but the idea of science or democracy."²

Let me exemplify the differences involved when we consider the issue between the liberals and the orthodox, first by the conceptual method, and then by the method proposed by Boutroux. To the orthodox in general religion involves a type of belief and conduct whose sanction is Divine; whereas to the liberals the religious life involves a type of conduct whose sanction is human well-being. To decide which of the two deserves to be called religion, we should ask, "What difference in meaning is involved by a life of loyalty to God or a life of loyalty to humanity?" This

² "The Essence of Religion", *Monist*, July 1921, pp. 337-349.

plan of campaign, however, is far from being as simple as its statement would indicate. To look for the difference in meaning that God has for the orthodox and that philanthropy has for the liberals is in the end hopeless; for though they admit of the common denominator of "dearness", this quality is notoriously incommensurable. Similarly, to look for the difference that may exist in the practical lives of the liberal and the orthodox, as pragmatism would do, is equally hopeless; for though the practical life may be measurable in a quantitative sense, they are, as quantities, without any meaning or value. This lands us in the dilemma of being unable to decide, from the conceptual view, whether the orthodox or the liberals set forth the true meaning of religion. The failure is due to the fact that it either forces us to adopt a criterion of religion to begin with (typically, the historical criterion) or else leads us to formulations without inner substance. That is, if we set out with the belief that true religion consists in the "worship of God", we ensnare ourselves in the common error that this phrase has an unvarying and unmistakable meaning; and this is precisely the issue that is raised by the liberalists.

The fact that they are in dispute is so far the only result concerning which the orthodox and the liberals can agree. Yet, there must be some more substantial agreement between them that conceptualism cannot evaluate, still less discover. There is another fact that both liberals and the orthodox have overlooked in their zeal, and that is, the dumb acknowledgement of each that *somehow their differences are not final, and that it were a blessing to all if there could be some understanding*. Have we not here already a sympathetic agreement, fundamental in the lives of men, which if brought to light by some method of magic would explain away the differences that are so insistent on the intellectual plane? It is indeed some blessing inarticulately hoped for that animates their argument. Can the intellect show them the common measure of excellence they look for in their religious lives? We have seen that it cannot. Is perhaps the intellect responsible for the fact that they have differences at all? In answer to these questions, let us consider in turn the objections each disputant has of the others religion.

The orthodox object that the liberal insistence on human welfare and its neglect of the attributes and will of God involves the contradiction that we shall find in humanity something better than human—the contradiction of mankind lifting itself by its own boot-

straps. The orthodox cannot conceive of striving except in terms of two levels, one human and the other super-human. The liberals, on the other hand, will complain that the orthodox conception only seems to provide the better things to our hopes: that the two levels of orthodoxy, the human and the Divine, fail to function after all for they are levels that are *different in kind and not in degree*. One is limited, the other unlimited: there can be no transition from the one to the other. God is perfectly good while man is only partially good; and between them there is no common measure just as there is no common measure between miles and an infinite space. How the human and the Divine can enter into the same experience is inconceivable if one occupies an absolute and the other a finite realm.

Boutroux would find in the very natures of the orthodox and liberal the "energizer" that their intellects failed to find. The intellect will always express a functional relationship in terms of levels—as a transition of stages. As a method of describing the occurrence this method may be satisfactory enough; but we are seeking to understand how it may be experienced. This view leaves us with the insoluble contradiction as to how the static realm of heaven and the dynamic realm of human affairs can articulate with each other. It is the contradiction of how perfect rest can hinder or aid human progress; of how perfection can help, still less sympathize with, imperfection; of how perfect wisdom can understand ignorance. Such contradictions are not peculiar to theology alone but arise whenever we seek to conceive dynamism of any kind in the language of conceptualism. What actually occurs in the lives of men is not an inexplicable jump from one state to another; but rather *a creative process which at once makes new levels as it arrives at them*. Needless to say this is an insoluble paradox to the intellect; but it has nevertheless a logic of its own as certain of verification as is the principle of contradiction upon which all formal logic rests.

Applying this solution to the chronic differences between the way popes and philanthropists conceive religion, we would say that popes after all are right in declaring that religion must embody more than complacent average opinion aspires to. Yet, the exponents of the "religion of humanity" are also right in demanding that worship be more than is afforded by an eternally complete God. A complete religion, as we said heretofore, must involve both an object and an attitude, a hope and at once a fulfillment, a realization which is still a resolve. But these cannot be discovered in terms

of logical externality, *for here a simultaneous identity and difference cannot exist*. It is only on the psychological level that this is possible; for it is here that we have change and yet identity, a subject who is undeniably at the same time an object. It is in subjective life that we find simultaneously the sense of something lacking and the possession of this something (in degree and not in part). In short, it is in immediate experience that the religion of the future may find the common grounds of all faiths which it has consistently failed to find when it employs dialectic.

The objection is invariably urged that immediate experience is inutterable; but the whole issue turns upon the consideration of whether in religion this is not a virtue rather than a fault. Some form of utterance it indeed has—the utterance of deeds. It finds voice, not intermittently as do arguments in a debate, but continuously in action. The intellect first gets its evidence and then believes, said Saint Anselm, but in religion we must believe first and then come to understand. So it is by living the life of Christ that we shall come to understand Christianity. Yet, it is not impossible to describe that life in words.

The fundamental fact in the lives of men everywhere is their conviction, whether articulate or inutterable, that life is essentially creative in nature. The very first verse of Scripture has therefore sounded the essential nature and mission of God in saying that God created the world. The stamp of the Divine sonship of man consists in the fact that he also can create. Theology spoiled the account by referring it to a point in time, whereas creation is omnipresent wherever there is life, and Bergson has been able to show that mental processes are inexplicable unless we suppose its presence. The creative aspect of life has always escaped science which by its very method is destined to make of all history a re-threshing of old straw, a redistribution of elements given once for all. It was in deference to a tyrannical intellectualism that made the law of conservation its cornerstone, that led religionists to the subterfuge that creation is a fact but a “miraculous” one. It is high time to give to religion the benefit of the fact that creationism is just as verified a fact in the universe as is conservationism. In social and psychological science the fact of creation is just as necessary as an hypothesis as is the law of conservation in exact science. But in the lives of ordinary men, creation is not a theory, but a responsibility—it is their natural religion. Religion is the overwhelming conviction that our powers exist and that they must be

expressed, that we must strive, however hopeless victory may seem. The true foe of religion, as Wilm observes, is not naturalism, but the mechanical absolutism of science which makes striving a deceptive appearance; or an absolute intellectualism which defeats our powers by representing all problems as solved.³ That our hopes are realizable is assurance enough for the soul not addicted to the sickness of metaphysical grubbing about the question as to whether or not the good is really predominant in the universe. Dr. McTaggart declared that the important problem for any philosophy of religion is the question, "Is the world on the whole good or bad?" Well, this may continue to be the concern of the philosophy of religion, but as for the religion of the rest of mankind the question is rather, "can the world on the whole be changed from the bad to the good?" To this question there is an answer in the heart of every person. We have the assurance that we do indeed possess such transforming powers; and if the content of religion must be a belief, surely it is this one. That life is a creative enterprise is indeed the common conviction of all mankind unless we except those who find in the very philosophy of determinism a field where their creative imaginations may expend their zeal. When we once possess and understand this idea of creationism we may wholly dispense with theology and its "levels" as the misapplication of a spatial concepts to facts of the psychological order where they can only be vicious metaphors.

Were this theme of freedom the concern of man only in his political affairs it might well continue to be the theme solely of dissertations on politics, statescraft and economics. But to the spiritual genius of mankind it is more than this. The theme of freedom is the theme of all life—it is the moving spirit of religion.

Said Boutroux, "The originality of religion lies in the fact that it proceeds not from power to duty but from duty to power; that it advances resolutely, taking for granted that the problem is solved, and that it starts from God. *"Ab actu, ab posse"*, such is its motto. "Be of good cheer", said Jesus to Pascal, "thou wouldst not seek me hadst thou not found me". God is being and principle, the overflowing spring of perfection and might. He who shares in the life of God can really transcend nature; he can create. Religion is creation, true, beautiful and benificent, in God and by God."

³ E. C. Wilm, Henri Bergson, *A Study in Radical Evolution*, p. 149.

JESUS' CONCEPTION OF HIMSELF AND OF HIS MISSION ON EARTH.

BY J. O. LEATH.

FOR a while, historical criticism was centered around the life and literature of the Old Testament. Many were alarmed, lest this precious treasure would be lost to us; but the process of turning on the light of history has resulted in giving us a body of sacred literature that is more edifying for religious purposes as well as more usable. The truth will never hurt in the end.

Just now the center of historical investigation is the life and literature of the New Testament. This means that every possible light of history is being turned on the life and work of Jesus with the desire of arriving at a historical estimate of Jesus' own personal Consciousness. We must not overlook the fact that we have not Jesus' own autobiography, neither have we records of his deeds and words taken down by shorthand in his presence while he was acting and speaking. But what we do have is biographies of Jesus written from one to three generations after his death. Moreover, according to Luke's own testimony, and from an examination of his gospel, we learn that in the composition of his gospel he used written sources; and, after examining Matthew's gospel, we find that he did likewise. What we have in our gospels is different interpretations of Jesus arising from different religious and social situations.

I believe that each of Jesus' early interpreters grasped something of the significance of his life and work; at the same time we must concede the possibility that each one misunderstood him in one way or another. Each interpreted him in the light of his own religious needs and the religious needs of the time and situation in which he wrote. Hence we should not be surprised, if we find the early sources differing somewhat among themselves. In the light of mod-

ern scholarship we are surely able to understand Jesus better than were his interpreters of any age in the past, by no means excepting the first century. The fact is that, according to the representation of our gospels, Jesus was misunderstood by those of his own generation, by not only the people at large, but also those disciples who were most closely associated with him; hence we should not be surprised, if he was in a way misunderstood toward the end of the first century, when our gospels were written; in the fourth century, when our creed was formed; and in the subsequent ages prior to the days of historical criticism. The fact is that from the first to the nineteenth century men thought little of the life of the earthly Jesus, but centered their thought on the Christ of glory. Our creed, which took shape under the philosophical speculation of the fourth century and purports to be an adequate statement of Christianity, mentions only two events in the earthly life of Jesus,—that he was born of the Virgin Mary and suffered under Pontius Pilate. It says nothing of the great meaning of his words and deeds,—freedom, truth, righteousness, brotherhood, love. It would be a too hasty conclusion to say that the historical method has already solved the problems as to what was Jesus' estimate of himself and of his mission on earth, yet we feel justified in expecting valuable results from the historical process.

When Jesus was on earth, his personal followers seem to have regarded him as the Messiah in the nationalistic sense, as the one who was eventually to gather a political following and free the Jewish nation from the Roman domination. When he submitted to an ignominious death, his followers thought that God had forsaken him, hence all their hopes for him as Messiah disappeared. They at once sought safety in retreat, or in repudiating him. As soon as they attained their faith in his resurrection and exaltation to heaven, then they began the process of reconstructing their faith in him as Messiah, and this new faith took the form of belief in him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense, that is, as the Messiah who would come on the clouds of heaven miraculously ushering in his kingdom. They at once conceived it to be their duty to make the people ready for the coming of the Messiah, which they expected to be within their generation. Then they began the process of reconstructing their remembrance of his words and deeds in the light of their new faith, and the tendency must have been to magnify those elements in his life that had an apocalyptic significance. Some circles of early Christians seem to have made less of the

apocalyptic element than others did. This is true of the Logia source as opposed to Mark. Well, the fact is that Jesus did not during the first generation return on the clouds of heaven as the apocalyptic Messiah, nor has he returned yet. So by the end of the first century or the beginning of the second, under the influence of Greek philosophy rather than Jewish Messianism, Jesus was being interpreted not as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense who would return on the clouds of heaven to set up his kingdom on earth, but as the eternal Logos of God who would return to earth in a spiritual sense; or, if he would return in person at all, it would not be on the clouds of heaven to set up his kingdom on the earth, but rather to take his beloved followers with him to his Father's house. This is the point of view in the fourth gospel. And this is the point of view that has had the greatest influence in the later history of the Church down to the present century.

What is an adequate statement, based on an historical interpretation of sources, of Jesus' estimate of himself and of his work? Did Jesus regard himself as a prophet or as the Messiah: if the Messiah, the Messiah after what conception? Some have held the view that at the beginning of his ministry Jesus hoped to become the Messiah in the nationalistic sense. He began his career as a teacher, hoping to win the Jewish nation to his point of view and eventually to lead the people in throwing off the Roman yoke. But when the nation failed to rally to him, and when the shadows of death began to cross his pathway, he lost hope of becoming the Messiah in the nationalistic sense and began to claim that, after his death and resurrection and exaltation to heaven, he would return to earth on the clouds of heaven as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. Others have held the view that he began his career as a teacher of righteousness after the order of the Old Testament prophets, not regarding himself as the Messiah in any sense whatever. He hoped to bring about the regeneration of the Jewish nation; but failing to win the people and believing that his word would triumph in the end, he then for the first time in his career began to think of himself as the Messiah, and that in the apocalyptic sense, who after his death and exaltation to heaven would return to earth on the clouds to judge the world and set up his kingdom. Still others hold to Mark's representation of Jesus' consciousness: From the beginning of his career, Jesus was conscious of being the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. During the early days of his ministry, he purposely concealed this conscious-

ness presumably for fear that the people would misunderstand him. Toward the end of his life, he unqualifiedly asserted that he was the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense, and, after his exaltation to heaven, would within that generation return to earth on the clouds with great power and glory. Still others accept as historical the picture of Jesus as given in the fourth gospel: From the beginning of his career, he knew that he was the Messiah, neither in the apocalyptic nor in the nationalistic sense, but in an ethico-religious and metaphysical sense, as the eternal Logos of God and the divine mediator of light and life to the world. Others, finally, think that they find in Jesus no consciousness of being the Messiah in any sense whatever; but that, from the beginning to the end of his career, his purpose was merely to preach inner righteousness and sonship to God somewhat after the order of the Old Testament prophets; and that whatever Messianic language is attributed to him originated not with Jesus but with his interpreters.

I hardly feel that in the light of all our sources either of the above interpretations is an adequate historical statement of Jesus' estimate of himself. From the time of his baptism, if not earlier, he had the consciousness of being the Son of God in a unique sense of the term. The expression, Son of God, carries both an ethical and a functional connotation. He regarded himself Son of God in an ethical sense in that he believed himself loved by the Father. Yes, he regarded himself as the only begotten Son of God in that he was pre-eminently beloved in the sight of the Father. He regarded himself Son of God in a functional sense in that he believed there was committed to him by the Father a special office and responsibility. From the beginning of his career, he felt resting on him the responsibility of self-denial and the leading of others into the relation of sonship to the Father that he himself sustained. The fact that, from the beginning, altruism played so large a part in his life and message suggests that he felt a peculiar responsibility for the salvation of men from sin. So from the beginning to the end of his ministry, his purpose was to be the Savior of men from a life of sin to a life of heart righteousness and sonship to the Father. His program was to induce men to repent of sin and follow him, to live the kind of a life that he lived, to be dominated by the same principles that dominated him, to sustain the same attitude of a son toward God and of a brother toward man that he himself sustained. He was absolutely sure that he himself possessed the secret of correct living and was able to impart the

secret to others. He believed that correct living meant life, abundant life, eternal life. From beginning to end, his message was pre-eminently ethico-religious, and so sure was his conviction on the subject of correct relations toward God and man that he regarded himself as the Lord, that is, the ruler of man's life and conduct.

In the light of the ethico-religious message of Jesus, I think we can best approach the subject of his Messianic consciousness. I fail to find the evidence that Jesus at any time of his career entertained the ambition of becoming the Messiah in the political sense. His message was ethico-religious rather than political. He approached man as the Savior from sin rather than as a political reformer. Again, I find no convincing evidence of a change of purpose in Jesus' program, due to disappointment or else. Furthermore, I think that we must accept as historical the view that from the beginning to the end of his ministry Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah. It occurs to me that it would be decidedly an unhistorical procedure to deny to Jesus a Messianic consciousness of some kind since each of our early sources attributes such a consciousness to him. Moreover, it is probably true that the attitude of Jesus toward the Messianism as set forth in Mark, and taken over by Matthew and Luke, is more nearly historical than the attitude as set forth in the fourth gospel. In the synoptics, Jesus is represented as constantly putting forth the effort to conceal his Messianism and restrain any public declaration of it. Not until his arraignment before the high priest does he publicly confess it. In the fourth gospel, however, Jesus is represented as constantly engaged in efforts by word and deed to prove his Messianism and induce people to accept it. The fourth gospel seems to be an interpretation of Jesus made by some of the devout disciples of the apostle John who at the same time were thoroughly saturated with the Stoic system of philosophy. That they based their interpretation on some memoirs of the apostle John is suggested in one instance by Jno. xxi. 24. "This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things; *and we know that his testimony is true.*" The italics are mine. On the other hand, while we must admit that there is room for the element of interpretation in Mark's portrayal of Jesus' Messianic consciousness, an interpretation influenced by the Jewish apocalyptic thought, at the same time Mark's representation of Jesus' determined and constant effort to restrain any comment on his Messianism is more in keeping with the point of

view, which I insist is historically founded, that Jesus' message was pre-eminently ethico-religious rather than Messianic or apocalyptic.

Most of the efforts within recent years to write the life of Jesus historically have taken either Mark's point of view with regard to Jesus' Messianic consciousness, insisting that Jesus was a literalist on the question of the Messianism, or the point of view, more nearly approached in the Logia of all our primitive sources, that Jesus did not regard himself as the Messiah in any sense of the term, but merely as a teacher of righteousness. I insist that from the beginning to the end of his ministry Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah in that he regarded himself as the fulfiller of the essence of the Messianic hope. Why should one interpret Jesus as a literalist on the subject of the Messianism, while at the same time all concede that he was in no sense a literalist on the subject of observing the law of Moses and other religious institutions of Israel? The criterion of authority in conduct for him was not what the law of Moses or the tradition of the Scribes said, but rather what the welfare of humanity demanded. Relentlessly he applied this straight edge of authority to traditions and institutions hoary with age. He held no brief for any religious institution as such, but only as it ministered to the good of man. This point of view led him to repudiate entirely the Mosaic distinction between clean and unclean. It led him to lift prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and the observance of the Sabbath clear of a legalistic basis and give them a spiritual setting. So it occurs to me that it is decidedly unfair to Jesus to insist that he was a literalist on the subject of the Messianism while we grant that he was not a literalist in other respects. If he possessed spiritual force and originality in the case of the law and other religious institutions, surely he did in respect to the Messianism. Matthew is written from the point of view to prove that Jesus was the Messiah for one reason because his life in several particulars corresponds to statements made in the Old Testament, but nowhere do our earliest sources represent Jesus himself as substantiating his claims to the Messianism on the ground that he literally fulfilled the Jewish Messianic expectations.

It seems that Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah in the sense that he brought real salvation to men. Back of all the imagery connected with the Messianic hope, whether of the Messiah in the nationalistic sense or in the apocalyptic sense, was the hope that God would through a new order of things usher in good to man. Unquestionably, Jesus regarded himself as God's agent in

making this good possible. He disappointed the hope of his followers that he would be the Messiah in the nationalistic sense. Likewise he disappointed their hope that he would immediately prove himself Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. But no one has been disappointed in his ability to bring real salvation to man, to the Jew as well as to the Gentile, and thereby fulfill the spirit of the Messianic hope of Israel as well as of the whole world. Human experience has demonstrated that his program of attaching men to himself and thereby leading them into experience of sonship to the Father brings real salvation from sin. In view of this program, it is probably true that Mark's representation, that Jesus endeavored to restrain any public confession of faith in him as Messiah, is historical; for he knew that, if they believed him to be the Messiah, they would necessarily regard him as the Messiah literally in the nationalistic sense. No one had ever advanced the idea that the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense would previous to his miraculous appearance on the clouds of heaven sojourn on earth as a man. So Jesus desired that his ethico-religious message have full sway in the minds of his hearers, not being complicated by the presence of any aroused political ambitions. It is probably true that at the end of his career he did confess that he was the Messiah. To have denied it would have been wrong and misleading. He knew himself to be a greater servant of the Jewish nation and of the world than the literalist of either Messianic school hoped of their Messiah.

The synoptic gospels have interpreted Jesus as a literalist on the subject of the Messiaship. The evangelists regarded him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense and expected his return to earth on the clouds before their generation passed away. As already suggested, there is room for the possibility that much, if not all, the Messianic and apocalyptic language attributed to Jesus is due to the fact that Jesus was being reinterpreted by his followers in the light of their new faith in him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. Yes, it is historically possible, if not probable, that he did not use as much apocalyptic language concerning himself as is represented in our sources. If he did use those terms, he must have employed them generally in a figurative rather than a literal sense. To conclude that he employed them in a literal sense is to some extent to discredit him. To conclude that he did not use them so freely as he is said to have used them, or that he employed them only in a figurative sense, is to interpret the earthly Jesus in this particular in keeping with the glorious fact that he was not a literalist and that his message was primarily ethico-religious.

COMFORT—GRATIFICATION—LUXURY.

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

THE world over there is much being written and said about Socialism, the great benefit it would be to humanity, its uplift and what not. And in many lands are there being made serious efforts to put these theories into practice. Everywhere the lodestone of socialism that attracts the masses is the idea that somehow or another the wealth of the world is to be redistributed more "equitably" and that we are all to have a fresh start on an equal footing. The lowly, the unsuccessful, the poor man, will always be ready to listen to the expounding of any scheme whereby they or he are to share the successful man's wealth, for would not that newly and so easily acquired share purchase them the comfort the gratification, the luxury they so much envy the rich man? In every clime, in every age, under every form of government, the desire for those three things, the strife to acquire them and invariably their abuse when once obtained, have been and probably always will be, striking characteristics of the human race. The "pursuit of happiness" that is supposed to be the right of all men is generally interpreted to mean the endeavor, the wish to enjoy the comfort, the gratification, the luxury, that the most luxurious in the land can possibly attain!

Until that most natural desire, that appetite, can be eliminated from man's composition methinks Socialism will have a hard row to hoe. It may be made the means of upsetting existing conditions here and there, but its permanent foothold anywhere is doubtful, it skates, so to speak, upon exceedingly thin ice, and breaking through into the old ways, republican, oligarchic, aristocratic and monarchic, is inevitable.

Luxury has always played a most important part in government. The relation of official luxury and private luxury has al-

ways been a moot question and one that legislators have ever tried to regulate. From the most remote antiquity the state has always exercised upon private life a control, a regulation that at times has been absolutely limitless. It has directed the dress, the table, the entire mode of life, of the people. It has simply always been a question of more or less regulation. Solon but used moderately a privilege, a right that Lycurgus pressed even to the point of destroying all individual liberty. Even in the philosophic view of the matter, Aristotle, the upholder of private rights, seemed to have had no greater conception of the real premises than did Plato, who preached the other extreme. And such government control is not a thing of the past. True, Louis XV was about the last monarch who imposed sumptuary laws, but nevertheless our luxuries are still to a greater or lesser degree controlled by the government today. Under some forms the people pay taxes that literally prohibit luxury, while others are merely taxed upon luxuries. A little thought given to the matter of luxuries, governmental and private, may be of some advantage to us, though it seem but pure theorizing ruminatingly.

Some theologians and many philosophers would have us believe that all men were born equal, absolutely so and that the earth and all it produced belonged to all men equally and that the acquisition of more property by some than by others was a false condition, a species of usurpation, brought about by and a part of government, forgetting that if the products of the land, wealth, are to remain equally divided, some power, some authority must limit each man to the enjoyment of only that which is physically absolutely necessary. Beyond that, there would immediately be some who expended more than others and others who acquired more than the first and the inequality would again be established. Government could alone do this and while some have attempted it, it has never been accomplished. Each form of government contending for its superiority claims that the greatest luxury and abuse exists under the other form. Yet it is doubtful if anyone has any real reason to feel superior to any other. Generally at the inception of each there have been moderation and sane living that have little by little given way to riotousness, if not debauch, that again generally have but shortly preceded the overthrow of that form and the establishment of a new one upon a saner basis.

Let us glance at what has been done in that connection and it may convince us that as long as men are men the same conditions

are bound to obtain, though it may be natural and perhaps praiseworthy to ever and anon engage in the pursuit of the unattainable.

There is perhaps no form of government under which luxury has shown itself in a garb of greater splendor and has been of more pernicious effect than in monarchies, to the point even of having destroyed them. Naturally the very apotheosis of luxury has been under autocracies, despotic monarchies. There it generally assumes the form of disordered phantasies, the realization of the most extravagant dreams by a power great enough to attempt anything, all-powerful and against which no opposition could stand. The very disproportion there is between the undertakings of an ambition that acknowledges no restraint and the limits that it encounters in our very nature makes us understand the unquiet character of despotic luxury, it explains its unmeasured tentatives, its colossal enterprises and its unclean caprices. History gives us enough portraits of such types, a collection of monsters, and does it in so prosaic a manner withal that these monstrous and criminal mountebanks seemed to have yielded to peculiarities, comprehensible eccentricities. Look at Caligula, for instance, who dearly loved the cruel sports of the arena. One day there seemed to be a dearth of criminals to be fed to the animals, but the spectacle must go on, therefore he simply ordered that some of the spectators be seized and thrown into the pit. In the name of luxury, Claudius perpetuated as great atrocities and so did Nero, who varied the order, however, by picking out Senators and officers for sacrifice instead of the haphazard spectator, and Domitian, Commodus and Galerius were equally shining examples of what despots could do in the name of luxury who, satiated with the ordinary, sought the inconceivable. And Rome was not alone in this. Everywhere despotism was alike in its disordered fatuousness, only the accessories, the frills were varied. In China, the Emperor Cheou-sin, 1,100 years before the Christian era, built a temple to debauchery, where even his wife passed days and nights in devising the super-refinements of luxury, in the guise of infamous, voluptuousness and atrocious sufferings of sacrificed victims. Under a later dynasty Yeow-wang and his worthy spouse, Pao-sse, continued in like manner until the invasion of the Tartars gave them something else to think about. And what Roman Emperor ever paralleled the career of the terrible "reformer" Hoang-ti? He first corrected many grave abuses, destroyed his predecessors' despotic rule, and lived in Spartan simplicity until the craze for luxury seized him, too, and

we read of the ten thousand horses in his stables and the ten thousand concubines in his harem. His funeral carried out as he directed, was a fitting sequel to his life. Three thousand men were immolated upon his tomb that their fat might serve to keep the funereal torches alight thereabout for the requisite number of months' mourning. Indeed, history, I firmly believe, has underestimated, rather than exaggerated the part that luxury and cupidity have played in the crimes of despotism.

A peculiarity of all this is that one would think that despotic luxury would have the very contrary effect upon people than that which it had. Instead of being disgusted with the results of and what was seen of this luxury, the people sought to emulate it from afar.

Under other than despotic forms of monarchy, there has always been fostered a nobility, an aristocracy that has kept but a step behind, if it has not gone ahead of the monarch himself, in the matter of luxury. An hereditary hierarchy surrounds, supports and to a certain extent contains the monarchy, while a despotism is nothing but one master over a nation of equals. Under monarchies generally, until comparatively recent times, the excesses and extravagances of the ruler have been masked, the sting taken from them, as it were, by the prodigal feasts and fetes and spectacles given by the monarch to the people. All that sort of thing has kept the proletariat in good humor and the same tactics were followed by the courtiers and barons and the lesser lights who all gave largesse to their retainers and serfs and vassals.

In all of this it is interesting to follow the influence that woman has had upon luxury. Her influence has been more far-reaching and baneful under so-called Christian and Occidental rulers than in the Oriental and other forms of despotic monarchies. In the latter woman has been part of the luxury, but as a servant, as a slave. True in polygamous countries where women were sold and fattened for the market, the maintenance of courtly harems was a most costly luxury, but nowhere has a woman played the important part in court affairs, has been so costly a luxury to the nation as well as the kings as were the favorites of some of the kings in Western Europe. Someone may say that despots have been known to raise certain of their concubines to even the throne itself, but, with rare exceptions, those women have never really reigned. Their example has never spread the contagion of luxury, they seldom exercised any influence whatever in politics. The court

favorites particularly of France, propagated and corrupted luxury by the influence of their courts upon the cities, they usurped governmental privileges, their secret intrigues, their deals made a very traffic of public affairs, affected the whole political situation and indeed were the causes, (oftentimes, but the mere caprice of some enchantress), of war and terrible international upheavals.

Luxury has tainted everything social and economic, our arts, all. Decadent absolute monarchies have given us marvelous specimens of architecture and other arts, colossal temples and monuments and generally tainted with the same spirit that luxury instilled in everything else, in that the art was simply riotously resplendent, garishly decorative, a mere display of wealth, always at the cost of good taste. Constitutional and other monarchies in their earlier stages have given us splendid and robust memorials of those times but as they grew more luxurious so their arts became effeminized, extravagant, and another period of decadence is marked. An overthrow, a return to virile, sturdy manliness, governmental and private, the infusion of new blood or the incursion of so-called barbarian peoples, then more ease and comfort, then luxury, then decay!

Strange, too, what a part religion has had to play in this. After each revolution or the reform of any people the habits of life have been severe, hard even, and in accord therewith the beliefs of such periods generally reverted to more primitive forms of religion; life was reduced to the essentials. Public monuments were few, and those plain in character. The temple only was made beautiful. Then the ceremonial robes of the priests became more gorgeous and the people clothed themselves in finer raiment upon church-going occasions, and, little by little, the habit of luxury was formed and grew. Feudal aristocracy gave vent to its luxurious inclinations by its large number of retainers and servants, a sturdy, but almost exaggerated hospitality, its hunts and its races, the pomp of its military retinues, its tourneys. That was feudal aristocracy. Its successor of today also entertains lavishly and but replaces the tourneys and joustings with brilliant balls and operas and lucullian banquets. England secures the continued enjoyment of luxury to its select by its law of entail by which the nobility insures the perpetuation of its wealth and exclusiveness and station and privileges by entailing them all to their heirs.

Commercial aristocracies have differed in their luxury from the landed aristocracies in that in all their extravagance there is a

species of economy. As a rule, the wealth has been acquired through severe toil, and habits of mind have been formed that make for their expended wealth. The habits of the merchant act as a corrective upon the tastes that would otherwise be merely luxurious. It is not in their nature to remain idle. Much as the warriors of old they have either to keep on winning victories, or become the vanquished, the losers. If they stop acquiring wealth they are ruined. Venice was one of the best examples of a commercial aristocracy and these points I have just enumerated obtained there in marked degree. But in course of time, a generation or two, such an aristocracy soon gets upon the same plane as the old-fashioned court nobility, where there was more vanity than real pride. The value of money is forgotten, mere prodigality rules and it is just as fashionable to be in debt as it is to gamble and they all do that.

Even in our democracies luxury plays an important role. In the church the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience are taken by its votaries; in the republics of old and even in the more modern ones, the vows of equality, fraternity and liberty were and are theoretically made but are never kept. True, the abolition of titles, crown-lands and special privileges that exaggerated luxury has tended to moderate it. With slavery has disappeared one of the most poisonous sources of abusive luxury. Free and responsible labor has its own correctives and has always held in repugnance the tendency to excessive luxury on the part of the employers. But we have seen a new form of luxury grow up that, in the abstract, is not better than the monarchical and aristocrat ones and that in all likelihood, will eventually lead to the same decadence and ruin that we have noted in the others. Twenty-five years ago we looked upon certain writers as croakers and false prophets because they told us of dangers they foresaw; the great concentration of wealth, all-powerful "captains of industry" holding the labor in a species of bondage, exploiting it without mercy and preventing it from tasting the slightest particle of luxury. It was said then that the birth of such a class was impossible; that never again would the excesses of the ancient aristocracies be equalled and that we were assured a continued diffusion of capital and a spreading of national wealth so that all would have comfort and but few would be justified in indulging in extravagance (the latter assertion all too true!) Industry and democracy were to go hand in hand. Each demanded liberty and light, and each had for its object the benefiting of the

great mass of humanity. The development of industry was to have created a vast amount of business with all the people and benefiting them all. Industry was to become the rival of art and art was to find expression in industry.

That was as it was supposed to be. What have we actually? To what excess of luxury have the democracies of our own time reached? As a matter of fact in a democracy where all men are supposed to be equal, is not the temptation to strain toward the attainment of luxury greater even than under any other form of government? In most others, the plain people are born so and seem quite content to remain so. With us, no limit is placed to our attainments and we have seen to what point some men have reached through their own unaided efforts and it is most natural that we should all endeavor to attain that same point, even if to do so we realize that we must scramble over our brothers, our equals! In practice, equality signifies the desire to rise. Who cares about equality in poverty, in obscurity? Our eyes are not turned in that direction. The equality we desire is that of being with—our superiors. We have no ancient monopolies, no privileged classes, no concentration of civil and military employment, no favoritism in the commercial lines as “special makers to the king” and what not, all that is well enough. But wealth still exists. Wealth may be acquired. One man has more ability to acquire it than the other and there lies the root of the prime cause of inequality, in the very nature of man itself.

Perhaps by education we may convince our people, two or three generations hence, that true happiness is not necessarily found in wealth, in the enjoyment of great luxury, that there is a higher plane of life, that service to one's fellows is nobler far and conduces more to one's own beatitude than any mere gratification of one's animal appetites. All that is possible. But to me it seems a good deal like rainbow chasing, and certainly an attainment of the far-distant future. Socialism is of benefit and far be it from me to do anything to detract from its laudable aspirations, but, and without feeling at all pessimistically inclined, it seems to me that Liberty, Equality and Fraternity have been perverted, twisted and turned until they are made to read Comfort, Gratification, Luxury, to which History has always added Deterioration, Degeneracy and Extinction, then a Renaissance and another run over the same gamut, an orderely and continued turning of the Wheel of Life—Mayhap that Wheel while turning on its center, is likewise moving ahead, progressing in the true sense of EVOLUTION.

COLOR NAMES. CONFUSING AND ARBITRARY.

BY WILLIAM GRUBY-WILYEMS.

IT is largely the household novelist of the gentler persuasion who revels in the sunset's colors of crysolite, nacre and carmine. Four men in every hundred are color-blind, in two hundred women only a single one. This must explain why men give so little heed to hues. With half-a-dozen syllabic tags they dispose of all the two thousand shades educed by the chrysanthemum society.

Refinement on the theme doubtless began with the other sex; the question is: What force do color-titles carry? Milady of the pen dipped in glory may be sanguine enough as to her power to convey to the reader's inner eye ideas reflecting not only the glamor but the true glint of her nomenclatural jewelry; yet any comparison of the various senses and absence of sense attaching to some of the commonest poetic colorifics gives rise to doubt. If this essay gets anywhere it should shortly disclose that the poetess's raptures about yon heliotrope west, yonder rhododactylous east, with flowers of carmine, scarlet, purple and so forth, bring home as little to the averagely attentive imagination as a draft on the mathematical calculus.

Sixes-and-Sevens—Let us begin with the familiar *livid*, properly meaning ember-colored, from Latin *lix*, ashes. "Livid with passion" seems almost the only phrase in which the word remains popularly current, and then as a synonym of purple. Borrow, who appears to have possessed some abnormality of vision, sets down the hue of the Jew as "livid."

How many who use the word know that *lurid* is defined in the dictionary as "pale yellow?" An ancient classification of human races describes the Mongolian as *luridus*—a "lurid" Chinaman! Or

who among those using the word recall that *sallow* (now implying pale greenish yellow) may with some lexical authority be used as equivalent to swarthy? The recruiting officer's over-employment of it for all shades of complexion save florid, freckled and dark, and especially for yellowish white, seems to have been born of a confusion with the noun *sallow* signifying a species of willow—hence *sallow*, willow-color.

Ovid called the Britons *virides* (green), where others have depicted them in a free and easy undress of blue woad. Homer makes the hair of Hector, as the beard of Ulysses, *kuaneos*, dark blue. Lucian in his Dialogs dubs Athena, *glaukōpis*, literally green-eyed, without any connotation of either envy or rusticity; she is always elsewhere portrayed as keen-eyed, martial. Purple was a term which the classic authors deemed applicable to any bright color.

Vermilion, at first glance, might strike one as the most locatable of all color epithets, for it comes from *vermis*, and is therefore designed to convey simply worm-color. Unfortunately there are many kinds of worms, but the ruddy earthworm is so widespread that little risk can exist of any other being invoked to explain the meaning of this epithet. The mnemonic "worm-color," then, is very fair as mnemonics go.

To Prove Black Is White—Etymologically, if not by logical mood and figure. For (to follow Euclid) if black be a shade or color and be not white it must be some other shade or color. Now, there is an English adjective "bleak;" this formerly meant colorless, or loosely, white; the *bleak* fish, from whose scales artificial pearls are produced, is also called whitebait, or on the Continent *Weiss-fisch*, French *able*, from Latin *albula*, that is little white fish. "Bleak" was pronounced in Anglo-Saxon *blaak*, so that "black" signifying at first ink, then the color associated with ink as anciently made, and "blaak" meaning pale, wan or colorless differed at most in the length of that vowel, a gap easily bridged by dialectal variations.

A century-old novel describes a damsel's lips as being of a beautiful purple, where many a modern might fall back on our colloquial allusion to the "pink of condition." But color-discrimination must have been very weak in the Middle Ages if, as some French grammarians hold, the word *bleu* (blue) is to be affiliated to the Latin *flavus* (yellow).

Prevalence of color-blindness is explained by the fact that only the center of the retina is sensitive to color, while light and

shade affect its whole surface. It may be in consequence of this that races such as the Tatars, who, some have credited, can see the major moons of Jupiter with the unarmed eye, possess only half-a-dozen terms for color in their language.

Air is colorless apart from its content of dust, to which is due the blue of the sky; artificial skies can be made by the chemist to test this point, the sky matter and with it the tint of cerulean being added and subtracted at will. The self color of water is true blue. In view of the apparent blueness or greenness of ocean depths, the wave's whitening into foam at the immixture of a little air may afford a legitimate subject for wonder.

It might be a great saving of thought to re-name or number all colors according to their position in a scale such as that of the solar spectrum; the systematic reformer could call black *nil* or *o* and attach to white the highest number, to signify that it is the all-inclusive color. Some color terms not self-explanatory to the run of folks but in frequent use are: *beige*, the natural color of wool; *paille*, straw color (to be distinguished from *faille*, meaning throw-out, that is, reject silk, which has no gloss); *azure* is named for the mines of Lajwurd mentioned by Marco Polo: lapis lazuli was the light-blue stone quarried there—Old French *l'azur* in mistake for *le lazur* being the connecting line; scarlet meant primarily Eastern broadcloth, which was usually of the loudest of hues; *crimson* meant the color of the insect called *kermes* used in dyeing; turquoise conveyed to the French the notion of Turkish (or light) blue; *invisible green*: a very dark shade of green, approaching black and liable to be mistaken for it; *matt* is German for dull; *cardinal*, the color of a cardinal's robe, a species of red; *buff*, "a saddened yellowish orange,"—Webster (the color of buffalo skin, with a velvety or fuzzy finish); *visual purple* and *visual yellow* denote parts of the contents of the retina of the eye; *purple* was so named from the shellfish purpur, from whose blood the people of the Levant prepared a bright dye, a blend of red and blue. In Spanish *colorado*, literally *colored*, is used only for red. The English adjective *blank* formerly had the sense of white (*blanc*), while in German the word means polished. *Calomel* is now the title of a white powder, yet its two roots make it express simply "beautiful black."

Dappled may mean dabbed with or dipped in color; *piebald* is equivalent to "bald in spots" (Latin *pica* a spot); *skewbald* means marked in a skew (that is, irregular) manner; *emerald* is the greenish color of the stone dubbed by the Greeks *smaragdus*, of which

name *emerald* is a corruption. *Lake* means the color of the gum lac, a variety of crimson: "crimson lake", then, seems an idle emphasis. *Taupe* means mole-color (Latin *talpa*, mole). *Moiré*, *moiré*, applied to the undulating or watered appearance in silk, is the same word as *mohair*. To remain true to its ancient intention *puce* should denote nothing more nor less than flea-color. *Pink* has its provenance from the flower called a pink, while in the case of *carnation* the flower affording the color term is itself named from a resemblance to human flesh, the carneous tissue, unless as some suspect it has been corrupted from "coronation." *Sorrel* once indicated the reddish-brown complexion of a sere leaf. *Mauve* still means, to all who understand French, of the color of mallow-flowers. *Roan* stands for a mixed color having a shade of red; it probably is unconnected with the rowan or mountain ashtree. *Maroon* means chestnut color, a brownish crimson; some recent writer speaks of a lady blushing maroon. *Hoary* alludes naturally to hoarfrost. *Grizzled* comes from French, *gris*, gray. *Café* (coffee) is the regular word in Spanish for brown. *Rose* in French means pink. It is said that no blue rose has ever been cultivated—a fatality like that of the invariable she-ness of tortoiseshell cats.

Red at present is applied to tints as diverse as the "ginger" (probably a metaphor for hot, fire-color) variety of hair that one could almost "redd" the dinner on and that quite different grog-blossom embellishing a toper's nose. "*Carrot*" hair may mean like that of Judas which was also called *Iscariot*.

A common expression is *violet* color, yet the violet is found of as many colors as the coat of Joseph. *Ochre* originally denoted yellow, but it is quite as usual nowatimes to speak of red ochre. *Jaundice* derives from French *jaunisse*, yellowness, yet there is a custom of speaking about yellow jaundice, which seems to suggest that several other colors may not be barred from competition. Froude writes of "the black colors in which Philip the Beautiful painted the Templars." Black is not properly a color, and how many black colors could there be, apart from degrees of admixture with white? Many of these color notions and emblazoned figures of speech appear as wide of the mark as the schoolboy's opinion that *scarlatina* might be the feminine of *scarlet fever*.

Although yellow and blue mixed by the artist produce green, yet because of interference with each other's rays a blue glass slide held over a yellow one results in the obscuration known as black. The red in "Red Indian" may have referred to warpaint, but this

is unlikely in view of the early loose use of color names. Green, said of fruit, is often used hastily for unripe, without any allusion to color, and one may compare metaphorical idioms such as "green geese," "a green wound." The root means still-growing. Blue blood probably alludes to the color of the veins in a Caucasian race as distinguished from the Moors and others. Verdigris (oxide of copper) may be translated offhand green of gray (*vert de gris*). Olive is the name of another green, the yellowish-green of the olive tree; "oil" itself is derived from the same word in its Latin form of *oliva*, and *oliva* descends possibly from the root of "elastic," referring to the quality of the expressed sap.

The blue gumtree seems to be christened from the color of its bark, while the title red-gum may refer to the tint either of the resin or of the hewn timber.

ROMANTICISM AND GOVERNMENT.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

OCCASIONALLY as our attention turns to and from the varying vicissitudes of Modern Romanticism we find that one of the striking points of interest, if not one of the most decisive features, is that of its relation to government administration and especially that phase of practice adjudged by romantic morality. Here and now, in an age of greed, extravagance, graft, superficial propaganda, wage-cuts, strikes and industrial strife, political stratagems and industrial jockeying for economic control, it might be said that we have a daily review of the whole situation. But at the less raucous entrance of romantic morality we find the general atmosphere tempered somewhat, whence it gradually becomes more fit for clear-seeing and free breathing, suitable for amiable tournament rather than for the deceptive cunning of stratagems and spoils. It is then that we meet our adversaries face to face in the arena of individual virtue and public morality. Romanticism implies and requires a certain compound of individual freedom, courage and aspiration while Government implies and requires a certain degree of discipline, respect for authority, and allegiance to the group-psychology of social institutions. True Romanticism does not recognize or sanction free-love, risqué literature, ugly art or jazz music; neither does a just Government recognize or encourage such things as free-lunch, partiality in industrial disputes, franked campaign propaganda, mercenary tariff discriminations, or plutocratic preferment.

Still, as we know, there are faults on both sides. Administrations are too multiple-minded, too clumsy and top-heavy, to be agile in action, balanced in judgment or uniform in legislative opinion. Likewise also the common character of public amiability is often imposed upon to the extent that the romanticist seeks to

dodge the difficulties of life; he renounces the "wise strenuousness" which Aristotle and Roosevelt prescribed, and takes refuge in the walled city of his dreams. Of course, this departure is not begrudged him if it is not made at the expense of some cunning exploit or public mischief. Indeed, his humble retirement is considered right and exemplary at times, as when we discover that in an ivory-tower sort of existence above the mediocre haunts of common men the bright visions and noble aspirations of a Kierkegaard, a Grieg, Father Tabb, Thorwaldsen or Leoncavallo come only when one lives well apart from the clamor and vice, the selfishness and petty cavillings of a sordid world. But then, the times are not always so auspicious, for, as with the double-jointed entrenchments of Rousseau's acrobatic policy, the sordid world comes crashing in and with its ruthless vandal power wrecks the beautiful house of dreams, upsets the dreamer in his easy chair and scatters the papers on his writing desk. Cracks and spots readily show on the peculiar ideal blue of Sèvres ware, and the rich lavender of Kismet easily fades.

No wonder he would then advocate a sensitive morality, knowing both by intuitive anticipation and by an actual misfortune of experience that such an event was possible, even more often than not, a probable incident in this imperfect and blind-striving world. And anyway, such a romantic individual, being only an Aeolian harp played on by all the various winds of Nature and empirical contingency, should expect now and then to have a string broken by less tender fingers. Carducci, the anagogic poet and philosophical critic of premodernist Italy, considered that a *soft* sort of Romanticism and hence not an adequate or worthy mold in which to cast either one's life or one's literary creations. In his famous work on the erotic poets of the 18th Century he repudiates such romanticism altogether and champions a sort of *religio grammatici* return to the classical paganism of old.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS.

The philosophical ground of all this seems to be that Natural Law is quite attractive so long as we conform our conduct to it, but absolutely ruthless and inexorable when we try to fool with it or oppose its stern decisions; while our finite Human Law is apparently harsh but easy to get around and wheedle into favorable readings whenever we think such an arbitrary course is expedient. And it is a similar opposition which exists today between Romanti-

cism and Cultural Education. Romanticism is too often inclined to hazy thinking; it likes to grope along in the ecstasy of the weird, and usually jams in the dry parts of its own mechanism. But Culture, if it is of the real sort which leads on to spiritual development and finds expression politically in a system of socially just Government, is always inclined to be clear and rational, seeking explicit conceptions of things and events, and is certainly always sufficiently lubricated to be in fairly efficient working order. The main trouble with the policy that is advocated by the romantic moralist is that he tries to teach us to be exceptional, superior-to-others, superficially naive, and does not begin to realize that he is preaching a dangerous doctrine until his idols are cast down by a world which seeks only the normal experiences of a rationally balanced life.

Romantic ideas are invariably so much mysticism; its metonymy and magic doors mark them out as mysterious and yet traditional as the yellow-beak birds and Bedouin coffee-pot designs on genuine Saraband rugs. Scientific romanticists, too, are ambitious to gain the Prix Pierre Gusman, but their essays are as abstruse and unpopular as a quantum theorist's technical lucubrations on the future possibilities of a worldling age which learns to harness atomic energy. They are playing for the delight of the elect, so they think, and never ask themselves what lay interest is popularly shown in astrophysics or cosmic phase-orders of existence, nor who, besides certain of their abstract speculator-companions, cares whether there are kinks in time or gaps in space. Less astute minds which are perhaps more honestly Nature-loving know that the plain homogeneous possibilities of motion and duration (Euclidean space and time) do not have to depend upon the exotic fancies and acrobatic rationalizing of intellectual moon-calves for an opportunity to become actual realities.

But howsoever this condition may seem to react against the periodical rebirths of idealism, Civilization will not fall; it will become estranged from simple living and high thought by the seductions of extravagance and pride, it will even be badly broken in the numerous political, industrial, economic and cultural upheavals it is bound to pass through, but it serves one of our favorite hopes to trust that Civilization will survive both the destructive science and the plutocratic government policies of today. that it will survive the hazardous struggle against a pseudo-romantic naturalism and be faithfully with us when we reach our final goal.

It is only in this bare negative sense that romantic morality is at all constructive and vitally functional as an actual accessory to our cultural progress. Nor yet can anyone deny that it has managed to supply us with many magnificent treasures of artistic literature and has given us exemplary models of what a grand achievement its realized ambition would make. This determinable quality is its one redeeming credential. It allows us to go through with all its vague ramifications of imagery and burlesque, and still come out at the magic door of plastic interpretation with a fairly close guess at the strange meaning of it all. The ultimate significance, however, of the experience is to show us that the highest value that may be attached to romantic morality is its heuristic service to cultural education and just governmental administration. It points out with unmistakable accuracy some of the things we should pursue or avoid for the sake of progress and the regeneration of man's travailing spirit.

Quite possibly there have been exceptions here and there in the general chronicle of humanity's vague aspirations. There is no racial uniformity of emotion just as there is no nationalistic hegemony of control over the means of making romantic pilgrimages to King Oberon's court. While the French romanticists of the older school were alert to almost every form of art and inspiration, their German contemporaries plodded on in perspiration toward their fixed ideal of perfection, and the English joined the Italians in the aspiration to be reasonable about both Nature and Art as they related to human life. But we of today are threatened, by a too loose valuism in understanding human needs and natures, with losing both our romantic and our cultural heritages in the maelstrom of monopoly, in the narrow nationalism of a moribund mediocrity, and in the weird seductions of would-be "practical" government concessionaries and committee-legislation. Every group of petty libationers drinks to the toast that "Our interests must be served *first*",—economic turmoil and industrial sedition notwithstanding. This is the only morbid Kulturkampf that must be guarded against. And strange to say, it was only that aspect of it which was anticipated as soon to be in conflict with neoclassic traditions that lead M. Francis Eccles, in his recent lectures on "La Liquidation du Romanticism" (1919, London), to deplore its break with the 19th Century *coup d'état* trend of French nationalism, naming it "une déviation de l'esprit français." But, for all we know or care, Romanticism has been the invariable deviation

from every other nation's habitual esprit, especially in those nations whose leaders become patriotic only when bond-issues are discounted and the tariff is revised (upward usually). An international rather than a nationalist perspective of culture and government policy is all that can or ever will be able to accurately and hence adequately liquidate the not-always financial obligations of modern Romanticism.

However much we are forced to attend to the worldling interests of obtaining a livelihood by more or less sordid contact with the grimy wheels of "essential industries", the fact still remains that the evenings and the Sabbath (if not an occasional holiday or vacation-period) are our own to dispose of as we will. There is a great majority of people who put in an admirable day of industrial efficiency and alert devotion to the tasks and duties of the business on hand, but seems to utterly relax at sunset and fritter away the time that is their own in idle pleasure, love of sleep, plots for revenge, or futile dreams of lazy luxury. They try to live on bread alone, and in the last communion expect viaticums to heaven. But it is not likely that they will have anything but the cruel recollection of vain exploits, lots of work, and indigestion. On the other hand, we have that scattered minority who devote their private moments to aspiring thoughts, to those refined feelings which delight the inward frame, and to those exalted motives which demand a nobler vision of the over-world. They are the courageous hearts and creative minds of this poor old mediocre nether-orb. They are perhaps the less conspicuous of the two classes as we observe them at the daily economic grind. "But in the evening is the difference seen", as Elbert Hubbard would have said, and on the Sabbath are their relative values as *men* revealed and verified. You do not have to wait ten years to see what will be the result of their public occupations and the legacy of their private avocations.

Such then, has been the great perennial antithesis, the vital either-or, ever since the world began: whether to seek out the spring of spontaneity and lay our humble festive board beneath the shady trees of a romantic life, swearing allegiance to nought but moral necessity and congenial spirits, or to leave our individual fate in the hands of careless contingency, hoping to balance our own weary days against the bare assumptive control of others' conduct. A certain rhetorical partiality here shows my private choice, but very often I find myself, not idly wondering or superficially contrasting, but actually philosophizing as to which is the more in-

dispensable portion of community's citizenry—its workers or its dreamers, its martyrs to ephemeral industry or its torch-bearers in the eternal procession of culture and religion.

One thing sure, the workers need a thorough education in solidarity, in how to forego personal interests in favor of those more social and justicial; an education in fact which emphasizes brotherly co-operation instead of mere radical agitation to violence. But they must think for themselves the while such enlightenment is in process of taking effect, else much effort be lost to larger and nobler causes. One of Art Young's cartoons shows one of our economic despots carrying away a bushel of corn labeled "Fat of the Land", leaving the husks to the worker whom he advises: "Don't think. Stay on the job." Just that is too much the trouble already. Spoliators and knaves do most all the thinking, and they codify their selfish processes of thought into laws which protect their schemes of ravinage and exploit. For any other sort of people it is nowadays fast becoming a crime to even think (for anyone who thinks cannot help but have the courage betimes to express what he thinks, even though it means trouble); witness the case of the Kansas editor, Wm. Allen White, against the rulings of the Industrial Court. Thought has all too significantly become the anarchy of fools just as thoroughly as words are the counters of wise men.

The majority of people today do not seem to have the time, talent nor inclination to contemplate for long any certain problem or phase of their multifarious existence. That is, they do not devote that longevity or sincerity of Thought to any one particular subject which will render it clear and ethically applicable to the almost insatiable requirements of life in a vulgar, selfish world. Thus comes the custom of shallowness and its consequent notion that anything which resembles Thought shall be taboo if not directly libeled and discountenanced with the various epithets of illegitimacy and anarchy. It is really good cause for alarm, and I am beginning to feel that it is a part—and a major part too—of the general debauchery of our public mind and private heart that the modern world is fast losing all honest capacity for effective meditation, and is blindly letting its philosophic functions deteriorate while it is so feverishly occupied with the putrid exploits of avarice, finite interests, unscrupulous adventure, folly and extravagance.

It is now popularly considered a sociological if not a physiological defect if anyone is so unfortunate as to have a brow any

more developed than that of an ape. It is almost impossible to go into an up-to-date bookstore and find anything in black-and-white that is not classifiable as "the latest fiction" or advanced as "a best seller that is different." An oldtimey work of sincerity in science, reverence in religion, profundity in philosophy, or true artistry in poetry is only to be had in the basement or balcony of some back-street store which handles an honorable but unpopular trade in "good though slightly soiled bindings." How could they remain in anything but good conditions, not having been used for years, and then probably by those only who treated them with tender care and choice selection here and there amongst the deckled pages? Even the modern historical, economic, educational and sociological works are inoculated to the very marrow with the specious virus of propaganda and misinformation. And those who read anything nowadays without first taking a generous dose of antitoxin to preserve their normal sanity are bound to become affected and perhaps fatally afflicted with some form of this insidious epidemic.

Thoughtfulness, like Romanticism in a vulgarian age or just government administration in post-war periods, being the habitual application to life of the power to meditate on the deliverances of consciousness and subconscious existence, is accordingly a rare attribute in the human makeup, at least as it is constituted and presented to us today. The exercise of any effectual degree of thinking capacity is as rare and discontinuous as lightning in foggy weather. The loose structure and the arbitrary functioning of our modern mind however should be expected, as they are foregone conclusions in this age of external perfection and internal chaos, smeer-culture and spiritual decay, somatic sophistication and soul-atrophy. So it is found to be a sort of vicious circle we are chasing ourselves around in. We are unable to think because we are wage-slaves to sin and folly, and we are ignorant fools because we prove by our mode of living that Thought is one of the lost arts.

The honest exercise of an adequate philosophy of life has provisioned far less houses with happiness than have been mortgaged to meet the demands of creditors. But it is not the philosophy which butters no bread and keeps the proportion in such hopeless minority. It is the sophist folly of people who think (feeble process) that they can gamble on the promises of youth and pay their debts with an early demise or with the inane sloth and in-

cessant regrets of a miserable old age. The history of ten thousand years has many times reiterated the proof that it cannot be done successfully, although for a time we may appear to survive the flood. In the first place, paying attention to what is venal, low-aiming, and ephemeral is not philosophy; it is a morbid pursuit of folly and usually works out as a most fallacious and mischievous occupation. In the second place, anyone who honestly knows how to think will actually study the processes of Thought and Life; he will entertain considerate opinions as to the philosophic measures supporting honest knowledge and just government, and will endeavor seriously to bring his more or less romantic vision of truth down to the bosoms of men that they may live more nobly and with less enfeebling notions about immediate selfish gain.

II. MORALISM, SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

The cerated moralism of hero-worship, with none but ivory apes and peacocks to exemplify the Good, is of little help or inspiration; it is grounded in a fallacy subtle and yet futile as the "horns" of old Carneades. Our age seems wholly mad with lucre-lust and the tarantism of intellectual jazz—our morbid mental stupor and inordinate desire to let others pay the piper while we dance seem quite incurable even by using the so-called appropriate medicinal music of Trotsky's tarantella. Governments are now taking a third dimension of their legislative function. Air routes and rights of way are listed in the new regulations of aerial traffic. Likewise with the recent realization of the necessity for unifying our various means of communicating information and experience we come across Chief Signal Officer (Major-General) Squier's valuable advice on how to so unify and supervise the practical ~~uses~~ of radio, telegraph and multiple telephony as to render them both efficient and unmercenary to criminal purposes. Also there is the new application of screen-art in cinematographic interpretations of scientific theories and discoveries; one somewhat extreme example being the recent filming in Germany of motions and signals demonstrating more or less effectively to laymen the extra-mundane and supra-empirical principles (or at least ideas postulated as principles) in Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity. One scientific fallacy, however, which I suppose the usual lay audience overlooks or which may be merely used through the necessity of material backgrounds to supply balance and familiarity to naive sensory experience, is this: that the hypothetical detached observer requires

no earthly landscape of assumed immobility from which to compare two or more motions or rather the relative course of a third motion of an object passing from one to the other of two diverse moving origins or "grounds." This fallacy is particularly in evidence in the filmed experiments such as that of the light signals from one end to the other of a moving train on a bridge with a mountain gorge for background, or in the imaginary extra-terrestrial view of a ball falling from the top of a tower which of course moves with the rotation of the earth. The ball's real path of motion is parabolic, although an observer anywhere sharing the earth's motion would view it as a straight-line fall.

This is a good example of scientific romanticism which is seeking some proportion of control or influence over the way we think about natural phenomena. By virtue of this aim it is in the same category with that phase of didactic moralism which is just now so anxiously concerned in love, sex, divorce, etc. Ethics as a rational science of man's natural affections and relations should take good care in turning over to romantic moralism the social welfare of people not yet able to cope successfully with the problem of evil in a vulgar, selfish and shallow-thinking world. The great furor set up a few years ago over the ascetic attitude toward marriage (which was considered "not a duty but a sin") in one of Tolstoy's last books, *The Sex Problem*, left the present generation no more enlightened on how to spiritualize such intimate relations as puppy love, pornographic courtship, common-law marriages, soul-mate triangles, love-nest scandals, et al. Beyond a sophist mess of specious arguments aiming to medicate and minimize the actual pejorism of the situation, nothing appears to have been really done in the direction of giving spiritual sanction and support to sex experience. Even the fairly representative symposium of Elinor Glyn in the Photoplay magazine or that right now (July) being carried on in the Hearst papers simply reflects a practical balance of opinion between variously famous of our contemporary worthies on just what is at the bottom of the human mind and heart when undergoing the equally named ecstasy and complex emotional experience of sex-urge or love, marriage or celibacy, gutter-grief or idealism. The very relevant question of continence or control is apparently overlooked altogether.

All that we can conclude from this is that the sincere initiates of Mrs. Eddy's or Madam Blavatsky's inner circle may possibly be able, with the assistance of compulsory circumstances, to satis-

factorily (or what the New-Thoughters hold is the same as actually) apply their esoteric scheme of asceticism to private life, but not likely the lay dilettanti who still remain absorbed in fleshly vanities and worldly interests on the outside. Monogamy and totemism, problem-plays and phallic worship, risque literature and pornographic art are by no means as yet purified of a degenerate appeal to the more physical appetites of a vulgar morbid patronage. Romantic morality should have none of such, but saints and sages often have to start reactionary combat before the sluggish government machinery can be properly oiled and fueled for ameliorative legislation. Mormonism is no less culpable of polygamous vices than the Lesbian eclipse of polyandry; the erotic hysteria of gynophily is no more innocent of sex perversion than the naked neurosis of the Rathayatra feast. But we still find them very well to the fore both as subjects of public interest and as items lending zest to our modern love-science. No wonder then that Achmed Abdulla has such little faith in modern continence and chastity as to define them as 'but the narrow ribbons on love's chemise.' The occasional rechauffes of Agapemonite theory and practice cannot help but vitiate an atmosphere into which nobler souls and more ascetic-minded men try to breathe a sterner discipline. So many men are not seeking *women* for their life-mates, but mere females; so many women are seeking mere males instead of *men*, that the social fabric is becoming faded and ugly and tattered and torn. The bathos as well as the pathos and irony of life is that they usually get what they seek, so that this is the source of much of the world's misery and discontent, although it is clearly a resultant retribution for folly and vice.

Dostoievsky is a peculiar example of the dualistic romanticism of the Slav nature; his religious paradoxes are grounded in the Gadarean compound of angel and beast, Greek Orthodoxy and Tartar bloodlust. His sociology could not have become exalted except on condition that his anthropology and historicism be conceived as the creed and chronicle of an utter depravity; such an expensive mental process does not appreciate the thrift of Puritan ethics nor the stern economics of a just government. Russia is the scene of perennial carnage, the never-decisive conflict between Romanticism and Government. It was only by dint of heroic courage and the endurance of imminent exile that practically all her best literature has been written. The revolutionary realism of Pushkin, Gogol and Turgenev simply passed the flickering torch of half-

infernally enlightenment on. I believe the world was fortunate beyond measure to find it held aloft by those two great devotees of mystic naturalism, Tolstoi and Dostoevsky, even after twenty years of hounding by both Czarists and narodniki.

Religion and Romanticism are most successful while they are mystic and theoretical; so soon as they begin to cast about for proselytes and practical applications of doctrine they begin to grow vulgarized, secular, commonplace and corrupt. Witness how the Quaker-like Sadhus have become demoralized so far as to follow their leader, Sundar Singh, in his violent revolt against any native Indian procedure of self-determination free from Anglican supervision. Witness how thoroughly the first fine brew of Democracy has recently turned to the vinegar of a crass vandalism, a morbid mediocrity of individualism and rhyomistic monopolies. Witness how the absorbing interest of theologians fifteen years ago in Delitzsch's plan to unite the world's three great monotheistic religions is now shifting over to the converse question whether or not the administration of the world's religious faith should be decentralized and given back its supposed freedom of spontaneous expression. During this interval people have found that religious imperialism has been delayed and thwarted more by racial differences and nationalist programs than by interchurch schisms, ritual objections, or lay petitions of secessional criticism. Any external irenic aiming at a possible unification of *all* religions whether pagan or puritan, pantheistic or personal, polytheistic or monotheistic, is a remote vision; its promises have little probability of realization so long as we have all those distinct forms of ritual and reverence, differences of attitude and practice, even their clumsy nominal classification as this or that sectarian group variously styling itself Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism, and so forth on down the list.

Mere uniformity of scriptural sense and textual interpretation is not enough: in fact it is useless to lay store on paper unity and agreement so long as a disparity of viewpoints regarding international equality, economic justice, industrial exploitation, co-operative spiritual effort and aid remain to make antagonisms and seditions between the various constituent leaders and devotees. Inspirations of text and ceremony are little more than the lip-service of a vicarious ecstasy; they are seldom deeply spiritual, like true reverence and mystic exaltation, to the degree that they have scope

for social or industrial applications, much less for international aids or interracial brotherhood. The pure and actual application of religious faith and love is seldom sufficiently thorough or innate to endure in new garments, work efficiently in avaricious armor, or take confident action upon those conflicting elements which concern its growth upon exotic shores. Much of every religion's original purity and power of spiritual expression is lost in the maze of subsequent public interpretation and private practice. The simplicity of the Christ ideal is lost in the complex motivation of an apologetic hypocrisy; the direct counsel of Dharmapada is brushed aside by the more ambiguous Vitanda of the Tripitaka and eristic Hinyana; the progressive ethics of the Wu-I or man's five social relations are sidetracked and polluted by the *squeeze* of a corrupt ceremonial practice in China; the *Arsha* revelations of the Koran are smothered under the idolatrous carpet of Kaaba lore; the Torah of Moses (like the original Hebrew and Greek texts trying to survive a half dozen Vulgate translations) is swamped with the vulgar half-vernacular tide of Talmud and Cabala; the Way of the Gods is murky with the smoke clouds of sentimental Zenist pachak; and Zoroaster's Zend of the ancient Kshatragathas in the Avesta is now vulgarized by forced passage through the hundred exegetical gates of Sadda commentary.

The living flame of ancient wisdom illumines the dark paths of the modern world with an occasional flash of inspiration for truth and virtue, and shows its devotees how to know and practice the best in life. But the superficial anecdotes, parallogisms, dogmatics, economic sops and external statutes of priest and potentate are soon lost to the inexorable erosion of time. They are largely the illegible modern scribblings of fools in the endless chronicle of man's transfiguration anyway, so why should they be treasured or mourned over. They emphasize and seek the profits (not the prophets, Upton Sinclair shrewdly tells us) of the world's pristine religious faith, knowing but never informing others that even the supposititious divinity and parthenogenesis of Christ are but subsequent refinements of linguistic fancy staking largely on substitutions or mistranslations of ancient texts. A false note of delusion gave the vital lie to their pseudo-romanticism and there was no superior critical faculty from which to render judgment or law covering the assumptive situation.

III. THE PROPER BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT.

Turning to the more recent marplots of contemporary events I cannot help but see that much of the current criticism ridiculing and opposing government interference in the operations of Big Business is but so much economic evasion and political flapdoodle. If the would-be innocent bourgeoning of capitalism and financial prestige into a mature octopus clutching at industrial and economic control were to be justly and resolutely restrained, the business world would not come to an abrupt end nor dash into the chaos which alarmist sopthrowers so excitedly prophesy. It would simply *divide up* the vast unearned surplus, the multiple turnover of what its meekened press-agents like to call half-of-one-per cent. Steel magnets, 100 percenters, Wall Street patrioteers, and other plutocratic despots would not be able to shut down their profitless (?) industries in prospect of turning their investments elsewhere under an efficient and justly administered government. No, for the same restraints on excess profits and corrupt political practices would be effective elsewhere also; there would be no Hooveresque commission to review tearfully the situation and put an extra margin on the lump-load price of coal.

Generally speaking, however, the political reformers of today are too much given to the *static aspect* of government policy and its title to state sovereignty. They attach too great an importance to the immovable type of political power, and this becomes the persistent ideal of all their aims and efforts. But we, in taking a few philosophical observations around and beyond their finite position, can readily see how far they fall short of framing any adequate plan with or by which to replace the present form of government so popularly in force in practically every nation throughout the world. To be sure they rightly attack our fallacious system of governing peoples by the fast and loose manipulation of industrial and economic power; but what other means can reach everyone who lives on a physical plane of existence? We are not trying to administer government in the astral world. And why is the present system found fallacious, if not because there is physical misery, material injustice, and worldly *nerf-ferure*? Why then are practically all our reformative measures so sadly inadequate, so culpably inapplicable and inert, if not because we seek to change the plan of life by talking to the workmen instead of going to the architect and the boss of the job? Like all the other processes of

livelihood and experience, government policies are (or should be, if not autocratic and tyrannous) motive and plastic; there is no static absolutist element in them except as we read it there and fall into doubt and disaffection over its possible solution.

Nowadays, and especially since the skeptical and materialistic times of Hobbes and Locke, Comte and Malebranche, modern society has become bafflingly complex as well as quite self-determinate and insubordinate to any feasible control by the old tattered codes of our predecessors; it is too high-gearred for slow-coach travel. Hence the consequent difficulties of readily analyzing and interpreting any particular phase or problem of its present condition render any prospect of an adequate solution exceedingly but not hopelessly distant of realization. As T. V. Smith shows in the *Open Court* for June, experimental criteria cannot readily get at systems which rely on an absolute and infallible authority; I wonder then how the authority of scientific control can replace that of either the individualist or the group (State) without ceasing to be purely peirastic and assuming even *that* measure of infallibility. No sufficient assurance seems to be given that those in the directors' private chambers will continue to be honest scientific seekers or experimenters and not soon degenerate into mere puppets of some more ruthless source of authority and control. I can readily recognize the necessity of departing from the individual kingship as well as the representative (?) group-rule sort of government, but cannot find the courage and nobility in human nature that is today necessary to even set up, much less maintain, a strictly experimental democracy which could secure equality of opportunity to all, industrial peace, economic justice, virtuous coal barons or honest oil promoters.

In any plan of scientific control over our social or political affairs we would have, first, the numerous vagaries and anomalies of individual temperament to deal with, seeing as we do that it is practically useless to try to draw up any set code of rules or static series of criteria as to what is good government procedure. when no two critics or advisors or cabinet members can agree on what constitutes the best legislative policy, the surest (if not most just) control, the true social welfare, or the most roundly efficient administrative mechanism. Second, there is the perennial obstacle of false valuation in every politically organized society which appears most often in the Orphean mask of selfishness and involves human turpitude all the way from insatiable greed up to maniacal

illusions of personal freedom and utopian destiny. And third, we have to spend time, so otherwise precious, accounting for and trying to dissolve the ethical gall-stones of domestic strife, poverty, commercialism, class-wars, plutocratic prestige, industrial or economic monopoly, and the thousand other variations of anarchy and social malevolence.

Although these are largely negative relations of fact, still they achieve telling results in their active opposition to whatever possible political philosophy we try to establish. We must take up positive weapons against all wickedness and folly, because negative attacks only give us "the feeling of security without the security itself, and at the same time cause us, in the enjoyment of the feeling, to neglect the attainment of genuine security in the only way possible, through intelligent and far-sighted control." (Smith, *ibid.* page 343). We know also that any political philosophy that is worthy of the name will aim and attempt to set up a reasonably practical code of control which not only guides present social conduct aright, but shall romantically qualify the temper of restraint so as not to too harshly discipline the creative works of true genius on the one hand, and shall so safeguard our justicial methods of control that no legal loophole will be allowed through which anyone viciously disposed can discount or evade the penalties provided in the code. Stated simply then, the true business of Government is properly that of supplying its subjects with a good and fair standard by which to live, an honorable and equitable means by which to preserve that standard from subversion or corruption, and an ideal in the bosom of which they will be glad, not coerced, to respect and help maintain the law and order thus established. Sumptuary and punitive measures are always in season to restrain the extravagant and segregate the wicked; but they should not unfairly be made to apply only when the transgressor is poor or friendless, else the only romantic element in public justice be rendered sterile, cast out and wholly alienated from the hearts of men.

According to this simplicity of conceiving it, the proper business of Government appears largely to be a masterly handling of the moral forces and an impartially scientific control of the economic, industrial, social and educational handicaps obtaining within the domain of its jurisdiction. Dealing with relations external to this proper domain should not be a government function at all, being as it invariably is, nothing but a postponement and evasion

(if not a traitorous controversion) of the immediate responsibility. Because most all our international intercourse and diplomacy (usually called statesmanship) is practically a rhetorical pastime for those in high and honorary but non-essential offices, such efforts have little directly to do with the domestic business of control.

It is easy then, to see what becomes of a government's political sovereignty when it seeks to base its operations or administrative functions on any but primarily moral grounds, on ethically just measures of control. The oldtime systems of governing by divine right, dynastic inheritance, religious imperialism, hand-me-down authority, minority-prestige, class-privilege, and kept-press tactics have been seen to fail time and again. And we are right now witnessing the failure of various more or less sincere attempts at arbitrating strikes, adjudicating wage revisions to meet (?) a far more buoyant cost-of-living, financing a soldier's bonus with *any* but a direct and confiscatory tax on unreasonably excess war-profits, and a myriad other schemes all in the mood of governing the nation according to the fallacious political philosophy of industrial hegemony, financial prestige, and mandatory economics. What about that old maxim about "pride goeth before a fall?"

If the political code is biased one way or the other, or even when only thrown out as a sop to the demands of any self-seeking clique which happens to have a powerful voice in making or breaking that code, then how can we expect the public, the subjects under that code really, to see in it any right to claim patriotic allegiance or consent to any other form of political sovereignty? But if the political philosophy adopted and enforced by a government provides honorable means of livelihood and adequate protection over all useful and worthy activities, enjoining those which overstep the ethical limits of personal liberty, and so interpreting and administering the just aids toward preserving the common weal, then and only then will it have any honest claim to sovereign power. The people will respect it and endeavor to live up to its secure and noble patterns, knowing that it guarantees to carry on its proper functions in full recognition of moral right and ethical justice, having confidence in and devotion to that decalogue of principles which can never be abrogated with impunity.

One of the world's worst fallacies in governmental theory is giving itself specious reasons and ill-founded hopes in the very face of the numerous hazards and presumptions of paternalism, whether nationalistic or agendic, industrial or educational. It is pseudo-nationalistic paternalism which is now leading Premier Nitti to

sublimate and medicate the feeble results of the Genoa Economic Conference; the same thing which led Giolitti (formerly premier and the Iago-Macchiavelli-Caillaux of Italian politics who renewed Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance) to become a dramatic deceiver with a perfect art of vicious casuistry and an ambiguous assumption of power. Likewise it was a fallacious turn of internationalist paternalism which caused both the Allies and the Central Powers to fail to preserve the integrity and economic rights of smaller nations, just as they failed both during and since the war to adhere to the given principle that "all government should be carried on only with the consent of the governed"—a principle good enough for all but vicious and refractory groups. However, Bernard Shaw and the Fabian Society struck a few conciliatory points for international government relations when they gave secondary notice to the patriotic pride of nationalism, but sanctioned the priority of properly using combined international force to compel the equitable decision of justicial issues, and suggested that some rational form of cosmopolitan culture and understanding might well be used as a guide-book to our social evolution.

Here were some anticipations of Randolph Bourne's heuristic suggestions of an impending twilight of idols, a stern irenic for terminating the numerous intellectual conflicts relating to the decisions of war in the particularly American assumption that they should be, primarily if not ultimately, carried on for the sake of international freedom and democracy. But the only *Demos* that has survived is that of a sophisticated vulgarity, a popular corruption of morals which holds us in a bog of mediocrity and pot-boiling, in a perennial mood of mercenary motive and ambitious monopoly. The supreme American fallacy in governmental theory is the assumption of an absolute, even incomparable, fund of administrative ability whereby even the pluralistic functions and relations of international co-ordination are considered to be in dire need of the would-be benevolence of a self-appointed guardianship and a reciprocally calculated but ill-balanced formula of economically sustained political hegemony. Surely anyone with half an eye can see in much of this the same old \$incere Octopus\$ reaching out his slimy tentacles to grasp and stifle the world. Else why do our profiteering potentates (so well exemplified by their predecessors, the war-lords, speculators in food-stuffs, and other so-called dollar-a-year men) reveal such an utter and lead-menacing fear of their very lives when anyone mentions Bolsheviki, I. W. W., Farm

Bloc, Non-Partisan League, Social Equity, etc.? Great concern is entertained for ship subsidies, compensation for broken ship-building contracts, railroad financing, guarantees of various industrial dividends, but they have used their Congressional puppets to recently show with conclusive certainty that they do not relish the idea of relinquishing the smallest part of their share in another great American fallacy (Service) even to the extent of financing a tax-free and discount-free soldier's bonus out of their astounding hoard of war-profits, not to say out of the equally greedy post-war "velvet" overlaying an economically well-trimmed world.

It is the business of honest and socially efficient government to disapprove and forestall any such national and international thievery, such direct and unscrupulous ethical anarchy, for such culpable conduct by either individuals or corporations or corrupt politicians is always preventable or controllable if in some just and adequate way they are held accountable to those who make and directly administer the laws. Even the most divergent contingencies of a nation's life may be effectively controlled by means of reactionary publicity and resort to popular moral action, if not by the more positive agencies of prosecution, imprisonment, segregation or exile of all who controvert our highest ideals, all who would corrupt the goods of life. One of the worst things that can befall a nation's administrative government is for it to function unfairly, giving ease of protection and luxury of ready exploit to *big* thieves and using its punitive powers only to hound the poor or improvident, the misfit or unemployed. Thus is bred the spirit of revolt, not against the laws or personnel of government particularly, but against the injustice, tyranny, special privilege and protected exploitation of the caste-wise malfeasance. Witness Ireland, Egypt, India, Russia, post-war Germany and the Fascisti-phase of the recent Italian economic transition toward a social democracy. Even in our own ribald, high-gearred, loud-labelled (but really mediocre, muddy-eyed) America we have far too much newspaper democracy, and not enough of the real, actual, pulsating people's government, of, by, and for themselves, not as selfish individuals who use their government as a cloak, but as a nation nobly organized for the best welfare of all and faithfully living up to the full requirements of its program.

However, the workaday business of government must be supplemented very often by the heroic efforts and courageous sacrifices of a few unselfish men. Like Lowell once said, the safety and en-

lightenment of the many always depends upon the courage and talents of the few. Like the ideal supplied in Royce's philosophy of loyalty, it means that one of the richest services a man can render his country is to make his intellect and capacity for moral distinction bring searching and constructive criticism to bear on the bettering of its customs, laws, ambitions, industries and other social institutions of national development. Every country or community is always in need of men with true and high ideals of life, men who also have the courage and the talents necessary to push their ability to the front so as to realize their worthy ideals in the affairs of both the smaller world about them and the larger world of international brotherhood and cosmic destiny. One of the encouraging facts is that any man who really has such ideals on the threshold of his ethical vision will do all in his power to amplify his neighbor's viewpoint of life, his contemporaries' ways of thinking, and exalt their worthier aims toward political reformation and true sovereignty.

In this sense, governmental reform is a far more gradual process than that of other less secular affairs, romantic morality, art, or religion, for example. Even while largely an inert mass of officialdom performing perfunctory duties, the cycle of political growth, flourishing and decay is usually pretty well marked off if we recognize its two perennial conditions; one holding that the static appearance of economic, industrial, financial, or judicio-social codes of government is really the fixed label of motive functions making up the so-called progressive character or purpose of our modern political system; and the other or dynamic aspect (field of active causal principles, the structure of both theory and practice) of those ethical action-patterns which give us any government at all holding that this field is really an everchanging expression of what is or should be morally static and ethically structural, the very soul of every just organization, free communion and uniform social improvement. This amounts to a rational, rather than a merely romanticizing, conception of the purposes and functions of good government.

Thus it must be said and, even in contradiction to the position adopted by many of our contemporary reformers, proved that taking it at any point of historical time human society can honestly be called organized only when the motives of organization and the functions of its self-preservation are morally good, when the activities of such life and ambition as it may show are vitally con-

structive rather than destructive, ethically co-operative rather than selfishly conflicting. We know that political power is proverbially changeable and arbitrary, lucre-loving and corrupt; but any government by moral hegemony and any just administration of adequate and inexorable laws are the only kinds that can give *all* the people security, for they stand ever ready to assist the fallen, they are accountable and responsible for what they do, they are enduring and conservative of the national welfare, both public and private probity being the featured virtue. It is, then, the proper business of governments to see that they have this hegemony, that they administer just and effective laws, that they guarantee equality and security to all, that their most durable value is constructive of social good, and that their conduct is always accountable and responsible to the people who acknowledge their guidance and benefit by their protection. Bare reliance on the integrity of personal conscience is not enough, and the motto of *pas trop gouverneur* resounding through Waldo R. Browne's political symposium ("Man or the State", Huebsch, 1920) should have been somewhat more stringent and historically accurate.

IV. CONCLUSIONS.

Therefore, there are many facts and fancies, truths and lies, to be met with in those two hemispheres of human conduct and control. A certain tonic effect is to be had from looking things squarely in the face, even though such disillusion to the clever camouflage makes us oftentimes pessimists and skeptics. In a fairly close survey of both Romanticism and Government I find that we live in a world of masqueraders, in an age of artifice and delusion, in a group-mood of mediocre mimicry and inert hero-worship. There is loud argument as to destiny and tradition, but any supposititious sense of effective discipline or co-operative interest is given an inaudibly small voice. Destiny is but the soft lining of tradition's coat; it is the raised nap of a dirty rug that has been sent to the cleaners. Traditions start, so Froude tells us, in the miracles of saints and the heroic exploits of supermen. But when once these have passed into the blear retrospect of ages less visionary, mediocre minds then read into our future a destiny commonly open to all humanity. The unique genius of those more talented and heroic is assumed as animating those still ignorant and cowardly. The survival of tradition, then, requires a certain respect for things venerable but irrelevant; the survival of man (i. e. the destiny-ideas of

such a future) requires a certain susceptibility of mind to visions of personal preferment, affective prestige, possessional merit if not also that peculiarly human appetite which craves *more* life, *more* love, *more* pleasure, *more* luxurious ease, *more everything*. Were so many of us not set on the vain career of realizing a fickle and illusory success in life we would not be prematurely grasping after destiny, the imaginary rewards hereafter; instead of this there would be far less error and misery, and far more progress and happiness in the world. Man's happiness philosophy is all askew with false ambitions and his life is grown corrupt; his ethics seem to have only a possessive case and his neighbors feel insecure.

The vulgar seek happiness in fads and cults, in wealth and luxury, in the specious prestige and egotism of a consciously directed influence over others. This is a vain and vacillating procedure; it is neither sure of its aim nor secure in its acquisitions. It is the worldling's faith in material perfection and argues a rhyomistic philosophy on the bourse of life. Such fools invariably miss the proper discipline of experience—nay, they also miss the joy of true living by controverting the normal interests of life into base means for self-assertion and self-service. They murmur in self-pity but know no sweet relief; they lead pinched lives, making no public sacrifice and seeing no lesson of justice in their private suffering. It is not always an adverse environment, not altogether an external defect, which can be marked down as the cause of wasted lives. It is rather the growing despond of spirit too innately feeble to wage a successful struggle; it is rather the emptiness of heart giving expressionless concessions to caducité; it is the sickening thud of souls falling into perdition. Mad purchases of murky pleasure, raucous pursuits of risque delight, are the functions of decaying souls; they are the inevitable symptoms of a gradually degenerating moral issue.

Resurgent souls, on the other hand, are more sternly set on righteousness and truth, more clearly conscious of Man's nobler pilgrimage toward the shrine of beauty and reality. But it is not a procedure wholly romantic, nor yet wholly ascetic and restricted; neither is it exactly patterned after our historical evolution, for that (as Huxley says) would be too "unutterably saddening." Progress is spiritual growth if anything; it is that specific ennoblement, enlightenment and advance which guards against both atavism and false culture, which secures us in a world neither brute-selfish nor foppishly ignorant. The element of rebirth in souls which populate

a good world precludes all base illusions of private gain, all fear of material loss, all barren toil and futile grief, all vengeful malice and undeserved rewards. The wicked are invariably conservative in their creed of vice, the spoliator is an inveterate toastmaster to his own debauchery. But saints and sages see the true romantic cycle of progress, the meliorism of bare human deeds and dispositions; for all of fact or fancy in our human world is always subject to either debasement or ennoblement, whichever we choose to put into effect. We would do well to be generous and good instead of stingy and degenerate, were it for no nobler purpose than that of our own ultimate welfare. We should make practical interpretation of the affective power of art, such for example as that wizardry possessed by the second century Chinese painter Liu Pao whose *North Wind* made people feel cool, whose *Milky Way* made them feel hot, and whose *Ravens* were like the 24 Filials of antiquity. We should appreciate Milton's advice in the sonnet and be like Cyriack Skinner's grandsire "on the royal bench of British Themis" pronouncing laws of writ and wrath, the while he let no solid good pass by nor cheerful hour disdained. We should so live as to honestly read into Southey's *Scholar* our own biography of friendly converse "with the mighty minds of old", gaining humble instruction from partaking their moral either-or. Thus could we derive substantial government and a valid political philosophy from our realistic romanticism and Nature-love. Thus also would we know why Shelley said that "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world."

True artistic temperaments are more mute than voluble except in viewing things deformed, unjust or vile. The esthete, like the connoisseur of the exquisite and romantic experiences of life, is in perennial ecstasy and rapture through his sense of beauty, good and truth. He is the genuine apostle of the poetic imagination, but can yet speak strongly in terms of emphatic vernacular when the violence of vandal power or the folly of fickle postichees come crashing in upon him. Any honest devotee of art dislikes to have anything—empirical or contingent, affective or industrial—disrupt the serenity of his refuge. And yet he lives no peacock life, his treasures are of the humble, they are not housed precariously aloft in the ivory tower of an exclusive existence. His very genuineness of heart and talent keeps his life exemplary and tangible to others; his very heroism of soul and livelihood keeps his enthusiasm social and his firewood dry. No proud company of the world's elect can

claim priority to his membership, for he was already a genius and a creator of good taste when the tribal instinct first took root in man. Benevolence, justice, integrity and cordial deeds of daily expression are constant companions to the soul of romantic art as well as to the intellect and moral tools of a good government. No hate or grudge, no spoils or umbrage is held against or taken from what others do, because artistic genius is in nowise narrow or provincial. A certain darkened outlook on life is necessary for umbrage to be either given or taken, and romantic souls are too clear seeing to be vexed with trifles and imaginary wrongs. Dull sorrow and care may drag the common folk down and sadden their days, but in the sanctuary of romantic art the sunshine of happiness, remembered joys, and the ideal contact with relics of past glory are ever the vigilant sacristans of the shrine set up in governments of Beauty, Nature, Faith and Love.

TWO ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGE OF JESUS.

BY WILLIAM WEBER.

(Concluded)

The words of Caiaphas breathe the same spirit in which the ruling classes of all nations and ages up to the present day have identified their own privileges with the welfare of their whole nation and even of the entire world. There is no need of looking for a higher truth hidden in them as the author of verse 51-52 does. "Now this he said not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation: and not for the nation only, but that he also might gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad," was not written by the author of verse 47-50, but was added by the compiler or a later reader. The statement belongs to an age when the death of Jesus was considered no longer as an event of human history, but of divine economy. As a matter of fact, the high priests were not endowed by virtue of their office with the divine spirit. Priesthood and prophecy were two separate things. The one was an hereditary position with strictly defined duties and emoluments, the other an individual gift of God that fell to the lot only of such as deserved it. A man of the type of Caiaphas was absolutely unworthy of divine inspiration. Thus no allegorical interpretation can be permitted to obscure the plain meaning of a proposition which breathes nothing but a selfishness that shrank not even from murder. That the resolution, offered by Caiaphas was adopted without a dissenting vote goes without saying. Before dismissing this subject, we have to consider the question how a disciple of Jesus could have learned what he relates about the council that decreed the death of Jesus. The general public cannot have known anything about that conspiracy. The account in Luke comes apparently from one of the Twelve. It does not contain anything but what an intelligent outsider could know and deduct from

what happened. The author of the Johannine version is, up to a certain limit, much better informed. He must have possessed special information which came to him from the camp of the enemy, unless we should have to conclude that his pen was guided by a vivid imagination. But such a conspiracy was bound to become known to quite a number of people. The chief priests had to take their whole entourage into their confidence and persuade them of the necessity of doing away with Jesus. They needed the co-operation of the temple servants for arresting him. We may therefore assume the meeting of verse 47-50 to have been of a semi-public character as far as the personnel of the temple was concerned. That some or the other of the subordinate priests and the Levites who were present at that occasion became afterwards believers in Jesus, is not impossible. In any case, the words ascribed to Caiaphas seem to have been addressed to the gallery.

The Johannine and the Synoptic accounts under discussion are independent of each other. The more important is the agreement of the Luke version with that of the Fourth Gospel. According to both, the chief priests and their allies want to put Jesus to death, and in both the hold which Jesus had upon the people is the cause of their murderous hatred. No details as to how that should be accomplished are discussed, whereas in the first two Gospels the emphasis is laid upon the means by which the end was to be attained. The reports of Luke and John are in that respect historical. For the execution of a plan of that kind is left quite naturally to an executive committee that is better qualified to act with decision and promptness than a deliberative body.

We are now in a position to state definitely what the first answer to the challenge of Jesus was. The chief priests and the scribes took up the gauntlet and replied: Thou shalt die!

Looking for the continuation of the source from which Jn. xii. 47-50 has been taken, Jn. xi, 54-57, and xii, 1-11, have to be put aside. The first passage is clearly unhistorical. For, according to it, Jesus, after having challenged the chief priests and incurred their deadly hatred, sought safety in flight and remained in hiding at a place called Ephraim for a whole year. For in verse 55 f. it is said that the people looked for Jesus at the next passover and wondered whether he would come to the feast. There are two unanswerable objections. In the first place, Jesus could not run away and hide himself after he had cleansed the temple without losing the confi-

dence of the people. Whatever else the Messiah might be, he could not be a coward. In the second place, Ephraim is identified with a fort only fourteen miles from Jerusalem. Jesus and his disciples could not tarry there for a whole year without being recognized and reported to the chief priests, especially as the enemies of Jesus had given commandment that the whereabouts of Jesus should be made known to them because they wanted to arrest him.

The Anointing at Bethany (Jn. xii, 1-8) has parallels in Mt. xxvi, 6-13, and Mk. xiv, 3-9. It is not a genuine Johannine pericope but a rather late compilation, most of whose features have been borrowed from not less than five different sources. These are, besides the just mentioned Matthew and Mark stories, Lk. vii, 37-39, Lk. x, 38 ff., and Jn. xi, 1-46. The name of the place where Jesus was anointed is derived from the first two Gospels as well as from Jn. xi. While the name of the host is not given, the names of Lazarus, one of the guests, and of Martha and Mary come from Jn. xi. But the statement "and Martha served," in verse 2, is based upon Lk. x, 40, where we read: "but Martha was cumbered about much serving." Mary anoints the feet of Jesus and wipes them with her hair. That feature is copied from Lk. vii, 38. The criticism of Mary by Judas Iscariot and her defense by Jesus is based on the Matthew account, not that of Mark; only there the disciples, instead of Judas Iscariot, find fault with the woman.

The party who put together Jn. xii, 1-8, out of odds and ends was an indifferent writer. The second half of verse 1 reads according to the Greek text: "where was Lazarus whom raised from dead Jesus." One might say perhaps that the first subject is placed after the verb for the sake of emphasis, but no reason can be found why Jesus should stand at the end of the second clause. That name indeed is entirely uncalled for, because the sentence to which that relative clause belongs begins: "Jesus came to Bethany." The reference to the raising of Lazarus from the dead is superfluous. For it has just been related at great length in the foregoing chapter. Neither the missing article before "dead" recommends our author. "But Lazarus was one of them that sat at meal with him" (verse 2) is rather suspicious. One should think Jesus could not have been the guest of anybody else at Bethany than of his friend Lazarus. The compiler must have felt that, too. For he omits the name of the host, who, according to Matthew and Mark, was Simon the Leper. The nameless woman of Matthew and Mark anoints the head of Jesus, whereas Mary anoints his feet and wipes them with

her hair. But in taking over these features from the Third Gospel, our writer failed to grasp their true significance. The woman of Luke is called a great sinner. When she stood with her cruse of ointment behind Jesus at his feet, her emotions overcame her, and her tears fell on his feet. That unforeseen accident forced her to dry the wet feet with her hair. Thereupon she kissed the feet and anointed them. As a rule friends kissed each other on the mouth, and the head was anointed with oil, as we learn from Lk. vii, 45 f. (comp. Ps. xxiii, 5). But the woman for obvious reasons did not dare to treat Jesus as a social equal. At Bethany, as is proved by the Matthew and Mark account, there was no reason why Mary should have abased herself. Moreover, the woman in Luke does not use her hair to anoint but to dry the feet of Jesus in order that she might anoint them. Mary in John simply rubs off the ointment with her hair and thus anoints rather her own head than the feet of Jesus.

The only original feature in John is that not the disciples in general, or some bystanders, or the host, but Judas Iscariot criticizes Mary, and that he is called a thief. In view of the other shortcomings of the pericope, no weight can be attached to these statements. Our compiler did not have first hand information. He lived at a time when Christians unconsciously drew the picture of the traitor in ever darker colors and crowned the faithful apostles with a halo. The answer of Jesus: "Suffer her to keep it against the day of my burying," indicates likewise the age of the compilation. It belongs to a time when the Christians believed the body of Jesus had been anointed when it was committed to the ground. But Mk. xiv, 8, and Mt. xxvi, 12, Jesus says: "She hath anointed my body beforehand for the burying," and "In that she poured this ointment upon my body, she did it to prepare me for burial." That was written while the Christians still knew that the corpse of Jesus had not been anointed. Therefore Jn. xii, 7, has to be regarded as an intended emendation of the older text. But since the *nard* had been applied to the feet of Jesus, it could no longer be sold nor kept against the day of the burial of Jesus. Thus the emended text of verse 7 is contradicted by its own context. Final proof of the dependence of our pericope upon the Synoptic Gospels is the expression *Judas Iscariot*. That is a strictly synoptic term and is used two times in each Synoptic Gospel. The Fourth Gospel calls the traitor three times *Judas the son of Simon Iscariot*, which therefore has to be considered as characteristic of John.

Jn. xii, 9-11, is closely connected with and dependent upon the story of the Anointing at Bethany. Since the latter is spurious, the former cannot be genuine. Both stand and fall together.

The Triumphal Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem (Jn. xii, 12-15) takes up the thread of the narrative which broke off Jn. xi, 50. The opening phrase, "on the morrow," places in the present condition of the text the occurrence on the fifth day before the passover. But that is an impossible date. The chief priests and the Pharisees could not afford to wait six days before they struck their victim. Their revenge, in order to be sure, had to be swift. The Jews remained for eight days at the temple; including the journey to and from Jerusalem, the Galileans spent about two weeks for the passover. For that reason alone, they would not congregate in any large numbers at the temple until the last day before the feast. The compiler of our section was aware of that fact. He undertook to account for the early presence of the multitude by stating in Jn. xi, 55: "Now the passover of the Jews was at hand: and many went up to Jerusalem out of the country before the passover to purify themselves." Still "many" and "a great multitude" are not the same thing. Besides, special purifications were not required before the passover. The law said: "If any man of you or your generations shall be unclean by reason of a dead body, or be on a journey afar off, yet he shall keep the passover unto Jahweh" (Nu. ix, 10). Moreover, Jn. xi, 55, could not explain the early arrival of Jesus. He foresaw the fate that awaited him; he had made up his mind to bear the cross; but he would hardly anticipate the fatal moment. The right time for striking effectively at the chief priests was when the pilgrims had arrived, that is to say, the afternoon of the last day before the paschal lamb had to be prepared. Of course, as soon as the true character of Jn. xi, 51-xii, 11, has been established, both the phrase "on the morrow" and the expression "a great multitude" of Jn. xii, 12, are quite correct. Jesus arrived and cleansed the temple during the afternoon of the thirteenth of Nisan. The chief priests and the Pharisees decided the same evening to put him to death. The next morning a great multitude went forth to conduct their champion in triumph to the temple.

The idea of going out to meet Jesus on the road and escort him into the city and temple was conceived and executed by the people. Neither Jesus nor his disciples suggested or arranged that triumphal entry. They played throughout the whole affair a strictly

passive part. It is necessary to call attention to that fact because the Synoptic Gospels tell a different story.

The Johannine multitude went forth to salute Jesus as victor. That is shown by the palm branches with which they were provided. The fronds of palm trees were the symbol of victory. They are mentioned only in John. Likewise the definite article is not to be overlooked. We read: "They took *the* branches of the palm trees and went forth to meet him." The taking of the palm branches was evidently a deliberate act, not a mere accident. Palm trees are not found in the neighborhood of Jerusalem. The altitude is too high for them. They do not thrive at an elevation of more than 1,000 feet above sea-level. They grow in the seacoast plain of Palestine and were raised in antiquity also in the Jordan valley near Jericho. (Ant. xvii, 13, 1) The palm fronds could therefore not have been picked up by the roadside. They must have been taken along from the temple. We know from Lev. xxiii, 40, that the Jews used palm branches at the feast of Tabernacles. But it is very probable that this custom was extended also to the Passover as well as Pentecost. One of the ancient rabbis, at least, writes: "With the palm branches in your hand, ye Israelites appear before the Eternal One as victors." Also Plummer (Internat. Crit. Commentary, St. Luke, p. 498) assures us: "The waving of palm branches was not confined to the feast of Tabernacles." The palm branches, and especially the definite article, are such an intimate feature that no later writer, interpolator or commentator could have added it to the narrative.

Since the palm branches were taken along purposely, the great multitude of pilgrims that sallied forth to meet Jesus must have intended to greet him as victor. But a victory implies a preceding fight. In what fight, had Jesus been victorious? We know of no other attack he made upon anyone except that upon the chief priests and the scribes when he cleansed the temple. In that encounter he held the field while the chief priests and their partners had to withdraw in discomfiture. The pilgrims who had sided with Jesus had prevented the chief priests from inflicting any harm upon him, mistook that initial advantage for the final victory. They argued, very likely, "As long as Jesus is in our midst, nobody shall lay hands upon him."

From that point of view, the clause "when they heard that Jesus was coming to Jerusalem" cannot refer to the first arrival for the feast. His coming to the temple on the morning after the

cleansing must be meant. The Greek text reads "into Jerusalem." That may be significant. Jesus and his disciples as well as the great majority of pilgrims camped during the week of the feast outside of the city, from where they came daily to attend the religious exercises at the temple. Some enthusiastic admirers of Jesus must have learned from the disciples where he was staying over night and by what road he came to the city. That knowledge enabled them to arrange the royal reception they gave him. The original text, however, may have been changed slightly by the compiler. That man, as I presume, supposed the triumphal entry to have taken place on the very day when Jesus arrived from Ephraim. That would follow from Jn. xi. 55, and agree with the Synoptic tradition, with which the compiler was familiar.

The great multitude went forth, according to verse 13, with their palm branches to salute and honor Jesus not only as victor but also as the Messiah. For they hailed him:

"Hosanna!

Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord,
Even the king of Israel!"

What could have prompted the people to acclaim thus in public the Messianic mission of Jesus? His teaching alone could not have caused them to do so. For thereby he had demonstrated only that he was a great prophet. The Messiah indeed was expected to possess the spirit of prophecy and know the will of God even better than the greatest prophets of old. But that spiritual gift alone could not prove his Messiahship. Neither could the miracles ascribed to Jesus establish any royal claims. For prophets of past ages like Elijah had performed similar deeds. Moreover, the signs of the Fourth Gospel do not belong to the oldest Johannine source which relates only the passion of Jesus. All references to those signs belong to the compiler. The Messiah, besides being a great prophet, was expected in the first place to do Messianic deeds. The Fourth Gospel reports only one such deed. That is the Cleansing of the Temple. An ordinary mortal would never have dared to do that. It presupposed the consciousness of royal, Messianic authority which surpassed that of the priests. Anybody might have criticized the chief priests most severely, but nobody would have dared to interfere actually with their business in the temple and with the sale of victims that were devoted to God. The people recognized that instantly. They understood at once what Jesus meant with his question about the baptism of John.

The royal reception which the pilgrims gave to Jesus was their answer to the Challenge of the Chief Priests and the Pharisees. Jesus, as the Messiah, had called them to repentance and urged them to renounce their selfish greed. The people saw that as clearly as they themselves did; but while the latter decided to kill him, the former ranged themselves with unbounded enthusiasm at his side. He was the long-expected Savior. They went forth to give expression to their conviction in an unmistakable manner for the purpose not only of honoring Jesus but also of bringing to bear the pressure of public opinion upon his opponents.

While Jesus was being escorted into the city, there happened an incident of little importance in itself. Jesus and his disciples were, of course, walking afoot when the multitude met them. Getting ready to march back with Jesus in their midst, the thought occurred to them how little it became Jesus to enter the holy city like any other poor pilgrim. Looking around, they found a little ass whose owner consented to put it at the disposal of Jesus. Neither Jesus and his disciples nor the multitude paid any special attention to that occurrence at the time being. Only later on they remembered a saying of the prophet Zechariah which had been fulfilled literally. Jn. xii, 14-16, says: "Jesus, having found a young ass, sat thereon; as it is written,

Fear not, daughter of Zion:
Behold, thy king cometh,
Sitting on an ass's colt.

These things understood not his disciples at the first: but when Jesus was glorified, then remembered they that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him."

The words quoted show that neither Jesus nor his disciples were responsible for the episode of the ass. "They," that is to say, the multitude or the leaders of the multitude took the initiative.

The Synoptic version of the Triumphal Entry is very different from the Johannine account. It is found Mt. xxi, 1-11—15-16; Mk. xi, 1-11, and Lk. xix, 29-40. It does not follow the cleansing of the temple but precedes that event. The very first sentence with which the narrative begins in the first two Gospels shows very distinctly that the triumph was celebrated right at the arrival of Jesus for the Passover before he had been in the city and temple. Mt. xxi, 1, reads: "And when they drew nigh unto Jerusalem."

In the preceding paragraph (Mt. xx, 29-34) Jesus passes through Jericho on his way to Jerusalem.

Also the place whence Jesus started his ostentatious procession is named. Matthew tells us: "and came unto Bethphage unto the Mount of Olives"; Mark: "unto Bethphage and Bethany at the Mount of Olives," and Luke: "when he drew nigh unto Bethphage and Bethany at the so-called Mount of Olives." Why the First Gospel has omitted the second village is not difficult to see. The Greek translator employed by mistake a wrong preposition for rendering the preposition of the Semitic text. He wrote "came into Bethphage." As a person can enter not more than one village at the same time, he felt constrained to omit "and Bethany." But the Hebrew preposition here in question means as a rule with verbs of motion like go and come "to" or "towards." That is confirmed also by verse 2, where Jesus directs two of his disciples: "Go into the village that is over against you." Jesus had not entered Bethphage nor intended to do so. Therefore Jesus may have stopped in the neighborhood of two villages before he rode into Jerusalem.

All three Gospels have Jesus order two of his disciples to fetch him an ass from Bethphage. He wanted to fulfill literally an old prophecy (Zech. ix, 9). We are told so Mt. xxi, 4 f. That passage is indeed a gloss, because it is not supported by Mark and Luke. But even if it is dropped, the fact remains Jesus in all three Gospels makes deliberate preparations for going into Jerusalem just as the prophet had described it. The very act of riding on the back of an ass proclaimed Jesus to all who knew him as the Messiah.

The translator of the Matthew version committed another linguistic error when he translated the just-mentioned prophecy into Greek. He discovered therein two different animals, an ass and a colt of an ass. He was not acquainted with the characteristic peculiarity of Hebrew poetry to repeat a statement in other words, called parallelism of members. The prophet had written:

"riding on an ass,
even upon a colt,
the foal of an ass."

That means the king rode upon a young donkey. But our interpreter made the disciples bring an ass and a colt. They not only put their garments upon both, but even made Jesus ride upon both at the same time, as if he had been an equestrian performer. The

translators of the Mark and Luke text did not make that mistake. There the disciples obtain but one animal.

As soon as Jesus had identified himself in that manner with the Messiah of Zechariah, the disciples started an ovation, designed to call the attention of the pilgrims to what was going on and enlighten them as to its true import. They spread their garments on the way and saluted Jesus as "the king that cometh in the name of the Lord." (Lk. xix, 37 and 39). The second Gospel reports the same thing. Only one addition is made. Besides the garments, leaves, cut from the fields, were strewed upon the road for Jesus to ride over. The disciples are not mentioned expressly; but as no other subject is introduced, the "many" and "others" of Mk. xi, 8, must belong to the same group of people as the "they" of verse 7. Of course, the term "disciples" embraces under those circumstances all the adherents of Jesus that were present. That is indicated perhaps also by the expression "the whole multitude of the disciples" of Lk. xix, 37. According to Matthew, the disciples, that is to say, the Twelve, only secured the ass for Jesus and put their garments upon him; everything else is done by "the multitudes." As they are thus distinguished from the disciples, the term must denote the pilgrims that happened to be traveling along with Jesus and his twelve companions. It reads: "The most part of the multitude spread their garments in the way; and others cut branches from the trees and spread them in the way; and the multitudes that went before him and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna," etc. (Mt. xxi, 8 f.) When, at last, they had marched into the temple, and the grown people had become quiet, the children still continued to shout: "Hosanna to the Son of David!" (verse 15). The three Synoptic accounts form a climax. The ascent from Luke through Mark to Matthew is quite conspicuous. One is tempted to consider "the whole multitude" of Lk. xix, 37, as a later addition to the text, suggested by Matthew. According to Luke, only garments were placed in the road like rugs for Jesus to ride over. Mark adds leaves cut from the fields. The Greek noun rendered in the American Revised Version "branches" (Mk. xi, 8) means a bed of straw, rushes, or leaves whether spread loose or stuffed into a mattress. The first Gospel has: "Others cut branches from the trees." (Mt. xxi, 8) That is doubtless unhistorical. Branches would not have made the road any smoother. Besides, nobody would have thought of depriving in the vicinity of Jerusalem trees of their branches, be-

cause trees are rare in that region. Thus the most simple account, that of Luke, seems to be the most original of the three.

But even the Luke account, though superior to that of Mark and Matthew, contains highly improbable statements. Jesus tells the disciples, who were to fetch the ass for him, they would find in Bethphage "a colt tied whereon no man ever sat." He also instructs them as to what they should say if anybody should try to prevent them from taking the animal along. Neither Jesus nor his disciples were acquainted with the owners of the ass. Jesus therefore must have possessed the gift of the second sight, and the owners must have been influenced by supernatural means to hold their colt in readiness for two men who were to claim it in the name of the Lord.

It would be silly to reject anything related about Jesus simply because it looks like a miracle. Still supernatural things do not exactly lighten the task of the exegete. But any explanation of the Synoptic pericope of the Triumphal Entry presents unsurmountable difficulties as soon as it is placed side by side with the Johannine account of the same event. The Synoptic Gospels date the Entry before, the Fourth Gospel after the Cleansing of the Temple. The former makes Jesus the arranger of the whole demonstration, and Luke confines it to the disciples; the latter describes the triumph as arranged exclusively by the people without previous knowledge and consent of Jesus and his disciples. The donkey which plays so prominent a part in the Synoptic Gospels is merely an accident in the Fourth Gospel. As the two versions are directly opposed to each other in their principal details, only one of them can be genuine.

The Johannine account presents not a single objectionable feature. Jesus acts as he acted before. He does not violate any of his well-known principles. He did not make a bid for the applause of the people; he simply accepted it when it was offered to him unsought although by doing so he sealed his fate. The Synoptic Jesus acts in an altogether different way. He proclaims his divine mission to the multitude of pilgrims who ascended to Jerusalem with him. It was quite a theatrical performance. Still up to that moment, he had concealed his identity most carefully and had even forbidden his disciples to tell the people who he was. He wanted the people to recognize him as the Messiah themselves. Jesus can never have renounced that principle and advertised himself like a charlatan. Thus the Fourth Gospel alone has preserved the authentic account

of The Triumphal Entry. The parallel tale of the oldest synoptic source was lost by some accident. But the compiler of the first synoptic memoirs possessed a legendary version of that event, inserting it, however, in the wrong place. That apocryphal version may even have induced him to omit the original story of his best source because, in his opinion, it was too plain and too short. Consequently, we have to insist with the Johannine account that the Triumphal Entry of Jesus, as arranged and managed by the people on their own responsibility, is the answer of the people to the challenge of the chief priests by Jesus.

That answer proved disastrous for Jesus. His mortal enemies needed the active co-operation of Pontius Pilate unless they wanted to employ hired assassins. A public crucifixion by order of the Roman governor was, of course, more desirable and safer than secret murder. It would look like a swift judgment of God because Jesus had rebelled against the priests. But Pilate would only proceed against Jesus if he had become convinced of the dangerous character of the man from Nazareth as an enemy of the Pax Romana.

Under these circumstances, nothing could be more welcome to the priests and scribes than the enthusiastic demonstration of the people in favor of Jesus. They passed the Antonia when entering the temple, and that citadel must have been the Praetorium of Matthew, Mark and John. Many scholars indeed regard the palace of Herod as the official residence of the governor. They do so because he occupied the palace of Herod at Caesarea. (Act. xxiii, 35) But there is a great difference between Jerusalem and Caesarea. Within the walls of the latter, the Roman governor was absolutely safe and would inhabit as a matter of course the most pretentious building. At Jerusalem, where he was only during the great festivals, he was in a hostile camp. His task was to prevent or to suppress any outbreak against the Roman authority. Not personal comfort and splendor but exclusively military considerations prescribed his place of business. He was compelled to be at the strategic point. As the temple was the only place where a revolt might start, the Antonia, a strong fort at the northwest angle of the temple, which commanded the entire temple area, was the Praetorium at Jerusalem. It offered ample room for a large garrison, was safe from attack from without, and gave "immediate access to the flat courts and to the inner Temple." Thus Pilate, his officers and soldiers always knew what was going on in the temple. In the

given instance, the guards, many of whom were recruited in Syria and Palestine, would report that a man riding on an ass was acclaimed by a large multitude as the Son of David, the king of the Jews. Pontius Pilate himself would in all probability come out to watch the scene. In any case, he would send at once to the high priest for information and advice. That worthy dignitary had only to confirm the suspicions of the governor and promise to have the pretender arrested during the next night so that he could be crucified in the morning without the knowledge of his adherents.

The high priest was not even compelled to resort to lies. All he had to do was to assure the Roman of his undying loyalty and devotion and complain of the attack made by the Galilean upon himself the day before. His wrong consisted simply in not telling the whole truth. But truthfulness is not to be expected from men of his caliber. For the whole truth would have indicted himself and his colleagues. They had abused their sacerdotal office to further their own unsavory ends. They were guilty of atheism and robbery and were ready to crown their misdeeds, unpardonable for men in their position, with the judicial murder of him who had dared to warn them.

CREED.

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID.

Consenting not, consulted not, I came,
What then am I? A simple pawn of fate
That accident of birth alone might claim
For prince or pauper, saint or profligate.
With knowledge of my whence to me denied,
With mystery my pathway shrouding o'er,
How then shall I my whither's hope decide?
Or seek beyond this sphere in thought to soar?
The Force that formed the mammoth in his time,
The cuttle-fish, the sponge, the coral reef,
The chambered molusk in his home of slime,
The smallest germ, the crystal, and the leaf,
No revelation yet hath vouchsafed man,
Though book and legend would proclaim it so;
But, loving good, I trust, nor fear to span
The final breach, presuming naught to know.



LOUIS PASTEUR.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

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RUSSIA'S HIDDEN FORCES. ✓

BY HERMAN JACOBSON.

THE problem of the day is Russia. European civilization centers on it. If Russia goes under, all Europe—and ultimately America—must go with her.

But the world, especially America, speculates on Russia without an adequate knowledge of the forces—hidden but fundamental—which actuate the Russian.

He forgets that Russia's accumulated experiences differ from the accumulated experiences of the Western nations. She remained in primitive communities long after the Western world became organized into feudal states. She struggled for centuries under Tartar rule. She continued under an Oriental despotism long after the Magna Charta was signed. She lived under serfdom long after the institution was abolished everywhere else in Europe.

The most marked characteristic of the Russian masses is their absolute illiteracy. Until the Revolution, nine out of every ten did not know how to read or write. It was the result of a carefully cherished darkness. The sources of knowledge, such as newspapers and magazines, were practically unknown to the average Russian. His communication with the world of thought did not go farther than his voice could carry.

We are in the habit of thinking that illiteracy results in a lack of intelligence, in a lack of sense. Some day we shall be forced to revise our opinion on this subject. In my rambles round the world, I have met with a profound wisdom among those who do not know how to read and write. Instead of relying on the guidance offered by the world of books, the Russian turned on himself. He knew nothing of this theory or that theory of life and conduct. Life to him was not a continuous flux, as we consider it, whose

waves no one can ride without "keeping abreast of the time"—without keeping in touch with books and newspapers.

Because of that lack of contact with the outside world he possessed no dogmas, no articles of faith, which the average man among us, through the instrumentality of books, schools, and magazines, comes to consider sacrosanct, eternal, exalted above life itself. To him life was a labyrinth of mystic windings where a man turned one way or another. Innumerable paths without sign posts. He loved his earth with a mystic love and trusted her with a mystic faith. That is all he knew. That is all he cared to know.

Another thing: Russia knows nothing of the forces which galvanize the life of the masses in the West. She knew nothing of books; and therefore knew nothing of the Washingtons, the Lincolns, the Jeffersons every country boasts of. There were no such slogans, no such ringing phrases as characterized our Civil War or the Great War. There were few things to direct the interest of the people to external objects, such as the State. Indeed, the average Russian, from the humblest peasant to the profoundest thinkers like Tolstoi and Dostoyewski, was far from exalting the State or those enhancing its successes. As a matter of fact, both the institution and those in any way associated with it, were always distrusted. The men and women of historic prominence in Russia, such as Peter the Great or Catherine II, who are considered heroes and benefactors of their country in the Western world, were known as anti-Christis to the average Russian. He tacitly acknowledged their instrumentality in creating a vast empire, but, insisted, they ruined the people in the process. Vast empires, the average Russian was in the habit of pointing out, were of great advantage only to emperors; never to the man in the street. He always asked whether a Russian was happier than a Dane because his country was larger. On the other hand, he never tired of talking of the bitter fruits of empire building in his own country: Peter the Great, the greatest empire builder, was a monster who lived on the misery and degradation of his people. He imported armies and navies into Russia and forced the inhabitants from pursuits of peace into pursuits of slaughter. In a word, there was no universal edification of the State in Russia; which unites all other peoples in an affection for a common object. For him the State has not yet dethroned all the other forces in human life as it has done in the West.

The unifying emotions in Russia were the emotions of pity,

sympathy, mercy. The outcast, the vagabond, the tramp, the thief, the prostitute were the common objects of commiseration. No genuine Russian could find it in his heart to berate misfortune, to mock poverty, to rebuke crime. The hero in the mind of the masses, as well as of the Russian novel, has rarely been the man with a perfect crease in his trousers and a bankroll in his pocket. Never the guttersnipe who had won his way to the presidency of the municipal gas plant. Russia's heroes have always been failures, suicides, consumptives, imbeciles, prodigals—men with a sense of value completely at variance with that of Solid Prosperity. The most important moment in the story of a Russian author is not when a great effort has been crowned with success, a protracted hope realized, or estranged friends reunited. It is not on the page where the hero comes into a big fortune or the heroine has landed the man for whom she had set her cap. The author rises to his highest powers only when he pleads for the fallen woman, for the criminal, the man out of joint with his time, for the rebel hurling defiance in the teeth of the great ones of the earth. This is the great single emotion that unites Russia.

Another thing which strikes the Western mind as peculiar, as "bad" in the Russian is his attitude toward "Law and Order."

The Anglo-Saxon, who is the leader in this respect of all Western Europe, considers "Law and Order" as the ideal embodiments of all human conduct. They are the items on the Decalogue purposely omitted on the stone tablets that they might later be inscribed on Anglo-Saxon hearts.

Shocking as this will prove to the average Anglo-Saxon, it must nevertheless be stated, if an adequate idea is to be gained of the secret forces actuating the average Russian—the Russian entertains a secret distrust of the efficacy of man-made law. He is so constituted that he doubts his own wisdom in planning out life and positively distrusts the wisdom of others—especially the wisdom of hired agents. The vast majority of the Russian masses feel, though in many instances very vaguely, that parliamentary regulations and restrictions do not make men nobler, better, more tolerant. Russian men and women with power of articulation will tell you that if all the legislatures and courts were wiped off the face of the earth, the world would be a better place in which to live. They insist that not only are their much-heralded benefits negative, but that they are positive in their malevolence. At best, they arrest man's powers of self-development physically, mentally, and spirit-

ually. In a discussion on this subject I once heard a Russian declare:

"Look at music and think of the marvelous powers for self-realization and development of the human spirit when not curbed by laws and regulations. Out of a half dozen elementary notes it has built up for itself a world so entrancing that it lays a spell on all those who come under its influence. Think of what would have happened to music had legislatures and parliaments taken hold of it, checked it a bit here, a trifle there. Instead of listening to the compositions of Wagner and Kreisler performed by the orchestras of Petrograd, Vienna, and Boston, we should still be listening to the improvisations of savages beating tom-toms and calabashes. What is true of the human spirit in music is also true of it in all other of its infinite potentialities. Why, who knows," he concluded, "how many such marvels in social organization and human intercourse man-made law has already strangled and how many more it will strangle."

Nor has the Russian that awe of Order that the Western mind has. He delights, indeed, in what Stephen Graham calls "Divine Disorder." When he beholds the order and arrangement of life in the West, he exclaims: "Tolko Meshayet!" (It's in the way). He cannot endure a life of systematized and regulated movement. He loses heart in a course mapped out from the cradle to the grave. He cannot live without mystery and adventure.

Some time ago I found myself in a restaurant at one of the most beautiful and orderly hotels in the United States talking to a prominent Russian publicist. We were discussing this very point. He grew eloquent and swept his hand over the room:

"You see these beautiful mirrors and cut glass, the starched waiters in austere frigidity? Well, after the first flash is over this wonderful order overpowers you with a deadly ennui. It is true, it keeps you befuddled at first, but you soon begin to feel like a drunkard after a furious debauch. A fatal tedium creeps over you and you are driven to thoughts of suicide. For all this represents a life so suppressed in the attempt at system that it practically ceases to function. The men and the women who are satiated with it are the unburied dead. They move and act, but the warmth of life and the suppleness of motion are gone."

However, the Russian is an adept at an altogether different type of order—the order that comes from within—self-discipline. He detests the discipline that comes from without, but glories in the

discipline that comes from within. He will not turn away from the most difficult task, from superhuman toils, from the most prodigious hardships, when he feels for them a prompting from within. He will devote his whole life to a single idea or ideal. He will concentrate all his emotions upon a single object. He will struggle on in the face of the impossible. He is a fanatic. For instance, Russia has produced unqualifiedly the greatest revolutionists of all time. The revolutionists of the past are children compared with them. Again, Western men and women are amazed at the toils and drills some Russian immigrants must have undergone in the acquisition of the language of their adoption, whether it be French, German, or English. Any one familiar with present day American literature will readily name half a dozen Russian immigrants with a mastery of English sometimes surpassing the best native writers. In England, the foremost prose stylist today is a Slav, Joseph Conrad, who first came into contact with the English language at an age when psychologists declare no foreign language can be mastered even for purposes far simpler than art.

The casual observer of the Russian people occasionally goes away with the idea that they are backward, unenlightened, flighty, tinged with mystery and romance. He finds them quickly discouraged, possessing no great power of will, prone to follow every turn of the weather-cock. Excepting their mysticism and romance, this is not the conclusion drawn by skilled observers. Says Professor E. A. Ross in his studies on Russia: "I have met with no competent foreign observer . . . of this people who doubts their gifts of intellect, imagination, and heart."

Again, with almost no exception, all the peoples of Western Europe and America, (since the rise of the State on the debris of the Church) are imbued with a feeling that their country is the best, their particular political system the most exalted manifestation of human ingenuity. The German has learned to shout with all the might of his soul: "Deutschland ueber alles!" The American has learned to proclaim: "America First!" Even the Mexican will tell you with all the seriousness of which only the Mexican is capable that he belongs to a *raza de leones* and a *raza de aguilas* (a race of lions and a race of eagles). The Briton will take you for a fool if you still happen to be among the benighted who have to be told that his is the best possible of all worlds. I recall at this moment a conversation with an unusually cultured English woman who had lived in America close to half a century and had been in

a dozen European countries. After telling of the marvels she had seen in many lands, she concluded: "But there is nothing quite so great and wonderful as the English government." An American lady said to me recently: "If only those poor people over there would learn to live as we Americans do. They never *would* have these dreadful troubles." And yet was she the typical American Mrs. Babbitt, spending her days in cooking and yawning.

The Russian, on the other hand, is always discontented with himself, with his government, with his mental and moral acquirements. He feels himself humble, subdued in the presence of the light and energy of the Teuton and the masterly solidity of the Anglo-Saxon. It is the other man who is always big-hearted and broad-minded. He is never quite so good, he feels, never quite so just as the other man. His broad, angular face is constantly corrugated like a choppy sea with the tragedy of existence. It is rarely that you may see in his eye a twinkle of humor. While Russia possesses a literature ranking among the greatest in the world, she possesses no Cervantes, no Mark Twain. Even the laughter of her greatest humorist, Gogol, is the laughter of a man on his death-bed. It resembles the humor of Heine in the sense that it is intended to hide a tear.

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As said before, the experiences which have nurtured the hidden forces of Russia are different from those that have nurtured them in the West. The nutriment came from two sources: Her great teachers and the land.

The land problem is an old one in Russia. It dates back to the middle of the last century. In 1861 the peasants were emancipated. But the emancipation was a farce. It created a condition as bad as the one it sought to remedy. In some instances worse. In reality it was a sop to the humanitarian demands of the time. Though the economic factor must not be overlooked, either. Feudalism had been disappearing for centuries, beginning with England and moving slowly eastward. When it reached Russia it struck a snag. But enlightened Europe, especially economic Europe, would not endure such a splotch on a greater portion of its area. Hence Feudalism had to go—just as chattel slavery had to go in this country—as a result of a combination of causes.

But the peasant, who makes up almost ninety per cent of the population and who therefore gives the bent to the hidden forces of Russia, found himself terribly disappointed. He found himself

divorced from the land, forced to buy land at four times its market value. He was made to pay a redemption fee cunningly concealed in the purchase price. The whole of that sorry bargain is best appreciated when one thinks of what would have happened to the Negro had he been forced to pay a redemption fee several times the price he fetched in the slave market at the time.

With the dice loaded against the peasant, you would think that the nobleman got away with the cake. Nothing of the sort happened. He found himself as ruined as some of the Southern planters after the Civil War. In some instances worse. For the Russian peasant is not a wage worker by nature. Offer him three times as much for a day's labor off his plot as he could possibly make on it, and you will find him scratching his head, hemming, hawing, and gritting out between his teeth the information that the field must be plowed first. The field! It is his love, his divinity. The Mohammedan dreams of a Heaven where the senses are gratified to the fill. The Russian peasant thinks of it as a place where a man may have all the acres he can plow.

The only way the large landowner could get his fields tilled was to drive all sorts of unheard of bargains with the peasant. For one thing, he would not sell the peasant pasture lands, woodlands, so that he could exchange it for labor. The peasant, feeling overawed in the presence of his erstwhile lord and master, made the wildest promises, relying on his cunning to dodge them. The nobleman made extravagant demands because he knew that the peasant would not fulfill them.

The benefits of half a century from such bickering and horse-trading to the psychic life of the people was far from advantageous. They left a stain upon them which will require years to be effaced.

More, with all his sharp bargains (and occasional petty theft), the peasant rarely succeeded in keeping the wolf away from the door. Hunger always stalked in his midst. In time he also grew shiftless. A generous commission entrusted with the destinies of the peasant, willed that the land be divided equitably among all the peasants; and since the fertility of the soil was different, each peasant received a nadiel or share consisting of scattered strips in scattered fields. The time and energy required to go from field to field discouraged effort. Hyperbolically speaking, the peasant had to spend a day's work in going to and coming from a day's work.

Another point in this problem: From the first allotment in 1861 till the second decade of the twentieth century, Russia's

peasant population doubled. The loaf too scant for one could hardly be expected to do for two. Land taxes kept constantly aeroplaning till they reached at the beginning of the century 280 per cent of the normal rent value. The increase in population in the imperial family made further inroads on the peasant's nadiel: Since every royal member had to receive a parcel of land commensurate with his dignity.

Without text books and economist to explain away his condition, he looked at life as a serious business, made dreadfully serious by those in charge of its arrangement. He knew that there was plenty of land all around him but he could not touch it. He kept asking why, not as a dogmatist or as an idealist, but as a man who is hungry. Every village contained an oral history on how this or that parcel of land had been presented to this or that nobleman as a token of gratitude by His Majesty Somebody or Other—by a Catherine the Great for this or that night of debauch—by Czar So and So for putting down the Polish insurrections, etc.

Anyway, the theory of Mine and Thine thus sprung a leak, as Mark Twain would have put it.

* * *

The other cause is to be found in the teaching Russia imbibed from her masters. Tolstoi, Dostoyewski, Gorki and Chekhov spent a great part of their lives going among the people and, indirectly it is true, imparting their philosophy of life to them. In many instances, as in the case of Tolstoi, the exchange was mutual. For he drew his inspiration from the common people; from their unreasoning faith in life, the deep religious conviction in the ultimate goodness of existence, and the need for a readjustment to make existence more of a success.

These teachers have pointed out to her the pitfalls of Western civilization. She was shown that its glitter was essentially superficial. That it was clean-washed; but hopeless. Its bread was white. But it was adulterated. They pointed out that the primary requisite of growing life was freedom; and that that freedom was denied to the factory enslaved masses of the West. The machine, instead of the much-heralded blessing it was supposed to be, had robbed man of his joy in work, one of the greatest of all emotions—as great as the emotion a man feels for a woman. It was a terrible catastrophe—ultimately leading to a loss of faith in life itself—as great a catastrophe as depriving love of its joys, which must lead to extinction.

She was further shown that Western dilettante intellectualism only bred political cynicism, secret diplomacy, aggression, misery, death. Worse, Western civilization had a tendency to soften the backbone of the masses so that they became too indolent to grab a crowbar and uproot the old and build the new. Its most important function seemed to be to "make citizens" and mar men by teaching them to uphold a vicious arrangement of society which no one would dream of upholding without such "education." Russia's Tolstoï, Dostoyewskis, Bakunins, Kropotkins, Herzens—all her great men—filled the land for half a century with strange notions about social justice, the indispensability of freedom, faith in life, distrust of politicians, and confidence in self. They showed that the efficiency slogans of the West were nothing more than the inventions of figure mongers, leather-tongued lawyers, and dry-hearted quibblers to aid in the aggrandizement of empty-headed money-changers. They showed that the Western panacea, the Three R's, was no insurance against stupidity and incompetence; that Western "higher education" only produced fops, snobs, and pretenders who thought themselves too good to work or think, and who looked down upon the man in the street as on a sort of botchy cosmic experiment in mud and water.

They pointed out that it bred a peculiar mentality extremely dangerous to a growing organism—an excessive veneration for tradition, an exaggerated love for snug comfort, a habit of appraising all things in terms of immediate profit and loss, a religious awe of money and an idolization of possession.

They pointed out that the salvation of the race lay in an altogether different direction—in co-operation, ethical justice, toleration, absolute freedom, internationalism, the elimination of the State as an agent of coercion and violence by free associations based on social need. Armies, navies, and bright breeches were all right for children on off-school days. But grown men should find something better to do.

These are some of the most important forces lying under the surface of Russia. No serious thinker can afford to ignore them.

ETHICS AND THE SPINOZA REVIVAL. ✓

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

CONFUSION reigns in the modern world so far as ethical problems are concerned. "The young", we are told, have repudiated ethical standards and principles, and decline to be bound by "the superstitions" of their parents. Everything is challenged, doubted, put to the test of—no one knows what!

In these circumstances it is perhaps not without significance that an international society should have been founded at The Hague for the distinct purpose of advancing the study and appreciation of Spinoza's teachings. The moving spirits in this society believe that Spinoza has a message for our own day, and that we, as well as the younger generation, might well hark back to him. The society proposes to publish an annual of original studies, as well as series of books to be known as *Bibliotheca Spinozana*. Membership is open to lay students and lovers of philosophy and high, serious thinking.

The foregoing facts suggest a re-examination of Spinoza's essential ideas and views. The task is worthy of scholars and educated men of leisure. The present writer has no intention or ambition to attempt any searching study of Spinoza, but he may venture to offer certain summaries of the ethical discussions of the great philosopher and logician, with some reflections, commentaries and comparisons. May my slight effort stimulate more competent writers to do more adequate and better work in the same fertile field!

To begin with, Spinoza was a philosophical realist who saw "life steadily and whole", in Matthew Arnold's phrase. He appreciated the need of studying human nature in conduct and behavior, and he warned us neither to groan nor to exult over manifestations of human nature, but just simply to try to comprehend

them. Such comprehension, in his judgment, was essential to any real effort at correction of human faults and blunders. No philosopher or ethicist dwelt more on "the guidance of reason", the life of reason, the dictates of reason than did Spinoza, yet the modern intellectualists cannot claim him as their authority or cite him with any effect. He never overestimated the *actual* influence of reason in the governance of the world.

Men, as a rule, says Spinoza, are governed in everything by desire or lust; they are varied—for those are rare who live according to the rules prescribed by reason—and, moreover, they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity; they are ignorant, short-sighted and necessarily liable to emotions; they are drawn in different directions and are often contrary one to the other; they are liable to emotions which far surpass human power or virtue; they are guided by opinion rather than by reason, and even the knowledge by them of good and evil often excites disturbances in the mind and yields to all manner of sin and wickedness. (*Ethics*, part four.)

If, then, men are thus inconstant, weak, the prey of passions and emotions, how can the wise and chastened few cause them to seek to live according to reason?

In answering this question Spinoza repeatedly admonishes us to cultivate patience and charity toward poor, frail, errant humanity. Those, he says, who cavil at men and prefer to reprobate vice instead of inculcating virtue, are a nuisance to themselves and to others, and they do not help solidify the minds of men, but rather to unloosen them. Here is a striking and edifying passage:

"Let satirists laugh to their hearts' content at human affairs; let theologians revile them, and let the melancholy praise as much as they can the rude and barbarous life: let them despise men and admire the brutes; despite all this men will find that they can prepare with mutual aid far more easily what they need, and avoid far more the perils which beset them on all sides by united forces."

It is true, alas, that "he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, or, as Ovid put it "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor (The better I see and approve, the worse I follow)." But to recognize these facts is not to despair of man, not to curse God and die, not to talk idle nonsense with the Bernard Shaws and Anatole Frances about the creation of man having been perpetrated as a sort of grim joke. "It is, says Spinoza, "necessary to know ourselves, to know both the power and want of power of our na-

ture, so that we may determine what reason can do in the moderating of our desires and what it cannot."

This passage should be pondered by the cynics, pessimists and superficial moralists.

What is, or should be, our social ideal, our goal? Spinoza's answer is clear and firm.

He begins by pointing out that, "since reason postulates nothing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should love himself and seek what is useful to him"—that is, what is truly useful to him—and "that each man should endeavor to preserve his being as far as it in him lies, and should desire all that leads him to a greater state of perfection." He then proceeds to argue that "there is nothing more useful to man than man." While envy, jealousy, antipathy, suspicion divide men, the fact remains that they cannot lead solitary lives, cannot dispense with social organization, and cannot renounce fellowship and co-operation without sacrificing much that they value and cherish. It is obvious that man is a social animal, and the question is to what extent his good coincides with the common good. Spinoza says:

"Nothing can be desired by men more excellent for their self-preservation than that all with all should so agree that they compose the minds of all into one mind, and the bodies of all into one body, and all endeavor at the same time as much as possible to preserve their being, and all seek at the same time what is useful to them all as a body. From which it follows that men who are governed by reason—that is, men who under the guidance of reason seek what is useful to them—desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful and honorable."

Here what we call altruism is frankly based on rational egoism. Spinoza insists that no virtue can be conceived as prior to the virtue of preserving oneself, and that the more one endeavors and succeeds in preserving one's own essence—the desire of living well, acting well, being blessed that essence—the more virtue he has. But an enlightened egoism imperceptibly and naturally shades into and assumes the character of altruism. Hatred and malice are *not* conducive to the preservation of one's essence, to the state of contentment and blessedness. Peace, friendship, co-operation *are* conducive to such states, and man's reason has no difficulty in finding out that truth. Hence it is idle to say that men

must continue to fight one another, to commit racial suicide, as it were, or to poison and destroy their better selves, their essence.

If men desire to live in concord and be of help to each other—and if they are reasonable they *must* desire this, for the sake of their individual security and happiness—that they must give up their natural rights, render themselves reciprocally secure, and determine to do nothing that will be injurious to another, continues Spinoza, and thus society, or the state, as an organized entity is brought into existence under a sort of tacit social contract. The individual does not sacrifice himself in becoming a citizen; his reason tells him that, on the contrary, he gains very decided advantages from the status of citizen or member of an organized community. True, he may at times be tempted to injure some one, to commit a wrong, but he must realize in his sober moment that restraint, discipline and prevention of anti-social conduct are legitimate and necessary.

Advocates of non-resistance to evil and aggression will find no support in Spinoza's teaching. And, although from a superficial point of view, such advocates may be said to cherish a deeper faith in human reason and human nature than that exhibited by their opponents, the truth is that the gospel of non-resistance is repugnant to sound psychology or a real understanding of human conduct. Spinoza, assuredly, will not be charged with contempt for reason and intellect. Yet the modern intellectualists may learn from him that undue trust in reason and enlightened self-interest is as unscientific, unphilosophical as it is contrary to the common sense of the average man.

In psychology, indeed, Spinoza was extraordinarily "modern." He did not share the error that so many of our half-baked reformers fall into when they assert or imply that evil and injustice can be eradicated by one-sided education, by logical demonstrations. Again and again he argues that *an emotion cannot be checked by a mere idea, an argument, a demonstration addressed to the intellect.* Here are far-reaching and pregnant propositions:

"An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion."

"An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present."

"The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it."

"A true knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emo-

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in gain a quicker, surer, and closer contact with God secured through any priesthood—and all honor to every ster. We shall come to realize that Heaven is not a condition, that true religion is a matter of inner of outer conformity to some statement of belief. We know and to acknowledge that each person's religious deals are conditioned by individual experience and cannot, instead of a dozen organized religions in the world, there have always been and there always will be as many religious beliefs as there are human beings able to think. When we have reached this stage the need for religious organization we know it, will have passed and in its stead there will be a larger form of organization whose aim is to secure for each individual ever greater religious liberty. The method of this organization will be informal discussion rather than formal instruction, yet this discussion will be far more instructive than all sermonizing in the world. Perhaps we may call this experimental religion, for in its practice each individual will make his own observations and draw his own conclusions, instead of blindly accepting the statements of others on important religious matters.

Finally, the future religion will disclose to us what none of the past and none of the present organized religions has brought forth, the essential divinity of human life. We shall learn that we come from God, that we are bound toward God, and that this is true, not of some one favored sect, creed, or religion, but of all people. We shall learn these things by closer study of the life and teachings of one who was human as we are human and who was divine as we are divine, one whose perfection we can therefore hope eventually to attain. In the light of this knowledge we shall realize that we cannot serve God by trying to force our neighbor to our religious belief. We shall know that the spark of divinity in each human being is that individual's license to seek and to find God in his or her own way. And when we are able to recognize the divine element in human life, we shall have learned the final and complete reason for permanent religious unity.

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question is a difficult one, but it must be faced and answered. The intellectualists have shirked this task, and are still shirking it. The conventional and superficial moralists have much to say about the duty of the schools, churches, the press, the theater and other great institutions to inculcate mercy, simplicity, love and other virtues, but it is well known that they have not found the means of successfully doing so. Sermons and didacting lessons leave most of us cold. Children are repelled rather than attracted by the type and sort of text-books or addresses on civics and morals which are inflicted upon them in the schools by dull boards and routine-ridden superintendents and principals.

Precept needs the re-enforcement of example, of conduct seen, read of, admired day by day. Parents, neighbors, teachers, social leaders must practice the virtues they would inculcate. The whole social atmosphere must reflect and illustrate the doctrine professed in books and in sermons. "Lives" of noble men and women, of heroes and martyrs, of single-minded reformers, must be placed in the hands of the young at a most impressionable age, and the "lives" should be written by literary artists, not by hacks. Books when produce deep, lasting impressions on young people and shape the color their lives to the very end. But this happens only when books delight, thrill and fascinate, and when they are given or read by persons who know how to inspire affection and admiration. There is one apt illustration of the point in question. The writer has just heard the following story: A man prominent in political and public life, a "progressive" and independent of courage and insight, was asked by a friend how he came to identify himself with popular causes, with radical legislation, with policies feared and condemned by most of his fellow-partisans and professional associates. He answered the inquiry by saying that while his parents and their neighbors had been conservative and "respectable", he had been fortunate, as a boy, to make the acquaintance of an "infidel shoemaker", an old man of mild manners and pleasing appearance. The shoemaker was a philosopher and a scholar. He gave his young friends books that were not known in orthodox circles—Buckle, Spencer, Owen, Godwin, Haeckel, Thoreau, Emerson. The books were devoured and secretly worshipped. The effect they had was never effaced. Their influence made for tolerance, liberalism, sympathy with suffering, a longing for a better, freer and pleasanter world. But the same books from another source might have totally failed to stir and charm the boy. The old "infidel shoemaker", the

modest philosopher, by the magic of personality, translated ideas into warm sentiments and emotions.

It is unfortunate that Spinoza, whose intellect was so powerful, failed to pursue the inquiry into the sound and effective method of re-enforcing mere ideas and opinions with appropriate emotions sufficiently strong to check and counteract the anti-social passions and emotions of man. But all that he has said on the subject is, to repeat, extraordinarily modern, consonant with the "new psychology", the "new education" and the new sociology. We are told by the most philosophical educators that the main task of the schools, colleges and universities is "to socialize the individual", to adapt him more and more to the true, co-operative, harmonious commonwealth. But how do those institutions socialize their charges? Alas, they graduate many snobs, egotists, cynics, pessimists and brutes. The effect avowedly sought is seldom obtained. Education will have to be reformed and reorganized. The home—once a civilizing and socializing influence—must also be reclaimed and adapted to new conditions. Personality, example, leadership, inspiration, emulation are severally factors in character-building which the modern world, thanks to the intellectualists, the economic materialists, the champions of mere "strength" and the other obscurantists, has almost neglected and despised. The Spinoza revival should help to recall us to essential truths of ethics and social psychology.

A CHURCHMAN'S RETROSPECT.

BY WALTER B. LYDENBERG.

OF few men is as little known or has as much been written. To learn of him first-hand, as of any man passed away, we must go back to what was said of him by his contemporaries or near-contemporaries. The contemporaries of Jesus who have left us written words concerning him are Matthew and John (two of his associates) and Paul, Mark, and Luke (associates of many who knew him personally during his life). Near-contemporaries who have left us written words concerning Jesus are the historians of the succeeding generation Josephus and Tacitus; their mention of him is, however, very brief and adds nothing to our knowledge of him, serving merely to establish the existence of followers of Jesus.

The written words of his contemporaries reach us as the New Testament. Modern versions of the New Testament are based on Greek manuscripts, the oldest of which appeared about the close of the fourth century. Evidence of the existence of earlier similar manuscripts is, however, contained in versions of it in other languages, now extant, chiefly in the Syriac, Latin, and Coptic, dating as early as the second century; also in quotations from it by Origen and Cyprian in the second century and by Aphrahat in the fourth century. None of the New Testament writers were historians; Paul was a preacher, the others probably what might now be styled historical novelists.

The first of these writings to appear may have been Paul's letters to the churches or Matthew's gospel in the Aramaic language. That the first of Paul's letters appeared about 20 years after the death of Jesus is generally accepted. The case with Matthew's gospel in the Aramaic is, however, uncertain. What we have of Matthew's gospel is a composition in Greek of the gospel according to Matthew. Papias and Irenaeus, writing in the second century,

state that Matthew wrote in Hebrew. If by this is meant that Matthew wrote in Aramaic what we now have as his gospel, this writing may have appeared as early as 15 years after the death of Jesus. The Greek gospel according to Matthew it is not thought could have appeared earlier than about 30 years after the death of Jesus, at least 10 years after the first appearance of letters from Paul.

With regard to Paul's letters to the churches, they are essentially moral exhortations. They tell their readers practically nothing of the life of Jesus, but of the significance of that life they state that Jesus is their lord and the Christ; that he was crucified and buried and returned to life and appeared to many (including Paul) after his resurrection; and that he will come again to resume his leadership on earth. To the Greeks to whom Paul's first letters were addressed the word lord must have meant sovereign, commander, ruler, or governor. The word Christ must have meant one especially anointed to perform priestly duties. This is the human Jesus of Paul's. From the absence from Paul's writings of actual incidents in the life of Jesus, we infer that Paul did not know Jesus intimately. We first meet Paul as a persecutor of the followers of the crucified Jesus. Soon he joins these followers and his life ever afterwards is devoted to the preaching of the leadership of Jesus. His message is a stressing of the divinity of Jesus, and he makes no attempt to dwell on the humanity of Jesus. The opinion is expressed by some authorities that in order to make amends for this deficiency of Paul's did the other New Testament writings appear, and that thus their purpose may be understood as to support the teachings of Paul's. Be this as it may, it is difficult to conceive how the four writers of the gospels could have agreed so closely in their narratives of the life of Jesus unless the events described were essentially historically sound.

About 10 years after the appearance of the first of Paul's letters to the churches, as is generally believed, the first of the Greek gospels appeared. This was Mark's, probably written at Rome approximately 30 years after the death of Jesus. The last of the four gospels to be written was probably John's, believed to have been written at Ephesus possibly as late as 60 years after the death of Jesus. Two views prevail with regard to the dates at which the Greek Matthew's gospel and Luke's gospel were written. Some authorities believe that both of these gospels appeared in close contemporaneity with Mark's, others that they appeared as late as pos-

sibly 50 to 55 years after the death of Jesus, Luke's first, then Matthew's. Many of those who hold to the latter view are of the opinion that Luke and the Greek writer of Matthew's gospel used as guides in their composition the gospel according to Mark and also a writing now lost and which was not available to Mark, since both Matthew and Luke contain in common much material not appearing in Mark and also adhere rather closely to the Marcian narrative. That many others had written "narratives" on the same subject is indeed stated by Luke in the opening paragraph of his gospel. It is easy to imagine that the sayings of Jesus were put in writing if not during his lifetime yet shortly after his death and were handed down to those who later composed the "gospels" which have come down to us.

In this connection it may be well for us to consider the meaning of the word "gospel." In the opening sentence of Mark's work he states he is going to write the "gospel" of the Lord Jesus Christ. In beginning his work, Luke states that he is going to narrate things as they happened. Matthew and John launch into their narrative without indicating its purpose. "Gospel" is an Anglo-Saxon word which might probably be rendered into present-day English in the term "good news." A present-day literal translation of the Greek word used by Mark would probably be "good message," and liberally translated might be taken to mean something such as "gracious news" or "gracious message" or "happy thoughts." The imagination must of course be exercised to gain a conception of Mark's meaning in thus describing the book he was about to write. In any event, he started in to write Jesus' "gospel."

The disinclination to attribute historical accuracy to the gospels is based on contents which, written at this time, would be considered fictitious. By this, however, it can not be understood that the gospels are without historical value. The fact that of the numerous contemporaneous writings of the period none dispute the historical accuracy of the gospels, means, if nothing more, that it is not permissible for us, at this late date, to dispute their historical value. There is no recourse but to accept their statements. Even if the view is taken that the gospels are narratives of events in the life of Jesus shaded to substantiate the teachings of Paul's, the events are narrated there for us, and we must accept them if we would learn of Jesus. They are not disputed. They are cast in the Jewish and Greek religious phraseology of the times. Though we many find in them few contradictions and many accounts of

miracles, we can still read between the lines the faint traces of a simple, natural, and powerful life—a life that certainly could be lived today by one possessed of like courage. Surely it is not denied to us to disregard what we find it difficult to accept in the gospels if we would get back to what Jesus was and what he can still be for us. It cannot be denied to us to seek to lift him out of the maze of the supernatural into which the writers of the first century probably cast him, if we would bring him now to our side and place him now in our midst. It can not be denied to us to seek to recast the gospels in phraseology that may make an intelligible narrative for today; and this is something that it is certainly possible for any one to do by a careful, intelligent, liberal, and open-minded reading of the English version now extant. The historical facts may be picked out by any liberal-minded reader. The outstanding fact, and one which can not be disregarded, is that the events in the life of Jesus had a profound, irresistible, conquering religious meaning with his contemporaries. That they interpreted his life, then, in the religious views of the day, is entirely natural, and that they should write of his life in religious terminology was unavoidable with those upon whom he made the most profound impressions. Accordingly it is not denied to us to learn of the life of Jesus and interpret it in the religious views which we ourselves may possess; for he was confessedly a religious teacher. We long to get back to Jesus. Without a mouthpiece of God's we are lost and it is impossible to live. He who could enfold the lives of his fellows, and through them the lives of millions for centuries that have elapsed—has he not a message still for us?

He is one of a trinity worshipped in a religion that embraces one-third of the inhabitants of the earth; and, strange to say, many who have studied the record of his life carefully, adhere to the belief that he never purposed to found a new religion. Significant in this respect is his own statement that he did not come to set aside the religious tenets of his race but that he came to prove their validity. It is hardly possible that this statement could have been invented by the writers of the gospels, so staunch as they were in their devotion to the new religion that sprang up after his death. All his life he was a devout Hebrew. Yet it is admitted that he has exerted an influence upon the human race such as no other man has exerted. Is it not wonderful that his brief three years of activity—and an activity characterized by an astonishingly small degree of self-assertion—should have accomplished such results?

And this can only mean that he fills a need in the hearts of men that none other has so well filled. What is this need? It is the religious craving.

In this capacity he brings a message to every heart. There is not a mind, and never has been a mind, that has not its religious yearning, from the savage engrossed in his war-dance to the scientist in his laboratory. Religion is the contemplation of the supernatural in its relation to one's moral obligations. Where there is a natural there is a supernatural; where there is ambition there is a moral obligation. However one may scoff at his fellows for their faith in religious beliefs, he himself has his own peculiar beliefs on the same problems, be they no more than a surrender to a future without hope. The eternal question ever remains unanswered. The future can not be thrust behind us. There is a seen and an unseen; a heard and an unheard; a felt and an unfelt; a touched and an untouched; a known and an unknown; a natural and a supernatural; a now and a hereafter. It is the seen that we can shun, the unseen that we fear; it is the known that we can accept, the unknown that we believe; it is the now that is, the hereafter that is to be. The stone in my hand is as great a mystery as is my soul. I can not exist without either. In the stone I see perhaps molecules; in the molecules, atoms; in the atoms, nuclei; in the nuclei, what? Thus we see that the natural itself is inevitably wrapped up in the supernatural and can not be known except in terms of the unknown—in pictured superstitions. To deny the existence of this soul is but the soul seeking to deceive itself: but it can not be done. And thus it is that the unanswerable question arises to torment us until we silence it with a belief. It is these beliefs that are religion, and hedged in as they are with doubts, it is to our fellows that we turn for assurance. This is the rôle which Jesus assumed,—the bearer of the light. He spoke; we listened. Others before him had spoken: they had spoken of God, Jehovah, the Lord, the Creator; he spoke of the Father. They spoke of vengeance; he spoke of love. They spoke of punishment; he spoke of forgiveness. They spoke of retribution; he spoke of salvation. It was a new message. It was indeed a "gospel" that he brought, and a gospel which possessed the singular merit of surviving his few years and perpetuating itself in a church and a religion that is the greatest blessing with which man has endowed himself.

The first preacher of the new religion was Peter. The first one to establish it through tangible formalities was Peter. It is

Peter's conception of the words of Jesus which has been accepted by these millions of men and women who through the centuries have called themselves Christians. It is Peter who has resurrected Jesus from the dead and handed him over to us, a blessing. But with it all, it is Peter's Jesus that we have. The religion of Peter's served a purpose and served it well, as history shows, and it still has its purpose to serve. Do we not owe to it the perpetuation of the teachings of Jesus? Is it not the song that fell from our mother's lips as she sought to hold up before us a savior? Are there more fitting words in which she could have sung? But when the light has dawned, we long to get back to Jesus; we long to know him better, more truly, more simply, more implicitly.

Peter's first sermon, according to Luke, was preached shortly after the death of Jesus. It is true that the words of this sermon were put into Peter's mouth by Luke, the companion of Paul, and that they may thus in large measure be Luke's words instead of Peter's. That this is so, however, we are in no position to state positively. The probabilities are that the occasion narrated by Luke was historic and that the theme of the sermon was Peter's and the words Luke's. This much is quite certain,—that Luke received his religion from Paul and that Paul received his from the followers of the crucified Jesus, the leader of whom was Peter. The occasion of this first sermon of Peter's was the gatherings of people on the day of Pentecost. The followers of the crucified Jesus had met together, as indeed must probably have been their daily custom, bound to one another as they were by the ties of a common discipleship and the memories of one who had led them in a life of loving self-sacrifice for a period of probably three years. The cruel death to which their master had been subjected lingered as a burden in their mind. May it not have given rise to a feeling of vindictiveness within their hearts? Yet with it all we find them arriving at the conclusion that his death was a victory, not a defeat. Surely the spirit of their master did not forsake them, and instead of vengeance their lips breathed love. They took up the word that Jesus had dropped from the cross. It fired their souls. They could not keep silent. And in their enthusiasm, a crowd gathered. Here was the occasion for Peter. He would tell them what it all meant. The servant of God David, he declared, died and was buried: the servant of God Jesus, who, as you yourselves have seen, did mighty works in your midst, and whom you crucified, arose from the grave

and appeared to us after his death.* Their conscience pricked, the multitude cried, "What shall we do?" "Repent of your sins", he answered, "and be baptized in the name of Jesus the Christ." And Luke says that three thousand persons accepted the teachings of Peter.

Peter's answer to the question was the answer of the church that he on the occasion established. The same question had been put to Jesus, "What shall I do to be saved?" He answered, "Keep the law, divert your riches to the welfare of the poor, and go to the sick in heart and sick in body and help them, as I do." The answer of the church was to believe and submit to a formality; the answer of Jesus was to love. The one answer involves a belief in predetermined dogmas; the other involves action. The one answer is hedged in with doubts; the other is as simple as life itself. Clearly it is permissible for us who are in the church and have been so blessed by it, to dig beneath the dogmas, beautiful as they are, and without defacing them, and kneel with Jesus beside the sick and the criminal, and through him and him alone make contact with our God.

A manifest inclination to dig beneath the dogmas of the church and get back nearer to Jesus did not evince itself until the later years of the church's history. Not until the sixteenth century, under the leadership of Luther and Zwingli, followed by Calvin and Knox, was any appreciable reformation accomplished. For fifteen hundred years the church had enjoyed a steady and thrifty growth. This was a period of accretion, under which its influence extended until at one time it controlled the temporal power of the civilized world. There is perhaps no phenomenon in the history of civilization more striking than the progress of the Christian religion. Launched by Peter and John shortly after the death of Jesus, we see it spread through Palestine and thence into Syria, where at Antioch we find a community to which the name "Christians" was first applied. This was about thirty years after the death of Jesus. About the same time the first of the "gospels" was written. In the meantime Paul, a Roman citizen, first a persecutor of the followers of Jesus, had become converted to the new religion and had taken up the mes-

*It is possible here to make two deductions with reasonable certainty. First, at the time of this Pentecost the death of Jesus was of too recent a date to permit Peter's statements on the occasion to pass undisputed in the event that they were not the truth; second, that the religion launched by Peter on the occasion was the theme that permeated the "gospels" written 20 years or more thereafter.

sage of Peter and John and started with it beyond the seas, and had set up Christian churches in Greece. Under his marvelous leadership and a life of self-sacrifice not excelled by the disciples themselves, the seat of authority began to shift from Jerusalem to Rome. The community of interests could not remain unorganized, and the offices of elders, deacons, and bishops were established. At the end of the third century almost half of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, and several neighboring countries, professed the religion. In the fourth century it was adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire, its one-time persecutor. Soon we see it take up the reins of temporal government that had fallen with the death of the Empire. We see it conserve within its hands the remnants of a civilization about the overrun with barbarianism. We see it gather into its folds these barbarians that would plunder it—not gathering them in by force, but by moral suasion. To accomplish this end it was entirely natural that it should cater to the barbarian instincts and woo them with mysteries and magic. It is quite natural that it should seek to hold within its sway these children of the human race through a mystified priesthood and a mystified Christ. And that it accomplished its ends can only mean that the gospel given to man by the crucified Christ, and which it preached though perhaps not in the words of Jesus but in the words of its hearers, is able to still the troubled heart, quench the murderous lust, and answer the doubt.

In the fifteenth century, however, signs of unrest began to appear. The gospel of Jesus which Peter, John, Paul, and the Evangelists preached had been monopolized by a church. In the hands of this church the gospel had become the predominant power in the world. Access to the gospel could be had only through the church. As long as the church exercised intellectual supremacy the words of Jesus could be framed so as to support the church's interests. It is significant that the Reformation followed closely the Italian Renaissance. Though abuses of the church, like the sale of indulgences, were the pretext of the Reformation, its underlying cause was the failure of the church to provide the moral food which would satisfy the yearnings of an intellect of rapidly widening horizon. It is but natural that the words of Jesus, which could give birth to such a church, should hold together its dissatisfied elements in its days of reformation. The reforming step was therefore no more than a step back to Jesus. All that was needed was that the reformers should discard the artificial authority,

dogma, and ceremony, and stand closer to the light that had first pierced the shadows of the spiritual eye. The process was a slow and a gradual one. Reformation followed reformation, quietly seizing hold on the Church of Rome itself. And the process is still going on. Still the church, whatever its form, does not answer the direst need of the human soul except the church casts aside for a moment its outward manifestation and opens to the struggling conscience the words of the one who gave it birth. It is the words of Jesus that can save, not the sanctuary. Perhaps it was not to be until the eighteenth century had come that, under the radical reforms of the Wesleys, it was possible for the church temerously to sanction a thing so bold as the unbearing in the streets of the words of their master. This, we see, was the accomplishment of Whitefield. The huge task was completed; the rock was shattered; the cloud was rolled away; the thunder ceased. And from the storm that had been smouldering for three long centuries was heard the still, low voice "Come to Jesus." "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and you shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden light."

But still the church did not satisfy that craving or nourish that hope which burn in the heart of even the most forsaken of mankind. William Booth came, and saw sin and suffering on one hand and a church on the other, and an impassable gulf between the two. Who was to speak to these hungry souls? Jesus? How could he speak to them?—through the church? Booth tried it; but the church revolted and cast Booth out. That the Methodist Church, which had been so bolstered up by the preaching of Whitefield should, a century afterwards, have rebuked the Whitfieldian tactics of Booth, is hardly to be wondered at when it is recalled that Calvin, Knox, and Luther themselves could not brook reformation of the churches which they had established out of a reformed Church of Rome. Perhaps the fault is inevitable in any institution founded by man. Perhaps it is a fault which the church can not escape if it would retain its organization. And not until some brave soul comes with courage enough to break away from the organization so as to follow simply Jesus is the light brought by this Nazarene uncovered to the world. This step of Booth's, then, was but another return to Jesus. It is interesting to consider what amount of dogma and ceremony has been cast aside from the

days of the height of the Roman church to the days when William Booth, four centuries later, cast off the cloak of Methodistic forms and, penniless and without second other than his frail wife already burdened with the cares of motherhood, lifted his voice, in the face of buffets and ridicule, in the slums of London. It is easy to imagine that Booth's tactics were probably the tactics of Peter when, on the day of Pentecost, a crowd of the curious drew together at the clamor of the disciple's vociferously expressed loyalty to his dead master, and Peter addressed them. Now enter the drum and the tambourine into the Christian liturgy; but still is it not the same tactics as we may imagine Peter's was? There is a difference to be noted, however, in the messages the two bore. Peter's message was the divinity of Jesus, and it carried with it the threat that if this was not acknowledged destruction would follow. Booth's message was the ability of Jesus to rescue from destruction: Jesus can save, he can save, he can save; if he can save, that is all that is necessary; any question of divinity may be discussed later, if desired. Who was Jesus? Nobody knew, except that he could save. How do you know he can save? Come and see. Easy enough. A trial costs nothing. The step is a simple one. Follow me, and see if he can not save. We can almost throw ourselves back into that day when, on the last trip of Jesus to Jerusalem, somewhere on the road between Capernaum and Jericho, there elbowed his way through the throng that surrounded the teacher, a rich young man. Booth was there also. We can imagine him perhaps as close up to the teacher as he could possibly get, much closer perhaps than dogmatic Peter. He stoops over to catch each word that falls from the teacher's lips. "What shall I do to be saved?" cries this rich young man. Ah, that is the question which torments the soul of the rich and the poor, the mighty and the lowly, the pure and the corrupt; it is the first question to confront the stumbling youth, the last to haunt the drifting senses when the pulse of life is slowly ebbing away. O, what will the answer be? Follow me. Like a jewel fallen from heaven it is snatched up by Booth and trumpeted back to the gathered hosts. He catches up the step himself, casting aside all hope of riches that might embarrass him and receiving without resentment the jibes and jeers and buffets which he encounters, and follows this teacher. Slowly the throng gathers about Booth. The procession moves. It is true it may not proceed with mathematical precision, but the line of march is diligently adhered to whithersoever it may lead. Though none may equal nor all ap-

proximate the grace of the leader, yet his command is accepted and cherished.

The success of this reversion of Booth's is attested by its results. The success was immediate and it is enduring. Like the revolting touching by Jesus of the lepers in Palestine, it came into contact with the practical in the establishment of rescue missions and a cost-service eating-house. The steps taken by both were innovations, nor was either an easy step to take except under the inspiration of the love that it was the confessed mission of Jesus to establish upon earth. The step was a bold one. Is it not the implicit adoption of the instructions of Jesus, "Follow me?" Are we thus not led closer to the Nazarene?

In a brief review of the story of Christianity one of the features brought out in perhaps unwelcome prominence is the biting and snarling that has gone on among its devotees themselves. Beneath this blot, however, there lies an ocean of benediction the depth of which it is hard for the world to comprehend. Conflicting interests are bound to arise. Settlement of the conflicts lies only in a return to the side of the leader. One lesson we must learn: that Jesus is the one who has brought us nearest to God; that to follow him there must be an organization; that whatever form this organization may assume, be it that perpetuated from the church at Rome established centuries ago, or that established by Luther or Knox or Calvin or Wesley or Booth or any other soldier of the cross, it is but a necessary though fallible means of getting nearer to God through Jesus; but that until we close our eyes to the faults of the churches and ourselves get back to Jesus, we are far adrift.

Like driftwood on the sea, from the unknown I come, by fate am tossed about, and into the midnight vanish. Lost? Drifting aimlessly? Food to the elements? And is this superb sight with which I am endowed in the end to be swallowed up in darkness? The visions I paint, are they to be but ruthlessly blotted out? With all my toil, shall I not conquer? Is there no victory? Is death defeat? My epitaph, "Forgotten"? Amidst the shadows of hopelessness I raise my head and through the mists dimly see the outlines of an outstretched hand; hear a voice, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life."

There are some things in the Gospel narratives of the life of Jesus so individualistic that they stamp upon the story there narrated the mark of indisputable genuineness. One of these is

this sentence just quoted. Though I can imagine Jesus saying these words, I can not imagine the evangelist John fictitiously putting them into his mouth. The idea they contain is unique in all history. I can imagine Moses giving the law, and Mohammed the sword, and Solomon and Confucius their maxims, but Jesus alone can I imagine who would dare to make the assertion we have quoted,—not Moses, nor Elijah, not Solomon, nor David, nor Confucius, nor Buddha, nor Mohammed, nor Plato, nor Socrates, nor Paul, nor John; nor can I imagine the last named, who quotes Jesus thus, nor any other man but Jesus himself, to have conceived even the thought conveyed by these words so individualistic, so all-embracing, so revolutionary, so daring, so strange, so simple, so beautiful. They without hesitation lift the clouds of doubt and misgiving, and of death itself. They pierce the heart to its core and thrill the hopes with a joy that no other words that can be compounded can convey. They lift the struggling soul and lay it in the very bosom of its God. And this is what Jesus says he is to me.

Can he be all this? To answer this we must indeed get back to him—get back to him through the maze of possible superstition with which the Gospelists and Paul in their enthusiasm and enthralldom hedge him in.

In this brief sentence of Jesus' all queries end. It is the conclusion of the whole matter. It embraces all theology, and indeed all philosophy. It prescribes religion. It came near the end of his career, and at the mental crisis of his life. It is the final outburst of his soul in his contact with his disciples. It is his final gift. It is his all.

The feast of the passover was at hand; but on the heart of Jesus lay the burden of humanity. He had preached his word, but on one hand he had been answered with hatred. Undaunted he had rebuked the very seat of authority among his people. Guiltless, they condemned him to death. He and his disciples were celebrating this feast of the passover. He must, however, soon leave them. He alone knew this. "I shall be with you only a little while longer", he breaks the word to them. Peter asks him where he is going. Peter would know in due course of time; indeed, he would follow him to the same place. He was going home. "There are many abodes in my father's house; and I am going first in order to prepare the way for you. You, however, already know the way home."

But Thomas was unconvinced. The veil of doubt still hung

before his eyes. "But we do not know this", he countered. "All is darkness. We can not see this home that you say you are going to. We are here today, but tomorrow are like the chaff and are lost in the wind. We know nothing real about this heavenly home. How then can we be expected to know of and to follow any way that will lead to such a place. All is darkness, all is hatred, all is death. No, we do not know the way."

And had Jesus suffered with and taught them these many years, and now, in almost his last moments, were the tangled meshes of infidelity still to be untied? He could make but one more effort. The secret in all its boldness must be declared. The way to salvation must be made plain. "I am the way; there is no fiction, for I am the truth; there is no death, for I am the life. There is no way to salvation except by following me. You may philosophize as you will, but in me and in me alone is truth. And unless you believe what I say you are doomed to death. No one cometh unto the Father, but by me."

The challenge is indeed a bold one. We must either accept it or reject it. Jesus was either a charlatan or what he said he was (twenty centuries have not proved that he was a charlatan). But we can accept or reject his challenge only when we familiarize ourselves with the subject of the sentence he uttered, namely the "I." The truth of his words hinges on the "I." Who was Jesus? His disciples certainly knew him well. They accepted his divinity. Indeed, in these words Jesus declares himself to be all that divinity can be in a human being. We must bear in mind that he was human, that he was a historical personage; at least it is from such angle that we are considering him here; it is of Jesus the man that we speak. Yet we find him declaring himself to be divine (as divine, mark you, as a human can be). Our acceptance of him as this human divine depends, as we have said, on what he was. "*I* am the way." "There is no other way but *me*." "*I* am the truth." "*I* am the life." "There is no truth except what *I* give you." "There is no life except as you receive it from *me*." Who is this "*I*"? That he was a historical personage may be debated, but to deny his historicity seems in the end to be but a subterfuge,—but a weak prevarication. His historical character is preserved only in the four Gospels and in the testimony in Paul's letters to churches. To these we must turn if we would know this "*I*." Other recourse have we none. No sweeter story is handed down by history than the life of Jesus. He shines like a new star suddenly cast upon

the canopy of night. It is not strange, then, that this embodiment of love and of all that is good and wise should be transfigured to conform to the religious tenets of his disciples. Yet he is not alone their Jesus. He is not alone the property of the Christian church: that church was founded after his death. He is not alone the property of the Roman church, nor of the Protestant church, nor of any of the other many manifestations of Christianity. He is the property of all who will learn of him and follow him, whether in secret or in public. He is the property of the sinner, the blasphemer, the wreck, of the churchgoer and of the non-churchgoer. He is the property of humanity. Nor is it strange that even with us it should all taste of the supernatural. It is not strange that we can behold this living reality only as a mystery. The real mystery, however, is that the way is so mysteriously simple and the truth so mysteriously plain. In the words of his judges, "No man has ever spoken as he speaks." And the same is true today.

"Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."

"Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in; naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee hungry, and fed thee? or athirst, and gave the drink? And when saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee? And when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily, I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethern, even these least, you did it unto me."

BERTHOLLET AND PASTEUR. ✓

Notes on Two Famous French Scientists for Whom 1922 Marks
a Centenary.

BY MAYNARD SHIPLEY.

FROM December 9th, 1748, when Claude Louis, Comte de Berthollet, was born at Talloire, Savoy, France, to September 28th, 1895, when Louis Pasteur died at Villeneuve l'Etang, Seine-et-Oise, is more than a century and a half. That century and a half comprise a period more fruitful for the science of France and of the world than any other, perhaps, in the history of this earth.

On November 7th, 1822, Berthollet died at Paris; and less than three weeks later, on December 27th, Pasteur was born at Dôle, Jura. The life-work of these two men, who missed contemporaneity by but a few days, marked the difference between two epochs of science. Both turned from the commercial and practical aspects of chemistry to profounder and more far-reaching researches and discoveries; but Berthollet was a pioneer of the static eighteenth century, Pasteur of the dynamic nineteenth.

At one time a trusted envoy of Napoleon, for whose dethronement he afterwards voted, Berthollet's life was nevertheless almost as entirely devoted to scientific study and achievement as was that of the untitled and obscurely born Pasteur. Think what it must have meant to a young and aspiring chemist, fresh from his studies in Turin, to become associated in Paris with the great Lavoisier! No wonder Berthollet so applied himself, under this inspiration, that by the age of thirty-two he was a member of the Academy of Sciences. Meanwhile he was discovering processes which were to establish industries:—the charring of vessels to preserve water on shipboard; the stiffening and glazing of linen, parent of the modern collar and the happily extinct hard-boiled shirt; the artificial production of nitre; most important of all, bleaching by

means of chlorine. He was the first to analyze ammonia; he was the discoverer of potassium chloride and of fulminating silver. But his chief contribution to chemistry did not come until 1803, when he published his *Essai de Statique Chimique*, which definitely treated chemical phenomena as operating under mechanical laws, and introduced the principle of chemical equilibrium, without which modern chemistry in all its branches would be impossible. Very largely his work, also, is the modern system of chemical nomenclature.

Berthollet served as professor in the Normal School at Paris, where later Pasteur was to complete the education begun at the Royal College of Besançon. But a glance at the academic positions held by the later scientist makes one wonder when and how he found time for original work. Professor of the Lyçee at Dijon; professor of chemistry at the University of Strassburg; dean of the science faculty, which he organized, at the University of Lille; director of scientific studies at the Paris Normal School; director of the chemico-physical laboratory of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris; permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences:—small marvel that in 1889, when presumably he was financially able to do so, he resigned all of these duties and honors which still clung to him, to give his undivided attention to the child of his old age, the Pasteur Institute.

And there he who had been at first practically a physicist, had actually founded the science of stereo-chemistry, which, treating as it does of the relation of the atoms in molecules, borders so closely on physics, brought to its fruition his great work in bacteriology. Accounting for fermentation by the presence of a micro-organism in the fermenting body, Pasteur's researches were of the greatest value to the brewers and wine-makers of France; and then gained national fame for him as they explained and cured the silkworm disease which was threatening one of the country's most important industries. But he could not stop here; Jenner's earlier discovery that each kind of fermentation was due to a specific ferment, and each disease (apparently) to a specific microbe, led Pasteur to further and further applications of the theory, based also on the researches of Robert Koch.

Fowl cholera; anthrax in sheep and cattle; and then at last, ten years before his death, the specific microbe a culture of which would act as an anti-toxin for rabies in the lower animals and man. When the layman speaks of the "Pasteur cure" it is this treatment

for rabies that he means; but of how much greater significance to the scientific world was the principle on which this particular cure was founded! Sir William Osler, in "The Evolution of Modern Medicine", says of Pasteur: "At the middle of the last century we did not know much more of the actual causes of the great scourges of the race, the plagues, than did the Greeks. Here comes Pasteur's great work. Before him Egyptian darkness; with his advent a light that brightens more and more, as the years give us ever fuller knowledge." From the work of Pasteur, and secondarily of Jenner before him, has grown the whole of serumtherapy, one of the very greatest of all medical accomplishments.

A curious coincidence may be noted here; Edward Jenner, too, died in 1822, the year Pasteur was born.

It is in science and in art that a nation's truest glory lies; let France forget the days and attitude of Napoleon, and turn her eyes back instead to a century ago, when the very year that lost her one great scientist brought her an even greater to spread her fame with his throughout the globe.

WHY TOLERANCE?

BY HAROLD BERMAN.

A CAMPAIGN has been recently launched by a few clergymen and laymen against Catholicism in America. With rare courage and fanatical zeal, if not much wisdom, they are calling their people to arms against the Catholic heresy—as they term it.

The average reader of this extraordinary call will see in it, and with apparent justice, a renewal of the Mediaeval intolerance, a recrudescence of the bigotry and fanaticism that has raged for centuries over Europe and brought endless misery to the human race, and will feel inexpressibly shocked as well as outraged by such a fool-hardy act. The French Revolution together with the Eighteenth Century Rationalism have established for us—and made it axiomatic—the principle that religious opinions are to be henceforth considered as a strictly private matter, not to be meddled with, to be neither penalized nor rewarded in the present life. This was made necessary by the rueful contemplation of the havoc wrought, for centuries on end, by man's intolerance of his fellow-man's creed and his desire to have him see the light by applying physical force to bring it about if necessary.

This, man did not consider as in any way unjust or even unreasonable. He was applying force to the material sinner—the pick-pocket, the forger, the tax evader—who have misappropriated things that are of temporary worth only, whose crimes are writ against the laws of property and none other, and could he do less when a transgression against Truth and Salvation itself—and *there can be but one truth in this life!*—has been committed?

Tolerance of error is really child of doubt, begotten by sophistication out of the general undermining of absolute, unshaken faith in the system of dogmas handed down to you by a long chain of ancestors who received it directly from man-revealed

Deity itself in the dim past. Said Bishop Parker ("In Ecclesiastical Polity" "Princes may with less danger give liberty to men's vices and debaucheries than to their conscience," and Mirabeau said "* * * the existence of the authority that is empowered to tolerate injures freedom in that it tolerates—because it could also do the reverse," and perhaps ought to do a reverse.

When Lessing wishes to plead the cause of tolerance on behalf of the persecuted and despised Jews of his day, he could devise no more effective home-hitting argument than is contained in the story of the Three Rings, only one of which was made of pure gold, but unknown to all people excepting the Goldsmith, who unfortunately was not about so he could be consulted. This is indeed the basis, the *Raison D'être* of the new tolerance Idea that was put forth by the philosophers and the essayists of the Eighteenth Century. They *doubted all*. The claims put forth by all religious to Divine Inspiration, to the possession of absolute truth and salvation after death as well as infallibility in all matters. They were thoroughgoing rationalists and believed that all faiths were man-made and rank impostures. They were children as regards psychology and the proper evaluation of man's institutions as works of his innate genius, to grow and develop slowly even as he himself has grown and progressed from stage to stage in his physical and mental evolution. To these theoreticians all religious systems were the *conscious* and premeditated creations of scheming priests and vainglorious political leaders.

This view was also current among the early exponents of the *Haskalah* movement in Russia and Galicia, men who had imbibed their learning out of the shallow wells of the Eighteenth Century French Rationalism. This rationalistic movement, as we well know, was succeeded in the early part of the Nineteenth Century by a wave of Romantic Mysticism, itself a reaction in the progressive movement of thought, but yet an entirely inevitable one as the pure rationalism lacked the essence of emotion, the power to move man's hearts, to fill his imagination and to impregnate it with the sense of mystery that he so dearly craves. But it was this *consciously* rationalizing process that brought about the convention of tolerance, which like all conventions of our civilized life, is factually a lie but a great convenience, an essential factor in man's happiness and his survival here on this earth.

A convention is not unlike—or rather is one of—all the compromises, part lie, part truth, a compound of the two elements that

go to the making of our modern life. Each party to the agreement abnegates a part of what it considers its due in order to get a *Quid pro quo* of his fellow. Yet when it is proposed that he sacrifice that which he considers as *beyond a doubt* an essential part of his claim, then he bristles up and shows fight or resorts to an appeal to a legally-constituted Court of Justice. Strange, isn't it, that man, while carrying a dispute about property rights to a court of law allows what is supposedly his most precious and most cherished possession to be trampled upon and be openly violated by another—for such it, in the final analysis, amounts to—simply because he has been guided so by teachers to whom this object was no longer a matter of vital concern. But to the man to whom these matters retain yet their vitality as well as reality there could possibly be no *laissez-faire* in this, the most important matter in human life, while the taboo also loses its cause for existence, being only a convention arrived at, as many others have been, without any regard to truth and the love of the same, but only as a means of increasing man's comfort here on earth.

To the consistent thinker, there is a way out of this labyrinth, however. Persecution of the believer in a certain faith is undoubtedly outlawed by our sense of Justice and logic, our doubts as well by our much-modified sense of proportion. Even in penology the motif is no longer punishment of the criminal but rather the prevention and the eradication of what we consider as a false conception of right and wrong. And even so must not the persecution of that which we consider as a false interpretation of life's greatest problems cease for one minute, as otherwise the search of truth shall be outlawed from among us and the road to spiritual progress blocked for ever. As long as men are content to use *abstract* weapons only in the battles, hurling the javelins of logic only at each other and do not attempt to persecute, ostracize or otherwise interfere in the orderly calling or pleasures of the man who believes differently from the great majority and subscribes to a different set of dogmas, there ought not, in all reason, be any stigma of bigotry attached to the deed. For only thus will knowledge grow and truth emerge from the enveloping mesh of falsehood and pretense.

If our Faith were not with us just one more of the vestigial organs, weakened and atrophied by disuse, that man may altogether discard sometime or other in the course of his development, but had been a robust and fully-functioning member with well-defined

duties to perform in the human economy, there could not have been any possible talk of tolerance of that which we consider as error, and the religious wars would still be raging all over Christendom—in books and on the platform. But dogmatic religion, even to the sincerest of us, has quite unconsciously become *a thing of doubt*, a thing about which there is some hidden perplexity, something baffling and mysterious, something not realized as realistically by us, as by our fathers who were ready to fight for it.

We no longer fear so much the eternal torments that may await in the Hereafter the soul of our doubting neighbor—who, according to our lip professions, is sure to land there unless he recants betimes—but rather are we concerned with the threat of our own souls being rendered uncomfortable by doubts arising in our own minds, right here and in this life! As a consequence, we established the dictum of *no discussion* in matters supposedly of supreme moment to us, matters that really do need constant airing and a periodical re-examination!

Even the oft-professed impartial inquiry in these weighty problems is an utter impossibility, such methods being automatically barred by the very nature of the matter under consideration, but there should, on the contrary, be heat and passion and scorching flames of conviction, if not for the believer but for the doctrine which he represents. For, while these problems may be of no moment to the many for which the Pillar of Fire that once on a time had lit their way in the desert had turned into a Pillar of Dust and Ashes, they are surely of great moment to the great majority of men who find that belief is real and vital and who yet adopt an attitude of fatalistic indifference towards it.

If men were as vitally interested in having light shed into the musty closets of their faith as they are anxious to have it play upon their problems in mechanics or business, their sociological or economic questions there would be no taboo, no sacred cows, no restrictions upon discussion nor any conventional tolerance of all *religious systems* indiscriminately, while at the same time there would be a thorough-going tolerance of their *practitioners*.

This, I admit, may be playing the role of the devil's advocate and to be taking a chance of being branded as a reactionary, as an arch-enemy of freedom and progress. Yet it is but the truth, a portion of that vast code of truth so carefully overlooked by the most of us who are so blissfully unaware of our inconsistency in this supposedly all-important matter.

CONSOLIDATION OF GOVERNMENT SCIENCE UNDER THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION.

BY ARTHUR MACDONALD. ✓

INTRODUCTION.

WITH the knowledge of the Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Government Departments, and at the suggestion of his Secretary, I endeavored sometime ago to co-operate and advise by obtaining the opinions of Government and other scientists on a general plan of mine for placing some, at least, of the Government bureaus doing scientific work under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. I, therefore, called upon most of the Government scientists in their laboratories to discuss the plan. I then sent the letter below to them and to the leading scientists of this country. From time to time I made reports to the Secretary of the Joint Committee on Reorganization. The great majority of the Government and other scientists agreed generally with the plan. Some did not wish to express an opinion, and very few were opposed to the general plan.

The bureaus designated below, as doing scientific work, were selected after consultation with leading Washington scientists. I desire, however, to state at the outset that the plan is intended to be elastic; that is, if there are substantial reasons why a scientific bureau at present should not come under the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, it would not of course be included. The general idea in the following letter is *to place Government science on a University plan, and with University freedom.*

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION.

The Smithsonian Institution is one of the most honored scientific organizations in our country, but it has a relatively small ap-

appropriation from the Government. I have never been able to see any good substantial reason why this appropriation should not be greatly increased, so that the Institution can do its work more fully, affording the many scientific men of national and international reputation their opportunity to develop their specialties more adequately, for I know from private conversations with its experts that the appropriations for their work are very inadequate.

The Secretaryship of the Institution is a great scientific honor and very much sought after, but the position seems to be regarded by some, more as a place for a scientist to maintain, retire in and enjoy the honor, than to develop. To promote the growth of the Institution does not seem to have been uppermost in mind. If what I say should be construed as a criticism, it is not in the least intended so by me. I have no one in mind in anything I state, but it is a condition of Government science, which has grown up, and for which no one is responsible. But this is no reason why every one interested in Government science, should not strive to improve the conditions in Washington. The Smithsonian Institution should be developed, many new scientific positions created and adequate salaries and appropriations provided by the Government. The reclassification bills in Congress, when enacted into law, are intended to help especially scientific employees who have been greatly underpaid, but they will create but few new positions and not increase appropriations so much needed for scientific work.

A LETTER TO AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND OTHERS INTERESTED.

Consolidation of Government Science Under Board of
Regents of Smithsonian Institution.

Washington, D. C.

Dear Doctor:

I trust you will consider this letter as if I had written it out with my own hand and honor me with as early a reply as possible.

It is very desirable that the opinions of leading American scientists be obtained as to the reorganization and more especially consolidation of Government scientific bureaus under one head or department. I desire, therefore, to present a tentative plan for this purpose. Any suggestions or criticisms from you will be presented with those of other leading scientists to the joint committee on the reorganization of the administrative branch of the Government for their careful consideration and action.

It is the first time in the history of our Government that the

Executive and both parties in Congress have all been seriously in favor of reorganization and consolidation of Government bureaus and departments. If the scientific bureaus are to be benefited they must receive serious and early consideration.

It is self-evident that if Government sciences are consolidated under one head they would receive more attention and obtain much greater support. But there is nothing to be gained in forming a new department for this purpose when already there exists an institution which has great prestige and represents the science of the Government in a general way. It is the Smithsonian Institution. It is proposed that this organization should be developed not only in its own bureaus but also by placing scientific bureaus of the Government under its Board of Regents. It is sometimes said that the Smithsonian Institution is a private organization. This, of course, is not true, as it already receives more than \$600,000 annually from the Government as an appropriation for its work.

A scientific reorganization and consolidation of the Government departments and bureaus is the purpose of this general movement, inaugurated by the President, and this is especially needed in the scientific bureaus.

Here the great aim in view is eventually to have our Government science developed to the highest possible efficiency.

It is generally agreed that too many departments or cabinet officers are undesirable and unwieldy and that the number should not be increased but rather diminished. The reorganization and consolidation of scientific bureaus is right in line with this idea. Moreover, the scientific bureaus are scattered all over the Government, many of them illogically or haphazardly placed, and as a result they may have little or no influence, and consequently the scientific workers are paid shameful and minimum salaries. The consolidation of governmental science under the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution will tend to give more influence and efficiency to science and divorce it, as far as possible, from politics.

If, for instance, any scientific bureau is taken from a department and placed under the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, having all its personnel and appropriations intact, the main and perhaps only important difference will be that the chief director of this bureau will be under a scientific man with knowledge of and sympathy for scientific work, instead of under a cabinet officer, who is not expected to be very conversant with science. Moreover, the cabinet officer is liable to be changed every four

years, and sometimes oftener, so that the chief of a scientific bureau whose heart is in his work, not to mention uncertainty as to his tenure of office, for other than scientific reasons, is kept in much uncertainty as to sympathetic help in his endeavor to develop his work.

The Smithsonian Institution deals mainly with pure science and scientific bureaus of the Government function principally with applied science. As an applied science is based upon pure science, they both help one another. Sometimes pure science gets a little too pure and drifts in the air, and sometimes applied science becomes a little too practical or commercial or mercenary. But if both these phases of science are put together they tend to reach a happy medium. The foundation, pure science, should not be separated from its superstructure, applied science.

A tentative plan is to place the following 33 bureaus, or as many of them as is practicable, under the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, together with all their personnel and appropriations intact:

1. Geological Survey.
2. Reclamation Service.
3. Bureau of Mines.
4. Patent Office.
- 5-16. All scientific bureaus of the Agriculture Department (12 in number), affording these bureaus still greater opportunity to develop and benefit still further the agriculture of our country.
17. Vital and criminalological and other abnormal statistics of the Census Bureau.
18. Bureau of Standards.
19. Bureau of Fisheries.
20. Hygienic Laboratory.
21. Bureau of Public Health Service.
22. Army Medical Museum and Library.
23. Government Hospital for the Insane.
24. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
25. Library of Congress, to be called Library of the United States.
- 26-32. Bureaus of the Smithsonian Institution itself (seven in all). These bureaus are named as a concrete working basis. The inclusion of all or any particular one is not necessary to the plan.

33. Naval Observatory.

In reading over this list of scientific bureaus objections occur to us instinctively, but when we analyze them we will find that most of these objections are from a long-established habit of regarding various bureaus in connection with the particular department under which we have been accustomed to associate them. I assume that every bureau chief with the scientific spirit will not object to the consolidation of Government science on account of some personal inconvenience to himself. The true scientific man is always willing to make some sacrifice, if necessary, when the good of all Government science is sought.

The prospect of being under a sympathetic man rather than a political appointee should encourage every scientific man to consider any plan with this in view most seriously. If any one of these 33 bureaus should be found not to function as well as formerly in connection with the Smithsonian Institution, it will be very easy to put such a bureau back in its old position or some other better place. But it is very probable that a great scientific independent and nonpolitical Department would be considered a most desirable place to be in, where every one is imbued with the same spirit for the advancement of science in all its branches, pure and applied, working together mutually for this common end. Such an atmosphere would please any scientist.

Now, it may occur to some that 33 different scientific bureaus under one head is rather a large proposition. My answer to this objection is that, on the contrary, it is an advantage from the scientific point of view, because too much organization and resultant red tape are not desirable in scientific work. My idea is to put this plan on a high university plane, with university freedom for each bureau. Thus the president of a large university would not think of suggesting or dictating, for instance, to the professor of chemistry how he should conduct his experiments. One of the main duties of a university president is to distribute the available funds among the different faculties according to their real needs and not to interfere in the least with the professors' methods.

The president of a large university has a hundred or more professorships, divisions, laboratories, and faculties under his jurisdiction; these are practically bureaus. Moreover, this plan would be in fact a department of science without a cabinet officer, but with a permanent nonpolitical head or secretary. Such a department of science would do research work, both in applied

and pure science, and for this very reason there should be more freedom allowed than in a university, which is mainly a lecture and pedagogical system, where there might be reason for restriction. Yet, curious to say, the opposite condition seems to exist in scientific bureaus of our Government.

I fail to understand why the public money should not be spent on as high a plane as the private funds of a large university.

Nearly all, if not all, of the objections to this plan apply to a large university under a president elected by a board of trustees. The main objections that have been made are the following: That too much power is given to one man; that there are too many bureaus under one head; that the work would not have immediate contact with the people; that many Government bureaus are held strictly accountable by the public for definite lines of research; that some of the bureaus mentioned would be out of place; that politics might creep in if there were larger allotments; that it might discourage scientific spirit by taking a scientific bureau from a department; that it is a plan for the Washington men to work out.

The president of a large university like Michigan is elected by a board of trustees; the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution is chosen by a board of regents. There is little, certainly no substantial, difference, and if there should prove to be Congress could remedy it.

Are not the Universities of Michigan, California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin (all State institutions) successful?

Are they not near to the people? Has the politics that may have crept in spoiled them? Is not scientific spirit encouraged in large universities? The objections to the plan prove too much.

Briefly, this consolidation plan for science in our Government is to give each chief of each bureau free and full independence as far as the work of his bureau is concerned and then to hold him responsible for results. As it is, he may be under narrow or even arbitrary limitations, if not meddled with, and yet held responsible, at least by the public, to whom he cannot explain.

Each chief or director of a bureau would send in his estimates for new specialists, experimental work, and clerical service to the head of the Smithsonian Institution, who would study these estimates and recommend them to Congress. Later the head could take each one of the specialists before the Appropriations Committee to present to that committee the reasons why he wants

these additional appropriations. This procedure would be wholesome, for the specialists would become acquainted with the committee and its legislative point of view, and the committee would be educated up to the real needs of science. When the late Secretary of Agriculture, Wilson, first came into this department, over which he presided 16 years under both political parties, he said to his bureau chiefs, "Gentlemen, I am not here to boss you but to help you." Secretary Wilson fulfilled his promise, and the result is that agriculture is the leading scientific department of the Government. Secretary Wilson, of Agriculture, is a model for every one in power in our Government to follow.

While it is not at present my purpose to go into too many details of this plan, I will venture to make a few suggestions as to certain bureaus and also some general observations. The Census Bureau should be called the United States Statistical Bureau; the word "census" is misleading, since it is only appropriate once in 10 years when the census is taken. The Library of Congress should be called the Library of the United States or National Library. This change in name and its transfer to the Smithsonian Institution would not in the least curtail any privilege accorded to members of Congress. The name Library of Congress was appropriate once, but at present this library is much more than a Library of Congress. The title of a library should at least cover its field of action like the title of a book.

The Smithsonian Institution has a library of nearly 100,000 volumes and the United States Surgeon General's library has nearly 200,000 books, and most of these scientific bureaus to come under the Smithsonian Institution have specialistic libraries. This combination of the several libraries under the Smithsonian Institution would tend, of course, to reduce expenses by avoiding duplication of books. As it is at present, the libraries are scattered about, making it very difficult to find out where the duplication exists. There may be an objection to placing the Library of Congress under the Smithsonian Institution, but the main difference would be that the office of the Library of Congress would not be an independent institution under Congress, but just as independent under the Smithsonian Institution. Instead of leaving the present and most competent incumbent alone in his efforts to develop his great library, he would receive additional aid and encouragement from the head of this new and greatest department of the Government. In such an atmosphere library science could develop

more freely and more easily. The same would be true practically for all bureaus coming under this independent department of science in its broadest sense. In fact, there is already a Smithsonian Division in the Library of Congress. The term "library science" has come to stay; the Library of Congress, which is developing library science to a high degree of efficiency could well come under the Smithsonian Institution.

But some one says, How about literature and history? Yes; there is a science of literature and history, at least there are scientific methods being applied to them; also scientific philological studies are already being carried on under the science of anthropology.

Helmholtz once said that the number of sciences would become so great that it would be almost impossible to learn their names. Science and scientific methods have now the floor in the realm of knowledge, and are fast entering into all new fields. Let the United States lead the world in these new directions on the frontiers of knowledge; the United States can do this if it will, and an opportunity now is given to take the first step which is to place Government science under the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

In our country medical science is already leading other nations in certain respects. But Government medical science has not been very influential nor is it taking the position which its importance demands. A beginning has been made, however, in the Bureau of Public Health Service, the Army Medical Museum and Library, and the Government Hospitals for the Insane. In all these three bureaus, to be placed under the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents, scientific work is carried on. The catalogue of the Surgeon General's library, consisting of a very large number of volumes, in three separate series, is considered in Europe the best work in this line in the world. Yet, through the mistaken economy of Congress, this library has been compelled to reduce this most valuable catalogue in size and practically hamper its utility. The Government Hospital for the Insane has done some most advanced and valuable work on the brain. These medical organizations fall naturally under the consolidation of Government science. At present they have inadequate appropriations and salaries, but under the present proposed plan they would receive special attention and help.

I might suggest also that in inviting scientific men to permanent work under the Government, it is under-
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so stated, that they cannot be removed from their positions without very serious cause; that their work is their life work, and considered from the point of view of a university professorship. If such a plan should be followed, there would not be any great difficulty—as there is now—of obtaining the best scientists to work under our Government. The salary should be adequate but not necessarily large. A true scientific man in love with his work is more concerned about permanency of his position and independence in his work than salary. We would then have, probably, under this plan, the greatest department of Government, without a cabinet officer, but under a permanent head.

But how about getting the right man for such a place? The men who elect the head of the Smithsonian Institution are the Chief Justice of the United States, who is chancellor of the Board of Regents, which consists of the Vice President, three members of the Senate, including both political parties, three members of the House, also including both parties; and six citizens of the United States, who are at present: Alexander Graham Bell, John B. Anderson, both of Washington, D. C.; George Gray, of Delaware; Charles F. Choate, Jr., of Massachusetts; Henry White, of Maryland; and Robert S. Brookings, of Missouri. There could hardly be a much more trustworthy body of men for choosing a scientist for the place, when at some future time it becomes necessary to elect a successor to the very able and distinguished scientist who now is at the head of the Smithsonian Institution.

The scientist elected to be the head of this new scientific department would probably not be thoroughly conversant with more than three or four sciences, so that there would be under him, say, some 30 scientific bureaus, the domain of which he really knows little or nothing about. If he should favor his own science to the disadvantage of other sciences, or if he should meddle in the work of the other bureaus, he would not be able to stand long the criticism of scientific men. But there is very little probability of this, and if it should occur, publicity, the greatest power in this country, would soon correct it.

In most of the departments, except the agricultural, there are relatively very few scientific bureaus, usually only two or three, over against some 15, 20, or 30 other divisions or bureaus. Of course, such scientific bureaus are generally only helped by their departments to the extent they are useful to the department itself, and government depends upon the opinion of a cabinet officer who is

usually ignorant of science. The result is that many of these scientific bureaus scattered about in the departments are developed very slowly, if not standing still. Their appropriations are very inadequate, their service much crippled, and, worst of all, their independence greatly limited. Of course, no first-class scientist would take such a place or remain in it long unless compelled by force of circumstances. With very few exceptions, these scattered bureaus of science could serve these departments at least just as well and probably much better if under the jurisdiction of the Smithsonian Institution.

SUMMARY OF PLAN.

The purpose and advantages of this plan for the consolidation of Government science under the Smithsonian Institution are summed up as follows:

1. To develop Government science to the highest possible efficiency.
2. To correct illogical and haphazard arrangements of bureaus or departments.
3. To reduce political influence in scientific bureaus to a minimum.
4. The efficient development of science bureaus under a scientific head is much more probable than under a political head.
5. To unite pure and applied science into a happy medium, increasing the efficiency of both.
6. To encourage scientific men in their work, which makes toward efficiency.
7. To put Government scientific work upon the high university plane.
8. To avoid duplication of scientific work, appropriations, and duplication of library books. It also facilitates their proper distribution.
9. To advance Government medical science, which has been much neglected.
10. To give permanency of position and independence to experts, making it possible to get the best men of science to work for the Government.
11. To make very improbable interference or meddling of the head in the work of the many bureaus under him.
12. To lessen one cabinet officer and one independent bureau.

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I trust you and every scientist to whom this letter is sent will express his views freely as to this plan or propose any new plan at earliest possible convenience, and should he not desire his name mentioned will so indicate, in which case I shall, of course, follow his wishes.

Requesting that all letters be typewritten, I have the honor to remain,

Most faithfully,

ARTHUR MacDONALD.

(Address: Arthur MacDonald, the Congressional Apartments, East Capitol Street, Washington, D. C.)

N. B.: If you are a member of any scientific or medical organization, I should be glad if you would have, as soon as possible, the following resolution (or some similar one) presented and acted upon as early as possible.

Resolved, That the.....favors the general plan of putting the scientific bureaus of the Government at Washington, as far as practicable, under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, with the view of developing Government science to its highest possible efficiency by affording workers permanent tenure of office, greater freedom in investigations, noninterference of politics and adequate salaries.

After the resolution is acted upon kindly have it sent to me at once, to be presented to the joint committee on the reorganization of the administrative branch of the Government, and also to your Senators and Congressmen.

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ANARCHY AND ASPIRATION*.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

PASSING along the broad highway of history we are often struck by the many scenes of vast exploit, ambitious tenantry and shrewd aggression toward some form of political, religious or economic monopoly. These are but so many items of misfit achievement, and not only stand athwart the path of mankind's nobler aspirations, but may invariably be accounted the actual if not the immediate causes of almost all the misery and rebellion listed in Earth's bloody chronicle. For no creed of gain survives but on the lazy lounge of public oppression; and no policy of oppression continues for long before it arouses disaffection and confusion. It is foolish to expect any people, howsoever meek and non-resistant, to *always* submit to injustice, exploitation and compulsory services without complaint or occasional insubordination. And any slave or mandatory victim of extra-territorial government does not have to be very smart to see when he is being imposed upon, his goods stolen or his own social institutions subverted. History repeats itself, not because some men think they are free to enslave and mistreat others, but because their lives, their very presumption to realize selfish and worldly careers, are subject to natural and spiritual laws which are impartial and irrevocable in their application to human nature and conduct. This was why Percy Ainsworth said that "the men who really conquer the world are those who see beyond the world."

In all critical times we find that two great movements invariably come to the front; one arguing revolt in force and the other counseling a search for freedom through personal control and aspira-

*Supplementary remarks on Rev. Gilbert Reid's "Present Day Ideas on Revolution" and Tarak Nath Das' article in the *Open Court* etc on "The Struggle for Independence in India."

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tion. The one would let down the bars to all the vicious moods of passion, cruelty and violence; thus hoping to straightway brush aside the one sort of despotism and set up its own, hence not really bettering the surrounding conditions. The other would calmly weed its own garden and raise nobler fruitage behind the hedge of moral and cultural restrictions against *both* sorts of prestige-mania, thus hoping that such spiritual example will not be long ignored and kept under the foist of those more selfishly aggressive. It knows full well that they are not real stars we see reflected in life's stagnant pool.

Rebellious feelings sometimes have a certain use in the private economy of our spiritual awakening, but not so with their public expression. When they break out in the form of mob violence or general strikes, society as an ultimate whole and the individual as the immediate unit of human life always suffer. There is no true sense of either public or private duty when measures favoring anarchy are advised or entertained. There is no actual confidence or sympathy in a creed which argues violence and premature retribution. These forms of passional expression are far too antiquated and clumsy for progressive souls to use in prospect of some day bettering the lives and ambitions of narrow-minded men.

Aspiring souls well know the more wholesome virtues and rewards of fortitude in suffering, honor in poverty, justice in war-time, and benevolence in times of panic. They look to innocence and joy for their relief; they seek no heaven bought with others' poverty and misery; they never recline at ease and enjoy the luxury supplied by worldly rancor and the ephemeral preferment of exploitation. They take all life for what it may and should become, never valuing experience as a meaningless incident in a fickle dream. And in the final estimate surviving minds will note that their existence was not lived in vain, that no experience of their inner life made plot for either goguette or revasserie.

But the aspiring soul must not be too innocent, too unsophisticated, else it be the ready victim of more subtle arts and mischiefs. It should know that the good things of life are oftenest imitated by the crude and false, that beauty is the pattern of a myriad forms of poseury and artifice, that knavery invariably shams some virtue from which to ambush its chosen victim. It should be sufficiently intelligent and noble-minded to recognize the utter antithesis between exaltation and vulgarity, that Clara Kimball Young's rare versatil-

ity of screen art as portrayed in "Eyes of Youth" is the direct opposite of the vulgar symbolism and seductive art produced by the supple spines of Hawaii's hula dancers.

Also those who are really seeking spiritual exaltation must not be too set on political or economic reform, else they overlook the personal culture of their characters and run into something like new India's recent political culdesac. That country, so otherwise well stocked with traditional wisdom and devotion, is now just about evenly divided between factions whose sentiments favor the two rival revolutionaries, Mohondas Gandhi and the Sadhu Sundar Singh; the one a pro-Indian who seeks to establish a Buddhistic non-caste form of Vedantist sociology with political justice and economic freedom for all, while the other is a pro-Anglican who claims that a Christian-Yoga panacea awaits his afflicted nation.

As a rule, anarchist movements and even their propaganda affect only a comparatively small part of a community, state or nation. And even when successful in their designs, such movements seldom exert any lasting influence beyond the reach of their immediate and more germane effects. A few social relations or sentiments may be changed, but the general eclectic character of human life goes on the same, still discriminating and choosing what best suits its aims of aspiration, helpfulness and betterment.

Aspiration, on the other hand, seeks to redeem and enoble the whole world, affects the cosmic tendency of life, and finds no rest in the finite interests of a personal salvation. It takes a saint's concern in all the weary tasks of those who toil, in all the poignant sufferings of those who have been invalidated for competent achievement, livelihood or love. It puts a sage interpretation on the dismal void of those whose prospects have been battered down and crushed by prejudice, misfortune and despair. To make a selfish pilgrimage toward Bethlehem belies the specious argument of false benevolence. And anyone with truly generous heart will take neither umbrage nor profit from what others do. He will never take fruit from the tree of life if such taking requires that he coldly let his neighbor await some other season. The relish of nobility is not concerned to satisfy such morbid claims of selfish appetite, for virtue is a spiritual restraint of physical desire.

We know full well that the staggering earth is burdened sorely with this bulky load called human folly. But we also know, or at least dreamingly feel and think sometimes, that it will some day reach its far-off destination and let down its galling pack. To gnize

will there be relaxation and refreshment, salvage and reward. Then will we find that the *finasseurs invétérés*, with all their raucous violence, fared not half so well as those few happy souls who calmly looked toward the stars at night and shuffled off their gnarled shell of low desire. A man must be free himself before he can expect to show the world the way to liberty and justice.

Even more thoroughly should we see why the latter sort of souls are always more skillful and courageous. They have the sense to know that meanness is ignoble, that fear and clumsiness are tokens only of ignorance and inexperience, and that a most recondite versatility is necessary if one is expected to keep up with even the modern advance of terminology in the Arts and Sciences, in Philosophy and Educational Method. They also recognize that it is a far cry from one's crowded desk-room in Threadneedle Street to another's lookout camp on the highest peak in Teneriffe. But the best part of both their valor and their wisdom is that they have no précieuse toast to offer such as once loudly resounded through Folly's 16th Salon announcing: *Vive les bagatelles et les hochets*—"Away with sorrow and care, long live trifles and toys!"

Such fickle moods are shallow and inane; they are always ready soil for seeds of vicious and rebellious tendency. The devotees of such a maxim also are soon grown corrupt, for they are too circumspect and skeptical of man's worthwhile achievements to pay homage there. They therefore never know the sweet relief of Aspiration, for all their lives they seek only vulgar conflicts, paradoxically expecting some bright day to make impossible conquest of chateaux in Spain.

Hannah More once said, "Christianity does not so much give us new affections or faculties, as a new direction to those we already have." So, too, in a world where cause and effect are found to hold impartial sway, we can neither readily miss the rewards of virtue nor escape the penalties of wrongdoing. It does not depend upon whether the world recognizes merit and repudiates wickedness. The law is deeper laid and operates inexorably just. On either side of our path, as we make life's paradoxical journey, we find cause both for joy and for sorrow, and (often unexpectedly) discover also effects both of a benevolent and a malignant nature. This is the elemental pattern of human life. It is the natural law of all intelligent existence that certain conduct has certain rewards and punishments as the case may warrant. As Drummond so well proved, it is the continuation of natural law into the spiritual world.

Very often the situation we find ourselves in or the form of conduct which seems best to pursue, is one of complex relations and hence cannot be easily analyzed into measurable items of this or that nature. I think, however, that any scheme aiming to better our condition, like any scene of problematic human experience, can be reduced to three constituent elements, namely: Environment, Character and Conduct. And after such a simplification, the said situation or form of conduct may be further reduced to the elemental conflict of character against the possible alliance of time, place, misfortune and others' opposition. It is even then encouraging to remember that a certain virtue holds good in actions which are superior to the often adverse circumstance of time and place. Character serves best in those forms of conduct which control, or at least have power to transmute, environment.

In this way, then, I have often found solace against the gray days of sorrow, found delight in the Springtime rejuvenation of the wintry world, and prospered sumptuously through the Fall term of economic recessions. I discovered also that no spice of life can prove too rich, no flavor seem too pungent, but that a special choice of diet can arrange a balanced and perennial relish. We eat of the fruits of Life's most fecund tree, never knowing and often never even asking why some of them should taste more sweet and ripe and appetizing than others.

Some people fill their days with mad pursuit of pleasure and extravagance, and in the end have difficulty in warding off ennui and caducité. Others drag along in weary toil, just barely drawing sustenance from the drying dregs of a sickly world, little dreaming that their misery and lack of nourishment is mostly a self-affliction and can at any time be thrown off and replaced with something more akin to happiness. But happy indeed by nature and by effort are those who seek not worldly charms nor cherish the crude *ravauderies méchants* of fickle hearts, for theirs is a constant joy, a resolute control of mind and soul and passion. They alone know how to live the spiritual life, aspiring to things more satisfying than anarchy and secular upheaval, and as a consequence have sturdy characters and are our true exemplars in wisdom.

It is a sad but not altogether discouraging commentary on our boasted civilization to admit that not all of us can understand the meaning of experience, that even its darkest moments of tragedy are still somewhat illumined by the flickering light of heuristlc promise. There are but very few who are ever able to recognize

what kind of life is *best* to seek or live. We are as a whole species still very closely housed within the spiritual cave of instinct and fear, brute force and cupidity—the heritage of our ancestral traditions. Moods of disaffection come over us untrammelled by restraint; trials of penance grip our souls in anguish and the tardy reflection of regret. Mortal tests of spiritual rectitude annul the high esteem we have for personal power and prestige. We sometimes have clear vision of our destiny, whence we usually feel inclined to take account of our true strength of character, if we have not already found that base circumstance has overthrown our proud morale to win. It seems a tragedy, alas to know that penance takes the place of victory. But we are often solaced through our trials by realizing that penance truly done is a token of good faith, and that honest faith makes us secure from all worldly harm. It is another and more subtle sort of spiritual victory.

In the Middle Ages, when all moods of virtue or intelligence were in constant political jeopardy and ecclesiastical torment, the popular trials of penance were more physical than spiritual. Water, fire, knives, boiling oil and lead were common judges of the derelict, the witch, the courageous genius and the criminal alike. The authorities of those crude days had great artifice and passion for revenge. They had elaborate court pageantry but meagre judicial qualifications of broad knowledge and keen perception of motives; they had an exhaustive legal procedure of accusation but a pitifully weak and inaccurate system of evidential inquiry. Hence their arbitrary justice knew little leniency for those of doubtful guilt, and their pity for the weak, unfortunate victim of conspiracy was nil, not having force enough to push through the vast *pesanteur messéante* of their vested dignity. Accordingly the actual penitence of their victims was not thought genuine except when observed vainly struggling and writhing in chains at a fiery stake or in a miserable dungeon clothed in rags, diseased, starving and companioned by carnivorous rats. The rare old Gothic manuscript in Professor Scoggin's library tells vividly of all the popular vices, virtues, penances and precepts of those dolorous days. The hazards of plotting rebellion are shown to be quite as great as those of aspiring to anything above or beyond such dreary conditions of life, but why our spiritual rewards should depend upon some forced vicarious confession, there is not a word of explanation.

The same old bugbear of bigotry and superstitious fear was behind all our own New England persecution of persons accused

of sorcery and witchcraft which was in vogue until clearer-visioned folks like Channing and Margaret Fuller purified the atmosphere and relieved the situation. Dr. Rush was the first to take a scientific view of abnormal mental processes and try to alleviate the miserable condition of the defecive and suspected.

Even today when *casse-coux* and *peronnelles* dictate the fashion of our lives, who would attempt to cross life's stage with any dignity of hope in calm, intelligible dialogue? Who would even suppose that generous conduct is the truly expedient, and that selfish aggression is the poorest way to value and take advantage of life's glorious opportunities? Public life is now grown banal and bromidic, for the world, thinking and acting only in terms of materialism and jazz, is fast becoming cursed with grossness and vulgarity, vandalism and garish extravagance. Retired life, then, is the only resort left open to noble souls. It is now at high premium, because the world's elect are teaching people that its very hermitage is a mystic refuge from the mad turmoil of want and woe, violence and vice, greed and welterstench.

Away from the jungle life of self-assertive men, smug in the countryside's serene delight, no actual hazard reaches there, no true decadence can take place. In rural simplicity and solitude intelligent souls are least alone; and though their previous careers have been pronounced deplorable and bitterly remembered, their present joys preclude all sense of penance or regret. And all that should be countenanced as worth our while is just this sweet contentment and relief. No urgent moods of anarchy can be entertained while innocence and aspiration are one's constant pattern of devout employment. There is ever a bounty on the wolf, but the lambs have but to bask in the sunshine and let their wool grow; the knaves of the world can't steal *everything* the good man has. To have such really useful employment on the soil, growing food for body and mind, and knowing no base contentions or conspiracies, is a truer, more innate and wholesome sort of happiness which all the luxury and cleverness of urban artifice have not power to give.

Of course, we often miss the company of genial friends, and usually too that strange melange of lively situations, economic problems and diverse assessments on one's evening leisure, which rounds out the daily life of most city folks. But the actual reward of retirement's sage remove is sturdy and self-reliant moral character, helpful generosity and the courage to pass one's days, if need be, in the toil and trouble of heroic sacrifice. On the ground of this

great argument all worthy lives are built, all meritorious deeds are done, all worthy goals achieved. At least such scenery marks the origin of all our civil nobility, because the urban world is more a hazard than a refuge, more often a sedge of dark revolt than a high plateau of fruitage and security.

We readily understand that it makes a vast difference whether a gallivant calls his lady acquaintance Dulcinea or Drolesse; so why not look at virtue and debauchery through similar eyes of favor or disapproval? If the modern age must resolve the eternal conflict of morality versus livelihood into a mere dilemma of "Have you got the money?" why not let fly the flaring gonfalons of threatened revolt and reverse this fickle, simpering shibboleth into "Have you got spiritual aspiration?" or at least something serious like "Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?" We now have in Belgium an international and in France a newly-organized local "*Confederation des Travailleurs Intellectuels*" for all brain-workers of the high-brow order—that is, poets, philosophers, educators and scientists. So why not have also some few individual attempts to organize the world's spiritual workers—that is, all mystics, friends, heroes, meekened saints and generous souls, who are conscientiously set against war and anarchy, greed and folly, who constantly aspire to make this a better and a happier world, and are willing to share in and promote that rare *tempère mollement* which is the invariable treasure of the humble? How surer or more readily could the modern world be saved from the painful penance apparently in future store?

THE UNIVERSITIES AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE NETHERLANDS.

BY ALBERT OOSTERHEERDT.

THE Dutch universities are comparatively modern in point of time, and fully modern in equipment, methods and scientific results. None of them date back to the Middle Ages, but several owe their existence to the struggle for independence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus Leiden was founded as a reward for the heroic struggle the citizens of the town made against the Spaniards.

There are three ordinary state universities, viz., Leiden, Utrecht, and Groningen; a municipal and private university are at Amsterdam, while Delft has a large technical university, Utrecht a veterinary school, and Wageningen an agricultural college. There is also a commercial university at Rotterdam, and a technical university at Bandoerg, Java, which also fall under the scope of this article. It will be seen that the Netherlands are well equipped with the higher institutions of learning, and the fame of some of these has become international. The state universities are governed by a board of curators, who propose appointments and appropriations to the government, while internal affairs are regulated by a senate, composed of the staff of professors. They have five faculties,—theology, law, science, medicine and literary, while the University of Amsterdam has besides these a department of commerce. The Free University at Amsterdam has no science faculty at present, but the technical university at Delft has seven sections: general science, civil engineering, architecture, mechanical engineering and ship-building, electrical engineering, chemical technology, and mining, the other schools having no formal sections.

Ordinary lecture courses are open to everybody at an annual fee of 200 guilders, and become free after payment for four years.

Dutch students must have a certificate of a Latin school or gymnasium, or from an ordinary high school. American students are admitted on graduation with a B. A. degree from the following universities: California, Catholic, Chicago, Clark, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Leland Stanford, Jr., Michigan, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Wisconsin and Yale. It will be seen that the Dutch Universities are real universities, and not ordinary American colleges, such as most of our schools. Other languages than Dutch may be used for a doctoral examination or dissertation. Lectures are generally given in Dutch, but at practical work in laboratories, at examinations and promotions the use of French, English or German is admitted.

Holland has a great number of institutions for scientific research, which admirably supplements the universities. Some of the more famous are The Royal Academy of Science, at Amsterdam, which controls the Dutch Central Institute for Brain Research, the Embryological Institute, a prize for Latin poetry, and the Van't Hoff foundation for research in chemistry; the Teyler Society which has a theological branch with a physical laboratory under the direction of the famous professor, H. A. Lorentz, one of the recipients of a Nobel Prize; Society for Dutch Literature; Historical Society of Utrecht; Royal Institute for the Languages, Geography and Ethnology of the Dutch Indies; Royal Geographical Society; Meteorological Institute; Botanical Gardens at Java; Dutch Zoological Association. There are further a number of societies for the promotion of mathematics, medicine and surgery, chemistry, botany, engineering, etc. The principal cities of Holland have a set of fine libraries, chief of which is the Royal Library at the Hague, where is also located the Colonial Library, and the general archives of the Netherlands.

✓ The University of Leiden was founded in 1575, and has about 1500 students, with a staff of about one hundred professors. Its library contains over 775,00 volumes, and has some famous codices. It has a museum for antiquities, ethnography, natural history, geology and mineralogy, a herbarium and a botanical garden, and laboratories for botany, zoology, physics, chemistry, pharmaceuticals, pathology, anatomy, hygiene, bacteriology and physiology, besides an astronomical observatory, and numerous clinics.

In connection with the University is a Fund Society, for the promotion and support of scientific interests, a society for scientific lectures, chiefly for inviting distinguished scholars from abroad.

a fund for promoting the study of international private law and law of nations, also by organizing courses of lectures, a South African fund, a school for tropical medicine and a tropical hospital, the latter being at Rotterdam. At Leiden there are also the municipal archives, the Museum of Antiquities, the Bibliotheque Wallonne, being the Library of the French Reformed Church in Holland, and a Batak-Institute.

The fame of Leiden's great university is indeed world-wide, and it has been called the center of European learning. During the days of the Dutch republic it was easily the first university in the world, and even now it ranks with Oxford, Cambridge, Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg and other famous schools. Some of its present professors are of European fame, and authorities of the first rank in their respective subjects.

The University of Utrecht has also an enviable reputation, dating also from the days of the Dutch Republic. Founded in 1636, it now has nearly 1800 students, and a faculty of over a hundred members. Its library contains over 441,000 volumes, 800 incunabula, and 2400 manuscripts. It includes the libraries of the Historical Society and the Provincial Society of Utrecht, the Central German Library, the Anglia-book Club, and the Library of the Dutch Reformed Church. Besides the usual institutes and laboratories, the herbarium and observatory, the university has an Old-Student Fund for scientific objects, the Stipendium Bernardium, for foreign students of theology, and the fund of Anna Everwijn, also for theological students, from the Paltz, Hungary and Transylvania. Utrecht has also its town and provincial archives, a museum for incunabula, miniatures, and medieval art, a museum of forestry, the royal mint, and a technical laboratory of fisheries. The oldest city in the Netherlands naturally is the home of an institute for mediæval history, and as well for the history of art.

The University of Groningen, in the northern part of the country, is the smallest of the State universities, having about eight hundred students, with a faculty of about sixty professors. It has a library of more than 150,000 books, including some private collections. Among its institutes are one for biological archæology, an astronomical laboratory, with which Professor Kapteyn, the great Dutch astronomer who recently died, was connected, one for experimental psychology, and one for philosophy and history, which has eight branches, six for languages and two for history. The university has two funds for general science and lectures by

scientists from abroad, and connected with it is a society for higher agricultural education. The provincial and town records, and a provincial museum are also located at Groningen. The university was founded in 1614, and shares with Leiden and Utrecht the distinction of having been a center of Dutch and European learning for more than three centuries. Its faculty has many German, French, Jewish and even English names, as have the other schools.

The University of Amsterdam is a municipal institution, having been an Athenaeum since 1632, and was converted into a university in 1877. It has more than 1500 students, and nearly 150 instructors or faculty members. Besides the regular departments it has a school of commerce. The Library includes a Jewish section, Bibliotheca Rosenthaliara, and a Lutheran seminary library, besides that of the Hygienic laboratory and for tropical hygiene. Among its laboratories the university has one for electrochemistry, one for the physiology of plants, and another for histology. It has also seminars for Dutch, German, French, English, Semitics, Geography and History, and an astronomical laboratory. Being in a large modern city, it has the benefit of its hospitals and clinics for its medical faculty, which is very large and complete. It has an extension department, evidently copying American methods, and a school for journalists.

Amsterdam has a great number of public institutions, such as the National Museum, the Colonial Institute, and the Zoological Gardens and Aquarium, as well as a nautica; library and ethnological division. Hugo de Vries, the great Dutch Botanist, whose mutation theory has become a rival to Darwin's natural selection, did most of his work at Amsterdam.

The Free University at Amsterdam is a Calvinist institution, and was founded in 1880 by Dr. A. Kuyper, a former minister of the Crown. It has about 250 students, and a faculty of less than twenty professors. It is stronger in theology than in the other faculties, and has no scientific department except that of medicine. It controls the Institutum Elomicum.

The Technical University at Delft was founded in 1842, and has about 2500 students, with a teaching staff of nearly ninety. It has a full equipment of technical laboratories, among others of microbiology and microchemistry, and ranks among the first in the world. The fame of the Dutch engineer has spread to all sections of the earth, due largely to the very efficient training at Delft, which has already included aerodynamics in its studies.

The commercial University at Rotterdam is quite recent, having been founded in 1913, and has about six hundred pupils, with a faculty of nearly thirty members. Malay is one of the languages taught here. Another school which teaches a specialty is the Veterinary University at Utrecht, which deals with the structures and diseases of the animal world. Its institutes and laboratories are also very modern. On the same plane is the famous school of agriculture at Wageningen, which has a student body of nearly three hundred, and a staff of forty-five professors.

Holland being a colonial power, the University has also a technology of tropical crops, and teaches tropical agriculture. Not a little of the progress in agriculture and dairying in the Netherlands is due to the last two institutions, which has put the country in the very front rank in this regard, teaching many more backward countries, being surpassed by none, and equalled by few.

The Technical University at Bandoerg, Java, while young, illustrates the need for science and engineering in the Dutch East Indies, and shows how the practical Dutch are solving the problem.

It is clear from the foregoing summary that the Dutch are splendidly equipped with a fine set of universities and technical schools, and that the ideal of education stands very high in the minds of the people. What other nation of seven millions can show a like number of large universities and fine educational facilities and institutions or make a better use of them? While other nations have been building for war, the Dutch have built for peace and international good will, not the least through their renowned schools, which have ever been models of democracy, of plain living and high thinking. It is much to be hoped that the proposed exchange of professors between the United States and the Netherlands will be soon in effect, bringing the best of the old world in close contact and association with the new, and renewing the ancient ties between Holland and America.

RELIGIOUS UNITY.

BY DAVID DARRIN.

AT the present time when some of the most trivial distinctions are being magnified to the size of differences and so many false barriers are being raised to no better purpose than the dividing of one group from another, it may prove both sane and refreshing to take a brief glimpse at life from exactly the opposite angle, viewing some of the facts which serve to unite rather than divide individuals and groups.

One of the most fertile sources of discord among human beings is difference in religious belief. This fact seems very strange when we stop to reflect that the fundamental object of all true religion is to harmonize the relations between individual lives and make them more responsive to divine guidance. The fact seems less strange, however, when we remember that, around the core of truth at the heart of every religion, there has sprung up a complex structure of man-made interpretation and formality, which growth has invariably been so luxuriant as to obscure the original truth. Nevertheless, there has been achieved substantial progress in the direction of religious unity.

In the world of today there are about a dozen organized religions. Let us see in what ways these religions resemble one another. Each of them traces its fundamental beliefs to the teachings of an inspired leader. All have experienced additions, subtractions, and alterations of these original teachings, at the hands of persons perhaps less divinely inspired. All of these religions preach the immortality of the spirit and all recognize the striving of the spirit toward an ideal. The ethical standards originally set up as practical manifestations of these ideals, show many points of similarity in all religions. All acknowledge the existence of super-human powers in Nature.

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