

THE OPEN COURT

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VOLUME XXXV

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~~ANNEXA~~

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
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HOMER.

Ideal bust in the museum at Naples.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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HOMER AND THE PROPHETS

OR

HOMER AND NOW.

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST.

INTRODUCTION. HOMER: MORAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS.

IN the days of Homer, Greece was a frontier land of the West, protected from the conquering East by a narrow but sufficient body of water and by comparative poverty in her earthly possessions. Her happy lot was isolation and opportunity for self-development, while neighboring nations on the mainland bordering the Mediterranean were conquered repeatedly by a succession of Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes and Persians.

But though the people of the Hellenic peninsulas and islands were unconquered, they were not stagnant within their own narrow boundaries and unrelated to the great outlying world of thought and action in their day, for they had ships and sailed them far, to rich Egypt and the northwestern coast of Africa, to the shores of Asia Minor and the Black Sea, to Sicily and the Italian mainland, and to the far, dread coast of Spain. Grecian sailors had even looked upon the Ocean Stream beyond the Pillars of Hercules.

Homer mentions many lands and nations, and from these we may form some conclusion as to the influences from abroad that were acting upon the Hellenic people. They knew Egypt: would they adopt her system of land and priestcraft, counting her people as nothing, but Pharaohs and priests as all? They knew the East: would they adopt her political system and honor kings as gods, to be approached in abject posture and given the right of life or death over the subjects? Would they adopt the obscene goddess Astarte (Ashtaroth, Aphrodite) along with her lover Tammuz (Adonis)?

Would they adopt the harem? If we read our Homer with these questions in mind, we shall find much that has not been found by reading without attention to what were the tendencies outside of Greece in his time.

A neighbor nearer to Greece than Babylon or Egypt, which were the great empires then striving for mastery, was Palestine. Living at the crossing point of the roads that connected the East, the North and the South, the children of Israel, by virtue of their position, received the ideas of all of the ancient world, not only through their constant contact with traders and frequent wars, but through intermarriage. Their national traditions, in their sacred books, make it clear that in them the blood of the East, the South and the North was mingled, for their patriarchs came from Ur of the Chaldees; an Egyptian strain was added during the sojourn in Egypt; and a Northern strain when they took to themselves women of the native tribes, when they conquered the Promised Land—Moabites and Ammonites and Hittites, all Nordic according to modern scholars. We know now that the Homeric Greeks also were Nordic, and in both Israel and Greece physical proof of the Nordic origin is found in the blue eyes and golden hair of individuals, along with proof in ideas and customs held in common. King David and Achilles, the goddess Athene and the god Apollo were of those who showed the Nordic signs.

From bitter experience in early wanderings, from the sojourn in Egypt, and the Babylonian Captivity, Israel attained an early conception of human liberty, and in the fires of her afflictions she came to transcend all other nations in her religious life. She has well been called a Martyr Nation and the Crucible of God.¹ Religiously, she rose to monotheism and gave the world its religion; politically, she was a theocratic democracy at the time when Troy was sacked by the Greeks, with laws which protected the weak against the strong and with prophets who denounced wrong-doing in high places—the very opposite from Babylon, who was drunk with the wine of her power. The laws of Babylon decreed death to the person who gave refuge to a slave, but in Israel that refuge was commanded: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the slave which has escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best. Thou shalt not oppress him." (Deut. xxiii, 15, 16.) In Homer, what is the practice with regard to suppliants and slaves?

¹ Tucker, *The Martyr Nations*.

Between 1400 B. C. and 1100 B. C. Israel suffered military defeat six times and came to ascribe her sorrows to the evil that she had permitted to exist, especially to her abandoning her service of her God of Righteousness for the service of "false gods of the nations round about," as Moloch, and Tammuz, and Ashtaroth, the Ares, Adonis, and Aphrodite of the Eastern nations. The date of the fall of Troy was within this period, being 1184 B. C. according to Grecian tradition. Did the Greeks also see in personal and national sufferings the hand of a righteous god? Israel had risen to monotheism and her prophets were struggling to keep her faith pure, but her wives and maidens were weeping for Tammuz and Ashtaroth—did the highest moral and religious leaders of the Grecian world also struggle against this debased cult of the East? The people of Israel had not bowed to native kings since their escape from Egyptian bondage, but chose to live under the rule of their Judges, from Moses to the accession of Saul (1451 B. C.—1095 B. C.)—did the Homeric Greeks show any tendencies against monarchy and toward democracy, under the rule of Judges? Are the people whom Homer pictured, the best of them, an-hungered and a-thirst for righteousness and worshipers of gods of righteousness, or are they hedonists, bent on mere pleasure and regardless of the rights and the wrongs involved in attaining their ends?

We know from authentic history the answer to most of these questions as among the historic Greeks. They abolished their kings, and that soon after Homer's time, which was approximately eight hundred years before the Christian era; in Athens they developed a State under the rule of Judges, called Archons, and under Solon established a democracy more wise and more just than any the world has seen since, with courts inclined to favor the people, with land reasonably controlled against monopoly, with burdens of interest lightened, and with money administered through the public treasury so as to pay all profits of issue and exchange for public purposes instead of for the enrichment of a class of privileged "bankers" as is done in all modern States. The Code of Solon, and the Athenian democracy of the Golden Age which developed from it, put modern codes and self-styled democracies to shame by the wisdom and justice which they show, and without further evidence they argue that Homer's system made for righteousness in public as well as in private life—for it was Homer's myths that supplied the ideals of Solon and the Golden Age. This in general, and pragmatically; a study of particulars, characters and incidents in the epics makes for the same conclusion.

"FALSE GODS" IN "JUDGES" AND IN HOMER'S EPIC:
 (1) APHRODITE; (2) ARES; (3) HEPHÆSTOS.

There are no devils in Homer's epics, but certain of the gods bring destruction to those who serve them, and these are, in general, the same "false gods" whom we find in the Bible, notably Aphrodite. Indeed, the central theme of Homer (which is the destruction of Troy because the Trojans, from Paris to Priam, had turned to Aphrodite against Athene, to whom they had given earlier devotion) finds an exact parallel in Israel, related in Judges ii. 12, 13, 14, 15:

12. And they forsook the Lord God of their fathers....and followed other gods of the people that were round about them, and bowed themselves unto them and provoked the Lord to anger;

13. And they forsook the Lord and served Baal and Ashtaroth;

14. And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about, so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies.

15. Whithersoever they went out, the hand of the Lord was against them for evil, as the Lord had said, and as the Lord had sworn unto them; and they were greatly distressed.

However exalted the goddess Istar (Astarte, Ashtaroth, Aphrodite)² may have been in her origin and in early Babylon, where she had been regarded as the Virgin, Mother of All, the ideal woman untainted and immortal, she was certainly not exalted and pure as traders and sailors carried her cult to the West in later ages. In Palestine, where she was worshiped along with her earthly lover, Tammuz (Adonis), she was regarded by Prophets and Judges as debased earthly love—shall we find her regarded by Homer as exalted heavenly love? The fact that in historic times many of her statues in Grecian temples showed purity of outline and nobility of character, as the Venus of Milo did, would seem to prove that the higher cult of Aphrodite Urania was present in Greece, though the lower, that of Aphrodite Pandemos, may have predominated. The name *Aphrodite*, given her in Greece, would argue the same conclusion. Competent scholars hold that *Aphrodite* is derived from the Egyptian word *Apharadat*, meaning "Gift-of-Ra," Ra being the god of the sun, and exalted; but this foreign derivation seems to have been forgotten by the Greeks themselves as time passed, and they gave it a native root, *ἀφρός*, meaning "foam." Consistently with this they developed the fable that this goddess was a child of

² Carus, *Venus, an Archeological Study of the Goddess of Womanhood.*

the sea and born of the foam, which would make her an altogether lower sort of person. The accident of homophony may have given them this idea, or the fact that she had acquired a character as "unstable as water." Homer does not show Aphrodite as a virgin mother, but as the wedded wife of Hephæstos, secretly connected with Ares, and exposed to shame by Apollo. Her opposite and opponent is Athene, the virgin, goddess of wisdom, who is given the highest esteem in heaven and among the wise on earth.

In Troy, the "gods of the fathers" had been Athene and Father Zeus, and in accord with them Apollo, their god of just retribution, who warned the people that destruction would come to them through Paris. . . . had Homer heard of the incident in the history of Israel, how "*the Lord had said and sworn unto them*" that they would be punished if they admitted the worship of the false gods of the nations round about, including Ashtaroth, and how he had punished them when they forsook him, delivering them "into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them and selling them into the hands of their enemies so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies"? As a bard Homer had wandered far, and the Ionian Islands where he had his home were not far distant from Palestine. Certainly, his great story and the Athenian dramas later built upon it have the Prophet's theme, and the fate of Troy and her people was a warning to the unwise worshipers of Aphrodite.

On the question of an influence from Palestine upon Greece, we have an opinion of Saint Augustine that some of the great Athenian writers, whom he loved and honored even after he turned Christian, were under the influence of the Hebrew prophets. He mentions Plato and the Athenian dramatists specifically as having been so. . . . was it an accident of omission on his part that he did not mention Homer along with them? Plato and the Athenian dramatists drew their themes largely from Homer, and the influence of the prophets may have come to them through him. Writing in the degenerate days of Rome, Saint Augustine has much to say about the vice of the Trojan myth as it was told in his country and by Virgil, but we shall see that his criticisms do not apply to the version given by Homer. To please his patrons, the Cæsars, who had enrolled the goddess Venus (Ashtaroth) among their ancestors, Vergil glorified Venus and showed her finally triumphant when Troy fell in rescuing Æneas, her son, by the shepherd Anchises, and in founding an imperial city, Rome, this by the assistance of Ares (Mars), who was accounted in Rome an ancestor of Romulus. Homer had shown Aphrodite, along with Ares, her secret lover,

defeated in war and unable to protect her votaries, driven abashed out of heaven amid the laughter of the gods—the goddesses remained away for shame—when her cunning husband, Hephæstos, caught the guilty pair in his golden net, having learned of their relation through Apollo. Homer did not preach a crusade against Aphrodite for this and tear down her temples, as a Hebrew prophet had done, but he used the Greek method of turning laughter against her, that potent laughter of comedy, by which Athenian moralists tried to destroy what they did not love and admire. Homer never turned laughter against what he loved and admired, and the good and the great in his epics were not much given to laughter even of a satiric sort, but were distinguished by the high seriousness and earnestness fitting to epic lives.

Among the other lower gods, or "false gods," are Ares, the god of war, and Hephæstos, the god of craftsmanship, or manufacture, both "gods of the nations round about," for Ares was the god of the wild, hostile Scythians of the steppes and Hephæstos was the god of the Cretans, a commercial people with great skill, but not dear to those who had to pay them tribute, witness the story of Theseus and the Minotaur. Aphrodite, also, was a "goddess from afar," having been brought in through Cyprus from the East.

The unfortunate child of a bitter quarrel between Zeus and Here, Hephæstos was ill-tempered, and he was deformed in body not only by the accident at his birth but also by the occupation of his choosing. He was the smith among the gods, and a subject for their laughter. Unwisely he had desired Aphrodite for his wife, it seems without loving her, for his nature was ignoble and no note of heartfelt sorrow is to be detected in his talk when he discovers that she has betrayed him secretly with Ares. He spies upon her and resorts to cunning and vulgar exposure, so that he becomes ridiculous instead of tragic, as he would not be if his wife's base betrayal hurt his heart. He rants, he clamors about the riches he gave for her to her father, and threatens to demand them back, brooches, spiral armbands, necklaces, and cups set with precious stones. These are his delight, and will be the dearest things on earth to his votaries, though they lack those highest of values which the god Apollo gives to real art by inspiration through the Muses. Even the wonderful shield that Hephæstos made for Achilles was a work of mere craftsmanship, not inspired by the Muse, though it pictured many appealing subjects with utmost skill. A background of nature, and people, high and low, at their work and their play—these a true artist might take for works of high art and as a means

to high life, working with aspiration and insight and reverence, in love of this beautiful earth, sympathy with his brother, man, and gratitude to the Divine Giver of all good things. Such a spirit is not in the work of Hephæstos, and how little he cared is shown by the fact that he put these scences from life on a shield, where they would be hacked and battered.

Even less in regard among gods and wise and good men than this smith, Hephæstos, was Ares, the god of war, inconstant and secret lover of inconstant Aphrodite, and betrayer of Hephæstos's home. Though Odysseus was the greatest of warriors, he was not in Ares's service, and he would have preferred not to go to the war, but to remain at home with his wife and child. No wise man loves war for its own sake, or even for the chances it gives him for fame, as Ares and his worshipers do. Ares does not fight for a cause because it is just, as Apollo does, nor because it is wise, as Athene does, and, being without moral power, he often turns coward on the battlefield and is always vanquished by those who have moral power though they seem at a first glance far weaker than he. So, a very young mortal hero, Diomedes, because he is strong in devotion to his worthy cause, lays Ares low in combat, this 'false god' who is wrong. The Iliad shows in various incidents how contemptible Ares is. When he has been vanquished by Diomedes in combat, he flees to Father Zeus, to get sympathy! and to complain of Athene because she started the war! But, son though he is, he receives cold comfort from Father Zeus, for Zeus looks sternly upon him, and says:

"Nay, thou renegade, sit not by me and whine. Most baleful art thou to me of all the gods that dwell in Olympus. Thou ever lovest strife and wars and battle. . . . My offspring art thou. . . . but wert thou born of any other god, long ere this hadst thou been lower than the sons of Heaven."

Ares is condemned by his mother, Hera, also, and no less rigorously, for she is the Guardian of the Home, which he has violated both by his intrigue with Aphrodite and his support of the Trojans who are protecting Paris and Helen. Of Athene, Ares has no comprehension, and when he faces her in combat he can only call her witless names. "Thou Dogfly!" he shouts to her, "What is the reason thou makest gods fight thus?" Such as he are not amenable to argument, so she answers, "Fool, hast thou not been taught to know mine eminence?" and then proceeds to teach him her eminence by vanquishing him in combat, for he may be convinced, or at least impressed by the fact that his own overweening brute force has been less than equal to her moral force. While Ares lies on the field,

defeated and unable to rise, Aphrodite comes forward to help him. raises him up, and begins to lead him away; but she is stopped by Hera and Athene. "Athene, see!" cries Hera, "Ares is helped from the field! *Dogfly* his rude tongue named thee—upon her fly!" Urged on thus by Ares's own mother to punish them, Athene flies at Aphrodite, beats her a furious blow on the breast, and lays her low ignominiously, along with Ares, while she shouts over them in triumph, "So lie all who succors yield to the false Trojans against the Greeks!" And at this, "whitewristed Hera smiled," though she saw her own son thus publicly beaten and scorned.

It will be observed that in the shout of triumph quoted, Athene expressed no personal rancor or satisfied spite against a rival, but only joy in victory for her cause. The motive usually ascribed to her and to Hera for opposing Aphrodite is vanity wounded because the apple of love was not awarded to one of them as most fair by Paris, but to her. This interpretation is not sustained by the preceding incident, nor by any other in Homer. If Athene were meanly vain and jealous, Zeus would not show such regard to her, but would roundly tell her her shortcomings, as he told Ares his. She is his Wisdom, and when he yields to her, it is always because she has spoken wisely. In this war, he must give support to her, because wisdom ought to prevail over unwisdom in such matters as this of violating a home; also, as guardian of guests and of hosts, he ought to take sides against Paris and those who protect him in Troy. Hera's speech urging Athene to humiliate Ares still farther and to attack Aphrodite, is further evidence that wounded vanity is not the motive of Athene—far from being a myth in which two vain goddesses plunge the world into war to spite a rival, Homer's great myth shows Hera overcoming her former feeling against Athene, who was no child of hers, and suppressing her natural prejudices in favor of her own child, in order to do her duty as guardian of the home. Only the "false gods" will defend Paris and his protectors; against them must be ranged (1) Athene, because they are unwise; (2) Hera, because she guards the home; (3) Zeus, because he punishes those who violate the rites of hospitality, and (4) Apollo, because they had been forewarned from God by prophecy against doing the evil thing but had done it nevertheless.

This interpretation of the myth of the fall of Troy as sternly moral and religious, as is the Bible story, is consistent with what we know of the times in which Homer lived. The Homeric age was not an age of dalliance and sophistication, but was notably serious and earnest as compared with later times. Critics have long realized this

and have called Homer's the *Apollonian period*, in distinction from the *Dionysian* which followed. It was characterized by subjection of the individual to the gods, and by self-restraint, which Apollo commanded, while the cult and period of Dionysos were characterized by a greater emotional fervor along with a general abandonment of self-control, sometimes to the "frenzy." The tendency to excess resulted speedily in degeneration, and finally in the evils so sternly and justly condemned by the early Christians. The Athenian drama of the great period (500 B. C.), with which Saint Augustine was in keen sympathy, as we have said, showed no weakening of the Apollonian self-control, but a happy blending of Apollonian and Dionysian elements. Its themes were taken largely from Homer, and its spirit was high and earnest, with developments in faith beyond what Homer had grasped, but consistent, and, as Saint Augustine judged it, very like the faith of the prophets. The periods to which Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Plato and the Athenian dramatists gave expression held a view of life, morality and religion more nearly akin to that of the prophets than to the pagan mythology of Rome under the Cæsars—we can only wonder that Vergil, the Aphrodisian, should ever have been credited with kinship to the prophets, as he was for centuries. It is true that he wrote of a coming Saviour and of the advent of Peace with him, but the Saviour he looked for was his patron Cæsar, "Augustus," who assumed divinity in imitation of the rulers of the East. So far as Vergil had a religion, he worshiped Venus and Mars, the "false gods" of the prophets, and of Homer. A study of Homer's "gods of the fathers" will show him, here also, not akin to Vergil, but to the prophets.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE COSMIC MAN AND HOMO SIGNORUM.

BY LAWRENCE PARMLY BROWN.

THE primary suggestion for the concept of the cosmos or universe in human (or animal) form is presumably found in the very ancient and widely distributed identification of the sun and moon as eyes; the cosmic man (*homo*, but generally a male, *vir*) naturally being assimilated to the supreme anthropomorphic god who is otherwise conceived as existing beyond the firmament and outside of the universe. In this assimilation of the cosmic man to the supreme god, whether or not as the one and only god, we appear to have the most primitive form of pantheism, with a recognition of the coexistence, consubstantiality and absolute identity of the god and the universe.

The sun and moon as eyes were doubtless originally assigned to separate deities, otherwise supposed to be invisible; but where these luminaries were recognized as the two eyes of the same deity, that deity must have been conceived as a vast celestial or cosmic figure, whose head was often identified with the celestial sphere (see previous article on "The Cosmic Eyes"). Although it was generally believed that the earth was at the center of the celestial sphere, nevertheless the head of the cosmic man, with its visible eye or eyes, was naturally and generally supposed to be viewed from the outside rather than from within; the head with the solar eye only sometimes being conceived in profile, as we shall see further on. But with the two eyes, solar and lunar, their ever-changing relative positions may well have been referred to a partial rotation of the head as it revolved about the earth, with both eyes always in the zodiac band. Thus the lunar (left) eye when full or round like the solar (right) eye, and farthest from the latter, is referable to a full-face view; while a gradual rotation of the head would make the eyes appear to draw closer and closer together, until the lunar eye is entirely hidden, to reappear as the head begins to rotate in a reverse direction—of course with no foundation in celestial phenomena.

The north having always been recognized as the top of the celestial sphere, the cosmic head with its eyes in the zodiac band has its crown to the north; its mouth and chin to the south, and its nose between the eyes and mouth; while its ears as well as nose were sometimes supposed to extend beyond the surface of the sphere, as we shall see. In another view, the head appears to have been conceived as facing upward, toward the north, with eyes, ears and mouth in the zodiac band and the nose corresponding to the north pole of the celestial sphere; while again, as in an Egyptian calendar of the XXth dynasty, the eyes and ears appear to have been assigned to the (oblique) zodiac band, with the nose to the pole of the earth, which puts the mouth to the south (see previous article on "The Cosmic Mouth, Ears and Nose"). The Egyptians sometimes considered the cosmic face with its two eyes as that of Horus (Heru, who was generally a solar or soli-cosmic god), perhaps because of the similarity in sound between *Heru* and *her* or *hra*, the word for "face" (see Maspero, *Dawn*, p. 86; Budge, *Gods*, I, p. 466).

With the head of the cosmic man more or less closely identified with the celestial sphere, his trunk or torso was sometimes identified with the earth, and his feet were supposed to be in the underworld, or in the underworld sea, or even on the earth itself; while his hands were occasionally identified with the solar flabelli or with those of the sun and moon (see articles on "The Cosmic Feet" and "The Cosmic Hands"). But in another view, the entire cosmic man (or animal) was identified with the celestial sphere, being conceived and figured in positions that conform more or less closely to the spherical—as we shall see.

In Egypt and elsewhere, both the heaven and the earth, as well as the sun, moon and stars, were generally personified as separate gods; but in a Hymn to Ptah-Tenen, belonging to about 1100 B. C., the father-god Ptah is assimilated to the very ancient Ta-Tenen = the Motionless Earth, and recognized as of soli-cosmic character. In one verse his feet are on the earth; while in another they are in the underworld, his body being the earth. Thus we read in the hymn: "Homage to thee, O Ptah-Tenen, thou great god, whose form is hidden (i. e., 'invisible')! Thou openest thy soul and thou wakest up in peace, O father of the fathers of all the gods, thou Disk of heaven! Thou illumines it (the heaven) with thy two eyes (sun and moon), and thou lightest up the earth with thy brilliant rays in peace. . . . Thy feet are upon the earth, and thy head is in the heights above. . . . The upper part of thee is heaven and the lower part of thee is the Tuat (the underworld). The winds come

forth from thy nostrils, and the celestial waters (the rain) from thy mouth, and the staff of life (grain) proceeds from thy back (the earth); thou makest the earth to bring forth fruit....When thou art at rest the darkness cometh, and when thou openest thy two eyes beams of light are produced. Thou shinest in thy crystal form (that of the firmament) according to (the wont of) thy majesty....Lord of the hidden throne, hidden is he....Hidden one, whose eternal form is unknown" (in Budge, *Gods*, I, p. 509-512). In later times the priests of Heliopolis referred the body and soul of the universe to Osiris, while the priests of Saïs referred them to Neith (*ibid.*, II, p. 299). Ra, originally the sun-god, becomes the *pantheos*, or the god comprehending all gods, and also the cosmic man, in the *Litany of Ra*. In this text he is said to be Temt = the universal being, "who is born under the form of the all-surrounding universe" (I, 1). He is Tenen = the earth (3), and "the god with the large (solar) disk" (4), He is the "supreme power, the only one (6)...the spirit that walks (8)...whose body is so large that it hides his shape (13)...whose head shines more than he who is before him (18)...his form is that of Remi (= the Weeper, the god of rain—21)...his form is that of the divine eye" (24). He is "he who raises his head (26)...who sheds tears (29)... who raises his hand (the solar flabellum) and who glorifies his eye; his form is that of the god with the hidden body" (30 and 39). He is "the god with the numerous shapes (32)...the being with the mysterious face, who makes the divine eye more (37)... the supremely great one who embraces the empyrean (38)...his form is that of the shining one" (50). He is "the hidden one" (52) and Senekher = Shining face, and "his form is that of Senekher" (62) as well as of Tenen (66). He is also "armed with teeth (71)...the great god who raises his two eyes" (74), etc. (*Records of the Past*, VIII, pp. 103-113). In the inscription of Darius at El Kargeh it is said to Amen-Ra: "Thou art heaven, thou art earth, thou art fire, thou art water, and thou art air in the midst of them" (*ibid.*, VIII, p. 143).

The early Egyptians believed that the deceased acquired the powers and attributes of a certain god or certain gods, with whom he was mystically identified; and the several members of his body were also identified with certain gods, who collectively appear to have comprehended the whole universe—the deceased thus representing the cosmic or soli-cosmic man. Thus we read in the *Book of the Dead*: "It is Ra who created names for his members, and

these come into being in the form of the gods who are in the retinue of Ra" (XVII, 11 and 12, Theban). In the very ancient Pyramid Texts, the body of the deceased is identified with "the eighteen gods" and "the double company" of the gods, composed of "the great company" and "the little company." The double company generally comprises $2 \times 9 = 18$ gods, but sometimes $2 \times 10 = 20$, $2 \times 11 = 22$ or $2 \times 12 = 24$, who were variously named in different localities and periods; and the two companies are supposed to have belonged to the heaven and the earth respectively, with a third company occasionally added for the underworld (Budge, *Gods*, I, pp. 85-92). In Chap. CXL of the *Book of the Dead*, twenty-three gods are named and said to be "the soul and body of Ra" (6 and 7). In one of the Pyramid Texts the bones of the deceased are the gods and goddesses of heaven; in another, his right (eastern) side belongs to Horus, and his left (western) side to Set (Budge, *Gods*, I, pp. 108, 109), while from the *Book of the Dead*, XC, 4, we learn that some assigned the heart, others the secrets, to Set. In fact, such assignments often varied in different periods and localities. Thus in several interesting texts we have variant groups of some twenty to twenty-five members of the deceased identified with the corresponding members of as many gods, or with the gods themselves, or with their symbols, etc. In the group from the Pyramid Texts (Pepi I, 565 et seq.; in Budge, *Gods*, I, pp. 109, 110), the head of the deceased has the form of "the hawk (of Horus)"; but nevertheless nine members of the head are allotted to as many gods (the hair to Nu, as suggested by the rain from the watery heaven), while the remainder of the body has thirteen members for as many gods, etc. Quite a different group is found in the *Book of the Dead* (XLII, 5-10, Theban; 4-9, Saïte), with some variations in the different papyri; the Papyrus of Nu having seven members and gods for the head, and twelve for the remainder of the body (see Budge, *Book of the Dead*, ed. 1909, II, p. 176; cf. pp. 179-182 for the Papyrus of Ani group). Quite different, again, is the group in the *Litany of Ra*, with seven allotments for the head and nineteen for the remainder of the body (IV, Sect. I, 8; in *Records of the Past*, VIII, pp. 123, 124). In the *Book of the Dead* (*loc. cit.*), the deceased is identified with the soli-cosmic Ra and is made to say: "There is no member of my body which is not the member of some god"; while in the *Litany of Ra* (*loc. cit.*) we read of the deceased: "His members are gods, he is throughout a god, no one of his members is without a god, the gods are of his substance."

The Babylonians supposed that the several members of the

human body were under the control of demons, to whom were attributed the various afflictions to which these members are subject (Lenormant, *Chaldean Magic*, Eng. ed., p. 36, and see previous articles in this series, on "The Cosmic Madness," etc.). Again, in ancient Mexico, according to the Codex Vaticanus (Mex.), twenty members of the body were ruled by as many powers represented by symbols, ten of which have names of animals, while the other



MAYAN ALLOTMENT OF SYMBOLS TO MEMBERS OF THE BODY.

(From the Mexican *Codex Vaticanus*, in Kingsborough, *Mexican Antiquities*, II, Plate 75, etc., with interpretations according to Bancroft, *Native Races*, III, 129—excepting (dragon), which should be (rain), for the eye.

ten have names of objects, elements, etc. (see accompanying illustration). Moreover, ten of these symbolized powers are allotted to the head and ten to the remainder of the body; which suggests that the figure originally represented the cosmic man belonging to the heaven and the earth, as in one of the variant Egyptian concepts.

But all the twenty symbols in the *Codex Vaticanus* illustration are doubtless mere variants of the symbols of the twenty days in the Aztec and Mayan month; twenty being one of the units in the Mexican system of numeration. In fact, the symbols in both groups are interpreted to represent the same twenty animals, objects, elements, etc., except in two instances, where the correspondence is reasonably certain. Nevertheless there appears to be no correspondence in the order of the two groups; nor is there any close resemblance between them and the Egyptian groups. But there is a remarkable resemblance between the ten Mexican animals and ten of the twelve in the Mongolian zodiac; which is one among several indications of a prehistoric connection between Mexico and eastern



CHINESE ZODIAC ANIMALS
as allotted to the members of the body.
English names substituted. (From
a modern Chinese Almanac.)



COSMIC BRAHM OR BRAHMA
in the form of the celestial sphere.
(From Guigniaut's *Creuzer's Symbolik*, Part II, Vol. IV, Pl. I, No. 1.)

Asia (see Geoghegan, "Chinese and Central American Calendars," in *The Monist*, XVI, pp. 562-596). In the accompanying illustration from a modern Chinese almanac, the twelve Mongolian signs are allotted to as many members of a seated man, approaching the spherical form, and therefore perhaps derived from some ancient figure of the cosmic man—on whose body we shall find the zodiac signs in other ancient representations.

In the Hindu *Rigveda* the universe is identified with Purusha = Man. "Purusha, who has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet (all as originally suggested by the stars as the eyes of celestial beings), investing the earth in all directions, exceeds

(it by a space) measuring ten fingers (apparently corresponding to the distance to which the ears and nose of the celestial head were conceived to extend beyond the sphere). Purusha is verily all this universe; all that is, and all that is to be. . . . the gods performed the sacrifice with Purusha as the offering. . . . From that victim, in whom the universal oblation was offered," all the creatures of the earth were produced. "When they immolated Purusha," his mouth, arms, thighs and feet became the four races of men, represented by the four castes of ancient India—a detail exclusively Hindu. But the broader concept appears in the next few verses: "The moon was born (i. e., 'produced') from his mind; the sun was born from his eye; Indra (for the air) and Agni (for fire or heat) were born from his mouth; Vayu (for the wind) from his breath (or, 'air and breath proceeded from his ear, and fire rose from his mouth,' according to the *Yajur Veda*). From his navel came the firmament; from his head the heaven was produced; the earth from his feet; the quarters of space from his ear; so they (the gods) constituted the universe. . . . (when they) bound Purusha as the (sacrificial) victim" (*Rigveda*, X, 90, 1-15; also in *Yajur Veda*, XXXI, 1-16, and *Atharva Veda*, XIX, 6). But of course this concept of the body of a primordial Purusha discepted or cut to pieces is merely a later variant of the identification of the universe as the great cosmic man. The Vedic Purusha is not only the cosmic man, but also the prototype of the first created man, the Biblical Adam, who is described in the *Talmud* as of such immense size that his head was in the heaven while his feet reached to the end (bottom) of the world (*Chagiga*, XII, 7). The supreme god of India is Brahm or Brahma; the former name often being restricted to the absolute spirit who was manifested as the creator Brahma. As the cosmic god, Brahm or Brahma is sometimes represented in spherical form, with one of his toes in his mouth—as suggested by the symbolical serpent of the zodiac forming a circle with its tail in its mouth (see Guignaut's *Creuzer's Symbolik*, IV, Part II, Plate I, No. 1; Lundy, *Monument. Christian.*, p. 88, fig. 26). In the *Bhagavadgita*, one of the books of the *Mahabharata*, the spiritual Brahm is mystically identified with Krishna, the latter in fact being the manifestation and incarnation of the former; and in one view set forth in that book, Brahm and Krishna are respectively the soul and body of the universe (VI). Krishna is everything in the manifested universe: "In him is included all nature; by him all things are spread abroad" (VIII). He is "the eternal Purusha" or Maha-Purusha = Great Man (X). In his human form he describes his divine nature to Arjuna, and

when the latter expresses himself as anxious to behold the god's divine form, he is given "a celestial eye" so he may behold the transfigured Krishna. "Behold in this my body the whole universe animate and inanimate," says Krishna; whereupon he appears as the cosmic man, more or less obscured by the Oriental exaggeration of the description. He "made evident unto Arjuna his supreme and celestial form; of many a mouth and eye; many a wondrous sight; many a celestial ornament; many an upraised weapon; adorned with celestial robes and chaplets; anointed with celestial essence; covered with every marvellous thing; the eternal God, whose countenance is turned on every side! The glory and amazing splendour of this mighty being may be likened to the sun rising at once into the heavens with a thousand times more than usual brightness. The son of Pandu (Arjuna) then beheld within the body of the God of Gods, standing together, the whole universe divided forth into its vast variety. He (Arjuna) was overwhelmed with wonder, and every hair was raised on end (with fear)." He addressed the transfigured Krishna thus: "O universal Lord, form of the universe! I see thee with a crown, and armed with club and chakra (a discus used in battle), a mass of glory, darting refulgent beams around. I see thee, difficult to be seen, shining on all sides with light immeasurable, like the ardent fire or the glorious sun. . . . Thou art from all beginning, and I esteem thee Purusha. I see thee without beginning, without middle, and without end; of valour infinite; of arms immeasurable; the sun and moon thy eyes; thy mouth a flaming fire, and the whole universe shining with thy reflected glory. . . . The (three) worlds, alike with me, are terrified at beholding thy wondrous form gigantic; . . ." Krishna says: "Well pleased, O Arjuna, I have shown thee, by my divine power, this my supreme form, the universe in all its glory, infinite and eternal. . . . The son of Vasudeva (Krishna) having thus spoken unto Arjuna, showed him again his natural (human) form; and having assumed his milder shape, he presently assuaged the fears of the affrighted Arjuna" (XI).

In the *Vishnu Purana* we read: "The universe was produced from Vishnu; he is the cause of its continuance and cessation; he is the universe": and he is the supreme Brahm, the soul of the universe, who first became manifested as Purusha (I, 1 and 2; cf. II, 7, etc.). In the same book there is an invocation to the Supreme, in which we find the following version of the above-quoted Vedic concept: "Thou art the male with a thousand heads, a thousand feet, who traversed the universe, all that has been, and that

shall be; and all this universe is in thee, assuming this universal form. . . . From thine eyes comes the sun; from thine ears, the wind; from thy mind, the moon; the vital airs come from thy central vein; fire comes from thy mouth; the sky, from thy navel; the heaven, from thy head; the regions come from thine ears, and the earth comes from thy feet" (I, 12). In the *Ramayana* it is said that Purusha assumed the form of a man, with the sky as his body, supporting the whole host of stars; while twenty-four of his members are identified or connected with as many objects in nature, elements, gods, etc. Thus his eyes are the sun and moon; his ears are the two Aswins (probably as gods of the two chief winds) fire is in his mouth; the oceans are in his belly; his bones are certain mountains; the clouds are on his neck, and his sides are at the four quarters of the heaven (VII, 28). According to Macrobius (*Sat.*, I, 20), the Egyptian Serapis made the following reply to Nicocreon, King of Cyprus (4th century, B. C.), when asked as to which of the gods he should be considered:

"A god I am such as I reveal myself to thee—
The ornamented heaven is my head; the sea, my trunk;
The earth forms my feet; mine ears are in the ether,
And my far-darting eye is the brilliant sun."

The most remarkable concept in the above-cited Hindu texts is that of the wind or the two chief winds as coming from the cosmic ears, which are allotted to the ether in Macrobius—probably because they were conceived to extend, like the nose, beyond the surface of the celestial sphere or head (for the later connection of the ears with the northern and southern zodiac signs and the corresponding chief winds, see previous article on "The Cosmic Mouth, Ears and Nose"). The *Vishnu Purana* text agrees in part with the Vedic concept of the formation or creation of the universe from the dis-cerpted body of Purusha as the archetypal cosmic man; and in the Norse *Elder Edda* we read as follows of the slain giant who represents the primordial chaos:

<p>"Of Ymir's flesh Was earth (= soil) created; Of his blood, the sea; Of his bones, the hills; Of his hair, trees and plants; Of his skull, the heaven:</p>	<p>And of his eye-brows The gentle powers Formed Midgard for the sons of men; But of his brain The heavy clouds are All created."</p>
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(*"Grimnismal,"* 40, 41; cf. *"Vafthrudnismal,"* 21, and *Younger Edda*, I, 8.)

According to the Pahlavi (medieval Persian) *Sikand-gumanik Vigar* the Christian heresiarch Mani (or Manichæus) stated that "the worldly existence is a bodily formation of Aharman (the evil deity), the bodily formation being a production of Aharman. And a repetition (= variation) of that statement is this, that the sky is from the skin, the earth from the flesh, the mountains from the bones, and the trees from the hair of the demon Kuni (the Kunda of the *Avesta*, "Vend.," XI, 28, 36, and the *Bundahesh*, XXVIII. 42). The rain is the seed of the Mazendarans, who are bound on the celestial sphere. . . . Kuni is the commander of the army of Aharman. . . . in binding the demon Kuni on the celestial sphere he is killed, and those magnificent creatures are preserved from him and formed" (XVI, 8-20). Again, according to the *Acta Disputationes cum Manete* (7), attributed to Archelaus, the Manichæans taught that the firmament is the body of "the princes of darkness"—probably for "the prince of darkness," Aharman. But all this is of comparatively late date; in fact, neither Aharman nor Kunda appears to have been recognized as a cosmic figure by the earlier Iranians, who held that Ahuramazda (Auharmazd, Ormuzd) and Aharman (Ahriman), as the good and evil deities, existed outside of the universe. According to the *Avesta*, Ahuramazda created the Aryan countries from the body of the slain Gayo-marathan (Gayomard), the primordial man ("Fravardin Yasht," 87). In later times, the cosmic Kronos or Æon of the Greco-Persian Mithraists, with four wings for the cardinal points and seasons, was generally figured in the folds of a serpent, for the oblique circles of the sun throughout the year; the heaven being represented by this aged cosmic man's trunk or torso, upon which the zodiac signs were sometimes placed, between the serpent's folds: and the breath of this Kronos was occasionally represented as the wind or spirit that vivifies the all-pervading fire or heat of nature, otherwise the soul of the universe (Lajard, *Recherches sur le culte de Mithra*, II, Plates LXX-LXXIII; Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, figs. 14, 21, 22, 68, 96). It also appears that the youthful Mithra was sometimes represented as the serpent-entwined cosmic man with the zodiac signs on his body; and the same is true of Serapis, at least in one Roman example (Montfaucon, *L'antiq. expl.*, I, p. 215; Supp. II, p. 149, Plate XLII).

The Greek Zeus (Jupiter) is the cosmic man in an Orphic hymn preserved in more or less fragmentary form by Aristotle (*De Mund.*, VII); Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.*, III, 9) and Proclus

(*In Tim.*, p. 95) ; the following verses being from Taylor's English version in his *Mystical Hymns of Orpheus* (pp. 47-49) :

"For in Jove's royal body all things lie;
Fire, night and day, earth, water and the sky.

.
See how his bounteous head and aspect bright
Illumine heaven, and scatter boundless light!

.
His eyes, the Sun, and Moon with borrowed ray.

.
The extended region of surrounding air
Forms his broad shoulders, back and bosom fair;

.
His sacred belly earth with fertile plains
And mountains swelling to the clouds contains;
His middle zone 's the spreading sea profound,
Whose roaring waves the solid globe surround;
The distant realms of Tartarus obscure,
Within Earth's roots, his holy feet secure."

According to another Orphic hymn (Frag. VII), the worshiper in the Bacchic mysteries personated the cosmic god, wearing a crimson robe for the fire of the sun; a spotted fawn skin for the starry heaven, and a golden belt for the earth-surrounding ocean—the body of the worshiper representing the earth. Somewhat similarly, the whole universe was symbolically represented on the long garment of the Jewish high priest (*Book of Wisdom*, XVIII, 24; Josephus, *Antiq.*, III, 7, 7, etc.) . Again, in the *Orphic Hymns* and elsewhere, Pan (Πάν) is recognized as a figure of τὸ πᾶν = the all, the universe (in spite of the difference in accent) ; and Athanasius Kircher gives a figure of Pan as the cosmic man, with his head for the superior heaven, his breast for the firmament, his belly for the oceans, his thighs and legs for the several divisions of the land—the erect figure standing on the pedestal of the "stable foundation" (*Oedipus Aegyptiacus*, II, Part I, pp. 204, 428).

In the *Bhagavat Purana* it is said that the celestial sphere is imaged by some in the form of the aquatic animal called Sisumara (= porpoise) ; "its head being turned downward (i. e., toward its belly), and its body bent in a circle," with Dhruva the pole star on the point of its tail. Other stars are allotted to other parts of

this porpoise, and the path of the sun is on its back (see translation of Sir Wm. Jones, in *Asiatic Researches*, II, p. 402). In the *Vishnu Purana*, II, 12, the celestial sphere again has the form of a porpoise, which revolves around the pole star, with its tail and hind quarters in the north; but in this text we find certain divinities and personifications either identified or connected with the several parts of the animal, and here is it added that "From the (primordial) waters, which are the body of Vishnu, was produced the lotus-shaped earth, with its seas and mountains." In the Babylonian "Creation Epic," it appears that Apsu and Tiamat, as husband and wife, represent respectively the lower and upper waters of the primordial chaos; Tiamat, the female, therefore corresponding to the Egyptian Nut, while Apsu, the male, corresponds to Nut's male variant, Nu. The Babylonian couple mingled their waters together and thus created the first of the gods ("Creation Epic," Tablet I, 1-13). In the storm-war of Apsu and Tiamat against the gods, the former are defeated by the solar Marduk (Bel), who chains Apsu in the underworld and cuts the body of Tiamat in two, making the heaven of one half of her (*ibid.*, Tablet IV, 119-137), and the earth of the other half (according to Berosos as preserved through Alexander Polyhistor by Eusebius, *Chron.*, V, 8). The body of Tiamat therefore became the twofold universe, exclusive of the underworld; and in the epic she appears to be conceived as a woman, although she was generally figured as a serpent.

The generality of the Greeks always took the universe for a vast revolving sphere, with its interior surface forming the heaven visible to men; and the pantheistic philosophers of Greece generally identified the one supreme Being with that sphere, which thus was conceived as a living being with body and soul. This view is said to have been held in the sixth century B. C. by Pythagoras (Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, I, 11, etc.) and Xenophanes (Aristot., *De Xenoph.*, V, p. 977); and it was doubtless at the basis of Zeno's philosophy in the fourth century B. C. (Cicero, II, 17, etc.), and that of the Stoics who followed him (*ibid.*, I, 14, etc.). The later Stoic doctrine of a spiritual supreme Being as the soul of the universe (*anima mundi*) appears to have been known in the fifth century B. C. to Empedocles, who speaks of the supreme Being as "a holy, infinite spirit that passes through the universe with rapid thoughts"; and he declares that the universe does not have members like a human being, but is a globe (Frag. in Hippolytus, *Philosophum.*, VII, 17). In the fourth century B. C. Aristotle taught that God is eternal thought, which is the universal essence, existing in nature both as body and

soul, the living God thus being the universe (*Metaph.*, XII). In the same century Plato distinguished between the supreme God and the spherical universe as the cosmic god, the latter being the creation of the former; for he makes Timæus deny that the universe has the form of a man, and describes it as a living animal (i. e., an animated being) in the form of a globe, a god created by the eternal God, with an invisible soul, "the only-begotten universe" (*Tim.* 30-34, 92). Thus, too, the Christian Father Origen says: "I am of opinion that the whole universe also ought to be regarded as some huge and immense animal which is kept together by the power and reason of God as by one soul" (*De Princip.*, III, 3); and Plato makes Socrates argue that the universe is a body because it is composed of the same elements as the human body, which comes from it, and that it has a soul, whence comes the human soul (*Phileb.*, 29, 30).

According to the neo-Platonists—Apuleius, Plotinus, Porphyrius, Proclus and others—the soul of the universe or "world soul" emanated from the Nous (intelligence), which emanated from the One, the supreme God existing outside of the universe; and in the twelfth century A. D. the Jew Maimonides says that "God must be thought of as the soul of the universe. . . . but God is not inherent in the body of the universe" (*Moreh Nebuchim*, I, 72). This is in accordance with *Wisdom*, I, 7: "For the spirit of the Lord filleth the universe; and that which holdeth together the All (or 'containeth all things') hath knowledge of the voice (of men)." But according to the plenists, following Parmenides (fifth century B. C.) there is nothing but absolute being, embodied in the spherical universe, which is a plenum (full thing) without any vacuum; and Jehovah sometimes appears to be identified with the absolute being of the plenists. Thus we read in Jer. xxiii. 24: "Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." Again, the Psalmist says: "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in sheol (hell), thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there thy hand shall lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." And still again, in Acts xvii. 28, it is said of God (= Jehovah): "For in him we live, and move, and are (= exist—A. V., 'and have our being')." Clement of Alexandria tells us that Peter, in his "Preaching," spoke of the "one God" who is "the Invisible who sees all things; incapable of being contained, who contains all things" (*Strom.*, VI, 5; cf. V. 14). According to the *Clementine Homilies*, Peter taught that God is the universe, but invisible, while man is his visible image—"He (God) is as it were in the center of the infinite, being (also) the

limit of the universe; and the extensions taking their rise with Him possess the nature of six infinities," penetrating above, below, to the right, to the left, in front and behind (*Hom.* XVII, 7 and 9). These six extensions in space apparently suggested the three pairs of "roots," æons or emanations of Simon Magus (early in the first century A. D.), whose "Great Infinite Power which is fire" generated the universe through the six "roots"—Mind and Intelligence, Voice and Name, Ratiocination and Reflection—in which the entire power resides potentially (in Hippolytus, *Philosophum.*, VII, 7 and 8).

In Colossians it is said of Jesus Christ as the cosmic man: "And he is before all, and all things in him subsist (A. V., 'by him all things consist') . . . in him all the fulness (*plērōma*—of the divinity) was pleased to dwell (A. V., 'it pleased the Father that in him should all the fulness dwell') . . . For in him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily . . . Christ is all things and in all" (i. 17, 19; ii. 9; iii. 11; cf. Eph. i. 23)* The Gnostic Perataë (second century) interpreted these texts to signify that Christ possessed the threefold nature of the Divinity residing in the three divisions of the universe: viz., the unbegotten, the self-produced, and the transient world in which we live—otherwise "Father, Son and Matter" (Hippolytus, *Philosophum.*, V, 7 and 12; X, 6); and the Arabian Gnostic Monoimus (second century) taught that the Christ of Colossians, as the son of man, had been generated by the supreme man (God), and that the son is both a monad and a decade, symbolized by the Greek $\iota = 10$ (*ibid.*, VIII, 5 and 6—where we doubtless have an error attributing to Monoimus the doctrine that the supreme man rather than the son is the universe).

The highest development of the concept of the cosmic Christ as the Pleroma or "fulness" of the divinity in the universe is found in the doctrines of the great Gnostic Valentinus and his followers in the second century A. D., as preserved by Irenæus (*Adv. Haeres.*, I and II), followed by Hippolytus (*Philosophum.*, VI, 24-32), Tertullianus (*Adv. Valentin.*) and Epiphanius (*Haeres.*, XXXI, XXXII, XXXV). The Valentinians taught that the supreme Being, called


* In Eph. i. 23, the Church is figuratively the body of Christ and "the fulness of him who fills all things in all"—otherwise "the fulness of God" (*ibid.*, iii. 19). "But to each one of us was given grace to the measure of the gift of the Christ," who not only lived on earth, but also descended into the underworld, and "ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things"—in the threefold universe (*ibid.*, iv. 7-10). And thus in the Gospel of John the fulness of Christ as the incarnate Word is referred especially to his glory (and truth); for he is "full of grace and truth. . . . And of his fulness we all received, and grace upon grace. . . . the grace and the truth through Jesus Christ came" (John i. 14, 16, 17).

Proarche (= first-beginning), Propater (= first-father) and Bythos (= profundity), "contains all things within himself" (Irenæus, *Adv. Haeres.*, II, 3, 1; 4, 2), and that his Ennoea (= idea) was his consort, called Charis (= grace) and Sige (= silence). From them proceeded the first pair of aeons or emanations, Nous (= intelligence) and his consort Aletheia (= truth); and Nous alone produced Logos (= word) and Zoe (= life), who in turn produced Anthropos (= man) and Ecclesia (= church) and ten other æons: while Anthropos and Ecclesia produced twelve, the youngest of whom was Sophia (= wisdom—in the sense of "knowledge" or "learning"). These form "the invisible and spiritual Pleroma" of thirty aeons, including the supreme Being and his consort; but afterward Nous (also called Monogenes = only-begotten, like Plato's universe) and Aletheia produced "another conjugal pair," the first (or spiritual) Christ and the Holy Spirit (feminine in accordance with the gender of the word "spirit" in Hebrew), who completed the number of the aeons (by some reckoned as thirty without the supreme Being and his consort—see Hippolytus, *Philosophum.*, VI, 26). Then all the aeons jointly produced "a being of the most perfect beauty, the very star of the Pleroma, and the perfect fruit of it, namely, Jesus (in spiritual form, before the creation of the universe). Of Him they also speak under the name of Saviour, and (the second) Christ, and patronimically, Logos, and Everything, because he was formed of the contributions of all" (Iren., *op. cit.*, I, 1, 1-3; 2, 5 and 6; but according to the Docetae, the primal Being produced three aeons, each of whom grew to ten, and finally to an infinite number, thus filling the Pleroma that produced the celestial Christ (Hippol., *op. cit.*, VIII, 1-3). In the meantime, Sophia had brought forth the primordial substance, formless and devoid of spirit or soul; this substance being identified as her enthymesis (= inborn idea), which was expelled from the spiritual Pleroma to the psychic world that exists between the spiritual and the material worlds (in accordance with the three-fold constitution of man as spirit, soul and body—in *Thes.* v. 23). The enthymesis of Sophia is also personified as Achamoth (for the Heb. Chockmah = wisdom), to whom the second Christ gave psychic form; and from the passions of Achamoth came "the substance of the matter (i. e., the psychic elements) from which this universe was formed. . . . from her tears all that is of a liquid nature was formed; from her smile all that was lucent, and from her grief and perplexity, all the corporeal elements of the universe." But she had previously produced the Demiurge (= worker—for the Old

Testament creator), who gave material and corporeal form to the universe and everything therein (Iren., *op. cit.*, I, 2, 3 and 4; 3, 4; 4, 2 and 5; 5, 1-4). In the original of this scheme, the second Christ or Jesus was probably the psychic emanation of the first or spiritual Christ, and also the soul that became incarnated as the son of the Virgin Mary. But some of the Valentinians held that the Demiurge (= Jehovah) had originally produced the son of Mary "as his own proper son"; and that the second Christ descended upon the latter at his baptism (*ibid.*, VII, 2; cf. XI, 1 for variant ideas as to the parentage of the psychic Christ who became incarnated).

In the Valentinian doctrine, the confines of the spiritual Pleroma (corresponding to the firmament in the celestial sphere or material universe) are personified as Horos (= limit) or Horothetes (= one who fixes boundaries), who is also called Stauros (= a stake; secondarily, a cross), 'that Power which supports all things'; a supposed allusion to this Horos as Stauros being found in Gal. vi. 14, where the writer speaks of "the stake (*stauros*, A. V. 'cross') of our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom to me the universe (*cosmos*) has been crucified (*estaurōtai*), and I to the universe" (Iren., *ibid.*, I, 2, 2 and 4; 3, 5—*stauros* always being employed for the instrument of "crucifixion" in the New Testament, where the A. V. has "cross"). When Achamoth, the enthymesis of Sophia, had been expelled from the spiritual Pleroma, the second Christ took pity on her, "and having extended himself through and beyond Stauros, he imparted a (psychic) figure to her"—thus being recognized as a prototype of the crucified Jesus Christ, son of Mary (*ibid.*, 1, 4, 1: 7, 2; cf. Tertullianus, *Adv. Valentin.*, 27: "The animal and carnal Christ, however, does suffer in delineation of the superior Christ, who, for the purpose of producing Achamoth, had been stretched upon the Cross, that is, Horos, in a substantial though not in a cognitional form"). It is not improbable that the primary suggestion for this psychic Christ as stretched or stretching himself upon the Cross of the spiritual Pleroma is to be found in Plato's description of the formation of the zodiac band and celestial equator from the invisible soul of the universe, which the eternal God "divided lengthways into two parts, which he joined to one another at the center like the figure of X, and bent them into a circular form, connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite contact," afterward dividing the zodiac band into six bands (by seven lines) for the orbits of the seven planets (*Tim.*, 36). But there is nothing of this in the Valentinian doctrine, where the underlying idea appears to be that of the cross as a symbol of extension

in all directions—more strictly in four directions, toward the cardinal points. Thus in the *Sibylline Oracles* it is prophesied by Jesus Christ on the cross that “He will spread his hands and measure all the universe”; while reference is made to the nail marks in his hands and feet, after his resurrection, as “denoting east and west, and south and north” (VIII, 301, 322). Like Purusha and Adam as cosmic figures, Jesus Christ as “the second Adam” was said by the Essenes to have been of such size that he stretched to an immeasurable distance (Epiphanius, *Haeres.*, XIX, 4); and as fastened on the cosmic cross he is a mere variant of the Manichæan Kuni who was bound on the celestial sphere, where he died (see above; and cf.



MEDIEVAL COSMIC MAN
and the Cross of the Celestial
Sphere.*

the figures of Christ and Krishna crucified in space, as apparently identified with the sun-god, in article on “The Cosmic Hands”). The cosmic man of the celestial sphere, with the center of his body on the crossing point of the ecliptic, the equator (for latitude) and an equinoctial meridian line (for longitude), is well illustrated in the *Margarita Philosophica* of Georg Reisch (VI, 1, 11; A. D. 1496, 1503, etc.). Again, in a medieval Christian representation given by Didron, the cross on which Jesus Christ is stretched is superimposed upon the gigantic body of God, who supports it by grasping the ends of its arms with his hands (*Christ. Iconog.*, Fig. 130, p. 505).

Whether the Gospel writers conceived that the *stauros* on which Jesus Christ suffered was a simple stake or a cross of some sort, there can be little or no doubt that their accounts of his sacrificial crucifixion are colored by some such ancient concept as that of the Manichæan Kuni as the cosmic man bound on the celestial sphere, and from whose discepted body the material universe was formed—as also in the case of the Vedic Purusha as a sacrificial victim (see above). But the universe was symbolically represented on the long garment of the Jewish high priest, and we find the disceptation of the cosmic Christ replaced in the Gospel story by the division of the garments of Jesus among those who crucified him (Mark xv. 24;

* From Reisch, *Margarita Philosophica*, VI, 1, 11.

Matt. xxvii. 35; John xix. 23—with some details from Ps. xxii. 18, as the prophetic type). Indeed, in the Gospel of John, these garments are divided into four parts, as if for the four quarters of the universe. The Manichæans also taught that Jesus Christ was "crucified in the whole universe," the earth and the fruits thereof being conceived as composed of his members; so these heretics would not plough, nor pull vegetables, nor pluck fruit, but had others perform such acts for them (Augustine, *Ennarat. in Ps. CXLI*, 6; *De Mor. Manich.*, XVII, 57). Again, according to Augustine, the Manichæans recognized the Father God as inaccessible light, and Christ the Son as visible light, with his power in the sun and his wisdom in the moon; while they held that the Holy Spirit dwells "in the whole circle of the atmosphere," and that "by his influence and spiritual infusion the earth conceives and brings forth the mortal Jesus, who, as hanging from every tree (in the form of fruit), is the life and salvation of men" (*Contra Faust.*, XX, 2; cf. Omar Khayyam's "Jesus from the ground suspires" or "breathes deeply," in the *Rubaiyat*, IV).

The concept of the supreme Being as the cosmic man, taken in connection with the Biblical statement that God created man in his own image (Gen. i. 27), naturally led to the doctrine that every man (*homo*) is a small universe in himself, a counterpart of the great universe. In the *Acta Disputationes cum Manete* (8), attributed to Archelaus (third century A. D.), the Manichæans are said to have held that the body of man is a universe in relation to the great universe, and that "all men have roots which are linked beneath (with those above)." Julius Firmicus in his *Mathesos* (fourth century A. D.), says that God produced man "in the image and similitude of the universe"; that He prepared man's body, his mortal abode, "similar to the universe," and that man is an animal "made in imitation of the universe." Macrobius (fifth century, A. D.) says that "the physical universe is a great man, and man is a small universe" (*Somn. Scip.*, I, 12); and Joannes Damascenus (eighth century) calls Adam "a second (and) little universe within the great one." But it appears that Pico della Mirandola, in his *Heptaplus* (circa 1490), was the first to employ the compounds macrocosmos and microcosmos, shortened to macrocosm and microcosm, for the great universe and little universe, respectively. Pico says that the macrocosm consists of three worlds, the terrestrial, the celestial and the supercelestial, that of the governing divine influences; and that "in addition to these three worlds there is a fourth, the microcosm, containing all embraced within the three. This is man, in


whom are included a body formed of the (material) elements, a celestial spirit, an angelic soul (corresponding to the three worlds), and a resemblance to God (as identified with the macrocosm).” In the sixteenth century Paracelsus taught that “the lower heaven is a man, and man a heaven; and all men are one heaven, and heaven one man” (*De Astronomia*; cf. *Liber Azoth*, I, where he treats of the macrocosm and microcosm); and in the same century the German alchemist Oswald Croll wrote a “Treatise on the Symbols of the Great and Little Universe,” in which he even recognizes certain cosmic counterparts to human diseases; the deluge corresponding to dropsy, tempests to epilepsy, etc. The Rosicrucians accepted the concept of the macrocosm and microcosm as set forth in their *Fama Fraternitatis* (seventeenth century); but it had previously reached its highest development in the Jewish system of theosophy known as the Kabbalah, the most important production of which is the *Zohar*, now recognized as the work of Moses de Leon (thirteenth century).

In the *Zohar* it is taught that mortal man is a type or counterpart of the celestial or cosmic man (II, 70b), and that the human form contains every other form, man being a small universe in himself (III, 135b, etc.). The ten æons or emanations of the Valentinian spiritual Pleroma, which were made ten numerical Sephiroth in the *Sepher Yesirah*, become in the *Zohar* the ten Sephiroth of an ideal or spiritual universe in the form of the Archetypal Man (Adam Kadmon) or Celestial Man (Adam Ilai), but sometimes as the cosmic tree or pillar (for the Valentinian Stauros). The supreme God, the En Soph (= boundless), “the most ancient” and “the most hidden,” manifested himself through the media of the ten Sephiroth or Archetypal Man (or tree or pillar); and this figure is divided longitudinally into three parts, to which are allotted three triads of the Sephiroth, while the tenth and lowest Sephirah represents the “harmony” of the whole—like the Valentinian spiritual Christ as the “fulness” of the Pleroma. The first triad of Sephiroth belongs to the Archetypal Man’s head and bust (down to the heart); the second triad belongs to the lower half of his torso and his arms, while the third triad belongs to his legs (see accompanying figure from Ginsburg, *Kabbalah*, Plate, op. p. 16; cf. pp. 17, 18 for tree and pillar). Furthermore, the Archetypal Man or Adam Kadmon is formed of the ten Sephiroth of light, and is conceived as “to the right,” while he is opposed by the evil Adam Belial, formed of ten Sephiroth of darkness, “to the left” (*Zohar*, I, 55). Thus, too, according to Swedenborg (who

has nothing of the æons or emanations), there are three heavens, which together constitute the Grand Man, or Divine Man, with the same members and organs as a mortal man (*Arcana Caelestia*, *passim*; *De Caelo et Inferno*, 63-65, etc.); and the latter is a heaven and a universe in miniature (*De Cael.*, 57, 90). The head of the Grand Man forms the highest or third heaven, containing celestial creatures; his breast and body to the loins form the second heaven, containing spiritual creatures; while his legs and feet (with which his arms and hands are sometimes included) form the lowest heaven, containing natural creatures (*De Cael.*, 65; *Apoc. Explic.*, 708, etc.). This threefold heaven extends "below as well as above" the earth (*De Cael.*, 66, etc.), and therefore appears to be identical with the celestial sphere; but it does not include Swedenborg's underworld, for his hell is a reflection (or variant duplication) of the threefold heaven, and has the form of the Devil as a variant duplication of the Grand Man (*ibid.*, 553).

The first and highest Sefirah of the Kabbalists is generally called the Crown (of the Archetypal Man), one of its variant names in the *Zohar* proper being Macroprosopon (= great-face). But in three of the *Zohar* supplements, the *Sepher Tseniutha*, *Iddera Rabba* and *Iddera Zuta*, the Macroprosopon is described in detail in connection with its inferior counterpart, the Microprosopon (= small-face); both faces or heads belonging to invisible bodies.

The Macroprosopon is conceived in profile, while the Microprosopon is a full-face variant reflection of the former, of which it is called the Son, being described as extended in the form of a cross, +, in connection with the Tetragrammaton, JHVH = Jehovah (*Sepher Tsen.*, II, 32-34). The Microprosopon therefore represents



KABBALISTIC COSMIC MAN.

(From Ginsburg, *Kabbalah*, Plate op. p. 16.)

Plato's "only-begotten universe," or celestial sphere, with its invisible soul fixed upon it in the form of \times (see above); while the Macroprosopon is a mere spiritual variant. The Microprosopon, in full-face, has two eyes (for sun and moon), with eyebrows (for light rays) and eyelids which open and close (producing light and darkness), which sleep (when invisible) and yet which sleep not, and at times shed tears (for rain and dew); and its nose is short and emits fire and smoke, etc. The Macroprosopon, in profile, has a right eye only, or two eyes in the one, always open, without eyebrows or eyelids; a long nose like a mighty gallery, whence the spirit of life (for the air) rushes forth upon Microprosopon; skin like the ether, and a skull white and shining—"And from that skull issueth a certain white shining emanation, toward the skull of Micro-



PAN AS THE COSMIC
ALL
Surrounded by the Zodiac.

prosopon, for the purpose of fashioning His head, and thence toward the other inferior skulls (for the stars), which are innumerable" (*Iddera Rabba*, Vol. V, p. 56). Very different from all this is the idea of David al-Jawari of the Mohammedan sect of Kiramiyah; for he identified the anthropomorphic God of that sect with the universe and held that His head (as the celestial sphere) was hollow from the crown to the breast, while He was solid from the breast down (see Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, s. v. Kiramiyah).

On many Greek and Roman monuments the signs of the zodiac appear in a circle or an oval around Zeus (Jupiter).

around Serapis and around Phœbus Apollo—the last as the sun-god, but the two first in all probability in their cosmic characters, of which we have already had evidence (for numerous examples see Grimaldi, *Catalogue of Zodiacs*). Pan as the cosmic "all" was sometimes so figured (Fosbroke, *Encyc. Antiq.*, I, p. 192), as was the serpent-entwined cosmic Kronos of the Mithraists (see a beautified Roman example in *Rev. Archéol.*, 1902, I, p. 1) and also Mithras as the sun-god (Cumont, *Textes et monuments*, pp. 389, 395, 419—but Mithras was more commonly represented in a cave, with the signs on the arch above the entrance, or on the sides). The Greek zodiac signs are found on several Egyptian mummy cases of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods; six signs on either side of a full-

length figure with upraised arms, generally the goddess Nepte or Nunpe, the goddess of the abyss of heaven, the personified heaven with the signs allotted to twelve parts of her person. In these Egyptian examples the signs are all placed below the shoulders and



THE MITHRAIC CRONUS SURROUNDED BY THE ZODIAC.

Bas-Relief of Modena. From *Revue archéologique*, I, p. 1.)

above the feet of the figure, with Leo to Capricorn on one side and Cancer to Aquarius on the other, reckoning from above down; this arrangement giving the appearance of belonging to the Egyptian year that began in Leo at the summer solstice about 4000-2000 B. C.

(see Tomlinson, in *Trans. Royal Soc. Lit.*, III, p. 487, and Plate B for figure on mummy case of Archon Soter with Greek signs). On the mummy case of Har-Sont-Iot (Tomlinson, Plate C), the large central figure has six small figures on one side, and twelve or more on the other; probably representing the zodiac signs for the body, and the arctic constellations for the head—and perhaps being a late Egyptian attempt at identifying some of the chief constellation figures with the gods who were earlier allotted to the members of the deceased and those of the cosmic man (see above). In a cosmogonico-astrological representation from the royal tombs at



THE BULL-SLAYING MITHRA SURROUNDED BY THE ZODIAC.
(From Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, p. 389).

Thebes, a large full-length figure of a man, side view, has six small human figures on one side and seven on the other; some of them being referred to the members of the large figure by connecting lines, as are the sun and moon and several stars (*Description de l'Egypte*, II, p. 84; Guigniaut's *Creuzer's Symbolik*, Plate, XLVIII, fig. 187). These figures, taken in connection with the evidence above presented, prove beyond doubt that the so-called Homo Signorum or Man of the (Zodiac) Signs is a mere variant of the cosmic man as identified with the spherical universe; and in all probability the Homo Signorum originated with the later Egyptian astrologers, after they had adopted the Babylonio-Greek zodiac—


for there is no evidence that the earlier Egyptians knew anything of a zodiac.

In the Jewish *Sepher Yesirah* (probably of the eighth or ninth century A. D., but containing matter of earlier date), the thirty or thirty-two æons or emanations of the Valentinians become the thirty-two attributes of the divine mind as manifested in nature. These attributes are identified with the first ten numerals and the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet, the letters being divided into three "mothers," seven doubles and twelve single letters (I, 1). The three "mothers" represent fire, air and water, and the head, chest and belly of man (II, 1; III, 2-5); the seven doubles are referred to the days of the week, the planets, the heavens and "the seven portals of the soul" of man—the eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth (IV, 3), while the twelve simple letters belong to the months, the signs of the zodiac, the faculties of the human mind and the members of the body—"the two hands, the two feet, the two kidneys, the spleen, liver, gall, privates, stomach and intestines" (V, 2). There is no specific allotment of the members to the signs in the *Yesirah*; but the modern Jewish scheme, beginning with the right foot for Aries, is given in Westcott's edition (V, Suppl., pp. 24-25). This Jewish doctrine is probably a comparatively late variant of that of the Gnostic Marcus (second century) who substituted thirty Greek letters for the Valentinian æons. These letters, divided among four words, respectively of four, four, ten and twelve letters, compose the unknown name of the supreme Being, through the enunciation of which he effected his primal manifestation; and the last of these letters (corresponding to the Valentinian Sophia and Achamoth) uttered a word which generated an infinite number of other words (for each letter of every word has a name), thus creating and arranging the material universe. Moreover, with the first six of the Valentinian æons after the supreme Being and his consort, Marcus identified the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet, which thus compose the spiritual Man (Anthropos) and also "the body of Truth," that of the female Aletheia. The alphabet appears to have been conceived originally as placed in an oval form on the front of these figures, as viewed in full length, with the first twelve letters from the head to a foot on one side, and with the following twelve letters from the other foot to the head on the opposite side; for A and Ω (the first and the last letters) are identified with the head, B and Ψ with the neck, Γ and X with the shoulders and arms, Δ and Φ with the breast, E and Y with the diaphragm, Z and Ι with the back (so Irenæus) or belly (so Hippolytus), H and Σ with the

belly (Irenæus) or pudenda (Hippolytus), Θ and P with the thighs, I and II with the knees, K and O with the legs, Λ and Ξ with the ankles, M and N with the feet (Irenæus, *Adv. Haers.*, I, 14, 1-5; Hippolytus, *Philosophum.*, VI, 37-41—the latter's members of "the body of Truth" being the more consistent with a front view of the figure). There can be little doubt that this arrangement of the $2 \times 12 = 24$ letters originally belonged to the Homo Signorum: in fact, we find the Greek alphabet split in a different way, with both halves reading in regular order, side by side, the letters being presented in pairs and thus allotted to the zodiac signs—A and N to Aries, etc. (see Boll, *Sphaera*, pp. 469, 470).

The earliest extant specific allotment of each of the twelve zodiac signs to a member of the human body (as the microcosm) is found in the *Astronomia* (II, 27; IV, 25) attributed to a certain Manilius who is supposed to have lived in the first century A. D. The same scheme, with minor variations, appears in Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.*, V—third century); Julius Firmicus (*Mathes.*, II, 24—fourth century); Paulus of Alexandria (*Rudiment. in Doctrin. Natal.*—fourth century—see Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 471); various medieval writers, such as Cornelius Agrippa (*De Occult. Philos.*, II, 14—fifteenth century) and Athanasius Kircher (*Oedipus Aegyptiacus*, Vol. II, Part II, p. 188—seventeenth century), and also in medieval and modern almanacs. In this scheme of the signs and the members of the body, the series of signs begins with Aries (in which fell the spring equinox about 2000-1 B. C.), and the first three and last five signs belong to the same members in all authorities, from Manilius down (excepting that some have the arms, others the shoulders and still others both arms and shoulders for Gemini). Among the variations in the four remaining allotments, Firmicus alone has the heart instead of the breast for Cancer, and Sextus alone has the buttocks instead of the bowels or belly for Virgo; while the allotments for Leo and Libra vary greatly in the earlier authorities. The modern scheme is exactly that of Agrippa and almanacs before his time; and this scheme differs from that of Firmicus only in the interchange of heart and breast for Cancer and Leo—all other authorities having the breast for Cancer. Again, the Marcosian body of Aletheia according to Hippolytus differs from the modern Homo Signorum only in that the ankles among the members of Aletheia are not specified among those of the Homo, while the reins (kidneys) of the latter are not found among the specified members of the former, whose diaphragm corresponds to the Homo's heart.

With the exception of the probable Egyptian prototypes above noticed, the earliest extant representation of the Homo Signorum appears to be in a calendar published about 1300 by Peter of Dacia (in south-eastern Europe), of which there is a manuscript in the Savilian library at Oxford (see J. O. H. [J. O. Halliwell], "Early Almanacs," in *Companion to British Admanac*, 1839, p. 56). Another representation of the same kind appeared in an *Almanac for the year 1386* (reprinted in London, 1812); another in a German almanac of about 1490, now in the British Museum (see Grimaldi,



EARLY EXAMPLE OF THE MODERN HOMO SIGNORUM.

(From Ming's *Hutchin's Improved Almanac*, New York, 1820.)


Catalogue, No. 1302), and another in Reisch's *Margarita Philosophica* (VII, 2—A. D. 1496, etc.). In such early examples, the Homo Signorum is generally a full-length figure, standing erect and facing front, with the body opened to expose the internal organs, and with nearly all the signs (animals, etc.) placed upon the members and organs to which they belong; the allotments being the same as in the modern representations with the signs or their symbols (generally the latter) placed around the figure instead of upon it. The earlier types of the modern representations first became popular in the seventeenth century almanacs, especially in England, crude wood-cuts of the said types appearing in numerous variations in

that century and later—the Homo Signorum generally being a male, but sometimes a female, and the whole representation being referred either to the dominion of the sun or of the moon over man's body (see collections in the larger libraries, and also Bolton, "A Relic of Astrology," in *Journ. Amer. Folklore*, XI, pp. 113-125). But all the signs are on the figure in some early almanacs, as in Saunder's *Apollo Anglicanus*, seventeenth century.

The Homo Signorum, as distinguished from the cosmic man, properly should have a circular form, and was probably so conceived originally—somewhat like the Puranic porpoise that represents the celestial sphere (see above); but no ancient type of the



HOMO SIGNORUM OF THE
CIRCULAR TYPE.
From Gadbury's ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΣ, 1689.



A MEDIEVAL MICROCOSMOS.
Agrippa, *De Occulta phil.*, II, 27, p. 164.

circular Homo Signorum appears to be extant. With Aries (the first sign) allotted to the head, and Pisces (the twelfth) to the feet, of course the series could not be placed in regular order around the erect Homo and still have all the signs in juxtaposition to the members to which they belong (see accompanying representations). Therefore the regular order of the signs is not followed in connection with the erect figure in the generality of almanacs (and elsewhere, as in Kircher, *Oed. Aegypt.*, II, Part II, p. 369, cf. p. 188). But the signs are placed in regular order, around the Homo as a female bent backward in circular form, in the later issues of Gadbury's ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΣ (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and also in *Poor Robin* (eighteenth century; both being almanacs

published in London.¹ Again, the signs, beginning with Aries for the head, were sometimes allotted in regular order to the erect Homo Signorum as the microcosm, thus connecting one or more of the central signs with the feet (as in Robert Fludd, *Utriusque Cosmi*, front; *Microcosmi Historia*, front; and in Kircher, *Oed. Aegypt.*, II, Part II, p. 358). Still again, the microcosmic man, with outstretched arms and legs, forms a Greek cross (X) within a square frame, with the signs outside of the frame and in regular order, three to a side (as in Agrippa, *De Occult. Philos.*, II, 27); the same representation sometimes being found with the signs within the square, arranged symmetrically about the man (as in Robert Fludd, *De Microcosmi, Opera*, I, p. 115). This representation was doubtless suggested by the concept of the cosmic man on the cross of the celestial sphere.

The seven planets were also allotted to as many members of the human body by some astrologers (see Manilius, *Astron.*, II, 34; Agrippa, *De Occult. Philos.*, II, 27, etc.), while others confined them to the head (*Sepher Yezirah*, IV, 3, and Suppl., p. 22, Westcott's ed., for modern Jewish allotments; cf. Bolton, in *Journ. Am. Folklore*, XI, p. 123, etc.). The organs of the face are seven, according to Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.*, VI, 16), while Philo recognizes not only seven divisions of the head, and seven of the body (*Quis Rer. Divin. Haeres.*, I, 35), but also seven entrails (*De Leg. Allegor.*, 4); and in Chinese works the five planets (without sun and moon) are allotted to the heart, lungs, kidneys, liver and stomach (Withington, *Medical History*, p. 364). Again, the seven planets are allotted to the hand by some medieval astrologers, and in the same manner as by modern palmists (see Agrippa, *loc. cit.*).

¹ In one Egyptian representation the body of Osiris is bent backward in the form of a circular band, but the accompanying text says that he thus forms the encircling border of the Tuat or underworld—otherwise the earth-surrounding ocean-river of the horizon (in the "Book of Pylons," on the sarcophagus of Seti I; see Budge, *Gods*, I, p. 203 and Plates, pp. 204, 298). Nut, for the upper hemisphere, is often figured bent forward in semicircular form; and in a representation from Dendera we find two such semicircular females, one within the other (as if for the superior heaven and the firmament), while still further within is a male figure in circular form—probably for Osiris as the border of the Tuat (see Denon, *Voyage*, p. 129, fig. 6; cf. Budge, *Gods*, II, p. 105).

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE THEOLOGY OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.

BY WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

ONE of the chief distinctions between the two great divisions of Buddhism, namely Mahayana or the Buddhism of the North, and Hinayana or Southern Buddhism, is that the former is possessed of a definite theology while the latter is not. In Hinayana, or as its own adherents prefer to call it, Theravada, all questions relating to the existence or non-existence of the Supreme are relegated into the background and their discussion denounced. To be sure, the existence of a superhuman order of beings such as *devas* (corresponding, more or less closely, to the Christian angels) is admitted, as well as a form of demons or devils, but the conception of an All-in-All, so essential to mysticism as we know it in the West, is altogether lacking. The highest which the mind can conceive in Hinayana is Nirvana (Pali Nibbana) which, according to the southern interpretation at least, is a condition of mind rather than an Infinite Being who is the norm of existence.

In Mahayana, however, or Buddhism as it prevails in north-eastern Asia and the Far East, theological and metaphysical speculation has been permitted to run riot, with the result that in those countries we have before us to-day a theological system so complete, so wide-spread and so hairsplitting, that, compared with it, the systems of the schoolmen of the Middle Ages with their problems, among others, as to how many angels could stand upon a needle's point at the same time, seem childish and lacking in detail. It is, accordingly, a matter of small wonder that the doctrine of Mahayana are said to be eighty-four thousand in number. This exceedingly complexity of Mahayana, the Great Vehicle (of salvation) as it calls itself, has been of no little difficulty to the many Occidental would-be students of the subject, and a large proportion have been entirely led astray by the intricate mazes which it presents. They have mastered an enormous mass of resultant features but in their bewil-

derment at the number, they have failed to grasp the essential spirit beneath.

As a matter of fact, however, to one who goes about it properly the understanding of this spirit—the underlying fundamentals—is by no means so difficult as might, at first sight, be supposed. We have a saying in Japan that although it takes eight years of hard study to understand the teachings of the Hosso Sect, yet the main principles may be fathomed in eight minutes. The same thing is true of Mahayana as a whole. An entire comprehension of all the details of Mahayana is, for one single man, almost an impossibility, yet the principal ideas may be understood by the average schoolboy.

Consequently the great question is, what are the fundamental principles of the Mahayana faith? Speaking generally, it may be said that, although Mahayana teaches far more than does its sister faith, everything which the latter proclaims the former admits to be true, and since, owing to the indefatigable endeavors of modern Orientalists, the teachings of Hinayana lie more or less open to the students of the Western world, the question is narrowed down to one, as to the main principles of the Mahayana theology, or its ideas regarding the nature and attributes of the Divine and his relations to the human world.

I.

Beyond doubt, the idea which is most essential to Mahayana is its conception of the oneness of life. At first sight, the world seems made up of an infinite number of separate objects with very little connection between them. A little closer examination will show, however, that Mahayana is right in declaring that this seeming separateness is false and that all objects, however different in essence they may appear, are in reality but transformations or manifestations of an infinite spirit of life which is one and eternal. This acme of being (if I may be pardoned this expression) is called in Sanskrit *Bhutatahata*, in Chinese *Chen Ju* and in Japanese *Shinnyo Hosho*. If it does not correspond to, it at least takes the place of, the Christian conception of God.

While, however, Christian writers devote a considerable portion of their time to a consideration of the Deity's nature and attributes, Buddhism begins by stating that by his very nature he is incomprehensible to the mind of the ordinary man. We find the foremost patriarchs of Mahayana declaring that so absolute is he that it is wrong to say that he exists or that he does not exist, or that he both exists and non-exists, or that he neither exists nor non-exists.

According to Mahayana the only way in which to gain a knowledge of his nature is to attain Buddhahood, or supreme and perfect enlightenment.

But while it is impossible to fully realize him, much less to describe him adequately to others, it is nevertheless obvious that every one may gain some little idea of the general nature of his existence—provided, of course, that his existence in general be granted. Accordingly, Mahayana teaches its followers to endeavor to increase their realization of the Divine Spirit day by day until finally by so doing, perfect enlightenment will be gained.

To the materialist the *summum bonum* is equivalent to matter, to the average religionist; to spirit, to the pantheist of Spinoza's school: it is both spirit and matter. But to the Mahayanist, God or the Shinnyo Hosho is far superior to both spirit and matter, though both of them are partial manifestations of him. It is often claimed that Mahayana is pantheistic, but this is true or untrue only according to the sense in which the word pantheism is used. If pantheism be taken as meaning that God and the universe are synonymous and nothing more, Buddhism is distinctly anti-pantheistic, but when by that expression is meant the doctrine that God is in the world as well as beyond it, then Mahayana takes pride in calling itself pantheistic. To quote the Rt. Rev. Soyen Shaku, in his *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot*:

"According to the proclamation of the Enlightened mind, God or the principle of sameness is not transcendent but immanent in the universe, and we sentient beings are manifesting the divine glory just as much as the lilies of the field. A God who, keeping aloof from his creations, sends down words of command through specially favored agents is rejected by Buddhists as against the constitutions of human reason. God must be in us who are made in his likeness. We cannot presume the duality of God and the world. Religion is not to go to God by forsaking the world but to find him in it. . . .

"We must not, however, suppose that God is no more than the sum total of individual existences. God exists even when all creations have been destroyed and reduced to a state of chaotic barrenness. God exists eternally and he will create another universe out of the ruins of this one."

This One Being is considered, in Mahayana, to have two forms or aspects, the first the absolute and transcendent phase, and the second its finite and immanent phase. The former is the Divine as he is, was and ever shall be, the Eternal out of space and time, infinite and without limitation, the latter the Divine manifested in

the world of life and death—the principle behind existence and life as it is to-day. It is the eternal in the transient. These two aspects, according to Mahayana, however antithetical they may appear at first sight, are in reality one.

This idea is not confined to Mahayana. We find it in nearly all of the most inspired religions and philosophies, and especially in primitive Taoism, where in the *Tao Teh King* of Lao-Tze we read: "That which is before heaven and earth is called the non-existent. The existent is the mother of all things. The existent and the non-existent are the same in all but name. This identity of apparent opposites I call the profound, the great deep, the open door of bewilderment."

In Taoism and the other philosophies, however, the idea remains somewhat vague and indefinite. We sense the general truth of the statement without comprehending how it is to be applied. The question as to the relation of the Absolute and the universe is indeed a very difficult one.

In Mahayana we are given two illustrations as to the identity and non-identity of the non-existent and the existent, to use Lao-Tze's phrase, or in Mahayana phraseology, the infinite and the finite. The first of these is that of pots of clay. There are, we know, pots of many shapes and sizes, some used for good purposes, some for bad, though they may all be of one substance. The other is of the ocean and the waves. The pots and the waves are the various objects of the universe while the ocean and the clay are the absolute. And while, to use the simile of the ocean, no two waves are alike, yet they are all of one essence—water; though the water assumes many shapes and transformations, yet does the nature of the water remain unchanged. In like manner, the Absolute manifests the universe without in the least affecting his own essence. And as there can be the ocean without the waves, but no waves without the ocean, so Mahayana declares that no life would be possible without having for its *raison d'être* the Bhutatathata.

II.

It would seem that, with the exception of Islam, practically all the great religions which admit the existence of a Supreme at all, have also taught that he has revealed himself to the universe in three aspects. In ancient Egypt we had Osiris, Horus and Isis; in India, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva; while in Christianity, of course, there is the trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

Mahayana is no exception to this rule. In fact, in that religion

we have several trinities, consisting of different sets of triple aspects of the One Supreme. The most important and the most universal, however, is the one which is termed in Sanskrit the Trikaya, and in Japanese the Sanshin, which means literally the three (Skt. *tri*, Jap. *san*) bodies (Skt. *kaya*, Jap. *shin*). These are: the Dharmakaya (Jap. Hosshin), Nirmanakaya (Jap. Ojin and Keshin), and finally the Sambhogakaya (Hoshin). The careful study of this Mahayana trinity is most necessary, since, owing to its general vagueness and complexity the subject has been the matter of much dispute and difference among the foremost Occidental students of and authorities on Northern Buddhism.

The study of the origin of the conception of the threefold manifestation of the Supreme is of especial interest. Originally, and we still have faint traces of it in Hinayana or Southern Buddhism, it was merely the doctrine that every Buddha or enlightened sage is in possession of the above-mentioned three bodies. The exact nature of the three bodies in the case of the mere personal Buddhas is rather vague. The Dharmakaya is literally the body of the Law, the more or less universal vehicle of the Tathagata or Perfect One; the Sambhogakaya is the body of bliss, or the vehicle which the teachers of gods and men are supposed to assume as a reward for their mental victory and which is supposed to insure perfect happiness; the Nirmanakaya is the body of transformation or incarnation which the Buddhas use in order that they may teach the world the path of salvation.

Perhaps the first thing which strikes the investigator of this subject is the unusualness of the idea, the distinction between that conception and all others commonly met with, and one naturally feels some little curiosity as to how the idea originated. Modern scholars are practically all agreed that the doctrine did not originate with Gautama, the historical founder of Buddhism (for the present, as I have already remarked, I am putting aside all questions as to which is the more genuine and representative of the two Buddhist branches and content myself with quoting common opinion) so that the question at once arises as to when and why the doctrine came into being.

Up to the present time the chief authorities have either acknowledged their complete ignorance of the true reason or else have put forward hypotheses which have been proved untenable by further and more complete investigation. The very absence, then, of probable explanations has emboldened me to put forward the theory which I have not hitherto met with—that is, that the three

mystic bodies of the Buddhas are in reality nothing more than the personification of the universal and completely orthodox threefold refuge which one finds both in Hinayana and Mahayana, the words which every candidate for admission into the Buddhist priesthood or even laity must repeat,¹ and which runs, needless to say,

"In the Buddha I take my refuge,
In the Law I take my refuge,
In the Church I take my refuge."

This refuge is a very natural thing and has come down to us from the very earliest times. It was not very long, however, before a tendency (somewhat unconscious) toward personification set in. Hinayana had no Supreme Being in whom its followers could take their refuge. It did not even expressly state that the Buddha Gautama continued, after his demise, to keep his divine, glorified personality in some supreme heaven, continuing to aid his followers on earth in their struggle for freedom from the wheel of life and death—in fact, Hinayana was entirely ambiguous as to whether or not his personality had been totally annihilated when he expired.

Man is weak, however, and constantly clings, whether or not with justification, to the conception of a personal *summum bonum* in which, to use Buddhist phraseology, he can take his refuge. Accordingly, since strict Hinayana theology could not give them this, many Buddhists gradually formulated one for themselves out of the best material which they had at hand. In an address which he gave to his disciples shortly before his death, Gautama, or Sakya-muni, as the Mahayanists prefer to call him, is supposed to have exhorted them not to grieve at his departure from them, since speaking figuratively he would continue to exist in the doctrine or the law (Skt. *dharma*, Jap. *ho*) which he had given them.

This law, like the Christian Gospel, is universal both as regards time and place. It was taught long before the advent of the sage of the Sakyas and would continue to be so long after his death. His law held good not only in this world but in all others. It is immutable. It is easy to see what the founder of Buddhism meant, provided that he spoke the words at all. The law (it means far more than the mere sum total of the various Buddhist teachings) was a very real and important thing to Gautama. In fact, we may consider that he believed himself to be the voice of the law, or, in a sense, that the law dwelt in him and that he was the law—the

¹ It must be remembered that in Buddhism, Buddha is not merely a certain historical person, but a spiritual condition which has been reached by many men throughout the history of the world.

Dharma—incarnate, much as we may look upon a musical genius to be music incarnate. After his decease, therefore, whether his mere personality survived or not, the law which was in him would forever endure, and accordingly, so would in one sense his own true self.

Such a conception, once started, however, could easily develop into something far more theistic and mystical. Sakyāmuni was to be considered as having two bodies, for in his own words, so it seemed to his followers, the Dharma which he preached to them was a living, concrete thing which was his true body, while for the purpose of manifesting himself to the world he had assumed a physical vehicle. In such a way may we trace the development of the Dharmakaya and the Nirmanakaya. In fact, do not the very meaning of the words themselves suggest it, for as we have seen, the Dharmakaya signifies the body of the law—the law personified and taken as a thing in itself—while the Nirmanakaya is the body of transformation or incarnation—which is, of course, nothing else than the physical Buddha, such as Gautama.

Since, however, the followers had taken two of their refuges, the law and the Buddha, and had deified them—personified them and shown them to be two different aspects or bodies of the same fundamental reality—why should they not have done the same thing for their one remaining refuge, the Samgha—the church, or, more correctly, the brotherhood of monks which Sakyamuni had instituted. Although we have, as far as I know, no record of the founder of Buddhism having explicitly stated that he would continue to live after his passing away in the order which he had founded, yet he may well have done so in some unrecorded instruction, and in any case the idea is an obvious corollary of the continued-existence-in-the-law idea. Even according to materialism a man lives on in his works (an artist in his paintings, etc.). The Buddhists call it Karma and certainly the establishment of the Samgha was Sakyamuni's chief work, and since the spirit of its founder was supposed to abide in the brotherhood, the idea gradually evolved that the brotherhood must consequently be considered as forming a third body in addition to the other two which the Sage of the Sakyas was supposed to possess.

Such were probably the rudiments of the present Buddhist trinity, but for some time they must have been regarded more as a poetic fancy than anything else. It was more or less as we should speak of a great general being possessed of three bodies—the spirit of patriotism, his actual physical vehicle and the army which he

had brought into being. Slowly, however, the idea, with the process of time, developed. The origin of the conception was lost sight of, and the poetry was taken for fact. No longer was the Buddha supposed to have three bodies in a merely figurative sense but in the actual meaning which the words conveyed. Gautama had three vehicles, and the physical body was no more really he than the other two aspects. Naturally the conception of the nature of these other two aspects had to change as the symbolic conception of the Trikaya was lost sight of. The Dharmakaya could no longer be merely the gospel, the body of truths, which was called Buddhism, for it had become the one great and unchanging reality. It became the norm of existence: that thing which everything must be in accordance with or perish. As time went on the process of personification went on until finally the Dharmakaya became almost a personal being which guides the course of evolution. It became the reason of the universe from which all other things derive their intelligence and their life.

The Nirmanakaya by its very nature required little or no change; but the conception of the Sambhogakaya was so altered as to practically obscure its origin. The idea of the physical order was entirely lost sight of and one of the most convincing proofs that it was originally the order to which the Sambhogakaya referred is that this third body seems somewhat strangely out of place and unnecessary as if at some former time it did definitely refer to something which has been lost sight of. Something of its old character still remains, however, in the idea that the Sambhogakaya is the divine in touch with man and the universe, for the Dharmakaya is deemed too impersonal and too distant—mere reason—so that an aspect is needed which is more in touch with the needs of the human world, just as in old days the law was the mere abstract truth while the Samgha was the vehicle which presented it to the people and which led them to an understanding of it. Again, the Sambhogakaya is at present supposed to be the immortal body of the Buddhas, the glorified body which unlike the mere physical one is permanent and supreme, and which is constantly giving illumination all over the world, just as originally while the earthly body of Gautama decayed his spirit continued forever unchanged as the essence behind the order which shone forth as the light of the truth of the world. It must also be remembered that the Samgha was ideally supposed to be composed of *arhats*, "saints," those freed from the wheel of life and death, and those just preparing for arhatship. Joy and bliss are supposed to have been

prominent characteristics of the arhats, which accounts, in some degree, for the third member of the trinity being known as the body of bliss.²

At first, it must be noted, these three bodies were supposed to apply to Sakyamuni alone. It is one of the chief distinctions between Buddhism and the other principal religions, however, that the position which Gautama attained is not unique, but, on the contrary, is one which has been and will be gained countless times. Consequently, being possessed of all of Sakyamuni's attributes, all the other Buddhas must be considered to have three bodies of their own—each, in a word, must have a Dharmakaya, a Nimanakaya and a Sambhogakaya. As before noted, this doctrine continues down to the present day.

The step from a conception of the Trikaya as belonging merely to each individual Buddha to that in which it is regarded as a threefold method of manifestation of the one ultimate reality may seem a sudden and an impossible one. As a matter of fact, however, it was one which was soon made and was logically rendered necessary; it was merely the result of two different tendencies which had, sooner or later, to make themselves felt. The first of these was the beginning of the attitude to regard the Bhutatathata or the Shinnyo Hosho as a sort of Buddha, though infinitely broadened and amplified; in other words, as the one universal and all-comprehensive Buddha. In addition to his impersonal and unmanifested aspect, the Bhutatathata was supposed to have his manifested and more or less personal side (using the word personal in its wider and better sense). This was, of course, also omnipresent and universal, but it seemed to them to be the Ideal Being, which was nothing more than their conception of a Buddha raised to the *n*th power. Being regarded as a Buddha, however, it was necessary that he should be regarded as having an equivalent to the ordinary Buddha's three bodies, though naturally correspondingly universalized.

² So obvious has been the development of the Trikaya from the three refuges that I have not found it necessary to give detailed proof, such as stating the different conceptions of the Trikaya at various epochs or citing the many other points of similarity between the two *summa bona*.

Those who think it impossible for the triratna to have undergone such a transformation should remember the indisputable evolution which it has undergone in Nepal. There Buddha is supposed to represent mind, Dharma, matter, and Samgha the concretion of the two in the phenomenal world. According to the Aisvarika sect of Nepalese Buddhism, Buddha is the symbol of generative power, Dharma the productive power, while Samgha, their son, is the *actual* creative power, or *active* creator and ruler. The other principal school, the Svabhavika, only differs in giving the Dharma (sometimes called the Prajna) the female element priority. Samgha is sometimes associated with Padmapani (Avalokitesvara). (See Hodgson's *Nepalese Buddhism*).

As a matter of fact, however, the Mahayanists would have been forced to reach the same conclusion to avoid a hopeless complication in regard to the three bodies of the various human Buddhas. The body of the law (Dharmakaya) of Gautama was necessarily universal; it was forced by its origin to be omnipresent, to be the sole standard of existence. Every Buddha, however, was supposed to have a similar body so that Buddhism was in danger of having innumerable omnipresents and innumerable sole standards of being—obviously a self-contradiction. Countless Nirmanakayas there might be, but not Sambhogakayas, which were likewise considered to be unlimited both in regard to place and time.

There was only one way in which Mahayana could get out of the difficulty into which it had gotten itself, and that was by stating that all the Dharmakayas were united in, or rather were reflexes of, one Supreme Dharmakaya; all the various Nirmanakayas but the results of the transformation of one universal Nirmanakaya; and, finally, that there was but one original Sambhogakaya of which all others were but emanations. The doctrine that each Buddha has three separate bodies of his own was retained but the idea was added that, as drops of water are inseparable from the whole ocean, so are the individual Trikayas inseparable from the one universal Trikaya. Obviously, once the idea of a universal Trikaya was admitted, it was necessary to add that it was but the Bhutatathata manifesting himself, so closely did the nature of the two conceptions agree with each other.

III.

Such, then, was the probable origin of the modern Mahayana conception of the Trikaya or trinity—a fundamental doctrine of Northern Buddhism—and such is its general nature. The only remaining question is as to the exact nature and attributes of each of the three bodies of the universal Buddha. The task of answering this is by no means as easy as might be supposed. In Christianity, and, indeed, in all the other religions teaching a triune God, the doctrines as to the nature of each member of the trinity are clearly set forth and easily understood, even if one be out of sympathy with the conception. In Mahayana, however, the subject is a most difficult one in spite of, and in fact owing to, the overwhelming mass of detail with which the doctrine is encumbered.

The nature of each member of the Trikaya has been minutely dissected and analyzed; yet in reviewing the idea as a whole no two Western authorities on the subject seem to agree. To a large

section the Dharmakaya seems to correspond to the Christian conception of God the Father, while to another section, including, it would appear, Dr. Paul Carus (see his *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics*, it is the Sambhogakaya which is God the Father, the Dharmakaya being the Holy Ghost. To still another school the Sambhogakaya is the equivalent of the resurrected Christ, while many refuse to make any comparison at all.

This confusion, however, while great, is by no means overwhelming and may easily be cleared away if one takes up separately the different attitudes of the various sects regarding the Trikaya. Speaking generally, there may be said to be two main ideas regarding it, and though, as we shall see, the two fundamentally identical, yet much of the confusion has arisen from the distinction not having been grasped. I shall call these two doctrines those of the Shodomon (Gate of Purity) and Jodomon (Gate of Pure Land) since these are, respectively, the ideas which are held by those two schools into which Mahayat is divided.

The former, to which belong five of the seven great Mahayana sects of Japan³ (the various schools of China having practically all more or less coalesced) namely, the Kegon, the Tendai (this sect is considered the mother of the later schools), the Shingon, the Zen and the Nichiren—is chiefly noted for having the Dharmakaya as its principal object of worship.

The teachings of this school may perhaps be more easily understood by the aid of the accompanying chart:

- | | |
|--|--------|
| 1. Dharmakaya | Reason |
| 2. Sambhogakaya | |
| 1. Self-enjoying body } | |
| 2. Others-enjoying body } | Wisdom |
| 2. Nirmanakaya | |
| 1. The Ojiri | |
| a. Superior Body for Pratyeka Buddhas } | |
| b. Inferior Body for Sravakas } | Love |
| 2. The Keshin. | |

In this arrangement the Dharmakaya might also be called the heart of the universe. In its general nature and attributes it is

³ There are altogether twelve great sects: three of them, however, belong to Hinayana and the other two to Madhyimayana, or Apparent Mahayana. The doctrines of these sects and their relations with one another have been brought out in another article (cf. *The Open Court*, February, 1919).

exactly like the Bhutatathata with one important exception—the Bhutatathata, being the Great Unmanifested, is largely a philosophic conception; we reason, we discuss, we realize the Bhutatathata: but we adore the Dharmakaya. The doctrine of the Dharmakaya is what gives Mahayana its truly religious aspect, something which is apt to be lacking in Hinayana. The Dharmakaya corresponds, as we have seen, in the Shodomon to the Christian God the Father, but though it is like the Christian conception of the Deity inasmuch as it is supposed to be the chief object of our worship, yet the Mahayana idea is apt to be more amplified, more universal, less restricted. In Christianity, in spite of the clause “Without body, parts, or passions,” we still in some remote portion of our theology seem to have the picture of “a man fourteen feet high with a beard six feet long.”

The Northern Buddhistic view of this law-body is not of a man made God-like, but rather of a principle self-manifested for the sake of aiding evolution. It is personal, I have said: yes, but care must be taken in understanding just what is meant by the word “personal.” If by personal we mean anthropopathic—man-like in feeling, if not in actual shape, with a man’s likes and dislikes, hates and partialities—the Dharmakaya is certainly not personal. Nevertheless, it is not purely abstract and colorless—it is not merely love, reason and justice. It is endowed with those attributes and is therefore in that sense a person, but it far transcends the limits of a personality in the narrow sense in which that word is so often used. The Dharmakaya is not impersonal, but rather than personal, we might call it super-personal.

The Bhutatathata, as we have seen, is both spirit and matter; the Dharmakaya we might perhaps call the spirit side distinguishing itself from matter and causing the evolution of the universe. It is the reason side of the divine—one may also with justice term it the will aspect, all sentient beings being supposed to derive their sentiency, their reason, and their will from it. It is the hidden force which constantly urges evolution upward without which this would quickly run along some side-track. In fact, if I were called upon to give the Dharmakaya another name, I should call it the Great Spiritual Urge.

The Dharmakaya is far removed from the idea of a purely transcendent despot far off in some distant heaven who hands down decrees to this world, for it is supposed to be not only in the world, but the very life and essence of it (“in whom we live and move and have our being”); and yet even so Mahayana has provided an even

closer medium of divinity in the Sambhohakaya. The Dharmakaya stands midway between the Sambhogakaya and the Bhutatathata as regards the abstract or the philosophical, and the concrete or the religious. The Bhutatathata is purely a philosophical conception, the Dharmakaya is indeed, a religious ideal but is looked upon as a thing unto itself, something independent of both man and worlds, though each might be obliged to exist in accordance with and derive their *raison d'être* from it (there again like the Christian doctrine of God the Father), while the Sambhogakaya is considered as the divine especially in touch with human life and its needs. Accordingly, it closely resembles in this respect the God, the Holy Ghost of the West, which proceeds from the Father (and from the Son also, says the Western Church) for the express purpose of keeping humanity in touch with the Father. While the Dharmakaya is reason devoid of limitation or feeling, the Sambhogakaya is wisdom, reason tinged with experience, the result of reason adapted to the material world; or, in other words, practical reason in contradistinction to pure reason.

With that hair-splitting for which Mahayana and all Oriental philosophy are so noted, the intricate doctrine of the Sambhogakaya has been made still more difficult of complete comprehension by the division of this sacred vehicle into two parts, the passive and the active Sambhogakaya. In order to understand the nature of these two divisions, something of the nature of the Buddhist doctrine of the power of thought must be taken into consideration. The passive Sambhogakaya is the recipient of the ceaseless devotion which is constantly being poured out by worshipers. It might be called the immediate object of worship, a sort of spiritual image, for when one desires to adore the divine in any aspect, the devotion is received by this aspect of the Body of Bliss. The active Sambhogakaya, on the other hand, is supposed to be that aspect of Deity which is constantly shedding its spiritual illumination over all the ten quarters, the Buddhist synonym for the universe. It is as if the spiritual energy which is poured forth by devotees were stored up, transmuted and sent back to the world at large "Cast your bread upon the waters, for it shall return an hundredfold." etc.)

These spiritual rays sent forth by the Sambhogakaya are supposed to be for the benefit of all classes of men impartially — the sinner as well as the saint, the ignorant as well as the wise man. Each man is supposed to absorb and to benefit according to his own capacity and willingness to do so. It is evident, however, that it is the spiritual minded who benefit most greatly by it, since it is they

who are the most conscious of these rays and are the most willing to profit by them. The Samghogakaya is entirely a thing of the spirit and can only be realized by spiritual perception.

What, then, however, becomes of the countless millions who are "of the earth earthy"? Are they to be left in the night of spiritual darkness until they finally become disgusted with it, and of their own volition turn their faces toward the light? To such a conception Mahayana gives a decided negative. The Divine, according to its teachings, is not merely something which can be approached (the approaching of which gives one perfect enlightenment), but it is ever actively working for the spiritual awakening of the masses. Accordingly, there is a third and still more material body of the universal Buddha which all may see and hear. This is the Nirmanakaya, the body of transformation or incarnation, corresponding of course to the Christian God the Son, or the "Word made flesh." It is the vehicle which the Supreme assumes when, for the purpose of enlightening the world and of "beating the drum of the Law," he manifests himself to the material world. He then takes a particular form, and becomes a devil, god, man, deva, or even an animal, adapting himself to the condition and the intellectual development of the people.

This Nirmanakaya is divided into two classes, called in Japanese the Ojin and the Keshin. These may be interpreted as the complete and the incomplete incarnation. The latter is frequent and universal. It is little more than to say that the spirit of God moves in an avatar or the person in whom the divine is supposed to be incarnated. The Divine inspires him and lives in him so that not only may we say that the message which he preaches is divine, but also the very person himself is divine. I am almost tempted to say that the Mahayana view of the nature of the divinity of the Keshin, or incomplete incarnation, corresponds to that of Nestorianism of old, which was that in the Incarnate being there were two persons, the divine and the human, which were in some mysterious way united or welded together. It must be remembered, however, that in Mahayana there can be but one person or being in itself, namely the Divine (this is the significance which the doctrine of non-atman has assumed in Mahayana) and that accordingly we are all latently divine, or, in other words, that we are all undeveloped avatars. The condition of the avatar may therefore be said to be brought about by the developing of the inner light. The avatar, then, is one who manifests the divinity which is everywhere present.

The principal avatars are considered to be men who have at-

tained to supreme enlightenment or Buddhahood. It is they who are supposed to be the most perfect incarnations of the Supreme. Even in Buddhahood, however, there are degrees, until finally the rank of complete incarnation or Ojin is reached. The difference between the Ojin and the Keshin is more one of degree than of kind, it is only that in the latter the union of the two natures is considered to be the more complete. In the Keshin it is more the human nature influenced by the divine nature which speaks, while in the Ojin it is rather the divine nature itself speaking, merely using the human nature as a mouthpiece.

While partial incarnations are of frequent occurrence (the great patriarchs of all the sects and all the religions being regarded as Keshins), the appearance of an Ojin is extremely rare, coming only at times of great need and for certain specific purposes. During the present age or dispensation there are supposed to be only two: Sakyamuni, the historical founder of Buddhism, and Maitreya—the Buddha-to-be who was prophesied by Gautama as his successor. There are two versions of the prophecy. One is that Maitreya (Jap. Miroku) would appear five hundred years after Gautama; the other, five thousand years afterward. The former figure has led many persons interested in the cooperation of Christianity and Buddhism (myself among them) to identify Christ and the promised Buddhist Messiah.

Each superior incarnation is understood to have two bodies—the superior and the inferior. In this case, however, "body" is not perhaps as accurate a term as "nature" or "aspect." In Mahayana there is a threefold division of Buddhist believers. The first of these are the Bodhisattvas, those persons who aim at the attainment of Buddhahood in order to attain and save the whole world. The second are those whose goal is Pratyeka (private) Buddhahood, or supreme enlightenment for oneself alone, while the lowest are the ignorant Sravakas (literally "hearers") who endeavor to reach Arhatship or mere salvation from the wheel of birth and death.

The Bodhisattvas are looked upon as the spiritually-minded who can obtain their illumination direct from the Sambhogakaya, while the superior body of the Ojin (Jap. Sho-Ojin) is for the aspirants for Pratyeka Buddhahood. Even this nature, however, reveals certain truths which the lowest, the Sravakas, are unable to understand or appreciate, so great is their profundity, so that the Buddha, desirous of the salvation of all sorts and conditions of men, assumes a still lower nature, the incomplete body, the Rettojin, for the sake of aiding the simple, the skeptical and the

unintelligent. Are we not reminded in this connection of the Christ's words, "Unto the multitudes I speak in parables, but unto you, face to face."

Such, then, is the conception of the Trikaya as held by practically all the schools of Mahayana, for even the Jodomon conception differs only in one important detail. Among the followers of the Shodomon, there is only one important division of opinion on this point, namely, the doctrine taught by the Kegon sect and that held by the Tendai and the remaining sects. The difference reminds one strangely of the difference between the Arian and the Athanasian views of the Trinity. In the Kegon sect, the Dharmakaya is looked upon as somewhat superior to the other two aspects of the Universal Buddha. It alone is the pure reason, the Cause, while the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya are merely the "things" (*ji*) or the result. In the Tendai theology, however, (and all the subsequent sects derive their systems from Tendai) the three bodies are absolutely equal and undivided (literally "not two"). It is interesting to note that not only did similar controversies occur in both the East and the West, but that also, in both cases, was the same theory triumphant, namely, the equal and undivided, or Athanasian, idea, for in Japan the Kegon sect is now practically extinct.

Only one other point remains to be spoken of in this connection. In the process of time, each one of the three aspects came to be more and more personified, until finally the names of ideal Buddhas were attached. Thus in the Shingon or Mantra sect (and to a certain extent in the others) the Dharmakaya came to be known as Vairochana Buddha (Jap. Dai Nichi Butsu) or the Blessed One coming from the sun, the Sambhogakaya as Amitabha or Amitayus Buddha (Jap. Amida Butsu) or the Divine Being of infinite light and infinite time while the Nirmanakaya was typified by Sakyamuni.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

A TRUCE OF PHILOSOPHIES.

BY ROBERT V. SHOEMAKER.

PRAGMATISM says that truth is always relative to our development of mind, and valued according to our purposes. If this is true—and there is no doubt but it at least represents a truth—then a philosophy that can reconcile the sustaining purposes of materialism, idealism and pantheism, will be able so to appeal to the whole soul of man that he will recognize the teaching as truth—as the idea-embodiment-for-him of reality. To sketch the outlines of such a reconciling philosophy, and to show the real underlying harmony between these three philosophies, is the none too modest purpose of this essay.

Following the pragmatic principle of practicality, let us try to assign a place to pantheism. The chief objection to pantheism is the passive mood that it imparts. The recognition of worthiness in everything that is, is not conducive to strife for the things that are not and must be. If everything at any one time is either good or working for good, there is no standard for the choice of more or less productive paths in life. Spinoza's pantheism resolved itself into an end to all striving, and a passive oneness with the All—though nothing is more manifest than that to be one with the All is to be active. The modern "Christian Scientist" pantheism does not discourage striving, but allows it recognition along with all things else, as good; but, since all is good, there is no impelling motive to altruistic striving, and selfish striving is the more encouraged. The materially prosperous flock to the Scientist standard; others of the fold are encouraged, and thus aided, to gain material prosperity; and the whole tone of their worship is one of deadening contentment in health and wealth or whatever other material blessings they may have. Not for them any agony over starving millions in China or in tenement houses in unvisited corners of their own city!

Yet it can readily be seen that this philosophy would do very

nicely for a well-adjusted world, where governmental and human frailties were so slight that there was no need of an aggressive and sacrificing altruism. The reason we rebel against pantheism is that the times are not yet ripe for it. Humanity cannot live half emancipated and half enchained. The emancipated must devote themselves to rending the others' chains. But once the chains are all broken and thrown into the melting-pot of dissolution, then pantheism can come into its own.

There are yet some objections which we must answer here. Some object to a perfect, pantheistic world for our goal, because, they say, they would not live in a land whose fruits were not sweetened by desperate strife. These we may ask if there is not something wrong with a mind that insists upon having others suffer to spice its pleasure. But, say others, granted such a world of perfection is better than our present world, is it worth striving for? Would it not be a tame object for century-long struggle? Why not give up the fight and die? To this the first reply is, to give up the fight is to shirk. Man has an impulse that makes him strive upward, and to drop out of the struggle is ignoble. Even could all men be persuaded to give up the fight, the world would still move on, even without man, and still have problems unsolved which only evolution and striving could solve. And this would remain true if man killed, before himself, all life upon which he could lay hand. And the second reply is that, no matter how near perfect the institutions of man and the dispositions of beasts, there are always the elements to brave, games to excite and develop, mountain crags to scale. And if the man of the perfect world becomes surfeited of these—which is not likely from our present need of bundling for the elements and of braces and supporters for our games—he may at least seek a calm death, untroubled by the responsibility of the sins of the world.

So pantheism is an unsilenceable craving, which the selfish hope of a personal reward hereafter cannot silence, but only deaden. In our philosophy, then, pantheism for the future.

Examining idealism by its fruits, we find two distinct, yet often entwined, types of idealism, which we will denote as aspirational idealism and as basic or cosmic idealism. Their products in the world are practically opposite, and when the two are combined in a philosophy, as they are almost invariably, they make for a sort of contradictory ethical indeterminism.

Basic idealism defines matter as we know it as a figment of the mind. Kant's critical rationalism concedes some ground to the

materialist in his threefold world of mental states, phenomena and things-in-themselves, but his definition of phenomena as the synthesis of sense-impressions by means of mental categories gives him a decided leaning toward basic idealism. Now the fruits of these beliefs—pure and critical basic idealism—are perhaps not so soporific as is pantheism, but they have marked tendencies that way. If ideals, ideas, or categories are held to be independent of matter (creating phenomena rather than created by phenomena), if ideas or categories are shot at us bolt out of the sky—we not only are involved in an endless array of equally dogmatic ideas, we not only find ourselves unable to cope with numerous physical situations for which there is no adequate God-given idea, but we are likely to become physically lethargic, and echo too emphatically the ideas of Rabbi Ben Ezra of “the vulgar mass called work,” of the world as “machinery just meant to give the soul its bent,” and the subsequent injunction, “Thou, heaven’s consummate cup, what need’st thou with earth’s wheel?” This tone of selfish individualism is sounded at frequent intervals through the idealism of the nineteenth century—its poets and its ministers—and its voice is still a strong one, comforting into torpor those who otherwise could not rest until they had made the world physically a better place to live in, and who but for trust that the sweet in spirit shall be saved to eternal bliss, might pin their lives and their trust to the hope of perfection achieved in the physical world, through physical as well as soul labor. (This is not meant in any way to ridicule the belief in a future spiritual life, except as it is used as a drug to deaden the sensibilities which demand a housecleaning in this world.)

But the other kind of idealism, aspirational idealism, we would cling to above all else in the world. It is forming and clinging to ideals that has raised us above the brutes of the paleolithic age, the brutes of the inquisition days, the brutes of this day of war and after-war terror, and the weaker brutes of our nation’s southern neighbor. It is the forming of ideals *and* the insistence upon making them *real* and *material* that has raised man to be man. And it is at this point that aspirational idealism conflicts with cosmic idealism. Cosmic idealists are content to keep their ideals in the realm of the ideal; natural, aspirational idealists throb to grasp their ideas and bring them to earth for all men to see and love.

So, then, idealism, not for the explanation of the present through the past, but for the evolution of the future through the present, shall be part of our philosophy.

And then materialism. Here again we have two sorts, ethical and cosmic. I know of nothing more gross than ethical materialism. That since a thousand dollars, a roomy home or a tiny pearl is to be desired, a million dollars, a thirty-room house or a string of giant pearls is of so much the more value, is absurd reasoning. Nor is the idea that to furnish a modern home with Oriental rugs, medieval art, Greek statuary, colonial pillared porches, bungalow roof and Roman lions at the gate—a hodge-podge of things valuable in their proper atmosphere—much better. To know a lady by the quality and quantity of her dresses, to measure a man by his possessions, to measure joy by laughter, or song by volume—these are of the gross.

But cosmic materialism—that is a different thing. The scientific investigations of evolution have shown that man could rise from the ignoble ape—yes, even from the Protozoa, who trace a common ancestry with plants. Possibly some day it will be shown that man arose from no higher origin than a chemical reaction. Does it, then, seem unlikely that mind should evolve from pure sensitive matter—that the ideal, though higher than the material, should have evolved from it?

What there is of natural revolt against this now fairly established theory is due primarily to a repugnance toward those animals which trace a common ancestry with us. But this repugnance has its basis in the fact that these types are not evolving types, but decadent and static offshoots of the true agent of evolution. This very naturally raises the question, "Is man also a stationary, unevolving type?" If we cannot answer this with a strong negative, we shall not be able to wean the aspirational idealist away from cosmic idealism, and the efforts of this essay are useless. But if we have faith in a slow but steady human evolution, we need not despise our lowly material origin.

It may serve us well to take up the question of empiricism. In spite of the ethical, pragmatic, view against cosmic idealism, and the preponderance of reason in evolution against it, may we not still be wrong in denying it? How do we know that there are things-in-themselves? And if we know that, how are we sure we know them as they are? This seems to me well enough answered, by, for instance, the predictions of astronomy. The ability to foretell by science is certainly indicative of sufficient ability to know things as they are, to satisfy all our purposes. Of course, we cannot know what our world would mean to a fourth-dimension person, nor have we fathomed just its relation to the universe. But it is

absurd to believe with the idealist that God tags us around, placing illusions before us, which in accordance with divine law produce certain effects upon the mind, leading the mind to imagine in turn control over an illusory body, made for our mind's benefit by God, which in turn produces certain God-inspired illusory effects upon the illusions which God has located in our minds as ideas of matter. Nor can we even agree with Kant that our idea of matter and movement is but the synthesis of sensations of things-in-themselves by God-given categories of cause, time and space, for psychology has been able in some degree to trace these categories to empirical experience. Psychology tells us, and perhaps we can dimly recall, of a time when the world was to our infant mind one vast confusion. Impressions were made, strengthened by repetition, knit with others by coincidence and analogy of effect, connected with opposites by conflict of effect, and so on until our minds could grasp with less and less mystification the things of this world. This remarkable train of development seems to require no other building-material than a head filled with matter having a sensitive reaction to ether-waves, air-waves and the grosser material bodies about us. Psychology has, in other words, practically accomplished what was once considered impossible—knowing the knower. The mind has practically been reduced to a structure evolved through the centuries (as the individual, so the phylum) from sensitive-reactive matter. Under this materialistic aspect our knowledge may be incomplete, fragmentary, and hence faulty, but it is not dubious in its foundation. It may be but a reflection, but it serves our purposes, and the only way to improve it is not to seek mystic interpretations of it, but to examine it more closely.

Nor even is a more radical materialism to be feared. (My discussion may be discounted from this point on without affecting my main contention as expressed in the conclusion. I am now merely adding my personal foibles to the possibilities.) Of course, all evolution may have been accomplished under the lash of a creator-driver—a personality—a fixed, immovable and ideal God. But does this seem likely? And if so, whence full-fledged into being sprang God?

An acceptance of a materialistic basis for the world is bound at least to make unnecessary the belief in an all-powerful creative and guiding hand, either in the growth of the mind or the growth of the world. (Do not misinterpret me as denying a guiding Aspiration or Spirit, for that is the object of my deepest worship.) It is not belittling to the human race to think of it as evolving through

the millions of years from a simple reactive-sensitive mass until it bodied forth creatures with a soul for beauty, for sympathy and for sacrifice. Nor is it a libel upon God to think of God as an impersonal Aspiration and Will, growing gradually in us through this evolution—the Soul ideal—always a step in advance of the body.

A future life of the spirit is not inconsistent with materialism. That the spirit—the motive pulse of the body—may pass into a finer and more plastic body, as the ether, appeals to the scientific mind. If it does pass into such a transcendent medium, its influence in the world is multiplied—a sort of mental telepathy—and it is also possible that every thought, every moment, has its immortality or eternal punishment.

To those who find a Reason for creation, we may say, find if you will the first reason for the universe. Then ask for the reason that lies back of that. And so on. Do you think you will ever find one that will explain itself?

And to those who seek a Cause for creation, we may say, find the Ultimate Cause, and then tell us how *It* sprang into being.

But to those who seek a Purpose pervading the world, we may say, Look at the universe as it was in the beginning, a causeless, reasonless, purposeless life. Then see through time a giant strength and purpose rising out of the mist—a will to the universal realization of fundamental impulses and to good will among men, beasts, birds, and growing herbs. This is the God in man—this is the soul. This is that which lives through death. This is that which will emancipate the earth from her terrible birth-pangs with an issue that shall comfort her as long as she lives. This is the idealism arising out of materialism to grasp pantheism.

So you see, we have materialism for the past, idealism for the present and pantheism for the future. We sought a truce of philosophies, but I fear we have stirred us up a fight.

CONCEPT OF SELF AND EXPERIENCED SELF.

BY JESSIE L. PREBLE.

I HAVE recently been led to the study of the concept of self because of my search for a fundamental starting-point in philosophy which should unite in itself two classes of merits, (1) ability to hold important place in a logical system of thought, and (2) ability to call to the mind the concrete impressions which produced it.

The term "self" may be used in many senses. Those enumerated by Bradley and James cover all the uses I have been accustomed to notice until recently. And the forms of self under James's "spiritual" and "material me"¹ certainly contain all the ideational data and sense-impressions which we need to choose between and to mass together for the formation of our full concept of self. Bradley's analysis breaks up this group of data and distinguishes several meanings which can be given to the term "self." (1) It may refer to the section of consciousness observed during any unit of time we may choose to select.² (2) It may refer to certain aspects which most frequently occur throughout life, and which compose what he calls "the constant average man."³ (3) Some more isolated factor—as memory or purpose—may be selected from the life stream and called the "essential self."⁴ Or (6) the self may be contrasted with the not-self, and regarded as that residue which is left after "the limit of exchange of content between self and not-self" has been reached.⁵ Bradley finds no difficulty in dismissing one and all of these conceptions of the self, as vague and untrustworthy because unclear and undefined. In this he is, to a certain extent, justified because in things psychical it is probably impossible to draw a rigid line

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Chapter X; *Psychology, Briefer Course*, Chapter XII.

² *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 77-78.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 80ff.

of demarcation between the like and the unlike. This difficulty, however, is found also in the physical world. It is impossible to measure anything with utter exactness; it is impossible to place a plane between two portions of water, one at 51° C and one at 50° C, which I propose to add together. Some of the 51° molecules have lost heat, some of the 50° have gained it, before the addition can be made. Kinetic activities of the molecules cause them to mix with a suddenness and irregularity which prohibits theoretical or practical locating of cleavage lines. This indefiniteness of outline is, of course, a feature of the concept of self, no matter what attempt to assemble all the images composing the concept might be made. Our question is, therefore, the following: Is it necessary to throw over the concept of self because of its indefiniteness? To this we may reply: All mental abstraction and generalization are based upon substitution of a word or a sign for a thing signified.⁶ "Smoke" is a general term which stands for a possible visual experience. Here we have what Taine calls a "couple," which may be written thus: Smoke (verbal percept or image) \rightarrow Visual experience, following, accompanying or preceding. One term in the couple is a word having a certain sound and a fixed usage in common experience. At the other end of the couple is the sense-experience.⁷

From this consideration, as it now seems to me, a refutation may be evolved of Bradley's argument against the self-concept on the ground of its unclearness. For suppose that when you utter the word "self" and try to utter it in any one of Bradley's seven senses you are unable to have a clear mental mosaic for any one of them. Suppose that you become still further disconcerted and thrown into bewildering unclearness, because for his first concept of self (1) you have a different mosaic tomorrow from what you had to-day. Even so, this imaginal unclearness is not decisive proof that you did not clearly *conceive* the self. For no single concept is used in any natural science which always has a setting in precisely the same imaginal complex. If I explain to you to-day the formula for a complex lens, $1/u + 1/v = 1/f$, I may very clearly image in my mind's eye the deduction as given in Duff's *Physics*, and the proof

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91. The numeral (6) indicates the place of this concept in Bradley's unsystematic enumeration of seven uncoordinated and overlapping concepts of the self. Only the more important of these are here cited.

⁶ *On Intelligence* (translation of T. D. Haye, 1872), Chapters I-III, *passim*.

⁷ It should be noted that the argument of this paper, though written on the basis of a purely verbal theory of the concept, could equally well be carried through in terms of any one of the doctrines which uphold the view that a concept is more-than-verbal.

will be rapid. In a month, if I have not thought about the proof at all in the interval, "Duff" may have vanished, yet I trust that by the knowledge of certain general principles and of the nature of wave motion I shall still be able to derive this concept and to relate it to other concepts. We may therefore conclude that, as the concept $1/u$, $F = mg$, $s = vt$ and the like differ from the corresponding concrete experiences, so self as a concept differs from self as experienced. As a concept it is stripped of certain characters—as experienced it cannot be deprived of any characters. In a word, we may apply Taine's formula to the self, as to the physical concept, and with the following result: Self, experiencer and experienced (including not merely "personal attitudes" but also images and sense-impressions) \rightarrow Self as concept (without fixed or clear sense-content, yet perfectly definite as to its meaning).

The self is, accordingly, not merely one of the concepts which can and must be discussed in philosophy; it is the experienced self. And since also the self is experiencer as well as experienced it occupies the unique position (1) of experiencing unit and (2) of constructor of concepts. It is self which sees, hears, feels, thinks, takes part in the dramatic episodes of daily life. And it is self, also, which as thinker (isolating here one factor from the whole just mentioned) constructs concepts. It seems to follow that from either point of view, the psychological or the logical, the self constitutes the unavoidable starting point for philosophy.

MISCELLANEOUS.

"SAVAGE LIFE AND CUSTOM."

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I have only just seen Dr. W. Thornton Parker's communication in *The Open Court* for August last, but as the subject is one of supreme importance to the great States who control aboriginal races, perhaps you will once again allow me a reply. Dr. Parker holds, as many other men hold who have come in contact with savage races, that it is *right* and proper they should disappear and be replaced by other races who can boast of a superior civilization: in other words, that primitive races "should go under."

In my articles describing the morals and customs of modern savages, I endeavored to show how mistaken were the popular conceptions of what constitutes "savage life." I tried to indicate that these early and partly civilized members of our race were really human, "even as you and I," and I fail to see that anything Dr. Parker has written, taken from personal experiences, proves the contrary.

So far as we anthropologists can reconstruct the moral character of the American Indian, before his contact with the white race, he was the superior of the white man, in ethics as well as in manners. I have myself been connected with anthropological science in this country for over thirty-five years; but what I have to say here shall be solely taken from American sources, and not culled from English writers who might be thought to be influenced by insular prejudice.

When we speak of "inferior" and "superior" human races, *what* do we mean? Is the race that insists on the early training of the young; the race that hates the liar; that does not steal from its fellows; that does not poison itself with alcohol; that is practically free from terrible diseases—tuberculosis, small-pox, and the *other diseases* which are known to modern medical science—is such a race an *inferior* or a *superior* one? There is surely no need to reply! In all such matters nature herself has the last word, and it will be in *her* Court that the final decision will be given.

Meantime, what have the most recent American researches told us respecting the Indians that once roamed the prairies and the plains of the New World? The name of Miss Alice C. Fletcher of Washington is not unknown to the people of the United States of America. In a summary of the morality of the American Indian (for which she and the late Washington Matthews, of the United States Army, were jointly responsible) we are told that the *natives* had standards of right conduct and of character; that abundant evidence exists to

"show that Indians were often actuated by motives of pure benevolence," and took a delight in generous acts. Honesty was insisted upon; personal property in the tribe was secure. Murder was always punished. "Truth, honesty and the safeguarding of human life were everywhere recognized as essential;" adultery was punished; and the care of one's family regarded as a social duty.

Take one or two of these points—is adultery *punished* in America or Europe to-day? Is murder also *always* punished? Are "truth, honesty, and the safeguarding of human life *everywhere* recognized" among the Christian nations of Europe and America as essential among all classes of their population? If these questions cannot truthfully be answered in the affirmative, then which of the two is the inferior, the savage or the Christian?

Dr. Parker is a medical man; he has written on medical subjects in American scientific journals; he therefore will be more or less cognizant of the fearful havoc wrought by *modern* diseases. Those diseases were unknown to the red man; they were bequeathed to him by the white, as Dr. Ales Hrdlicka and other American authorities have conclusively proved: is freedom from disease a sign of inferiority, and does it evidence the assertion that the red man deserves to go the way of his own buffalo?

There is no more terrible chapter in the history of modern civilization than that of the treatment of the colored races by their white brothers; and if my own research in the anthropological field has taught me anything it has taught me this—that there will be a day when the truth of that treatment shall be known to all those who represent all that is best in modern civilized lands, just as that truth is known now to the few; and who, when that day comes, will look back on the past as a terrible nightmare, and declare that all the material wealth that has accrued to them by the possession of Naboth's vineyard, is poor compensation for that real wealth which was once the possession of the white man, as it was also of the man he has now displaced—a healthy body and a healthy soul.

EDWARD LAWRENCE.



BARBEY D'AUREVILLY.

(From *French Men, Women and Books*, by Miss Betham-Edwards.
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HOMER AND THE PROPHETS

OR

HOMER AND NOW.

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST.

[CONCLUDED.]

CHARACTERS IN HOMER'S POEMS, MORAL: MORAL AND ALLEGORICAL NAMES.

It is clear from what we have seen thus far that Homer's stories should not be regarded as tales designed merely to pass the time pleasantly—when we look into their deeper meanings we begin to wonder whether these Epics were not Moralities, like *Pilgrim's Progress*, for we find that the names of the characters, like Bunyan's, are appropriate to the Vices and Virtues which distinguish them. Let us not be understood to mean that Homer preaches—he is far too good an artist to do that, as Bunyan also is. Both show men as they are, dramatically and realistically so that we love them or hate them for the traits that they reveal. An examination of the names in Homer as to their derivation and root-meaning will repay our effort and throw light upon the moral intent of these stories—we shall find Mr. Pliable, Mr. Wordly-Wiseman, Mr. Facing-both-Ways among them:

Leading the vicious characters we find:

Antinous—*ἀντι νοῦς*, *without-mind, fool, idiot*. Can this be the name that his father and mother gave him when he was a child? That is not possible.

Paris—*παριῶω*, *I sleep beside, or with*. This is the phrasing in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi for committing adultery, a crime which was decreed the penalty of drowning in the river, for both of the guilty persons. This also is not the name that the parents of this prince gave their child at his birth, nor is that of *Alexander*, which Homer often calls him, derived from *ἀλέξω* and *ἀνήρ-θρός*, meaning not *defender of men*, as has been suggested, but *defended of men*, which is appropriate, and a reproach to

the men who defended him, for they should, according to Babylonian law, have drowned him along with his companion in the river.

Helen—This name is usually derived from the Aryan root meaning *to shine, to beam*, cognate with the root in *Helios*, the sun, and this would be appropriate to this queen because of her exceeding beauty. However, there is an infinitive, *ἔλειν*, which must have been suggested to Greek hearers by the name, meaning *to grasp by the hand, to lead away, to seduce*, particularly appropriate to Helen because it fits her elopement with Paris and because ancient vase-paintings commonly represent her going away with Paris, *hand in hand*. The earliest represents her leading, and the Greeks did not regard her act lightly or condone it. As late as the laxer times of Euripides she was hated by the people, and in the *Electra* Euripides shows her own father refusing to protect her. She is afraid that the people will do her violence if she appears on the streets and ventures forth only with a muffled face.

Menelaus—*μένω*, *I stay behind*; *λαός*, *the common men, subjects*. This king is commonly called by Homer *Good-at-the-Battlecry*, and the suggestion now is that he usually shouted safely in the rear. In incidents in the *Iliad* he appears as a coward, and he was the last of the kings to return from the war to his home, except Odysseus, who was forcibly detained.

Agamemnon—*ἄ γαμός*, *a marriage that is no marriage, a fatal marriage*. This is appropriate, for his wife hated Agamemnon for many reasons, and killed him. If this king was an historical character, this name can have been given him only after his death.

Clytemnestra—*κλύτω*, *I give ear to*, *μηστήρ*, *a suitor*. This is a fitting name, for this queen gave ear to Ægisthus's wooing.

Ægisthus—*αἴξ-γός*, *a goat*. He was a goaty, lascivious, unheroic man who did not go to the war.

Agamemnon and Menelaus, unfortunate kings whose house had been shadowed by a curse of black crime for generations, are cursed in their own persons with traits that bring them sorrow—will their children be more happy? The daughter of Menelaus by Helen is named Hermione, and she is described as having "the grace of golden Aphrodite." Alluring in body, and with a name that is feminine for Hermes, patron of traders and thieves, we may expect her to be even less reliable than her mother, and "fast." Her half-brother, the son of Menelaus by a slave-mother, is named *Megapenthes*, from *μέγα*, *great*, and *πενθεῖν*, *to bewail*, a name with little promise of happiness for his parents or the new family that he will found. He will have the usual fate of the House of Atreus, his ancestors (*ἄτερος*, *driven to ruin, baneful*). The bride of Megapenthes is a daughter of Alector, whose name is derived from *ἄλεκτωρ* meaning a cockerel, and imitates the sound of a cock's crow. He, it seems, is *Good-at-Crowing*, as Menelaus is *Good-at-the-Battlecry*.

The coming generation can hardly be expected to lift the curse from the House of Atreus.

The good characters in Homer also have names that are fitting:

Odysseus—*ὄδευν*, *I travel, I journey*. This is appropriate, for he traveled far, in mind as well as in body.

Penelope—*πήνη*, *a thread, a web*, *λυπίζω*, *I cover, I wrap up*. This is appropriate in reference to the famous web that Odysseus's queen was weaving as a stratagem to put off answering the suitors, on the plea that it must be ready for a winding-sheet for Odysseus's aged father.

Telemachus—*τελεῖν*, *to complete, to perfect*, *μάχομαι*, *I fight*, with nouns and adjectives as desired. In connection with *ἀνὴρ*, *man*, *τέλεος* means *a full-grown man, a man who has full rule or authority, able to do or bring about*, and this fits the character and situation of Telemachus admirably, for in the first incident in which he appears in the *Odyssey* Athene finds him dreaming like a boy but rouses him to act like a man. His first act of authority is to tell his mother to return to her chamber when she has come down to speak to the bard in the presence of the suitors and to announce to her that authority in his father's house rests in him. This pleases her greatly, for it shows her that her son has *become a man*. He now proceeds to call an assembly, lay his wrongs before the people, warn the suitors to leave his palace or take the punishment which he calls upon them from Zeus, and announce that he himself is intending to undertake a journey to seek his father. The adverb *τήλη*, *far away*, is usually accepted as a root in the name of Telemachus, but has no application to his case. He is not only *completely a man*, but also *completely a warrior*, as his name implies, discreet, farsighted, courageous, obedient to command, generous enough to give the evil-doers a warning and a chance to avoid punishment, and admirable in every respect as he stands by his father through the last combat. He does not fight *from afar*, but hand to hand and face to face, with word and weapon.

Alcinous—*ἀλκή*, *ἀλκί*, *ροῦς*, *Strong-Mind*, was fitly named, the king of the sailor-nation, who helped Odysseus on his last stage home.

Arete—*ἀρετή*, *Goodness, Excellence, Virtue*, was the charitable queen who granted Odysseus the privileges of a suppliant when he made his appeal to her. She is a fit wife for Alcinous, and her daughter, Nausicaa, is the wife-to-be for Telemachus. She is the perfect girl, as he is the perfect man and warrior. She is dreaming of her approaching wedding; Queen Helen has given Telemachus a robe for his bride to wear on her wedding day, a very beautiful robe woven by her own hands; Fate even puts the words into Nausicaa's mouth that she wishes the gods would send her *such a husband* as Odysseus—Telemachus is so very like his father in head and beautiful eyes that Helen knows him at sight as Odysseus's son when he comes unannounced to the palace of Menelaus. The lines seem all laid for this marriage, and for the founding of a new house, whose kings shall be not like those of the house of Atreus, *baneful*, and *driven to ruin*, but wise and just in their rule. With such parents as Telemachus and Nausicaa, and such grandparents as Odysseus and Penelope, Alcinous and Arete, the coming generation of the new house is

certain to be dear to gods and to men. No manlier groom and no womanlier bride were ever made for each other.

Can it have been mere accident that all of these names fitted the characters? Impossible. It is impossible, too, that these were the names given to the children by their parents, for (1) some of them are not affectionate, as that of Antinous, (2) some fit the events of mature life, as that of Paris, and (3) that of Agamemnon can have been given only after his death. Were these "nick-names," and applied to real people as we call Lincoln *Honest Abe*, a name that he bore among the neighbors? and were they perhaps caught up by the poet and passed along to the exclusion of the names that the individuals had really borne? Or were there no historic characters who bore these names, but just fit names to convey moral allegory?

It is not necessary that we should answer these questions here; later we will touch upon the questions of historic fact. It is sufficient for our purpose to realize that the names must have conveyed to the early Greeks who heard the *Odyssey* recited the vices and the virtues of the characters, and that this was done by means of native roots, strongly, as the native roots of *Pilgrim's Progress* do, more effectively than the names in Shakespeare's *Tempest* do, where the derivation is from foreign roots:

Prospero—*pro, ahead; spero, I hope*. Prospero hoped ahead when other men would have despaired.

Miranda—*mirror, miranda, to be wondered at*. Miranda is Shakespeare's Wonder, the most perfect of his heroines.

Ariel—*aer, air*. He is an airy Spirit of the Air.

Caliban—*cannibal*, by metathesis. Even the transposition of the letters is appropriate and symbolical, for Caliban is dwarfed and crooked.

If the pleasure in appropriate names is strong in "The *Tempest*," it must have been doubly strong to the Greeks in their Homer, where it pointed more strongly the moral qualities. Should not a new translation of Homer be given us, using native roots, and preserving the full force of the names for modern readers?

THE RIGHTEOUS GODS, "GODS OF THE FATHERS":

(1) ZEUS, (2) ATHENE, (3) APOLLO.

According to Homer and Hesiod, Zeus, the Father of the Gods and King of Heaven, was a son of Time (Chronos), and husband to various consorts, whom he had chosen wisely and well in the main. Of these, Hera, the special guardian of Hearth and Home, was his Queen; Metis, Cunning Counsel, bore him a daughter, *Wisdom*, named *Athene*; and *Leto*, a fair Titan of the dark early world, bore him the glorious god of the sun, Apollo, who is Light in the moral world as opposed to Darkness. His attendants, who enforced his

rule, were Strength and Force, the same who attend all kings since his day, but in the main his rule was beneficent, wise and just, for when Athene spoke he heeded her and gave her his support, and he seems never to have been at variance with just Apollo. Zeus



ZEUS.

Colossal Mask of Carrara marble, found in Otricoli, near Rome, in the eighteenth century. (From a copyrighted carbon photograph published by A. W. Elson & Co., Boston, Mass.)

took action on the right side of a cause eventually, though he sometimes permitted an evil to continue a long while without taking action against it. Homer expresses no doubt of his wisdom, power and

goodness, and in the Homeric epics good men pray to him in their need and are saved by his assistance. Those who injured strangers and those who broke the laws of hospitality, as Paris and the Suitors did, were certain to receive their punishment from Zeus, assisted by his righteous son, Apollo, and his daughter, Athene.

In ages following Homer, critics had much to say against Zeus on the score of his many loves, and Plato and Saint Augustine were agreed that many stories told of him in this time were evil, but in early days, when plural marriages were the rule, as they had been in Israel in the time of the Patriarchs, there would have been no criticism of him on this point. The age following Homer began to feel, also, that Zeus was a tyrant and to hope for a better ruler, a hope expressed in the Myth of Prometheus, Fore-Thought, the friend of Man, who saved Man from destruction at the hands of Zeus and was therefore punished by Zeus with a kind of crucifixion. He saved Man, but himself he could not save, and endured physical torture at the hands of Strength and Force so long as the rule of Zeus endured. This Myth shows the struggle of a passing order against new ideas and proposed change, in this case, of Monarchy against the rising spirit of Democracy, for Prometheus is giving his service *to the people* instead of to the reigning King of Heaven. Such a struggle was going on in Greece in the days of Solon, and that is probably the date of the Prometheus myth. The Zeus of Homer seems not to have been subjected to criticism of this kind by gods or men, feels no fear of Prometheus and waning power, for the kings of Homer were not yet trembling on their thrones. Such a myth will rise only when the new democracy is threatening to put kings from their thrones.

The best thing that can be said for Homer's Zeus is that he is the Father of Wisdom, in the person of Athene, and of Justice and Inspiration in the person of Apollo.

"Glorious Apollo," as he is called in Homer, was represented by the Greeks as a radiant youth at the early period of manhood when ideals are still untarnished by contact with the sordid world, but, at the same time, he was a god of exceeding power, the Archer, mighty in combat, slayer of Python, the great snake of evil. If his name is derived, as has been suggested, from ἀπ-όλλύω, *I destroy utterly*, it is appropriate to his character as god of the Sun and Archer of the Silver Arrows, for just as the sun pours his beams down upon the earth, causing physical carrion to decay and purifying the earth of its contagion, so Apollo purifies the moral world

by shooting his arrows of retribution at those who do wrong. He is the god of justice, poetic justice, as he showed himself, for instance, in the case of Orestes, whom he judged to be right in killing



THE APOLLO BELVIDERE.

his mother, Clytemnestra, because she had betrayed and treacherously killed his father, Agamemnon. The expression of stern power in the face of the Apollo Belvedere is appropriate to this Archer—he has just shot one of his arrows of punishment and is looking

upon the pain it has brought to the guilty. Those who are glad that this world has a moral order must rejoice in this stern beauty.

The best lives of ancient Greece were ruled according to Apollo's laws, graven in the marble of his temple, "Know thyself," and "All things in proportion," or, "All things in restraint." These were Commandments, which, if obeyed as to riches and power would correct most of the wrongs of the world. The shrines of Apollo at Delos and at Delphi became the centers of pilgrimage for Greece.

Homer's Apollo was not the patron of the powerful kings and warriors who sought worldly advantage, and he judged men not as the world in general judges, but according to his own high standard. The special patron of Achilles was Hephæstos, who rewarded his worshiper with the cunningly wrought shield of gold and silver which he made on his forge; the special patron of Menelaus was Ares, an arrant coward when put to the test and easily defeated by those who fight with the sword of the higher ideals—the rewards he gives will be the plunder of cities; the special patron of Odysseus was Athene, and her reward to even this greatest of her votaries is wingless victory, not the greatest riches or power, but moderate, along with contentment in his human lot and the favor of God. This kind of victory has no wings and will remain with him. But Apollo was the special patron of the Blind Bard, a man without material possessions, and even without a home, for the poet's home is the whole world of the spirit, and he holds himself as only the instrument to give voice to the Song that Apollo sends through the Muse. To the Blind Bard, and to other artists who render Apollo heartfelt devotion the god will not give material rewards—only a crown of wild olive, symbolical of the greater glory that a man may win in the realm of pure spirit, exactly the opposite from the rewards of Hephæstos, but with this, high joy in his work.

In Homer's poems, does the archer god of the silver bow punish men justly when they have done wrong, and reward them justly when they have done right? Paris and Ægisthus and the suitors all suffered punishment, death, because they did not regard the laws of the gods or the rights of other men; so also the Trojans did for permitting a great wrong to exist among them and for protecting the wrong-doer; but Odysseus and all of his household, who obeyed the laws of the gods, and who offered sacrifices and prayers to the gods, received protection in their need and ended life happy. Their religion was largely that of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but the gods demanded rigid justice, and even mercy—Odysseus stayed his hand from punishing the suitors when he re-

turned until he had seen with his own eyes the wrong that each had done, and until he had given every man a final chance to mend his ways. If any should show at the last that he repented the wrong and intended to do right in the future, if any should show a will to be merciful to the beggar and the suppliant in their midst—who was, as Fate willed it, Odysseus himself—Odysseus would pardon him. The gods punished those who refused to show mercy, as when Apollo punished Agamemnon because he refused to take ransom for the priest's daughter; Achilles mutilated Hector's dead body and dragged it behind his chariot, but when aged King Priam humbled himself and came to offer a ransom for it, Zeus sent a warning to Achilles that if he refused to do this mercy he would be condemned by the gods, and punished.

In the Iliad Apollo is active sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, but this does not argue that he does not give his assent to the punishment of Troy in this war. He treats individuals always according to their deserts, and in doing this he does not change the final award of victory to the Greeks and punishment of the Trojans. He is never neutral, and he never supports a person who is base. He punishes Paris and Helen, but he also punishes the greatest of warriors in battle, Achilles, who fights on the other side, dimming his glory, hindering his progress, taking the field against him in person, and finally putting it into the mind of cowardly Paris to shoot him in the heel—this is the only way to spoil Achilles's chance in future combats, and the appropriate way to kill him, for no man can outrun him, not even Hector, so he can avoid conflict and save himself whenever he wants to do so.

Why should Apollo be so against Achilles but that Achilles is a man of low ideals, whose patron is Hephæstos, god of the forge and of things? Achilles does not fight for his cause, but for his reward, and he would ruin the chance of his nation in a righteous war in order to satisfy his own personal anger against his superior officer, in case his reward were withheld. Admitting that Agamemnon was unjust to Achilles, and punishing Agamemnon for being so, Apollo judges Achilles also wanting and punishes him, not only on the field of combat and by death, but also by his tarnished fame, for the Muse does not move the Blind Bard to celebrate him as the greatest of the warriors at Troy, though he is conceded the first in running and in personal combat. He was no tortoise (the name *Achilles* seems to be derived from *ἀ χέλις*, *no tortoise*), but he lacked the best qualities of the ideal warrior.

which Odysseus and Telemachus had, namely, wisdom and inspiration by a high ideal.

Apollo does not love Achilles, though Achilles triumphs; he does love Hector, though Hector meets defeat. Apollo could not prolong Hector's life or give his cause victory, but he can and does give him honor throughout his life, and an eternal fame. It is one of the high things in this poem that Homer, inspired by Apollo, does Trojan Hector full justice though he judges the Trojan cause wrong.

Athene does not take the attitude toward Achilles that Apollo does, but assists him in every way. When Achilles is quarreling with Agamemnon and lays his hand on his weapon to threaten the king, Athene comes to his side and stops him—in her view he might be killed if he went farther, and it would not be wise for her to lose a man who is fighting on her side, though he be far from high-minded. She is a very practical person and often, herself, resorts to means not the highest, as when she practises deceit and tells falsehoods, and compliments Odysseus for doing the same. Apollo would never do that.

Wisdom, in Odysseus, required that he should practise deceit and tell falsehoods, and he was extremely clever in his lying, so clever that when he told Athene a long story that had not one word of truth, she complimented him upon it by telling him that she could not have done it better herself! She had come to him in the form of a stranger, and he had cautiously tried to hide his identity for a time. In justice to him, it must not be forgotten that desperate men were watching for his return, intending to waylay him and put him to death before he should enter his own door, and that he was using the only means that could save him.

Those were wild times, and we shall have to admit some worse defects in Homer's hero than his lying. He was a pirate, as were his companion kings and his men at arms, who all "made" their wealth by the simple process of taking it from weak possessors, considering it more honorable to live upon the wealth produced by others than to produce wealth for themselves. It is no excuse for Odysseus that most of the so-called Christian wars, including most of the Crusades, have had a motive of riches, though this design was usually cleverly hidden by those who were to profit—in the Great War of 1914 it is a pathetic fact that the men in the armies of every side had been made to believe that their country's cause was just. We can say for Odysseus that he was no hypocrite, but an honest pirate, and that the gods of Olympus had not forbidden

such warfare. In his day the ideas of right and wrong that shall apply to all men and in all places had not been generally accepted among the men of the Mediterranean, and he could glory in the strength of the arm that enriched him without fear of being criticized on moral grounds even by the men he despoiled—they would have done the same to him if they had been able. Certainly modern imperialists will have no quarrel with him. To his credit, also, we may count it that his men understood what they were fighting for, that they were not conscripts, but volunteers, and that he shared generously with them the booty that was captured. His was no case of setting the men to do the dangerous fighting while he safely reaped the material rewards, and he was not an imperial financier, or a profiteer. He will stand comparison to his advantage with war-makers of our generation whom the world has called great, on most of the counts. Being a pre-Christian pagan, Odysseus lived by what theologians call common grace, and perhaps because of his benighted state he was not tempted to play the hypocrite as are those of our generation who have clear vision and higher ideals, but along with these an overpowering impulse for other people's possessions and a good chance to put money in their purse by starting war. Is it something toward restoring our self-respect that hypocrisy is a concession to the ideal, and therefore something to rejoice in even if cataclysms of war should continue to occur? Or is it the more of a reproach to us in modern times and of the Christian dispensation that we have added a new sin to the old pagan ones? The lying of Odysseus was not so vicious as modern hypocrisy, but then, Odysseus never faced the problems of the modern world. There seems to have been no conflict between his religious theories and his practice; his faith in his gods guided his life, nerved him to fight at tremendous odds and to gain victory in the conviction that he was sustained by wisdom and by justice.

Perhaps we should say, "by wisdom, if not always by justice," for there is one passage in the *Odyssey* in which Homer, and Apollo, are seen not to approve of pirates, such as Odysseus has been and the other kings still are. It is that in which "noble Eumæus," as Homer calls him, the slave and swineherd who tries to do right in all things, as his name assures us, *εὖ, well, μαίωμα, μαιεύομαι*, says to Odysseus in their talk at the lodge:

"Reckless deeds the blessed gods love not; they honor justice and man's upright deeds. Why, evil-minded cruel men who land on a foreign shore, and Zeus allows them plunder so that they sail back home with well-filled ships—even on the hearts of such falls a great fear of heavenly wrath."

The artistic fiction that Odysseus then proceeds to tell the good old man as to his past seems to acknowledge the point that Eumæus has been making, for it shows that Zeus had brought all of his piratical expeditions to naught—at one time Zeus thundered, and wrecked the ship; at another, Zeus struck his men with terror in the midst of an attack that they were making, but encouraged those whom they were fighting, so that his men were destroyed and he would have perished himself but for the protection of the king, to whom he became a suppliant. It is not without significance in this connection that the riches which Odysseus brings back with him to Ithaca are gifts, not spoils of war, and that he undertakes a journey to placate the god of the sea, Poseidon, after his return, but makes no more raids. Does not the Odyssey mark the time in the moral evolution of Greece when those who serve Apollo are teaching that wars of aggression and for possessions are wrong? "God gives and God withholds, as is his pleasure; his power is over all," is the comment of this good old Job among the Grecians, who himself has endured in patience one of the hardest of fates, that of a kidnapped child sold into slavery in a foreign land.

In this incident at the lodge, it is the noble slave, Eumæus, and not kingly Odysseus, whom the Blind Bard, inspired by Apollo, is giving the highest honor, and Homer becomes so moved with enthusiasm that he abandons the narrative form and breaks into apostrophe in telling the story: "Then, Swineherd Eumæus, you answered him and said." Is he not saying, in a concrete example, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, and those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, and those who make for peace"? Homer can not be awarded the glory of having formulated the Beatitudes, but of having at least a vision, a vision in which the mighty on their thrones were not exalted, but those of low degree who *tried well*.

Was Odysseus dear to Apollo as well as to Athene, though in a lesser degree? We may infer that he was, from the fact that Apollo showed grace to Odysseus when he stopped at Delos on his way to Troy to offer Apollo a sacrifice—Odysseus never failed to offer fit sacrifice to the gods of his devotion. When he meets Nausicaa at the washing-pool after his shipwreck and asks her assistance, he tells her how the god, at Delos, gave him courage and comfort by showing him a vision: Beside the altar, a fair olive shoot sprang up before his eyes, and this he interprets to mean that a fair young maid will be sent to aid him in his hour of direst need. When

Nausicaa gives him the needed assistance, all is fulfilled as the god foretold.

Another point in proof that Odysseus was dear to Apollo is the fact that Apollo inspired the Blind Bard at the palace of Alcinous to sing the Song of the Destruction of Troy, giving praise to Odysseus as the one who, under Athene, brought the war to a close. It was poetically fit that the Blind Bard should do this without knowing that the hero he sang was the honored guest at this banquet. Perhaps Apollo rewarded Odysseus thus, and at once, because he had just done an act of the gentlest courtesy to the Blind Bard, cutting a piece of the choicest meat with his own hand and sending it to him by a page. An act of appreciation like this shows the innermost heart of a man better than his great public deeds, and Apollo will rate this kindness at its true value and reward it, as surely as he punished Agamemnon for not heeding the plea of a humble priest. Odysseus seems to have been the opposite of Agamemnon in consideration of the humble priests who served Apollo, for we are told that "through holy fear" he protected the priest Evanthe, his wife, and his son. For this act, also, Apollo rewarded him richly, for the gift which Evanthe gave him in gratitude became the means by which Odysseus was saved at another desperate moment in his career—it was that very delicious, dark, sweet wine that Evanthe gave him with which he intoxicated Polyphemus, and thereby escaped from the man-eater's cave. Because he served the god of Light, it was poetically just that it should be given him to break the power of this monster of darkness, who devoured wayfarers and suppliants when they were his guests. The reward that Apollo gave to Odysseus after his kindness to the Blind Bard was also fit—a song, an immaterial thing, but one that had the power to move the hearts of virtuous Queen Arete, King Alcinous, the wise counsellors and the people of the Phæacians to honor Odysseus, give him rich gifts, and assist him on his way home. Also, that song will give fame which will last as long as time shall endure. . . . No small thing is Apollo's gift of a song!

Homer, who also was a Blind Bard inspired by Apollo and the Muse, enshrined in this story other acts that *Odysseus did*, little things, which prove him a man of the kindest heart as well as of Wisdom. Among these was his treatment of his slaves, his kind old Nurse and his Swineherd. How Homer, and the god Apollo love the "noble Swineherd, Eumæus"! and what a true king among men they have shown him to be!

From highest to lowest, all who were good loved Odysseus; his



THE ATHENE OF PEACE.
(In the Louvre.)

mother died of grief at his absence, his devoted old dog died of joy when he heard the returned master's voice. "Your wise ways, glorious Odysseus, and your tenderness—the longing for you took joyous life away," said his mother to him brokenly when he made his descent into Hades; the love of his poor old dog, Argo, drew tears from his eyes, eloquent of what he had been and why he was worthy, not only in the sight of father Zeus and Athene, but also in that of Apollo.

The epic, an oracle in song, was inspired by Apollo, and the Blind Bard knew that all of his power was from this great god: "Sing, O Muse," is his prayer, not "Help *me* to sing," making himself nothing, or only an instrument in the hands of the god. An empty form in many other writers the invocation to the Muse is a sincere and humble prayer in Homer, and is followed by incidents deeply religious, showing the ways of gods to men: in the Iliad the first incident shows how Apollo punished the king, Agamemnon, for refusing to heed the prayer of the poor priest in behalf of his daughter, who was a captive of war held by the king; in the Odyssey the first incident shows the gods in Council approving Athene's plan to help Odysseus return to his Home and approving the punishment that Orestes, Agamemnon's young son, has just given Ægisthus. "Lo, how men blame the gods!" says Zeus, and clears himself of blame for Ægisthus's death by showing that he had warned Ægisthus against his evil courses: "Surely, that man lies in fitting ruin!" exclaims Athene. "So perish all who do such deeds"—the deed Ægisthus had done was to woo a wife and help her to kill her husband.

In Apollo, the god of the sun, Grecian mythology touched a height sublime. He was the son by whom Zeus gave light to the world, the light of justice and inspiration, by which man rises above his brute estate. With the help of the Muses, men can transcend mere mortals, in the arts, and can create, like the gods, great works which will not die. The Greeks did not make the mistake, common in darkened ages, of thinking that morals and religion have nothing to do with art. Their word *ἄρτιν*, from which our word *art* is made, meant a *fitting, or joining together*, and applied to painting, poetry, drama, sculpture, architecture—all of the high arts presided over by Apollo and the Sacred Nine. But while they used the word to apply to things made of words, sounds, marble or any other material *fitted or joined together* with beauty, they never forget that these beautiful things were also true and good, for their inspiration was

from Apollo, the god of the sun, and everything less than true and good was unthinkable as emanating from him. Just as the sun pours down his beams upon the earth, giving light, which is the condition of life, so through the Muses Apollo lighted the minds of his chosen *art-ists* and warmed their hearts with *en-thusiasm*, which means derivatively, *God-Within*, for the exaltation of spirit that man feels when the True and the Good are crowned with beauty, they recognized as God-given. Our word *poet*, also derived from the Greek, meant *maker*, or *creator*, and honored the maker of song by comparing him with the Divine Creator, for his work also is a thing of pure spirit, and at its best is immortal, as Homer's is. It is the true poet who becomes an instrument in the hands of the god to waken men to a sense of the good to be attained and justice to be rendered. Out of the heart are the issues of life, and the poet's appeal is from the *God-within* himself to the *God-within* other hearts, and so is fundamental. True poets, who ennobled and uplifted men, were leaders among the Greeks, and "poetic justice" was recognized as perfect and to be acted on, as in the Code of Solon. "Oh, that is poetry," says our blind time, and continues to pay the price of injustice and unwisdom. By a living faith in Apollo's justice and Athene's wisdom Homer's hero took courage to fight singlehanded the hundreds of desperate suiters who threatened his home, and he won; by faith in the wisdom and justice of God Athenian Solon, called the Wise and the Just and therefore selected by his people to do this political work for them, wrote the Code that made Athens a Democracy and brought her her Golden Age; by faith in Athene and Apollo, little Athens dared to defend herself against giant Persia at fearful odds, and saved herself and the Western World by her victory at Marathon and Salamis—Davids against Goliaths!

In the myths of wise Athene and just Apollo, and in the wonders they wrought in Athenian life, one must admit that the Grecian religion was earnest and noble, especially in the periods before great riches and imperial ambitions had tarnished the national ideals, before Hephæstos and Ares had become the gods of devotion to practical purposes.

By "the gods of the fathers" men were offered salvation on condition that they obey, and were visited with punishment in this world and the next if they did not keep the commandments—in fact, Greek paganism was far from being the easy and lax religion that it has been thought. In the Apollonian period it was dark.

offering little hope to even the best of men and showing many instances of trials and tragic fates that the good had been made to endure because some of the gods themselves were unwise and ill-intentioned. Witness the case of Odysseus wandering, of Ædipus blind, and of Prometheus tortured. Only a mistaken interpretation, from a lax and degenerate period, as the late Greek, the Roman and the Italian Renaissance, could justify the opinion that the Greeks held their religion lightly and thought little of family ties. In the early period, even the loves of the gods were not the *chronique scandaleuse* that some of the critics take them to be, but conveyed the best thought of their time. In the *Odyssey*, the gods are in their heaven beyond question, and punish those who do wrong in the world. . . . I was about to say, *especially in the home*, for the *Odyssey* is a story of happy and unhappy homes, and every person who violates the home is punished by Zeus and Athene and Apollo—God, in his wisdom and justice.

Aphrodite, the destroyer of homes, is "laughter-loving," according to Homer's epithet, but Athene is nobly serious, patron of the useful arts, as that of the loom and the needle, and giver of the fruitful olive; Aphrodite is held lightly among the immortals and is distrusted by wise men and women, but Athene is able to turn all wise minds to her purposes. Aphrodite brings ruin to her devotees and those who give them protection; but Athene protects her own. Her tongue is a spear, even when she talks with Father Zeus, and sometimes by pleading, sometimes with sarcasm, she wins their cause for her votaries. So, having wisely bided her time, she skilfully turns the attention of Zeus to the plight of worthy Odysseus at the Council and persuades him to take up this cause, changing the subject from Ægisthus who has been justly punished to Odysseus, who has been unjustly prevented from reaching his home:

"Our Father, son of Chronos, most high above all rulers, that man[Ægisthus] assuredly lies in fitting ruin! So perish all who do such deeds! But now my heart is torn for wise Odysseus. He, hapless man, long cut off from friends, longing but to see the smoke springing from his land, desires to die. Did not Odysseus seek your favor by offering sacrifice upon the plains of Troy? Then why are you so wroth against him, Zeus?"

Then answered her cloud-gathering Zeus, and said:

"My child, what word has passed the barrier of your teeth? How could I ever forget kingly Odysseus, who is beyond all mortal men in wisdom, beyond them too in giving honor to the immortal gods who hold the open sky? . . . Come, let us all here plan for his return."

tained that his creations were the natural children of the Church. He prefaced his stories with a declaration of belief in the Devil and called to witness the teachers of the Church. "I have always believed," Barbey writes in his preface to *l'Ensorcelée* (1854), "... in the intervention of occult and malignant powers in the struggles of humanity.... In regard to the intervention of the malignant powers in the affairs of humanity, I have as support the testimony of the Church, and I do not, moreover, believe that what is going on at present in the world permits the most recalcitrant to doubt it."⁶ In his preface to *les Diaboliques* (1874)⁷ Barbey again describes himself as "the author...who believes in the Devil and in his influence in the world."⁸

The position which Barbey takes in regard to his belief in the Devil cannot be assailed. His assertion that the Devil is as essential to religion as the Deity cannot be gainsaid.⁹ He is wholly right when he maintains that you cannot be a believer in the Almighty and be a dis-believer in the Adversary. The belief in the Devil is an important part of the teachings of the Church. It is the pivotal point of the Catholic scheme of salvation. What need would there, indeed, be for salvation through Christ if there were no Satan constantly plotting against man? It is, furthermore, wholly in conformity with the Catholic creed if Barbey sees the paw of the Devil rather than the hand of God in the affairs of life. The Church has always taught that the evil influence has a stronger hold upon mankind than the good influence. It is part of the doctrinal system of the Church that the Devil can and actually does exercise a greater power—physical as well as moral—over man than God. Barbey's belief that it is the Devil rather than the Divinity that pulls the human puppets on this stage which we call the earth is canonically correct. Is not the Devil the prince of the world (Joh. xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11; Eph. ii. 2; vi. 12), nay even the God of this world—*deus hujus saeculi* (2 Cor. iv. 4)? Do we not infer from another

⁶ "J'ai toujours cru... à l'intervention des puissances occultes et mauvaises dans les luttes de l'humanité.... Quant à l'intervention des puissances mauvaises dans les affaires de l'humanité, j'ai encore pour moi le témoignage de l'Eglise, et d'ailleurs je ne crois pas que ce qui se passe tout à l'heure dans le monde permette au plus recalcitrant d'en douter." *L'Ensorcelée*, p. 61.

⁷ This collection of ten tales is considered by Philip Treherne, *Louis XVII and Other Papers* (1912), 137, the most characteristic of all of Barbey's imaginative writings.

⁸ "...L'auteur qui croit au Diable et à ses influences dans le monde."

⁹ The German rationalist of the eighteenth century Christoph Friedrich Nicolai already said that God and the Devil make up the whole of religion.

biblical passage that the authority over the world has been delivered to Satan who can give it to whom he will (Luc. iv. 6) ?

Now that the belief in the Devil and the use of the word devil have gone out of fashion we fail to grasp the importance of the doctrine of the Devil for our ancestors. These scoffers, who at the very mention of his name burst into shouts of laughter, should be reminded of the fact that not so very long ago it was authoritatively declared in the ecclesiastical courts that a denial of the Devil's personal existence constituted a man a notorious evil liver and a depraver of the Book of Common Prayer. At least in one country of Europe the Devil has not yet lost his legal status. Ireland still recognizes witchcraft as an offence against the law. In the Commission of Peace the newly appointed magistrate is empowered to take cognizance, among other crimes, of "Witchcraft, Inchantment, Sorcery, Magic Arts."¹⁰

From the days when Athanasius was writing the life of St. Anthony in devil-fighting heroics, man's evil thoughts and acts have been considered by the faithful the machinations of the Evil One. Heresy was traced by the Church to the blowing of Beelzebub's bellows into the ears of humanity. For the Roman religionist the belief in the Devil as any other belief has been fixed *ne varietur* by the Church. It follows, therefore, that the belief in the Devil as the power that directs our destinies must form for every Catholic a part of his religion. In other words, every Catholic is necessarily a Satanist. Jules Lemaitre, another of the *grands converti*, may think that the denial of Satan is a stronger sort of Satanism than the belief in him, and that the real Satanist was the atheist Sainte-Beuve rather than the Catholic Barbey.¹¹ There can be no question, however, that Satanism in its original meaning is nothing but the belief in Satan as the controlling power in the world's affairs. Just as deism means a belief in God (Deus), and Christianity implies faith in Christ, so is satanism or diabolism primarily the belief in Satan or Diabolus.¹² As a Catholic believer Barbey necessarily was a satanist, and in portraying the Devil's activity on this earth he is wholly within Catholic teaching and tradition. His method is sound theology, whatever we may think of it in other respects. If a novelist is permitted to resort to providential intervention, why should he not be allowed also to get the

¹⁰ Cf. St. John D. Seymour, *Irish Demonology and Witchcraft* (1913), p. 248.

¹¹ Jules Lemaitre, *Les contemporains*, 4th series (8th ed., 1889), p. 54.

¹² Eugène Grèle, *Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly. L'œuvre* (1904), p. 121

Devil to help him out of a difficulty? In what respect, pray, is infernal machinery inferior to celestial machinery? Why should *diabolus ex machina* not be just as good as *deus ex machina*? If we allow extra-human powers to intervene in the affairs of man, the representatives of both realms ought to enjoy equal rights. From the theological point of view the introduction into literature of superhuman characters, evil as well as good, offers no difficulty whatever. From the point of view of psychology, however, no influences for good or evil which do not flow from man's character can be considered. But Barbey makes no claim whatever upon psychological truth. He never attempts to explain psychologically the acts of his characters. It is his method to develop and to explain an extraordinary, an abnormal condition of spirit, and to avoid all psychological motivation by attributing it to the Devil. In this respect, too, Barbey is a consistent Catholic. To explain in a natural way the unusual thoughts or acts of man would run counter to the teachings of the Church. According to Catholic belief the human mind cannot accomplish anything unusual without the aid of Satan. Barbey's contemporary, the Marquis de Mirville, also refers all unusual phenomena to the Devil.¹³ Theology and psychology do not mix well. A Catholic novelist must not attempt at all to explain man's acts through his character. In conformity with the Catholic creed he must account for each act by the whispering either of a good or of a bad angel. Barbey as a Catholic novelist had to adopt this method of motivation and present his characters as moved by a mysterious hand. As he was, furthermore, convinced of the predominance of evil in the world, he could not fail to see the Devil wherever he turned his eyes. That is why the Devil is so frequently recurrent in his pages. As a matter of fact, it is the Devil who is the real hero in his stories. Satan does not appear in person, but he is the power in whom all Barbey's characters live and move and have their being. For Barbey is interested not so much in the person as in the power of the Devil. His stories deal with demonic possession rather than diabolical personality. All his characters are diabolically demented, bewitched or possessed of the Devil. His women especially will be found to be of a diabolical temperament. There is not a woman in *les Diaboliques* who is not possessed of at least seven demons.¹⁴ "Diabol-

¹³ Marquis de Mirville, *Des esprits et de leurs manifestations fluidiques dans la science moderne* (1858).

¹⁴ "Pas une de ses femmes qui ne soit complice de la moitié des démons." Léon Bloy, *Un brélan d'excommuniés* (1889), p. 42.

ical." remarks their pitiless painter, "diabolical indeed. Not a woman in this book who is not more or less diabolical. Not a woman whom a man could call seriously and truthfully an angel..... Not a woman who is pure, virtuous, innocent.....These sinning women belong body and soul to the Devil."¹⁵

Barbey's conception of woman, too, is based on Catholic teaching and tradition. As Satan is the eternal tempter, so is the woman in the eyes of the Church the eternal instrument of temptation. Woman was conceived by the medieval monks and missionaries as *instrumentum diaboli*, as the most efficient of stalking-horses behind which the Devil went hunting for souls. Love is held by this diabolical doctor to be nothing short of demonic possession, and its enjoyment is certain to lead man to eternal perdition. As in Rops's etchings, so do we behold in Barbey's stories woman in her worship of Lord Lucifer. She is an adept in all black arts and an expert in all forms of sexual perversion. The woman wallows in the wildest orgies of lewdness and licentiousness, continually invoking, extolling and worshiping the Devil. To the credit of the author it must be admitted that his stories do not fail of their purpose as announced in their preface, and that his inventions of sorcery and sacrilege, of witchcraft and wickedness, of debauchery and depravity, of erotomania and theophobia will terrify the most hardened reader. But it is not so easy to discover the moral aim which this doctor of the diabolics claims for his stories. As a matter of fact, the French government sued Barbey for corrupting the public with his *Diaboliques* as it had prosecuted Flaubert for the publication of *Madame Bovary* and Baudelaire for his *Fleurs du mal*. Whether or not we see in Barbey, as we do in Baudelaire, his contemporary and comrade-in-letters, a man who obtains delight from treading on forbidden ground, we find it rather obvious that he considered it all a matter of mirth. His men, who are slightly less diabolical than his women, are described with an obvious complaisance. These vassals of Satan have been most carefully and most sympathetically drawn. They are the elect of the Devil, and the *élite* of mankind. Barbey makes them inherit the earth and play the lord over their fellow men. They are endowed

¹⁵ "Diaboliques, il n'y en a pas une seule ici qui ne le soit à quelque degré. Il n'y en a pas une seule à qui on puisse dire sérieusement le mot de: Mon Ange! sans exagérer. Comme le diable, qui était un ange aussi, mais qui a culbuté,—si elles sont des anges, c'est comme lui,—la tête en bas, le...reste en haut! Pas une ici qui soit pure, vertueuse, innocente....Ces pécheresses ont le diable au corps et ou cœur." Preface to the first edition of *Les diaboliques*, p. 6.

with an insolent, joyous, imperial, Don Juanesque beauty, a beauty which they preserve even unto the end of their days, "as if," exclaims their chronicler, "they had concluded a pact with Satan." But in contrast to all other men who dared to deal with the Devil, Barbey's men never fulfil their part of the agreement. They never pay the penalty of their impiety and perversity. Barbey's sympathy for his diabolical men cannot be mistaken. He sinks his personality wholly into them and fully identifies himself with them.¹⁶ They are but the projections of his own ideal self. Mesnil, Brassard and Ravila apparently are portraits of their painter. Barbey even went so far as to give the third of these three diabolicals his own two personal names Jules Amédée.

Barbey thus transcends the Catholic belief in the person and power of the Devil. This fanatic, this frantic Catholic evidently not only believes in the Devil, but really worships him. He not only accepts Satan, but also accords him a seat in the sanctuary. Barbey informs us that the Devil is rather interesting, from the ethical as well as esthetical point of view.¹⁷ Of all Devils it is Satan who appeals to our author most. "This fallen angel, coming from a good family," Barbey tells us, "has more wit than all the other demons whom he commands."¹⁸ What won our author for Satan was that distinguishing trait in the discrowned archangel's character which brought about his downfall. It was the empyrean rebel's cry *Non serviam* which found a strong echo in the heart of the literary-feudal *grand seigneur*. Barbey was, indeed, *fier comme Lucifer*, as the French saying runs. This poor scion of an old aristocratic family was of a very proud spirit. His friends, Rémy de Gourmont tells us, suffered much from his diabolical arrogance and audacity. The quality which Barbey admired most in Satan, however, was his power. This stalwart reactionary to Romanism and Royalty, this champion of medievalism and monarchism, loved power above everything else in the world. He called power "the most beautiful thing there is in the world after virtue."¹⁹ This lover of power could not help but fall down and worship the almighty god of evil and prince of this world. As a matter of fact, Barbey felt himself so much kin to Satan through his haughty spirit and love of power, so fully identified himself with his hero that he ended by

¹⁶ Cf. Ernest Seillière, *Barbey d'Aurevilly* (1910), p. 190.

¹⁷ "...Moralement comme esthétiquement c'est intéressant, un démon."

¹⁸ "Cet archange tombé, étant de bonne maison, a plus d'esprit que les autres diables dont il est le chef." Cf. Seillière, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁹ "...La force la plus belle chose qu'il y ait dans le monde après la vertu."

believing that he was the Devil himself. Toward the end of his life he used to sign his letters *le prince des ténèbres* (the Prince of Darkness). "A devil" seems to have been the consensus of opinion among his friends regarding our author (*François Laurentie*). Barbey certainly had *le diable au corps*, which is, according to Voltaire, the necessary prerequisite for success in any of the arts.²⁰

In all truthfulness, however, it must be stated that with Barbey as with Rops wickedness was all pose. They both portrayed diabolism, but they never practised it. Barbey's personal life was almost monastic, the general view gathered from his writings to the contrary. Anatole France, who is the authority for this statement, tells us that Barbey wrote as an angel and as a devil.²¹ "A confessor by implety," is the term this critic applies to our author. Philip Treherne has Barbey's dual character in mind when he calls him "a Mephisto in mufti."²² This eccentric Romantic succeeded in combining the role of champion of the cross and the crown with that of apologist of dandyism and diabolism. He was a Bonaldic Traditionalist²³ and a Byronic Titan, a compound of Joseph de Maistre²⁴ and of Alfred de Musset. Barbey's Romanticism was half Seraphic and half Satanic. His great literary ancestor, however, was Chateaubriand.²⁵ His writings may be considered as the natural offspring of *le Génie du Christianisme* (1802). It is from Chateaubriand that Barbey like Baudelaire²⁶ derived his Catholic Satanism, the belief in Satan as the most essential element in the Catholic creed, as well as his Satanic Catholicism, that mingling of pagan sensuality with Christian sentiment, that sort of religion which should furnish occasion for esthetic pleasure and pious emotion. "Sentimentalism in religion," says Professor Guérard, "is ever a dangerous thing but when it is intensified in literature, it leads straight to—the Devil."²⁷ Of further influence on Barbey were the writers of fan-

²⁰ "C'est le diable au corps qu'il faut avoir pour exceller dans tous les arts."

²¹ Anatole France, *La vie littéraire*, 3d series (1891), pp. 37-45.

²² Philip Treherne, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

²³ Louis de Bonald, author of *La théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile* (1796), was a defender of authority in things spiritual as well as temporal.

²⁴ Joseph de Maistre, author of *Du Pape* (1819) and *Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg* (1821) headed with Bonald the movement back to Rome and Royalty.

²⁵ Cf. Edmund Gosse, *French Profiles* (1904), p. 96; *North American Review*, Vol. CXCII (1910), p. 485.

²⁶ James Huneker, *Iconoclasts* (1905), p. 352, believes that it was from Baudelaire that Barbey got his brand of Catholicism.

²⁷ Albert L. Guérard, *French Prophets of Yesterday* (1913), p. 35.

tastic stories of the first half of the century.²⁸ Of foreign writers the German Hoffmann²⁹ and the American Poe³⁰ have been counted among his literary ancestors.

But Barbey d'Aurevilly surpassed all his masters in the art of giving his readers the holy shudder. Rémy de Gourmont, who calls our author "one of the most original characters of the nineteenth century,"³¹ counts his stories among the greatest masterpieces of the last century in France. "If Balzac had written *les Diaboliques*, he tells us, "it would be regarded as the greatest of his works." Paul de Saint-Victor compares Barbey's stories to "the philters that sorcerers brewed in which were asphodels and vipers, tiger's blood and honey." But alas! this diabolical dish is hard to digest for most of us.³² The disdainful dandy knew very well that his writings would never be popular, but he suffered poverty and misery rather than cater to the mob. He used to say that his works were read by thirty people only. Included in this number was, of course, Satan himself. It is to be hoped that the Devil, in return for the signal services Barbey rendered him, has finally left him to God.

²⁸ Cf. J. H. Retinger, *Le conte phantastique dans le romantisme français* (1908), p. 130.

²⁹ Cf. Auguste Dupouy, *France et Allemagne* (1913), p. 103.

³⁰ Cf. *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. LXVIII (1891), p. 699.

³¹ Rémy de Gourmont, *Promenades littéraires*, 1st series (1903), p. 258.

³² Of all of Barbey's imaginative writings *Une Histoire sans nom* (1882) has been translated into English and published, with impressions of the author by Edgar Saltus, in the "Lotus Library" (Brentano's, 1919). This *Story Without a Name* recalls in its essential points Heinrich von Kleist's *Die Marquise von O...* (1808). Of his critical works *Du dandysme et de George Brummel* (1845) was rendered into English by Douglas Ainslie and published, in 1897, under the title *Of Dandyism and of George Brummel*. His poem "Le Cid," which is now very popular as a recitation, has been translated by Miss Betham-Edwards in her book of essays *French Men, Women and Books* (1910), which also contains a portrait and a study of our author.

THE EUCHARIST.

BY WM. WEBER.

THE Church has certain solemn ceremonials, called sacraments. They are, according to Protestant doctrine, instituted by Jesus Christ and given to the Church that she should administer them for the benefit of the faithful. That conception compels any one who cannot ascribe the founding of the Church to Jesus to study the question when and how the two sacraments, Baptism and Eucharist, originated. For if Jesus entrusted them to the Church, she must have existed at the time he did so and, consequently, must have been established by him.

The Catholic Church is not interested directly in that problem. Her sacraments are enjoined as such, not by Jesus, but by the Church by virtue of her divine origin and authority.

As to Baptism, we possess not the least bit of evidence that it was ordained by Jesus. The posthumous baptismal commandment and trinitarian formula of Matt. xxviii. 19, is of apocryphal origin and was not added to the text of the First Gospel before the year 350 (see *The Open Court*, May, 1920, "Manifestations of the Risen Jesus"). The Gospels connect the Christian Baptism with that of John the Baptist, by whom Jesus himself was baptized. Only in one instance are we told that Jesus baptized in person (John iii. 22ff). The absolute silence of the Synoptic Gospels as to that fact is rather ominous. The Apostle Paul did not regard baptizing as very important. He writes: "Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the Gospel" (1 Cor. i. 17). Thus the question whether Jesus instituted the sacraments is confined to the Eucharist.

The New Testament contains four passages which refer to the Eucharist. These are Luke xxii. 14-20; Mark xiv. 22-24; Matt. xxvi. 26-29; and 1 Cor. xi. 23-25. Besides, the Johannine account of the last meal which Jesus ate with his disciples has to be examined.

The Luke version differs to such an extent from the others

that it is advisable to consider it first. Westcott and Hort, the restorers and editors of the oldest text of the New Testament in Greek, attainable by textual criticism, have marked the words: "which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me. And the cup in like manner after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood, even that which is poured out for you" (Luke xxii. 19b-20) as a rather late interpolation. The great English text-critics base their conclusion on the testimony of the manuscripts. They sum up their argument as follows: "These difficulties added to the suspicious coincidence with 1 Cor. xi. 24f. and the transcriptional evidence given above, leave no moral doubt (see *Introd.* § 240) that the words in question were absent from the original text of Luke, notwithstanding the purely Western ancestry of the documents which omit them." *Notes on Select Readings, Appendix, Introd. to the New Testament in the Original Greek*, p. 63f.)

Some scholars wish to retain at least the words: "which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me" of verse 19b. But just as for these words, the conclusion arrived at by Westcott and Hort is confirmed by the testimony of Matthew and Mark. The common source of the Synoptic Gospels read without doubt only "This is my body" without any modifying remarks. (*Matt.* xxvi. 26 and *Mark* xiv. 22.)

Our Luke text read, therefore, about the years 350: "When the hour was come, he sat down, and the apostles with him. And he said unto them. With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer; for I say unto you, I shall not eat it until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God. And he received a cup and when he had given thanks, he said, Take this and divide it among yourselves; for I say unto you, I shall not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God shall come. And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it and gave to them, saying, This is my body" (Luke xxii. 14-19a).

Even this comparatively short text has been enlarged by several interpolations. That is not to be wondered at; for just the chapters which record the passion of Jesus aroused from the beginning the keenest interest.

"And the apostles with him" has to be dropped as a gloss, suggested by mistaken zeal for improving the traditional text. The title "apostles" belongs to the Twelve only when they acted as messengers of Jesus and in relation to people to whom they brought the message of the kingdom of God. But where their personal relation to Jesus is referred to, they are called "disciples." The

expression "the Twelve" may be used in either case. Therefore, the noun "apostles" is out of place in our passage. That is confirmed by the rather awkward position of the words at the end of the sentence and furthermore by the corresponding readings in the first two Gospels. Matt. xxvi. 20, we find "with the twelve disciples" and Mark xiv. 17, "with the Twelve." These three variants prove that none of them appeared in the original text. If "and the apostles with him" as well as the parallel phrases are omitted, the text is absolutely clear and perfect. For anybody familiar with Jewish customs, and for such the original Synoptic source was written, knew Jesus would not take his place at the table alone. The passover meal was not eaten by a single person. Thus it was understood that the disciples were with Jesus. Besides, the narrator was intent upon relating what Jesus, not his companions, did and said.

Another difficulty is presented by verse 16: "For I say unto you, I shall not eat it until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God." Both verse 16 as well as verse 15 are missing in Matthew and Mark. That does not imply that the statements in Luke are spurious. For it is impossible to explain how any one could have added them to the Luke text if they were not part of it from the beginning. On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand why those sayings of Jesus should have been left out in Matthew and Mark. They refer to the passover meal whereas the first two Gospels treat of the Eucharist. For that reason, I am compelled to accept Luke xxii. 15-16, as genuine with the exception of the clause "until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God."

The subject of "be fulfilled" must be the passover meal. For there is no other noun which could be connected with that verb. But in what respect could the passover be fulfilled in the kingdom of God? All the promises of God, of course, were expected to be fulfilled: but the passover meal in the New Testament age was considered as a thanksgiving feast in remembrance of the deliverance of the people of Israel out of the house of bondage in the land of Egypt. There is, to the best of my knowledge, no Jewish tradition concerning the fulfilment of the passover in the kingdom of God. For that reason, I have to reject the clause under discussion as spurious. It was probably inserted in order to harmonize verse 16 with verse 18. Jesus, very likely, said only: "I shall no more eat it from now on," or words to that effect. Some reader missed in that statement a reference to the kingdom to come and altered and enlarged his text accordingly.

A third difficulty we encounter in verse 18: "For I say unto

you, I shall not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come." The words must have been spoken by Jesus toward the end of the meal when he passed the fourth and last cup of wine to his disciples. But in that case they would represent merely a superfluous repetition of the thought expressed in verse 16 in its present form. For the eating of the passover there implies as a matter of fact the partaking of everything that belonged to the meal, including the four cups of wine.

We cannot avoid this dilemma by assuming verses 15-16 to have been pronounced at the beginning, whereas verse 18 was uttered at the end of the passover. For the words "I shall no more eat it" point very distinctly to the conclusion of the sacred repast. If they belonged to the opening scene, they would imply that Jesus, although the head of the company, did not eat the passover. That, however, is contradicted by the words of verse 15 "I have eagerly desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer."

Moreover, the conjunction "for," introducing verse 18, appears out of place. The same conjunction is entirely proper in verse 16, where it supplies the reason why Jesus had desired to eat that passover with his disciples. He was in urgent need of the spiritual strength imparted by that memorial of the almighty assistance which God would and could give his chosen ones. In verse 18 it contradicts verses 15-16 and explains why Jesus wanted his disciples to divide the wine among themselves. He expected to drink better wine in the kingdom of God. As a matter of course, Jesus as the president, the father of the family, partook of the cup before he offered it to his disciples. Besides, the parallel versions do not have the conjunction "for." Matt xxvi. 29, reads: "But I say unto you, I shall not drink," etc., and Mark xiv. 23: "Verily I say unto you, I shall no more drink," etc. In both instances Jesus evidently drank of the wine together with his disciples. Mark xiv. 23, states expressly: "they all drank of it." The adjective "all" includes Jesus.

These observations show in my opinion that Luke xxii. 18, cannot belong to the original text of the Fourth Gospel, but must have been borrowed from Matthew and Mark. According to verse 17: "Take this and divide it among yourselves" Jesus did not want to drink another time after the cup had made its first round.

Verse 19a: "And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and gave to them saying, This is my body" is quite clear. Jesus offers after the fourth cup of wine of verse 17 the apikomen which closed the celebration of the passover. In handing the pieces to his disciples, he uttered one more personal remark, "This is my

body." The *tertium comparationis* is that the bread was broken and crushed just as his body was to be broken and crushed a few hours later. What happened to the malefactors who were crucified with Jesus (John xix. 31f) was done, of course, to all who were taken off the cross and buried before sunset in Palestine.

The oldest text of the account of the last passover, as preserved in the Third Gospel, was therefore:

"And when the hour was come, he sat down. And he said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer: for I say unto you, I shall eat it no more. And he received a cup, and when he had given thanks, he said, Take this and divide it among yourselves. And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it and gave to them, saying, This is my body."

Those words certainly do not relate how the Eucharist was first celebrated, or instituted. The short paragraph simply records a few personal remarks which Jesus made in connection with the closing rites of the passover. They were prompted by his foreknowledge of the fate which was swiftly approaching. The occasion did not favor longer discourses nor the institution of a new sacrament. The entire program of the feast was minutely prescribed in all its details. Jesus had no chance of voicing his personal feelings till they had reached the closing exercises. On the other hand, everything on the table, including bread and wine, formed part of the passover meal and had to be consumed as such.

Even the ancient Christians were fully aware of the true character of Luke xxii. 14-19a. That is demonstrated beyond the possibility of a doubt by the addition of verses 19b-20 to our text. The Third Gospel, in their estimation, contained originally a description of the first Eucharist just as Matthew and Mark did. Failing to find that in Luke, they felt in duty bound to replace what, as they thought, had been lost, by adding verses 19b-20.

Mark xiv. 22-25, and Matt. xxvi. 26-29, are derived without question from the same source. There are slight differences between the two accounts. Mark xiv. 22, Jesus says: "Take, this is my body." Matt. xxvi. 26: "Take, eat, this my body." Mark xiv. 23, reads: "and they all drank of it." Matt. xxvi. 27, the drinking of all is enjoined as a command, "Drink ye all of it." The words pronounced over the cup are Mark xiv. 24: "This is my blood of the covenant which is poured out for many." Matt. xxvi. 28: "This is my blood of the covenant which is poured out for many unto remission of sins." The relationship of the common Matthew and

Mark source to that of the Third Gospel is not so easily determined. As a rule the accounts of the same occurrence found in all the Synoptic Gospels is based on closely related documents which, however, may have had each a history of its own and, consequently, have undergone important changes. In view of such a possibility, it cannot be decided as yet which version, that of Luke or that of the first two Gospels, is more reliable.

The Eucharist paragraph is separated from the passover account in both Matthew and Mark; and before the Lord's Supper is held, Jesus predicts his betrayal, without indicating the traitor in Mark, while exposing Judas in Matthew. Luke xxii. 21-23, Jesus likewise mentions the presence of the traitor, but does so after the passover had been finished. That difference is very significant. The Third Gospel tells only of the closing scene of the passover, which as a religious ceremony did not admit of any general conversation. But after that sacrament had ended, the participants might stay together and discuss their own affairs. In Mark and Matthew Jesus interrupts the passover in order to celebrate the Eucharist. The presence of Judas as a guest at this celebration was apparently not wanted; and Jesus seemingly forces him to withdraw by speaking of his treachery. Still neither of them states expressly that Judas left. It is the Fourth Gospel alone which informs us: "He then, having received the sop, went out straightway: and it was night" (John xiii. 30). By the way, the participle construction in Mark xiv. 22, and Matt. xxvi. 26, translated "as they were eating" as well as Mark xiv. 26, and Matt. xxvi. 30, where the last part of the Hallel (Ps. cxv-cxviii) closes the passover exercises, place the Eucharist within the passover meal.

The question suggests itself whether Jesus could arrange under such conditions a new religious ceremony, destined to supersede and abolish the ancient sacrament of his nation. It has been noticed already that not only the lamb but also the bread and wine belonged to the passover feast. Moreover, Jesus himself had warned his disciples: "Think not that I came to destroy the law and the prophets. I came not to destroy but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 17-19). Jesus would have acted in contradiction to this his own principle if he

had employed anything of the passover for any other purpose than that hallowed by the Jewish law.

There is another reason why the origin of the Eucharist cannot be connected with a celebration of the passover. The latter was an annual festival. If Jesus had added to it the Lord's Supper, the Christians, at least, those of Jewish descent would have observed it only once every year on the fifteenth day of the month of Nisan. But exactly the early Jewish Christians, as we learn from the Acts, partook of the Eucharist every day. The Pentecost account closes with the statement: "They continued steadfastly in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and of prayers" (Acts ii. 42). Acts ii. 46. we are told: "And day by day, continuing steadfastly with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread at home, they took their food with gladness and singleness of heart." The Breaking of Bread in this connection must be a religious ceremony of a private character as distinguished from the public religious services in the temple. In the first place, it is mentioned apart from their partaking of ordinary food. In the second place, it would be preposterous to assume the author of that passage had thought it worth while to inform his readers that the first followers of the apostles did eat and drink. The phrase can refer only to the Eucharist, which, as follows from Acts xx. 7, was held by the early Gentile Christians on the first day of the week, that is to say, on Sunday.

Some scholars, denying the force of the just given argument, insist that the Lord's Supper may have been ordained at the passover and yet celebrated immediately afterwards day by day. They overlook entirely the influence which the hypothesis that the Eucharist was ordained in connection with the passover has exercised upon the Church. Up to the age of the Reformation, the Eucharist was the main and central part of all religious services because that had been customary ever since the earliest times. The reformers, looking for scriptural authority and finding the Eucharist instituted at an annual Jewish feast, reduced at once the number of times it was to be observed by their adherents and arranged for regular Sunday services without the Lord's Supper. Even the Roman Church has given way to their influence and, while celebrating the Eucharist at every mass, insists only on her members observing the annual Easter Communion.

A comparison of the words reported to have been spoken by Jesus over the bread and wine renders it absolutely sure that the words: "This is my body" belong to Jesus. All our sources, the Synoptic Gospels as well as First Corinthians agree as to that fact.

As soon as this text-critical rule, agreement of all our sources, is applied to the words spoken over the wine, it becomes apparent immediately how uncertain our tradition is. Matthew and Mark read: "This is my blood of the covenant." 1 Cor. xi. 25, has: "This cup is the new covenant in my blood." Luke does not know of any such formula.

It is rather difficult for us to appreciate the meaning of the two variants. We should expect Jesus to have said simply: "This is my blood." That is, at least, what Justin Martyr puts into the mouth of Jesus (*Apol.*, I, 66). But the Jews were strictly forbidden to taste blood in any shape and form. For they believed blood to be the carrier of life, of the breath of God. That idea prevailed just as much during the Apostolic age as during any preceding period of Jewish history. It was shared as a matter of fact by the Christians of Jewish descent as is demonstrated by the decree of the Apostles' Council at Jerusalem. (*Acts xv. 20, 29*). The thought of drinking blood, and that, blood of Jesus Christ, at the Eucharist would have been utterly repulsive and terrifying to Jewish believers in Jesus. Gentile Christians, however, were not troubled by such scruples; they were used to consider blood as an article of food. Hence, it is very unlikely that Jesus should have spoken of blood in connection with the wine he offered his disciples. For he respected all Jewish prejudices. That confirms both the uncertain tradition of our records and especially the silence of the Third Gospel. Jesus has not pronounced the words, ascribed to him as spoken over the cup.

That conclusion is corroborated by a very prominent mark of later origin which characterizes the formula both in Matthew and Mark as well as in First Corinthians. That is the term "covenant" or "new covenant." The word is altogether foreign to the vocabulary of Jesus. His mission was to bring, not a new covenant, but the kingdom of God. The new covenant is opposed to the old covenant. Since the kingdom of God is not the opposite of the old covenant it cannot be a synonym of new covenant. The latter term was coined during the Apostolic age. It occurs only in the Pauline epistles and that to the Hebrews. The Catholic epistles employ it as little as the Gospels, where it is used only in the two passages under discussion (*Matt. xxvi. 28, and Mark xiv. 28*). It is easy enough to explain how the new theological term was formed. The Gentile Christians had to meet the Jews who claimed their religion was the only true religion because it was the covenant made by God himself through Moses with their nation. St. Paul and his associates could not deny that historical fact but maintained God had established

through Jesus a new and greater covenant, embracing not one nation but the whole human race. Consequently, the noun "covenant" alone proves that the words of Matt. xxvi. 28, Mark xiv. 24, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, were not spoken by Jesus. In other words, it becomes more and more probable that Luke xxii. 14-19a, is the only true account of what happened actually at the last passover of Jesus.

The words: "Verily I say unto you, I shall not drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God" (Mark xiv. 25) as well as the parallel passage in the First Gospel require special attention. Unable to recognize a genuine saying of Jesus in Mark xiv. 24, one might be tempted to drop the closing utterance together with it as unhistorical. Its relation to the Eucharist is not very intimate, and I doubt whether it is quoted anywhere in celebrating the Lord's Supper. It does not occur 1 Cor. xi, and we have reasons for considering it an interpolation in Luke. Nevertheless the question remains to be answered why the text of Matthew and Mark should have been burdened with a statement rather out of tune with the context and the situation.

My impression is the party who revised the original passover account upon which the Matthew and Mark version is based and made out of it the first celebration, not the institution, of the Eucharist, took exception to the statement of Jesus that he was no more to eat the passover. According to his way of thinking, Jesus must have proclaimed at that solemn occasion his second coming. For we know the early Christians when observing the Eucharist strengthened their faith in the coming kingdom. The introductory prayer over the bread in the Didache ends as follows: "Let thy ecclesia be brought together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom" (Didache, IX). The prayer after the Eucharist has the same refrain: "Remember, O Lord, thy ecclesia to deliver her from all evil and to perfect her in thy love and bring her together from the four winds, when hallowed, into thy kingdom which thou hast prepared for her" (Didache, X). Also St. Paul writes: "As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come" (1 Cor. xi. 26). Our commentator wanted apparently Jesus to express the same sentiment when he observed the first Eucharist with his disciples. He did that by taking his clue from Luke xxii. 16, which he did not care to retain because it applied to the passover, not to the Lord's Supper.

The passage under discussion must be spurious, not because wine is prohibited in the kingdom of God, but because the implied conception of that kingdom was not shared by Jesus and not ever

by the Pharisees. Matt xxii. 30, has preserved a saying put into the mouth of Jesus: "In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven." Any intelligent Pharisee might have given the Sadducees the same answer. For it is based on the Book of Enoch, a pre-Christian apocryphal writing (chap. li. 4, and civ. 4). Not even the Jews, not to speak of Jesus, cherished grossly materialistic views of the kingdom of God. The Apostle Paul writes, Rom. xiv. 17: "The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking." That is the general principle from which he deducts his advice not to cause a weak brother to stumble by inducing him to eat meat he believes to be defiled by the sacrificial rites of the heathen. The words quoted do not impress me as the personal wisdom of the Apostle but as an axiom current among his compatriots and known and accepted as true by the Christians to whom the advice is given. Accordingly not even the pious Jews expected to drink wine in the kingdom of God. That Jesus can but have held the same view is self-evident.

The words "unto-remission of sins" are found only in Matthew and cannot be genuine on that account alone. They point to the age of decadence when the Church had begun to offer the Eucharist to her members as the means of securing forgiveness of all their little and great sins in which they continued to indulge in spite of their conversion to Jesus. At first Baptism assured the new converts of the remission of all the sins they had become guilty of while they were ignorant heathen. After being baptized, they were expected to live a holy life, devoted to the practice of the ideal virtues which Jesus Christ held up before them. The Eucharist was, as its very name tells us, an offering of thanks for the new life, and knowledge, and immortality which Jesus had revealed to them (*Didache*, IXf). Christian virtue at that time possessed still its positive, offensive character. But after a while, when the first zeal and enthusiasm had slackened, the Church made, so to say, a truce with the devil. She confined herself to the purely negative task of condemning sin and sinners in general, whereas she connived at the sins of her members as long as they remained faithful and obedient supporters of the Church. Such people were assured of remission of their sins at any time by means of the Eucharist.

That was the period when Christianity was emasculated, when the ideal of striving after moral perfection was exchanged for the idea of avoiding sin or of obtaining forgiveness of sins whenever that might become necessary. What Jesus had declared to be the only mortal sin, the sin against the Holy Spirit, the cowardly denial

of one's true convictions, was proclaimed as the highest Christian duty. Of course, it was not called any longer the sin against the Holy Spirit; but a more pleasant name was given to it. It is known to day as *sacrificium intellectus*.

When the later additions to the Mark and Matthew version of what is called the institution of the Lord's Supper are omitted, the Mark text reads as follows: "And as they were eating, he took bread, and when he had blessed, he brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take, this is my body. And he took a cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave to them: and they all drank of it." The remainder of Matthew's text is: "And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it; and he gave to them, and said, Take eat; this is my body. And he took a cup, and gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink all of it." That evidently cannot be accepted as the original text. For it would have been silly to report such statements. Therefore, the Third Gospel alone has preserved the unaltered Synoptic source as far as the last supper is concerned.

1 Cor. xi. 23-25, reads: "The Lord Jesus in the night in which he was betrayed took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, This is my body, which is for you: this do in remembrance of me. In like manner also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as often as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." These words are generally considered as the most authentic version of the institution of the Lord's Supper; and if they were written by St. Paul, there is no room for doubt as to their genuineness. Nevertheless, taken by themselves alone, they are subject to very serious objections. In the first place, the repeated enjoinder: "This do in remembrance of me!" and "This do, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me!" are not vouched for by Matthew and Mark. They constitute clearly the ordaining of the sacrament and prescribe its constant observation as a Christian duty. If 1 Cor. xi. 23-25, were older than the corresponding passages in the first two Gospels, we could not account for the later omission of the most important part of the ceremony, namely, the command to observe it. The sentence: "This cup is the new covenant in my blood" has been discussed above, and the conclusion was reached that they conform neither with the ideas nor the vocabulary of Jesus. Furthermore, the absence of the reference to the drinking of wine in the kingdom of God in first Corinthians implies in comparison with the Gospel text a later origin of the version of the birth of the Eucharist in the Pauline epistle. We

possess indeed documentary evidence showing how long it took to develop the most satisfactory Eucharist formula which we have. For in the *First Apology* of Justin Martyr we read, Chap. LXVI B: "The Apostles record in the memoirs that were written by them that they had thus been enjoined: "Jesus took bread, offered thanks, and said: This do in remembrance of me. This is my body. And he likewise took the cup, offered thanks, and said: This is my blood." Consequently, the formula ascribed to St. Paul was unknown as late as the year 150, if not even later. For I am not certain whether Chap. LXVI is not a later addition to the *First Apology* of Justin Martyr.

All these difficulties urge us to study 1 Cor. xi. 23-25, with the greatest care. For if that passage forms an integral part of First Corinthians, the Pauline formula of the Eucharist must be accepted as absolutely authentic in spite of all the doubts and difficulties it presents.

We have to direct our attention first upon the words which introduce the Eucharist formula. They are: "For I received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you." "I received of the Lord" can only mean: I received directly of the Lord, that is to say, out of his own mouth. As St. Paul never met Jesus before his crucifixion, the latter must have imparted that information to the former after his resurrection. But up to the time when the Apostle composed first Corinthians he had seen the risen Christ but once. That follows from 1 Cor. xv. 5-8, where only one manifestation of the risen Christ to St. Paul is enumerated and expressly denoted as the last of all. But at that occasion St. Paul cannot have received the information under discussion.

Nothing is said 1 Cor. xv. about the risen Christ having spoken to St. Paul or any of the other persons to whom he appeared. From the statement of Gal. i. 15f, "When it was the good pleasure of God to reveal his Son in me," we might conclude that the conversion of St. Paul was an experience rather of his mind than of his senses. In any case, the Apostle cannot have obtained any specific historical information on that occasion. The Acts present three different accounts of the same event (Act ix. 3ff, xxii. 5ff, and xxvi. 12ff). According to all Jesus speaks with St. Paul, but does not instruct him in the Christian faith, neither as a whole nor as to any of its details. On the contrary, he is told Acts. ix. 6, to go to Damascus and learn from the Christians at that place what he had to do.

Besides, there existed no necessity whatsoever for enlightening the Apostle elect of the Gentiles concerning the true words with

which Jesus had ordained the Eucharist. The personal disciples of Jesus were still living and not only willing but eager to share their knowledge as eye-witnesses with all who asked them for it. The zealous disciple of the rabbis had persecuted the Christians and learned from them what they knew and believed. He had to do so; for otherwise he would have been unable to controvert them. Hence, the introductory statement of 1 Cor. xi. 23, is, to say the least, very strange in the mouth of St. Paul, and it is hard to believe he could have written those words.

That observation is confirmed by the whole construction of the Eucharist formula. It is reported from beginning to end in direct discourse but not as Jesus himself would have related it. It is without question a direct quotation of what a third party had told the writer.

The main objection to the entire passage, however, arises from its grammatical connection with the context. The very first word "for" denotes that verses 23-25 furnish the reason why the preceding statement is correct. The Apostle writes immediately before verse 23: "What shall I say to you? Shall I praise you? In this I praise you not." It is absolutely inconceivable how the Eucharist formula could justify St. Paul for not praising, but blaming the Corinthians who had indulged in gluttony and drunkenness while celebrating the Lord's Supper. On the other hand, verse 26 likewise begins with the causal coordinate conjunction "for." It reads: "For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come." That sentence does not furnish an explanation why the Eucharist formula is quoted, but states very clearly why the Apostle has to blame the Corinthians. The Lord's Supper proclaimed the Lord's death. Therefore, it was utterly unbecoming to turn that solemn ceremony into a drunken bout. That is to say, verse 26 joins verse 22 directly, and verses 23-25 are an interpolation which interrupts the original context.

Some reader of 1 Cor. xi. 17-34, imagined he could render that passage stronger by inserting the at his time current formula of the institution of the Eucharist. Admitting that even only as a possibility, one can no longer maintain that Luke xxii. 19b-20, has been derived from the Pauline epistle. Both passages may have been added to the text of the Gospel and First Corinthians quite independently of each other.

At this stage of our investigation it becomes necessary to turn to the Fourth Gospel to ascertain whether it confirms the conclusion arrived at or not. John xiii-xvii treats apparently of the last supper

which Jesus had with his disciples. For it contains the Judas Iscariot episode (xiii. 21-30) and the prediction of Peter's denial (xiii. 36-38). The meal is followed by the arrest of Jesus (xviii. 1ff). But these few items exhaust the list of parallels between the Synoptic and Johannine supper. The latter is not the passover meal. It is called simply "a supper" (xiii. 2) and was held, not on the day of the passover, but "before the passover" (xiii. 1). According to John xix. 14, Jesus was crucified on the day called "preparation of the passover"; and when his enemies took him to Pilate, they did not enter into the Prætorium "that they might not be defiled, but eat the passover" (xviii. 28). Finally the Fourth Gospel does not mention the Eucharist.

The last-mentioned fact might be taken for a sufficient proof that Jesus did not ordain the Eucharist. But that argument *e silentio* would only be decisive if we could be sure of the apostolic origin of the Gospel in its present condition. For the Apostle John as an eye-witness must have known and reported what actually was done and said during the last supper; and his testimony would outweigh the Synoptic account. But what we know of the composition and history of the Synoptic text prevents us from claiming *a priori* for the Fourth Gospel a miraculous escape from the same fate. Thus we have to study carefully the Johannine tradition. Yet for our purpose, it is sufficient to form a correct opinion of chapter xiii. For the quartodeciman controversy lies beyond the scope of the present investigation.

We notice first of all that the narrative is interrupted frequently by interpolations which may belong partly to the compiler, partly to later commentators.

The first passage of that kind are the words of verse 1: "Jesus knowing that his hour was come that he should depart out of this world unto the Father, having loved his own that were in the world, he loved them unto the end." The clause "he loved them unto the end" in this connection must refer to the washing of the disciples' feet, related verses 4ff. But that act is defined there rather as a lesson in love and humility to be learned and practised by the disciples than a direct manifestation of the love of Jesus. For he himself offers the explanation: "If I, the Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that ye also should do as I have done to you" (verses 14-15). The author of verse 1, therefore, failed to grasp the true significance of the episode he deemed proper to preface with his would-be mystic remarks. Moreover, the statement

does not connect with the adverbial phrase "before the feast of the passover," at the beginning of verse 1. Does it modify the participle "knowing," that is to say, had Jesus just learned, within the last six days before the Jewish Easter, what fate was in store for him? According to xii. 1, Jesus had arrived at Bethany "six days before the passover." But the Synoptic tradition represents Jesus as preparing his disciples for the coming catastrophe even before he set out on that fatal pilgrimage to the temple (Matt. xvi. 21; Mark viii. 31; Luke ix. 22). If the temporal phrase should be constructed with the principal statement "he loved them unto the end," it would set a date for the end of the love of Jesus. That very idea is utterly foreign to Christian sentiment and experience. Jesus is believed to live the life everlasting and to love his own "world without end."

The second interpolation is found in verses 2-3 and was inserted perhaps by the party who added the Judas pericope to the account of the Washing of the Feet. A true translation of the passage reads: "The devil having already put into his heart that Judas Iscariot Simon's son would betray him, knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and he came forth from God and goeth to God." The participial construction "having put" and "knowing" without any principal statement is highly suspicious in itself in comparison with the clear and simple style of the following narrative. Verse 3 refers again to the Feet Washing and improves upon verse 1 in as far as it touches the exact meaning of that pericope. Still Jesus himself washes the feet of his disciples although he is their teacher and master. The interpolator is not satisfied with such an humble title; he emphasizes that Jesus was conscious of being the divine master of the universe. The most obvious proof that the passage does not belong to the original text is presented by verse 2, which contains an altogether impossible statement. Our translators, of course, conceal this fact by adding "Jesus" to the text and by rendering the Greek nominative "Judas Iscariot Simon's son" as if it were a genitive which modified the noun "heart," from which it is separated by the way by the subordinate conjunction and the verb of the dependant clause. "Judas Iscariot Simon's son" may be a secondary gloss, for it does not stand in its proper place. But dropping the name of the traitor does not improve the remaining text.

The words "and ye are clean, but not all. For he knew him that should betray him; therefore said he, Ye are not all clean" (verses 10-11) must likewise be a later addition to the text. For they refer

to a previous statement which has been diagnosed as an interpolation. Apart from that argument, verses 10b-11 are evidently a superfluous comment on the preceding words of verse 10. The passage shows how much the Christians during the formative period of the Gospels were disturbed by the thought that Judas the traitor might have shared in any of the blessings which Jesus imparted to his disciples. They misunderstood in the given instance the real import of what Jesus did and imagined him to have imparted to his followers some special spiritual gift. Simon Peter evidently did the same thing when he begged to have his hands and head washed in addition to his feet. When refusing to permit Jesus to wash his feet, he showed how little he possessed of the spirit of his master. For as he considered himself unworthy of accepting menial services from Jesus, so he would have abstained from offering such services to others whom he imagined to outrank. Such a disposition has, of course, no part with Jesus. He did not care to impress upon his followers the duty of performing humble service for superiors. That is a mere selfish dictate of worldly prudence. Jesus desired his disciples to serve willingly and heartily the weak and the lowly. That being the case, he was not thinking of the uncleanness of Judas Iscariot.

There are other interpolations which it is unnecessary to discuss in detail: for instance, verses 18-19 interrupt the close connection between verses 17 and 20. Also verses 34-35 belong to the Foot-Washing episode, from which they are separated at present by verses 21-33.

The original text of the Foot-Washing pericope, as far as it can be recovered from the traditional text, reads therefore:

“(Before the feast of the passover) Jesus during a supper riseth from the table and layeth aside his garments; and he took a towel and girded himself. Then he poureth water into the basin, and began to wash the disciples’ feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith he was girded. So he cometh to Simon Peter. He saith unto him, Lord, dost thou wash my feet? Jesus answered and said unto him, What I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt understand hereafter. Peter said to him, Thou shalt never wash my feet. Jesus answered him, If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me. Simon Peter says unto him, Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head. Jesus saith to him, He that is bathed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit.

“So when he had washed their feet, and taken his garments, and sat down again, he said unto them,

"Know ye what I have done to you?
 Ye call me, Teacher, and, Lord:
 And ye do well; for so I am.
 If I then, the Lord and Teacher have washed your feet,
 Ye also ought to wash one another's feet.
 For I have given you an example,
 that ye also should do as I have done to you.
 Verily, verily, I say unto you,
 A servant is not greater than his lord,
 neither one that is sent greater than he that sent him.
 If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them.
 Verily, verily, I say unto you,
 He that receiveth whomsoever I send receiveth me;
 and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me.
 A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another;
 even as I have loved you, that ye love one another.
 By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples,
 if ye have love one to another."

These words of Jesus do not rise into the realm of mystics and metaphysics. The statements are as clear and simple as in the Synoptic Gospels. Even the parallelism of members, so characteristic of the language of the prophets, is to be discerned. Jesus as teacher and master illustrates for the instruction of his disciples his New Commandment. There is nothing to suggest the fast approaching death of Jesus except possibly the date "before the feast of the passover." One thing, however, is certain, Jesus cannot have waited with proclaiming his New Commandment, "the Golden Rule," till the last week of his life. The Synoptic Gospels place the event rather close to the beginning of his Messianic career (Matt. v. 43ff; Luke vii. 27ff; Matt. vii. 12; Luke vi. 31; comp. Matt. xxii. 37-40).

The words ascribed to Jesus have not only the true Synoptic ring but there exist also Synoptic parallels. Matt. x. 24, we read: "A disciple is not above his teacher, nor a servant above his lord;" and Luke vi. 40: "The disciple is not above his teacher."

The quotation from Matthew occurs among the instructions which Jesus gave his disciples when they were about to start on their first missionary journey. Also in Luke it precedes that mission and follows almost immediately upon the commandment "Love your enemies" (Luke vi. 35). That missionary journey may be dated approximately. For the report of the returning Apostles led to

what is called erroneously Peter's Confession. The latter was followed in turn by the Transfiguration, after which Jesus began to acquaint the disciples with the fate that awaited him at Jerusalem. I am inclined to think that a term of about three months will cover the whole period from the sending out of the Apostles to the day of the crucifixion. Our Johannine pericope contains not only a saying of Jesus, preserved as a fragment in the Synoptic Gospels, but also the noun "apostle" itself. That term denotes in verse 16, not the ecclesiastical dignitary of a later age, but simply a messenger. Therefore, the Am. R. V. translates it "one that is sent" instead of "apostle."

Also John xiii. 20, has an echo in Matt. x. 14 (comp. Luke ix. 5, and Mark vi. 11). "Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words" etc. It is a negative version of what is expressed in the Fourth Gospel positively. The latter is therefore in all probability the more authentic one.

Matt. xx. 26f, and Mark x. 43f, we come upon another saying of Jesus, reminding us of the Johannine pericope.

"Whosoever would become great among you, shall be your servant ;
And whosoever would be first among you, shall be your slave."

That word was pronounced apparently shortly before the last arrival at Jerusalem. But it may belong to an earlier time. For we have, at least, the testimony of Papias to the effect that the subject-matter of the Gospels is not arranged in strictly chronological order. Thus the just given quotation may after all belong to the same date as the earlier parallels of the Foot-Washing pericope.

All these observations assign the principal part of John xiii. to the time when the disciples were going forth to proclaim the message of the kingdom of God on their own responsibility. That is to say, the compiler of the Fourth Gospel did not possess an account of the Last Supper, looking for one, he came upon the Foot-Washing pericope, which he imagined to treat of the Last Supper because the Washing of the Feet occurred at a supper. The words "before the feast of the passover," which are placed in parentheses above, were added by the compiler.

The result of this excursus is purely negative as far as the Eucharist is concerned. Since the Fourth Gospel has not preserved an account of the Last Supper, we cannot even guess what the lost chapter may or may not have contained.

Our investigation has proved so far that Jesus did not ordain the Eucharist at the last passover. Nevertheless, the notices of the

Acts, however short and casual they are, speak of the Eucharist as observed by the first Christians as early as the day of Pentecost. That fact can be explained in only two ways. Either Jesus instituted the sacrament before the Last Supper or the ceremony came into use immediately after his death. Our sources are utterly silent as to the observance of the Lord's Supper previous to Good Friday eve. Indeed, if the early Christians had known about a celebration of the Eucharist before that date, the two Gospel accounts and that of first Corinthians would never have found a place in the New Testament. For that reason, we must assign the birth of the sacrament to the days following the death of Jesus. In this case it must go back to some old Jewish custom. For the disciples were law-abiding Jews and neither willing nor authorized to withdraw from the temple and the synagogue. From this viewpoint, Jer. xvi. 5-7, throws light upon our problem. It reads:

“Thus saith Jahveh,
Enter not into the house of mourning,
neither go to lament,
neither bemoan them.

For I have taken away my peace from this people, saith Jahveh,
even loving kindness and tender mercies.
Both great and small shall die in this land;
they shall not be buried,
neither shall men lament for them,
nor cut themselves,
nor make themselves bald for them;
neither shall men break bread for them in mourning,
to comfort them for the dead;
neither shall men give them the cup of consolation
to drink for their father or for their mother.”

The prophet bears witness to a Jewish mourning custom, consisting in breaking bread and offering the cup of consolation to the bereaved relatives. That custom was still observed during the age of Jesus, as it is with certain modifications even to-day. It therefore stands to reason that after the death of Jesus his disciples offered each other the bread and wine of consolation. For their crucified Master was more to them than their own parents. Of course, the Eucharist has become within the Church a public ceremony which is celebrated at certain intervals if not every day, or Sunday. But the necessity of that change or development is not difficult to understand.

In the first place, the Eucharist of the first Christians was of a strictly private character and held as such in their homes. In the second place, there was a good reason for repeating the ancient rite. Jesus left behind the twelve Apostles and quite a number of other followers whose hearts longed to be comforted and who looked upon the collation of bread and wine as a source of consolation and renewed faith. So one Christian, or one group of Christians, would serve the other in turn with the time-honored repast of the mourners. The next step would be that all new converts would observe that meal. For they too would be afflicted with the keenest sorrow over the cruel fate of their Messiah, especially as they must feel guilty of having assented to the unspeakable crime of their priests. That constant repetition, brought about by the ever increasing number of new believers, invested by and by the ancient Jewish ceremony with a new Christian character. When Gentiles accepted the message of Jesus, they adopted the Eucharist as the principal religious exercise of their new faith. They could not, as the Jewish Christians did, continue to take part in the temple services of their heathen neighbors and friends. For they were taught to abhor them as idolatrous. They were accustomed, however, to sacrificial banquets at their temples and naturally wanted to have something like it in their new organization. 1 Cor. xi. 17ff, shows how good a time they managed to have when they celebrated the Lord's Supper in accordance with their old heathen notions and customs. The Gentile Christians, unacquainted with the true origin of the Eucharist, must have ascribed its enjoinder very early to Jesus Christ himself. But even then it took quite a time until the final satisfactory formula was worked out.

The question may be asked: What is the use of such rather tedious, longwinded investigations? They are necessary to enlighten those people who take an interest in religion and are inclined to accept the leadership of the Church. They will protect them from narrow-mindedness and fanaticism. It was just the Eucharist which caused the first great schism among the Protestants and has prevented the Protestant nations up to the present day from treating each other with brotherly love and mutual forbearance. Moreover, people familiar with the true beginnings of the Church and her ceremonies will never be carried away by the blind zeal and ignorance of those self-appointed leaders of public religious opinion who want to put the tyrannical yoke of their bigotry upon the neck of all their fellow men and teach them to practise hatred instead of love.

THE THEOLOGY OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM.

BY WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

[CONCLUDED.]

We next come to a consideration of the Jodomon. It must be remembered that this school represents that division of Mahayana which teaches its followers to aim at Buddhahood through being reborn at death in the Pure Land through the mercy of the universal Buddha. It is natural, therefore, that especial worship should be given to the Divine in his mercy or wisdom aspect, rather than in his garb of mere law or will. Accordingly, instead of giving especial reverence to the Dharmakaya as in the other sects, the divisions of the Jodomon have as their special object of worship the Sambhogakaya, or, to give it its personified name, Amitabha. Probably in the early days of Jodomon the reverence paid to Amitabha was not nearly as exclusive as it is now. The Dharmakaya or Vairochana was very probably considered the highest being in reality, the supreme acme of perfection, but while admitting its superiority, the Jodomon sects made the worship of Amida their especial object, just as in the Roman Catholic Church, while every orthodox believer admits the inferiority of the Virgin Mary to the Supreme Creator, yet certain congregations and orders of the Church make the extension of her worship their *raison d'être*.

Henotheism, however, runs strongly in man, and gradually, as the worship of Amida as the patron saint of the school was intensified, the conception of his nature and powers were amplified. Nor must it be forgotten that while especial emphasis had been laid, in the Shodomon, upon the Dharmakaya, yet, theoretically at least, each member of the Trikaya was supposed to be equal, so that the exaltation of Amitabha was made easier. Meanwhile, as was natural, since the Sambhogakaya grew to receive most of the worship which had hitherto been given to the Dharmakaya, it also took over

many of the supposed attributes of the latter until at last, instead of corresponding to the Christian God the Holy Ghost, Amitabha became equivalent to the First Person of the Trinity.

The nature of both the Dharmakaya and the Sambhogakaya, strange to say, led very easily to this change. The Sambhogakaya was always a trifle more personal than the Dharmakaya, just as God the Father is generally, however unconsciously, considered more personal than the Holy Ghost, and accordingly the Sambhogakaya was much better fitted to play the part of the great guiding power of the universe, the principle which makes and unmakes worlds. Its power to receive, transmute and irradiate the spiritual energy of the devotees is one which should of its nature belong to the fountain-head of divinity, while, on the other hand, the very vagueness and universality of the Dharmakaya fitted it, when stripped of its absolute supremacy, to act in the role of the Holy Spirit.

The change, once begun, was soon completed, so that soon, in the Jodomon at least, Amitabha found himself the One Supreme without a second. All Mahayana is essentially monotheistic in the sense of admitting but one universal Buddha, but Jodomon is far stricter in its monotheism than is Shodomon. Both schools, while teaching but one fountain-head of divinity, admit the idea of countless emanations or manifestations which have often been personified into separate deities. But while Shodomon lays special emphasis upon the fact of their being manifestations, Jodomon is no less insistent in pointing out the one source. We find the priests of this denomination preaching, "Bind all men into union by means of the One Name. Turn all men to the one and only Buddha. . . . This is our central idea."⁴ In the Jodomon, so stern is its monotheism that Amitabha is no longer merely the Sambhogakaya, he is the other two bodies also, and such Buddhas as Vairochana and Sakyamuni are considered as but passing reflections of the one Transcending Light amidst the countless other hordes of those who hold their power by virtue of Amitabha's imputed glory.

In the temples of the Path of Good Works (Shodomon) we

⁴ It is to be noted, however, that very little emphasis is laid upon this feature of the Jodo doctrine, and that every year its importance is decreasing, especially in the most progressive of the Jodo sects, the Shin. Avalokitesvara was originally a Hindu (some say Persian) male deity to whom we find a chapter devoted in the *Saddharma Pundarika Sutra*. In China the sex was gradually changed. In old Chinese pictures the figure is frequently represented as bisexual, one half being male and the other half female. In Japan the female aspect has tended to predominate, and the deity is even represented with a child in her arms, the similarity to the Christian Virgin Mary of course being obvious.

find images of innumerable gods and Buddhas, while in those of the Path of Pure Land (Jodomon) often all images are done away with and we find only scrolls (Jap. kakemono) inscribed with the words "Namo Amitabhaya Buddhaya" (Chin. "Omīto Fu," Jap. "Namu Amida Butsu"), which is, "Glory to the Buddha of Boundless Light." At the most, beside the images of Amitabha are those of his manifestations Avalokitesvara and Mahasthamaprapta (Jap. Kwannon and Seishi), the former being the personification of Amitabha's love and mercy and the latter of his wisdom. Except for this point, however, the doctrines of the two schools of Buddhism are identical, for in both we have the three bodies, the twofold division of the Sambhogakaya and of the Nirmanakaya, the latter being further subdivided into two parts. On the whole it may be said that the doctrines of the Jodomon on the subject are the more advanced and logical.

IV.

The other chief feature of the religious aspect of Mahayana, and one which it shares with Hinayana, is its worship of the Buddhas, or those persons who have gained the highest goal of human endeavor. In fact, this doctrine of Buddhism may well be considered its most distinctive principle.

In spite of its great importance in the Buddhist speculative system, however, many grave mistakes and misrepresentations continue to exist in the Western mind, and even in many of the books which purport to expound the Buddhist faith. These various misunderstandings of the true nature of the Mahayana conception of Buddhahood are, of course, far too numerous to mention. There are three, however, which may be said to be of especial importance.

The first of these—of which mention has already been made—is that tendency which seeks to identify the terms Gautama or Sakyamuni and Buddha. It is most essential in an attempt to fully understand the fundamental principles of Buddhism to bear in mind the fact that the word Buddha is not in any sense a proper name and is, in fact, nothing more than a title of religious honor which may be bestowed upon any person who has reached a certain stage of advancement. Buddha might well be translated "enlightened sage," denoting a sort of spiritual rulership, and may therefore be no more properly limited to one person than the word "king." It is, in this connection, interesting to note that a similar statement can, etymologically speaking, be made of the Christian term "Christ," the proper meaning of which is simply "the anointed one."

While in orthodox Christianity, however, the word Christ has become limited to one person, orthodox Buddhism has all along maintained that the persons to whom the term Buddha is applicable are unlimited, both as regards time and number. Whenever, in the past, spiritual darkness has fallen on a people a divine "teacher of gods and men" has appeared to preach "the gospel glorious in its beginning, glorious in its middle and glorious in its end," and we are assured by Mahayana that the divine will never be so lacking in compassion as to allow a similar time of need pass by unheeded.

Furthermore, we are even told (implicitly by Hinayana, and explicitly by Mahayana) that each of the great world-teachers, each founder of a world-religion, has been more or less a perfect Buddha, consequently worthy of worship, and the message which he brought, worthy of acceptance. Mahayana not only puts forward, as does Catholicism, the claim that it is not merely a thing of the historical ages, but that it has, under forgotten or unknown sages, always existed, and that in future times under future Buddhas it will continue to live, but also that it is the truth of which all the prophets of the world have had a glimpse. Accordingly Buddhism, and especially Mahayana, rejects with some asperity the use of the unqualified word "Buddha" when used as a synonym for Sakyamuni, since to the words "Buddha said," etc., a query as to *which* Buddha was meant might at once be raised; except, naturally, in such cases as when the historic Gautama has previously been specifically referred to in the same passage.

The second and even more subtle and therefore invidious mistake is that concerning the nature of Buddhahood. The statement is often made that according to Buddhism, existence is an unmitigated evil which it is necessary for one to endure until one reaches Buddhahood or extinction. This conception of Buddhahood, however, is very far removed from the true one, for Buddhahood in itself has nothing whatever to do with extinction, one way or the other. Neither is it, as some persons erroneously suppose, the idea that a person freed from the wheel of life and death gains an unending existence in some part of Paradise. In reality, Buddhahood is nothing more than a state of mind obtainable anywhere and at any time. The extinction in Buddhahood is no more than the extinction of desire, and amidst the innumerable other synonyms for the term perhaps the most expressive is "the Great Peace." In ordinary life, we are torn by many conflicting desires and emotions which leave us far from peace of mind; but in attaining Buddha-

hood, the "Mr. Hyde" side of our nature is extinguished and accordingly supreme happiness and serenity is the result.

Another prominent conception in connection with Buddhahood is supposed to fathom the great secrets of life and realize those truths which others can only believe.

We know that it is a fundamental doctrine of both branches of Buddhism that as long as *tanha*—the desire for life—persists, rebirth on earth is necessary. A Buddha, therefore, having extinguished his *tanha*, is no longer bound upon the wheel of life and death. The query, however, as to whether or not his personality persists after death is left by Buddhists largely an open question, the followers of both Hinayana and Mahayana being divided on this point. It may be said in a general way, however, that Hinayana favors the idea of personal extinction, while Mahayana teaches that individualities remain, at least the Dharmakayas and Sambhogakayas. In fact, we read in the *Saddharma Pundarika Sutra* of the various persons who have gained "complete extinction" (Nirvana or Buddhahood) who came from their various Buddha-fields to hear Sakya-muni preach. The *Saddharma Pundarika*, or the Sutra of the Lotus of the Good Law (Jap. Myohorengekyo), is perhaps the most important of the Mahayana sects. It is, however, far from being the only sutra bringing out this point; in fact, practically all the sutras dealing with the subject at all contain the same idea. Mahayana is not dogmatic at all, however, and each person is left to form his own conception.

The above two misconceptions refer to Buddhism as a whole, while the remaining two refer to those points where Mahayana differs from Hinayana and where the difference has been too often overlooked. The first of these is on the universality of Buddhahood. In Hinayana the highest goal to which the vast majority of mankind may aspire is arhatship or mere personal freedom from the wheel of existence. Buddhahood, the state of supreme and perfect enlightenment, may only be reached by one man in the course of one cycle of human evolution. Hinayana also teaches that there are some of the Buddhas, termed Pratyeka Buddhas, who do not openly and universally proclaim the Dharma—in contradistinction to the great Buddhas, such as Sakya-muni, who make it their duty to preach the law for the salvation of all mankind.

In Madhyimayana (Apparent Mahayana), the stepping-stone from Hinayana to the true Mahayana, Buddhahood is, as we have seen, divided into three distinct stages, arhatship, Pratyeka Buddhahood and Buddhahood proper. According to this system, any one

may aspire to whichever stage he desires, but once decided there can be no turning back, once an arhat always an arhat, once a Pratyeka Buddha always a Pratyeka Buddha, etc., so that while whoever may desire to do so may become a Buddha, yet in order to reach this high degree one must continually direct one's efforts toward this end. True Mahayana, however, while maintaining the threefold division, declares that these are merely temporary and that the final goal of all, whether primarily arhats or Pratyeka Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, is supreme Buddhahood. This idea is one of the most prominent features of Mahayana; in fact, the first half of one of the most important Northern Buddhist scriptures, the above-mentioned *Saddharma Pundarika Sutra*, is given up to expanding the idea and giving parables and allegories supporting it.

In this connection another point of interest comes up. In Hinayana and the early stages of Mahayana, when Buddhas were considered few and far between, it was easy enough to limit the appearance of the Buddhas to one particular place or country, and the Hindus, always rather proud and exclusive, maintained that no Buddha could be born out of the continent of "Jambudvidpa" which they identified with India.

Naturally this idea was not attractive to the non-Indian countries. Consequently, we frequently find statements by Japanese and Chinese priests to the effect that while it is true that no Buddha could be born outside of "Jambudvidpa"; yet their own countries should be considered as being comprised within the sacred continent. As a matter of fact, however, the Mahayana conception of the universality of Buddhahood gradually relegated the "Jambudvidpa" idea into the background. Every one, says Mahayana, may reach the supreme goal regardless of time or place or condition of birth—and not only that, but the gaining of Buddhahood consisted in fully realizing that one had always been in possession of the Buddha nature. Consequently, Mahayana became more and more a universal religion until finally all traces of nationalism and continentism and racial feeling were swept away, and we cannot but rejoice that this was so. Mere nationalism and sectarianism must forever be things of the past.

The last and perhaps the most important of the various misunderstandings of the nature of Buddhahood as conceived by Mahayana is the tendency to look upon the Buddhas as *merely* glorified men. It is quite true that the Buddhas *are* men and have throughout the former history of evolution been only men, winning their exalted position by the exercise of their spiritual powers. Their

difference from ordinary humanity consists solely in degree and not in kind. Originally they were subject to all the temptations of life, and, in their pre-Buddhic days, not only were they subject to temptation but they very frequently fell and became drunkards and rouses. Gradually, however, as they learned the fleetingness of temporal and unworthy pleasures and sought after that happiness which is eternal, they, by extinguishing their lower natures, attained to Buddhahood.

And yet the Buddhas, as well as being human, are divine. Something of the nature of their divinity we noticed when dealing with the question of the Trikaya, but it would be well to go into the subject more thoroughly in the present connection.

The divine as taught by Mahayana is practically synonymous with goodness or enlightenment, so that, logically, wherever goodness is manifested there to a corresponding extent is God. ("Wheresoever two or three are gathered together in my name there am I.") Accordingly, the Buddhas, since they have succeeded in destroying their lower natures, must be regarded as divine inasmuch as they are all good. They are *not merely the instruments* for the manifestation of divinity, but *actually the Divine* himself.

The usual expression is that by a long process of evolution the Buddhas "become one in essence with the Divine," so that in their divine aspect they are worthy of all adoration and worship. The phrase is indeed true and for the most part expresses the idea to be conveyed. The human aspect raises itself up to such a height that it becomes united with the Divine (though maintaining at the same time a separate individuality) so that the appearance of a Buddha is equivalent to the incarnation of the Supreme. We must, however, reiterate the caution made before not to allow the phrase to run away with us so to speak, and give a false impression. "Becoming one in essence" would seem to imply that at present we are not one in essence but that we subsequently become so—thus engendering the idea that Buddhahood is absorption into the Godhead and hence annihilation. We are all of us, even now, at least unconsciously, one in essence with Amitabha, and Buddhahood consists only in realizing that fact. Buddhahood, then, consists rather in consciously recognizing one's unity of essence with the Supreme and the consequent explicit expression of it."

We have a similar conception even in orthodox Christianity. God, we are told, is absolutely omnipresent, and accordingly he is here with us wherever we are, though we are unable to see him. In Christ, the Godhead was not more present in *quantity* (the

quantity of Godhead being everywhere the same) but merely in quality, the expression being more perfect than elsewhere, the universal presence more explicit. The only essential difference is that Christianity limits the divine incarnation to one man, while Mahayana makes God universal in his efforts toward human salvation.

In fact, the similarities between the Christian view of the Incarnation and that of Mahayana, except for this one point, are far more numerous and of far greater importance than might at first thought appear possible, and we may even use the Athanasian Creed, the very typification of Christian orthodoxy, to show how close the resemblance is. The comparison will further act to bring out more fully the Mahayana doctrine.

The so-called Athanasian Creed, it is needless to say, is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the dogma of the Trinity and the Godhead in general; the second, with the incarnation. The former, except, of course, for its damnatory clauses, may be said to be accepted in its entirety by Mahayana though Mahayana, perhaps, brings out the idea more philosophically, more lucidly and less paradoxically than does the Christian symbol. It is the latter part, however, which now claims our attention.

"For the right faith is that we believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is both God and man." Understand by Jesus Christ the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, the Nirmanakaya and its many manifestations, and we find Mahayana accepting the same doctrine. Every Buddha is both divine and human: he is divine inasmuch as he reflects, manifests, or is consciously one with, the Supreme, while at the same time he is distinctly human in another sense.

"Equal to the Father as touching his Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching his manhood." Here the Mahayana conception is most clearly expressed. In each Buddha's divine aspect, he is not only equal to God but he actually *is* God. In this respect he is omnipresent and eternal, out of space and time. He is superior to everything else. He is the unthinkable—the unknowable—the One without a second. Nevertheless, in his human aspect, the Buddhas are necessarily inferior to the Absolute. Having a physical body (even though it be for the salvation of the world), each Buddha is, *de natura*, limited—form and space being limitation, and limitation inferiority, for the first requisite of the Absolute is that he be unlimited. The human Buddha, therefore, is equal to the "Father" as touching his divinity and inferior to him as touching his personality.

"Who though he be God and man, yet is not two but one Christ." We here come to the question of the nature of the personality of the divine incarnations, a matter which greatly troubled the early Christians, and which was the cause of many of the disputes and sects which rent the primitive Church. On this point there were two principal heresies: one the Eutychian, which declared that Christ had not only one person but also but one nature; the other the Nestorian, which declared that there were in Christ two distinct persons which were joined together in some mysterious way. The orthodox view, as every one is aware, is that Christ was but one person, but of two natures—the divine and the human, and strange to say, this view is the one held by Mahayana as regards the Ojin. Each person is but one person naturally, he is not two distinct persons joined together, while at the same time he has, as we know, two different natures, the human or the limited, and the absolute or divine. As does Christianity, Mahayana declares that the object of worship is not the human aspect but the infinite.

Next in the Athanasian creed comes the phrase which is most strikingly Mahayanistic, namely: "One not by the conversion of the Godhead into the flesh, but by taking of the manhood unto God." This article is most important since it seems to contradict the usual orthodox conception on the subject. Indeed, how the expression made its way into the creed at all is very perplexing, and considering the character of its supposed formulators, it has never been satisfactorily solved. Orthodox Christianity is apt to run contrary to its teachings and to declare in effect at least, that it was the taking of the Godhead into man that constituted the incarnation—as, in fact, the very expression incarnation shows. God, in the modern Church, is supposed to have felt remorse for the results of the Fall; emptied himself of his divinity and became man. According to Mahayana and the plain literal interpretation of this part of the Church's strictest standard of faith, it is rather a question of the human nature being gradually elevated until a divine nature is acquired, or rather, until the divine nature, which is always latent, is developed.

It can be easily seen from the above that the Mahayana doctrine of the incarnation is far nearer to the doctrines of orthodox Christianity than is the conception held by the so-called liberal Christians and Unitarians of to-day, who teach that Jesus was purely a man though inspired of God, for the Buddhas are as truly divine as the Catholic would make the Christ. They are not only "men sent of God," but actually God himself, God manifested in the flesh. "The

Lord became flesh and dwelt among us and we beheld his glory—glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” We have, then, the strange paradox of the Unitarians who call themselves Christians denying the divinity of Christ and the non-Christian Mahayanists affirming it, for, as we have already seen, according to Mahayana Jesus must be counted among the Buddhas and accordingly must be looked upon as divine.⁵

v.

The Northern Buddhist doctrine corresponding to the Christian doctrine of the incarnation being thus more or less explained, a word or two must next be added in regard to one more striking similarity concerning the character and the work of the great saviors of man, namely, that which has been called the vicarious atonement. This dogma, as presented by orthodox Christianity, has been the object of much severe criticism in recent years, and the present tendency seems to be to drop a vast amount of the crudity with which the idea was formerly associated. In this search for a new interpretation, a knowledge of the Mahayana outlook on the question may prove of interest.

The Christian view, of course, is that man, owing to his innate corruption arising from the Fall, would be condemned to the eternal fires were it not for the fact that Jesus made a complete atonement for the sins of the world by dying upon the cross. In Buddhism, of course, there is no eternal damnation or never-ending hell into which a man may be thrust, but the idea of an atonement is expressed by the technical word *parinamana* or the “turning-over of merits,” a doctrine which is restricted to the Northern branch of Buddhism.

Both Hinayana and Mahayana teach the doctrine of karma, or the reward of merit. It is the sowing and the reaping of which St. Paul speaks, or the law of cause and effect which is the key-note of all modern sciences. It is, in a word, the responsibility for actions. It is the same law which says that when two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen are put together that water is the result, which declares that evil deeds will bring unhappiness, and

⁵ It is interesting to call to mind in this connection the fact, to which attention was first invited by F. Max Müller, that Sakyamuni (under the name of Josaphat—a corruption of the Sanskrit term Bodhisattva or Bodhisat—is one of the regularly canonized saints of the Roman Catholic Church. The details of how the discovery was made may be found elsewhere, so that it is only necessary here to note the fact that the founders of the world's two largest and greatest religions have thus received mutual honor at the hands of their followers, although the canonization of Gautama may have been done unconsciously and as the result of a singular misunderstanding.

virtuous ones their due reward. Thus both Buddhism and Christianity agree that justice will finally prevail.

In both Hinayana and Mahayana, though chiefly in the former, much is heard about the 'stock of merits.' This stock of merits is as convenient as a modern bank account. Every good deed which is performed leads to an increase in this stock, and, oppositely, every vice to its diminution. Buddhist believers are told to look after their stock of merits carefully, to direct them toward the attainment of Buddhahood—in other words, not to exhaust them in obtaining useless rewards, but to reverse them for the attainment of the supreme goal, just as a father might advise his son not to waste his patrimony in order that by saving he might purchase a valuable estate.

Now according to Buddhism all the Buddhas are free from sin. Consequently, according to this law of Karma, as a result of their purity and holiness, their stock of merits should be of so high an order that all the things of the world should lie at their feet. Wealth, power and luxury should be theirs. They should be temporal, as well as spiritual, rulers.

As a matter of fact, however, we know that the very opposite of the above is the case. That not only are they not wrapped in luxury, but that they are the object of scorn and even of persecution. "The birds have nests and the foxes have holes, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head." In the case of Christ, whom as we know Mahayana would regard as a Buddha, crucifixion is supposed to have been his reward for his ceaseless endeavors for the salvation of man's soul.

Hinayana entirely passes over this phase of the matter, but Mahayana attempts to show that all the various things of the world are within the Buddha's reach, but that they turn over the rewards of their merits which would otherwise secure such things, for the sake of mankind at large. Instead of enjoying the fruit of his good works himself, the Buddha gives it to the world at large that it may benefit the more. In the legends which have arisen about Gautama and Jesus we find the story of the Evil One offering them the temporary sovereignty of the world, only to be rejected by both in order that they might go forth as homeless wanderers for the salvation of sentient beings.

Before closing the question of the Parinamana it would be well to compare the idea with the teachings of material science. To many persons versed in scientific knowledge the idea of the turning-over of merits may seem repugnant as being incompatible with the

strict principle that the law of cause and effect is irrefragable and unchanging. The law of the universe will not be changed simply because one man died, as Christianity avers, or merely because he verbally renounced in favor of all mankind the fruit of his actions, as we find the conception in Mahayana.

This statement, however, but shows a complete misunderstanding of the Buddhist doctrine. As a matter of fact, we find instances of the Parinamana in every-day life. A man may struggle for years and finally, after amassing a fortune, give it to the world at large without injuring the law of cause and effect. A man of unusual strength may remove an obstacle in the road which can be done by no one else so that all may pass more freely and not a single law of science be broken. Yet these are both instances of the Mahayana conception. Or take the case of a man who after long years of study and practice of medicine has reached a position where he can demand enormous fees from wealthy patients, yet gives all of his time to the curing of charity cases. In this case his stock of merits is his surgical skill which he could use for his own benefit but instead uses for the benefit of the world at large. In such a manner, says Mahayana, have all the Buddhas, by their long course of evolution, reached a position where it was quite possible to stay away from the present world with its attendant evils, or, if they appeared in it at all, to become the absolute masters, while on the contrary they gave the fruit of their evolution (their wisdom and knowledge) to all sentient beings.

The Mahayana view of the turning-over of merits, it will have been seen, by no means implies the destruction of the law of Karma or of cause and effect, but merely the transmutation of it which is as scientific as the law of the transmutation of energy.

We can see from the above that the Mahayana doctrine on the subject and that held by Christianity have much in common. The principal difference is that, as in so many other cases, the Christian idea is apt to be more narrow and more limited than the Mahayanist. In Christianity the atoning work is confined to one man, though, indeed the Catholic doctrine of supererogation suggests a somewhat wider scope, while in Buddhism, naturally, all the Buddhas are supposed to have turned over their merits for the sake of all sentient beings. Furthermore strict Christian orthodoxy is apt to consider that the atonement consisted only in the crucifixion, while Mahayanism holds that it was not merely one instance but a line of conduct persistently maintained. In Buddhism the cross would be only the final and supreme link in the complete chain. Christianity is bound

to admit, however, that the whole life and even the birth of Christ were in the nature of a vicarious atonement since thereby he suffered innumerable persecutions in order that man as a whole might be saved. The atonement has long been considered a stumbling block to the belief in Christianity by intellectual and scientific persons, but if Christianity were only to give to this doctrine an interpretation similar to that of Mahayana, it would become one of orthodoxy's strongest bulwarks in its attacks against materialism.

Certainly, in any case, the doctrine of the Parinamana is a beautiful one, for while, according to Hinayana, one may only do a deed of kindness for the sake of acquiring merit, according to Mahayana it may be done quite without thought of the accruing reward—simply out of pure altruism.

VI.

There remains now to make mention of but one point before bringing this article to a close, and that is the method of the attainment of Buddhahood. We have already observed that in the Mahayana system every one is finally to become a Buddha, so that the next thing of importance is to know what method one must pursue in order to gain, according to Mahayana, supreme and perfect enlightenment.

This is another one of the many points on which Mahayana and Hinayana fundamentally differ. In Hinayana, salvation is to be obtained solely through good works—through bringing one's stock of merit to maturity. A man continues to whirl upon the wheel of life and death until he has accomplished sufficient good works to free him from it. Every present that a man gives, every kind word that he speaks, every poor man whom he keeps from starving causes him to advance so far toward and nearer to the attainment of the final goal.

That this idea had, and has, its good points cannot be doubted. It encourages kindness and charity: it is active in increasing benevolence and might at first sight appear superior to any other. Its great weakness lies in the fact that it is scarcely logically compatible with the Buddhist doctrine that Buddhahood is not a place of existence, or even of cessation of existence. If that were so, it is quite conceivable that the mere performing of good works would enable one to be born there. It must be remembered, however, that Nirvana and Buddhahood are primarily states of mind obtainable anywhere and everywhere, and that consequently obtaining these depends, logically, upon the proper regulation of the mind, which is

the Mahayana view of the subject, agreeing, on this point as on so many others, with Vedantic doctrines. Mahayana, except perhaps the sects of the Pure Land division, the Jodomon, is not always very explicit as to its *not* being good works which results in the gaining of Buddhahood, but it is very much so in declaring that it is through a proper system of absolute realization. Accordingly, the Mahayanists attempt to reach this by a proper systematic mind-cultivation. Consequently, as far as Mahayana goes, the performance of good works has only an indirect effect, inasmuch as (1) it reacts favorably upon the mind, and (2) as it may tend to bring about a rebirth under conditions more favorable to the attainment of perfect peace.⁶

Not only, however, does Mahayana affirm that it is the mind which is the direct cause of gaining Buddhahood, but it also warns its followers against being too self-confident as to their spiritual state owing to the performance of acts of physical charity. An instance of this occurs in the case of the famous Bodhidharma, who brought the Dhyana or Zen sect from India to China. Shortly after his arrival in the latter country he, it is said, was invited to the court of the emperor Mu and proceeded to the capital, Chin Liang. Upon being received in audience, the emperor said to him, "I have built many temples, copied sutras, ordered monks and nuns to be converted. Is there any merit, sir, in my conduct?" To which Bodhidharma laconically replied, "None at all, your Majesty."

This might appear brutal at first sight and scarcely true, but in reality it might be that instead of merely not obtaining any merit for his actions, the ruler might have actually been the worse off for them, inasmuch as they cultivated pride, arrogance and self-satisfaction, thus placing him further than ever from supreme enlightenment. While Hinayana places more emphasis upon the amount of the gift that is bestowed, Mahayana emphasizes the spirit in which it is given, agreeing thereby with the Christ's teaching of the widow's mite. Hinayana would be apt to regard two gifts of equal pecuniary value, one given out of a desire for renown and the other out of pure altruism, as of equal spiritual value, while Mahayana would be apt to judge the gifts themselves to be of no value whatsoever, but only the idea which each giver had in mind.

Like Protestant Christianity, however, Mahayana, while teaching that the performance of good works does not necessarily tend

⁶ I may as well mention here that in Shodomon, the Holy Path division of Mahayana, Buddhahood is to be gained through knowledge, and in the Jodomon through faith.

toward spiritual enlightenment, yet declares that spiritual enlightenment is necessarily attended by the performance of good works. One may give to charity and yet be far from holy, but one cannot be holy and not give to charity to the best of one's means. Good works necessarily follow the path of spirituality, and so Mahayana bids its followers to aim after the spirit, teaching that the letter will take care of itself.⁷

Now that the means of the Mahayana way to Buddhahood have been ascertained, there remains but to study the roads and the routes to be trodden, some idea of which may be gained from the accompanying chart:

The Lesser Vehicle (Hinayana)	{	For Sravakas and Pratyeka-Buddhas	}	
The Greater Vehicle (Mahayana)	{	1. Shodomon	{	Gradual
		2. Jodomon	{	Abrupt
			}	Gradual
			}	Abrupt

The two routes of Hinayana, Sravakaship, and Pratyeka Buddhahood, have already received due attention, as well as the fact that even they result finally in Buddhahood, though they do so but indirectly. That there is but one goal must also, of course, be said for the various Mahayana roads, though they are supposed to lead to it far more directly. There are two ways of classifying the Mahayana paths to Buddhahood. The first is by the time taken to attain the goal. In Hinayana and the Gradual School of Mahayana, the supreme goal may only be reached by long and arduous courses of evolution. There are many stages in the road to Buddhahood (ten are usually enumerated) and each one must be passed before the next one can be obtained. In the abrupt school of Mahayana, however, the perfect peace may be obtained at one leap. Buddhahood, according to this school, consists in realizing that we have always been Buddhas, and this may be done at any moment. A drunkard might become a Buddha in the twinkling of an eye were it *only possible* for him so suddenly to perceive the true nature of his own being, just as Protestantism teaches that it is possible for a hardened sinner to become regenerate in a second's time.

⁷ In most of the Mahayana sects this doctrine does not prevent the continued prohibition of the eating of meat, marrying, etc., but in the Shin sect, where the idea is carried to its logical extreme, even these prohibitions are dispensed with as being contrary to the spirit of the Buddha.

The other method of classification (and the two methods bisect each other) is between the Shodomon and the Jodomon, the chief distinctions between which we have already observed. The Shodomon teaches its followers to seek for supreme enlightenment here on earth, by a proper system of discipline. This discipline may not take one the whole length of the path in this life, but it will at least aid one in one's development so that several stages may be passed. At death one will be reborn in one of the numerous heavens or hells which Buddhism declares to exist, according to the stage of development at which one is, varying in each case in the intensity of bliss or suffering according to past actions. None of these heavens or hells are permanent, all men being finally destined to reach the supreme goal, which is higher than the most blissful heaven.

At the end of the allotted time in one of these abodes, one is reborn in this world, likewise in a condition governed by actions in a previous birth.⁸

And so the process of birth and death goes on until Moksha—Nirvana—is attained. This must be accomplished only after innumerable lives, according to the gradual division of the Shodomon; or in this life, according to the Abrupt School. As it works out in actuality, however, the differences between the two schools on this point are of little or no importance.

Of far more seeming importance is the distinction between the Shodomon and the Jodomon. While Shodomon teaches its followers to seek Buddhahood here upon earth, Jodomon encourages its followers to gain that goal by being reborn in the Pure Land (Jodo, hence the name of the school) or the Sukhavati of the universal Amitabha, a sort of penultimate heaven. Buddhahood being obtainable anywhere, as we have already observed several times.

Theoretically, the attainment of Buddhahood, in all Buddhism, gives one power over nature and all the elements—practically, however, as Shodomon is to-day, Buddhahood is merely a mental state with no corresponding physical reaction; in other words, the supreme state is purely mental. In Jodomon, however, the practice of intense faith (not mere belief) in Amitabha on the part of the devotee is

⁸ Most of the Mahayana sects, in permitting the ancestor worship which seems to be inherent in the Oriental mind, make a proviso that persons are not to be worshiped after the lapse of one hundred years, as they may well have reincarnated by that time. All Mahayana asserts, however, that the discarnate period may, and usually does, last a much longer time. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Buddhist conception of rebirth differs somewhat from other systems teaching a similar doctrine, in Buddhism there being no ego-soul to transmigrate from birth to birth.

supposed to develop the Sambhogakaya (Hoshin), or the body of bliss of each one of us, which is always latent, so that at death, by thus being able to use this body (the complete use of which means Buddhahood) we are able to go to Jodo—the supreme paradise.

The Ojo (salvation or going to Sukhavati) of the Jodomon consists of two phases—one of the regeneration which takes place in this life. It is the true entrance into Jodo, which like Buddhahood is quite as much a state of mind as a place.⁹ By the exclusive adoration of the universal Amitabha, the Amitabha within each of us is awakened, and accordingly the Buddha nature of each of us in our Sambhogakayas is made manifest. We are thus inhabitants of Jodo all the time that we are on the earth.

The second phase comes at the moment of death, when the physical vehicle, so to speak, is cast aside, and only the Buddha body remaining. We are then materially in Jodo, in Amida's land, in the City of Light. On earth, as we know, however, the degrees of development vary greatly with different people; accordingly the degree of the development of the Buddha body likewise varies. Consequently there are degrees even in Jodo. These are classified into two main heads, (1) the Kwedo, or the apparent Pure Land, where the mere believers go and those whose faith has only been half-hearted; and (2) the Hodo or the True Land where are gathered together those whose faith has been pure and undefiled.

Even in the Jodo school, however, there is the distinction between the Gradual and the Abrupt doctrines. In the Gradual school which is represented in Japan by the Jodo sect proper, the attainment of Jodo is only a step in the road to Buddhahood. There the external conditions of life being somewhat less incompatible, the attainment of supreme enlightenment is rendered easier and quicker. In the Abrupt school, however, of which the powerful Shin sect is representative, rebirth in the Pure Land is itself equivalent to reaching Buddhahood.

The real differences between the four schools, however, are very slight and even the distinctions between the Jodomon and the Shodomon is far more apparent than fundamental; in fact, as it works out, there is practically no difference at all, the two divisions being but different aspects of one whole process.

⁹ Reincarnation is the reappearance of the Karma, or the fruit of the action set in motion in the previous life. In Buddhism the soul is both and neither the same in two successive lives. Owing to the limited space at my disposal, however, I am forced to refer the reader to the numerous books on the subject by other writers.

The way in which this seemingly impossible fact comes about is this: In the Shodomon, while the process of evolution is slow and the round of birth and death continuous, yet finally all men will attain to Buddhahood and be able to use their Sambhogakayas or Buddha bodies. This, however, is exactly what constitutes the Pure Land. Accordingly, it may be said that even the Shodomon teaches that all men will be reborn in the Pure Land.

In the Jodomon, where the mode of progress is somewhat different, the following is the course of evolution.

The <i>Woso Yeko</i> (Going)	}	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Teaching (<i>Kyo</i>), as set forth in the sutras 2. Practice (<i>Gyo</i>), the reciting of the name of Amido 3. Faith (<i>Shin</i>), or believing in his will to save 4. Attainment (<i>Sho</i>), or being reborn in Jodo and becoming a Buddha 	}	Cause
The <i>Genso Yeko</i> (Return)	}	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Coming back to the world of suffering to save all fellow-beings 	}	Effect

This last is most important, and is a point which is often overlooked in considering the doctrines of the Pure Land Sect. Its presence puts an entirely different aspect upon affairs. Instead of Jodo being merely a place of eternal beatitude, it is rather a place where one having reached peace oneself, prepares oneself for helping on the course of evolution.

The Shodomon and the Jodomon, then, take but different times for going through the same process. In the Shodomon, one is first whirled upon the wheel of life and then enters Jodo; in the Jodomon, however, one first reaches Jodo, and then "for us men and our salvation" repeatedly returns to life to guide the footsteps of those less faithful and less progressive along the path to what the Jodoists poetically call the Eternal City of light and life.



STONEHENGE, Trilithons (B and C) from the South West.
(From *Stonehenge, Tursachan and Cromlechs*, by Col. Sir Henry James. 1867.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE AFFINITY OF DRUIDISM WITH OTHER RELIGIONS.

BY DUDLEY WRIGHT.

THE Druidical religion and philosophy were so like to the Pythagorean system that some writers have arrived at the conclusion that the one was borrowed or adapted from the other, but the borrower is assumed generally to be Pythagoras and not the Druids. Dr. Abraham Rees, in his *Cyclopædia*, is of opinion that Pythagoras himself learned and adopted some of the opinions of the Bards, and imparted to these some of his own thoughts and discoveries. Milton states that: "the studies of learning in the deepest sciences have been so eminent among us that writers of good antiquity have been persuaded that even the school of Pythagoras and the Persian wisdom took beginning from the philosophy of this island." Borlase, in his *Antiquities of Cornwall*, expresses the belief that long before Greece could boast of her wise men, Britain was famous for learning, philosophy, and wisdom, and that the Greek philosophers were really beholden to our Bards whom they copied in many particulars. In the opinion of Toland, no heathen priesthood ever attained the perfection of the Druidical, which he describes as being "far more exquisite than any other system, as having been much better calculated to beget ignorance and an implicit disposition in the people, no less than to procure power and profit to the priests."

Both the Druidic and Pythagorean alphabets were Etruscan in character. The three Orders of Druidism correspond to the three Orders of Pythagorics, Pythagoreans, and Pythagorists. Each cultivated the study of theosophy, metaphysics, ethics, physics, the magnitude and form of the earth, the motions of the heavens and stars, medicine and magic. Pythagoras enjoined the rule of con-

cealing philosophy from the uninitiated and forbade it to be written down.

The points of resemblance between Druidism and Brahminism are very striking. In ancient times, according to Brahminical lore, a great intercourse existed between India and the countries in the West, and the British Isles are said to have been described in the *Puranas* as *Brcta-st'han*, or the "Place of Religious Duty." Faber in his *Cabiri* gives expression to the opinion that the undoubted resemblance which existed between Brahminism and Druidism, originated probably from the Asiatic extraction of the Druids. The various Japhetic tribes which peopled Europe all came out of the widely extended regions of Tartary; and many of them, among whom were doubtless the Celtic Druids, came from the neighborhood of the Indian Caucasus. The Brahmins made it a rule never to reveal to the uninitiated the secret doctrine of their religion and, in like manner, the Druids concealed from strangers and the uninitiated even of their own country, the sacred mysteries of their religion. There was throughout India a veneration for the serpent: among the Druids there was a superstitious reverence for the Anguinum, or serpent's egg, and many of their temples were constructed in serpentine form. The Druids regarded it as unlawful to eat ducks, hens, and other winged animals. The Brahmins, of course, looked upon the killing of any live animal as unlawful and abstained from eating anything that had been killed. The Brahmins carried a sacred staff and a consecrated wand or magic rod was carried by every Druid as a sign of his initiation. Brahma is generally represented as holding in his hand a wheel or circle and the circle was regarded by the Druids as a symbol both of the sun and of eternity. Each had a veneration for white horses and for vast pyramidal heaps of stones. The Indian stone temples were, for the most part, uncovered or in the open, like Stonehenge, Abury, and many other sites. Each had solemn rites of initiation: in each religion the priests wore tiaras and white robes, not unlike the Persian Mithra. Just as the Brahmins were the most venerated caste in India, so the Druids were regarded as superior even to the nobility of Britain. Belief in the immortality of the soul was the basic article in each creed, combined in both with the belief in transmigration. Each had severities of discipline and penitential exercises. Maurice is of opinion that "it is impossible to doubt that at some remote period the two orders were united, or, at least, were educated in the same grand school with the Magi of Persia and the seers of Babylon," while Sir W. Jones contends that a race

of Brahmins anciently sat on the throne of Persia. Barrow in Volume II of *Asiatic Researches*, says: "That the Druids were Brahmins is beyond the least shadow of a doubt, but that they were all murdered and their sciences lost, is out of all bounds of probability: it is much more likely that they turned schoolmasters, Freemasons, and fortune-tellers; and, in this way, part of their sciences might easily descend to posterity, as we find they have done."

There is also a striking resemblance between Druidism and Judaism. Not only did each religion inculcate a belief in a Supreme Being, but the name given to that Supreme by each is akin. The Jewish name for the Supreme Being, Jehovah, means "The Self-Existent," or, to adopt the term employed by Moses Maimonides, "The Eternal." Among the Druids, Bel was the name given to the Supreme, the meaning of which is "He that is." The name "Ptah," also, it may be pointed out, means, "I am all that has been, is, or shall be." The Hebrews were accustomed to worship the Eternal under the name of Baal. Thus we read in Hosea ii. 15: "And it shall be at that day, saith the Lord, that thou shalt call me Ishi, and shalt call me no more Baal." This was because the Israelites had become idolaters and served other deities under the name of Baalim. Each possessed a priest vested with supreme authority, and had three classes or orders of sacred men. The Jews had their priests or judges, prophets, and scribes, while among the adherents of the Druidical faith there were the Druids, Bards, and Vates. Each measured time by a night and a day. Grove worship was common to both Israelite and Druid, and it is clear from the many references to the oak in the Old Testament that it was regarded as a sacred tree. The same Hebrew word which signifies "oak" also means "an oath," and the root of this word is "mighty" or "strong," the root of the name given to the Deity in many languages. The angel (or messenger) of the Eternal came and sat under the oak at Ophrah when sent to deliver a message to Gideon (Judges vi. 11). A similar instance is recorded in 1 Kings xiii. 14. In Ezekiel vi. 13, and Hosea iv. 13, reference is made to the practice of offering up incense under the oak. It was at the oak of Moreh (Genesis xii. 6, R. V.) that the Eternal appeared to Abram, and it was there that Abram built an altar. Joshua (xxiv. 26) wrote particulars of the covenant in a book of the law of God and took a great stone and set it up under an oak tree, by the sanctuary of the Eternal. Among the Jews the oak was occasionally a burying-place. Deborah, Rebekah's nurse, was buried beneath Bethel, under

an oak (Genesis xxxv. 8), and Saul and his sons were buried under an oak (1 Chronicles x. 12). Abraham planted a grove of trees as a retreat of silence and solitude and prayer, but, in later times, the denunciations of heaven were launched against groves, because they were used by idolaters, or the followers of a different religion. The May-day festival was in honor of spring, when the sun entered the sign of Taurus, the bull. Hence, the calves, or bulls adored by the Israelites were golden, because gold was a fitting representation of the benign sun, then beginning to shed his glittering beauties at the approach of Spring. By the ancient Britons, says Faber, in his *Pagan Idolatry*, the bull was not only revered in a very high degree, but he was likewise revered and exhibited by them exactly in the same manner as he was by the Egyptians, the Hindus, and the Greeks. He was the symbol of their great god, Hu, the whole of whose character and attributes prove him to be one with Osiris, Siva and Bacchus, all of which deities were represented by living bulls. The oak also has been held in veneration by all nations and peoples. In Rome an oak garland or crown was called *corona civica*, and was bestowed only upon him who had saved a citizen's life, though in process of time it came to be bestowed upon an official if he spared a Roman citizen when he had power to kill him. In Ovid's time the emperor had always standing before his gates an oak tree, in the midst of two laurels, as an emblem denoting two worthy virtues, required in all emperors and princes; first, such whereby the enemy might be conquered; secondly, such whereby the citizens might be saved. In Sweden, the ancient inhabitants held in reverence and awe the sacred groves and trees, because they regarded them as given by the Supreme as ornaments to his noble creation, as well as to afford protection to the husbandman and cattle against the scorching heat of the midday sun. The Dryopes, who lived near to Thibet, are said to have been named from *drus*, an oak, and *ops*, the voice, and Pococke claims that they are identical with the Druids. Dr. Stukeley calls Abraham "the first Druid," in reference to the oak grove at Beersheba.

The affinity between Druidism and the religion of the Persians is strongly marked. The Druids held that the Supreme Being was too exalted to be confined within temples made with hands. Their open-air temples were round and in their form of worship they made use of circles to intimate that God was to be found in every direction. Cyrus, in Xenophon, sacrifices to Jupiter, the sun, and the rest of the gods, upon the summits of mountains, "as the Per-

sians were wont to sacrifice." The Persians taught that the celestial expanse was their Jupiter, whom they worshiped in the open air. In like manner to the Druids, the Persians forbade the introduction of images into their temples, for they held that the Supreme was too refined to be represented by any figure, a belief also taught by Mohammed and held firmly by all Moslems to the present day. The Druids were not idol worshipers, and they would not sanction the setting up of any image or statue, although certain stones, rough as taken from the quarry and consecrated according to ritual, are said to have been erected in retired spots to represent Isis, or Ceridwen, British divinities whose merits were eulogized by the Bards. Some of the Persian temples were caverns in rocks, either natural or artificial. They had likewise Puratheia, or open temples for the celebration of their rites of fire. The Persians also venerated the serpent, which they regarded as a representation of their god Mithras, who, according to their teaching, was born from the rock. The Druids had their sacred fires and the Persians had their holy flame, to which they paid divine honors, and they, like the Druids, lighted festal fires at the return of the consecrated season. The Druids considered their fires to be antidotes against the diseases of cattle, and the Persians extended their powerful influence to the human body, placing their sick within the range of the gentle heat of the fire, in order that they might recover the more quickly. The Druids compelled the Britons at a certain season of the year, to extinguish all their fires and to rekindle them from the sacred fire, a toll being exacted, and, with some trifling variations, a similar custom prevails in Persia to the present day. In the art of divination, both the Druids and Persians are said to have been proficient; both also regarded it as unlawful and a sacrilege to cut the mistletoe with anything but a golden scythe, and the Persians used a knife consecrated and set aside for that special purpose. Both knew the power of excommunication and cast out and expelled from their communion the abandoned and impenitent transgressors of their holy laws. In Mithraic worship there were ceremonial bull fights annually on the first of May, but the Maypole festival was common to all ancient countries and is generally believed to have a phallic origin. Cicero says that none was qualified to be king of Persia who had not first learned the doctrine and science of the Magi. The Persians, even in ages when temples were common in all other countries, had no temples made with human skill, which was the reason, some think, that Xerxes burned and demolished the temples of Greece. Porlase, as did Strabo, saw much similarity between



TOLMEN CORNWALL.

(From *The Celtic Druids* by Godfrey Higgins, F.S.A. 1829.)

the Magi and the Druids; each carried in the hand, during the celebration of sacred rites, a bunch of plants: that of the Magi was the *Hom*, or Barsum, which closely resembled the mistletoe. Dr. Stukeley is of opinion that this parasite is the same as that mentioned in Isaiah vi. 13. It is generally agreed by commentators that the "tiel" tree of the translators should be rendered "oak," or a species of sacred lime, having purple flowers, like those of the vine, growing in bunches, with a fruit of ruddy purple, the size of a juniper berry. It will be noticed that it is winter time with this tree, and Dr. Stukeley maintains that the passage should be translated: "As an oak, whose plant is alive upon it, which, says Isaiah, "shall be eaten," so that here we have the same idea in regard to the all-heal, or mistletoe, as was the case with the *Hom*.

A similarity also existed, both in belief and practice, between Druidism and the religion of the Phœnicians. Pinkerton, in his *Enquiry Into the History of Scotland*, says that Druidism was palpably Phœnician, and Sammes remarks that "the customs, religion, idols, offices, and dignities of the ancient Britons are all clearly Phœnician."

There are many points of affinity between Druidism and the religion of Greece. The Greeks worshiped their gods upon the tops of mountains. Jupiter, in Homer, commends Hector for the many sacrifices he had offered upon the top of Ida.

"My heart partakes the generous Hector's pain;
Hector, whose zeal whole hecatombs has slain,
Whose grateful fumes the gods received with joy,
From Ida's summit and the towers of Troy."—*Pope*.

They also worshiped in groves of trees, and looked upon the oak as the oldest tree. It was so common to erect altars and temples in groves, and to dedicate them to religious uses, that all sacred places, as we learn from Strabo, even those where no trees were to be seen, were called groves. The solitude of groves was regarded as creative of religious awe and reverence in the minds of the people. Pliny says that in groves the very silence of the place became the object of adoration. Ovid says:

"A darksome grove of oak was spread out near,
Whose gloom oppressive said: "A god dwells here."

The number three was commonly observed in the religious ceremonies of the Greeks. Thus, in Ovid,

"Terque senem flamma, ter aqua, ter sulphure lustrat."

It was customary for the Greeks on some occasions to dance round the altars while they sang the sacred hymns, which consisted of three stanzas or parts, the first of which, called *strophe*, was sung in turning from east to west; the other, named *antistrophe*, in returning from west to east; then they stood before the altar and sang the *épode*, which was the last part of the song. The Greeks practised divination by the entrails of animals slain. If the entrails were whole and sound, had their natural place, color, and proportion, then all was well; but if any part was decayed, or wanting, if anything was out of order or not according to nature, evil was portended. The palpitation of the entrails was a very unfortunate omen. Pythagoras, the soothsayer, is said to have foretold the death of Alexander because his victims liver had no lobes. Among the Greeks the oak of Dodona was the seat of the oldest Hellenic oracle, whose priests sent forth their declarations on its leaves.

The Egyptians worshiped the sun, and the serpent was sacred among them, as representing the eternal existence of the Deity. At the temple of Isis at Dendera there is a representation of a procession of men and women bringing to Isis, and Osiris, who stands behind her, globes surrounded with bulls, horns, and mitred snakes. The Egyptians had a Tauric festival and even went so far as to embalm cattle. They were firm believers in the doctrine of metempsychosis. They also offered up both human and animal sacrifices.

If not Druidism, it was a religion of a very similar character which was followed by the inhabitants of a considerable part of Italy. The Sabin country lies about twenty miles to the north of Rome, on the west side of the Tiber. On the top of the mountain Soracte in that country were the grove temples and carn of Apollo. Hirpins was the name given to the race of people inhabiting that district, and they held annually a sacrifice, similar in every respect to that of the Druids. It is referred to in Dryden's version of Virgil's *Aeneid*:

"O Patron of Soracte's high abodes,
Phœbus, the ruling pow'r among the gods
Whom first we serve, whole woods of unctuous pine
Burnt on thy heap, and to thy glory shine;
By thee protected, with our naked soles
Thro' flames unsinged we pass, and tread the kind'd coals.
Give me, propitious pow'r to wash away
The stain of this dishonourable day."

The priests of Moloch also walked through the fires they lighted in honor of their god.

John Keeson in *The Cross and the Dragon* relates how the Franciscan missionaries, when they reached the court of the Prince of Batou, situated on the Volga, had first to pass through two fires in order to destroy any malign influences they might have brought with them. Two lances erected by the side of these fires supported a stretched cord, from which depended several pieces of rag; and,



STONEHENGE

(From *Stonehenge, Tursachan and Cromlechs*, by Col. Sir Henry James. 1867.)

beneath this cord, to be purified, had to pass men, beasts, and gods. Two females, one on each side, sprinkled them with water at the same time, reciting certain words in performing the act.

It was the custom among many ancient peoples to erect a stone in commemoration or remembrance of any benefit received at the hands of the Supreme. Such practice was particularly observed among the Jews. Jacob, after his wonderful vision, "rose up early

in the morning and took the stone that he had put for his pillow and set it up as a pillar and poured oil upon the top of it" (Genesis xxxviii. 18). He did the same when he entered into a covenant with Laban (xxxvi. 45), and when he is said to have talked with God at Bethel (xxxv. 14). Joshua built at Gilgal (a word which means "a circle"), a temple composed of twelve stones, and when he had assembled the children of Israel within this temple he told them that when their children should ask them the meaning of the stones they were to make answer that it was the acknowledgment of the power of the Eternal. The custom of venerating baetyla, or consecrated stones, and worshiping under oaks was diffused over both hemispheres in the remotest periods. The existence of stone monuments, whose antiquity is undoubted by archeologists, is proof that learning and culture existed in Britain long prior to the Roman invasion, before even the foundation of Rome. Stone circles are common in America, in the province of Coimbatoor in India, and over all northern Europe, as well as in several of the islands of the Mediterranean. Sir John Chardin says that he saw in Media a circle of stones which the traditions of the people living near, in singular conformity with Grecian and Celtic customs, ascribed to Caous, or giants, who wishing once to hold a council respecting some matter, brought each his official seat and left it, when the meeting broke up, as a wonder to men. The explorations of the Ordnance Survey of 1869 proved the existence in Palestine and Arabia of circles "nearly identical in character with those which in England and Scotland are commonly called Druidical circles." In Germany, as in England, the oak was long regarded as a sacred tree; solemn assemblies were held beneath it, and decrees were often dated *sub quercibus* or *sub annosa quercu*. Scandinavian folk lore ascribed man's origin to the oak or ash, a myth also prevalent among the Romans. The Arcadians believed their ancestors were oaks before they became men.

Whenever possible the tops of hills were chosen by the Druids for their services and worship; their temples of initiation and the scenes of the performance of their secret and sacred rites being in caves. Mountain worship is referred to frequently in the Old Testament as being a patriarchal practice just as afterward it was adopted by non-Israelitish nations. The Persians also worshiped on mountain tops. When Philip II made war against the Spartans he sacrificed on the mountains of Olympus and Eva. Cyrus sacrificed to the gods on the mountain just before his death. So, in China, 2300 years before the Christian era, sacrifices were offered

to the Supreme and Chan-Ti on the four great mountains with the four Yo. Cicero tells us that when Xerxes made his expedition into Greece, the Magi commanded that all the Grecian temples should be destroyed "because the Grecians were so impious as to enclose those gods within walls who ought to have all things around them open and free—their temples being the universal world."

The principal deity of the Germans was Mercury; they sacrificed human victims, they had open temples, they consecrated groves and venerated oaks, and computed by nights instead of by days, and this last-named practice was common to all the northern nations of Europe.

It has been a practice from time immemorial to build temples in the form of crosses. The *crux ansata* of the Egyptians was the hieroglyphic of life. A serpent joined to the cross symbolizes the immortality of the soul.

The close affinity between the doctrines of the newly-established Christian faith, as taught by the early missionaries, and the beliefs of Druidism, will warrant the assertions of several writers that the followers of the Bardic faith were so struck with the similarity of the doctrines of the new religion that they were without difficulty persuaded to embrace Christianity. It was a question really of merging of beliefs, rather than an entire change of faith. O'Donovan in his *Annals of the Four Masters* says: "Nothing is clearer than that Patrick engrafted Christianity on the pagan superstition with so much skill that he won the people over to the Christian religion before they understood the exact difference between the two systems of belief, and much of this half-pagan, half-Christian religion will be found, not only in the Irish stories of the Middle Ages, but in the superstitions of the peasantry of the present day." The cross, as a symbol, was known to and revered by the Druids, and their mode of consecrating an oak-tree was, first to fasten a cross beam upon it if the two main horizontal arms were not sufficiently prominent. Upon this right branch they cut in the bark, in fair characters, the word "Hesus"; upon the middle or upright stem, the word "Taramis"; and upon the left branch, the word "Belenus." Over all, and above the branching out of the arms, they inscribed the word "Thau" (see Ezekiel ix. 4), and, according to Schedius, "This tree so inscribed, they made their Kebla in the grove cathedral, or summer church, toward which they direct their faces in the offices of religion, as to the ambre-stone or the cove in the temple of Abury, like as the Christians do to any symbol or picture at the altar." St. Columb, when in Deacon's Orders, is said to have placed him-

self under the instruction of an aged Bard, named Gemman. A miracle wrought by St. Bridgit in the production of butter is given as the cause of her Druidical master becoming a Christian. Richards, in his *Poems, Lyric and Pastoral*, published in 1794, says in the preface: "The patriarchal religion of ancient Britain, called Druidism, but by the Welsh most commonly *Barddas*, Bardism, although they speak of *Derwyddentaeth*, Druidism, is no more inimical to Christianity than the religion of Noah, Job, or Abraham: it has never, as some imagine, been quite extinct in Britain: the Welsh Bards have, through all ages down to the present, kept it alive. There is in my possession a manuscript synopsis of it by Llewellyn Sim, a Bard, written in the year 1560; its beliefs are corroborated by innumerable notices and allusions in our Bardic manuscripts of every age up to Taliesin in the sixth century, whose poems exhibit a complete system of Druidism. By these (undoubted authentic) writings it will appear that the ancient British Christianity was strongly tinged with Druidism. The old Welsh Bards kept up a perpetual war with the Church of Rome and therefore experienced much persecution. Narrow understandings might conceive that they were the less Christians for having been Druids. The doctrine of the metempsychosis is that which, of all others, most clearly vindicated the ways of God to man. It is safely countenanced by many passages in the New Testament and was believed by many of the primitive Christians and the Essenes among the Jews." Dr. Stukely boldly asserted that Druidism and Christianity were identical. It is clear that Christianity assimilated Druidism to a great extent, but it is difficult to say how much the newer faith was indebted to the older religion. There is no evidence that the Druidical Britons gave other than a welcome, and, it may be, a hearty welcome to the exponents of the newer creed: in fact, Christian historians state that the Britons embraced the new teachings with more alacrity than any other nation. There is, indeed, a legend to the effect that Edwin was persuaded to embrace the Christian faith by Corfe, the chief of the Druids. At that time, also, it must be remembered, the Christian religion had not developed many of the corruptions and sacerdotal elements which afflicted it in later times.

THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT IN JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

BY JOSEPH I. CHESKIS.

THE dogma of original sin reduces itself briefly stated to the following: The main consequences of Adam's fall were twofold, physical death—the separation of the soul from the body, and spiritual death—the separation of the soul from God, as man no longer made God the end of his life but chose self instead. The responsibility for Adam's fall was placed on the entire human race "through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners."¹ In other words, Adam's sin was the cause and ground of the depravity, guilt, and condemnation of all his posterity. The dogma of eternal punishment is the natural corollary of the dogma of original sin. Separated from the soul man's body is in a continual state of pain due to the disturbance of the original harmony between body and soul. Separated from God man's soul is in a continual state of suffering and sorrow due to the absence of that which constitutes the true life of the soul, namely, the presence and grace of God.

To atone for Adam's sin, to save man from damnation by re-establishing the unity between man's soul and God, Christ descended on earth and suffered death by crucifixion. Faith in Christ as the son of God and the saviour of mankind is, therefore, the first and essential *sine qua non* for salvation: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned."² The dogmas of original sin and eternal damnation form the basis not only of Catholic but also of Calvinistic theology. In fact, Calvinism stresses the above—dogmas much more than catholicism and limits very much the chances of the individual for salvation. For, while Catholicism proclaims that Christ has suffered death for

¹ Rom., v. 19.

² Mark, xvi. 16.

all men and that man is consequently to a certain extent the maker of his own salvation: Calvinism, stressing the teachings of St. Augustine and giving them its own interpretation, claims the absolute necessity of a special grace, not necessarily merited, for one's salvation. Calvinism represents man as sent into the world under a curse, as incurably wicked and doomed, unless exempted by special grace. He cannot, however, merit the special grace by any effort of his own. "To live in sin while he remains on earth, and to be eternally miserable when he leaves it—to represent him as born unable to keep the commandments, yet as justly liable to everlasting punishment for breaking them, is alike repugnant to reason and conscience and turns existence into a hideous nightmare."³

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Geneva was still to a certain extent, the Jerusalem of Protestantism. In spite of the somewhat liberal religious views of some of the ministers of the church, the general bulk of the ministry, as well as of the people, still clung tenaciously to the orthodox teachings of Calvin. The sermons which were so frequent at Geneva were full of exhortations to live up to the dogma and of detailed interpretations of the teachings of Calvin. Questioning the dogma of eternal punishment, for instance, or denying its validity, was a very risky and dangerous matter. David Noiret, once partner in Rousseau's father's "Dancing School" almost lost his life at the hands of a group of bourgeois because he dared to express the hope that his brother-in-law, a Catholic convert, may, after all be saved; as in both religions "the one and same God was invoked."⁴ At Neuchâtel the questioning of the justice of the dogma of eternal damnation led to civil commotion and disturbances. "It was at Neuchâtel that the controversy as to the eternal punishment of the wicked raged with a fury that ended in a civil war. The peace of the town was violently disturbed, ministers were suspended, magistrates were interdicted, life was lost, until Frederic promulgated his famous bull: 'Let the parsons who make for themselves a cruel and barbarous God be eternally damned as they desire and deserve, and let those parsons who conceive God gentle and merciful enjoy the plenitude of his mercy.'"⁵

³ J. A. Froude, *Short Studies*, II, 3. Quoted from the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, 199.

⁴ See E. Ritter, *La famille et la jeunesse de J. J. Rousseau*, p. 109.

⁵ J. Morley, *Rousseau*, Vol. II, p. 90. Cf. also Rousseau's own account of the affair in his letter describing Neuchâtel to the Marechal de Luxembourg. "Ils (les ministres) viennent encore d'exciter dans l'état une fermentation qui achèvera de les perdre. L'importante affaire dont il s'agissait étoit de savoir si les peines des damnés étoient éternelles. Vous auriez peine à croire avec quelle chaleur cette dispute a été agitée; celle du Jansénisme en France n'en

Such were the conditions and such was the religious state of mind of the environment in which Jean Jacques was born and reared. Endowed with an extremely vivid imagination Rousseau must have been deeply impressed with the sermons in church and the religious controversies and discussions outside of the church, in the streets and cafés. And, we may perhaps be justified in assuming that the germ of his mortal fear of being damned, which later in his life assumed an almost pathological aspect, took roots in the early years of his adolescence. We do know positively that as a youth Jean Jacques was pretty well versed in Calvinistic dogma and general theology. At the age of sixteen, while at the hospital of the Catechumens, in Turin, he gave rough battle to the priests who were to instruct him in the Catholic dogma. It was also at the same place that Rousseau was confronted in a rather ugly manner with the practical applications of the dogma of eternal punishment. It was put squarely before him by the Father Inquisitor as the final test before being received into the bosom of the Catholic Church. "After several questions. . . . he (the Father Inquisitor) asked me bluntly if my mother was damned. Terror repressed the first gust of indignation. . . . I hope not, for God may have enlightened her last moments."⁶

It was later, however, particularly during his stay at the Charmettes that Rousseau became literally obsessed by the fear of damnation. His readings may partly account for his state of mind at that period. He was studying then the writings of Port Royal and of Pascal, and Pascal's influence on his mentality must have been very great indeed. The passionate poet-thinker must have appealed greatly to the imagination of Rousseau, especially since Pascal's conception of man and that of Calvin were so very similar. The deep anxiety and sorrow of Pascal communicated itself to Rousseau's already feverish state of mind, and the result was a sort of pathological fear of death and damnation. The very idea of damnation caused him great mental agony and sheer animal fright. Madame De Warens, Catholic convert though she was, was still under the influence of Magny, the pietist, and she did her best to quiet Rousseau's fears, but her assurances that there was no hell and that the Lord was all merciful would disperse his fears temporarily only to

a pas approché. Tous les corps assemblés, les peuples prêts a prendre les armes, ministres destitués, magistrats interdits, tout marquoit les approches d'une guerre civile, et cette affaire n'est pas tellement finie qu'elle ne puisse laisser de longs souvenirs." (*Correspondance*, Vol. II, p. 177. Werdet et Lequien Fils, Paris, 1826.)

⁶ *Confessions*, Vol. I, p. 49; London, 1901.

come upon him again with greater force. "A dread of hell.... little by little disturbed my security, and, had not Mamma tranquilized my soul, the frightful doctrine would have altogether upset me."⁷ Outwardly content and calm he was continually brooding over the idea of death and damnation. The dread of hell would come on him in the midst of his studies and he would then ask himself, "Should I die at this instant, would I be damned?" Haunted by these morbid thoughts, Rousseau had recourse to what he himself calls "les expédients les plus risibles" to free himself from that state of mind. "One day meditating on this melancholy subject, I exercised myself in throwing stones at the trunks of trees, with my usual dexterity, that is to say, without hitting any of them. In the height of this charming exercise, it entered my mind to make a kind of prognostic that might calm my inquietude. I said, 'I will throw this stone at the tree facing me; if I hit my mark, I will consider it as a sign of salvation; if I miss, as a token of damnation.' While I said this, I threw the stone with a trembling hand and beating heart but so happily that it fairly struck the body of the tree.... From that moment I have never doubted my salvation."⁸

We may reasonably doubt his last statement, though Rousseau's peculiar frame of mind would perhaps lend itself to such expedients. The fact, however, remains that even in his "happy days" Rousseau was tortured by the idea of damnation. His poetry, even, contains traces of that state of mind. In his "Epitre aux religieux de la Grande Chartreuse" we find the following significant lines:

"Happy, indeed, if I could, living as you do,
Obtain his favors and calm his anger.

.....
Your enemy (the devil) beaten, ashamed of his defeat,
Comes not any longer to trouble your sweet abode,
Tranquil on the fate of your eternity,
You are already witnessing the beginning of your happiness;
And, my soul torn by thousand remorse,
Fears one day to be delivered to the demons and hell."⁹

Thus his "âme déchirée" was haunted by hideous images of flames and demons until the magic voices of Diderot, Holbach, Grimm, etc., dispelled their charm and rid him from their wicked power.

⁷ *Confessions*, Vol. II, p. 106.

⁸ *Confessions*, Vol. II, p. 107.

⁹ Quoted from P. M. Masson's *La Religion de Jean Jacques Rousseau*, Vol. I, p. 118. Mason's book is a real treasure to the student of the religious evolution of Rousseau. Cf. also, A. Monod, *De Pascal à Chateaubriand*, pp. 402ff.

In the course of the evolution of his religious views, Rousseau gradually frees himself from the nightmare of constant fright, but the problem itself is always present to his mind. Under the liberalizing influence of the philosophers, Rousseau's outlook upon life broadens and his conception of God becomes more spiritual and less dogmatic. In his daily intercourse with Diderot and his meetings with the other encyclopedists religion was certainly discussed and the supremacy of reason in religious matters supported. They, the encyclopedists, expressed themselves with great ease and displayed on every occasion their erudition. They had an almost blind faith in the truth of their theories, and they advertized them at every opportunity. To men like Diderot, D'Holbach, Helvetius, religious dogmas were baneful expressions of ignorance, fanaticism, mental perversion. And, there was nothing they hated so much as the Church and its representative—the priesthood. Rousseau was for a long while one of them, and, although of a different religious mentality, he could not help being influenced by them. And so he was. "Philosophy, while it attached me to the essential part of religion, had detached me from the *thrash of the little formularies* with which men had obscured it."¹⁰ "Peu de dogmes et beaucoup de vertus" becomes his motto, and writing to Voltaire in 1756 he boldly states his belief that the Lord "will not refuse eternal happiness to any virtuous and earnest unbeliever." And in the same letter "The question of Providence is closely connected with the problem of the immortality of the soul, in which I am fortunate to believe, . . . and with that of eternal punishment in which neither you, nor I, nor any right-thinking man will ever believe."¹¹ Writing to Vernes two years later he again finds occasion to maintain "with regard to eternal punishment it does not accord with the weakness of man nor with the justice of God."¹² It is, however, only in his "Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard" that Rousseau gives a sort of final battle to this herculean problem. In majestic and eloquent language, picturesque and passionate, Rousseau bitterly attacks those who gloating over the idea of hell "because they would like to damn everybody" have invented a cruel and blood-thirsty God. And he goes on to enumerate all the forcible objections to the dogma of eternal damnation:

"Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Christians, nor Mohammedans. How many millions of men, therefore, must there

¹⁰ *Confessions*, III, p. 73.

¹¹ *Correspondance*, I, p. 241.

¹² *Correspondance*, I, p. 328.

be who never heard of Moses, of Jesus Christ, or of Mohammed? Will this be denied? Will it be said that our missionaries are dispersed over the face of the whole earth? This, indeed, is easily affirmed; but are there any of them in the interior parts of Africa, where no European has ever yet penetrated? . . . Do they penetrate into the harems of the Asiatic princes to preach the Gospel to millions of wretched slaves? What will become of these secluded women. . . .? Must every one of them go to hell for being a recluse?

"But were it true that the Gospel is preached in every part of the earth, the difficulty is not removed. On the eve preceding the arrival of the first missionary in any country, some one person of that country expired without hearing the glad tidings. Now what must we do with this person? If there be a single individual in the whole universe, to whom the Gospel of Christ is not made known, the objection which presents itself on account of this one person, is as cogent as if it included a fourth part of the human race."¹³

The passage quoted above is a masterpiece of argumentation and it betrays at the same time all the grudge that accumulated in Rousseau's heart against the dogma. The enormous injustice implied in the dogma of damnation is very intensely expressed and the solution given is very characteristic of Rousseau. "Your God is not mine! He who begins by choosing for himself one people and proscribes the rest of mankind is not the father of the human race; he who destines to eternal punishment the greater part of his creatures, is not that good and merciful God whom my reason acknowledges."¹⁴ In other words to Rousseau the problem is no longer extant. The eternal damnation argument is a wicked and cruel human or rather priestly invention. He, Jean Jacques, does not conceive a God capable of such wanton and unjustified cruelty. Indeed, in his later works and correspondence, Rousseau, though returning now and then to the "cruel dogma," has but very little new to say. His last indignant outburst is found perhaps in his letter to M. de Beaumont: "How in heaven can one conceive a God who creates so many innocent and pure souls with the only intention of bringing them into guilty bodies, in order to make them morally corrupt, and to condemn them to hell, because of no other crime except their union with the body, which is his work!"¹⁵

One of the greatest human poets, Dante, was perplexed and irritated by the same problem of damnation: "A man is born on

¹³ *Emile*, Vol. II, pp. 94ff.

¹⁴ *Emile*, II, pp. 82ff.

¹⁵ *Lettre à M. de Beaumont*, p. 19.

the banks of the Indus, and there is no one there to tell, read, or write about Christ. All his acts and desires are virtuous. . . . He dies unbaptized and without faith, where is the justice that condemns him? What is his sin if he believed not?" (*Paradiso*, XIX, 69-78; cf. also *Paradiso*, XIX, 893-5, and *De Monarchia*, II, viii, 28ff.) Dante's answer to the question is orthodox Catholic: "Who art thou that wouldst sit on a bench to judge a thousand miles away with thy sight short of a span." The answer is, of course, entirely inadequate. It is a sort of rebuke for formulating the problem rather than an answer to the problem itself. And it was probably suggested to Dante by certain passages of the Book of Job: "Wilt thou disannul my judgment? Wilt thou condemn me that thou mayest be righteous?" (Job, xxxviii. 4; xl. 8.)

Dante was an ardent Catholic and as such he could solve the problem only in accordance with the letter and spirit of Catholic theology. And, however much he sympathized with the ancients, however keenly he felt the injustice wrought upon the "virtuous Hindu," he could not but meekly resign himself to the mystery of the dogma.

Both Dante and Rousseau affirmed the "insufficiency of reason in matters of faith." Dante, however, included in the field of faith not only the existence of God, immortality of the soul, etc., but also revelation, tradition, and all dogma. Rousseau, on the other hand, limited the field of faith to what to his earnest belief were the essentials, refusing to confuse "le cérémonial de la religion avec la religion." He then disdainfully rejected the competency of reason to deal with the essentials of faith, but loudly proclaimed its authority in matters of ceremonial and dogma.

"MICHAEL WOOD": A STUDY IN MYSTICISM.

BY VINCENT STARRETT.

"If in this world there is one misery having no relief, it is the pressure on the heart from the Incommunicable. And if another Sphinx should arise to propose another enigma to man—saying, what burden is that which only is insupportable by human fortitude? I should answer at once: It is the burden of the Incommunicable."—De Quincey, *Confessions*.

SOME years ago, at a clearance sale of books, chiefly, I believe, of books that would not sell, I purchased for the American equivalent of a "song of sixpence," a duodecimo volume entitled *The Willow Weaver and Seven Other Tales*, by Michael Wood. Something about the appearance of the volume, the style of the writer (as suggested by a hasty perusal of occasional paragraphs), and the curious allure of the story-titles, drew me to it. I had never heard of Michael Wood, and did not then know, as now, that the name should be written in quotation marks. I read the book.

Then, after a lapse of months, I read nine other books by that author in rapid succession. The lapse was occasioned by the fact that no one else, apparently, had heard of Michael Wood, and that I was a long time in bringing together the other volumes signed with that name. When they came, they came together, and from London.

If, by this, I have managed to suggest that the first collection of tales pleased me, and that the rest of Michael Wood's work, when it arrived, continued to please me, I confess that has been my intention. Indeed, I was fascinated.

It is a pity that one may not stop at that; that, having testified to one's extreme liking for a writer, one must explain why, and point out the excellences, and find public explanations for the symbols, in that writer's pages. If it were possible to say, merely, "These are works of extraordinary merit," and then retire, with

the assurance that one had said enough to excite public curiosity, the business of literary criticism would be much simplified. Unfortunately, one's lone word is insufficient; it is challenged by the casual reader, and by the critic's own colleagues of the craft. One must give reasons, and, in the case of Michael Wood, that is just what it is difficult to do, for while the surface reasons are sufficiently obvious, there are deeper reasons which have to do with what De Quincey called the "Incommunicable."

Michael Wood is a woman. She is one of the few women I have read who is a perfect artist, but who is not, by the same token, hard, brilliant, and possessed of an opal for a heart. Behind the artist there is the woman, and behind the woman there is—well, it is only fair to say at the outset that Michael Wood is a *religieuse*, and allow opportunity for those canny readers to run, who object to the word God. For Michael Wood is a mystic of mystics, a High Church mystic, I think, although once I thought her a theosophist, and, more than once, a Roman Catholic. Indeed, she is something of all three: and there is an occult beauty about some of her passages, which, ordinarily and easily, we speak of as pagan. It is dangerous too closely to connect an author and his work, and one hesitates to suggest that the extraordinary experiences recited in Michael Wood's stories have been her own; but for the fact that they are founded on experience we have her own assurance. Almost without exception, they are studies of the conflicting powers of good and evil, visible and invisible, as they affect the lives of her various characters: and they offer a solution to certain obstinate questionings which, try as we may, refuse to be stilled.

The sense of the invisible, the intimate understanding of what Arthur Machen calls, simply, "the other things," are here for those who have what the French describe as the "seeing ear and the hearing eye," and to those who understand the appeal is diverse but unmistakable: in the delicate descriptions of nature's most intimate charms, in the color of sound and the sound of color, and in the secret light of a far radiance—evidences of a mysticism that the most pronounced materialist cannot ignore. The characters through whose moods her revelations are vouchsafed, through whose "strangenesses" the arresting quality of her work is made possible, are specimens at whom doctors might elevate their brows (save perhaps Irish doctors, not too far gone with science): they are children with the gift of clairvoyance, possessed of "the sight": men described as having "the look of eternal childhood on their faces, and the fairy fire in their eyes": men and women conscious

of a measureless Power working in and through them, "fused and remade in a crucible of the Spirit, a cup of the Holy Graal." Such folk, indeed, as often we call "halfwits," or, more charitably, "innocents," whose eyes have the appearance of looking upon things invisible to us, and who hold converse, after darkness has fallen, with the "little people" of hill and plain.

Those are only some of Michael Wood's characters, however. Too, there are many quite "human" persons in her pages. Neither the man, *March*, nor the boy, *Perry*, in a tale called "The Bending of the Twig" (one of the "seven other tales"), was able to see the curious things the child, *Dennis*, saw; both were entirely normal and "human." Yet the man *March* flogged the child for lying, while the boy *Perry*, sympathizing, dimly understanding, groped for solution, and ultimately was the cause of the man's shamefaced half-surrender. The attitudes of *March* and *Perry* are typical of the intolerance, and the finer tolerance, of many thousands of persons, whose lives are touched by manifestations beyond their ability to credit, and while the moral is obviously that furnished Horatio by the Prince of Denmark, it is an excellent one, and the story is admirably done. Other eminently "human" personages enter the tales, although for the most part they serve as foils for more remarkable characters whose prescience goes beyond ordinary experience. *David Alison*, a lovable individual, a naturalist and author, who occurs in several of the novels, lingers happily in memory as hovering intellectually somewhere between the known and the unknown lands. Certainly, *Alison* had flung open strange shutters and looked upon secret things, but he was far from "mad"—unless it be madness to loathe commercialism and the city, and to love nature and the fields. And *Father Anthony Standish* of the *House of Peace*, a very remarkable character indeed, and Michael Wood's chief creation, is one of the most human and humane figures in recent fiction. *Father Standish*, in his simple wisdom, knew a great deal better than to believe anybody mad, whatever he might say or do.

This *Father Standish* is an extraordinary person. He occurs in more than half of Michael Wood's tales; and it is, in part, this trick of the author, constantly to reintroduce her familiars in successive stories, that makes for her unusual plausibility in difficult circumstances. *Father Standish*, *Alison*, and half a dozen others, weave through her various books like a hidden cipher, connecting the volumes by a thread of association, the cumulative effect of which, after six or seven appearances, carries a conviction of reality that banishes fiction from the mind. *Father Standish*, as Warden

of the House of Peace, a sort of Quietist retreat, and an asylum for persons weary of the agony of living, is the main influence for good in the narratives he enters; and his rule of intercessory and contemplative prayer is shown by the author to act as a real and active force of singular potency. To his friendly sanctuary come dreamers of strange dreams, and broken, tired men, fleeing from themselves and from the world. In *The Penitent of Brent*, it is *Jesse Cameron* who seeks refuge, while beyond the walls he is called a "murderer"; in *The House of Peace* (which should be read first), comes *Gereth Fenton*, seeking *Truth*; in *The Mystery of Gabriel*, it is *Gabriel Forraner*, possessed of a strange devil, and seeking he knows not what until he finds it; and in *The White Island* (the latest volume, chronologically), it is *Réné Clinton*, whom, for a certainty, physicans would call a halfwit, but whom Father Standish calls "an instrument of God." Come, too, sometimes, the Playwright and the Doctor, to discuss metaphysics with the wise priest, and others from the outer world, on various missions, but all in search of something incapable of discovery by familiar paths, and incapable of solution by standards know to the material world. Through these lives and these stories moves Father Anthony Standish, the ideal friend, the ideal priest, with no hint about him of the evangelist and little of the preacher; at home in the drawing-room and upon his knees, seeing no visions himself, but accepting without cavil, and with entire belief and sympathy, the strange reports of others.

There is nothing particularly eerie about any of these tales, occult as is their background; rather, one reads in a sort of wonder, like a child occupied with a fairy tale. Neither (and this is important) is there much sermonizing. In a sense, every page is a sermon in little, and many of the conventional words appear, which, used by a less skilful artist, might make of the production an intolerable piece of "goody-good"; but Michael Wood is concerned with incredible secrets, only half revealed. . . . suggested by the green fire of Spring, the bubbling note of a thrush, the rush of rain, the color and contour of a cloud, and all the mystery of star-set space and pulsing earth; suggested also by the strange effect of these phenomena upon certain of Nature's favored children, more sensitive than most to the evidences of the ancient enigma and its solution. In contrast to these high lights, there are quaint, subtle, often ironical, etchings in shadow of the humbler life of communities, and of the activities of little *Milors* and *Miladies*. It is all

quite admirably done, with few false touches, and few words to spare.

Recently, a young critic, reviewing *The White Island*, thought the author's powers of invention not very pronounced, and the book, as a novel, almost to lack a *raison d'être*. He could not find much "story," and so, for him, the book failed. He was an unhappy choice to review a book as suffused with mysticism as is this one. René Clinton, pursued by his ineffable vision of a "white island," is, for our critic, less of an "invention" than, perhaps, Rider Haggard's "She." It is, of course, needless to point out that the movement of the *story* is not the most important part of *The White Island*. One feels sorry for a reader who demands a carefully involved and ingenious plot, in which the characters melodramatically vanish and reappear, and the chapters end on exclamation points; and who fancies that sort of thing the highest form of novel-writing.

In spite of the excellence of her novels, however, I am inclined to like best the short stories of Michael Wood, as found in *The Willow Weaver*, *The Saint and the Outlaw*, and *The King Predestinate*. Here, her precise and delicate characterization is seen to best advantage—in little. "The Mystery of the Son of Man," in the first of the volumes mentioned, is one of the finest short tales I have read in any language, a piece of medieval "remembering" with the flavor and authenticity of a Franciscan legend. Other extraordinary stories are "The Excellent Versatility of the Minor Poet," perhaps the most ironic of them all; "Lox," a powerful and moving dog story; "The Prince and the Water Gates," "The Teller of Drolls," and "The Tumultuous Shadows." Those titles alone should be sufficient to send a discerning reader after the books. The last four mentioned occur in *The Saint and the Outlaw*.

Occasionally, it should be said, Michael Wood offends artistically by her use of a hackneyed situation. Thus, in her novel, *The Double Road*, there is a young man falsely accused of theft, but accepting the stigma to shield the actual thief, a girl. Stated baldly, that way, it sound pretty sentimental and conventional, and, I confess, I like it least of her stories. Still, the author's fine sense of beauty, and her love of nature and humanity, pervade it, . . . and prospective readers may be glad to know that the young man does *not* marry the girl.

Michael Wood's style is a very simple and beautiful thing, and, casting about for its inspiration, one finds it, without surprise, in the Bible. Many fine artists have gone to the Bible, and where the

experiment has been successful, usually it has been noteworthy. But Michael Wood is a quite conscious artist, selecting and arranging her words and phrases with meticulous care. I shall quote two passages purely at random. The first from an allegorical tale, with a natural biblical fervor to it. Thus:

"Now the other traveller passed into profound musing, till his outer senses were locked as though in sleep; and he saw the place in which he was after the following manner and semblance. He saw the girdle of trees as the wall of a great temple, wherein there were three courts, and at the center a shrine. In the first court was the image of a woman bearing a child in her arms; about her were lights burning and the smell of incense, and the song of human praise; priests in rich vestments celebrated solemn rites, and worshippers, both male and female, old and young, bowed down before this mother and child. In the second court there was a dimness as of a starlit night; there was no incense save the smell of earth and flowers, no song but the song of birds, and of streams, and the boom of waves like the tones of an organ; no lights but strange fires that gleamed and flickered through the night, no worshippers save dim forms of the gracious 'hidden peoples,' the gods of wood and orchard, plain and tilth. . . ."

And here is a description of a storm:

"At last he slept; and he woke to a wild rush of rain. The wood was full of pale cool light; the pine-needles dripped; he heard the gurgle of a hurry of water in the ditch beyond the gate. He got up; the livid greenish-purple clouds were rushing across the sky; the island was veiled in a white mist of rain; the forest ponies galloped for some scant shelter; some of the herd turned disconsolate noses from the rush of waters; some squealed and kicked and bit at each other; others endured in meekness. A big ants' nest near the gate was flooded; pools stood in the heather; and a heap of cream-white foam swirled on the brown water in the ditch. Light wisps of cloud fled across the background of livid green-purple. He stood under shelter of the trees and watched the storm.

"It passed; the clouds flew seawards; the sky grew pale even grey; then a cool, soft wind began to blow. The east grew faint pink, then yellow-grey; then a long line of light quivered over the heather. The new day had come. The birds were stirring and singing; the rabbits hopped out to feed; a stoat darted across the track; and the clang of a cow-bell echoed across the moor."

All that, I submit, is of its kind quite perfect, and, as I have deliberately chosen at random, I have not chanced upon any of the

author's more occult descriptions of nature, in which, often, there is a remote radiance of the "light that never was on land or sea."

In this sophisticated day, it is almost literary heresy to find praise for a writer on religious subjects. "Art for art's sake," an excellent doctrine when understood, has become the cheapest of cant, a catchphrase of the opportunist followers of fantastic "movements." But in Michael Wood, even the most violent "Art for art's-saker" may find much to admire, while followers of an older fashion will find some refuge from a ruined physical world, and not a little mental retirement.

One feels indeed, that Father Standish's House of Peace would be a pleasant institution to have located not too far from one's own dwelling.

SELECTIONS FROM CHU TZU'S ADVICE ON
HOME MANAGEMENT.

CHOSEN AND ARRANGED BY WANG HSUN OF YANG HU.

TRANSLATED BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

Wang Hsiin's Preface.

CERTAIN selections from the philosopher Chu's advice to householders on home management are already familiar to many minds. They are points of family counsel which no one can either ignore or mistake, being simply and clearly set down so that the present generation or even the people of the whole world in general may interpret and take unto their bosoms the meaning of and respect for true authority both in the home and under Heaven. Surely in order to act properly in our conduct of life we must examine as herein advised both our requirements and the intentions of our action, for all activity may be dually examined as to both motive and method, both the end and the means to the end.

The sovereign conqueror, Ting Hai Liu, has become famous in matters pertaining to books and education, having founded a model system of village schooling which has become essential as a preparatory course in advance of higher classical or technical education. The primary study consists in teaching the pupils how to speak fluently, logically and forcefully. Yang Te Wang also has founded a system which encourages the docile to an advanced position in life by aiming toward a clean and cultivated personality. Hence all children who would hope to benefit by following such courses as these must bear in mind the fundamental importance of loyalty and kindness, sincerity and righteousness.

Hurriedly written, but cordially—WANG HSÜN (seal)

Authorized and copyrighted under the seal of Kuang Hsu's reign,
May, 1908.

Choice Remarks on Home Management.

"The Incomparable Mountain," Chu Fu Tzu, exercising simplicity and goodness, has conveyed to us in this publication the fundamental truths and duties of family life. In orderly arrangement they are as follows:

Early in the morning you must immediately arise from bed, wash, and clean up the bed-room unless you have urgent business which calls you outside. Arrange the furniture and tidy up the house; otherwise an indolent and late-sleeping wife will require you to keep the doors locked.

If you have relatives staying with you they can surely look after some of the household duties, understanding that the same rule applies to all who therein take shelter.

Bring proper thoughts to bear on every occasion so that you can make just and practical decisions, thereby avoiding both negligence and incapacity. With a sense of fairness and equality constantly meditate on the problems and affairs of life. Remember that moral strength striving daily with the difficult circumstances of life is quite compatible with the rational order of Nature: no one being so fortunate that he will not find these two conflicting elements of life closely bound together.

Do not look down upon others haughtily nor with covetous desire; but dig a well yourself to serve them.

It is certainly necessary to be frugal and saving, although occasional hospitality to strangers or visitors is also a duty of importance, especially when it is done without gossip, unrestraint, or following with the eyes the victuals as they pass back and forth. Plain and clean chinaware is fully as adequate to the occasion as golden or gem-inlaid dishes. It is well to be saving with one's food and drink, knowing that well-prepared garden vegetables are better than rare delicacies which are often indigestible, whence a man feels better hungry than dyspeptic.

Do not be a man who would build a palatial house surrounding it with excellent gardens and fertile fields, because swindlers and disreputable women, verily lewd and lusting for gain, are always ready to defraud such a person. Coveting maidenly beauty their concubine loveliness is unreal; even the blessings announced over the doors of their private apartments appeal only to their abject patrons and bondservants. Without seeming to exercise any superior abilities a man's truly beautiful legal wife will urge him to shun the seductive beauty who is all adorned and painted.

Always honor your family ancestors even though you are living in a distant place. Not unwillingly offer up sacrifices on the appointed days and be sincere with your sons and grandsons. Ancestry and posterity are man's vital root and branch.

Although stupid people do not tolerate, much less attempt to study, the Classical Books; people with clean habits and an intelligent disposition strive to achieve an understanding of the principles underlying the exemplary wisdom and virtue of the ancients. Then they exercise plain sincerity in their instruction so that their pupils will in turn want to keep the covenant of righteousness and propriety, benevolence and equanimity.

Do not entertain evil ambitions or greedy intentions regarding what is outside your own rightful possessions. Do not drink beyond your capacity for liquor. Allow an even exchange in your trading with the load-carrier (huckster or peddler), without being inconsiderate or seizing the opportunity for imposition.

Observe that poverty is unpleasant to relatives, and that when neighbors expect much kindness and sympathy it is quite embarrassing. For relatives at a distance are not like neighbors close at hand when one is poor and needy.

After completing your home (i. e., after taking a wife), manage your domestic affairs without a too eager pursuit of pleasure and feasting. Constant and habitual disobedience in the home, you will please observe, requires to be sternly eliminated. Brothers, uncles, and nephews should be made to share equally in the many good things of life. Rarely under this arrangement do either old or young step outside the proper rules of respect for their authorized instructors.

Solemnly listen to your wife's accusations against your blood relations, and consider to yourself why she so lets loose her tongue. A capable husband who is worthy of his position as head of the family will be serious about real estate and the legitimate uses of property. Whoever slights his father or mother has not yet reached complete manhood.

To give one's daughter in marriage requires care and discrimination so as to select a superior son-in-law. But do not inquire too seriously about the betrothal presents; for a daughter in marriage should be given as a benediction, not sold as a bondservant. To take a wife in marriage first seek out a chaste and accomplished lady, but don't calculate that she is wealthy on account of her gorgeous toilet-case. Look rather for an abundant nobility of character so that she will be able to bear a child of ability and gentle

manners. This excellence, however, may be liable to embarrassment whenever your family suffers misfortune and finds itself in impoverished circumstances. And yet to become haughty in one's attitude toward others is ignoble. If you cannot keep your heart humble why carry your chin high?

Do not those who are extremely home-loving refrain from wrangling and litigation? They know that litigation as a rule results in misfortune and anxiety. If you would hold your proper place in the world you must refrain from talking too much, for gossip certainly proceeds by hearsay and without waiting for witness or authority for its claims. Grass and leaves may be blown about by the wind, but it cannot move the hills of Han.

Moreover, to pass your life quietly you must be ever ready to constrain ingratitude, and be moderate without greediness merely for the sake of self-aggrandizement (mouth and belly). Also the wanton killing of animals and birds you will look upon as a most perverse and mean form of selfishness. Repentance for one's faults and mistakes is certainly the duty if not the scruple of many lazy, weak and self-complaisant people; only they do not readily observe their obligations to either their fellow-men or Heaven.

The proper manner of ruling the home is indeed difficult to accomplish or realize. Familiarity in close quarters is repulsive because very few people follow the path of duty. The best and only thing you can do under such circumstances is to endure the company of those who repeatedly outrage your sense of right. This always achieves the quickest harmony for all concerned. It is always possible to weakly coincide with the fickle opinions of your company, but if you would have decision of your own you should listen rather to the *issue* of their words, calmly understanding that malicious people are those who slander and calumniate others.

Always act with patient endurance, thrice thinking over the causes and effects of everyday affairs. Examine closely into the world-wide struggle for wealth and happiness, and see how vain and illusory it largely is. Understand distinctly what is not "mine," that it is not always what you think it is. With a tranquil mind and a pure heart deeply meditate on giving as the duty of true benevolence and not with any calculation as to the return benefit.

Do not forget that in all the affairs of life it is always suitable and prudent to retain some further resources for action. An exhausted granary means famine and the improvident are the soonest to suffer. While realizing the pleasantries of benevolence, still you

should see that it is not proper twice to send a present as if you were a debtor to your friends.

People having delightful dispositions and best wishes at heart should not let their attitude be changed; surely they cannot be bearers of envy or jealousy as if disliking at heart. People who are undergoing a life of misery and misfortune find it extremely difficult to bring forth a cheerful and rejoicing heart. Flattering and cajoling people, please observe, are not really sincere. Evil-thinking and suspicious they know that this is an expedient course of action to follow. Great evil-doers look around greedily and raise up overbearing desires for recompense and requital. Know then what a vast difference there is between the heart that is good and the heart that is evil.

If you dwell with a legal wife, outside women will hold secret malice and use great cunning in stealthily shooting the arrows of slander to disrupt your home. Remember that calamity and affliction extend to all posterity, the family door weakly yielding to the hereditary influence. But even then, if breakfast and supper are discontinued owing to your straightened circumstances, you still have crumbs which have fallen, intimating that the lesson of your Heavenly Kingdom will soon reach its consummation. When your purse is empty and the future looks foreboding, take yourself in hand and assume a pleasant attitude toward life and the world. Study books, go to the school of ripe experience, and let your purpose consist in wisdom and virtue. This was the way of the sages.

To have authority either at home or in your official life you must preserve a cheerful heart and maintain your soberness of mind. To rule a state you must supervise all the relevant affairs, distinguishing sharply between your own and others' business, and be content with the position in which destiny has placed you. For no man's lot in life is really improved by the cloudy insurrection of discontent. Yield when you hear the Will of Heaven. For, by acting thus, people will then be able to closely follow and perhaps realize in a worthy life the practical provisions of this code.

At Yang Hu (in Anhwei) Wang Hsün has made this synoptic record.

(Translator's Commentary Remarks.)

In the copy of this work of noble ethics and literary art sent to me from China and which I have thought it worth while to translate for the benefit of those who do not read Chinese, Wang Hsün, the famous artist-collator of Yang Hu, has drawn a veritable

treasure of Chinese calligraphy as well as giving us an intelligible and representative selection of quotations from Chu Tzu's ethical and political discourses. Delicate moral distinction and a keen artistic taste have always been the major points aimed at by the famous litterateurs of China. But these qualities are not the only credentials of Chinese genius. Especially in their educational methods, antiquated and sterile though they may appear in comparison with western systems of strict efficiency-training and business loquacity, the Chinese have still managed to drive through a vast swamp of rote learning and classical quotation, and have reached a deeper and more logically sound philosophy of life than we have yet been able to put into practice in the western world. And not a few points of their religious devotion are fully as exalted and exhortant to nobility of mind and heart as may be found amongst any of the numerous doctrinals of occidental worship.

It is true a large part of their lack of aggression, their simple ways and apparent dulness is caused by and fostered in their peculiar but venerable form of ancestral worship. And yet, what would aggression and cleverness avail them in their quiet, dreamy, almost detached portion of the moral world? We are all ancestor-worshippers for that matter—only our ritual or the temper of our attitude varies. On the other hand, to what cause should be laid the sporadic rebellions, commercial boycotts, and religious uprisings which appear recorded on the pages of recent Chinese history? Almost wholly to the agitating influence of foreign interests who are making China their commercial and economic war-zone. At heart the major portion of China's four-hundred-million population constitutes a people of rare contentment with frugal industry, impartial ideas of justice, a thorough understanding of life, honest views of social duties and relations, and a profound loyalty to truth, virtue, and the rights of others.

It is no more just or reasonable to judge the Chinese Conception of life and morality by the often poor and questionable example of their nationals in this country than it is for them to judge all Americans, French or British by the few nationals of such named countries who are right now seeking to shackle China through the specious benevolence of an ambiguous consortium. The truer method of judging the high morality and profound philosophy of life which are equally cherished by the Chinese heart and mind is to trace the derivation of their words, following the *implied choice* which any Chinese author always makes when he constructs a sentence or asks a question or writes a letter. Here we find an almost un-

believable thoroughness and reliability in their anticipations of modern psychology, ethics, philosophy, politics and economic jurisprudence.

But its greatest critical value is to be seen by bringing this judgment to bear on the general trend of Chinese Literature wherein we can readily see the deeply implicit significance which, as distinct from the avowed purpose of the compilers, may be read for instance from the pages of one of China's famous exhaustive lexikons, the *Pei Wen Yün Fu* or "Treasury of Memorial Verses" in 110 octavo volumes. Herein are contained references to authors as well as explanations of the meanings and original uses of both common and classical phrases. It is the monumental product of the combined learning and industrious research of some seven hundred scholars collaborating under the editorial direction of Nien Hsi Yao in the early eighteenth century, and is a valuable accessory if not an encyclopedic necessity to every one who seeks to write in an elegant literary style. Excepting the large share of authority which is noticeably allowed to the poets this work largely seems to rely on the philosophers for an authoritative construction of sentences, ancient meanings and modern figures, period-colloquialisms and anagogic quotations.

Thus, like many other modern Chinese scholars the collaborators on this treasury have thought it proper to take as a prime authority one of the greatest writers in the annals of Chinese Literature—the philosopher Chu Fu Tzu or Chu Hsi who lived approximately between the years A. D. 1130-1200. Although his reputation has for several centuries been at stake in the arena of native criticism owing to his hostility to the anthropomorphic notions of the Confucianists and the Hinayana Buddhists, we find that he is held in general esteem as a voluminous writer on all conceivable subjects from the mystic calculus of the Yih philosophy to the simple yet profound ethical code of Lao Tze on reason and virtue, faith and love. His industry proves that, with all his quiet meditations and ponderous commentaries on the Classics, interrupted as they were by numerous periods of official life, still his stubby deer-hair brush was as alert and active as the animal from whose hair it was made. Admirably well might the figure also apply to Chu's writings which was once remarked by the noted poetic critic of the seventeenth century, Chang Jen Hsi, regarding the poems of the T'ang period: "The rhymes of T'ang are as agile and artistic as Chang Cho's paper butterflies."

But we cannot say that Chu Tzu was an expert "penman," as

what appeared as his writings, even his personal as well as his official correspondence, were manuscripts artistically transcribed by clever secretaries. Similarly, the original purpose of the collated work of which the present is a translation was to give a series of perfectly drawn "square characters." And yet, so far as literary worth is concerned, even though we do highly appreciate Wang Hsün's skill as a calligrapher, this work is valuable to us only as a synopsis of Chu's remarks on some of the principles and ethical relations of home management. Practically all the filial and paternal duties are enumerated, as well as valuable references to the manner of treatment proper to one's friends and less immediate relations, and at the end Chinese equivalent is given of the Christian exhortation to "Do the Will of God if you would lead a virtuous life."

In this translation I have purposely followed closely the verbatim text of Wang Hsün's Chinese edition. Only in certain places, such as where he quotes Chu's colloquial phrases, Buddhist maxims, or classical figures of ethical significance, have I departed from a literal interpretation. But even then I have allowed a version only which would convey the sense in which the words were meant to be used. With the feeling of a work, highly and almost universally cherished in Chinese homes, translated and introduced to the western world, it is to be hoped that a hurried but cosmopolitan nation like America might relish the advantages of Chinese wisdom and brevity, and pause long enough in the mad struggle for life and happiness to benefit by some of these family counsels which were suggested by "The Incomparable Mountain" more than seven hundred years ago.

SECULARIZED MYSTICS.

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER.

PROBABLY the mysterious operations of the autonomic system, as that is expressed in and through the psychic aspect of human behavior, will never be completely explored. So long as there is any large unsolved psychic mystery we will have an excess of the mystical temperament, building its metaphysical heavens or phantasmal universe, peopled with its immaterial beings, or being itself an infinite spirit. Such theories of superhuman entities are believed, because they answer to a human need. That need is a feeling of inferiority. Our emotional identification with the superhuman, for certain types of mind, furnishes a satisfying compensation or neutralizer for depressions or injured feelings. These religious mystics have, and will continue to have, their counterpart in the secular domain. To improve our understanding of this fact is the purpose of this essay. I will begin by stating my conception of the mystical mental process and then to exhibit its operation in the domain of secular activities.

MYSTICISM A STATUS, NOT A DOCTRINE.

As the result of my studies in religious psychology I conceive the problem of mysticism to be always essentially one of the psychology of the mystics. That is to say: The differential essence of mysticism is to be found in the relative subjectivity which means the relative immaturity of the desires and of mental processes, even when accompanied by great erudition and cleverness, as that may be exhibited in the process of intellectualizing and rationalizing the immature fancies and feelings. In harmony with this result of my previous study, I conclude that persons have not necessarily outgrown the mystical stage of development when they abandon a conventional mystical cult, for one that is hostile to it, or for one that is non-mystical in its verbal expression. In other words:

From the psychogenetic viewpoint individuals are *not* to be classified according to their creedal professions, ceremonial performances or institutional adherence, but according to the psychologic *how* and *why* of these manifestations. To keep this viewpoint in mind we must remember that one may maintain any creed, either religious or secular, as the result of varying degrees of morbidity, or of immaturity. It is the compulsive *how* and the psychogenetic *why* of creed or conduct that now counts, and not the creed or conduct in itself. If we add to this the viewpoint of an evolutionary psychology then this *how* and *why* must also be seen in an evolutionary setting.

The claimant or proponent of secular and anti-mystical creeds may still be in the throes of an emotional conflict over mysticism. It may be therefore worth while to furnish some description of the mystical type of mind, when that is functioning in a secularized garb. This will help to clarify the viewpoint and assist in outgrowing the mystical stage of development.

THE MYSTIC'S REALITY.

One of my college mates has become such a secular mystic. With significant vehemence he scouts all religion. His omnipotent idea is a concept of honesty which he has carefully formulated and to which he gives a pathological valuation. In consequence of this compulsion he gave up a useful and promising professional career and his family, in order to live nearer to his ideal, and he is doing this mostly on charity. When I tried to encourage him to readjust his habits to harmonize more with the real world of his environment he retorted that I did not know what reality was like. In response to my request for a definition of reality he wrote this:

"A thing is real to us when it corresponds to our idea of what it should be—in other words, when it corresponds to our ideas of what it must be to justify the name given it or what is otherwise and reasoningly to be said of it. This means that a thing is real to *me* when it corresponds to *my* idea of what it should be and the picture I draw of it will or will not be real to you depending upon whether or not our ideas of how things ought to be, do or do not agree."

If now we get away from the dictionary meaning of the above quoted words and seek to understand the state of mind which they symbolize, one cannot well escape the conclusion that this secular mystic presents much the same phenomena as when the New Thoughter or Christian Scientist speaks of "the allness of mind and the nothingness of matter." It is also the equivalent of Evelyn

Underhill (Mrs. Stuart Moore), a pan-mystical authority, when she asserts that the mystic life founds "the whole of reality in a cosmic inner life," quoting Eucken.¹ All mysticism is relatively subjective, that is, self-centered attention.

MYSTICAL PROCESS DESCRIBED.

As I conceive it, mysticism is an immature method of intellectualizing and rationalizing the urges of our autonomic apparatus. This immaturity is evidenced by the excessive feeling-value which is attached to our explanatory concepts. These are usually found to ignore rather obvious and important actualities of the problems dealt with. The precise quality of the mystical compulsion (predisposition and valuation) is predominantly determined by the present subconscious operation of past emotionalisms. People generally lack the understanding and the willingness to explain themselves in terms of their own past. In part this is due to the fact that we all conceal some skeletons in our closets, sometimes fearful and shameful ones, which often contribute mightily to a feeling of inadequacy, of inferiority. To conceal, to compensate, to neutralize this depressing feeling, we invent theories, make explanations, justify actions, all of which mentations are but wish-fulfilling phantasies, constructed to escape an unpleasant reality. These fancies are projected into the environment where they accomplish an effective distortion of our vision. These fancies relieve or even exalt us, because they are so peculiarly our own, the creation of our particular need for neutralizing our painful inferiority feeling. Because of the obsessing importance of this emotional disturbance the mystic always tends to exalt the emotions, his own estheticisms, as if thereby to prove his own relative omnipotence and omniscience. In its unconventional and therefore more obvious morbidity we call it esthesio-mania.

Now the mystic earnestly and zealously defends the intellectual product of his compulsion as the voluntary choice of his greatly superior mind. And again, he may claim that the intellectual child of his emotional need was the product of a conscious induction, an imposition of the outer world which was in fact only his phantasmal universe subconsciously created by his own needs. The religious mystic reads the intellectualizations of his autonomic requirements into the heavens, into the mind of a supposed God, the creation of an Omniscience which is only his idealized self. There in the universe he rediscovers his phantasms in terms of his metaphysics.

¹ *The Mystic Way*, p. 97. Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, p. 510.

theologies,² inspired sociologies and ethics. Similarly the secular mystic reads his phantasmal necessities into the more immediate environment, also to be rediscovered and justified, all for the sake of a subconscious necessity. Behind all the zeal and strenuosity in these mystical persons is a feeling of inferiority, sometimes desperately seeking an escape, a neutralizer or compensation; that is something to justify a desired feeling, a pose or an action having at least seeming importance, and so giving some little excuse for a balancing feeling of grandeur. At times this feeling of importance is measurably achieved by a more or less blind emotional attachment to leaders or causes, enabling its victim, through association, to shine by a reflected light. These leaders and causes in turn are given an emotional valuation, or overvaluation, equal to that feeling of inferiority which needs neutralizing. Our heroes and our God, our reforms and our Utopias, our heavens or Nirvanas all shed glory upon us as their discoverers or creators. So we are relieved from our depression by the grandeur that we achieve by our reflected light. Just in proportion to the intensity of the emotional importance that we give to our intellectual projections so to that same degree do we approach the feeling that we are playing the satisfying role of a relative omniscience and omnipotence. As one's feeling of inferiority is great, to the same degree of intensity must one love or hate such dominating personalities as were the Ex-Kaiser or Theodore Roosevelt. According to whether the afflicted persons achieve their emotional grandeur through identifying themselves with such leaders or by opposition to them, the valuation of the leader's achievement or his failure will be emotionally as great. Then our overestimation of such persons of importance will be as great as is the inferiority feeling. So come hyper-patriots and absolutist rebels.

FREETHINKERS AND SUNDAY-SCHOOLS.

How many avowed Freethinkers and Agnostics feel it to be useful to their children and convenient for themselves, to send their children to Sunday-school? One can understand such conduct as being the product of an emotional conflict, one aspect of which is the lingering subconscious influence of unsuspected devotion to ancient or popular superstitions. It means that their skepticism is not due to their having outgrown the religious mode of feeling, or of thinking, but is rather the mere intellectualization of the anti-religious aspect of an emotional conflict, of which a suppressed sympathy with

² See Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*.

religion is the other aspect. The same sort of subconscious emotionalism sometimes makes professed Atheists an easy prey to the propaganda of Spiritualists, Christian Scientists or even the more orthodox mystics and revivalists. Psychologically such a conversion means that such persons are the victims of an emotional conflict concerning religion and in conversion they only accept into consciousness the other aspect of the conflict and intellectualize and perhaps try to rationalize it. They had never outgrown the intellectual methods which are involved in primitive religious modes of behavior. Their emotional aversion to religion expresses one aspect of the disrupted personality. Their inconsistent conduct, or their unexpected conversion to mysticism means only that these persons have been forced to take into consciousness, and to act upon, another aspect of their emotional conflict. Sometimes they will express it by saying that they have really always been this or that but didn't know it. From the standpoint of the psychology of emotional conflicts, they are mentally no different after conversion than they were before conversion. In both conditions their mental processes are functioning on the level of the conflict, and this always means relative intellectual immaturity and inefficiency. It also means that they have been dominated by an emotionalism which compels conformity to mental processes on the level of a relatively childish or adolescent subjectivism, seldom rising higher than to make special pleas for the purpose of rationalizing one or the other aspect of disrupted personality.

SECULAR MYSTICS IN PEACE AND WAR.

In the political field, these secular mystics in their fancies build and contend over Utopias, which are quite often unrelated to the orderly evolution of human society, or to an adequate understanding of the relation and behavior among things and humans. When they achieve an emotional identification with the beneficiaries of things as they are they are compelled to take a relatively static view of society and then to give an extravagant emotional valuation to the established order. Fundamental critics of present forms are vigorously denounced by them and must be severely punished as traitors. In their dreams of perfection they have absolute standards and do not hesitate to act as if without knowing it they were seeking to play the role of omniscience. In these Utopias of their own creation they themselves can reign, either through feeling or phantasies, each by his own particular reform, formula (or even in or

through a glorified existing institution) as an omnipotent being whose legalized fancy determines the destiny of the human race. Without consciousness that it is so, they quite uniformly act as if they were indeed omnipotent and omniscient. In the more developed pathological case they often frankly proclaim their omniscience, or the approximate omnipotence of their pet idea. In the extreme they acquire delusions of being the Kaiser, Czar, Pope, or President.

RULE OR RUIN TEMPERAMENT.

Just to the extent that one is the victim of a feeling of inferiority will he give an exaggerated emotional valuation to whatever theory, or institution it is to which he attaches himself as a means of compensatory exaltation. Thus come our hyper-patriots and our absolutist revolutionaries, as but contrary manifestation of the same subjective conflict.

In the practical affairs of social or political organizations, this urge to act like an omnipotent and omniscient being creates the "rule or ruin" attitude of party leaders, in both Church or State. They must crush at any price, every challenge to their omnipotence and without troubling to take serious thought, whether or not the persecuted one has not some truth on his side. Within the conventional fold, where the disrupted personality is not yet clearly pathological, it is merely a policy of rule or ruin by conventional methods. Against the rival of another nationality or against the social heretic with fundamentally antagonistic social aims, it means dominance by means of physical violence, and for the sake of one's own infallible ideals, or for an absolute social justice. Such omnipotence has not the patience to rely upon the evolutionary potency of its superior intelligence. Thus came the savage repressions by the minions of the late Czar as well as much of the present-day temperamental adherence to the old regime and to its inevitable revolutionary reaction on the same level of emotionalism. If we know no better than to imitate the policy dictated by the late Czar, or by his clique of courtiers, we will inevitably produce the same revolutionary result in these United States. At least, so far human nature is much the same. The forcibly repressed emotions will find an outlet in violent reprisals. With more intelligence we will not repress, but develop them to function on higher levels of desire and of mental processes. Have we achieved that maturity and understanding in ourselves?

LUST FOR MILITARISM.

These secular mystics, madly craving a consciousness of ever greater power, to overcome their morbid fears and feeling of inferiority, are leaders among the would-be war lords of every nation; among their boisterous supporters; among the hyper-patriotic street-corner loafers no less than among hysterical drawing-room parasites. Adherence to one's government from a comparative study of governments, or from any considerable understanding of the relations and behaviors of humans, is foreign to their emotional necessities, and at times is even resented. They can understand only what is on their own emotional borderland plane. Hence they demand only an instinctive patriotism. They even resent a reflective patriotism should they ever become conscious of the contrast. Their emotional conflicts and their attendant psychologic ignorance produce an almost infinite variety of theologies, of political nostrums; of moral creeds; of morbid patriotism; of morbid resistance to progress as well as morbid Utopian schemes of reform. It is the morbid resistance to social evolution toward the progressive democratization of power and welfare that has made inevitable every revolution by violence, and most of the world's inquisitions, persecutions and wars. Finally the practical universality of these mystical modes of feeling and thinking, this temperamental absolutism, combined to bring on a world war, and to make it very generally acceptable.

PROSPECTS OF UNDERSTANDING.

If once we can secure a psychogenetic understanding of the mystical temperament, seeing the determinants in a wide range of time and space, this may furnish us a new and most valuable approach to the solution of all human problems, and especially will it produce a revaluation of popular leaders and their boisterous, dominating temperaments. This I imagine may come from the study of a genetic and evolutionary psychology. When such concepts are applied, as the basic idea of an educational system, its demand of educators will require and enable them to mature the desires and mental processes of humans so as to eliminate at least the extreme of emotional interest in both religious and secular mysticisms. Most important of the consequences of such understanding is that it will enable us to overcome our present emotional valuations and so open our minds to a more objective understanding and rating of humans and their ways.

This means that through the maturing of human desires and mental processes will come the approximate emancipation of the race from fear, from emotional valuation of things as they are, and so from the predominance of subjectively and subconsciously conditioned compulsions which are the most potent forces leading to all slavery, exploitations and conflicts of force whether ecclesiastical, political or economic. So also will come the elimination of both love and hate (that is the emotionalism) which makes for cruelty (sado-masochist conflicts) as manifested in ordinary social relations, in reformatories, jails, governmental and military establishments.

RELIGION TO MENTAL MATURITY.

Just as a world war and its crude aftermath are the most conspicuous example of secular mysticism, the product of infantilism in action, so all religion and theologies may yet come to be viewed collectively as the most conspicuous concurrent exemplification of infantilism in the domain of thought. For the mystic, even the "sane mystic," my type of mind seems "strangely perverted." Yet I am inviting the race to become even more "strangely perverted" than I have been able to become, so that we can pursue all our studies with a much higher degree of emotional aloofness, and achieve a corresponding enlargement of our understanding of the relations and behavior of things. This understanding, ever in the process of perfecting, will then become a more useful guide to human action than religious, moral or political creeds. These creeds and their elaborate rationalizations are mainly the predetermined product of those same immature impulses (desires) which brought upon us the world-wide slaughter, and are now preparing the field for another such slaughter in an impending world-wide war of economic classes. All this is because our feelings (as in the case of religion) determine our thinking, with a minimum coordination of any understanding of the relation and behavior among things and humans. When we reach a greater psychic maturity this relationship or emphasis may appear to be reversed. Since religious activities furnish the oldest and best organized defense of this archaic mode of feeling and of thinking, it becomes the most important center for its study and for achieving that understanding by which it is to be outgrown. The object to be attained by this is the outgrowing of mystical modes of behavior, especially in the field of the social sciences. Here the difficulty is the greatest, because we habitually overlook the contributing factor from within our-

selves, which can be adequately achieved only by developing the psychological approach to social problems.

THE FUTURE.

Once having achieved an evolutionary standard of the psyche, we also have a standard for the more conscious and more accurate rating of workers in the social sciences. The secular mystic, like his religious prototype, may now be more readily and more accurately distinguished and corrected. Once this concept is adequately developed it must also influence our ideas of education. Now our differences in religious and secular activities, in war and peace as well as the disputes between laborers and their exploiters, are all seen as but the objectivization of differences of desire and of mental processes, operating with or without an adequate coordination of objective data. From this view point our educational methods will put some real emphasis upon reconditioning the desires and mental processes of humanity. Perhaps when these desires and mental processes attain a greater and more uniform maturity, our social problems can be solved by other methods than those of the legislative mystic. In the main the secular mystic is merely reformulating religious morals and demanding a devotional obedience to his personal law and order, subserving his interests as conceived on the level of some infantile desires. So also may we outgrow the judicial mystic enforcing law and order according to his sadistic impulses; and the economic despots dominating a nation by the spontaneous interaction and blind unconscious co-operation of the victims of a morbid fear-psychology; a world war precipitated by the necessities of a subconscious sado-masochist conflict in and among national leaders; wars that are welcomed by a world floundering in similar emotionalism, and therefore (no matter how unconsciously) ever ready and eager for an excuse to release an intolerable quantity of repressed emotion, repressed only because of our general ignorance of emotional behavior and our consequent superstitious reverence for the intellectualized and rationalized ignorance of religionists, moralists, sentimentalists and secular mystics generally.

THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION OF JULY 31, 1919.

BY EMIL REACH.

I.

WHAT is the political temper and spirit in which the new Germany is laboriously struggling to rise out of the depth of her present misery? How far has the breath of the new time touched her? In what respect does she turn over a new leaf? The question is full of psychologic interest and political significance: especially as we are aware that former pillars of the Kaiser's régime, men like Bernstorff or Ludendorff, are still prominent in the social and political life of Berlin, and that great German newspapers have seriously discussed the possible candidacy of Hindenburg for the presidency of the republic. Therefore—if for no other reasons—is it logical and profitable to delve into the mazes of the German Constitution, the most notable document that the after-war time has produced east of the Rhine.

The official text, as lying before me, is published as a pamphlet of forty-seven pages. The moment we open it we are struck by the import of the second article; the more so, because the first one—a proclamation of the republican form of government—consists of only twelve words. According to this second article the German Republic can legally extend her boundaries only if the population of the territory that is to be added so desires. Express reference is made to the right of self-determination. Evidently the Germans esteem highly at least one of Mr. Wilson's ill-fated Fourteen Points; and while opinions may differ as to whether that article evinces sound statesmanship, no one will deny that the average American citizen has expected nothing of the kind to come forth from the National Assembly in Weimar.

In addition to the desire of those who inhabit a territory the incorporation of which may be intended, changes of boundaries (barring frontier rectifications in uninhabited tracts of land) require

the passage of a special law (Article 78); and this brings us at once to a consideration of the legislative machinery as now existing in the German Republic.

The "Reichstag," which we must not confound with the "Reichsrat," is still the country's legislature. It consists of representatives of the people, whom the male and female citizens over twenty years of age have elected for four years (Articles 22 and 23). Generally speaking, "the laws of the realm are decided upon by the Reichstag" (Article 68), and no express concurrence of a council or an upper chamber is thereby required. Nevertheless the elected legislators are not always to have their sweet will. For article seventy-three prescribes:

"A law passed by the Reichstag must be referred before its proclamation for final decision to the people, if the President of the Republic so decrees within a month.

"A law whose proclamation is deferred at the request of at least one third of the Reichstag must be submitted to the people for final decision if one twentieth of the qualified voters make such proposal.

"A decision by the people shall further be resorted to if one tenth of the qualified voters have expressed the desire that a certain project of law be submitted for enactment. A fully elaborated bill must be the basis of such desire. The Government must lay this bill before the Reichstag and explain its own stand regarding it. The decision by the people shall not take place, if the desired bill is accepted by the Reichstag without alteration.

"Concerning the budget, tax laws, or salary regulations only the President of the Republic may ask for a decision by the people."

Furthermore, the Reichsrat (literally translated: Council of the Realm) has the right to protest against any law the Reichstag may pass. If such protest takes place, the law returns to the Reichstag for reconsideration. Should nevertheless no agreement be reached between the two bodies, then the President of the Republic may within three months refer the disputed points to the people for final decision. In case the President fails to make use of this prerogative, then the law is considered as *not* decided upon, unless the vote in the Reichstag against the protest of the Rat has revealed a two-thirds majority: when the majority was so great, then the President must proclaim the law within three months, or else have recourse to a plebiscite (Article 74).

In this connection we should not overlook that the power of the people to annul a decision of the national legislature does exist

only under the condition that a majority of those who have a right to cast their vote in the plebiscite actually make use of that right (Article 75).

The whole scheme is no doubt a little complicated; but it is a serious attempt to attain the best laws possible, even where opinions conflict and are difficult to reconcile.

The Reichstag does not only legislate. It may also depose the Chancellor or the ministers through an expression of lack of confidence; or if one of these should break the law of the country, the legislature may initiate impeachment proceedings against him. Even the President of the Republic may thus be impeached, and while the Reichstag cannot depose him, it may make his deposition subject matter of a plebiscite. To express lack of confidence in the government or a member of the government, a majority vote is considered sufficient. However, when bills of impeachment are in question, or the removal of the President from office, then the decisions of the Reichstag require a two-third majority (Articles 43, 54 and 59). Thus while the Reichstag still holds in its grip the pursestrings of the country, as it did (together with the Federal Council) in the times before the war, it does not need now to go to the length of refusing necessary funds in order to make its will prevail over any views within the executive branch of government.

The "Independent Socialists" have already attempted to oust the cabinet through a motion to express lack of confidence into the government. But on the 3d of July this motion was lost: there were only 64 ayes out of 379 votes.

Now how about the *Reichsrat*? This term was before the war the name for that elected legislature of *Austria* which there roughly corresponded to the Reichstag of the German Empire. But in the new German constitution "*Reichsrat*" designates a body of councilors that may be considered a successor to the former *Bundesrat* or Federal Council. In this Council, as now constituted, every one of the several States composing the Republic has at least one vote, while no State is allowed more than two fifths of all votes (Article 61); and there is a movement on foot to equalize approximately the size of the States, and consequently their representation in the *Reichsrat*. We should not overlook the fact that the members of this body are not elected by the people. They are sent by the State governments or (in the case of Prussia) in part by Provincial Administrations (Article 63) to represent them in the *administration* of the realm or *Reich* (Article 60), and at the same time to supervise *legislation* in the indicated way.

The President of the Republic is elected by popular vote (Article 41) for seven years (Article 43), and keeping in close touch with Reichstag and Reichsrat and the President, have the Chancellor and the ministers to pursue their difficult duties. As their tenure of office depends no less on the pleasure of the Chief Executive by whom they have been nominated (Article 53), than on the confidence of the Reichstag, it is easy to see the stage set for grave moments; for it is always hard to serve more than one master. But, of course, other countries are also subject more or less to serious governmental crises. The French Republic especially is known for her governmental instability.

Stability is also largely a question of leadership. Will the new Germany produce in time forceful and clear-sighted leadership—a leadership that will prevent waste of energy and possible disruption of the complex organism? Only strict economy of political energy will yield prompt spiritual and material recovery from the consequences of the war tragedy and achieve that salvation for which the masses cry from out their wretchedness.

II.

In that part of the Constitution devoted to education it is expressly stated that the schools should strive to develop the character of the pupils in the spirit of the German nation (*Volkstum*) and of international conciliation, and that care should be taken by the instructors not to hurt the sentiments of those who differ in opinion. Religious instruction is to be given under avoidance of official compulsion for either teachers or pupils, though the latter shall have to heed in this respect the decision of their parents or guardians; furthermore, at the end of his period of obligatory school attendance each pupil shall receive a printed copy of the country's constitution (Articles 148 and 149).

The last named of these provisions seems to have for purpose the attainment of so general a familiarity of the common people with the new constitution, as to make rare the violation of its terms. And the masses of course show always the greatest interest in the discussion of the political position of each individual citizen. Beside the usual guarantees relative to freedom of movement, speech, press, and assembly (Articles 111, 118 and 123), we find it laid down, for example, as a principle that the political rights and duties shall be the same for men and for women (Article 109).

There is also a passage (Article 113) for the special benefit of the non-German citizens; this article decrees that "those elements

of the people who speak a foreign language must not be impeded through legislation or administration in their free ethnical development, especially not as to use of their mother tongue in instruction, or such use in the internal administration, or in the dispensation of justice." And beside the ethnical diversity is also the people's division in social classes made an object of special mention and regard. The economically independent middle class in agriculture, industry and trade is to be assisted through legislation and in administration and "is to be protected against becoming overburdened or absorbed" (Article 164); while wage labor is put "under special protection" of the "Reich" or realm. (Article 157—Here as in many other cases the constitution does not speak of the "government," thus giving directness to the role of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat.)

It need hardly be mentioned in passing that in strong contrast to this recognition of classes and class interests are the principles of our two leading parties. Senator Harding, in his speech accepting the Republican nomination, exclaimed:

"The manifest weakness in popular government lies in the temptation to appeal to grouped citizenship for political advantage. There is no greater peril. The Constitution contemplates no class and recognizes no group. It broadly includes all the people, with specific recognition for none, and the highest consecration we can make to-day is a committal of the Republican party to that saving constitutionalism which contemplates all America as one people and holds just government free from influence on the one hand and unmoved by intimidation on the other."

True enough, our constitution knows no social classes; but they exist in fact just the same, however vague and indistinct and smudgy here or there may be the boundary lines between them. Whether or not it is best to mould the basic law of a country in the manner that gives so much satisfaction to Mr. Harding (and presumably also to Mr. Cox), whether close cooperation of all can thus be reached most safely, that is a question which the future will decide in the light of such legislative experiments as, for example, that of Germany.

But let us consider the German experiment. Before showing how over there the protection promised to the laboring class is to be carried out, we may record some blows dealt in the face of the capitalist. Namely, Article 155 of the constitution decrees the abolition of the entailed estates and makes it the duty of every landowner to work and exploit his property; it subjects the sources of exploitable power in nature and the treasures of the soil to

supervision by the state, and determines in addition to all this that "*any increase of land value, arising without investment of labor or capital, must be used in the interest of the public.*" Surely, it's a pity that Henry George is no longer among us to comment on these innovations.

Immediately thereafter (Article 156) we learn that the Reich, wherever public interest is involved, has the right of "socialization," that is to say, the right to transfer by way of legislation economic property from private to public or semi-public ownership and control. The Reich may also in case of pressing necessity decree the consolidation of certain economic enterprises or organizations for the purpose of common management on the principle of self-government, insuring all producing elements (i. e., employers and employees) participation in such management.

Much will depend on it what use the legislature and the government are going to make of these rights. Extent and detail will be closely watched by economic and political experts the world over. So far, according to press dispatches, special committees have been constituted to delve into the preparatory work for the socialization of the following industries: coal, iron, potassium, power production and building trades. But that is held to be merely the beginning of the reformation.

By the way we may perhaps point out that we have here to deal with a topic in which the American Federation of Labor has manifested intense interest. After long and animated debate the Montreal convention of last June passed a resolution in favor of state ownership and democratic management of railways. The division took place in an uproarious tumult and revealed 29,059 against 8349. Frank Morrison led the forces of the majority, while Gompers was in opposition.

To protect labor the constitution prescribes furthermore that every German should be given opportunity to work, and that in so far as that is not possible "his necessary support shall be taken care of" in a way to be defined by law (Article 163). This is an attempt to counteract an evil on which a certain I. W. W. agitator has dwelled as follows:

"If through an improved process, the use of a better machine, or overproduction, his (i. e., the wage earner's) services are no longer needed, he may be discharged; and if he can find no other master before his slender savings are exhausted, he should starve in silence and die with the dignity befitting his high estate as a free man."

A counterpart to the poor chap who would like to work but can find no job is the striker. What does the German constitution say about the right to strike? We meet here with the distinction between moral and legal duty. Morally every German has "without prejudice to his personal liberty" the duty to use his intellectual and physical strength in the interest of public welfare (Article 163); but "legal compulsion is only admissible to enforce endangered rights or to serve surpassing exigencies of the public weal" (Article 151). The text of these stipulations leaves a good deal to later interpretation by the government and the courts of justice. They read much like platform planks proclaimed by our National Conventions.

One of the most notable and novel features of the constitution is doubtless the long article 165, devoted to those Industrial Councils which are to supplement the Governmental care for the laboring classes. Within certain limits these Councils may be compared with certain industrial councils sporadically existing in our country. The article is difficult to epitomize or to translate. It may perhaps be rendered as follows:

"The workingmen and employees are called upon to take part with equal rights and in cooperation with the employers in the regulation of wages and working conditions, as well as in the whole economic development of the productive forces. The organizations of both sides and their agreements are given recognition.

"For the protection of their social and economic interests the workingmen and employees shall receive legal representation in Workers' Trade Councils as well as in Workers' District Councils (which latter shall be organized according to economic districts) and in a National Workers' Council.

"The Workers' District Councils and the National Workers' Council shall meet with representatives of the employers or otherwise interested groups in District Economic Councils and a National Economic Council, in order to discharge all economic tasks and to cooperate in the execution of the laws relative to socialization. The District Economic Council and the National Economic Council are to be formed so as to provide for representation therein of all important professional interests, according to their economic or social importance."

Then follows a paragraph explaining how the National Economic Council may influence economic legislation, after which the article continues:

"The Workers' Councils and the Economic Councils may have

conferred upon them the powers of control and administration in the fields assigned to them. Organization and task of the Workers' Councils and of the Economic Councils, as well as their relationship to other self-governing social bodies shall be exclusively within the competency of the 'Reich.'"

Evidently the makers of this constitution were anxious to prevent dictatorship or anything approaching dictatorship on the part of any class or clique whatsoever. The spirit of compromise and tolerance in which this work has been conceived will prevent oppression of those factions who are not in power; but if this spirit is carried too far—perhaps it has not been carried too far—it will deprive the government of strength and stability. We have touched already above upon this danger of instability.

In conclusion a word of warning. While the modernization of Germany should be for us an object of greatest interest, we should at the same time, not overlook that political institutions can not always be transplanted from one continent to another with impunity. The frequent appeal to the masses, and the power increase of the wage earner will possibly be good for Germany. We do not know yet. But if we should indulge in a hurry—attempt to follow suit, what undesirable influence would then be vested in the illiterate negro of our South and in other illiterates that unfortunately exist within our boundaries? We may grant that the votes of the Southern negroes are never counted: *yet sooner or later they will be counted to the deep regret of many white minorities who do not and will not want to submit to superior numbers.* Is it not so?

Therefore, whatever importance may be justly ascribed to Germany's nation-wide plebiscites or to her ubiquitous Workers' Councils, let us proceed only slowly and gradually and cautiously with any attempt to amend the constitution of these United States.

THE NEW MYSTICISM.

BY GUY BOGART.

"An American correspondent going home from the field in Europe 'the long way around,' met an old Persian Master on the road to Damascus. With the sage was his nearest disciple, also a Persian; in fact the young man was so loved that he had been changed from discipleship to sonship. This young Persian became very devoted to the American. They stood together for a moment in silence, when the time for parting came. The old Master drew near and said:

"It is good to see you place your hands together. To me it is a symbol of the marriage of the East and the West, for the East and West must mate. Long ago the East went up to God and the West went down to men. The East has learned Vision and the West has learned Action. These two must meet and mate again for the glory of God and the splendor of earth. The East has lifted its soul to the hills and held fast to its memory of the Father's House. The West has descended into the folds of the valley, and won from agony and isolation its efficacy in material things. And now the mystic is looking down and the materialist is looking up. Soon their hands shall join—like your two hands in mine—and there shall be great joy in the Father's House."

—Will Levington Comfort in *The Hive*.

"'Tis a mystery why the mist wraiths
Veil vistaed views, sometimes,
Or moods send heart mad discords
Athwart bell clarioned chimes.

"But mists must melt with magic
Of sun-glad, gleaming light,
And rudest noise yield music,
To hearts, low-tuned aright."

—Dr. G. Henri Bogart.

In spite of the old truism that there is nothing new under the sun, we hear much of the new world, the new race, the new state—

everything new. Truth is eternal, without beginning or ending, but its rephrasing in the light of changing human understanding is essential. And so the new mysticism.

If new 'tis news,
'Tis news to the pews,
But to him who hews
And to you if you choose
'Tis easy to use.

New? Yes, to those of the office and shop and mill. To most of those who tread the great highway of life engrossed in business this new mysticism (or the old mysticism) is the "unknown God" to which they are unconsciously turning in yearning worship. The spiral cycles the races have progressed have included much that is seemingly lost, and we need not worry about what has gone before in the world. There are needs to be met to-day, and there is material to meet these needs. The means of bridging the gap is the new element.

There are ever hunger cries in the cities, and grains and fruits on the distant farms. Transportation is the connecting link. There is a need (or a supposed need) for coin and jewels; while distant lands are rich in minerals and gems. Commercialism and the spirit of adventure satisfy the cravings of those in the crowded centers for the baubles and the necessities alike.

There is, moreover, a spiritual hunger for something more satisfying than has been taught to the majority of the race in the name of religions during the past thousands of years. But there is never a human need without a source of supply. The mountains and high plateaus of the world hold something more precious than gold and gems. There is the spiritual food for lack of which the world is starving.

The "new" element in mysticism is to transfer this mountain-top understanding to the plains. We would not transport a gold mine to New York City, nor would we take the ancient wisdom to all humanity. But there is much of occult knowledge for which the masses are prepared and the new mysticism would carry these facts to all who are crying for them.

There will be new foods in this spiritual diet which even those who hunger for will not at first like. Those whose systems are deranged by years of unnatural foods do not take kindly to wholesome food of a physical nature. The children of the dead end when brought into the school restaurants have so long fed on pickles that

bread or milk throws them into violent sickness. No more will those, in many cases, long accustomed to the spiritual malnourished adulterations, be able to assimilate a full spiritual diet without difficulty. But the starving souls will accept the new food because they realize instinctively that it is the source of renewed life and strength.

The world is bankrupt and civilization ready for the scrapheap. From the ruins comes the bright flower of mysticism, which has blossomed thru all the ages, but found scant place for development in western materialism. Now that this western materialism has fallen, drenched in blood, amid the din of cannon; and the golden dream of money kings has turned to the nightmare of disillusionment, the lovely flower of mysticism springs up to cover the ugly scar that civilization has left upon the body of nature. From the mountain plateaus and sheltered ravines the seeds of truth are finding lodgement in the plains and valleys long usurped by the ranker growth of commercialism.

Scoffers there will yet be, though the world in general is turning to an acceptance of some of the demonstrated truths of mysticism. The many will not penetrate to the esoteric understanding of life. The brightness of that light is not for them—that is perhaps the task of some far-distant future "new mysticism." The rays from the light, however, travel far and in the faintest glow there is healing power and comforting assurance.

"Prove these things" is the constant challenge of the world. My answer is "live them." The world says, "we do not believe in metaphysics." Neither do I, and the new mysticism has nothing to do with any such philosophy. Mysticism is the safe course between the Scylla of materialism and the Charybdis of metaphysics. We learn not to become extremists in either direction. A balancing of Eastern mysticism and of Western commercialism and materialism is the heart of the new spiritual urge.

The new mysticism is not found in a life lived apart from our fellows, but by alternating mountain-top meditations and quick-throbbing man-to-man contact on the highways of life and in the market place.

We read much of the life hid with Christ in God. That does not mean a hiding of the body. Many of the early and middle age Christians hid away from the populace as hermits or in monasteries. They did much good—and much harm—for themselves. They accomplished deeds of worth for the world, there can be no question of that. Other religions, too, have sent their votaries into seclusion

and separation. For the masses—for people like you and me—neither society nor the individual needs such a hiding from the world to-day (if they ever did, but there is no use bothering about the past.)

Here I may remark that the Masters know their own work best and it is probably well in exceptional cases, for special purposes, to take an individual or group of individuals apart from the general populace and separate them for rigid preparation in mystic service. We need not enter this phase of mysticism. My message is for a popular presentation of some of the most elementary questions and for a harmonizing of all the various elements, spiritual, economic and otherwise, for a unified meeting of the challenge of life. The new mysticism deals with spiritual discernment of the people.

"Hid with Christ," to return to the topic. But Christ lived among the men of the street: it was they who needed his message, then as now. He fasted alone in the wilderness and took his select chelas to the Mount of the Sermon; He agonized alone in the Garden—but He died between two thieves from the proletariat and was wept over by a redeemed woman from the street. "Hid with Christ" means hidden from the miasma of fear—and hundreds of other meanings as well. If we would be hid with Christ (and of course I mean the mystic Christ) we will find Him revealed in ourselves, the final realization when we are in very truth Christ-principle. This standard is lived in the temple, on the street corner, wherever social life throws men and women into common haunts.

I may well pause just a moment to explain the meanings of the mystic Christ. Many volumes may be found for those further interested in the subject. From a little volume (*Gems of Mysticism*) I select these explanatory paragraphs:

"The mystic Christ is not a personality, but a Divine Essence. It is a spiritual emanation from the Godhead, the Son of God or the Godhead in its creative aspect: that Mystic Power or Principle which fructifies and animates all manifestations of life. It is the Divine Creative Force, a great stream of life-giving, creative essence which manifests in all things on all planes as the animating Principle of the One Life.

"The Christ-force, therefore, is the animating Power back of all life and evolution—physical, mental, psychic, spiritual. In Nature it is the unquenchable urge toward perfection which adapts the organism to its environment. Among men it is the divine urge

toward union with God: the effort to 'bring the divine within them into harmony with the divine in the universe.'"

We must distinguish clearly between the Christprinciple and the personality of the man Jesus "who manifested an individualization of this force to a superlative degree."

My own search in this life-span began with early recollections back to about my sixth year. The thirty years since that time have enabled me just to begin to get my feet fairly well on the outer path across which play the shadowy reflections of the light ahead. I am rushing to the world from year to year with my partly-understood realization, like the apostle who rushed from the presence of the Master to seek his brother with the glad cry, "I have found the Christ."

In school, college, pulpit, factory and mill, directing construction gangs, in offices, and in the soul-exhausting grind of the newspaper game my soul growth has been among men. But there have been many rebellious moments when I have turned my back on my mission to the world and have pined with a terrible longing to quit and just "enjoy" a life of seeking apart from men, in some secluded corner of the earth. But all the while, even as I yearned to get away from the mad rush—to live more or less the life of a recluse, to hide within the cloister—as I have hungered for the quiet of the temple cell as in past lives—still, something within has urged me ever to the heart of action, to taking up the banner for the under dog, to bear aloft the torch of light as I understood it. All this, because the urge of the new mysticism was the driving power of my life from infancy, even though not at first understood.

Much time was spent in chasing will-o'-the-wisps of organizations which I pointed out to my audiences by oration and pen as the light of the world. But all the while the real light kept shining in my soul, even as it is in your own. Finally, I looked within and found the way led from within outward. Gradually my desire to leave the busy marts of trade became less urgent. They have not died out—there are too many reincarnations of the temple behind me. I still love the meditations of the study and the forest, but my social consciousness drives me relentlessly into the thick of the battle.

The same urge led me to seek a far goal as a propagandist of all beauty, to coordinate the best in all groups of seekers: not to unite them in organization but in purpose and tolerance—to be an inter-group messenger. In the years that I have been giving this service, the light has broken more and more clearly for me. Teachers

have come into my life and guided me along the way. So, some day soon will come to the race the Master.

He comes!
 The Master, to redeem the world.
 Long ages have we waited for his coming,
 Weary centuries of warfare and strife;
 But mankind was not ready for the coming
 Of the new Master
 Until, purged by bloodshed and weakness,
 The vaunted institutions and learning
 Have demonstrated the limitation of things material.
 Now is man ready to turn once again
 A yearning heart to God.
 My ego hath worked through karma
 Until, purged, the light breaks forth anew
 Upon my inner mind.
 I see myself in priestly robes
 And dimly sense the other days
 When in temple service my lives were spent.
 Memories of those incarnations broke upon my childhood
 And sanctified my early years.
 To the priesthood of orthodoxy was I called,
 Only to find how through organization
 And alliance with worldly forces of greed and exploitation
 The church had failed of Christ's great mission.
 Sadly I turned from the altar, abandoning the pulpit.
 In mazes of materialism I sought solace
 And satisfaction where these were not.
 The lesson learned, inward turned my search.
 Through mysticism learned I the pathway rare
 And discovered my true mission of service.
 A propagandist I became of everything Beautiful,
 For beauty is of God;
 And lo! I found naught but beauty in the universe
 Albeit hidden oft by man's wrong thoughts,
 And love of power and profits.
 In California's sunny land,
 Cradle of the new race,
 I found souls with whom my comrade wife and I
 In other lives had served.
 Here we work and wait together
 For the coming of the Master,
 Humanity's greatest teacher of all the ages,
 Who alone has power and wisdom
 To guide the race
 Into the glories of the New World.

Perhaps there are some who will still find their mission in the seclusion of meditation apart from their fellows. For these I have

no word of censure. The ways to Attainment are many. I do think, however, that for far the greater majority the life of balanced meditation and action is the course that will bring realization. Most of us lack the opportunity to live our lives otherwise, no matter how urgent the appeal; and it is well that it is so, in so far as we are compelled to work out our adjustment on the natural plane of fellowship.

Often I seek what I have called my council tree. It is a big eucalyptus, close to a busy switching yard of the largest western railroad, with one of Southern California's main highways also close at hand—switch engines, through trains, street cars, hundreds of automobiles, the busy march of crowds on the sidewalk. I shut my eyes and the hum blends into the sound of a mighty waterfall. But no difference—waterfall or the hum of traffic—both are manifestations of God working through varying instrumentalities and are equally beautiful to me. Here I can meditate for a moment—seldom more than five or ten minutes—but how frequently the mountain-top experience of the day has here taken place, giving courage and strength for the rough places of the day's journey.

It was under my council tree, as I sat before coming to my study as I write to-day on this chapter, that my brother Karl came to me from the spirit world with the following message:

"Do you want my opinion as a dweller in the spirit world about your new mysticism? It is just this—that you keep your writing in the elementary stages, for the time being at any rate, I understand perfectly well that you see beyond the primary steps and it is good of you to turn back to adapt your knowledge to the masses of people who haven't considered this matter seriously.

"The mysticism which will help the world the most is that which gets the attention of the general run of humanity. Even I, who have been eighteen years in spirit land know next to nothing about the bigger aspects of mysticism. But there is much of advantageous nature in the elementary steps of occultism that a quickening of thought along that line will develop many for the farther reaches of mysticism.

"The new mysticism will reach far into the deeper realms of spiritual adventure; it will also travel much the simpler highways of ordinary living. Help the boys over here by awakening their parents and friends. Interworld communication is such a simple link in the bigger plans of mysticism as you understand it—but as one who is working hard to help in simple ways, I plead with you to go into the market places and shout the message that the dead

are yet living. I am active—just came from my flower-garden to hold this talk with you. (Can't you smell the exquisite odors of our flowers?)

"That is all the plea I wanted to make, Guy. The new mysticism must not neglect the millions who came over here recently through war and disease."

I am not calling upon you to come out of your religions—just read a little more into them. You can function anywhere if you learn the meaning of the new mysticism. Let us get this matter straight. Let society serve the individual. Don't bow to symbols. The old Atlanteans and the more modern Zoroastrians did not worship the sun; the Catholic does not worship the images of his shrines; Christians do not worship the cross; Buddhists do not worship the images of Buddha. All are but symbols of the God-idea variously expressed. The symbol matters not as long as you understand the Christ-principle back of all signs. Awaken, beloved. The State and every other social organism should serve the individual. Seldom has there flourished an institution dedicated to the use of the individual; yet such is the demand of the new mysticism. Social life must cease to be the crushing progression of the Juggernaut.

True it is that the best of each individual must be given to the service of the social body. Only in and through brotherhood can the soul progress. The individual man or woman, however, has the same right as the collectivity to demand justice.

The collectivity must exist primarily for the greatest good of the individual, while the individual must give his all for the collectivity. Socialized structures are you and me and the other fellow. True, we, in our group-relationship give rise to the group-soul; still there is no call for a surrender of our individuality in this you-me-him combination.

Individualism, by no means; individuality, yes.

Institutionalism, never; free cooperation, always.

Only on a basis of mystic understanding is it possible to work out the balance between the individual and society. A blending of the factors such as is needed can never come from the materialistic plane.

Another thought—this individual I have spoken of—this man-being—is himself a highly organized society; coordinating and co-operating societies and colonies balanced and adjusted into a harmonious whole (when we permit them to function). I am the State; I am the God; I am the Group-soul of millions of soul-entities.

I do not pretend to understand it all, the origin and the goal; but I am thoroughly aware of the fact that my ego is responsible for the well-being of these individual cell-citizens that compose my various bodies—physical, astral, mental. They live for me; no less must I live for them. Perhaps when I have learned more closely the relation between me and myself in my bodies I shall know more how to deal with me and myself in the broader social expression of myself.

Is prohibition a social question? Then solve the social-prohibition problem of your own little soul-kingdom. Feed your cells pure, nourishing foods. If your breath is foul from improper food, and the State is composed of millions like you, do you expect sweet incense to arise from your collectivity? If your cell-collectivities are vibrating on a low plane, do you expect the nation-collectivity to function on a high plane?

Solve the problems at home while solving the broader problems within the nations. Both are one—there is only one Life in the universe, of which the you-me-him are manifestations of the great I Am That I Am. So simple is the root-study of the new mysticism.

Of ultimate and infinite and eternal I do not know; I speak of the God my consciousness has thus far evolved to. Of these I shall have more to say in another place. Their "solution" is not a part of the primary stages at least of the New Mysticism. We can develop to an unbelievable height by assimilating the relative truth of the present dispensation. Do not worry about the other fellow's conception of these fundamental guesses. A reverent conception of the workings of the Life-Force will be all that is required. I wear a silver ring hammered out by hand by some Indian and bearing his tribal insignia of the Great Spirit. They meant God to him; and they mean God to me; what matter if the God appears to us in different forms? That Indian and I are one in our search. The new mysticism recognized only the search and is never critical. "Narrow is the way" and if you pass through it will be without any tenets and creeds and minus your beloved organizations. These are all right as crutches and helps at certain stages, but you will find none of them on The Way.

Make clear the truth as you see it, for thereby will greater light shine through you. Awaken to the possibilities of each hour. Presume not to know the infinite, but do not refrain from investigations whose ultimate goal is infinity. The only point to be remembered while seeking the infinite is that religion is meant to be lived on earth. It is all very beautiful to live in the clouds—but

I doubt if it is more helpful either to the individual or to the world than the life of the gross materialist.

Idealism hitched to the world's plow is what is needed. Emerson advised us to hitch our wagon to a star. Perhaps it amounts to the same thing in the long run, but I prefer the emphasis on the earth work to be accomplished. The leaven of mysticism won't help much if kept on a shelf. It has to get mixed with the dough to perform its work—and it is surprising what an amount of work a little leaven can accomplish.

We must not confuse mysticism with mystery. Mysticism will clear away mystery. To understand the two most revolutionary figures in American literature (for the viewpoint of giving a new form and content in their message, the one particularly to the grown-aways, and the other primarily to the children)—I refer to Walt Whitman and L. Frank Baum—one must read them with the mystic concept in mind. The mystic sees the hidden meaning of all acts—for mysticism is above all else teleological. There is no room for chance in the concept of mysticism, though you may gain much good from the teachings of mysticism even though agnostic on the question of a first cause. My own soul prefers to recognize the heavenly in the simplest acts, and I do not think there are any complexities in life. I like to think of every act as linked in the One infinite tune, as in my

VOICES FROM THE SHOWER.

(A Little Song for Lucy.)

She was lulled to sleep by the shower,
 And awoke at the midnight hour.
 Raindrops fell softly,
 While a little bird in sheltered nook
 Sang cheerily in the darkness of the storm,
 Prelude to heavenly music.
 Again she dozed, as astral concert
 Uplifted her soul.
 She awoke in the morn
 And her light within dispelled the lingering clouds of the storm.
 A peach bud had emerged from the flowers at her window,
 And the barren fig limbs green-budded into resurrection,
 While the music of infinite voices
 In harmonies exquisite
 Kept tune with her heart.

To summarize, the New Mysticism is not new except to those who have failed to look to the God within. It is a call to the ideal-

ism of the race, to a living of the Utopias of which men have dreamed, to the actualization of comradeship, to the realization of brotherhood. It is tolerant always and dogmatic never. It is God-in-action—your own God, whatever that conception may be. It is the basis of the cooperative commonwealth of humanity—a blending of the economics, idealism and health-seeking of the races—an understanding and living of truths we have long thought were only for sermon-texts, the harnessing of occult forces to our lives and the knowledge that occultism is only science older grown.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE WANDERLURE.

BY LOUISE MALLINCKRODT KUEFFNER.

O for the aches and joys of the wanderlure!

A law is held deep in the core of things
That the "God" would be "I," that the "I" would be "God";
That all things urge and flow and seek,
That the world evolves to greater and greater growths.

The birds and the streams and the tireless wind—
They are wanderers all.
I hail the buoyancy, strength, and joy of these wandering things.
I too am of you, and drink the rich red wine in your love.

All things lift wings for the heaven-blue faraway,
Where dwell the Ideal, and bliss, and love, and "God"—
But man, strayed stranger, with eyelight blurred, too often lifts but
listless uncertain wings—

O Heart, rekindle the Light that we lost as we grew to be Man!
Help us to find—Self's vision—the kingdom within—
So may we find the homeward way and the far homestrand we have
left!

Ah, blame men not, that, yielding to the homewoe's ceaseless urge,
They yearn from land to land, from fruit to fruit,
Seeking ever the golden shores of desire;
For the lore which they learn: that no fruit can fill—
Is proof of our birth as the sons of infinite God.

And some of us feel the urge as a vague unrest in the marrow and
blood,
And follow the thousand voices of flowers and birds and streams and
men,
(And oh, they are fair)—
Now hither, now thither, and live the vagabond's restless life.

And some of us give the seeking a shape.
As gold or fame, as wife and home and child, as life's labor loved, as
the Grail's red heart;

And anon, grown weary of change, or the stranger's cool or bland or
bitter words,
Hearing the still insistent voice of mere four walls and soil become
dear.

Feeling the pull of yearning roots scant-earthed,
We long for rest—ah rest—and think we have found what we sought—
(But deep deep in the soul the urge still lives).

Ah, let not me ever be fain to lie still and dream the dream of the
lotus-land;

Nor, though I live not the vagabond's careless fevered life,
Let me ever forego the joys of the wanderlure!

Through all life let me be the Wanderer still, and follow the soul's
faint gleam to the end;

Through all life let me keep my faith

In the deep blue distances of dreams and desires and beauties not
known, and the old old trail of the homeward quest!


A Wanderer? Yes; and yet,

With the great Form of the Whole close-clasped in my heart,

Let me feel at every moment, too, God's breath the One and the All,

The great world-breath in which is held all time and space,

And in which the wanderlure is at rest.



ERNST HAECKEL.
Etching by Karl Bauer.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE LEAR-TRAGEDY OF ERNST HAECKEL.

BY HERMAN GEORGE SCHEFFAUER.

"Huxley once said of me, that I was the Bismarck of zoölogy. I do not know if that be true. But if I am to have the honor of being compared to that great man, it must follow as a natural consequence in my destiny that I too am to be deposed in my old age from my place in the foundation that I have created."

Ernst Haeckel, on Jan. 21, 1910.

ERNST Haeckel, the last of the great Darwinians, died on August ninth, 1919. During the days and the weeks following, solemn memorial services took place in halls, schools and groves in Germany. Goethe's invocation to *Gott-Natur* rolled forth in measured recitative. Requiems were played and chorals were sung. Altars to the immortality of his labors arose, decked in green and black. The benign face of the sage, snow-white of hair and beard, gazed down from countless walls and tribunes upon the throngs that came to do him the last honors as master and as man.

He had gone to his rest in a dark hour. His country's fate oppressed him. But this Luther of Science, one of the last Great Ones of the nineteenth century, had departed, as all men thought, bearing no other burden than the fullness of days, had fallen asleep like a weary king with a crown overheavy with honor, throned on a pyramid of incomparable achievement. He had fought many battles, even with Church and Kaiser in his passionate crusade for scientific truth. But was not his old age beautiful, sunny and serene?

Up to his death few in his own land and perhaps no one among his millions of followers abroad knew of the personal tragedy which had embittered his last years, the grim feud with one whom he had

royally benefited, or of the scandal in the idyllic old university town of Jena, the battle for his dignity and peace of mind, even his good name and honor.

This sordid Golgotha which Haeckel was forced to climb, this gauntlet of ingratitude, pedantic-Torquemadaism, and incredible bureaucratic harshness, has been called the "Lear-Tragedy" of Haeckel's last years. It has broken beyond the confines of the university and of Jena and has lately aroused a Germany torpid with its own griefs. It has brought about a bitter fight in the newspapers between two of Haeckel's pupils—Prof. Ludwig Plate, his successor and persecutor, and Dr. Adolf Heilborn, his champion—the publication of pamphlets and a trial before the District Court of Jena, whose judgment against Professor Plate has just been sustained by a higher court at Leipzig. The quarrel has been furthermore complicated by party strife among certain newspapers, Professor Plate being an active anti-Semite.

On August seventeenth, 1920, Dr. Heilborn in an article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* threw down a public gage to Professor Plate. A man of distinguished scientific prestige, Professor Plate had been appointed to the important chair of Zoölogy upon Haeckel's own recommendation. The old scientist saw in him his most gifted pupil and took no heed of the warnings he had received against his personal character. Ingratitude, petty persecution and aspersions, a systematized torture of his venerable master,—these were the charges brought against him by Dr. Heilborn. He declared that Professor Plate had turned the last decade of Haeckel's life into a martyrdom. Professor Plate's reply was a suit for libel. Thereupon Dr. Heilborn published his accusing pamphlet.*

This ordeal was hidden even to many of Haeckel's friends and it is said that he begged them to maintain silence respecting it. I myself had been in personal touch and correspondence with the master ever since the friendship we struck up in 1904, and to me he had written only a hint of his troubles. When my wife and I visited him in December 1915, he seemed, though greatly aged, to be his old happy and exuberant self. Only the shadow of the war and the wreck of the great hopes he had built up for mankind darkened his spirits. It is true that he spoke vaguely of unpleasant relations with his successor.

For almost two generations Ernst Haeckel had carried on his teachings at Jena, as well as the Directorship of the Zoölogical

* *Die Lear-Tragödie Ernst Haeckels*, Dr. Adolf Heilborn, Hoffmann & Campe, Berlin-Hamburg.

Institute and the Phyletic Museum. Generously and in absolute trust he gave all these honors and offices into the hands of his former pupil, Dr. Ludwig Plate of Berlin, on April first, 1909. Haeckel, though capable of a stout intellectual belligerency, was of a child-like ingenuousness of soul: he remained the simple-hearted and unsophisticated scientist, the poet, the scientific devotee of Nature to his last days and a lamentably poor judge of men and character. And who more Christian in his practice than this great anti-Christ of Evolution?

Haeckel had written Professor Plate on March twentieth, 1919:

"I write once more to reassure you that it is with the greatest confidence that I place the entire organization in your hands and that I shall always subordinate my plans to your own—which have proved themselves to be so much better in practise."

Professor Plate replied, obsequiously, but with stinted admiration:

"Your Honored Excellency:

Under date of December tenth, 1908, the Ministry of Education at Weimar has sent me my appointment to the Chair of Zoölogy at Jena, which you have occupied with such great success for more than forty-eight years. In heartily thanking Your Excellency for the great trust which you have shown in your old pupil, and in promising to further our branch of science to the best of my ability in the sense of a liberal research in the theory and teaching of Evolution, I shall esteem it a particular pleasure as the Director of the Phyletic Museum, to give Your Excellency the use of the three rooms desired in the upper story (archive-room, library and study) and to equip the Museum with your cooperation and according to your intentions.

Your most sincere and devoted

Ludwig Plate."

One of the first acts of the officious Professor Plate, after having ensconced himself in the chair of his great master, was to demand that Haeckel should immediately vacate his study in the Zoölogical Institute. The aged scientist was at that time suffering from a severe attack of rheumatism. As Haeckel's faithful old servant Pohle relates amidst tears and objurgations, it was necessary to carry Haeckel to the Institute, where the precipitate removal took place amidst immense discomfort and confusion. In two days, however, all the books, documents, manuscripts, etc., were installed

in the Phyletic Museum. Plate once more appeared and declared that he would require the assistant's room for the purpose of installing 84 cases full of living mice for experimental purposes! Haeckel protested against this desecration of the handsome new structure and the unbearable smell and dirt which the mice would occasion and suggested that they be installed in the Ceylon Room in the Zoölogical Institute. This, however, did not suit Plate, as they would then have been in too close proximity to *his* laboratory! Haeckel pointed out that the Phyletic Museum had been his own individual foundation, had cost him ten years of work and the greater part of his fortune, and that it was destined for other purposes than mice-breeding. Under the circumstances it was reasonable that he, its founder, should have something to say in the matter of the arrangements.

Professor Plate, touched to the quick of his petty and drill-sergeant dignity, exclaimed grandiosely: "Since April first, *I* am the sole Director of the Phyletic Museum and you must submit unconditionally to all my orders!"

This led to a wordy battle in which the white-haired Haeckel expressed his grief and anger at this offensive and unwarranted behavior. He is said to have exclaimed: "You are a Shylock and insist upon your bond." As soon as the matter became known, all Jena glowed with indignation, and this was so great in university circles that Dr. Plate suddenly felt himself isolated and ostracized. This new and bristling broom was bent on achieving a reputation for "making a clean sweep of things." His favorite *bête noire* was the Library of the Zoölogical Institute—to a large extent composed of donations of Haeckel's and kept in good order.

Haeckel had proposed that three rooms in the upper story of the Phyletic Museum be reserved for his personal use during his lifetime—as a study and library, and an archive-room for the preservation of artworks, manuscripts and other personal souvenirs after his death. Surely a modest request, this, in view of the fact that Haeckel was practically the founder and donor of this institute. Professor Plate, however, stubbornly opposed this concession, and yielded only after the District Court had formally declared it to be an integral provision of the donation.

The venerable Haeckel expressed his relief at this and departed for Baden-Baden to take the waters. Professor Plate, assuming a friendliness he did not feel, now devised a new instrument of torture for his former master. Grubbing among paid bills and book-lists of the preceding twenty years, he had discovered that a certain

number of volumes were missing from the library of the Institute and that these were either in Haeckel's home or in the Phyletic Museum. In tactless and offensive language, making the utmost use of his formal rights, he issued a demand for the return of these works.

It was eminently natural that a genius such as Haeckel, despite his infinite attention to scientific detail, should be free of the meticulousness of a pedagogic machine in the smaller affairs of daily life. He was occasionally afflicted with a slight dash of the *laissezfaire* of the artist, for artist at heart he was. And the unworldliness and abstractedness of the professor likewise clung to him. What more natural than that he should make use of his privilege of purchasing such books as he needed for his studies, or that he should occasionally fail to have one stamped or returned to the Institute Library? It must not be forgotten that the Zoölogical Institute itself was established by Haeckel, who had donated his entire sociological library to it, as well as thousands of volumes that were sent him regularly from all parts of the world. He had also arranged a system of exchanges. His bills for books had been revised yearly by the Government and found correct. Donations, legacies, gifts were showered upon the University of Jena through Haeckel's activity. What Goethe had been to Weimar, that Haeckel was to Jena. Haeckel replied briefly to Professor Plate's pettifogging accusations. By return post a still more aggressive letter, dated May twentieth, 1909, full of veiled threats and reproaches, swooped upon him like some ill-omened raven.

The effect of this onslaught upon Haeckel's delicate nerves and sensitive spirit was devastating. Professor Plate's blows and incessant poisonous pin-pricks were beginning to tell upon him. The old man finally summoned up strength enough to reply to his tormentor—on June fourth,—in a letter of such nobility of feeling and calm dignity, that anyone but a hide-bound fanatic, rivetted to the letter of the law, would have been touched by it and remained silent. No trace of the reverence due a world-famous master from his comparatively obscure pupil, not even of the courtesy due an older man from a younger, is visible. The intimation he makes is crass and clear. Haeckel is supposed to have *filched* the missing books! During Haeckel's absence Dr. Plate had even gone so far as to have a key made to Haeckel's exclusive private rooms in the Phyletic Museum! By means of this he had entered these rooms and had gone burrowing among all the papers and manuscripts of the great biologist.

Further acrimonious and unedifying differences demanded the judicial intervention, and decision of Dr. Vollert, the Curator of the University. Dr. Plate, the slave of implacable "devotion to duty" whines of the "great wrong done him by Haeckel," of the "false game he had played" and allots to himself the mantle of magnanimity in extending the hand of forgiveness because of Haeckel's great services to science and because Haeckel had once been his teacher. Jena grew hotter and hotter for Professor Plate, and although indurated to disfavor, he seriously contemplated resignation.

In a letter to his friend and pupil, Dr. Wilhelm Breitenbach. (July seventh, 1909) Haeckel wrote:

"Actually I have surrendered everything (with the exception of these three rooms) to my successor in office, who is certainly by far my superior as a talented teacher, a splendid speaker and a practical Director of the Institute—surrendered everything which I had created in the course of my forty-eight years of activity as a teacher here in Jena." He adds that "this horrible fight extending over three months—now definitely decided in my favor by the Ministry and the University—has injured me greatly in body and mind. After this saddest of all my experiences, I shall withdraw myself entirely and seek solace in common with Mother Nature, ever benign and faithful, and in my artistic pastimes, the writing of my memoirs and the like."

Professor Plate in an article published in a review called *Die Umschau*, declared: "It is untrue that our conflict was decided in favor of Haeckel by the Ministry and the University. On the contrary he was forced to keep the oral and written promises he had made, namely that I was to be the sole Director of the Museum, and he was also obliged to return the books of which he had illegally possessed himself. . . . Haeckel had reserved the three rooms in the Museum only for his personal 'use,' but subsequently he demanded that after his death they were to remain as he had arranged them. He wished to establish here a kind of 'Goethe House' to himself. Later on he voluntarily gave up this plan and surrendered these rooms to me, whereupon my protest was withdrawn."

The spirit of this casuistic self-justification is clear—the words are adroitly chosen and the aged Haeckel's illegal practices cunningly suggested. The allusion to the Goethe House is an example of Professor Plate's delicate epistolary manner and the adroit "voluntarily" an ironic mockery of the tragedy of an old man, a travesty of his spiritual suffering.

Dr. Heilborn, who visited Haeckel in the summer of 1909, was

startled at the change in his appearance; the harrow of grief had gone over him all too heavily.

For ten long years this silent yet fatal feud cast its shadow over Ernst Haeckel. If Dr. Heilborn's comparison of Haeckel with King Lear be too strong there were at least parallels in the fate of the two kingly greybeards which must be obvious to all. Both had given up everything, reserving only a few small requisites. Both learned "how sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child"—or pupil. In Haeckel's case two personalities, two ages, two philosophies of life had clashed with each other—Haeckel, the generous pantheistic spirit and lover of nature—Plate, the rigid and frigid pedagogue and specialist—the one the child-like poet and enthusiast, the other the correct, meticulous official—philosopher against bureaucrat, the expansive searcher and creator against the narrow organizer and director.

When asked how this almost pathological rancor of Professor Plate's was to be explained, Haeckel had once said:

"I do not know. Presumably it is ambition accentuated almost to a disease, perhaps the oppressive feeling that he cannot attain to full validity beside me. And yet there is no reason why he should fear this. For Plate is an efficient scholar and above all—something which I have never been—an excellent teacher. In this connection I cannot sufficiently praise him. Were it otherwise I should never have proposed him as my successor. Moreover, the Institute which I created out of nothing—which I raised to one of the most honored in all Germany,—I have permitted to go to seed, as he declares—so that it was necessary for him to establish order. Well, I shall be glad if he improves things—for natural science will profit thereby."

Dr. Heinrich Schmidt, the director of the Haeckel archives, proved that Professor Plate was congenitally incapable of understanding a man of genius. The famous Swiss psychologist Prof. Otto Binswanger, declared Haeckel's persecutor to be a "malicious psychopathic."

During these bitter years Haeckel worked almost entirely in his home, the "Villa Medusa"—writing his last works, painting water-colors and dictating his memoirs. Now and again his faithful old servant Pohle would fetch him books from the Institute or Museum—Dr. Plate handing them out only upon the signing of a receipt, and demanding their return as soon as the lending period had expired!

When Haeckel's eightieth birthday came, on April fourth, 1914, and the whole world showered honors and congratulations upon him.

Dr. Plate remained dumb and even left on a long voyage so as not to be present at the university festivities.

After Haeckel's death, his former pupil adopted an attitude of what may be called pragmatic magnanimity:

"Haeckel permitted me to look deeply into the recesses of his heart, and what I saw there was surely not always edifying. He was no saint, and he who regards every line and every action of his as the expression of infallible wisdom and virtue, will be doomed to severe disillusion and will deliver him into the hands of his numerous opponents. Where there is much light there is also much shadow. His weaknesses, in my opinion, are only small, disturbing spots in a great painting rich in colors and figures. They cannot darken Haeckel's greatest achievement—the unprecedented success with which he labored for the extension of scientific thought. For this reason I have remained silent concerning Haeckel's attitude towards me, something which constitutes the most painful disillusion of my entire life."

After Heilborn's disclosures, Professor Plate felt himself called upon to "reveal the whole truth." He went so far as to accuse Haeckel of deliberately misappropriating the funds of the Institute in order to buy books for himself and friends and even hinted indirectly at worse things—at scandal—belief in which, of course, he virtuously and indignantly repudiated. It need only be said that Haeckel's indifference to money was so great that on more than one occasion I found him perfectly disinterested in the value of the English and American rights of some of his books.

In reply to a letter which I had written Professor Plate, expressing my indignation at his treatment of Haeckel, I received an answer, dated December sixth, 1920. The general spirit of his reply amply supports the charge brought against him by Dr. Heilborn. After denying that he was in any way under obligations to Haeckel, Dr. Plate proceeds to declare that he had damaged his position and his income in every way by leaving Berlin and going to Jena. He then strives to cast an oblique pity upon himself and a jibe at Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*—a book which—quite overlooking its absolutely unprecedented success and influence,—he declared "unloosed a storm of indignation throughout the world." Nay, he goes further than this and ventures to repeat some of the unfounded slanders circulated against Haeckel by his clerical and scientific enemies—respecting his alleged "forgeries" of certain evolutionary plates—slanders long since refuted. "To be the successor of such a man, is surely not exactly pleasant," remarks the virtuous

Professor, as though he had just bethought himself of the heritage of crime left by some malefactor which he had been seduced into accepting in the simplicity of his soul.

"Even the judge,—" he continues, "who was a venerator of Haeckel's, acknowledged that no thanks were due Haeckel from me—the same is true of Haeckel's friend, Privy Councillor Rosenthal. It is my opinion that I made a sacrifice for Haeckel's sake (something which he also acknowledged), because I valued his scientific achievements and because so far as the main points are concerned, I follow the same path he pursued in the Study of Evolution. I was therefore all the more indignant when Haeckel, after I had settled in Jena, *fulfilled none of his promises*. There is no doubt that he played me false, just as previously in Hamman's case."

Hamman, a so-called "pious biologist," had been an assistant to Haeckel and differences had arisen between them. There can be no doubt that despite the open-heartedness, the sunny and boyish *insouciance* of Haeckel and his ardour in the search for truth, his temperament sometimes betrayed him in his relations with his colleagues, as his imagination sometimes betrayed him in his daring scientific hypotheses. To expect that the great should not be human must be left to a hierarchy of academic pharisees such as Professor Ludwig Plate, in whom not the counsel to, but the realization of perfection has become possible. If one be permitted to draw another Shakespearian parallel, there can be no doubt that, according to his lights, this stiff, straight pedagogue is like Brutus, an "honorable man." And yet by the sheer preponderance of human character, essential greatness and the force of an upright nature, the personal and scientific honor of Ernst Haeckel, one of the greatest pillars of our modern enlightenment, remain unsmirched and unshaken.

ON CHERISHED FALLACIES OF TENDER MINDS.

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

THERE is something amazingly inspiring about a person who boldly, bravely, unalterably and even nonchalantly does good for the sake of good and persists at the task in a determined and unswerving manner. Compared to this person the weak individual who must needs postulate gods and demons and punishments eternal and rewards everlasting—casting into objective form his purely subjective fancies because the process pleases him—is a poor piece of clay indeed.

William James has divided people into the tough and the tender minded. Let those bold persons above be then tough minded; let that other class, composed of those timorous souls of instinctive mental processes who absorb fallacy as the bread of life, and who regard their toughened fellows with a mixture of awe, hatred and contempt—let them be for us the tender minded. And it is quite true that to do good for the sake of doing good is no more rational or logical than to do evil for the sake of doing evil; but those hardy souls who stand like sentinels of virtue in a wicked world, without hope of reward and without fear of punishment; who persist in a course of action altogether *sui compos*, who manage to “suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea.”¹ who are impervious to vituperation and immune to fallacy—these people are irritating beyond all peradventure to say the very least!

A man long since sicklied o'er with the pale cast of effeminacy and weakness lent by insipid religious dogma was of that type—the man Jesus. For he said in effect: “For the sake of ideals I shall live a life of pure idealism. You may say that it is impractical; you may insist that it is irrational; you may prove that it is useless. You may persecute me, revile me, condemn me, spit upon me, scourge me—yea, you may crucify me. Yet shall I defy you. For I

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*.

shall live pure idealism and shall show that this can be done for no other reward than the triumph of having done so." In a measure he reflected the aloofness from materialistic misfortune Epictetus had taught. Here were two souls toughened against the soporific fallacies which do numb the minds and stimulate the hearts of those of us who falter and stammer along, continually under the influence of some psychic alkaloid.

These psychic alkaloids, these cherished fallacies of tender minds, are the aspects objective reality is made to wear under the impress of our subjective beliefs. For we do have an overwhelming tendency to believe what it pleases us to believe. So much so that A. Clutton-Brock correctly quotes Nietzsche as saying that "all our beliefs are but efforts to make ourselves comfortable in a universe that is indifferent to us."² The universe is indifferent to us; its laws work out unalterably regardless of the wishes of puny man. But man rises superior to the universe by possessing the magic faculty of convincing himself that things are as he wishes them to be! There is no evil that has not somehow been demonstrated to be good; there is no torture that has not by someone been looked upon as a pleasure; there is nothing in the gamut from unpleasantness to catastrophe which cannot be regarded as a blessing in disguise if such fallacy makes us more comfortable.

"To die is gain!" cried Paul in ecstasy, and to die for Christ's sake has ever been an approved pleasure, however superficial and however certainly vicarious that approval be on the part of the nodding limousine congregation napping at some fashionable first church. Mackenzie³ has explained how we at first find pleasure only in sensuous excitement, to evolve on through the stage of the more reflective Epicureans to attain, in some cases, the point where physical agony and mental distress are looked upon as the keenest pleasures. The frantic flagellants of an earlier age knew this art to perfection and enjoyed it hugely. The poet who sang "grow old along with me, the best is yet to be" was well versed in the process of convincing himself that things were really as he wished them to be. The mourner at the bier of one much beloved who asserts that 'twas better so after all finds solace in the same method, so great is our power to believe what we please in spite of adverse circumstances.

Dr. Johnson says somewhere that "Every man, however hopeless his pretensions may appear to all but himself, has some project

² Arthur Clutton-Brock, *Studies in Christianity*.

³ J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*.

by which he hopes to rise in reputation; some art by which he imagines that the notice of the world will be attracted; some quality good or bad which discriminates him from the common herd of mortals, and by which others might be persuaded to love or compelled to fear him." That would have been said at this point in other words had it not been discovered said more effectively by the Doctor. It fitly illustrates another aspect of the tendency under discussion.

There is indeed ample reason to think that the wish is largely father to the thought—at least that a desire to believe what we are pleased to believe, rather than conviction of a more logical character holds true—in the case of such matters as the belief in God, in immortality, in cosmic progress and in the ultimate triumph of the good. We do not deny any of these things; they may every one of them be true in an absolute sense; but we should face the fact that nothing produces such conviction as a simple, but intense, desire to believe which we more euphonistically christen "intuition" or something still more profound.

For instance, nothing produces so tremendous a belief in personal immortality as does the death of one near and dear to us. Even notorious skeptics of the coldest mentality have weakened in the face of such a tragedy, while poets and prose writers under stress of grief produce lines bearing the stamp of deep conviction. As we hear it said over and over again—without the persistence of personal consciousness all is lunacy and unreason. It seems harsh and irrational that we should live here but a little while, growing, developing, forming friendships and attaining certain ends, only to be snuffed out suddenly like a light that is no longer wanted, and without the remotest possibility of ever meeting our kind again.

And it does seem harsh and cruel; but the fact of its seeming so would make it none the less true, if true it was. Perhaps it seems impossible to believe this largely because we are conscious of the ruthless disregard the theory shows for vaunting human pride; yet consciousness itself is but a refinement of an instinct which we share with the lower animals, and the animal sees no injustice in annihilation merely because he has escaped this psychic development.

In spite of our comforting beliefs Schopenhauer may perfectly well be right. We may be "like lambs in a field, disporting ourselves under the eye of the butcher, who chosés out first one and then another for his prey." And it may very well be possible that even "though things have gone with us tolerably well, the longer we live the more clearly we feel that, on the whole, life is a disappointment, nay, a cheat." Not that we claim life is necessarily an "unprofitable

episode disturbing the blessed calm of non-existence," but that it may quite as well be so for all that intuitive conviction founded upon desire alone is worth.⁴ Certain it is that if death be followed by a single day or hour of total unconsciousness, it had quite as well be followed by an eternity thereof for all we should ever know about it; for in unconsciousness a day is no longer than an hour and a thousand years are but a day.

It is quite certain also that we have no standard of absolute value by which to measure the progress of the world. Who shall weigh the mechanics of to-day against the philosophy of Greece; who shall weigh the science of to-day against the religion of the Hebrews; who shall weigh the stupendous material achievements of the modern against the matchless art of the ancient? True enough we can see progress if we incline ourselves to see it. Schopenhauer remarked in a letter to Goethe that truth is so seldom found because we are much more intent upon finding some preconceived opinion of our own. We can well enough observe cosmic evolution if it pleases us to do so just as the confirmed optimist can always find good in evil, given his own peculiar values. Nietzsche founded an iconoclastic philosophy by merely reversing popular values.

We can see the triumph of good over evil in any particular instance if we sufficiently desire to do so. We can sanctimoniously carry on a horrible inquisition or we can complacently murder Aztecs and Incas wholesale, immediately after administering a sacrament, and do all to the glory of God and for the triumph of the good. We can brace ourselves through a war more terrible than any the world has ever seen with the pious thought that we fight for right; and then we can make a predatory peace which contravenes every noble ideal we espoused and every upward aspiration of the human soul, and yet persuade ourselves that good has triumphed.

And so we go incorrigibly along. We find ourselves somewhat lonely at times in this vast and rather antagonistic universe; hence we are apt to postulate some Great Companion who guides our steps, whose guardian angels preside over our lives, whose cosmos graciously withholds its drastic laws for our protection and whose compassion ultimately refines us into perfect beings composed of equal parts of George Washington and an Idealized Allied soldier, thus to live out monotonous eons of undiluted bliss. Out of the loneliness of the human heart cometh God, and the modern god-makers recently analyzed in the *Unpartisan*⁵—Reeman, Wells and G. A.

⁴ Schopenhauer, *On the Sufferings of the World*.

⁵ *Unpartisan Review*, Jan.-Feb., 1920, "The War and the God-Makers."

Studdert Kennedy—to whom may be added William James and John Stuart Mill and, perhaps, Frederic Harrison et al, merely continue the process more intellectually and more fastidiously and postulate some unique kind of finite or limited liability deity who suits their particular purpose.

The war brought out two interesting aspects of the ability of mankind to believe what pleases them. Previous to the war the custom of looking charitably upon one's enemy was growing with sufficient rapidity to alarm the ubiquitous militarists who thrived in all nations. Certain it is that the German was universally regarded as rather learned, rather stupid, rather innocuous and absolutely harmless; scientifically he was worshiped, personally he was amusing. Furthermore the belief in immortality was distinctly on the wane, and the escapades of the Society for Psychical Research were viewed with tolerant amusement, scarcely with hatred or contempt, for they were not of sufficient importance to menace our soul's comfort; and an opinion must threaten something about which we are not indifferent before we are moved to declare it dangerous license instead of justifiable liberty.

At this point came the war. Almost immediately we ourselves became the vicars of right on earth, paragons of truth incarnate, guiltless of wrong before God and man and the heavenly appointed crusaders of Deity for justice and other high sounding virtues. Our enemy—and of course this held true whether "we" were Teutons or of the Allied nations—became fiends diabolical, incapable of anything right or true or good or noble and deserving only to be exterminated from the earth like the pests which plagued Egypt of old. The eyes of the Anglo-Saxon professors who had grasped at coveted and much prized decorations bestowed by William Hohenzollern in his palmy days were opened and they cast these filthy baubles from them in fine disdain. So also were the eyes of the professors of Germany opened and they penned a rousing creed of spleen which rivaled in childish bitterness the super-ludicrous Hymn of Hate and the Allied newspaper editorials. And why all this? Was it not because it pleased us humans, with our boasted reason, to so believe? A Daniel come to judgment said, "Give an intellectual any ideal and any evil passion and he will always succeed in harmonizing the twain."⁶

We who had been taught ethics in the light of the Ten Commandments must bolster our robbing, our lying, our killing and our reversal of the morality of civil life by assuming our enemy possessed

⁶ Romain Rolland, *Above the Battle*.

of all the most degraded passions of our own subconscious minds. For in such cases we are essentially projecting our own subconscious evil outwardly and objectively.⁷ In popular parlance the Kaiser was made an outward symbol upon which were fixed all the unconscious capacities for evil of many thousands; "in their mental picture he is surrounded by a glamour of fear and hatred, such as properly belongs to no human being but only to some fantasy of the unconscious."

Secondly there came with the war, born of lonely vigils beside the chair forever vacant, a recrudescence of barbarism and superstition. For not only was the more legitimate intuitive faith in immortality universally strengthened, but thousands of minds turned toward the most crude spiritism for proofs of what they frantically desired to believe. Facts well known to abnormal psychology and scientifically classified under dissociated consciousness and secondary personalities, were reinterpreted in the light of preconceived desires, and fiction more elaborate than that of inspired genius was produced by the disordered fancy of former scientists. We reverted to the days of primitive credulity, of belief in "mana," of association purely by contiguity, and it was the heyday of those perspicacious minds which hold that "pink pills" more effectually cure "pale people" than do white pills of precisely the same chemical composition.

Not, be it understood, that there do not exist facts which cannot as yet be fully explained by science, facts which may point to personal immortality. The point is that hosts of people to whom immortality was a mere thoughtless affirmation, or who, if they thought at all, were inclined to postpone to most remote future the eternal bliss reserved for them, now suddenly became passionate in their conviction, grasped at any straw to support that conviction and did all of this because, in the presence of tragedy it pleased and comforted them to do so. The facts were well known; they had existed and been ridiculed by these same people for years; but with "the will to believe" what a change in them!

It was said that immortality had become a mere pious affirmation. It is another of our vagaries to cling tenaciously to institution and forms of belief long after they have ceased to be animated by the spirit of life, and then to smile at the Englishman for his slavery to precedence! Go to the movies, if your digestive apparatus is abnormally strong, and observe the moron rabble as it loudly acclaims the triumph of conventional virtue—however absurd and inherently unlikely that triumph—at the end of a series of episodes.

⁷ M. K. Bradby, *Psycho-Analysis, and Its Place in Life*, Chaps. 13, 14.

shaving as near to the prohibitive as the censorship permits. Just so long as everything finally conforms to the publicly accepted standard of morality, all is well; otherwise all is something that rhymes well with well. True enough the private morality of these very people is a different matter. Pope described immorality as a monster so hideous that to see it is to hate it. Francis Thompson adds that the implication is plain—as long as it is kept unseen, well and good!⁸ That this rude crowd blandly shatters the conventional code when expedient; that it is even aware of the fact that the code is an empty form, makes no difference whatever. The film or the play or the book must outwardly and superficially conform to the accepted mandate of conventional morality and traditional theology or what Francis Hackett aptly calls “the invisible censor”⁹ steps in to repress and to banish.

And why again? Because it pleases us to think, as did those self-satisfied Pharisees that Christ so superbly tongue-lashed, that the whited sepulchre is an admirable piece of architecture, and that so long as outward forms are punctiliously observed, other things will automatically take care of themselves. Because it pleases us to ignore our own eternal sense of values and to abide by an external set which cannot mean to any one of us what it meant to the few who originally made the mistake of codifying it. A Clutton-Brock has well said that “since few of us act upon the religious dogmas of Christ, we may conjecture that they fail to mean to us what they meant to him, that for us they are often as untrue as the enemies of Christianity assert them to be.”¹⁰

Or, to express the same idea a little differently, this vagary is due to the restrictions upon our mental activities which are imposed at the very beginning of our respective careers by our instruction. The ideas and the information given to us in our early years, the creeds inculcated and the antipathies aroused, a “selection which under any other circumstances whatever would have been different,”¹¹—these things mould us and in great measure make us please to believe certain other things which can be congruously knit to them. Thus we pass through the world believing what pleases us, espousing the causes which support our preconceived notions, ignoring the facts which have an unpleasant habit of perverseness and obstinacy and finally, emptying the vials of wrath upon the heads of those luckless

⁸ Francis Thompson, *A Renegade Poet*.

⁹ Francis Hackett, “The Invisible Censor,” *New Republic*, Dec., 3, 1919.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 2.

¹¹ Frederick J. Teggart, *The Processes of History*.

individuals who presume to think differently about matters regarding which the absolute truth is unknown.¹² When the truth does become known, if it ever does in the sense of our attaining an absolutely terminal experience the word truth would be a misnomer, for these experiences would then be real, "they would simply *be*."¹³

Yet how good it makes things if they appear in an accustomed guise and in a manner to conform to our pet notions. There rests in memory a picture of King Rami of Siam wending his way to the Royal Wat and standing at the shrine in meditation while his awed subjects watch him breathlessly and a slave chases madly by to irritate His Highness with a large umbrella. There he stands, but how out of place in these Eastern surroundings! For 'tis khaki of the latest cut he wears and he resembles more than anything else some corpulent American swivel-chair colonel: certainly his appearance is ages away from that of an oriental potentate. Yet, doubtless, to our fallacy laden minds he becomes, in looking thus, very civilized, very refined, very advanced. For he looks quite as we do, so uniformed, and that goes a long way with us.

Furthermore in those we like we pretend to find our own sense of values just as we surely discover abominations in those we do not like. Yet, "if we could look into the minds of those furthest away from us, of the Chinese, or even of the wildest savages, we should find that they shared our conceit as well as our values, and that to them we seemed cold and inhuman."¹⁴ These cherished values of ours are after all rather universal; nor are those we love so good, or those we hate so bad as we choose to make them. Yet how we resent it when our pet convictions are menaced and how bitterly we snarl at those hardy souls who, to our great discomfort, persist in the pursuit of truth for truth's sake!

Or perhaps it had better be stated that we can only become properly horrified and angry when the matter is one of essential importance. It has been truly and pithily said that "The dividing line between liberty and license is now, as it always has been, the line between those things about which we are comparatively indifferent and those which we regard as of supreme importance."¹⁵ And the "monster of iniquity" who dares advocate any opinion on these matter which is adverse to our own conclusions merits a punishment which can scarcely be too severe.

¹² Emerson, *Intellect*.

¹³ William James, "The Essence of Humanism" in *The Meaning of Truth*.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.

¹⁵ M. Jay Flannery, "Liberty and License, *Open Court*, Dec., 1919.

These days of moribund Christianity (regarding it as an instituted religion) we can view with considerable complacency, not to say apathy, quite dubious theological opinion. Not long ago the President of the American Unitarian Association, the President of the American Association of Rabbis and the president of an orthodox, though liberal, theological seminary spoke from the pulpit of a Methodist church at one and the same meeting. But, they tell us, this means broadmindedness and freedom of thought. Can we be certain that it does not mean sectarianism gone to seed and growing indifference? Ask these same people to listen to some lukewarm political liberal who finds slight glimmerings of truth in the soviet idea and you may discover how broadminded they are—provided you are not fatally injured in the rush to tar and feather him. But, they say, Bolshevism is—oh well it is described correctly by any adjective that can be applied to what we do not like—anarchistic, infidel, irrational, a menace to democracy, etc., etc. True. Nor does one have to be very old to remember the time when liberal theology, the mild liberalism of Emerson for instance, was all of these terrible things. But of course sectarianism was then a matter of high importance. To-day nationalism has largely taken its place.

And anything that menaces the status of things as they are in so far as it is important to us to have them as they are, is hated, reviled, persecuted and suppressed; the effort is made to gas it out of existence with talk if mere reasoning is ineffective. In France, Barbusse and Rolland and Thomas and Anatole France are annihilated by a caricature in *Fantasio*; in Australia, straight Australian doctrine and the tendency away from the empire is wiped out by refusing Dr. Mannix a hall in which to speak; in America—but why speak of America when we can much more pleasantly condemn other people? And of course history shows that error persists forever if upheld by the powers that be, and that truth may readily be persecuted out of existence as was Christianity. Not to say that Bolshevism, for instance, is true; but, if it is, measures of repression are powerless.

There was once a man who held that the gods worshiped by the people he lived among were rather childish beings and that this crude religion of theirs might well be refined and evolve into something nobler and better. He taught them that there were mightier truths than silly myths and that it would be a good idea to attend to them. He perverted the young men of his city by teaching them to believe in ideals which have come down to us through the ages as the purest and the best. But in doing this he told some people what

they did not want to know and what they did not find it pleasant to believe; therefore they hated him and eventually found legal provocation to give him hemlock to drink—for law can always be made to subserve passion. And thus it was that Socrates joined the true immortals.

There was a man born into an insignificant satrapy of the great Roman Empire. He found his people enslaved by a formalistic religion, bound by creed and dogma and meticulous rule of conduct and thereby missing life's higher values. He protested boldly against these things and continually told his countrymen that the things which they liked to believe were not necessarily true just because it pleased them to believe. So their frenzy finally reached the proper pitch and they did him to death like a common criminal. And, having crucified Jesus, they joyfully went their way assured that error was banished from the earth and that what they liked to call truth was vindicated. And to-day Jesus of Nazareth is still the inspiration of those who can sufficiently dissociate him from the accretions of nauseating dogma to appreciate him, while the brilliantly endowed mob which cheerfully cried "Away with him! Crucify him!" is but a hazy and repugnant memory.

There was Copernicus who set the sun in the midst of the solar system and relegated the earth to a subordinate position, and how the discerning masses rebuked him for his error. There was Galileo who continued this preposterous mistake and even enlarged upon it; yet how effectually did the priests dash his conclusions to atoms by refusing to look through his telescope. There was Colenso who derogated from man's dignity by insisting that God did not create all animals out of hand for the pleasure of man; and how quickly and unerringly the masses perceived his ignorance!

There was Darwin who insisted upon the kinship of man and the lower animals, a view which shocked the vanity of human kind and which made the celebrated Englishman an abomination. To-day we have Freud who does psychically what Darwin did physically, and declares that the very finest brain has within it the inherited instincts of the most degraded beast, and how intensely and whole heartedly he is hated by people whose mentality is severely taxed by a problem play.

Each and every one of these men was met with vituperation and passion; their ideas were misstated, their conclusions were ridiculed and their systems made objects of derision. Men of science otherwise rational laughed at their absurd conjectures and brushed them aside as unworthy of notice, refusing to examine them

calmy and reasonably. Even so mild an adventurer into radicalism as William James met this barrenness of logic on the part of critics who hastened to misinform themselves and then to demolish ludicrous men of straw which they had carefully labelled "Pragmatism."¹⁶ To-day men of the cast of Bertrand Russell, Romain Rolland and Victor Berger—everyone of them apostles of peace and opponents of violence—are misjudged, are slurred and insulted and worse, and are studiously and deliberately misunderstood with the studied insolence that Samuel Butler finds so offensive, being the conviction that another could understand if he chose but he does not choose.¹⁷

Nous ne croyons par les choses parce qu'elles sont vraies, mais nous les croyons vrais parce que nous les aimons, said Pascal; and we very deliberately and maliciously libel those who ask us to believe the true. Even if it only seems true to them we could credit them with intellectual sincerity. This immense nation of a hundred and ten millions which has declared it could "lick the earth," trembles in terror and ships away from its shores a few hundred aliens unconvicted of any crime, lest these purveyors of falsehood should disrupt our nation which is founded upon what we choose to call the eternal rock of truth! If our nation is so founded ten thousand apostles of falsehood shall not triumph over her; if she be brought to the dust by the determined efforts of a few hundred radicals then is her foundation insecure. Truth is its own justification and error will always eventually commit suicide unless protected by law.

However, for our peace of mind, these naughty agitators—of whatever breed—simply must not prattle too loudly against things essential to our happiness. Of course if by some strange mischance they manage to prattle along, as did the prohibitionists, and to make unnoticed inroads before we are aware of the damage they are doing, till they have us bound hand and foot and "personal liberty" is dead—then—why then, we can very gracefully and very skillfully retreat, without any appearance of giving ground, to the equivocal point where we suddenly discover that an apparent evil is a positive good. Yesterday prohibition was to the press a dangerous infringement of personal liberty; to-day it is found to be what was wanted all along! To-day these newspapers realize unanimously that prohibition is an excellent and a virtuous thing; and, since the average newspaper editorial would test at about eleven years on a scale for the feeble-minded, and since this near moron grade represents the

¹⁶ See *The Meaning of Truth* especially.

¹⁷ Samuel Butler, *The Fair Haven*.

average mentality of those charming people who once hated Socrates and Jesus and Spinoza and Darwin, and who now collectively hate any one with advanced opinions, this means that prohibition is an unmitigated good and that is all there is to it!

Yet, in spite of all our cocksureness, life may be any number of things that seem distasteful. It may be a more or less conscious struggle toward an ideal never to be attained and under the tutelage of a finite God who is also struggling and getting nowhere. We may be but the most recent effort of that being among whose early mistakes were the leviathan and the prehistoric mammals of mountainous aspect. Life may be an examination paper set us "by God and Matthew Arnold." And when the prisoner declared that he stole bread because he must live, the judge may have been right in replying "I don't see the necessity!"

We may be able to see some cosmic meaning in this struggle between love and strife as does Mackenzie,¹⁸ or we may approach the brink with our ideal unattained and still wondering and half bewildered as Adler thinks probable.¹⁹ We may be but self-directive organisms menaced on all sides by inexorable nature and calling that good which helps and that evil which hinders us, as Roy Wood Sellars presumes.²⁰ Humanity may be God as hold the positivists. Nature may be God as held Spinoza, there may not be a God as held Huxley. Or as James tells us we may live in the universe as do dogs and cats in our libraries, having no inkling of the meaning of it all.²¹ To which Mackenzie might well reply that though a cheese mite had a human consciousness and had thereby but small knowledge of the place of cheese in the totality of things, yet this circumscribed life cannot be called an illusion, but is an "aspect of reality imperfectly apprehended." Life may even be as futile as Ameil sometimes and Schopenhauer all the time imagines it or as Calderon sings it—*una ficción, una sombra, una ilusion*. We may be mildly hopeful and say with Maeterlinck that "it seems fairly certain that we spend in this world the only narrow, grudging, obscure and sorrowful moment of our destiny,"²² or we may become more exuberant and echo Maurice Barres when he says: "*Je suis un instant d'une chose immortelle!*"

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.

¹⁹ Felix Adler, *The World Crisis and Its Meaning*.

²⁰ Roy Wood Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion*.

²¹ William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*.

²² Maeterlinck, *Death*.

Any of these things may be true totally or in part. The point to be stressed is that truth remains truth whether we like it or not and that our hatred of truth seekers neither defeats their purposes nor extenuates our error. James tells us that if a novel experience contradicts too emphatically our preexistent systems of belief, we will in most cases treat it as false.²³ We see the giraffe and simply say "There is no such animal" because we have no category in which to classify it and do not care to frame a new one. And yet the ideas which lead to strife are not those verified as a result of scientific inquiry, but are opinions about matters which we do not yet fully understand. "Men begin the search for truth with fancy, after which they argue, and at length they try to find it."²⁴

Just here lies the difference. It is absolutely necessary to distinguish between personal opinions and objective facts. Hydrochloric acid reacts with marble to form calcium chloride. Here is a fact of absolute reality to which everyone must agree once it is sufficiently explained to them. Facts of such character, where the search for truth has resulted in a terminal experience of reality, are to be propagated and insisted upon. Jesus Christ died to save sinners. Here is an opinion which became intuitive fact for certain people who crystallized it into dogma and, by trying to objectify intuition, gained nothing and lost much; to-day this unverifiable assertion is believed by every man in his own peculiar and individualistic manner, and it must always be so regarded. To insist upon propagating such things as fact and to expect others to objectify it as we may happen to, is a pure waste of time. The facts of intuition may be the most potent and the most precious things in our lives, but they must be regarded in a light altogether different from that in which we regard the accredited facts of the objective world.

At the end of his *Biographical History of Philosophy* Lewes seems struck with the futility of all this speculation, and he espouses the scientific method as the rational way out. The desire for the knowledge of "things in themselves" is dismissed as unpardonable moonshine; what we can have and what we must attain to is phenomenal knowledge about things. Perhaps this view is too materialistic. It seems, for instance, that the philosophy of a Haeckel errs by ignoring the spiritual side of man quite as much as does that of a Clutton-Brock by making intuitive faith into something bordering on naive credulity.

There are facts of nature which must be believed because they

²³ *Op. cit.*, 13.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, 11.

are demonstrably true; there are also undeniably facts of subjective experience which carry intuitive conviction and which are certainly true for the individual at very least. Some of these remain simple solipsism; others are in a sense universal. But it is characteristic of such beliefs that as soon as they are formulated they lose their value. For they are seen after all not to be true for all in precisely the same manner as they are true to any one. The statement—Acids turn blue litmus red—means precisely one thing for any one to whom it is made and who has sufficient intelligence and education to apprehend it properly. The statement—God is a spirit—means something a little different to every single person who hears it, and we can scarcely postulate a time when things will be otherwise.

We need science and we need faith; we need knowledge of externals and internal convictions; we need objective demonstration and subjective illumination. But we need to regard the two as separate aspects of that "mysterious Goddess whom we shall never see except in outline"—Truth.²⁵ Facts of the first type may be inculcated in so far as we are able to overcome inherent distaste for the unusual. Facts of the second type are in no case to be thrust upon another, especially when that other is a helpless child whose future life will be moulded thereby: these things are the individual possession of the reflective mind at maturity and are of little value to another. They must be formulated by each within the sacred precincts of his own soul.

Our task is to see that the intensity of our personal over-beliefs never causes us either to discount the assured convictions of scientific research or to look with intolerance upon the sincere professions of another believer wherein his opinions differ from our own. If this task be neglected we may readily attain a certain complacency and comfort in beliefs which are largely fallacies and thus go our myopic way to the paradise reserved for the exponents of cow-like virtue and the idolators of convention. If that task be done we may go forward assured that we have realized the highest law of our being and discerning that

"Life is but half a dream, wherein we see
The shadows of those things we may not know;
Yet do we trust the forms that come and go
Hold forth a promise of the world to be—
And, till the creeping darkness covers all,
We lie and watch the shadows on the wall."
—Allan Sanderson, *Chamber's Journal*.

²⁵ Matthew Arnold, Preface to *Essays in Criticism*, 1st series.

THE EARLY DIETICIAN.

BY W. B. CONGER.

"Wherein consists the contents of primitive thought?
....that which awakens his emotions and calls forth
particularly fear and terror comes to be an object of
magical and demoniacal belief."

Wilhelm Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*.

AS we derived our morals from the fear of angry ghosts, so did we attain to etiquette by devious by-ways through the fear of woman! The process was a long and painful one, but has developed into a condition whereby women reap the benefit, as all social customs will eventually accrue to their advantage. It is a peculiar Christian who does not, when he carves the turkey, leg of lamb or cuts the steak, serve his wife with the choicest morsel, even though he may retain the larger share; but his early forebears would have regarded such politeness with horror. Neither, to-day, are troubled by the fear of magic or dread of the evil eye; the only bugaboo is the medicine man, the dietician, who substitutes beans for meat.

In the long ago, before science made the faith of some of us totter in things visible and invisible, our ancestors evolved an etiquette which must have made meal time not altogether a thing of pleasure.¹ The main idea is a fear of contamination through the qualities of the female. We shall also find that this belief is not confined to a low stage of culture, but that it is taught and held by the Parsis and Hindus, and that the results are still widespread, as with the Chinese, whose social customs, like all ancestor-worshipping peoples, show similarity of origin, and still lingers with the Syrian Christians among whom eating with men is still taboo to women.

¹ The principle of social taboo is an idea, due to the concrete habit of the human mind in a low stage of culture, that the attributes assigned to the individual who is feared, loathed, or despised are materially transmissible by contact of any sort. The most widely diffused form of this taboo is the rule which forbids men and women to eat together. Ernest Crawley, M. A., "Taboos of Commensality," *Folk-Lore*, VI. 1895.

With primitive peoples great ceremony attaches to eating. This applies also to men, but in more limited ways than with the ostracized woman. Contact is feared. In the Solomon Islands guests bring their own food, as these natives believe that if any one should accidentally retain a morsel of the food of his host, the host would mysteriously exercise an influence over him. In some places a man will not eat out of the same basket as another, and others will not accept food offered with bare hands. This fear follows the savage² into a far higher stage of culture and has the faith of others besides the Parsi,³ who believes that a nail paring left unprayed over turns into the arms and equipments of the Māzanān demons. Among the Bakairi each man eats by himself, and the natives of Borneo feed alone, with more or less ceremony, considering it wrong to attack even an enemy while he is eating.⁴ Linked with the belief that a woman's glance is especially poisonous, would permeate the food and deprive it of its strength,⁵ besides conveying in place of its inherent virtues the deleterious and obnoxious qualities characteristic of the female,⁶ is another special danger particularly imminent at meals. This is the danger to the soul. When the mouth is open it may be extracted by an enemy present, or, while one's own soul is absent, a homeless spirit may take up its abode. It is believed that the soul of man sometimes leaves him, as in dreams, or when he sneezes, and hence it is well to invoke a blessing upon him at such a moment.⁷ The distinction drawn as to women and the food taboo is clearly shown inasmuch as while no alien is initiated into the sacred mysteries of the Fijians, yet they are allowed to aid in the preparation and partake of the feast which follows such ceremonies, but a Fijian woman never.⁸ The Warua will not allow any one to see them eat, but are doubly particular that no one of the opposite sex does so.⁹ Youths are particularly liable to malign influences when they have just undergone the initiation ceremonies into the new and religious life reserved for men, and among some tribes, at least, must carefully cover their mouths when a woman

² Crawley, *The Mystic Rose: A Study in Primitive Marriage*, 86 (1902).

³ *Pahlavi Texts*, I, 342 4, 5.

⁴ (*Jour. Anthropol. Inst.*, XXIII, 160) Crawley, *Ibid.*, 140, 148-149.

⁵ *Grihaya-Sutra*, 123.

⁶ *Pahlavi Texts*, I, 283 1.

⁷ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 367.

⁸ Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, 27.

⁹ "I had to pay a man to let me see him drink, I could not make a man let a woman see him drink." Lt. V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa*, II, 71.

is present.¹⁰ The fear of the savage does not die out but follows him into a higher culture.

Whatever etiquette, however, is observed through fear of sympathetic magic between men, the most widely diffused form of this taboo is the rule which forbids men and women to eat together.¹¹ Many peoples have an implicit belief in the transmission of qualities, moral as well as physical, as the most prominent dietician to-day believes in his theories regarding the harmful effects of a protein diet upon a patient suffering from auto-intoxication. Partaking of the flesh and blood of any creature¹² caused them to absorb its qualities, desirable or otherwise. In drinking blood which represents and is life, one might appropriate the spirit of the animal.¹³ The early Romans forbade wine to women under the severest penalties. The juice of the grape being its blood, the wine god infused his votaries with his spirit. The gambols and ravings of the drunken man were considered inspired, and no one might interfere with or insult him. An inspired woman was an undesirable member of society owing partly to the impossibility of keeping her in subjection, with the additional danger of an intoxicated woman not only bringing confusion into ancestor-worshiping families, but into the *gens*.

A man in a low stage of culture dreads the hyena, for if his wife succeeds in making him eat its brains, he will acquire its stupidity, and she will gain complete control over him. Not only does the possession of food or any object belonging to another, or, especially, any portion of the physical being, such as hair or nails, cause the thief to acquire power over the original owner, but in Central Australia a man fears to even have his wife's relatives see him eat, for if he did their smell would get into the food and make him ill.¹⁴

The forbidding of certain foods to women or certain portions of the anatomy arises more from a belief in the qualities possessed by animals, and the desirability of increasing such characteristics as it is desirable for men to possess, such as courage, swiftness,

¹⁰ J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, "Taboo or the Perils of the Soul," 116-117, 122.

¹¹ Crawley, "Taboos of Commensality," *Folk-Lore*, VI, 1895.

¹² W. R. Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, 313-314; First Series (1914).

¹³ Wilhelm Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, II, 200, 209. Trans. E. L. Schaub, Ph. D.

¹⁴ (Spencer and Gillen). Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 398-399.

cunning pugnacity, etc.: to obtain by absorption qualities supposed to be contained in certain organs or portions, the fear of allowing women to use such specifics so as to increase such traits as the above, as well as sagacity, and in particular eloquence, thereby augmenting the difficulty of keeping them in subjection, causes the various taboos on food rather than mere greediness on the part of men.

A woman of the Kafirs who eats fowl is sold into slavery,¹⁵ and among the Samoyeds the head of reindeer is forbidden, though the Dyaks of Borneo refrain from deer's meat as it might make them fainthearted.¹⁶ The Dacotahs eat liver of dog and the Kafirs prepare a powder made of the dried flesh of various animals so as to absorb their varied qualities.¹⁷ The heart of a water ouzel eaten by an Ainu, will not only make him a good marksman but will enable him to endure fatigue and above all things grow eloquent. The Eskimos have a taboo on eating seal and caribou the same day. Not only do some early peoples forbid the eating of fish,¹⁸ but those living in a higher stage of culture sometimes ostracize the eaters of fish. The Masai formerly forbade their women to eat anything but sheep.¹⁹ The Hottentot shares cow's milk with his wife, but a man is forbidden to eat sheep. Among the Mbyas of South America beef and monkey are two of the meats not allowed to women, and no girl may partake of any fish over a foot long.²⁰ The Miris of Northern India consider tiger meat unsuitable for women as it would make them strong minded.²¹ The Hindus believe in the virtues of certain foods as do other races.²² Then again we find the liver becomes an honorable organ, the kidneys dishonorable, the organs of mastication gentile, the organs of generation vulgar.²³

In addition to the forbidding of meat to women for the above reasons, the loss occasioned to men if the *mana* or soul of any

¹⁵ E. Reclus, *The Earth and Its Inhabitants*, I, 215.

¹⁶ (Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forest of the Far East*, I, 186). Crawley, *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁷ Sir John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization*, 19-20.

¹⁸ Frank Boaz, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, 222-223 (1911).

¹⁹ Friedrich Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, 493. Trans. from 2d German ed. by A. J. Butler.

²⁰ Lubbock, *Ibid.*, 447.

²¹ (Dalton, *Ethnology of Bengal*, 33). Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Idea*, II, 321.

²² *Grihaya Sutra*, II, 283.

²³ J. P. Warbasse, M. D., *Medical Sociology*, 89 (1909).

creature be absorbed by a woman, is the fear of the power of the occult, and that they may yet be more than ever at the mercy of a creature who repels and yet allures them. The forbidding of meat to women for three nights at certain rhythmic periods becomes a religious tenet in a far higher stage of culture, as the fiend dwelling within her is in a state of activity, and any strength she may gain accrues to Ahriman;²⁴ the ruling evil spirit of the Parsis, as opposed to Ahura Mazda, the benevolent. There is reason to believe that the foundation for the exclusion of women from social, political and religious life, and the limiting of even the domestic, rests upon the fear men entertain of the catamenia. (There is no known connection between the catamenia and ovulation). Through the prohibitions caused by this fear they are still in a few instances ostracized from the village occupied by the men, in more numerous cases a wife will either sleep in another building or only occasionally enter her husband's room, wherever the men's house is established, and it has been and is widespread,²⁵ they are usually forbidden to enter at any time on pain of death but always at meal time. As with religion they crept in later as servitors. Among the Mayas women acted as cup-bearers, and when presenting a cup to a man the woman turned her back while he drank.²⁶

Sympathetic magic is strongly brought out among a people whose enciente women are not expected to eat game whose intestines have been injured and who is forbidden to eat that given to her by others than her husband, as the child, though born in wedlock, is in danger of being a bastard.²⁷ The men of the Kwakiutl, who catch geese, are not allowed to eat herring eggs because this would cause the geese to scatter. They are also forbidden rock cod, which causes the fires to be red and smoky, so that they cannot see what they are looking for. Sea-eggs and tallow are also forbidden for these would cause their faces to become white and easily visible to the birds. The association of the traits of animals with portions of their anatomy is carried so far by some Indians that they wear the claws of bears in order to absorb their courage and ferocity, these conveyances of power appearing to us merely as the uncivilized idea of ornament. Bones are believed to contain certain specifics. A child's skull was hung around the neck by the Tasmanians in order to check the progress of disease.

²⁴ *The Zend-Avesta*, 182.

²⁵ Hutton Webster, *Ibid.*

²⁶ H. H. Bancroft, *Civilized Nations*, II, 711. M. A. B. Tucker, *Woman Preachers, The Nineteenth Century and After*, Dec., 1916.

²⁷ E. Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 35-36.

Wherever cannibalism was or is practised, the portion of the body considered the seat of the soul is retained for the chief. A man's strength and spirit may reside in his kidney fat, heart, or even a lock of hair.²⁸ Some cannibals eat the body of the slain to destroy its soul or ghost and thus secure themselves against its vengeance,²⁹ but the African cannibal in conquering his enemy eats him in order to absorb his strength, skill and bravery.³⁰ When Sir Charles McCarthy was killed by the Ashantes in 1824, the chiefs divided his heart between them, while his flesh was distributed among the lower officers and his bones preserved as national fetishes for many years at Coomassie.³¹ To women, *bokolo* or dead body is usually forbidden. As opposed to the faith in the efficacy of the blood of a man or of certain animals, some tribes believe a draught of women's blood would kill the strongest man. In China the heart, liver, gall and blood of executed criminals is used for life-strengthening purposes, and Chinese soldiers still eat the heart and liver of criminals to gain pluck. In Christian Europe the blood of criminals has been drunk as a cure against epilepsy and other diseases.³²

The fighting instinct was undoubtedly cultivated and the courage of the individual increased through a staunch belief in the efficacy of the means used, as the deprivation of such specifics to women aided in cultivating the opposite traits, the possession of pugnacity and the enjoyment of physical strength and courage eventually becoming unladylike. The consideration shown by the husband to a wife, the deference he pays the womanly qualities he admires, the courtesies of men to women are the reversal of the original customs of society. The military man is still of preeminent importance, and the spectacular exhibitions of prowess of his profusely decorated ancestor is repeated in the exploits of the U-boat, the U-boat chaser, and the aviator, not to mention the courage of the individual of all ranks. The protection of women in war or in a mishap is of slow growth, in which men to their muscular

²⁸ Andrew Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, 48.

²⁹ P. V. N. Meyers, *History of Past Ethics*, 26.

³⁰ (Dr. H. C. Trumbull, *Blood Covenant*, 1893). Rev. R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, 246. J. A. McCullough, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, 233-245. J. Deniker, *The Races of Men*, 147-148. L. T. Hobhouse, *Ibid.*, 240.

³¹ J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, "Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild," 149.

³² (De Groot). Westermarck, *Ibid.*, II, 264, 565 2. E. H. Parker, *China*, 277.

courage have added the moral strength to stand against odds or certain death with a coolness and self-control which thrills the blood of the most phlegmatic. Sir Samuel Baker says a Latooka man values his cows³³ and wives. In a *razzia* fight he will seldom stand for his wives, but when he does fight it is to save his cattle. Under similar conditions of belief, it would not be etiquette to shoot a poisoned arrow at a man, but perfectly correct to discharge one at a woman.³⁴

That animals are sacred, that the most sacred portions of some animals have been used in sacrificial ceremonies has been found to exist in many parts of the world. This belief is carried to such an extent that even contact will cause an inanimate object to absorb sacredness. The Inuits hoist a bear's bladder on top of the poles supporting the *igloo*, and if a male's will contain the man's weapons, if a female's the wife's ornaments also. The bladder is the seat of life, and the desired qualities of the former owner will enter into the articles. The holy feast of the male buffalo, the flesh of which is eaten only by the men of the Todas, is held in the depth of the forest. The Caribs forbid the holy part of an ox to women. These same people believe that the viands partaken of by the spirits become holy, and only the old men and people of importance might taste them, and even this required a certain amount of bodily purity.³⁵ Mohammed would not eat lizards because he thought them the offspring of a metamorphosed clan of Israelites.³⁶ Dog with some peoples is particularly desirable for a religious feast, and the Ban-

³³ They are sacred.

³⁴ "Only when the arrow is smeared with plant poisons does the bow become a real weapon. In itself the arrow wound is not sufficient to kill either game or enemy; the arrow must be poisoned if the wound is to cause death or even temporary disability." Wundt, *Ibid.*, 26. A native of the Naga Hills told an Englishman that it was not the correct thing to use a poisoned arrow except to shoot it at a woman. (*Jour. Anthropol. Inst. of Great Britain*, 199). W. G. Sumner, *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals* (1907).

³⁵ Edward Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II, 388.

³⁶ "Moreover, if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, certain others, on the contrary, are forbidden to persons of a sacred character, because they are profane. Thus it frequently happens that certain animals are specially designated as the food of women; for this reason they believe that they partake of a feminine nature and that they are consequently profane. On the other hand, the young novice is submitted to a series of rites of a particular severity; to give him the virtues which will enable him to enter into the world of sacred things, from which he had up till then been excluded, they center an exceptionally powerful group of religious forces upon him. Thus he enters into a state of sanctity which keeps all that is profane at a distance. Then he is not allowed to eat the game which is regarded as the special food of women (Howitt, *Native Tribes*, 674). Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religion*, 303-304.

ziris in the French Congo reserve its flesh for men, surrounding it with a solemn ritual. A man must not touch his wife for a day afterward.³⁷ The Dayfur people of South Africa and the For of Central Africa prohibit women from eating liver, because they believe it to be the seat of the soul, that a person may increase his soul by partaking of it,³⁸ the inference being that as women have no souls it would be wasted. Totem animals are sacred to the clan, often named after them, which believe them holy, and are usually forbidden as food, besides, as with the Kwakiutl, the owl, their totem, when killed causes the death of a person.³⁹ *Au contraire*, with others the killing of the totem is sometimes necessary, as with the Lilloats of British Columbia, and is also a religious carnival. Over the body of the dead bear, their ancestor, they chant:

"You died first greatest of animals. We respect you, and will treat you accordingly. No woman shall eat your flesh; no dogs insult you."⁴⁰

Race culture is practised and there are few breaches in civilized society which would meet with the disapproval of the social community as would the slightest remissness considered detrimental to the race or which would tend to bring misfortune upon it. Among the Malays neither father nor mother may look at a mirror nor into a bamboo tube, as if they did the child would squint.⁴¹ An enceinte woman must be most abstemious. On the islands of Torres Straits should an expectant mother eat *at*, a flat fish, or a *gib*, a red fish, her baby would have poor eyes or an unshapely nose or be like a dotard. Eugenists even require girls in some instances to refrain from pig on account of its ugly mouth and long snout. In the Admiralty Islands no enceinte woman may eat yams or taro bulbs less her child be dumpy, and if she ate pork the little creature might have bristles instead of hair. Among the Thompson River Indians a pregnant woman was not allowed, among other articles of food, to eat or even touch porcupine flesh or to eat anything killed by a hawk or eagle. If she ate the flesh of the bear the infant would have a hair lip. Besides her own prohibitions, anything forbidden to her husband was taboo to her. It appears, also, that in some places the husband is under prohibitions for a time. The Shuswap

³⁷ Sumner, *Ibid.*, 339.

³⁸ (Falkin). Westermarck, *Ibid.*, II, 320-321.

³⁹ A. A. Goldenweiser, "Totemism: An Analytical Study," *Amer. Jour. Folk-Lore*, April-June, 1910, 200 2.

⁴⁰ Goldenweiser, *Ibid.*, 204.

⁴¹ Ratzel, *Ibid.*, 441.

woman was forbidden to eat any bird, mammal or fish, except salmon. Among the Haida, a woman was forbidden certain meats owing the harm it would do the unborn child. Among certain peoples women at no time ate the head parts of any animals, and but few men ate them, unless they were shamans.⁴² In the Banks Islands of the Pacific both parents eat only such food as would not cause illness to the new-born child.⁴³ A Cherokee woman was not allowed to eat ruffed grouse, for while that bird has large families it loses most of its young; strict people do not allow women to eat this bird until they are believed to be incapable of bearing children. The list of food denied the Australian woman is long, including many fishes and all turtles; only an enceinte woman may eat pigeon, it would make all others ill.⁴⁴ For an expectant mother among ourselves who desired a boy, a meat diet was recommended not so very long ago.

In Mili, one of the New Hebrides, the men prepare all their food in the men's club house, which is, of course, taboo to women, as anything a woman cooks is by them considered unclean.⁴⁵ In other communities a woman cannot enter the dining room during meal time,⁴⁶ and in others no woman may enter the building at any time on pain of death. Travelers have found unconscious infringements of such taboos a matter of peril, for the injudicious handing of food to women for distribution among warriors has brought them perilously near to being speared.⁴⁷ A Maori who touched an unclean woman himself became taboo "an inch thick,"⁴⁸ which is a literal translation of the belief in the corpuscular theory further developed by the sages.

New crops are frequently taboo until the chief has partaken of them, whereby he exercises his *mana* or magical power over them. In New Caledonia women may not eat of them until long after the men have partaken of them.

Such taboos affected necessarily not only social but domestic life. The Hottentot woman eats separately. She rarely enters her

⁴² Goldenweiser, *Ibid.*, 199.

⁴³ Wyllistine Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, 39.

⁴⁴ Ratzel, *Ibid.*, 372.

⁴⁵ (Baessler, *Südsee-Bilder*, 625). Webster, *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁶ The catamenia is an offense against meal time. *Pahlavi Texts*, III, 303-305.

⁴⁷ Rev. J. G. Wood, *The Uncivilized Races of Man*, II, 757.

⁴⁸ (*Jour. Anthropol. Instit.*, XIX, 101). Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, II.

husband's room. Catlin says that in all his experience among the Indians of North America he never saw an Indian woman eat with her husband.⁴⁹ A Dacotah believed that if he ate with his wife his lips would dry up and turn black; a Uripiv who ventured to do so would face a mysterious death. Among the old Semites it was not customary for a man to eat with his wife, and to-day a Southern Arabian "would rather die than accept food at the hands of a woman."⁵⁰ It was not, in the early part of the nineteenth century, a universal custom for a man belonging to the higher classes among the Egyptians to take his meals with his wife, either being too haughty or too engaged to do so.⁵¹ It is not a custom for men and women to dine together in China, although husband, wife and adult children will oftentimes eat at the same table, but when guests are present the women of the family do not appear,⁵² a modern repetition of the social custom which bound the woman-citizen of Athens. Some men who will not eat with their wives will eat with their employees.⁵³ The present idea appears to be, not so much the fear of harm, as that a man's dignity is impinged by eating with women. A mother is said, also, to be forbidden to eat with her male children, and here again we find the Hindu idea paralleled, nor has she the right to touch the food her son leaves.⁵⁴

The savage's belief in the magical power exercised over another through the possession of some article or by proximity continues in a century-long domestic taboo. Among some tribes of barbaric status, the elder brothers and father are served by the younger male members of the family, and when there are guests at table wait upon them, and on such occasions, like the women of many nations, take their meal afterward. The peasant wife of to-day of whatever clime, eats from a stew pan in a corner, rarely sitting at the table with her husband.⁵⁵ Mrs. Bishop found the custom wherever she traveled.⁵⁶ In one account she gives, a wife presented the food to her husband with the customary gesture of

⁴⁹ (Catlin, *Manners, Customs and Conditions of the North American Indians*). H. T. Finck, *Primitive Love and Love Stories*, 578.

⁵⁰ Sumner, *Ibid.*, 459.

⁵¹ E. D. Lane, *The Modern Egyptian*, 129.

⁵² Rev. Justus Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, I, 46.

⁵³ K. F. Junor, M. D., *Curious and Characteristic Customs of the Chinese*, (1910).

⁵⁴ W. M. Gallichan, *Woman Under Polygamy*, 287-288, (1915).

⁵⁵ Caroline Dall, *The College, the Market and the Court*, 275-276, (1914).

⁵⁶ *Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan*.

respect, then served her little son, omitting the salutation, and then she and her little daughter retired and ate together. A Serbian bride at her wedding for the first and last time eats with a man and is served instead of serving.⁵⁷ The Nestorian Christians do not eat together, that is, the women do not eat with the men, a phenomenon of savagery running alongside the doctrines of Christ. As usual, we can find the expositions of savage ideas in the Sacred Books of the East, especially among the Parsis and Hindus. As the savage believes in the transmissibility of qualities by contact, so is the corpuscular theory expounded by orthodox pundits,⁵⁸ and in some respects surpasses that of the barbarian.

As we rise higher in the stage of culture sacred precepts forbid the sexes eating together. The fear the savage entertained of magical influences becomes religious tenets. Among the Hindus it is proper for a woman to eat apart from men, including her husband.⁵⁹ A Snātaka, a particularly holy man, is especially forbidden to eat with his wife or even look at her while she eats or sits at her ease, for it is declared in the *Vâgaseneyaka*, "his children will be destitute of manly vigor."⁶⁰ The behests to students of the holy books are not only numerous but specific.⁶¹ So well are these tenets obeyed to-day, that even in a happy home, where, in spite of many obstacles (principally in-laws) love dwells, the women of the family usually take their meals after the men have had theirs, and the wife as a rule, eats what it may please her lord to leave on his plate.⁶² The Sadhs have twelve commandments, of which the tenth says a man must not eat a woman's leaving, but a woman may eat what a man has left, as may be the custom.⁶³

This fear was not alone the fear of touch, but of glance, which has its foundation in the fear of the evil eye, and includes certain objectionable animals, and the low caste. If a man of inferior caste enters the kitchen of a Hindu while food is being prepared, all of it must be thrown away. If food so contaminated were eaten, it would taint the souls as well as bodies of the eaters and would cause long and painful expiation. A Brâhmana who dies

⁵⁷ Crawley, *Ibid.*, 177. Esther Singleton, *Turkey and the Balkan States*.

⁵⁸ E. Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of Southern India*, 109 (1912).

⁵⁹ *Satapatha-Brâmana*, I, 259. *The Institutes of Vishnu*, 221, 226-227. Crawley, *Ibid.*, 169-10.

⁶⁰ *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, II, 61. *The Laws of Manu*, 138.

⁶¹ *Grihaya Sutras*, 123.

⁶² Pundita Ramabai Saravasti, *The High Caste Hindu Woman*, 48-49.

⁶³ H. H. Wilson, *Sketches of Religious Sects*, I, 355.

with the food of a Sudra in his stomach becomes a village pig in his next life or is born into the family of a Sûdra. If, after eating such food, he becomes guilty with a Sûdra woman of an offense against caste, his sons shall belong to the Sûdra, and he shall not ascend to heaven.⁶⁴ A *Kândâla* must not look at the Brâhmanas while they eat. Now a *Kândâla* is the offspring of a Sûdra and a woman of the Brâhmana caste. There is nothing as low, for morality in India is largely founded on caste, except the offspring of a Brâhmana and a Sûdra woman, a *Pârasava*, who, though living, is impure as a corpse. No one, not even a Brâhmana, can escape the contamination caused by nearness to a corpse.⁶⁵ Offenses in India are in inverse ratio to caste importance, even sex playing a somewhat inferior part, though the sexual offense of a woman, as founded on ancestor-worshipping families, is far more heinous than that of which her husband is guilty.

The development of the moral ideas of the Brâhmana has been as remarkable, if not more so, than any other race, but certainly none have made such a comprehensive effort to protect caste. It is to be noted that a village pig is one of the animals not allowed to look at a Brâhmana while he eats, as well as the cock and dog. Here the Hindu is at absolute variance with the Parsi, both of these animals being held in high honor by the Parsi, ill treatment of our most faithful friend being severely punished, the penalty sometimes being death. To the list of those who may not look at a Brâhmana while he eats is a eunuch and an unclean woman: "what any of these sees at a burnt oblation, at a solemn gift, at a dining given to Brâhmanas, or at any rite in honor of the gods and *manes*, that produces not the desired result."⁶⁶ The fear of the evil eye did and still exists in Christian countries and is not always confined to the uneducated.⁶⁷

A boy is separated from his mother in early society sometimes at the age of three or four, but it is not usually until puberty approaches that he is taken away and preparations for his initiation into the world of men's interests are begun. This is a religious

⁶⁴ *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, II, 39.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 94, 95.

⁶⁶ *Manu*, 119.

⁶⁷ The evil eye is firmly believed in in Syria. A fat and sweet baby, a handsome and strong man, a beautiful woman, a very fruitful tree, an abundant crop of silk cocoons, etc., are in constant danger of being injured or even killed by an admiring evil eye. "Often did my mother grab and run away with me, her beautiful baby, to the nearest hiding place, when one who was supposed to 'strike with the eye' happened to be passing anywhere near our house."—A. M. Rihbany, *A Far Journey; an Autobiography* (1914).

world, and his initiation into it is sometimes so severe that the weaker novice dies. Prior to his initiation he has lived in a profane world, the world of women and children and uninitiated men.⁶⁸ Through these sacred mysteries the novice undergoes, not simply a new development in his life, but a "transformation *totius substantiæ*."⁶⁹ The novice dies. He is reborn a new being, purified in body, with the birth taint removed from him, and with a mind vivified to embrace the sacred mysteries imparted to him by the old men. This idea is illustrated, in its development, among the Hindus. The syllable OM, which is the essence of the Veda, a salutation to Râma, is to be pronounced at the beginning and end of a lesson studied from their sacred books by a student, who, meditating on the syllable OM becomes thereby fit to be united with Brahma.⁷⁰ Sometimes a few preliminary precautions are taken before such separation begins, and boys will be forbidden to eat food belonging to women. Novices among the Kumai of Gippsland may not eat female animals. The undesirability of having women at meals, the belief in the transmission of undesirable qualities of course easily embraces the physical. It is presumable that the hard labor women perform, the distances they trudge burdened with heavy loads, soon turn them into unpleasing objects; for these people think that if a boy ate with women he would grow up ugly and become gray. It is said there is no leisure to equal the leisure of an African gentleman. The tribes of Western Victoria forbid a boy to eat a female opossum, for if he did he would become peevish and discontented; these two traits are ascribed as characteristic female qualities. The list of food forbidden a boy is sometimes long about the time of his initiation. Parrots and cockatoos are among those forbidden in some tribes, kangaroo tail also, as it brings premature age and decay. No boy may eat a female bandicoot, because he would probably bleed to death at the initiation ceremonies.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Rules are given in the sacred books at what ages a boy may be initiated. If the initiation does not take place at such times, after a certain age he can no longer be a candidate.

⁶⁹ Durkheim, *Ibid.*, 39, etc.

⁷⁰ *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, II, 283-284. H. H. Wilson, *Sketches of Religious Sects*, I, 40. *The Institutes of Vishnu*, 126. *The Laws of Manu*, 43-44.

⁷¹ Goldenweiser, *Ibid.* Harrison, *Ibid.*, 36. I. W. Thomas, *The Source Book of Social Origins*, 241. Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*. Jane Harrison, *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of the Greek Religions* (1912).

A god would not only be polluted by the approach of an unclean person and his holiness diminished, thereby exciting his anger,⁷² but any offerings could be defiled. In Tahiti the choicest foods, the flesh of pig, fowl and fish, coconuts⁷³ and plantains, anything which was to be offered to the gods, could be partaken of by men, but a woman was forbidden on pain of death to touch them.⁷⁴ Temples, altars, and ground held sacred to the mysteries of a religious faith are forbidden to women at all times; there continue to be certain restrictions at all times, and again at certain periods.⁷⁵ Of the great religious teachers Christ alone placed the woman-soul on the same plane as the man-soul. A Hindu wife takes a quiescent part in certain household ceremonies. *Ghec*, the sacrificial butter, is always a sacrificial element, and its purity is so sullied by her glance that it has to be reheated in order to remove the impurity she has imparted to it.⁷⁶ The Parsi teaches that the glance of an unclean woman takes the virtue out of any object at which she looks, imparts evil to every thing which she touches, and taints even their most sacred shrub if she is within a certain number of feet, so that earth, wood, fire and water, the sun and the starlight must be, as well as her fellow man, protected against her;⁷⁷ therefore in the olden days she was incarcerated in the *dashtanistan*, nowadays in a windowless and doorless room contained in every Parsi home. The Hindu warns all men against approaching an unclean woman; Mohammed is an echo. The Hindu woman must remove her ornaments, she must not laugh or run, she must not attend to household duties, etc. The cultured Roman held ideas not as extreme, but showed this belief still held him.⁷⁸ A world-wide situation is summed up by the Hebrew sage: "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow

⁷² Westermarck, *Ibid.*, II, 354.

⁷³ Which have magical qualities.

⁷⁴ Sir John Lubbock, *Ibid.*, 447-448. "Oppressive as were the laws to men, they were far more so upon the women. . . . Neither could they eat with men; their houses and their labor were distinct; their aliment was separately prepared. A female child from birth to death was allowed no food that had touched its father's dish. The choicest of animal and vegetable products were reserved for the male child; for the female the poorest; and the use of many kinds, such as pork, shark, bananas and coconut were altogether interdicted." J. J. Jarves, *History of the Sandwich Islands*.

⁷⁵ Thomas, *Ibid.* Durkheim, *Ibid.* Rt. Rev. Chas. Jos. Hefele, D. D., *A History of the Christian Councils*. Trans. and ed. by Rev. W. R. Clark, M. A. 2d ed. revised (Edinburgh) 1884.

⁷⁶ *Satapatha-Brâhmana*, III, 75 19.

⁷⁷ *The Zend Avesta. Pahlavi Texts*, I, 279; III, 303-305.

⁷⁸ *Pliny, The Natural History of*, II, 150-152; IV, 199 2; V, 304-307. Trans. J. Bostock and H. T. Riley.

and thy conception; thy desire shall be unto thy husband and he shall rule over thee."⁷⁹ In savagery, in barbarism and in civilization a woman at child-birth is a tabooed object; girls at puberty, women when enceinte were and are objects of dread. Lingering beliefs hold their influence in Christian Europe, whispers are heard in our country districts; nay, even in our large cities!

In Africa it appears there is no usage for the word "home,"⁸⁰ and there is apparently no family institution among the Bako, dwarfs of Kamerun.⁸¹ Women are sometimes totally excluded from the villages occupied by the men.⁸² In the Pelew Islands there is no family life, no social life including the women, and needless to say, the taboo is also political. In the Society and Sandwich Islands the women are practically isolated. Among the Samoyeds and Ostiaks the wife keeps in her corner of the tent. Among the Bedouins the tent is divided, the men talking in the one side, the women working in the other. In Corea there is no family life. There is no family life, as we know it, in China, Japan or India. Women, at least among the lower classes, among Slavonic peoples owe formal deference to men. From the dance, from festivals, from the drama, women have everywhere, in one way or another, been forbidden participation.⁸³ Such customs merged from the fear of magic through the religious tenets of our Aryan ancestors into one in which it was not etiquette for women to appear at the same table when men were guests. An Athenian citizen-woman in the age of Pericles who attempted to break down this barrier would have done so at the price of her reputation. So long did this taboo continue it is said that wives in England did not sit at the table until the tenth century.⁸⁴ Harmless superstitions carry on the ancient fear, as in Brandenburg lovers and married people must not eat from the same plate or drink from the same cup. In the district of Fahrland, near Potsdam, there is a prohibition which is observed against a married couple biting the same slice of bread.

⁷⁹ Gen. iii. 15.

⁸⁰ D. Crawford, *Thinking Black: Thirty-Two Years Without a Break in the Long Congo of Central Africa (Konga Vantus)*.

⁸¹ Sumner, *Ibid.*, 345.

⁸² (Burrows, "On the Native Races of the Upper Welle District of the Belgian Congo," *Jour. Anthropol. Inst.*, N. S., I, 41); Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 299, 300.

⁸³ (J. Georgi, *Les Native Samoyeds*, 15, 137); 37 5. (B. T. Somerville, *Jour. Anthropol. Inst.*, XXIII, 4) 40 (1, 2, 5, 6), 52-53(3)-54. Thomas, *Source Book*, 471. Stephen Graham, "The Russians and the War," *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1915.

⁸⁴ Matilda Jocelyn Gage, *Woman, Church and State*, 341-342.

The psychological effect of a phenomenon which neither sex understood is the fountainhead for the exclusion of women not only from partaking of food with men, but the resulting exclusion and ostracism which has been and is domestic, social, political and religious. This separation of men and women led, we may believe to a more varied development than otherwise would have occurred. The seclusion, the ostracism developed diplomacy, which is one of the chief characteristics of women, coyness, a trait which has puzzled the anthropologist and psychologist, fear, asceticism, with other contributory causes, brought dissembling, prudery. Modesty, however, among Christian women, is largely a matter of fashion; a "striking" costume attracts attention, if not admiration. Fear, asceticism and aestheticism developed a viewpoint which has produced an unhealthy attitude toward the essentials of normal living; but this involves the enforcement of the double moral standard which first made the married woman the bearer of a double burden and at a later stage of culture involved the young girl in the bearing of an even heavier burden. Timidity was engendered, besides a certain amount of gentleness and sympathy. The fighting instinct, however, is not dead among women as evidenced by the late war. Both seclusion and ostracism tended to make women more tractable than the sex which became, as a rule, unclean⁸⁵ only through contact with unclean objects, as opposed to a sex which was fundamentally *noa*, common, or more properly speaking, evil. Woman was the dwelling place of superabundant evil, and as such was the object of demoniac attack and the source of evil to others.

The subjection of women was not founded on muscular weakness; there is no record of such in savage or barbarous society. The chief cause was much more subtle, i. e., fear, which is the most unreasoning of all the emotions. Her blood was poisonous, at certain stages of belief, to drink; if seen it would cast a blight upon a boy's life or cause a man's death; her touch took the virtue out of weapons; her glance banished the polish from metal; it blunted weapons. She was ostracized from the chase, the fight.

From savagery into barbarism, through barbarism into civilization, through civilization into Christianity we find a belief which has made society what it is.

⁸⁵ This phase is brought out more clearly in the teachings of the Hebrew than any other peoples.

THE EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH.

BY ORLAND O. NORRIS.

I.

WILL the Church survive? Will Christianity itself survive? It all depends. The answer to the first question depends on the Church itself. If the Church survives, that will be because it so adjusts itself to the evolutionary needs of humanity, as these are more and more clearly apprehended, as to merit and to win continuous voluntary support. The answer to the second question depends upon what is meant by Christianity. If the name is understood merely as a meaningless synonym for "western civilization," as people commonly use words, and if western civilization adjusts itself to the demands of evolution, then the name Christianity may be expected to persist, but actually as a misnomer: the distinguishing features, that once made our civilization true to the name, will have disappeared. But if tradition-serving ecclesiasticism and sectarianism persist in asserting the meaning historically and etymologically denoted by the name Christianity, we may expect men to revolt against the name and discard it, even though western civilization continues. The survival of the mere name, on the one hand, will connote no gain; its disappearance, on the other hand, will be no sign of loss. For by that time we may expect a respectable minority of men to understand the psychology by which the Jew Jesus was made out to have become a supernatural Christ; to know that transcendental, other-world belief is not a motive but only a sanction of conduct, and an erroneous one at that; and that however far men may stray from the evolutionary highway, misled by the glaring bill-boards of an erroneous cultural tradition, their prime and essential affiliations are of this world and with their fellow men. The problem of supreme importance for man is continuously to provide that the human species itself may persist upon earth:

and only as it ministers helpfully and directly in the species struggle for a continued life upon earth has the Church, or Christianity, or what we call western civilization, or any institution in the life of man any claim upon a right to perpetuity. The human evolutionary process demands some such institution as the Church. Our established institutions of secular education cannot suffice; their work is not extended to all, nor far beyond the limits of youth. The press cannot meet the need; the personal and the social touch are necessary. The Church of the present cannot fill the breach, its vision distorted by a mythological idealism that is a mere travesty of man's real impulses. If the Church does not awake and adjust itself to the need, we may expect some other institution to develop, out of the very needs of men, to supplant it.

II.

The Church, like the Sabbath, was made for man; and, like the Sabbath, it was made by man to satisfy unidentified impulses and needs that the current social order brought to consciousness and set men to trying to interpret. But considerable critical thinking has been done since the Man of Nazareth lived and propounded his social program for the satisfaction of these needs—a program that lacked the scientific data and presuppositions to keep its logical implications within the scope of the real world, a program which his followers misconceived and misinterpreted to suit their own preconceived purposes in the founding of the Church. And our present-day philosophies of life, in so far as their authors go to the life process itself for their data and not to theological misinterpretations of previous misinterpretations of the impulses of life, represent a greatly changed conception of those needs, even from that of Jesus.

Jesus lived and taught among a down-trodden people, in an age of cruel economic exploitation, when his race and economic stratum saw no hopeful outlook for themselves in this world. In his attitude Jesus himself was not of this hopeless mass. He felt and taught the essential oneness of humanity, as had the great author of the Book of Jonah before him. His message embodied an equal measure of rights and of possible hopefulness for all the units of his regard, namely, for all *individuals* of all degrees and of all races. Living before the discovery of man's evolutionary backgrounds, as he did, his philosophy had none of that direct reference of distant social and racial futurity that would have

satisfied the desires of all normal men regarding a future life; and he was too much interested in men's lives in this world to give much attention to that imaginary, mythical afterworld in which his disciples located their chief interest. Like them, he apparently felt convinced of man's increasing wickedness, and therefore of an approaching "end of the world." His altruism, expressed in the Golden Rule, took account only of men's lateral, social relationships, as individual creatures of one flesh and blood. It was a "saving" philosophy, calculated to stay the supposedly inevitable disintegration; it was not a positive, constructive program intended to build a social order that would persist because of its own vitality. While it presupposed for all races of men a derivation from a common source, yet the course of their descent it represented as not of a progressive but of a degenerative character. It embodied no account or even intimation of an evolutionary past, of the responsibility of each generation for as many as possible to succeed it, and therefore of an earthly species future evermore to be achieved, complementary to the evolutionary past that we know about.

Jesus apparently shared with his followers a belief in an afterworld. Otherwise they would hardly have followed him; their most cherished interests and convictions would hardly have found satisfactory confirmation in his teachings. But whereas his prime interest was in man's lateral, social rights and obligations in this world, his socially less hopeful followers, both in his own and in succeeding generations, centered their interests and hopes in a mythical, transcendental world beyond the grave. Because of the social injustice and oppression to which they were subjected, and for which they could discern no relief in this world, they were glad to believe that for exemplifying the kind of social righteousness urged by their Master in this world, there would be a compensation in that suppositious afterworld, which would be an effectual turning of the tables upon the oppressors of the weak everywhere—a belief too selfish and vindictive to find favor with him, but one that through all the succeeding centuries has been used to reconcile the exploited of earth to their own exploitation. The teachings of Jesus appealed to certain men of his day, as to like men ever since, not because they were true, but because they were easily interpretable in terms of what those particular men wanted to be true. Satisfaction of desire is never an evidence of truth; it can never be other than an evidence of a more or less near approach, direct or indirect, to adequate and truthful interpretation of *the impulse to that desire*. The desire for continuity of life, which Christian theology has satisfied with

the promise of a mythical, "spiritual" afterlife for the individual, finds its natural and proper satisfaction in the promise of an endless line of succeeding generations in which the desirer's own values shall continue to function on the side of species continuity. For belief in such a future world, an extension of the racial life far beyond any given generation, there is abundant foundation of fact. Satisfaction with this foundation and its promise for the future, however, can be no more than a confirmatory sanction of the reinterpretation of life therein embodied. Even here satisfaction can not be accepted as proof. Proof belongs to the intellect, sanction or confirmation to feeling. But just as a blotting of the race off the earth is the greatest calamity of which man can dream, so is the certainty of a continued life, by whatever social order this may best be achieved, his most cheering prospect.

But the conception of an evolution of the species, covering millions of years in the past, with the complementary conception of as many millions of years for the species yet to live upon earth, was not then possible either for Jesus or for his disciples. Whereas we to-day can discern life to be a matter not only of individual, nor yet of merely institutional, or national, or racial, but of really earth-wide species import for all time to come, it was by the early Christians conceived in terms of the individual. And therefore the impulse to continuity of life was by them interpreted in terms of the individual as an independent, self-existent entity with a finality of worth in himself. Instead of relating their interests in the future to such a new social order as would assure a still further future, a future to be achieved by social cooperation on an earth-wide scale, they deferred the consummation of these hopes and interests to a mystical, "spiritual," mythical existence beyond the event of death.

But between the world of the flesh and that other world was a great gulf that needs must be bridged. Removal of sensuous and logical contradictions between the notions held of these two worlds led to the conception of a non-substantial, immaterial existence, which scientifically and logically amounts to mere nothingness. Yet the feelings associated with the inherent impulse to continuity of life led men to accept and cling to this as a reality, in an unreasoning hope that it was nevertheless, in some sort of incomprehensible way, a real existence. The blind hope of a continued existence led to the blind, uncritical faith that the hope might and must have a substantial basis, and that existence itself some sort of substantial content. Then the desire for such a faith led to an assertion of

that faith, the more vociferous as the grounds of the hope appeared the less substantial. The hope, in that individualistic form of its assertion, was declared to be of itself evidence for that particular mode of fulfilment. The asserted faith was itself insisted upon as in fact the very substance of the thing hoped for. There was naturally no conception that future knowledge might so elucidate the nature of human earthly existence that this same impulse to continuity of life might be satisfied with a different interpretation: but for mutual confirmation and encouragement in this forlorn hope that they so ardently wished to entertain, men banded together and organized themselves into an institution which should some time so compel all men to join in the affirmation that none might be left to raise or suggest a doubt to disturb their unsubstantiated assurance. In whatsoever way they rationalized their action, men's chief motive in founding the Church was the desire to maintain in undisturbed comfort the precarious interpretation that they had made of their impulse to achieve a continued life.

And so we find the Church to-day supposing that its existence depends upon its assertion of this more and more precarious hope, in which men are constantly losing interest because of their greater socialization and humanization. But the motive to this supposition so strenuously held is as ever the desire not to give up this particular form of belief, because no other so satisfying interpretation of men's impulse to live has yet been presented to take its place. The Church—or, rather, the ecclesiastical element within it—fears a “phobia of disbelief” *in its own tenets*, on the myopic assumption that there can be no better, and therefore no more satisfying, form of belief. If it continues to assert this hope, in which men are rationally losing faith and interest, and if it thus continues trying to perform an impossible service, a merely suppositious service where no need is felt, it requires no seer to predict its end. The Church has not adjusted itself to the evolutionary process. Because of its leaders' fears for its integrity as an institution, partly because it is the source of their social and economic support, they have made it so to dominate men's minds as to keep them from discerning the nature and function of the process itself. Because of their insistence in season and out of season upon the ideas of soul and afterworld, they have kept themselves and all men in a blind alley where they could not discern their true nature. But those of each succeeding generation were born in this alley and brought up in fear of transgressing its confines. How then can they be blamed? If the Church survives, that will be because it outgrows its ecclesiasticism, discards

its mythological transcendentalism, and accepts itself as an institution whose fundamental concern is with such services within the evolutionary process as will give most rational grounds for hope of species continuity.

III.

Will Christianity itself survive? But what is Christianity? One is not accepted as being necessarily or essentially a Christian, who habitually and rationally accepts the historicity of Jesus as a great social and ethical teacher of Galilee nineteen hundred years ago. To be accredited a Christian one must accept the web of rationalizing myth by which the physical Jesus was made out to have become a metaphysical Messiah, or Christ, or Anointed. The use of the words Christ and Christian always implies an acceptance of this myth. It was for the purpose of making this myth more plausible and acceptable to the unscientific minds of the long ago that the slender thread of relationship between the real Jesus and the mythical Christ was invented and embodied in the story of Mary Magdalene anointing the feet of Jesus. Whether or not the incident was an actual occurrence, the primary interest in the story of it came from a misinterpretation and misapplication of such Old Testament passages as Ps. xlv. 7, Is. lxi. 1, and Dan. ix. 24. Essential Christianity, as interpreted by its ecclesiasticized interpreters, is a civilization which not only accepts the historicity of Jesus as a great prophet of social righteousness and admits in theory the essential righteousness of his ethical code, but one which accepts also and chiefly the story of his resurrection, and therefore the story of his anointing, and all the other stories that in the course of a century grew up by suggestion from misunderstood Old Testament passages, out of the effort to make him appear a plausible fulfilment of a gradually misinterpreted hope of the denationalized Jewish people. If this belief be insisted upon as the test of Christianity, while the name itself may continue to persist as the name of Occidental civilization, that name will in no long time be wholly a misnomer, because men will have outgrown the belief. The much better civilization that will some day be built up about the concept of evolution and its meaning, while it will incidentally embody the essential social teachings of Jesus—and that not because he taught them, but because they approach a scientific application of the evolutionary meaning of life itself—will not at all be truthfully subsumed under the name of Christianity. But, then, what do we care for the name? It is the thing itself that counts, by whatever

name it is called. Only, one does like to hear things called by names that are apposite and true.

IV.

— And what will be the nature of that better, that evolutionary, or racial, civilization? It is not enough to discern and to insist that our present civilization admits of change, and to interpret that change as progress. The question to ask is whether the change in each case better supports the fundamental life process.

It is common to draw invidious contrasts between the natural, or real, and the ideal. The natural is often regarded as base, un-inspired. The ideal, in which man pays peculiar compliments to himself as the only rational creature of earth and as being therefore in some way supernaturally endowed, is supposed to be lofty, anti-natural, supernatural. This fetching compliment man uses to set himself off from the rest of earth's creatures, so that he feels justified in treating them quite as suits his own selfish purposes and convenience; and with it also he sets himself above his fellows who prove unable to follow him through all the mazes of his selfish rationalizing. As if intellect were the be-all and the end-all of human reality and existence, and not a means to an end, developed out of the evolutionary experience of the race! As if reason did not often follow a straight course and yet reach wholly wrong conclusions, because its presuppositions had been wrong! To urge that man should live true to natural law, that he should fulfil his true nature, that he not only admit his past evolution but that he make his future history true to the immanent laws of existence, which make for an endless species life—this is supposed not to be in good taste; it would be "a retrograde movement in morals," "a reversion to type"! Most particularly is it resented by those individuals and self-appointed leaders, the borderland scouts of conservative traditionalism who profit economically and socially by their position in our various "civilized" institutions.

Men have been very slow to discern the meaning and implications of evolution. Because of ecclesiasticism's preemption of interest in the future, which it long ago misinterpreted in terms of individual destiny beyond the grave, the evolutionary interest has been almost wholly concentrated upon the past—upon the "ascent" and the "descent" of man, upon his lateral relationships to the rest of the organic world, and upon the formal nature of the evolutionary process itself. Because the thing there seized upon as most significant was the fact of evolution, development, progress, the evolu-

tionary interest in the future has been quite wholly concerned with "progress." And because of the traditional interest in the individual, progress has been conceived in terms of individual efficiency, and its culmination in a race of imaginary supermen, "a coherent universe-process of interacting spirits advancing to ever higher attainments." Furthermore, because that evolutionary progress has been chiefly expressed in terms of the physical, in terms of man's increasing control over his physical environment, his rational capacity being still regarded by the great majority as supernatural, the scientific and philosophic interest in evolution is even to-day confined to the almost wholly academic problem of the acquisition and transmission of acquired characteristics. Men fail to discern that human self-control has been a necessary prerequisite to control of nature, and that every new control of nature must also be a matter of self-control, both in the interest of its acquisition and in that of its right use. There has seldom been a more conspicuous case of gaping for a camel and swallowing a gnat than is exemplified in the total results of the study of heredity as applied to man; and seldom a more conspicuous case of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel than the biologist's acceptance of the mythological doctrine of souls. The extenuating explanation of his plight is the fact that ecclesiasticism had already got him thoroughly indoctrinated with this belief before he had yet dreamed of becoming a scientist. It is hard indeed to slough off deeply ingrained folkways of acting and thinking.

But the most significant thing in the past history of man, as of other species, is not the fact of progress, however marvelous all this may appear. Progress is secondary and incidental to that most significant thing, which is the fact that the phyla that have become man and all the humbler species have actually achieved continuity of life through perhaps a hundred million years. As the really significant thing to discern in the evolutionary past is perpetuity of life through many millions of years, chiefly through responsiveness to sensory stimuli and to blind, organic impulse, so should our interest in the present and future of humanity be an interest in the perpetuity of the species itself. If the human phylum was so long successful without intelligence, and if since the development of intelligence and reason it has been so successful in spite of ignorance and selfishness, who is to say that with its dawning world-wide social intelligence it may not achieve as long a span of life in the future as it already has in the past?

Here, then, we discern what must be the concern and spirit of

that better civilization which is certainly destined to supplant ours of to-day. Its standard of evaluations will not be traditional ideas or beliefs, or compliance with social or institutional forms, but an ideal of perpetuity for the human race. This will be our new humanism. It will discern that man does not live to progress, but progresses as the basic condition of a continued species life; and its concern for this fundamental evolutionary ideal will direct it in its decisions regarding the nature of progress, of good and evil, of social organization and activities. Here will be found a new and really scientific basis for practical ethics. Moreover, here will be allowed the greatest possible freedom for the individual, who will readily admit that he has no right or privilege to violate the demands of the species life, save as he sublimates one impulsion in terms of a higher, more helpful one for the species, and who will always have before him as a free field of liberty a choice of all the modes of service to the race that his capacity permits. How much greater freedom can one demand for himself? Where shall he find a greater stimulus to healthful living? Where shall he find more abundant happiness, the reward of well-living? Who will grieve to see the old order give place to the new?

v.

And, finally, what shall be the place of the Church in that new order? At first thought most persons will perhaps discern no place for it at all; it is so common an error to suppose that an institution depends for its continuity upon a maintenance of the forms, practices, and "principles" with which its founders and developers envisaged its meaning. The erroneous assumption has perhaps never been more succinctly stated than in Thomas Davidson's *Aristotle*: "An institution perishes when it abandons the principles on which it was founded and built up." And yet even here is left open a way for the Church to save its face and live. If it insists that its tenets regarding soul, forgiveness of sin, heaven, and all the rest of its individualistic and mythological philosophy are the grounds of its existence and therefore must be retained, its days are all but numbered. But if it insists that the basic principle of its founding, as of its historical continuity, was service to man, and that with the advance of knowledge a new conception and a reinterpretation of what constitutes real service has become necessary; if it will discard its old "revelations" as inadequate and will proceed to adapt itself to the new revelation extracted from the scientific examination of

man's history and nature, in that case it opens before itself a vista of service as broad as the surface of the earth and as long as the possible future of the race itself. Furthermore, in so doing it will be able to throw off the enormous incubus of myth and casuistry with which ecclesiasticism loaded it in its effort to save the shadow without admitting the substance of truth.

What adjustment, then, must the Church make in order to become true to the spirit of evolution, and what is to be the service that it must render in its regenerated existence? The new thing to which it must adjust itself is the idea of, and the demand for, a practical earthly immortality of the human race. Out of this adjustment will arise as many problems as it ever attempted to solve, problems of which there will be no end for number, problems whose solution will be continuous with the life of the race, because each new generation must be oriented and prepared for its life work, and each generation of the elders must ever and anon have its knowledge extended and refreshed and its *faith* renewed. Such an adjustment will result in a practical, working identification of religion with life, a relationship which the Church has always asserted, but never convincingly, because it really knew neither term of the equation. Such an adjustment will put the Church in the way of rendering a positive, dynamic, intelligible service in the life of the race, instead of the incidental and ineffectual service that it has indirectly rendered, because it put a mythical interpretation upon it, in the past. It will array the Church positively upon the side of life and common humanity, as against privilege and the oppressors of the weak. Better, by revealing to all men their really innate humanity, it will remove the temptation to profiteering and oppression. It will make the Church the fighting champion of science and of every new application of knowledge that will redound to the betterment and therefore happiness, of the human race. It will restore to humanity the office of prophet, which it all but lost when institutionalism gained the ascendancy in the life of the Hebrew race. It will change the current conception of life from that of a "struggle for existence" to one of a "cooperation for living," a continuously cooperative living of the life of the whole human race, to the end that it may never die.

The Church has not been mistaken in claiming for itself pre-eminence among human institutions, but only in its misinterpretation of man's need of it, and of the kind of preeminent function that it was called upon to perform. The error was wholly natural in the days of man's ignorance, but to-day man calls upon it to repent

of its old error and to set forth upon the right path. As it was man's institution in the beginning, so is it to-day, in spite of the ecclesiasticism that has always held it as preeminently a stronghold for propaganda recommending an existenceless world; and he will either mold it to his needs, now better discerned, or will supplant it with a better. It rests with the Church to decide which he shall do.

ROMAN TOLERANCE TOWARD THE GREEK LANGUAGE.

BY A. KAMPMEIER.

IN empires consisting of different nationalities, the language question always has played a great part. The ruling people generally considers its own language as far superior to that of the other nationalities and very often is intolerant toward other languages, even if these languages are not those of savages, not yet fixed in literature, but are languages which have been fixed in literature long ago connected with a high civilization. Probably very few ruling peoples have not shown intolerance in this respect.

In this connection it is interesting to consider the attitude of ancient Rome toward the languages of the peoples becoming subject to them, especially toward the Greek language, the most widely used in the Roman Empire besides the Latin. It is that of the greatest tolerance.

In order that philologists and historians may not say, that I am carrying owls to Athens, i. e., that this is long ago known, I must give a reason for my writing this. I have found out that this is really not so generally known as we think it is. Why this defective historical information, I do not know. In these latter years of national hostility also other things have rushed into print which show a lack of historical information. A few years ago the president of a noted American scientific association published an article in a well-known American scientific journal, to show that the Germans in fact had done very little in scientific research and discovery, etc. Among other things he said that the Germans cannot show up in physical and astronomical science such men as Galilei, Newton and Kepler. In a private note I called his attention to the fact that Kepler was a German. He admitted his mistake with the excuse that he intended to say in that sentence "Prussians" instead of

"Germans." That mistake was on a par with another historical mistake that rushed into print. A certain writer called *Deutschland*. *Deutschland über Alles* "a new catchy song, a product of the new German empire," with the implication that the words meant Germany is to take everything. I informed the writer, that the author of the song, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, lived in the time before the new German Empire came into existence, and had even undergone punishment for his political opinions from the side of a narrow government, and that the implication attached to the words rested on a false knowledge of German. But enough of examples of defective historical information. I ought not to take away too much of the space allotted to me.

The Greek language had long ago, before the Romans came into power, been spread along the coasts of the Mediterranean, in Italy, Sicily, Gaul, Spain, North Africa, through colonies sent out by the Greeks, besides those established on the coasts of Asia Minor, Thrace and the coasts of the Euxine. Through the conquests of Asia and Egypt by Alexander the Great and his successors the Greek language had also spread more inland, through colonies established and cities built everywhere by Greeks, even to the confines of India. Greek had become a sort of universal language even among non-Greeks, serving as a medium of intercourse between these peoples. Not even the most exclusive peoples, as the Jews in Palestine, could escape the contact of the Greek language, on account of the numerous Greek cities on the northern borders of Palestine, the district of the Decapolis, and on account of Alexandria, Egypt, between which and Palestine there was always a continuous intercourse. Nor even the most exclusive classes, as the Babylonian priests and theologians could escape the knowledge of Greek. Berosus wrote the Babylonian traditions in Greek, and the Jewish priests and theologians translated their sacred books into the language which was not only the international one but also the language of learning. If they wished to be heard, they had to write in Greek, for "a Greek work," as Mommsen says in his Roman history, "found an entirely different (and we might add a greater) public than a Latin one." In later times similarly two other Jews, likewise of priestly extraction, Philo and Josephus, wrote their works in Greek. Now what was the attitude the Romans took toward this wide-spread language among their subjects? While they extended the Latin language and civilization among the conquered Italian peoples of kindred stock, and among the Iberic and Celtic barbarian peoples through Roman colonies and garrisons and

Roman law, they did not touch the Hellenic language and civilization in the many Greek cities of Italy, Sicily, Gaul and Spain, though they were incorporated into the empire. Greek in these cities had the same right as Latin. There was many a city *bilinguis*, as Horace calls Canusium, founded by the Greeks in Apulia (*Sat.* I, 10, 30), in Italy, Sicily, Gaul and Spain. Even after the downfall of the Western empire, Greek was still spoken in Tarentum, though it had long ago been made a Roman colony, and it was long one of the chief strongholds of the Byzantine empire in the South of Italy. (Smith, *Classical Dictionary*, 1871, art. "Tarentum.")

But not only did the Romans not repress the Greek language and civilization in the West, but in such countries as Asia Minor, where Greek was especially much spoken, Roman governors even gave judicial decisions in Greek, and even in the several Greek dialects, not only the common Greek, as Mommsen gives an especial case. Foreign ambassadors were allowed to address the proud Roman Senate in Greek, a proof how tolerant the Romans were toward Greek and how they themselves took pains to acquire Greek, and that this language was considered by them as a language fully equal to their own. For all these statements and many following I refer to *Römische Geschichte* (Vol. II, chaps. 12 and 13, and Vol. III, chaps. 11 and 12, Berlin, 1857), by Theodore Mommsen, one of the greatest authorities, if not the greatest, on Roman history. It is well known that he spent his whole lifetime mainly in Roman historical research.

As further examples that cases were brought before the Roman governors in Greek, I quote the trial of Paul before Festus and Felix. Paul pleaded in Greek, while, on the other hand, Josephus during the time of one of these governors, Felix, pleaded the case of certain fellow priests before the Roman Emperor (Josephus, *Life* § 3) likewise very probably in Greek, for Latin was practically little known and spoken in the East, while Rome, as Mommsen says, was swarming with Greek slaves, *literati*, instructors and lecturers, and Greek therefore heard almost as much as Latin. The same was probably the case when Philo headed an embassy from Alexandria to Caligula, in order to procure a revocation of the decree which exacted from the Jews divine honors to the statue of the emperor, as foreign embassies were allowed to speak in Greek. The Hellenic civilization was acknowledged as throughout equal to the Roman, yes earlier and better privileged, as Mommsen says. The same historian writes: "It is a wonderful accident that the same man who definitely conquered the Hellenic nation.

Lucius Aemilius Paullus, was at the same time one of the first who fully acknowledged the Hellenic civilization as being that, which it has since then uncontradictorily remained, the civilization of the ancient world."

The study of Greek was encouraged in every way at Rome, besides the many opportunities to hear Greek every day. For an educated Greek slave as much as \$14,000 was paid. It was not only a fashion or fad, that to Greek studies such a preponderance was given, but a necessity, for in the departments of philosophy, science, art, literature, rhetoric, history, the Greeks were everywhere the masters and the Romans the learners. Latin literature was at all times essentially dependent upon Greek school education and remained so. Whoever wanted to amount to something, heard Greek philosophy in Athens and Greek rhetoric in Rhodus, and made a literary journey through Asia Minor. Cæsar gave the citizenship to all teachers of the free sciences and to all physicians of the capital, and these were mainly Greek. He further decided on founding a public Greek and Roman library in Rome and appointed as head librarian the most learned Roman of his time, Marcus Varro. "We unmistakably see in this the purpose," says Mommsen, "to unite with the world-monarchy also the world-literature."

The letters written in that time show to what extent Greek words and phrases had penetrated the conversational language. In spite of the modern purism, which expelled all foreign words from poetry, Lucretius, as Ennius had done, rather uses the Greek term, instead of a weak and unclear Latin word. The house of Lucullus and other Romans of rank was almost like the Alexandrian *Museion*; a seat of Greek culture, and a gathering-place of Greek literati; every educated man, and especially every Greek, was welcome.

And not only in Rome was Greek encouraged, but even in inland Spain, and on the borders of the empire. In Spain we find noted Greek instructors settled on the Guadalquivir and in the school of Osca. Where the Roman legionary came, the Greek schoolmaster followed, in his way not less a conqueror. "The higher Roman education itself," says Mommsen, "was indeed throughout nothing else but the preaching of the great gospel of Hellenism in the Italian idiom." The Middle Ages, when the knowledge of Greek had been almost entirely lost in western Europe, would have been barren in thought in many respects if Greek knowledge and thought had not been transmitted to them in some extent through the medium of the Latin. Because the Romans not only encouraged Hellenism in Rome but also on the borders of the em-

pire, "the Greeks, therefore, everywhere saw in Rome," as Mommsen puts it, "the shield of Hellenism, and most decidedly just there where national feeling was the purest and strongest, that is on the borders, threatened by barbarian denationalization, for example in Massalia, on the northern coast of the Euxine, on the Euphrates and Tigris. In fact, the founding of cities in the far East by Pompey took up the work of Alexander after centuries of interruption. The Roman Empire was an Italian-Hellenic empire with two languages. Cæsar promulgated every enactment in Latin, but for the Greek-speaking countries besides in Greek. "It was a Greek historian, Polybius, who portrayed the position of Rome in such a way," says Mommsen, "that all later generations, and we also, are indebted to him for all that is best, which we know about the development of Rome. He comprehended Rome's historical mission more clearly than the Romans of that time themselves could do it. He rather alone saw the streams, which had flown separately so long, join in one bed, and the history of the Mediterranean states go together in the one leading position of Roman power and Greek civilization."

The part which Greek played in the empire till up to the time of Cæsar did not wane after him. History teaches that it continued. Macenas, Horace, the emperors Tiberius, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius, Pliny the younger, and a host of others, all were well acquainted with Greek literature, and even used Greek very well themselves.

From all the foregoing we see that the otherwise haughty Roman conqueror could not be accused of being illiberal and intolerant to his Greek subjects. In many respects he had to acknowledge the superiority of Hellenism, so that occasionally exponents of it, as Polybius, were even envied by such men as Scipio Aemilianus, who otherwise valued him, as altogether did the first men in Rome.

In certain respects we may even speak of a reign of the Greeks over the Romans, says Mommsen. He remarks that the reign of the Greek footman over the Roman monarchs is as old as the monarchy. The first one of these individuals is the intimate servant of Pompey, Theophanes of Mitylene, who, through his power over his weak master, has probably contributed more than any one else to the war between Pompey and Cæsar. It was the Greek footman who introduced the reign of the gentleman of the privy chamber of the times of the emperors.

But aside from this evil influence over the Roman monarchs,

it was a blessing for the world that the Roman victory did not proscribe the Greek muses in Rome, thus continuing the ill feeling between the vanquished and the victor, in this way showing more tolerance than does the modern world and even our own country. It repaid the Roman that he did not stretch his nationalism too far, but opened his mind to everything that was valuable in Hellenism, thus escaping the dangers of a onesided civilization inimical to true humanity.

THREE POEMS.

BY GUY BOGART.

I strolled with my soul through the close
Of slumbering summer at rest ;
Felt soft songs of silence, heard fountains.
Blooms purple, bright gold or old rose
In pageant triumphant made quest
O'er flower-flecked velvet of sod.
I paused on the hilltop, while dreams
Made chord with my heart song of love—
Veiled vistas clasped hand with far mountains ;
Hills, valleys, fields, forests, bright streams
Glowed glad 'neath soft skies arched above—
My soul, tuned with Love, breathed "God."

* * *

Humanism!
Next step in progress.
Slowly through millenniums of toil
Man has pursued his godward path :
Best of every age preserved
In each succeeding stage.
The good of most primitive time
Is bulwark of the best to-day.

Savagery developed man
And passed.
Barbarism saw man
Farther on his way
And passed.
There is much good in each system.
Each the best

Man could grasp at the time.
 Humanism!
 Heir of all good of all time,
 Purged of evils that have held.
 Man from his heritage.
 With the new world comes
 Meekness
 That shall inherit the earth.
 With the new race comes end of
 Oppression
 And claims of rights and privileges.
 Love will be possible
 And democracy nearer;
 Spirits shall mingle freely with earth-dwellers
 And the barrier called death
 Shall lose all power
 In days of the new mysticism.
 Our oneness with the universe
 And growth in understanding
 Will make brothers of us all,
 While organizations and institutions
 Will cease their tyrannous rule
 When we come into the light
 Of Understanding:
 For in that hour has Humanism come.

* * *

Man the master
 Becomes the servant:
 Man the god
 Becomes the slave.
 Because
 Man the creator
 Worships that his hands have wrought.
 God created heaven and earth
 And fulness thereof,
 Man is god-soul,
 Co-worker,
 Co-creator,
 With the Infinite.
 God created men
 And man forgot God.

Man created conceptions of God,
 Fantastic, fierce, anthropomorphic,
 And straightway worshiped what he had made.
 Tree-dweller and cave-man, he
 Groped his way to godward heights.
 Came fire,

 And man worshiped
 What he had discovered.

Came the home

 And man became the servant
 To an institution he had builded.

Church, school, factory, State—
 All builded by man—

Have

 Hounded
 Him to hell.

Fetishes,

Bugaboos,

All belittling, dominate man,

While the Frankenstein creations of his own mind
 Pursue him to destruction.

Use, O man!

The handiwork of your creation.

Bow not before your institutions and creeds.

 They were made by a young race

 As crutches ere a few sensed power

 To rise above child-fears of primitive ignorance.

These institutions you constructed

Were—and are—but tools.

Not one is sacred.

Cast with the crumbling relics

Of post-evolutionary débris

Those which serve not humanism.

A new age I proclaim

When humanism prevails,

When institutions serve man

And man serves not one institution.

MISCELLANEOUS.

INTELLECTUALISM AND MORAL EVOLUTION.

Certain reviewers have properly emphasized the essential thesis, or moral, of Mr. H. G. Wells's extraordinary, if superficial, *Outline of History*, while refraining from just and necessary criticism of that thesis. Mr. Wells is an intellectualist. He seems to have profound faith in mere knowledge, in science. He is a "collectivist" of the Fabian school, or evolutionary type, and he believes that ignorance and error are the chief obstacles to human and social progress. In particular, Mr. Wells deplors the harmful effects of popular ignorance of history. What ails lame, blind, halting humanity is the lack of a common tradition, he affirms, and the failure to realize that we are all members of one another, and that our salvation lies in brotherhood—the spirit of unselfish service.

To quote one of the most striking passages in *The Outline*:

"There can be no common peace and prosperity without common historical ideas. . . . Our internal policies and our economic and social ideals are profoundly vitiated by wrong and fantastic ideas of the origin and historical relationship of social classes. A sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind is as necessary for peace within as it is for peace between the nations."

What basis, we may ask, is there in history, in psychology, in sociology, or in our own direct experience, for these very positive, far-reaching affirmations?

For more than nineteen centuries the Christian Church has preached the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of men. Assuredly this preaching has been inspired by the sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind and the solemn responsibility of each for all and all for each. No organization in the world has a deeper sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind than the Catholic, or "Universal," Church. Yet what is the condition of the civilized and Christian world to-day?

Moreover, if ignorance of the past were the root of all modern social and international ills, the educated, cultivated elements would naturally exhibit more unity, more solidarity, than the illiterate and vulgar. What are the facts? Are the educated persons in any country, or in the world at large, in agreement concerning any difficult economic, social or political problem? Were the German intellectuals and professors less prejudiced and blind in the critical days of 1914, when Junkerdom demanded war in the name of German and Austrian honor and prestige, though neither was affronted, than was the populace generally? How many of the educated Germans saw the situation steadily and

whole at that juncture? Did a sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind tend to clear their minds of cant and poison?

Was there ever a time in history when special privilege, injustice, wrong, narrow and bigoted forms of nationalism, were not supported by educated and cultivated men? The defenders of religious and racial persecutions, the champions of slavery, the apologists for anti-social monopoly have not been deficient in education. Hatred, malice, vanity and arrogance are not the especial vices of the ignorant. Intellectual education, with any amount of history thrown in, does not purge the human heart or substitute sweet reasonableness for passion and sentiment.

Is it necessary to cite authorities on the question at issue? If so, the embarrassment that faces one is the proverbial embarrassment of riches. From St. Paul down to Spencer, John Morley, Anatole France, all serious thinkers have contended that intellectual culture alone will never insure moral and social progress.

"The love of money is the root of all evil," said St. Paul. Dante, no mean psychologist, found the root of human evil in greed, pride and ambition. Herbert Spencer called the intellect a tool of the emotional nature and always stressed the need of educating the heart, the emotions. John Morley, in his *Notes on History*, argues that each school of thought draws from history what lessons or morals it finds suitable and convenient for its own purposes; that the same event is interpreted in different ways by different partisans or doctrinaires. Lord Macauley says somewhere that if the law of gravitation were deemed to be inimical to any considerable material interest, there would not be wanting arguments against it. Anatole France, who has recently declared himself a disciple of Lenin and a convert of Russian sovietism and communism, insists repeatedly in his critical essays that "passions and sentiments," not ideas and knowledge, govern mankind. By passions and sentiments he means racial and national and class hatreds, prejudices, antipathies, appetites, desires, and the like.

Is it not true, then, that, in Mr. Wells' words, the history of mankind has been a race between education and catastrophe? Yes, it is true, and it is equally and sadly true that, as a rule, catastrophe has won. Revolutions, civil wars, wars of aggression, famines, economic crises—all these episodes in human history show that humanity learns only in the school of bitter experience, learns slowly and imperfectly even in that school, and too easily forgets its lessons. Too many of us—more than one is apt to imagine—are Bourbons—persons who resist necessary and inevitable change until a terrible explosion occurs. Would the study of history change the nature and the mental habits of the Bourbons among us?

Education is indeed the only preventive of catastrophe, but the knowledge of the past is but a small part of the education that can save humanity from avoidable catastrophes in the future. The education chiefly needed is social, moral, practical. We must seek to understand one another, to grasp each other's point of view, to sympathize with one another's difficulties and troubles, to recognize each other's honesty, sincerity, and right to his opinion. Capital and labor will get rid of many of the obstacles in the way of harmonious industrial relations by taking counsel together; by conferring and learning to know each other's needs and anxieties; by establishing direct and intimate contacts. In America we have no classes, and no wrong or ridiculous notions

concerning the origin of social distinctions and divisions. We know that the employer of to-day is often the laborer of yesterday and that the servant of to-day may be the master or boss of to-morrow. We have no aristocracy, and we have no superstitious reverence for our plutocracy. Yet do we know one another, do we seek to understand one another, to remove barriers of station, condition, education, race?

We moderns face certain grave and great problems. Not all of us realize this fact. The first step in education is to bring that fact home to many of those who, though capable of understanding, are indifferent, complacent, ignorant, cynical. The second step is to cooperate systematically in working out the solutions of our problems, cooperate in a hundred different ways, formal and informal. Community centers, neighborhood forums, conferences, symposia, church and club discussions, newspaper publicity—these are some of the means of attaining the end in view—solutions of grave menacing, by mutual accommodation, timely compromises, wise adjustments.

VICTOR S. YARROS.

DR. S. MENDELSON'S "THE ARTERIAL FUNCTION ETC. IN ANCIENT RABBINIC WRITINGS."¹

That the study of ancient Hebrew writings deeply interests and amply rewards any one who has the inclination and the aptitude for it, may be postulated from the fact that so many students, mostly abroad, employ their untiring pens in recording and promulgating the produce of their lucubrations in those musty volumes of the long past; but that it could add much to human knowledge, or in any way correct historical data, twentieth century scholarship is loath to believe. Demurring against the "bookworm's" claim to recognition, the prejudiced critic dismisses him with the sixteenth century anecdote which relates of a Rabbi in some out of the way place, who when told of the discovery of America, after a few minutes cogitation, naively remarked: "No! it is not true; it cannot be true, for the Talmud knows of no such continent!"

Hence it may be with more curiosity than predilection that one will open Dr. Mendelsohn's pamphlet and apathetically start to turn its leaves; but before progressing beyond the first fifty lines, his curiosity will become interest and his apathy will give place to eagerness. He will not lay it down before reading it through; and having read it through and digested the wealth of information crowded into it, he will unhesitatingly subscribe to Huxley's dictum, quoted by our author (p. 26): "That the science of former days is not so despicable as some think; and that, however foolish undue respect for the wisdom of the ancients may be, undue respect for it may be still more reprehensible,"—a dictum which is abundantly demonstrated in the pages of the modest publication before us.

The author's primary object is to prove that, notwithstanding the doctrine of their contemporary physiologists: *Spiritus ex pulmone in cor recipitur et per arterias distribuitur* (Cicero *De Nat. Deorum* II ss), the ancient Rabbis in Palestine and in Babylonia maintained that the arteries are not air tubes (*arteria*), but blood-carriers; and that, owing to the anastomosis between all arteries and veins, the perforation of the *weridin* (*carotids*) lets out all the

¹ "Die Funktion der Pulsadern und der Kreislauf des Blutes in altrabbinischer Literatur," von Dr. S. Mendelsohn. *Jenaer Medizin-historische Beiträge*, No. 11. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1920. 26 pages.

blood from the animal (p. 19f). But while this is his main object, he incidentally corrects many errors in the chronology of scientific discoveries or inventions. For example, he shows that periodicity of comets was known 1500 years before the advent of Newton, and that the use of a crude telescope dates from about the same period (p. 6). These and many other inventions and discoveries, which we have learned to credit to scientists of comparatively late times, he shows, were familiar to the doctors of the Talmud; and the fact that they are spoken of in that stupendous collection of Rabbinical writings the final redaction of which closed about 500 C. E., he rightly adduces as palpable evidence of their high antiquity (*loc. cit.* n. 3).

Considering that, as our author admits (p. 7), the ancient Rabbis delved into the secrets of nature, not with a view of becoming professional anatomists or physiologists, astronomers or geometers, but with the sense that familiarity with the sciences would aid them in mastering their specialties—religion, ritualism, law; that in fact, one of those Rabbis who was a prodigious mathematician in his age, plainly expressed himself to this effect, saying: "The laws concerning bird-sacrifices and incipient uncleanness are nomological elements, while astronomy and geometry are mere (relishes, appetizers) auxiliaries of wisdom" (p. 6, n. 3),—the attribution to them of high scientific attainments may be astonishing, doubt provoking. However, our author vindicates his claims by numerous quotations from the Talmud and coeval writings. He proves his statements not by ambiguous references and specious constructions of their casual remarks, but by their enactments and actions, arguing on the principle: *Acta exteriore indicant interiore secreta*, and he shows that their practice was the eventuation of their scientific investigation and experimentation. In short, Dr. Mendelsohn's effort shows wonderful learning and is very interesting. His conclusions are perfectly convincing. Carefully pondering them must result in the reader's verdict that the case is gained for the ancient Hebrew teachers, though comparatively late scientists enjoy the plaudits as pioneers.

I. G.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GERMAN CARNIVAL COMEDY. By *Maximilian J. Rudwin*, Ph. D. New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1920. Pp. xii+85.

The author of the book under review, a frequent contributor to *The Open Court*, is favorably known to medieval scholars through a number of researches on the German religious drama (cf. *The Open Court*, Vol. XXXI, 1917, pp. 444-6). He has now followed up his studies on the sacred drama with a monograph on the secular drama. Of the two types of medieval drama, the sacred has almost eclipsed the secular in our interest. While much research has been carried on to further our knowledge of the origin and development of the ecclesiastical plays, the popular plays have received but scant attention from the historians of the drama.


The purpose of this book is to show the growth of the Carnival comedy, the form which the secular drama assumed in medieval Germany, from its earliest beginnings to its culmination in the *Fastnachtsspiele* of Hans Sachs. It is generally assumed that the secular plays grew out of the comical scenes

which had early been introduced into the serious plays. Dr. Rudwin claims an independent origin for the comedy. Just as the Church drama developed out of Christian worship, so the secular drama, the author maintains, originated in the heathen ritual. He then attempts to reconstruct the ancient pagan rites out of the few fragments which have persisted until the present day among the European peasants. He proceeds in much the same way as a scientist reconstructs a dinosaur from the most meagre osseous remains. It is a most ingenious work; and what surprising analogies the pagan beliefs and practices show to Christian creed and cult! This part of the book will interest chiefly the students of the history of religion.

The Carnival, the author maintains, was not instituted by the Church. It is of pagan origin. The word "carnival" is not derived, as is generally assumed, from Latin *carnem levare*, the removal of flesh as food, but from *carrus navalis*, the ship-cart, which played a very important part in Carnival processions for centuries, and which may still be seen in the modern float. The ship had no relation to the sea, but was a symbol of femininity and hence of productivity. In addition to this ceremony were other charms intended to bring about, through "mimetic" magic, the revival of the earth—the death and resurrection of the fertility god, the burning or burying in effigy of Death or Winter, the bringing in of Life or Summer in a tree or branch procession, and the like. In all these magical rites we see the elements of drama, for the leaf-clad mummer is impersonating the vegetation demon. This masked performer the author considers as the originator of the rough and ready comedy of contemporary men and manners. Very soon the ritual acts, it is claimed, were supplemented by comical scenes in which certain individuals among the spectators were imitated.

The Carnival comedy is of country origin, but developed as an art when it later came into the hands of the burghers. In the course of its development it absorbed all the *ludi* of the Feast of Fools and of the Feast of Boys, the *spectacula* of the medieval minstrel, the successor to the Roman *mimus* on the one hand and the Germanic *scôp* on the other, and was moreover influenced in its literary form by the Church play. This influence, however, was mutual. The sacred and secular plays of the Middle Ages influenced each other to such a degree that it is very difficult to state in definite terms on which side was the greater debt. The similarities between the two types of medieval drama became so great toward the end of the fifteenth century that they imperceptibly merged into each other. To draw a well-defined line of demarcation between the two would thus be a difficult task.

The author himself thus realizes because of lack of sufficient data, the difficulty of determining the priority and relation of the two types of medieval drama, and he frankly admits, in the Preface, the hypothetical nature of his theory. It must, however, be conceded that his theory is not only original and interesting, but also plausible. Withal the book is well worth reading. It is an acute and accurate study of Carnival custom and comedy in Europe, and a definite contribution not only to the history of the drama, but also to the study of comparative mythology and religion, to anthropology and ethnology.



THE ALTAR TABLET OF THE TEMPLE OF THE CROSS NEAR PALANQUE.

(From Kingsborough's *Antiquities of Mexico*, Part III.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE CROSS.

BY ERIC ROSENQUIST.

FOR the word of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us who are saved it is the power of God. (1 Corinthians i. 18).

It was a Saturday in the latter part of the month of October in the year 732 of the Christian era. Two mighty armies were facing each other on a vast field in the neighborhood of the French city of Poitiers. All Europe was filled with dread. Hearts were beating with anxiety, and fervent prayers rose from the bosom of every devout Christian, while the Mohammedan world exulted in the almost uninterrupted victories of the Saracenic armies which, under the able leadership of Abd Arrahman, had crossed the Pyrenees, burnt the city of Bordeaux, and was advancing upon the wealthy city of Tours. It was on the plain lying between this latter town and Poitiers that the Cross and the Crescent had now met for a decisive struggle which was to determine the fate of Europe, and thus also, we may say, the fate of the civilized world. The result of the battle of Tours, or of Poitiers, in which the Franks, under the leadership of Charles Martel, delivered a crushing defeat to the Moslem host, is well known. The Cross, and not the Crescent, should remain the symbol under which the greatest civilization of the world was to accomplish its triumphant march, until every nation on earth had been subjected to its magic influence.

It is true that about seven centuries later the sign of the Cross should again be pitted against the triumphant Crescent which had again invaded Europe. But though the Mohammedans succeeded in capturing Constantinople, and thus gained a firm foot-hold in the south-eastern part of the continent, the glorious victories of the Hungarian hero, John Hunyadi, the champion of the Cross, saved

the European civilization a second time from the domination of the Crescent. Since the fall of the Byzantine, or East Roman Empire, into the hands of the Turks there has been one continual struggle between the Christians and the followers of Mohammed. Though the latter have now lost all their possessions in Europe, with the exception of Constantinople of which they are but nominal masters, the death-feud is by no means at an end. This bitter war is not caused by racial difference, for the Hungarians who, as champions of the Cross, formed the bulwark of Europe against the invading Turks, were of the same race as these latter, both being branches of the Turanians.

During eight centuries the Mohammedan Moors retained their possessions in Spain, though they had been continually crowded toward the south by the incessant pressure of the Christians. Finally Ferdinand and Isabella, after a struggle lasting ten years, succeeded in capturing the last Moorish stronghold, Granada, and in the year 1492 the Crescent was replaced by the Cross on the walls and towers of that famous city of the Moriscos.

That same year, and, we may say, as a result of the Christian victory, Columbus was enabled to carry the Cross over the great ocean, and transplant it on the soil of our continent.

Suppose it had been the Crescent instead of the Cross!

But barely has the Cross emerged from the din of the battle with its ancient opponent before another struggle looms in the distance. How long will it last? What will be the outcome?

The Cross has met the Rising Sun.

No, this will not be a war between races alone. It will also be another duel between two mighty symbols. The Crescent is defeated—the Rising Sun remains to be defeated. The industrial and diplomatic skirmishes have already begun. When the guns of Commodore Perry boomed at the entrance of the harbor of Tokio the die was cast.

Shall the hitherto victorious Cross be replaced?

No!


But if we shall be able to rally around the Cross we must know for what it stands. We must be acquainted with its origin as well as with its history. Christian, Jew and Infidel, Protestant and Catholic—whether Roman or Greek—will then unite under the same banner to fight the common foe.

For nearly two thousand years the Cross has been looked upon as an exclusively Christian symbol. To the Jew it has been an object

of hatred, and the Infidel has treated it with derision. Few have realized that the time would come when all these various factions would stand united under one banner emblazoned with the Cross, and inscribed with the familiar motto, *In Hoc Signo Vincas!*

But will the Christian ever forget that his sacred symbol once stood for the founder of his religion, who was condemned to death by a Roman Infidel, and cruelly nailed to the cross by the Jews?

Yes he will forget that when he realizes that the mystic sign has a far more ancient history, and was a cherished symbol long



EGYPTIAN CROSSES.

Reproduced from Lipsius, *De Cruce*.

before the Golgatha legend had ever been penned on parchment, or issued from devout lips.

"The application of the cross," says Arthur Drews, "to mystic or religious ends reaches far back into grey antiquity. From of old the cross was in use in the cult of the Egyptian Gods, especially of Isis and Horus. It was also found among the Assyrians and Persians, serving, as the pictures show, in part as the mark and ornament of distinguished persons, such as priests and kings, in part also as a religious attribute in the hands of the Gods and their worshippers." (*The Christ Myth*, page 150).


The same author also shows that the cross was a sacred symbol among the ancient Hebrews. In Rome, he says, it was worn by the Vestal virgins upon a ribbon round the neck. "Indeed, it even served as an ornament upon the weapons of the Roman legions and upon the standards of the cavalry long before Constantine, by his well-known 'vision,' gave occasion for its being expressly introduced under the form of the so-called 'Monogram of Christ' into the army as a military sign. But in the North also we find the cross, not only in the shape of the hooked-cross and the three-armed cross (Triskele), but also in the form of Thor's hammer, upon runic, stones, weapons, utensils, ornaments, amulets, etc. And when the heathens of the North, as Snorre informs us, marked themselves in the hour of death with a spear, they scratched upon their bodies one of the sacred signs that has been mentioned, in doing which they dedicated themselves to God." (*The Christ Myth*).

In proving the ancient use of the cross, professor Drews quotes a large number of research works on the subject, demonstrating, beyond the shadow of doubt, the correctness of his statements.

As to the origin of the symbol, Dr. Drews says, "Naturally, indeed, different views can be held as to what the various forms of the cross betoken. Thus, for example, according to Burnouf, Schliemann, and others, the Svastika represents the 'fire's cradle,' that is, the pith of the wood, from which in oldest times in the point of intersection of the two arms the fire was produced by whirling round an inserted stick. On the other hand, according to the view most widespread at the present day, it simply symbolizes the twirling movement when making the fire, and on this, too, rests its application as symbol of the sun's course. . . . Not only among the peoples of antiquity and in Europe, but also in Asia among the Indians and Chinese, it is in use from ancient times. In America, too, among the Mexicans and Incas, it played a part in worship long before the arrival of Europeans."

That the cross dates back to the days of the camp-fire can no longer be doubted. While we have many symbols and ceremonies that have been arbitrarily designed, these have never played an important part in the history of the human race. They have been merely, what we may call child's play, or imaginary imitation of something real. Though for a while very popular, they have never lasted a great length of time. What may be termed true symbols and ceremonies are remnants of former methods or customs which once served a useful object. Their origin has always been found

to be extremely simple, while enlargements and embellishments have resulted from the general desire to add a mystic importance, and thus awaken or retain interest in that which has survived its usefulness. As the ancient Egyptians took delight in having their dead bodies embalmed, so as to preserve them long after their usefulness had passed, so have men always cherished the fond desire of clinging to that which was once dear to their hearts. Symbols and ceremonies are heirlooms, which, though no longer useful for their original purpose, yet are valuable as connecting links between passing and coming generations. The aged cherish the fond memory of their childhood days. What would life be in declining years if all memory of the past were suddenly cut off? The idea of cutting loose from the past and live exclusively in the present is entirely



RATTLESNAKE ROCK, MOJAVE DESERT, CALIFORNIA.

contrary to human nature. It lowers man to an inferior level of life. Remembrance of past sorrows as well as joys are necessary for the full appreciation of the present. If individual life is to continue from generation to generation it is necessary that memory survives; and any thing that contributes to that end must be of the greatest value. Symbols and ceremonies are part of the history of a people, and, therefore, part of its life. In order to love a person we must be acquainted with him, and that means that at least some part of his life must be familiar to us. The more of his life we know the more intimate will be our acquaintance. The history of our life reveals our character, and only congenial characters can form firm friendship. To love our country's flag we must know for what it stands.

To love one's flag is to love one's country, for the history of the flag is the history of the country for which it stands.

When we find that the traditions of the cross are indissolubly interwoven with the past life of our ancestors, with the struggles, the achievements and failures, the joys and sorrows of our fathers, then that cross will become dear to us. To worship the cross without knowing what it stands for is idolatry. No people can form a united



X CROSS.



ROMAN CROSS.

Reproduced from Lipsius, *De Cruce*.

nation unless they have some object of love and worship in common. Such love and worship is the cement that binds the loose grains of sand together and forms the solid concrete stone which increases in strength as time rolls on.

Now, where do we find the first indisputable traces of the cross? We find them in the camp-fire where the burning logs lie crossed. It requires no conjuring of the imagination to detect this early trace. Upon this cross the eyes of our primitive ancestors

would be resting during the long hours of the dusky evenings. When the sun had set, and its delightful, life-giving warmth and light had been replaced by the chill and darkness of the night, the flames issuing from this cross would impart warmth to limbs benumbed with cold, and dispel the gloom of darkness, while savory odors from the broiling meat produced a delightful anticipation. To the children of the forest the pleasant and interesting phenomenon remained a deep mystery and an object of the greatest admiration. Can you see that child, eyes sparkling with intelligence, pondering the mystery? The sun, the flame, the cross, the light, and the heat! How are they connected? What is their relation to each other?

In primitive pictorial writing we find the camp-fire symbolized by a cross, sometimes with a ring in the center, indicating the flame.

The cross did not always have the same shape or form. Of the unembellished simple forms, used in most ancient times we have the "Latin Cross," called *Cruce immissa* or *capitata*. The "Tau Cross"—so called from the Greek capital "T"—which in the Middle Ages was designated as the "Cross of St. Anthony," and was known as the "*Cruce commissa* or *ansata*." The X-cross was called *Cruce decussata*, and is also known as the "St. Andrew's cross" in consequence of the apostle St. Andrew, according to a tradition, having been crucified on a cross of this form. The "Greek cross" had the four limbs of equal length.

The equally armed cross duplicated with an oblique cross, or the cross, set diagonally, like the Roman letter X, crossed in the point of intersection by a vertical line, ✱, were used as the symbol of the sun. The sun and fire were also symbolized by a ring placed either around the point of intersection, or above the vertical arm of the Latin or the Greek cross. In the mirror of Venus, ♀, the ring refers to the sun. In the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics a "Tau cross" with an oval above, †, was the symbol of "life." As is well known, the tongue of fire was a symbol of life, or spirit. On the first day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit with which the disciples were filled was symbolized by tongues of fire. "And there appeared unto them tongues parting asunder, like as of fire; and it sat upon each one of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit." (Acts iii. 3, 4).

As the altar originated in the camp-fire, so did the cross which appears upon the altar.

However, the object of the camp-fire was not only to give light and heat, and protect from dangerous lurking beasts, but also to

prepare the food. Thus the bullock, the ram, and the lamb soon became intimately connected with the cross and the fire.

At first the preparing of the meal and the partaking of it by the family or the tribe was a very simple act, but gradually certain ceremonies were observed, and as time went on these, following the natural law of evolution, became more and more complex. Gathering of the wood, bringing it to the camp, building the fire, bringing the animal, slaughtering it, examining the flesh, and preparing it for the meal—all this was very carefully planned and



ANCIENT GREEK CROSS.



LATE CHRISTIAN CROSS.

Reproduced from Lipsius, *De Cruce*.

regulated. We need but read the first chapters of the book of Leviticus to get a fair idea of the punctilious observance of these ceremonies.

The broiling of the lamb over the camp-fire gradually became a sacred, religious ceremony in which the camp-fire finally was replaced by the altar. Thus is easily explained the appearance of the lamb upon a cross, which was one of the most common of ancient Christian symbols. "In the year 692, A. D., at the Quinisext Synod

in Trullo these pictures of a lamb on the cross were forbidden, and it was required that the representation be the figure of the Savior in human shape." (*The Christ Myth*, page 159).

The identity of the cross with the fire-wood on the altar may also be seen in the use of the same Greek word to denote the two. *Xulon* means wood, and also that which is made of wood, as a beam or a cross. In I Corinthians ii. 12 the word is used for the material, wood ("If any man buildeth on the foundation gold, silver, costly stones, wood—*xulon*—, hay, stubble." In Acts v. 30 *xulon* denotes the cross (The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom ye slew, hanging him on a tree—*xulon*—." *Stauros* and *xulon* are both used in denoting a cross, and are translated by the Latin word *crux*).

Another incident which points to the identity of the cross with the fire-wood on the altar is found in John xix. 17 and Genesis xxii. 6, 9. The former reads: "They took Jesus therefore: and he went out, bearing the cross for himself." There we find the sacrificial victim bearing the cross upon which he is to be sacrificed. The passages in Genesis read: "And Abraham took the wood of the burnt-offering, and laid it upon Isaac his son; and he took in his hand the fire and the knife; and they went both of them together. And Isaac spake unto Abraham his father, and said, My father: and he said, Here am I, my son. And he said, Behold the fire and the wood: but where is the lamb for the burnt-offering? . . . And they came to a place which God had told him of: and Abraham built the altar there and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar, upon the wood." Here we also find the victim bearing the wood upon which he is to be sacrificed. In those days the sacrifice of human beings was nothing unusual, and the incident referred to shows that the sacrificial rite was the same, whether an animal or a human being was to be the victim.

When the lamb is found upon the cross at the point of intersection of the two arms, and surrounded by a disk, or ring, symbolizing the sun or fire, there can be little doubt that the cross is the wood, burning on the altar.

That the altar represented the original camp-fire is further seen by noticing the various vessels and utensils which were to belong to the altar. In giving the directions for making the altar (Exodus xxvii. chapter) God says: "And thou shalt make its pots to take away its ashes, and its shovels, and its basins, and its flesh-hooks, and its firepans: all the vessels thereof thou shalt make of brass."

Another illustration is found in I Samuel ii. 12-17. "Now the sons of Eli were base men; they knew not Jehovah. And the custom of the priests with the people was, that, when any man *offered sacrifice*, the priest's servant came, while the flesh was boiling, with a flesh-hook of three teeth in his hand; and he struck it into the pan, or kettle, or caldron, or pot; all that the flesh-hook brought up the priest took therewith. So they did in Shiloh unto all the Israelites that came thither. Yea, before they burnt the fat, the priest's servant came and said to the man that *sacrificed*, Give flesh to roast for the priest; for he will not have boiled flesh of thee, but raw. And if the man said unto him, They will surely burn the fat first, and then take as much as thy soul desireth; then he would say, Nay, but thou shalt give it me now: and if not, I will take it by force. And the sin of the young men was very great before Jehovah: for the men despised the *offering of Jehovah*."

The *offering* was evidently meant to serve as food for those who ministered in the temple or at its doors, both men and women.

Still another instance, showing the close connection between the sacrificial rites and the partaking of food at the ordinary meals, we find in Exodus xxxii. 5-6. Aaron, during the absence of Moses, had made a golden calf which the children of Israel were to worship. He then "made a proclamation and said, To-morrow shall be a feast to Jehovah. And they rose up early on the morrow, and offered burnt-offerings and brought peace-offerings; and the people sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play."

In several places it is expressly stated what offerings were to serve as food for the priests and others, and, also, what offerings were to be entirely consumed in fire. We have quoted but a few instances in order to call attention to the various means by which the symbols may be traced to their original source. Reference to the Bible, rather than other works on the subject has been chosen on account of the familiarity of most people with this sacred book.

To get some idea of what the symbol of the cross stands for let us take another glance at the camp-fire.

Our earliest human ancestors have just reached the period of their evolution when the divine spark of human intelligence has enabled them to handle that wonderful phenomenon, or element, as it has been called, light and heat producing fire. They had often seen it before, in the lightning of the thunder-storm, and in the great conflagrations of the forests, started by a bolt from the skies. Like

other animals, they had, by experience, learned to look upon that fire with dread and fear. It had often driven them from their home, when it swept through the under-brush of the forest. Finally some one with more courage than others ventured to pick up a brand and do some experimenting. He could kindle other fires with it, and he could extinguish them. Among the embers of a forest-fire he had found a broiled deer, or some other animal. He tasted it and found the flavor exceedingly pleasant. He offered it to his friends, and they were delighted. He sat down and pondered the wonderful discovery. Suddenly another bright idea struck him. He could broil an animal over his own fire which he had kept burning, since he picked up the fire-brand. Man had now taken the greatest step in the history of his evolution, and the greatest, we may add, up to the present day.

When the first sticks or logs of wood were crossed under that choice piece of meat the symbol of the cross originated, and became, with a circle attached, the hieroglyphic symbol of fire.

How many generations it took before man discovered an artificial means of producing fire, we do not know, but it must have taken a long period of time.

Here we also have the origin of the most important institution of human civilization, *family life* and *community solidarity*, of which the cross upon the family hearth, or altar, became the symbol.

Hitherto each individual had taken care of himself. Even the child, after being weaned, could begin to pick fruit and nuts for its own sustenance. When an enemy appeared they all scampered off and hid themselves among the branches of the trees. But now all this had changed. The food which had hitherto been eaten raw was now brought to the camp-fire to be prepared. Each individual brought what he had been able to procure, the head of the family prepared it, and all the members partook of it in common. The family grew into clans, the clans into tribes, the tribes into communities, but they had but one camp-fire, one altar upon which the wood, or cross, was continually kept burning. It naturally devolved upon the young women, the first "Vestal Virgins," before they had yet chosen their mate, to guard this fire. The boys were with their fathers, hunting, fighting or keeping guard against foes. The mothers were occupied with the little ones. It was a true family life. The virgins were not dedicated to the service for life and doomed to celibacy. Such abominable, vicious customs were unknown until ages later when family life had begun to degenerate. It was the natural, young woman, the daughter in her transition period between

child and responsible woman, who was assigned to the office of vestal virgin, and was to guard the sacred fire.

It was also the duty of these young women to wait on the other members and pass the drinking cup from one individual to another. One cup served for all, and was later made of most valuable material.

See there, the origin of the *holy grail*, another symbol of family and community life.

As the fire on the altar was a means of protection against cold and lurking beasts, so did the cross become a symbol of refuge and safety. The object of the temple was merely to protect the sacred fire from being extinguished by wind and rain. It was the altar that sanctified the temple, and the gift, or sacrifice, that sanctified the altar. Whether the temple consisted merely of a tent, as that of the Children of Israel in the desert, or it took the form of a grand cathedral made little difference.

We now ask, Shall the cross remain the symbol of our family, our community, and our national life?

We erect monuments to serve as silent, yet powerful, witnesses of great, past achievements. Is the building of the first camp-fire, the founding of the family and the home institution, the beginning of community and national solidarity, are these, we ask, worth commemorating by a sacred symbol and a noble monument?

In standing before the cross and the cathedral our thoughts pass back through the history of the human race, and especially of our own civilization to the very dawn of the life of man as a conscious, intelligent being here on earth.

And, let us not forget, the cross does not belong to the recluse, the monk, the nun, the priest who has renounced his allegiance to the most sacred of all institutions, the family and the home. Should we not reclaim the Cross and the Holy Grail. The temple is not identical with the church, or meeting house. The temple is the sanctuary where silent, yet eloquent, symbols, monuments, and ceremonies speak of gone-by times. In the church, the meeting-house, we listen to the sermons of the living orator.

It would be interesting to follow the history of the cross through the various forms of human civilization, in which it has played such a significant part, but volumes would be required for such an undertaking, for, as has been mentioned, the history of the cross is the history of the most highly civilized people in the world. The symbol has, at times, been dragged to the very depths of

degradation and trailed in the mire, but it has risen again to the most lofty heights, and served as inspiration for the grandest and noblest deeds achieved by man. It has been a symbol of sorrow, suffering, and death; but it has also been the symbol of resurrection and final victory of light over darkness, of truth over falsehood. Some day it will lead us back to nature, to a truly natural life in which the curse of sin shall have been removed, and harmony with God restored. We shall then enjoy to the fullest extent, the fruit of past experience. The past, the present, and the future of the human life shall then be united into one delightful, glorious and continuous existence.

RETARDED EVOLUTION.

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

AS the musical critic of one of the great daillies of a prosperous mid-western city wended his way from a popular concert given to a partially filled house by the city's symphony orchestra, he was elbowed into the gutter by a traffic blocking crowd waiting patiently their turn to enter a combination moving picture and vaudeville theater. The contrast conduced to thought. True the weather was bad; that might reasonably have lessened the attendance at a church, or a lecture, or an orchestra concert; but the places where the masses desired to go would be quite as full as on any other day.

What was the world coming to? Where was this boasted evolution of man from the mere mammal? Had not the Darwinian process been arrested after all at a point where the difference between man and monkey was decidedly too slight for comfort? Is not the human animal rather habitually attracted by the same material things which appeal to an intelligent horse, and does the human not generally neglect those things which alone could satisfy a spiritual nature? Said G. K. Chesterton—you can say to a man who has transgressed the moral law—"Be a man!" But you cannot say to a crocodile who has just completed the deglutition of his tenth explorer—"Be a crocodile!" But can you, with impunity, direct the attention of the human to the nobility of manhood when the tastes of said human so closely resemble those of the lower animal?

What a mania for amusement we do have! What fear of ourselves! How madly people try to get away from themselves and how desperately they are horrified at the prospect of being alone. For they find themselves such poor company! This in large measure accounts for the vogue of the moving picture, of vaudeville and of the dance. Whereas a reasonably reflective adult should in many cases be content with the companionship of a good book—or should

even find profit in cogitation—we find people, and not only young people either, out till early morning day after day, painstakingly seeking happiness and solemnly assured that it is only to be found where lights glitter, where loud music arrests and strikes dumb the ear, where crowds throng and where money must be spent extravagantly.

Can this be regarded otherwise than as a low stage of mental development? But did not John Drinkwater recently write in appreciation of the "Follies"? And did not Rachmaninoff become wildly enthusiastic over the pulsating "jazz" coaxed from a tinkling xylophone by a vaudeville "artiste," while the great Paderewski more than once hammered out American rag-time in his own home during those merry days before the war? Did not Lord Dunsany, even while denouncing "silly revues," admit that they had an attraction for him as for all real men? Has not Brander Matthews, with that breadth of vision which never troubled austere William Winter, told us that spectacle has a legitimate place in the theatre; reminding us that Kemble and Siddons were compelled to step aside for *The Castle Spector* and *The Cataract of the Ganges*, that Shakespear's own theater was frequently used for exhibitions of fencing and of bull or bear baiting, while the amphitheater of Sophocles was also the scene of cock-fighting? And not long since an unusually thoughtful clergyman asserted that the critic who viewed the amusement craze too superciliously might perchance be a snob; for here were doubtless new art forms in evolution. In fact European visitors of undeniable taste have insisted that "rag time" was a real and typically American contribution to music and folk lore.

These facts cannot be ignored. It cannot be denied that the producers of the "Follies" and the "Passing Shows" have done something of positive value in easing the tedium of life by bringing together several comedians of undeniable talent surrounded with a clever hodge-podge and mounted in a manner highly artistic. The obsession of the general public and the press with certain penuriousness in the matter of costume merely demonstrates our lack of moral poise and refined taste and our unwholesome and childish subconscious. More unfortunate is the tendency to multiply revues beyond the supply of talent and cleverness and artistry and thus to degrade. It is true also that out of the welter of "jazz" with all of its hideous vulgarity there may be coming American art forms. Certain it is there is little but cant in the idea that America lags hopelessly behind Europe in these matters; a very little study will show that Europe produces and always has produced and applauded quite as much of

the banal as America. If the evolution of man from mammal is retarded, or arrested entirely, this is true the world over and not alone in North America.

In the course of a work on subnormal psychology Goddard¹ tells something about the amusements prized by the feeble minded. At one time he was called upon to entertain a group of these people and by chance he early made some mention of bean soup. This liquid having formed rather a stable portion of their diet for some time past appealed to them as irresistably funny and they laughed heartily. Dr. Goddard perceived thereupon that nothing further was needed to amuse them and by injecting the words "bean soup" at frequent intervals he kept them convulsed for half an hour or more. It is difficult to distinguish, in type, between this and the painfully limited activities of two burlesque comedians or vaudeville entertainers whose efforts, however, amazingly beguile groups of normals—albeit dull normals in majority. It is, in the light of such facts, also difficult to postulate the time when there will be forty orchestra halls and one moving picture theater instead of the reverse: for minds which lack the capability of forming the complicated neuron tracks necessary for the appreciation of more abstract pleasures cannot be rendered normal by any process of mere education.

In fact expert psychologists tells us that "sensuous pleasures and the joy of physical action and expression bulk more largely in the early stages of human life than they do in the more reflective consciousness that is developed later."² The progress of this development, therefore, gives proof of the transition from the more animal satisfaction of immaturity to the more spiritual satisfaction of normal maturity. It is a sad commentary on our low intellectuality that during fuel shortages it was necessary to keep open the theater, the dance hall and the pool parlor while the church or the lecture hall could be closed with perfect impunity. A further illustration of the depravity of public taste is found in the fact that the divorce of a burlesque queen occupied two columns in the daily paper which finds it profitable to pass without mention a concert by a famous orchestra. The reflection is not on the government in the one case or on the paper in the other; in each case the institution merely mirrors public taste where falls the incidence of reprobation. How much more wholesomely and humanly we should have been living had we been able to dispense with sensual amusement for several

¹ *Psychology of the Normal and the Subnormal*. Henry H. Goddard.

² *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*. J. S. Mackenzie.

days and to supply the deficiency with helpful books, with serious reflection upon life and our place therein, or with the beauties and the solaces of nature.

It may be asked how we can insist that these things are so much more valuable. We cannot do otherwise than so insist unless we dare to discount mental evolution through the ages. That man's spiritual side is his better nature has been admitted in all ages and by deep thinkers of whatever stripe, whether religious, scientific, philosophic, agnostic or infidel; what Haeckel called vital force, Emerson called the Oversoul and Channing called God. A. Clutton-Brock³ has called our attention to the fact that all men in all ages have largely possessed and endeavored to express the same values; even those apparently furthest from us share them and these values of ours are not peculiar to the elect. Mowry Saben⁴ has demonstrated the same thing about morals; the pagans had quite as excellent moral systems as we have ever had; "if it be said that the pagans did not live up to these lofty ideals, it is sufficient to say that they lived up to them quite as well and closely as Christians live up to the Sermon on the Mount." Thorstein Veblen⁵ very clearly expressed the idea that in every life it is "some ulterior, immaterial end, in the pursuit of which these material means find their ulterior ground of valuation," and that this is so even among the "common run that do not habitually formulate their aspirations and convictions in extended and grammatically defensible form." There are things of eternal value and we cannot believe otherwise; these things make for self-realization and spiritual unfolding and we are never taught otherwise; the great minds of earth past and present agree upon the tremendous importance of certain fundamentals and it is only the mind untrained, or incapable of being trained, which fails to appreciate these things.

In music we may observe an interesting evolution from the lower to the higher, from the stage where the foot must pat and the shoulders undulate, to the stage where the art makes a more abstract and intellectual appeal, but gives a permanent satisfaction not to be compared to the maudlin intoxication of the "shoulder shaker." There comes, of course, and with annoying frequency, the statement that the great musicians have seldom led exemplary lives and that they, of all persons, should have been uplifted by music if anyone can be. None the less good music does educate as well as entertain

³ *Studies in Christianity*. A. Clutton-Brock.

⁴ *The Spirit of Life*. Mowry Saben.

⁵ *On the Nature of Peace*. Thorstein Veblen—On Peace and Neutrality.

and it has a cultural value though composed and played by a libertine—provided the libertine be for the nonce a true musician. It is not contended that music will transform a rascal into a saint; it is certain that it will make him a more useful and a more pardonable rascal; it is certain that music ameliorates in spite of inhibitions. Through that loose lived composer, weak instrument though he was, many were refined, cultured and ennobled.

It has been objected that music in abstract is valueless; that it is valueless to acquire the ability to criticise the symphony, coldly and pedantically—with the icy evaluation of the classist. Amiel indeed once said "In truth, whether one knows or whether one does not know, is so perfectly imperceptible cosmically that all complaint and all desire are ridiculous."⁶ The same objection might always be made by the uneducated regarding any abstraction. Molecule and psychic phenomena are studied in spite of the obstinate and rebellious results of pure experience; yet these abstractions underlie life's myriad trivialities. Art, science, philosophy and literature offer us vast fields of exploration and we may better be piecing together the fundamental laws of the Cosmos, at least occasionally, than always assuming satisfaction with a fractional knowledge of puny man and his anthill earth. "We may think of human goodness as meaning rather the general spirit of devotion to what is true and beautiful"⁷ than as a devotion to what is momentarily satisfying in the manner of an opiate.

To attain this broader outlook on life what more valuable or more easily obtained assistant can we get than a book? Read, and associate with the best minds that have ever lived upon this planet, the mighty aristocracy of the dead. Read, and live the lives lived in all ages, by all men, in all climes. Read, and survey the world in every era, from the hazy memoried days when some hoary headed Hebrew penned the Pentateuch, through the Middle Ages, into modern times and projecting out toward futurity. Whenever you can, wherever you can, however little you can, read; read and learn.

Peruse Bacon on *Studies* and learn to choose the good and to reject the bad. Consult Lamb's *Detached Thoughts on Books and Reading* and learn when and where to read, and above all, how "to lose yourself in other men's minds." Study Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies*, where he gets more out of twenty-two lines of *Lycidas* than most men would from an anthology, and learn to read slowly and

⁶ *Journal Intime*. J. F. Amiel.

⁷ *Op. Cit.* 2.

thoughtfully. Discriminate, concentrate, deliberate—to do each is essential; to neglect any one is to read unwisely.

Read, for knowledge and pleasure will accrue therefrom as an unearned increment. "Reading maketh a full man"; will you be filled then with grain or husks? With the masterpiece or with the idle and meaningless tales that slip weekly from the press to find their way to well merited oblivion? How much time out of these few years of life can we afford to waste in reading profitless books? Any of it? But it must always be remembered that reading, to be profitable, must inculcate or invigorate the faculty of thinking; the thoughts of another must be merely the stimulant needed to start our own reflections. Too many people are well read but utterly lack the ability to think; in fact for this very reason wise men have written books in order to discourage the reading of books!

We are too prone to refuse to think as it is; too prone to adopt whatever convictions are most convenient by what Spinoza in his shorter treatise calls "hearsay." Like Emerson's conservative we possess the first creed, the first philosophy, the first political theory we meet—and let it go at that. "Life is ruled more by emotion and habit than by reason,"⁸ rightly says James Bryce—although the dear fellow apparently imagined that he could compile an unbiased and unemotional report of German atrocities in Belgium while his mind was dammed with passion and anti-Germanism. (Or did he think this? More likely he was too intelligent to think so but thought the more wood the more fire!) Our own pragmatic philosopher reminds us that we are more than likely to discount a novel experience as false just because of its novelty. And Bertrand Russell⁹ declares that what we often imagine to be thought is really nothing more than a conflict of impulses at the termination of which the most powerful impulse rules and directs the "reasoning" animal!

Given the emotions pride, superciliousness and domineering, coupled with the habit of having one's own way, and you have inevitable conflict of opinion with the misunderstandings and quarrels which follow in train. Given the emotions of partisan loyalty and prejudice, coupled with the habit of believing everything published in derogation of opponents, and you have the political bigot. Given the emotions of self-righteousness and intolerance, coupled with the habit of accepting the assertion of a sectarian leader as divine fiat, and you have the religious bigot. Given the emotions of contempt, suspicion and duplicity coupled with a habit of thinking

⁸ *South America*. James Bryce.

⁹ *Justice in War Time*. Bertrand Russell.

along stereotyped lines toward preordained conclusions, and of regarding all honest difference of opinion and all other logical methods as hypocritical and heretical, and you have the philosophic bigot.

Given the emotions fear, distrust, suspicion, hatred, brutality coupled with a lack of international consciousness and a childish habit of avenging insult to national prestige with blood, of regarding our own nation as infinitely superior to all others and hence necessarily fitted to rule the world, or to wage offensive wars of defence, and you have a Great War. Given a few hours of reason—cool, clear, unbiased reason—and war would be both impossible and absurd. In China man must pay his account to humanity by tenaciously holding his place in the sequence of generations; in the occident he profitably dies fighting for the cause and thus, going into bankruptcy, constructively pays the reckoning in full.¹⁰

How much habit in the world, how little intellectual grasp: how much emotionalism, how little reason; how much impulse and how little thought! In what a large majority of cases habit, impulse and emotion, rather than reason, govern us and, in pure animal fashion, we let them dictate our line of action. For to lack the moral or intellectual control of impulse is more plainly just to be an animal. In Freudian terms it is to live largely in the subconscious, just where the animal is predicated to live altogether. Any dog, if he deteriorated a little from the average standard of dogdom, could find gratification in eating gluttonous dinners and dancing dumbly nights on end. Let it not be said that any respectable canine would do this: for be it noted that the dog is far enough advanced intellectually to have adopted an Epicurean standard of pleasure, and the Epicurean standard is ages in advance of the dining and dancing mania. But we could forgive a dog for it more graciously than we could forgive a human. There is some consolation in the fact that men with normal minds will always react to the proper stimulus if it be applied and will almost always ultimately insist upon being men.

In certain contrast to those people who work themselves ill in the effort to be properly amused¹¹ are those who amuse themselves by placidly, complacently, shamelessly doing—nothing. Ben Jonson said "What a deal of cold business doth a man misspend the better part of his life in! In scattering compliments, tendering visits, following feasts and plays." Yes, Ben, and also consider those good ladies who inhabit more or less stately apartment houses and who, all summer long, occupy the benches out in front in bovine

¹⁰ *Op. Cit.* 5.

¹¹ *Beyond Life.* James Branch Cabell. Cf. on this matter.

inertia, physical and mental as well, assisting one another to do nothing. Women of more than average intelligence, of disused faculties, of undeveloped talents and possibilities; women who could do something, be something, accomplish something—sitting, sitting, sitting, hour after hour, idly chatting of the most vapid commonplaces. They read not neither do they sew; one day of idleness follows another in an unvaried succession of wasteful monotony. "The very breath that frames their words accelerates their death," yet they sit certainly quite as immoral as those restless, butterfly creatures who work at the task of pleasure seeking with an assiduity that might accomplish much, more commendably employed.

The world holds out to every man the opportunity for service; the opportunity to do some positive good; the opportunity to leave that indelible footprint Longfellow would have resting "on the sands of time." Is it not one duty of man to leave the world better for his having lived therein; is not this the least he can do whatever his philosophy? "The cow is a most respectable, orderly, docile and inoffensive animal; yet, since the days of Isis, no man has honored the cow. Now there are human beings who possess a cow-like virtue, who pass their existences doing very little harm to anyone, and very little good. They are turned into life as into a pasture, and when their time comes are turned out again."¹² Why even be a cow if it is possible to be a man?

Then there is another creature perhaps still sorer than the empty ladies of the bench. There is the man who had been house officer in a type of theater which constantly requires the strong arm policy for a matter of thirty years! There is the girl who has been a simple stenographer for a period of ten years—a long time when you look back on it from twenty-eight. What more tragic than the necessitous pursuit of the commonplace? And, unless the slaving be the means to a greater end, how terrible the sacrifice! This type is so aptly described by Gerald Cumberland in *Set Down in Malice* that one cannot forebear quotation—

"I allude to the vast throng of people who arise at eight or thereabouts, go to the city every morning, work all day and return home at dusk; who perform this routine every day, and every day of every year; who do it all their lives; who do it without resentment, without anger, without even a momentary impulse to break away from their surroundings. Some people amaze and stagger one. To them life is not an adventure; indeed, I don't know what they consider it. They marry and, in their tepid, uxorious way, love. But

¹² *Nature's Immortality*. Francis Thompson.

love to them is not a sacrament. They do not travel; they do not want to travel. They do not even hate anybody."

A more intelligent species of this genius is alluded to by Ford Maddox Hueffer in what is a most interesting preface to a most mediocre book.¹³ In reality Hueffer describes the gentle amenities of this type of mind when educated. And he admits that "there is no reason in the world why a man should not pass a large portion of his time, or his whole time, in collecting instances of misprints . . . in playing patience or in collecting postage stamps. These are innocent and innocuous occupations and all of them are mental soporifics and anodynes in a world that is sad enough and tragic enough." But he finds it hard to convince himself that the "ergoteur" (a blood brother to the "cognoscente" cousin in Goldsmith's *Vicar*), the gentleman who dilates on infinitely unimportant immaterialism; or the doctor of philosophy whose thesis related to the use of the word "at" in *The Rape of the Lock*; or the savant who ignores Jesus Christ because Kuno Meyer discovered five grammatical errors in a Celtic translation of the Sermon on the Mount; are very important members of society.

By all means let us have the light pleasures, the passing shows and the moving pictures as anodynes for care; but let us have something else besides. The sinfulness of the present age, its gross immorality and its reversion to animalism come about because these purely incidental matters are given the all important place in our scheme of things. Even drudgery at a worthless task—think of being in the male chorus of a musical comedy, or a superfluous footman, or an instructor in ball room dancing, or a pig sticker!—or at best a task valuable in a remote sense but stultifying to the worker, may be less an abomination if it enables one to so mould circumstances that it becomes a stepping stone to something nobler. If economic necessity bind us thereto like a galley slave, we may circumvent fate by using our faculties in some other direction when at leisure, and thus accomplishing positive good. Otherwise we have done not a whit more than an intelligent horse—we have merely exerted ourselves sufficiently to go on living and have spent the remaining time eating and sleeping and acting in a fittingly gregarious manner. "Blessed is he who has found his work," said Carlyle. "let him ask no other blessing."

There are those, and they exist the world over, for it is a great mistake to imagine that dollar chasing is an American provincialism—the chasing of francs and pounds and pesos is very real and very

¹³ *When Blood is their Argument*. Ford Maddox Hueffer.

spirited—who make the dull task simply the gateway to wealth. And, though Americans have probably been no more prone than other people to procure money, we have instituted the dollar valuation of life more painstakingly than any other nation. On this foundation of plutocracy we have reared an aristocracy of wealth which lacks the pardonable features of an aristocracy of culture; and the extent to which we have gone is distressing.

We view askance the talent which does not cash out in dollars. Recently some whimsical pedagogue exposed the *Importance of Being a Professor*¹⁴ and the old story of the inability of the people generally to recognize talent when it fails of decent remuneration was told again. Moreover it has been a commonplace among some American critics to call our attention to England where mere money cannot buy one's way into the "best circles." And it is to a large extent true that in Europe people see things in better perspective; they have perspicuity, to a greater extent than we, to recognize real genius even when it is not adequately rewarded from a pecuniary standpoint. They know, these people of the older civilizations, that a man may be extraordinary, profound, learned and worthy both of admiration and respect—and yet poor!

With this money mania goes the craving for extravagance that leads to much unnecessary improvidence. It is surprising how many young people imagine that it is impossible for them to exist without silk shirts and expensive furs and suits bought at double the price so as to be assured of a certain magic name in the collar. Graduates of colleges and universities spend their money in precisely the same foolish ways, demand the same type of amusements and luxuries that gratify those in a social strata so much lower that the college people cannot discern them with the naked eye. True the poorer classes dance at cheaper halls, see cheaper shows and wear cheaper models of more expensive clothes; but the type is absolutely the same, the aspiration is the same, the extravagance is the same and the effort for sensual satiety is the same. If our universities fail to teach the younger generation how to think and how to live what can we expect? Here is an excellent place to apply Aristotle's mean and to guard against miserliness on the one hand and extravagance on the other, although the present crop of misers suffers severely from blight.

Undeterred, this money mania certainly leads to a suppression of the spiritual side of man, which again is but a euphemism for what is plainly an atavistic tendency toward animalism. This is readily

¹⁴ *Atlantic Monthly*. Dec. 1919.

to be noticed in the industrial centers where wealth comes easily, where intellectuality is low and where it is almost impossible to interest people in things esthetic, cultural or ethical. Six dollars for a single meal is nothing; a dollar to hear a great dramatist or a noted pianist is too much. It has been said that present industrial unrest is largely due to the blind groping of the masses for spiritual self-realization.

No wonder the common man fails in the attainment of spiritual self-realization when his educated fellows do so when, indeed, the greatest have done so. There is something strangely pathetic about the aged Darwin's assertion that he sometimes wondered whether he had not bought too dearly his achievements in science. An epoch making system he formulated; an inspired book he wrote; a new world he discovered, and yet the steady grind, year in and year out, took from him that which was more precious than much fine gold. For in age he found that he had lost his taste for the higher, more esthetic things; good music and fine literature no longer charmed him as they had in youth; the taste for poetry was gone—and gone forever, for it was then too late to acquire faculties which had atrophied through long years of disuse and neglect.

"The cost of a thing is the amount of what I call life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run," said Thoreau.¹⁵ And Stevenson quotes him with lively approval adding "that a man may pay too dearly for his livelihood, by giving, in Thoreau's terms, his whole life for it, or, in mine, bartering for it the whole of his available liberty and becoming a slave till death." Thoreau decried the money evaluation of life and lauded instead the way of inner riches followed by the philosophers of old and by the real benefactors of the race; these men saw life largely and developed symmetrically.

Darwin a one sided man! If so, how many lesser men have travelled life's short pathway deformed mentally, to reach the grave with talents in embryo and capacities dormant. How many of these might have been earth's noblemen had there been a sympathetic voice, a master touch, to make them realize their unsuspected ability. What greater and more fundamentally religious mission than to make the great masses of men realize and draw upon the unlimited power within!

And so there are lives all about us devoted to worthy ends, but so intensely, so fanatically, as to brutalize. There was a life so blindly devoted to a science that art and music and literature, that

¹⁵ *Familiar Studies*. R. L. Stevenson. Thoreau.

the song of birds and children's laughter all meant nothing; and when the day of leisure finally came, the capacity to appreciate was gone forever. There are those who attain opulence by dint of painful economy only to realize sadly and in bitterness that they have lost the ability properly to enjoy wealth. How foolish when devotion to these ends is so blind that all the finer part of life is starved out of existence! The Darwin who explained why the ears of the Belgian hare drag on the ground discovered that he himself had atrophied organs and faculties.

Lopsided lives, mentally deformed—lives more unfortunate than those grotesque shapes of physical deformity; more repellant than the athlete with magnificent biceps and spindle legs! We who were meant to develop fully, physically, mentally, morally and spiritually have not lived other than as the brute—even though we be greater than Darwin—if our development be not well rounded. Not science, not riches, not amusement, not the end in view is wrong: but it is the devotion of all our time and all our energies to one infinitesimal fraction of the universe that is horribly wrong. Only worse are those deformed and idiotically lived lives like the ones in *The Passing of the Third Floor Back* until came the master touch; then what a change came with spiritual awakening! Must we be counted among those who ask with a blank and imbecile look—"Who is Huxley" or "What are Keats?" Or had we not better partake rather of the kind of living practised by that mathematician, dramatist, economist, educator, author and distinguished parliamentarian and diplomatist—Jose Echegaray e Izaguirre, perhaps the greatest man Spain produced in the nineteenth century, and consequently a man all but unknown in the United States.

No. Food, raiment and a modicum (usually too large) of amusement are not all life holds. Beyond these trifling things—necessary as they are—lies the vast domain of the spirit. The fabled prince could not be content in the Valley of Happiness though every creature want were supplied. For he lifted his eyes unto the hills and said—"O Master, what is beyond? What is beyond?" Within this narrow, confined world we walk but cannot be content though material gifts be showered upon us with a lavish hand; without lies the uncharted universe of better things. Like Alice in the Looking Glass, we somehow know that we are real and not the dream illusions of a sleeping King; we know that there is a beyond to which we shall awaken in due season. It behooves us to vegetate in mammal satiety no longer. We must look unto the hills, nor must we be satisfied with looking but, like the venturesome Prince, we must climb them

and ultimately scale the furthest mountain to embark upon that mystic land beyond.

That the spirit of to-day yearns for something better, though it knows not what, and though it sadly lacks intelligent direction, is evidenced by the popularity of such pseudo-philosophic cults as Christian Science, New Thought, Ethical Culture and Spiritualism. A greater number of people than ever before know the spirit of inquiry and reach out blindly—almost frantically—for something that shall satisfy that craving they do not understand, the craving of their starved spirituality. Unfortunately most of these people are of the type so aptly characterized by Gerald Cumberland as *Intellectual Freaks*¹⁶ who “were cultured without being educated, credulous but without faith, bookish but without learning, argumentative but without logic.”

Carefree looking girls who rather suggest the dance hall than Indian mysticism, lisp in half meaningless syllables the queer conglomeration of philosophy, science, superstition and unadulterated ignorance taught by varied occult and near-occult societies. They speak of “Yogis” and “astral bodies” and “going into the silence” with a garrulity that suggests technical nomenclature in everything save only percision. In nearly every instance there are elements of truth, but the philosophy is always ancient and often long discredited by minds of first rate calibre; the science is usually puerile and always distorted. The most ordinary platitudes are uttered in obstruse phraseology and the most trite and commonplace ideas are accepted with enthusiasm as distinctly oracular.

A moderately sane sample of this consummate gibberish runs as follows “The flow of the efferent fluids of all these vessels from their outlets at the terminal loop of each culminate link on the surface of the nuclear organism is continuous as their respective atmospheric fruitage up to the altitudinal limit of their expansibility, whence, when atmosphered by like but coalescing essences from higher altitudes,—those sensibly expressed as the essential qualities of external forms—they descend, and become assimilated by the efference of the nuclear organism.”

Now the reader will have to admit that this looks very good and sounds even better than it looks; we have here in contiguity diction that should fit together and express an idea, but if that paragraph means anything to a rational mind Henry James should be forgiven and presented with a gold medal for clarity. It is quite in a class with the newspaper gem which read—“The birds filled

¹⁶ *Set Down in Malice*. Gerald Cumberland.

the tree-tops with their morning song, making the air moist, cool and pleasant." In both cases the writer should have been apprehended and led away to be shot as humanely as possible. G. B. S. was right when he remarked that the only crime of the anarchists was that of shooting the wrong people.

Yet your average person reads that and it arouses an idea. Your average person can read the queer spasm about the efferent fluids and begin to feel very erudite, very superior and very much inspired. Of the reason for this, more later on; but the whole circumstance demonstrates at very least that humanity yearns with a mighty yearning, for spiritual refinement; for something beyond mere material comfort. The pity is that so much valuable desire and endeavor is so hopelessly misdirected. What a help a little real education would be; the education which James calls *sui compos*—or "the ability to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea";¹⁷ this, coupled with sufficient information to enable one to embrace ideas discriminatingly.

Perhaps more unfortunate than these cult deluded creatures who are at least struggling with the problem and reaching out for a solution, are those self-satisfied persons who are so complacent in their abysmal ignorance that they really resent any offer of enlightenment. Nevertheless these people are convinced beyond all shadow of doubt that they are, somehow, the elect of the earth, the supreme development of living things, the culminating point of evolution. They wear fine clothes, they eat at the best restaurants and they dance only at the most aristocratic hotels; in short they go through all the proper and conventional automatic evolutions that they presume to be necessary for one who craves to be called "society." They view with a sneer "queer" persons whose intellects are developed. Their motto is "Where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be otherwise" and their coat of arms bears a lorgnette lying haughtily on an opera cloak. This class will be very difficult to arouse to the necessity for spiritual development so deeply is the purely animal mode of living imbedded in their natures.

True there are those like that splendid and over conscientious pessimist Amiel who say that no matter what we do we can never more than "slightly undulate the line of destiny." Amiel replies thus to his own query "What is life? . . . It is but the variation of an eternal theme; to be born, to live, to feel, to love, to hope, to suffer, to weep, to die." And, he adds, "The entire human race is but a lightning flash compared to the duration of the planet; and the planet

¹⁷ *Principles of Psychology*. William James.

might revert to a gaseous state without the sun being for an instant affected. The individual is but an infinitesimal atom of nothingness." But when all this has¹⁸ been said what is there to prevent a human being from attaining the greatest height, and living the most complete life that his fully developed intellect will permit? And what healthy soul could be nourished entirely upon Amiel's sad philosophy?

For here is the minority of the ages, the minority who esteemed genius instead of talent, depth instead of cleverness, art instead of sensuousness, literature instead of entertainment; the minority that has gradually come to be a majority and, outweighing the dictum of any one generation, rules unchallenged. The majority may claim the world's attention for the moment, but the will of the chosen minority of the ages is in the end supreme.

"The chosen heroes of this earth have been in a minority. There is not a social, political or religious privilege that you enjoy to-day that was not bought for you by the blood and tears and patient sufferings of the minority. It is the minority that have vindicated humanity in every struggle. It is the minority that have stood in the van of every moral conflict, and achieved all that is noble in the history of the world. You will find that each generation has always been busy in gathering up the scattered ashes of the martyred heroes of the past, to deposit them in the golden arm of a nation's history." So John B. Gough answered the question *What is a Minority?*

The multitude may madly acclaim a Bougaereau or a Canova or a Murillo, but the minority of the ages hands down to posterity the artistry of a Valasquez, a Rembrandt, a Manet. Bernini, Thorwaldsen, Dolsi and Reni were admired in their day, but the world of art now worships Titian and Raphael and da Vinci—the chosen of the minority. Brahms and Gluck and Bellini and Rossini bowed to the vociferous plaudits of the indiscriminating multitude, but as time goes on their devotees yield to that elect minority who appreciated the pioneers, the men who boldly ventured into new fields while the vulgar eagerly praised their mediocre favorites—Bach, Wagner, Schubert, Straus—these shall live on forever. The courtly Weber was petted by princes while unkempt old Beethoven was looked askance; the gentlemanly Mendelssohn captivated Europe with his now almost forgotten melodies but the art of an unknown and an unhonored Schumann compels admiration still.

Gone are Diderot and de Bury and Pope and Hallam. And who are the masters? A common showman who blandly thieved the plots of other men; a blind and bigoted Puritan who quarreled with

¹⁸ *Op. Cit.*, 6. Present author's translations in all citations from Amiel.

his wife; an execrable and irascible Frenchman who groveled to a Prussian King and was exiled from his native Paris! Yes, Mr. Pepy's found the plays of William Shakespeare insipid, *passee* and out of date! Brilliant average citizen Pepys! Representative of the vast majority in taste; and yet there rules always in the end that steadily growing minority of the ages, which pins its faith to the truly great and which in time becomes the intelligent, educated, cultured and comprehending majority that knows.

But can we postulate that day when culture will be more generally diffused; when we shall have the forty orchestra halls and the one moving picture theater instead of the reverse? Scarcely; for in the light of scientific psychology of the normal and abnormal this is an impossible ideal. It is a melancholy fact that the average mentality of this country is but slightly over twelve years, on a scale which assumes adult maturity to be reached at twenty years. This means that almost half our population is in reality sufficiently feeble minded barely to escape some institution.¹⁹ This means, furthermore, that our average mentality is just slightly above the moron stage—at least nothing more than what would be called "dull normal." It is very obvious that the highest culture cannot become universal.

While facing this fact it is nevertheless evident that a vast work is to be accomplished toward educating each mind up to the limit of its capacity. There are plenty of fifteen year old minds going around which might be educated up to eighteen years. Of course it must be remembered that if the mental age be fifteen further education is impossible. Education cannot outdistance intellect—or if it does we merely have another educated fool—because certain minds lack entirely the physiological attribute of forming the complex neuron tracts which are necessary for the appreciation of more abstract things. To the imbecile anything is an abstraction which he has not experienced; he can conceive of ten horses if he has seen ten horses, but cannot comprehend the idea of ten cows if he has not seen ten cows. The moron, while more advanced, still lacks many factors upon which depends the ability to progress far up the mental scale. And certainly an average mentality of twelve years will never spell universalized intellectuality of a very pronounced excellence.

But there are many people going through the world little realizing the actual capacities that they have. There was known to the writer a girl who lacked even a complete grammar school educa-

¹⁹ *Op. Cit.*, 1.

tion and whose reading and other mental pastimes were most trivial. But this girl was subsequently placed in an atmosphere of refinement and erudition and she very rapidly developed into a charming letter writer, an intelligent conversationalist and a sensible reader of the very best books and reviews. Minus this stimulating environment she would have gone on the typical "shop girl" type and would have missed most of life's finer gifts.

It is ours to be what Emerson in *Power* well named "plus" people. He declared that in every company there was to be discovered a sex of mind quite distinct from physical sex—"namely the inventive or creative class of both men and women, and the un-inventive or accepting class." Every man has within him the possibility of belonging to the former class. The distinction is quite clearly between the man who lives as befits a human being and the man who lives after the manner of the less fortunate but more pardonable animals. And in the striving for higher things, in the thrill that comes with esthetic enjoyment and creative production, comes the only real happiness that we can know here. Joy we may easily attain. But happiness comes not with diligent and painstaking search, but indirectly, as the unearned increment of living the higher life. To be a man, then, is to be truly happy as well.

A DIPLOMATIC TINDER-BOX.

BY B. U. BURKE.

THOUGH aversion to secret diplomacy is very generally expressed in these days, public interest in the matter does not often extend further than condemnation of the actual terms. Details and examples of its processes are apt to be dismissed as dry, though they can hardly be seen otherwise than as dynamic and dramatic when the wide extent of their influence and their far reaching consequences are taken into account, and accurate knowledge of them is essential to thorough comprehension of public problems. The case of Morocco exemplifies perhaps better than any other the devious ways of governments when left to their own devices, and continues to be of interest not only as having been one of the deepest roots of the war, but because its ramifications are not necessarily ended.

The following short summary of the case is drawn in substance from the books, pamphlets, and speeches of Mr. E. D. Morel, who made a most exhaustive study of it and exposed it fully in 1912 with the hope of averting war. The honesty of this purpose was generally acknowledged at the time, even by those who differed with his deductions, and his presentation of the facts has never been adequately refuted, however much interpretations of them may vary.

Important to an understanding of the whole problem is a preliminary realization of the fact that remote as Morocco seems it was a matter of direct interest to most of the great European Powers. To Great Britain, as containing a point of strategical importance opposite Gibraltar; to France, as adjacent to her colonial interests in northern Africa; and to Germany for the markets it offered to her increasing trade. To Spain, the fate of so close a neighbor could not be a matter of indifference; and Italy, as a Mediterranean Power, shared this interest to a lesser degree.

The first international convention on the subject of Morocco was held at Madrid in 1880. Up to that time only France and Great

Britain had enjoyed "most favoured nation" treatment in Morocco, but at the suggestion of Germany, supported by Great Britain, this was then extended to all nations. In the succeeding decade German trade increased considerably in Morocco, so that in 1890 a commercial treaty for five years was signed between Germany and Morocco, it having been previously submitted for approval to the other signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention. During the same period the imperialistic party gained ascendancy in France, and being ambitious of eventually gaining complete control of northern Africa, they opposed Lord Salisbury's scheme for a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Morocco, mooted in 1891, though it was approved by the German and Italian Ministers as seeking no purely selfish interests.

From 1894 to 1901 friction continually increased between France and Morocco on the Moorish-Algerian frontier, aggravated by French annexation of several debatable border towns. At the same time throughout these years M. Delcassé gave repeated assurances to the Sultan of Morocco that his government intended to respect the integrity of Morocco. In 1901 M. Delcassé concluded an agreement with Italy in which he undertook to allow Italy a free hand in Tripoli, on condition that Italy would not interfere with French claims in Morocco. At the same time he commenced secret negotiations with Spain whereby France and Spain were to divide Morocco between them. This treaty assumed final shape in September 1902, but in the meantime Great Britain had got wind of the scheme and prevailed upon Spain at the last minute not to agree to it, though her influence in this was not revealed until November 1911.

In March 1904 M. Delcassé assured the German ambassador at Paris that France desired to "uphold the existing political and territorial status of Morocco." In April 1904 an agreement was drawn up between France and Great Britain, and in October of the same year a declaration was made public between France and Spain. In the Franco-British agreement France undertook not to interfere with British plans in Egypt, and Great Britain agreed to recognize France's special interests in Morocco. So much was published to the world at large. In the Franco-Spanish declaration both countries announced that they were firmly attached to the integrity and independence of Morocco. Now subjoined to both these transactions there were secret agreements whereby France and Spain agreed to divide Morocco between them and to share the economic spoils, Great Britain consenting, with the stipulation that Spain should control the coast line of the Mediterranean.

These secret agreements were drawn up by the Foreign Offices of the governments concerned and were kept secret from the parliaments as well as the people of Great Britain, France and Spain, as also from the governments and people of other countries for seven years, for the world only came to know their contents in November 1911. (To quote Mr. Morel exactly: "No more unpardonable betrayal of the public interest, no more indefensible perversion of the public mind has taken place in our generation, and in the French parliament at least, the action of British and French diplomats has been stigmatized as it deserved to be." This he illustrates in *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy* by extracts from speeches of Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Ribot and M. de Lamarzelle. The matter was never broached in the British parliament.) The fact that there were secret clauses which would not be revealed was made public in the French press at the time, and confirmed by the leader of the French Colonial party, M. Etienne. Germany grew suspicious.

In March 1905, the Kaiser, acting on Prince Bülow's advice, visited Tangier, where he informed the Sultan's representative that he regarded the Sultan as an independent sovereign and that he was determined to safeguard Germany's interests in Morocco. Simultaneously the German Government pressed the Sultan to demand a second international conference, urging that the future of his country was a matter which concerned all the great powers. This proposal M. Delcassé naturally opposed, since he had taken the whole direction of French foreign policy on his own shoulders and had not even taken all the cabinet into his confidence. As the French premier, M. Rouvier, and the rest of M. Delcassé's colleagues finally approved it however, he was forced to resign. Meanwhile the British Foreign Office also opposed a fresh conference and the *Times* adopted a most hostile attitude to Germany for having made the proposal. The British public were of course ignorant of the secret agreements and the German government had had reason to be suspicious of their existence for some time, so that by the end of 1905 when a conference had at length been reluctantly consented to, Anglo-German relations were badly strained and the Entente Cordiale had grown correspondingly stronger.

The Conference of Algiers took place in February 1906. Representatives of all the powers, including the United States, were present, and an act was drawn up and signed by Great Britain, France, Spain and Germany, the countries with chief interests in Morocco. It was drawn up "in the name of God Almighty" and based upon "the threefold principle of the sovereignty and inde-

pendence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality." This was the crucial point in subsequent international relations. Had a new page really been turned and a frank open policy followed, the British-Franco-German atmosphere might have cleared and the great war—already looming so threateningly on the horizon—might possibly have been averted.

Instead of this, from 1907 on, the French Government, ignoring the Act of Algeciras, proceeded under one pretext or another to absorb Morocco, encouraged by the British Foreign Office and the officially inspired section of the British press. In the course of the absorption many thousands of Moors were killed, and while the French gradually took up permanent military occupation of more and more towns and districts, the French Chamber was continuously reiterating that it had no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Morocco.

Early in 1909 discussions began between France and Germany over Morocco, in which Germany sought compensation elsewhere in Africa for the shelving of her Moroccan interests, and these discussions were intermittently kept up until the spring of 1911, being alternately taken up and dropped according to the changes in the French Ministry. Owing to her continually increasing population and relatively small colonial possessions, economic outlets and opportunities for obtaining raw material were increasingly necessary to German industrial expansion.

In the meantime the disintegrating fungus of high finance, which always accompanies Colonial ventures, was doing its deadly work. The Sultan Mulai Hafid and his predecessor Abdulaziz had been encouraged and even pressed to draw loan after loan upon Europe, so that in 1910 Moroccan indebtedness amounted to £6,520,000. In order to meet the interest on this sum Mulai Hafid had finally become compelled to mortgage the Customs duties and all his other Moorish sources of revenue, and he tried as well to raise extra revenue from his subjects by all manner of cruel extortions. This naturally led to internal unrest, and the French administration made this a pretext for sending, in May 1911, a military expedition to Fez to restore order, which was to be recalled when that object was accomplished. Sir Edward Grey publicly approved of this proceeding.

But the French troops remained in occupation, and Spain, determined not to lose the share that had been allotted to her in the secret agreements of 1904, also sent troops to take possession of the

Moroccan coast. Thereupon the Franco-German negotiations were broken off and the German Government despatched a gunboat, the Panther, to Agadir, to indicate more forcibly than by discussion that they also had an interest in the fate of Morocco. This act was promptly denounced in England as a violation of the Act of Algiers, and as almost a *casus belli*. The British press comments on the subject were indeed more violent than the French ones. France looked upon the sending of the Panther less as a hostile act and more as an intimation that Germany intended seriously to dispute the annexation of Morocco, and as a sign that the long continued negotiations between the two countries must be finally concluded. It subsequently transpired that in the negotiations previous to the march on Fez, Germany had agreed to consent to a French Protectorate in Morocco given suitable compensation elsewhere, and the sending of the Panther was therefore a public protest at an act at which she had already privily connived. Foreseeing the settlement this action must lead to, Sir Edward Grey insisted that Great Britain must take part in any Franco-German discussions.

The case in brief was this: reciprocity of trade having been guaranteed at two international conferences, at both of which Germany was one of the signatory Powers, the German Government felt that they were not justified in submitting to the alteration of the status quo in Morocco without either their consent or the receipt of some compensation, where such a change so materially affected their economic interests. They virtually said to France: You have treated with Italy, then with Spain, and subsequently with Great Britain, donating to all these Powers something in exchange for their consent to your setting aside publicly ratified treaties as to Morocco. How will you treat with us?

In answer to enquiries from the French Ambassador in July 1911, the German Foreign Secretary proposed that France should turn over to Germany rather more than half the French Congo, and offered in part exchange two of the German colonies in Africa, Togoland and part of the Cameroons. This conversation was not made public until December of that year, but in the meantime the British press published many heated articles to the effect that Germany was demanding impossible compensation from France and that her real object was to gain possession of Agadir, which in turn was represented as affecting British interests. Though Sir Edward Grey afterwards admitted that France had kept him *au courant* with what really transpired, this version was not contradicted, the affair of the

Panther was exaggerated, and finally such a feeling of hostility to Germany was aroused in the public mind that war seemed imminent.

At the height of this wave of public sentiment Mr. Lloyd George made his famous Mansion House speech, in which he said: "I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . . But if a situation were forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." At the time this speech was made about 80,000 French troops were in occupation of Morocco and had taken possession of its capital, while Spanish troops occupied a large portion of the coast. The Act of Algeciras had become a farce.

Meanwhile France, on whose behalf England was working herself up to fever pitch, was comparatively calm about these German proposals and only seeking to arrive at the best solution of them. The attitude of the German public was that it was a matter between themselves and France, and that no British interests were endangered or involved in any way. Which indeed was so, except for the major interest Great Britain felt she had in preventing any Franco-German rapprochement, from fear of its upsetting the balance of power. At length a treaty was signed between France and Germany on November 4, 1911. Germany agreed to formally recognize a French Protectorate over Morocco on condition that the "open door," was to be assured to the commercial and industrial enterprises of all nations, and in return received territorial compensation in tropical Africa.

In November of that year the Paris press published the secret agreements arrived at seven years previously between France, Great Britain, and Spain, and about the same time disclosures were made in England by Captain Faber M. P., Lord Charles Beresford, Admiral Freemantle and others as to the plans of the British Government for giving military and naval aid to France in the event of war. The truth of these latter statements was denied at the time, though they were subsequently proved correct by Sir Edward Grey's disclosure of the understanding with France in his speech of August 3, 1914. All these revelations strengthened the hands of the Imperialistic party in Germany, and the German people became convinced that their Government had dealt weakly in the matter of Morocco and had lowered German prestige in consenting to be

ignored on a matter affecting all the great powers. War indeed was only staved off in that stormy year of 1911 by the joint efforts of the pacifically inclined parties in all the countries concerned.

But although war was then averted, the international atmosphere had become, and was to remain, thoroughly poisoned by jealousy and suspicion, and friction was intensified to an alarming degree by the steady increase of armaments each power felt it necessary to make. So that, as Mr. Morel says in his preface to *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*: "The Moroccan quarrel will, by future generations of English-speaking people, be regarded as one of those episodes which leave indelible traces upon its destinies, forging links of inter-connected circumstances affecting a remote posterity." In such a condensation as this the threads left out are necessarily many, but the more fully the case is viewed, the more of an object lesson it becomes as to what the peoples of the world have to expect if they continue to leave the conduct of foreign affairs exclusively to Foreign Offices and Chancelleries, and submit to being left in the dark about matters so closely and vitally affecting their own interests.

THE ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION.

BY T. B. STORK.

A profound and revolutionary change has come into the industrial world. So gradual and natural has been its approach that it seems more like a process of evolution, which in fact it is, than the result of any conscious effort. Competition, that word of might in the old political economy, is a thing of the past. "Competition was the life of trade." Competition was this and that, we were wont to be told by the old theory. For our present purpose, however, the important, the vital, characteristic of competition is that it was of old the great and only price fixer: it made market price. Buyers and sellers met and competed with each other: the buyer, if he found few sellers would increase his bid, just as the seller with few buyers would shade his price to bring about a sale. So for centuries it has been between merchants; it has functioned in the industrial world, a natural law, an economic factor, usually fair, impartial, impersonal, regulating prices, not only between individuals and smaller communities, but between the nations of the world.

But now a new era, new industrial methods, have come into play, exhibiting characteristics that are disconcerting to minds accustomed to the old political economy. Competition, the great price-fixer of the ancient world, is dead and in the new world there has appeared in its place, combination. Men are no longer individual buyers and sellers, but combinations of nearly all sellers and of some buyers: for the new methods have not reached the world of individual buyers to anything like the same extent.

One form of combination of buyers will naturally occur to the reader, the only one, so far as I know, that has had very much practical effect: I mean the cooperative store: how far this might go to meet the combination of sellers, it would be rash to venture an opinion from the data at hand. It would be still more rash to predict what the possibilities of its further development might be,

or whether it might be more potent than regulation which seems to have very much outstripped its rival in practical application to the evils of combination of sellers and their monopolistic price-fixing.

Theoretically speaking, it might seem that the natural remedy for the evil of combinations in selling would be combinations in buying, but the practical difficulty of combining isolated buyers, with no common bond but the desire to buy cheaply, would seem almost insuperable. If it could be done it would bring back competition on equal terms between buyers and sellers and so restore the economic balance.

Until, however, this or some other method be found the buyer must face alone the almost universal combination of sellers. Market price, the result of competition, no longer exists, but combination monopoly price, the result of monopolistic agreements between sellers. This great change has not come suddenly; no industrial or economic change ever does, particularly one so apparently well founded and with such a promise of permanency. The economic observer may trace its beginning possibly in the necessity for larger capital developed by the growth of modern instruments of production; first the railroads, later the great steamship, later still the vast plants of the iron and steel companies with their ore beds, their coal mines, lime quarries, their cargo boats and railroads making a single gigantic enterprise. All these contained in them, latent and obscurely defined, the seeds of the new industrial method. Any industry that requires large aggregations of capital tends to kill competition. It reduces its competitors to the few who possess the requisite amounts of capital, it excludes smaller capitalists and tends at the same time to draw together the larger excluding capitalists. These latter from a common interest work more and more in harmony and for the benefit of themselves as against the rest of the trading community: for however at first, as has been seen in the past, great industries may compete, fight against each other for supremacy in their respective trades, eventually and inevitably it comes about that their intelligent heads perceive the great advantage of combining against the community to raise prices and make large profits, rather than by cutting prices to ruin each other for the benefit of the outsiders. Thus it comes about that competition is abandoned and for it is substituted combination. At first forced upon the industrial world by these necessities of railroads, steamships, and other large enterprises, these combinations of great capital showed such advantage

and conveniences, not only to the producer, but also to the public at large, that gradually by insensible steps they grew and multiplied.

Then came the department store, at first dealing chiefly in dry goods, but adding each year something more until now we have magnificent buildings presenting for sale every possible kind of merchandise, furniture, toys, trunks, carpets, boats, jewelry, pictures and photographs, food: there is nothing omitted that is known to the wants of men. They have restaurants, hospitals, organs, concert recitals, to attract and please their customers.

Then came the mail-order house, as they are called, where from a distance of a thousand miles or more you may purchase a paper of pins or an automobile. The trade of these is stupendous: a revenue of over a quarter of a billion dollars is reported last year by one of them, a sum equivalent to the income of a small state.

Even the small corner grocery store is done to death by the chain stores of the great corporations which buy on a huge scale and sell through a series of small stores established at convenient places in the great cities.

Fruit and vegetable dealers are not exempt: daily we read of car-loads of potatoes being thrown away or suffered to decay unsold rather than break the market: of tomatoes which, by agreement of dealers, cannot be sold below a fixed price. All of which proves the existence of combinations to the extinction of competition: for no sane dealer would deliberately suffer the destruction of his wares, which were saleable at some price, however low, save in the expectation of re-couping himself by the high price of the remaining stock to be realized by combination with others.

Here is not the place to emphasize the wicked extravagance, the actual loss of wealth to the whole community which such combinations entail when they destroy food for the purpose of keeping up prices. Such acts are so contrary to public policy, to the interests of the state considered as a community, that they should be by law made crimes and punished accordingly. To destroy food for such a purpose is in its degree as much an offense against the interests of the state as to destroy unborn offspring. Here plainly the path of regulation is clear and unmistakable: all such destruction of food should be forbidden under penalty of a jail sentence.

It is not necessary to more than mention these very obvious combinations of iron and copper and oil companies whose names are household words throughout the land. United States Steel, Kennecott Copper, Standard Oil, these and all the rest that no man can number.

What is the economic meaning of all these industrial and commercial phenomena? Is not one of the meanings that competition, the good old price-fixer, is forever gone, consigned to the scrap heap with the stage coach, the hand loom and the horse plow?

With all these combinations there has come about a vast monopoly. There are no longer any independent sellers of goods competing with each other and so fixing a price for the consumer. That luckless individual is as much compelled to buy his goods from the department store, the chain grocery shop, the great oil company, as he is to step up to the ticket office of the New York Central R. R. company and buy his ticket for the price asked if he wishes to travel by that road. There is no independent seller for him to go to; unorganized and uncombined himself he is face to face with these combinations of sellers united as one man against him. He is at the mercy of huge aggregations of capital directed by expert intelligence and careful to extract the last penny the traffic will bear, and wonderfully united by a common, if unexpressed, understanding, the offspring of a common interest to get the most for what they sell.

And so with labor. In good old-fashioned economics just as the seller and buyer of goods met and competed, bargained and fixed prices, so the laborer and employer bargained for labor. Labor was in this sense a commodity, and indeed always will be while the present industrial organization continues. Much as it may savor of a gross brutal materialism, the fixing of its price is as much a matter of barter as any other object of commercial dealing. The laborer asks as much as he can get; the employer offers as little, and the ultimate price is fixed by an adjustment between buyer and seller just as in any other market.

But this old-time competition in the labor market has now in its turn been succeeded by combination: just as in goods, so in labor the sellers have come together, not quite so completely perhaps, but nevertheless with sufficient strength to seriously disturb in all fields of industry the old price-fixer, competition, and in some industries it has put the sellers of labor in quite as commanding a position as the seller of goods. In some industries, such as transportation, the seller of labor is in fact by reason of combination, a true dictator of prices. It is there not a matter of choice whether the needy purchaser will or will not buy, but of life and death, he must buy or perish.

Here is one of the keys to the problem of high prices, to the high cost of living—combination. The old price-fixer, competition, is gone forever, the principles of combination with its magic power

over prices has come upon all the industrial world as a revelation of the purse of Fortunatus. All classes may plunge their hands in and take out fistfuls of gold for themselves and from the uncombined and helpless buyers, the school teachers, the clergymen, the farmers, the doctors, all the general public who bear not that union label which distinguishes the combined from the uncombined. Thus in a new and different sense emerges the war of the classes against the masses. "Man competes with man like foe with foe"—to quote Burke's saying—no more, but like predatory bands of robbers combine to plunder all without the sacred circle of the particular union.

How long this process can go on, how far each class of railroad employee, garment maker, miners of coal and copper and steel and iron workers, can proceed, each class like Oliver asking for more, is the vital and all-absorbing question of to-day. "Commerce," to quote Burke again, "is very well able to find its own way out and its necessities are its best laws." But it is doubtful whether this rule will work in the present remarkable situation, a situation not confined to the United States, but prevailing to a greater or less extent over the entire world of industry.

Combinations of capital and labor have developed naturally in the course of industrial growth, made possible as well as necessary by the increasing complication of the world's work. It has brought with it great advantages which industry cannot afford to lose, greater economy of production, greater certainty in all its operations to the benefit of workman and employer. It gives the workman steady employment, a fixed wage; it gives the employer a volume of reliable labor that assures his out-put at regular times and in calculated amounts.

Combinations, therefore, of capital and of labor cannot and ought not to be prevented by law; their advantage to all concerned, to the public in cheapened production, to the capitalist in certainty of his enterprises, to the laborer in steadiness of employment and reasonableness and fairness of remuneration, are overwhelming.

But are such combinations to be allowed to go unchecked, exacting whatever they see fit and have the power by reason of their monopoly to take from the helpless consuming public? That has been the course very largely in the past, but especially just now, for, making all allowance for the scarcity of post war goods, much of the high prices is due to the monopoly created in everything by these combinations.

What then is to be done? Are capitalist and workman, en-

trenched in their respective class monopolies, to go on exploiting every other class and the unclassed, uncombined public? Such a course is impossible for any length of time. Marking up prices of particular things is for a short time a very pleasing amusement for the markers-up, but is soon countered by the marking up of the prices of other things and so reduces itself to a species of useless book-keeping for all save the unfortunate who have not the marking-up power.

It may be conceded that competition was not a perfect price-fixer, often it worked hardship, sometimes injustice. It was a natural law, one might say, but like all natural laws it was at times brutal and unscientific. But this question of a substitute for it, now that combination has destroyed it, is vital to the future of industrial society, and of no easy answer. Some aspects of it are more difficult than others; the labor combination looms large and threatening. Regulation of prices in some shape which seems the only possible answer may be all very well for the capitalist's goods or the returns from the railroad investor's property, but the fixing of the price of labor involves many and very difficult considerations. Yet it is not to be avoided. A vast industrial army of laborers combined to exact what wages it pleases cannot be permitted to take the whole community by the throat and to demand what it will under penalty if its demands are not granted, of stopping vital processes, such as transportation of food, supplying of heat, or water or light.

The very fact of combination of labor gives the right of regulation: combination which makes monopoly and for the express purpose of monopoly and the power that goes with it gives the corresponding right of control. It creates the necessity and justifies the exercise of control; for while it is not a monopoly in law; it is a monopoly in fact and like all monopolies it carries within its own breast its legal remedy—regulation. So it was that the United States Supreme Court in the so-called Granger cases of the last century attacked and solved the question. A monopoly of any public service, such as a ferry, for example, gives the legal right to regulate it, to prescribe how the monopoly shall be exercised, and it is no great or illogical step to apply the same reasoning to monopolies in fact such as these combinations constitute.

Regulation by some supervising authority therefore, difficult as it proves in practice, would seem to be the answer to these monopolies of combination. And already this answer has been put into practice in certain directions. The Inter-State Commerce

Commission with its ever-extending powers, has undertaken the regulation of the railroads. Its success thus far has not been encouraging, but nevertheless it is evident that along some such lines of proceeding as it has followed, the regulation of all monopolistic combinations of labor and capital must be worked out.

The combinations of labor are especially hard to deal with. How they are to be regulated without infringing the personal liberty of the workman is not easy to ascertain. All men in society, the workman like others, must submit to a restriction of liberty in many ways; this is universally recognized by sane thinkers, and when new situations arise, such as the great organized unions of workmen create in industry, some new restrictions must be made to meet the new situation. The general proposition is indisputable, that no class of men shall be allowed by force or otherwise to coerce the other classes of society. And the further proposition will probably be acknowledged, that the prevention of such coercion must be with as little infringement of individual liberty as possible.

It is here that the profound remark of Governor Coolidge has especial significance. He has said we do not make laws, we discover them, and in regulating combinations of labor we can by no theorizing find the true course of conduct, we must discover by experiment, by trying first one and then another way how best, while conserving as far as possible the liberty of the workman, we may safeguard the interest of the whole society.

One of the difficulties of the problem is that you cannot regulate any one thing by itself, the regulation of one thing necessitates the regulation of another, and so on. There is no stopping until you have regulated everything. Each service or article of commerce whose price is regulated involves the prices of other services and articles. Thus the regulation of the railroads, the fixing of wages and of freight rates upsets the price of countless other articles which in their turn call for regulation.

Thus again the attempt to regulate rent, for which a very general and insistent demand is made, involves not merely the price of houses, but the wages of carpenters, the cost of lumber and of all that goes to the making of houses, for while of course the rent of existing houses may be fixed even to the extent of confiscating them for the benefit of the tenants, yet nobody outside of the insane asylum would expect any houses to be built in the future unless the prospective rent is fixed with some regard to cost of building in wages and material so that a return satisfactory to the builder will be allowed on his capital. So if you regulate rents to a lower figure,

you are, of necessity, obliged to regulate wages and the price of lumber and of all else that goes to the making of a house. The Chicago City Councils are now asking a special session of the Illinois Legislature to empower the Councils to regulate rents, but even a city council will hardly attempt any such regulation except on these terms for it is not likely that they will go so far as to undertake to compel men to build houses to rent against their will. In the renting of houses, if anywhere, we might expect the old price-fixer competition to survive; if it no longer functions in what seems such a separate non-monopolistic transaction as the renting of a house by one man to another, it is hard to see how it is to function hereafter in anything.

It may be assumed, therefore, with a fair amount of certainty that regulation in some shape and of some sort is coming to rule the industrial world more and more completely. It is the only substitute for competition. How exactly the price of every service and every article of consumption is to be measured and with the nice adjustment of a merchant's scales by some authority, no one can foretell.

Perhaps something like the present rule of the Esch-Cummins act for the earnings of the railroads furnishes a guide.

A law fixing the permissible earnings of all capital and labor within certain limits and a penalty by way of taking any surplus might serve to stop profiteering in goods and unreasonable demands in wages. It would not be asking more of every man than is now asked of that devoted class of income tax payers, if it were required that every man should report his capital and gross earnings to the revenue officers, and where these earnings seemed to experts excessive, an investigation might be made and if then more was taken by capital or labor than the law permitted the excess would be paid as tax to the state.

The law would of course fix very liberal and elastic limits for the earnings permissible so that only the extravagant and plainly unreasonable exactions of capital or labor would be prohibited and penalized by loss of the surplus.

THE RABBINIC CONCEPTION OF WORK.

BY JULIUS J. PRICE.

THE Jews¹ were the first people to proclaim to the world the dignity and holiness of labor. What Israel's law giver² recognized as man's highest duty four thousand years ago, the modern world has just begun to appreciate. In the very beginning the God of Israel was portrayed as a laborer. The creation of the world is the work of His hands. He differed by far from the Olympian gods of Greece, who were depicted as revelers,³ and from Buddha who tried to do nothing, or from Brahma, who was only thought.

In this glorified conception of labor Judaism was far superior to the civilization of all other ancient peoples.⁴ We laud and respect the culture of the Greeks, yet her greatest mind derided honest labor so far, as to exclaim: "The title of the citizen belongs only to those who need not work to live."⁵ Work to the Greek was servile and degrading, the lot of the slave and the contemptible poor.⁶ He only could aspire to Athenian honors whose days were free from the drudgery of toil.

Roman civilization offered no more dignified conception of labor. The workman was still regarded as a slave, a social nonentity. And these Roman traditions together with the Biblical view tended in great measure to mold a labor policy of the middle ages. Labor

¹ Comp. *Pesahim* 118 a, so also, *Genesis* ii. 15; iii. 19.

² *A. Z.* 3 a.

³ Comp. Lowes-Dickson, *The Greek View of Life*, passim.

⁴ *Polit* III. 3 and 2, p. 75.

⁵ Comp. the lives of Hillel, *Yoma*, 35b; *Gittin*, 67b; Isaac Napha, *Sabbath* 52a; Chanina, *Kethuboth* 112a; Judah Chaita, *B. B.* 164b; Yochanan Ha-Sandler, *Aboth*, IV. 14; Judah hanechtam, *B. B.* 132a; and Joseph, *Gittin* 67b.

⁶ See Plato, *De Repub.* III, p. 168. On the other hand we find a certain number of warlike communities in antiquity where in citizens were forbidden to follow a profession, Com. Xenoph, *Orcon.* c. 4 Par. 3, vol. 5; p. 22; Comp. also Aristotle, *Politik*, I, 2; 1252b, 7ff. (ed. Bekker).

was a necessity, as a consequence and penalty of sin and directly connected as a curse with the "Fall."⁷

In the middle ages, the clerics held a life of contemplation to be far superior to one of labor.⁸ Labor was regarded as a means for penance and ascetic purposes.⁹ Often it was employed for useful results and with beneficial efforts on useful arts. The purposes, however, was to ward off the vices of leisure.¹⁰ Labor for economic production was not appreciated by the church. It was even discouraged since disapproval of wealth and luxury was one of the controlling principles of the external assumption of the medieval Church. It is only in the more recent times that labor has been regarded as a blessing, or at worse, a necessity which has a great moral and social compensation.¹¹

The Bible praises the work of man's hands, for well do we find the whole national life of the Jew with all its ordinances connected with the earth and agriculture. This moreover argues the existence of an active working spirit amongst the Hebrews. Work was also regarded by the Bible as rendering "the sleep of man sweet" (Eccles. v. 12), so also "rejoicing the heart" (Eccles. ii. 10) by means of which "the hand of the diligent maketh rich while he becometh poor who dealeth with a slack hand" (Prov. x. 4), and so also Sirach, the son of Jesus, sings his need of praise as well when he says with regard to labor, "Hate not toilsome labor, nor husbandry which the Most High has created" (Sirach VII. 16). But the Rabbis are even more emphatic in their praise of labor, for while they readily recognize that "In the point of dignity and rank there might be a difference between trade and trade; yet to the lowest attaches no disgrace if it supplies a real human want and any calling is better than none."¹² For well do they realize that "great is labor, for

⁷ *Pesahim* 118a comp. also, Bonhoffer, *Die Ethik des Storkers, Epicktet*, p. 73. Comp. also *Pesahim* 118a, also I, Thes III, 10; Pseudo Justin, *ad. Zenam* 17 (*Patrologia Graeca* VI. 1202); Ep. Barnabas. 17. "Thou shalt with thy hands as ransom for thy sins"; see also Apost. Constit. II. 63; Epiphanius., *Haer.* 80n. 5 and 6; 70n 2; Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, II; 521.

⁸ The Rabbinic conception however was somewhat different from this view. Work the Rabbis conceived to be of equal importance with the Sabbath, Comp. Aboth d'Rav Nathan. II. (ed. Schechter.) p. 44, so also *passim*.

⁹ Compare in this connection the Mishnic phrase—"Love Work", Aboth I; 10.

¹⁰ According to our sages it is incumbent even upon women of unlimited means to spend part of the day in some sort of labor, *Kethuboth* 59b (Mishna); comp. also Franz Delitzsch, *Judisches Handwerkerleben zur Zeit Jesu*. P. 17.

¹¹ Hartmann, *d. rel. Bewustsein*, Berlin 1882, p. 520.

¹² *Kiddushin*, 29a.

she honors her Master"¹³ and that "Man must work or people will talk about him."¹⁴ The following sums up their attitude on the question as follows:—"I am a creature of God, and so is my neighbor. He may prefer to work in the country, I in the city. I rise early to follow one calling, he to follow another. As he does not seek to supplant me, I shall do nothing to injure him; for I believe that when the ideal of duty is present before our minds, whether we accomplish much or accomplish little, the Almighty will reward us according to the worthiness of our intentions" (Berachoth 17a). "For the man who does not love work, but shuns work, excluded himself from the covenant with Heaven; for just as the Holy Law is a sign of the covenant, so does work constitute a sign of the Covenant between God and man" (Aboth d'Rav Nathan XI). Many passages are cited from the Rabbinical literature in honor of productive labor and in disapproval of idleness. "Greater," says the Rabbis, "is he that maintains himself by his own labor than he that fears the Lord; for of the latter it is said (Psalms cxii. 1); "Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; but of the former it is said (Psalms cxiii. 2) "If thou shalt eat the labor of thine hands, happy shalt thou be in this world, and it shall be well with thee in the world to come."¹⁵ "Love secular work, say the Rabbis, and eschew the Rabbinical office and have no fellowship with the government authorities."¹⁶ According to the Rabbis, the study of the law must be sustained by secular work, for otherwise, "It must come to an end and involve in sin."¹⁷ "Rabbi Yehudah, when ever he went to the Acedemy, used to carry a leather bottle on his shoulders. Rabbi Simon used to carry a fruit-basket on his shoulders. Both used to say: "See what honor work confers": for they both had something to sit upon at the academy."¹⁸ The Rabbis also thought work was a cure of physical ailments, and Rav. Joseph, who suffered once from a malady, occasioned by a cold, turned a mil stone, and Rav Shaiseth carried heavy loads; for, said they, "physical exertion (work) heats the body."¹⁹ More than a hundred of those Rabbis named in the Talmut besides their Rabbinical functions followed trades. These were among others,

¹³ Gittin, 67a.

¹⁴ *Aboth d'Rav. Nathan* 2nd. version XXI: 22b.

¹⁵ *Ber.* 8a.

¹⁶ *Avoth* I. 10.

¹⁷ *Avoth* Ch. II.

¹⁸ *Nedarim*, 49b.

¹⁹ *Gittin*, 67b.

tailors, shoemakers, a baker, an architect, a grave digger, a fisher, a dyer and a carpenter.²⁰

Although it is a common custom to rise in the presence of disciples²¹ of the wise, no workmen who are paid for their work are allowed to do so.²² To quote the words of the Rabbis: 'No workman who are paid for their time are allowed to whilst at work, to rise in the presence of disciple of the wise.' But should matters of a heavenly kind call a disciple of the wise from his business, the public is bound to perform the work for him.²³ Yet we find that the Rabbis did not excuse a laborer even to take time from his work to recite the Shema.²⁴ In one instance however I have found where a laborer even considers himself on a par with a sage of Israel. Simon, a well digger in Jerusalem, once remarked to Rabbi Yochanan, "I am quite as great a man as thou art." "How so?" inquired the Rabbi. "For the reason," replied Simon, "that I, no less than thou, supply the wants of the community. If any man comes to thee and inquires for ceremonially clean water, dost thou not tell him "Drink from yonder fountain, for its waters are pure and cool" or if a woman inquire concerning a good bathing place, sayest thou not, "Bathe in this cistern, for its waters wash away uncleanness?"²⁵

Work, says the Rabbis, is one of the eight things which is injurious when immoderately indulged in, and beneficial when done in moderation.²⁶ In Egypt the life of the Jew "was made bitter with hard bondage."²⁷ Ray Samuel bar Nachmaine said: "They imposed men's tasks (work) upon women and women's tasks upon men."²⁸

Rabbi Meirs says: "A man should always teach his son an easy and cleanly trade, and pray for his prosperity to Him, to whom riches and substance belong"²⁹ or better still "to teach a child a trade or a

²⁰ *Kiddushim* 33a.

²¹ *Comp. Tosephta* in loc. *Comp.* also, *Berachoth* 16a.

²² *Sabbath* 114a. *comp.* also *Sotah* 44b.

²³ *Gittin* 7a. *Comp.* also *Aboth d'Ray Nathan*, XI.

²⁴ *Deut.* vi. 4: "Hear O Israel the Lord our God, the Lord is one."

²⁵ *Midrash Koheleth* 4: 17.

²⁶ *Exodus* I 14.

²⁷ *Sotah*. 11.

²⁸ *Kiddushin* 82a. In this connection, it might be well to compare the Greek concept, i.e., that it is degrading for young people to be taught trades, *comp. Xenoph, Oecon.* VIII; p. 245.

²⁹ *Sabbath*, 150a.

handcraft is to be considered as one of the "religious deeds" for which arrangements may be made even on the Sabbath."³⁰ So also "He who does not teach his son some special handicraft" is as though he had trained him to become a robber (*Kiddushin* 82b). While on the other hand "though famine may last seven years, it can never reach the door of the industrious mechanic" (*Samhedrin* 31a). For there is no trade, which is not represented by poor and rich people, though neither riches nor poverty are due to the trade, but to merit, or the want of it.³² Rabbi Simon (latter half of second century) said: Hast thou even seen a beast or fowl, engaging in trade? and yet they have no trouble in securing a livelihood. These exist only to serve me, whereas, I exist to serve my Creator. How much less trouble then, should I experience in obtaining a livelihood? But my deeds being evil, they interfere with my sustenance.³³

"A man should not change his trade, nor that of his father; for it is said (*Kings* vii. 13-14): "Hiram of Tyre was a widow's son of the tribe of Naphtali, and his father was a man of Tyre, a worker of brass."³⁴ Rabbi says: "No trade will ever pass away from the world; but happy is he whose parents belong to a respectable trade, and woe unto him whose parents engage in a derogatory trade. The world cannot exist without a perfumer and a tanner; but happy is he whose occupation is that of a perfumer, and woe unto a tanner. The world cannot exist without boys and girls; but happy is he whose children are boys, and woe unto him whose children are girls."³⁵

Those whose occupation bring them into frequent contact with women, may not be alone with any number of them.³⁶ A man may not teach his son a trade which belongs to a woman. "Rabbi Nehoradee said: 'I leave all trades in the world, and teach my son the Law only; for the interest thereof sustains a man in this world, and the capital is reserved for the world to come. Besides, no other

³⁰ *Ibid.* It might be well to compare here the saying of the Rabbis "flay a carcass in the market-place rather than be under painful necessity of applying for charity and say not. I am of noble origin. I am a descendant of Aaron, the high priest; how can I stoop to such an occupation?" *Pesahim*, 113a.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Erachin*, 16b.

³⁴ *Kiddushin*, 82b.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 82a.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

trade will, like the study of the Law, keep a man in illness and old age.'"³⁷

Certain traders were taught to influence the characters of those employed at them, for the rabbis teach that "the majority of donkey drivers are wicked men; the camel drivers are mostly virtuous men, being humbled by the dangers they encounter in the desert. The majority of sailors are holy men, by reason of their exposure to still greater risks. The best of physicians is destined to hell, and the most virtuous of butchers is the companion of Amelek."³⁸

The Rabbis abhorred the usual doubtful methods of earning a livelihood, and have given vent to their feelings somewhat as follows: "Happy is the man who has been reared in an honorable calling; woe to the man who has selected a doubtful walk of life." (Kiddushin 82b).

We also find that those men who employed their time in the unproductive labors suffered civic disabilities, for "dice players, usurers, pigeon flyers and dealers in crops grown in the years of release provided," adds Rabbi Yehudah, "they have no other occupation"³⁹ (work), cannot be admitted as judges or witnesses."⁴⁰ Our rabbis have also taught that "Those whose occupation brings them into frequent contact with women, are morally depraved, such as goldsmiths, wool or flax carders, millstone borers, perfumers, weavers, hairdressers, washermen, phlebotomists, bathkeepers and tanners. These are never appointed to the office of king or high priest, not because they are personally incapable of filling it, but by reasons of their disreputable occupation."⁴¹ Work for the public benefit was even allowed in the case of a mourner.

In their home in Palestine the Hebrews were distinctly agricultural, "Rabbi Eliazar said: 'A man who does not own a piece of land is not included in the species Homo': for it is said (Psalms cxv. 16): 'The heavens even the heavens are the Lord's, but the earth hath He given to the children of men.'"⁴²

According to Rav Papa, there is a special blessing in working the fields. "Sow thy own corn for home consumption," said Rav Papa, "rather than buy it; for although there is no immediate saving in the outlay, a blessing rests on the former; it goes a great way."⁴³

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Sahedrin* 24b.

³⁹ Maimonides, *Hilch, Adoth*, Sec. 10, *Halacha*, 4 ff.

⁴⁰ *Kiddushin* 82b.

⁴¹ *Yevamoth*, 63a.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Rabbi Eliazer once observed a field ploughed up latitudinally. "Plough it again" said he, "longwise also"⁴⁴ and you will find commerce more profitable." Several other observations with regard to the cultivation of land as expressed by the Rabbis are "He who has no land to tile cannot be called a man for the Bible states: 'The Heaven, even the heavens are the Lord's; but the earth hath He given to the children of Men.'")

"Only when a man cultivates the soil with diligence can he expect to be satisfied with bread; if however he neglects the ploughing and watering thereof, he cannot expect to have his wants satisfied."⁴⁵

And even with regard to the status of the rich man the Rabbis say, "If a man has no other work to do, let him go and attend to the waste fields and dilapidated courtyards which belong to him."⁴⁷

In so great regard was Agriculture held by the Rabbis that they state "In the future all trades and occupations shall vanish from off the face of the earth, agriculture shall alone remain."⁴⁸ "If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen, for an ox⁴⁹ and four sheep for a sheep."⁵⁰ Come and see the value attached to work: For the loss of an ox, which interfered with the owner's work, he is paid five oxen; but for the loss of a sheep which does not work he is only paid four.⁵¹

With regard to work on the Sabbath, the Rabbis say, he that performs any work on the eve of the Sabbath and annual festivals, from the time of the meat offerings (or prayer now offered as a substitute that is at 3:30 p. m.) never sees a token of blessing.⁵²

There are forty different works save one, which constitute the first category, and which, if performed inadvertently on the Sabbath, require a sin-offering for each: Sewing, ploughing, reaping, binding into sheaves, thrashing, winnowing, removing husks with the hands or with a sieve, kneading, baking, shearing, bleaching, carding wool, dyeing it, spinning, weaving, making two holes for the insertion of threads, twisting two threads, shortening two

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Sanhedrin*, 58b.

⁴⁶ *Aboth d'Rav. Nathan*, XI.

⁴⁷ *Jevamoth*, 63a.

⁴⁸ *B. K. XI.*, 79b.

⁴⁹ *Exodus* xxii. 1.

⁵⁰ *B. K.* 79b.

⁵¹ *Pesahim* 50b.

⁵² *Sabbaoth* 73a.

threads, knotting, solving, making two stitches, tearing away for the purpose of making two stitches, hunting a stag, slaying, flaying, salting, tanning, removing its hair, cutting it up, writing two letters, erasing for the purpose of writing two letters, building, pulling down, extinguishing, lighting a fire, hammering, removing from one plot to another.⁵³ All these works were carried on in the building and arranging of the Tabernacle, which had to be suspended on the Sabbath day.⁵⁴

Although guilds⁵⁵ were unknown in Europe prior to the thirteenth century, there is a record of Jewish guilds in the name of Rabbi Yehudah: Whoever has not seen the twofold gallery in Alexandria of Egypt, has not seen the glory of Israel. They say: It was something like a large colonade, with porches with porches, and accomodating sometimes double the number of those that had followed Moses out of Egypt. There were seventy-one chairs arranged in it, for the seventy-one members of the larger Sanhedrin, each chair of not less value than twenty-one myriad talents of gold. A dais was in the middle, upon which was stationed the public officer holding a napkin in his hand. At the end of each benediction pronounced by the reader, who could not be heard by such vast multitude, he waved a napkin, and they all answered Amen. The people were seated by guilds, goldsmiths, silversmiths, blacksmiths, embroiderers, and weavers. And when a poor man came in, he knew at once his fellow craftsman; he applied to them for work, and obtained his livelihood. All these, adds Abii were massacred by Alexander the Macedonian.⁵⁶ Rashi says, they were the descendants of the colony, led by Johnanan, the son of Sareah into Egypt, some of whom had survived the Babylonian invasion. (Jer. xliii).

Innumerable other instances could still be multiplied as to the Rabbinic conception of labor, but perhaps the above citations prove sufficient the great regard for labor held by the Sages of Israel.

⁵⁴ *Exodus xxxv. 1-4ff.*

⁵⁵ We have on record a number of associations which in our modern parlance might be called unions. See the various societies of workers as they are described in *Megilla 26a; Sukka, 51b; a Kings xxvi. 16.*

⁵⁶ *Sukka, 51b.*

ON THE EDUCATIONAL BUNCO.

BY L. A. SHATTUCK.

WHEN the American soldier in France stopped hammering at the Hindenburg line on November 11, 1918, at that precise moment did educators, shell game operators, medicine men, and failures in all the professions commence firing at the head of American youth their salvos of preparatory literature regarding education. The country was, and is yet, full of this literature. At the moment of the Armistice came a need for the wooing of the engines of peace rather than the engines of war. Through magazine, newspaper, and periodical of every sort and condition, came a rain of educational literature that has inundated the country. The Polish immigrant was appealed to for the study of English and botany; the newly arrived Zecho-Slovak was regaled with the munificent return that a course in chiropractic would make; our own soldiers, sailors, and marines were bombastically threatened with absolute failure in the race for life preservation unless they enrolled in a school of finger-printing or doughnut making. And this irrespective whether they happened to be good rivet-heaters or farmers.

The causes of all this have been manifold. The suddenly acquired new viewpoint of the soldier who had come in contact with new languages, new faces, and new ideas, i. e., the enlargement of the provincial purview, the military thoroughness which by its "Attention!" and "Eyes Right!" had taught him the gift of taking orders; also a certain amount of the old sang-froid and the slouchiness in performance of work had been driven out of him; his outgrowing of the old job, i. e., no matter what work he performed excellently before the war had taken on a pettiness in appearance due to what he considered his newly found executive ability; the old kind of independence had given place to a newer kind or what he considered initiative. He had seen corporals giving orders as pompously as generals; coxswains he had seen commanding like captains, and

he imagined in civil life the same method should be as successful. As a consequence he believed that if he could get away from his old shopmates, his old office and store associates, and learn a new vocation he felt assured that he would become one of the world's captains of industry. Hence the service man has been the direct cause of this flood of educational literature and the craze for erudition.

These mental processes of the service man which were the cause of these effects would not, however, have taken place if there had not been one or more contributory causes. While it may be possible that in a few isolated cases the service man's mind may have, without a stimulus, functioned in this manner, and by the process of repeating these ideas to others, the desire for education and new jobs may have become prevalent, it is hardly probable. First, by reason of the numerical amount of those that have been effected, and secondly, by the wide latitude of its scope. Both the service man in France and the service man here had no intention of going back to the old job after the germ of education had become imbedded. From camps in New England to camps in the South and West it was the same. They all had ideas of becoming educated to a new line of work.

There were also, it is true, one or two organizations having educational courses that had representatives in the field, principal among which was the Y. M. C. A. But the main cause was not this. When the Army Vocational Schools commenced sending forth their literature and collecting their data overseas, in Army Camp, in hospital, and in training camp, that, and that only, was the initial mental stimulus of the educational "bug." Good plasterers immediately wished to become human bloodhounds. All the camp literature containing the "Adventures of Sherlock Holmes," "Vidoq" and "Craig Kennedy" became the reading of the moment. Fine *cidevant* horseshoers had aspirations of becoming world famous artists. Gibson, Flagg, and a host of other illustrators were the recipients of mail requesting testimonials for schools of art. Men who were excellent hotel cooks back home were ambitious of becoming magicians and all the tricks of Hermann and Kellar were assiduously practiced. Literature by the ton describing these courses went its several ways. And eventually, from the Army and the Navy, this educational bee stung everyone in this country.

The U. S. A. immediately upon the signing of the Armistice was practically in a state of chaos. The sudden termination of hostilities had metaphorically taken away the breath of every business man in

the country. As a result the immediate cry was "Reconstruction"—the getting back to the old basis of doing business; the discharging of a few (very few!) employees who had replaced the heroes (sic!) and the making of a place for these latter. There was an attempt on the part of employers to adapt themselves to a condition the majority of them had never met with in their business careers. There were calls from these employers to the colleges of the country to train men for new lines of work, such as the experiments as had been made for the chemical and dye industries during the war; also, the expected augmentation of business. All of these were causes to fit new men for new jobs. And it was obvious that a good many men would thus have to be fitted. While there were several industries engaged in manufacturing the same product on war orders as they made in peace time, as in the case of the garment and shoe trade, these latter had the simple problem of only adding to its force of employees, whereas in the industries in which the whole fabricating process would have to be overturned in order to get back to normal, this fitting of new men to new jobs became a highly complex one.

While employers were paving the way to a new accession of business under these new conditions, some few legitimate schools had been preparing the way educationally. But these latter who knew mob psychology were not to have monopoly of this teaching. Others there were, of a more degenerated order, who desired the mighty dollar, even though they obtained such blood money and exacted their pound of flesh from the ex-service men who stood as a wall of might and who protected them and their filthy kind from the ravages of war. These fakirs, with the cessation of hostilities, commenced their educational propaganda. Gobs and doughboys by the thousands were enrolled in these courses; became enamoured as it were with every species of industrialism—some legitimate and some not. But by far the most of these courses were not. Business, the arts, the sciences, as well as charlatanism were among the curricula of the illegitimate pedagogues. While fortunately the ex-service men have had a rude awakening from their dreams of all becoming Alexanders of business, railroading, etc., this had an adverse effect upon business men for the following reasons: First, being improperly trained, or rather not trained at all, by these educational hawks and with which training, or lack of it, ex-service men have been given a position with a responsible employer. Secondly, the discharging of the same for inefficiency, for no employer could help but become readily aware that the training has only been superficial. Thirdly, repetition of the above, and the employer

passes the word along to hire no more ex-service men. No employer can afford to be continually making experiments for while his patriotism may be of the very highest grade, he can't, nor will he, continually sacrifice his business interests to sentiment. These are sheerly the reasons why at the present time that a large element of the unemployed are ex-soldiers and sailors. By leaving the training of the returning valiants to chance rather than persuading them to go back to the ploughshare we have allowed them to come in contact with medicine men and charlatans. Instead of warning them against this evil of education we have rather encouraged them. Though it is true that each man is responsible for his own welfare yet many of these so-called students were little more than children in mind. We have taken them away from their childhood desires and put into their minds what once would have appeared to them the desires of demigods. The desires of the youth of the southern mountains, were, before the war, as archaic as were the desires of their great-grandfathers. To-day there is a great dissatisfaction with both the old and the new, caused by this germ of education. A timely warning against evils of the mind as well as against evils of the body (venereal talks) would probably have saved many of these a great many dollars and saved their ambition for something constructive. Many through this educational idea have become disheartened and lost ambition through their first real defeat.

These courses in education which were made to appeal to the doughboy, the gob, and the marine, range from accounting to zoroastrianism. If you will pick up a periodical dated November, 1918, and get all numbers of that periodical until the present date you will notice how these advertisements increase by leaps and bounds. And why? Sheerly by reason of the phenomenal success of the courses. Education of every kind in this country is now at its height. But there is no limit to the kinds of it. Every mail order quack in the country can, with a few dollars and a slight knowledge of advertising psychology, raise a shoe-string into a presentable bank-roll, if he has a good pen, a good printer, and a good medium. There is no law to stop him from running a course in swimming or piano playing by mail. Every line of endeavor can be made the means of causing the golden shower to return to him. He can, with this ready pen of his, influence the carpenter to become a Bahaist preacher or the billing clerk an embryo Jack Dempsey. The pen of the charlatan can raise images to the illogical that have no limit. The office boy can be made to see himself in the president's chair and the lady typist is raised to the heights of divine contemplation of having a

fur coat, a Rolls Royce automobile, and envisions the colored chauffeur who opens the door of the car while the steamer awaits the coming of the Chief Foreign Buyer.

It will be readily perceivable how imbecile all this is when we must consider the ground and framework that is necessary to clothe all these diverse minds. No matter what kind of seed you plant it must fall upon fertile ground to obtain a product. You can't throw corn among ashes and get a growth unless the corn happens to seep through to the soil underneath. Neither can you plant ideas in a clerk's head relative to poultry raising unless he has a peculiar aptitude for poultry farming. To get results from any form of education you must have a carefully prepared foundation. I am, of course, speaking of averages. One man may have the adaptability of doing several things well, but the average man certainly has not. Given a certain amount of preliminary education a man can become a mediocre anything if he has the will, but as for him becoming exceptional he must have the adaptability. I can't say whether or not a good farmer could ever become a detective like Burns, but I certainly can say that the average man will not. Nor can I say whether a tinsmith or a waiter could ever become another Faurot or Bertillon but certainly he would be the exceptional exception if he did. You have to have analyses of the character, the will, and the mind before any of these super-exceptions can be brought to pass. It's ridiculous to think that without these things you can be trained in anything but being a *verdampft* fool. Each man has a different mental makeup. You can't educate yourself to any line of work unless you have the peculiar aptness necessary—if you would be highly successful—no matter if the dean in every college in the U. S. tells you otherwise.

One of the greatest of faults (in addition to others) of these educators in the "arts bizarre" is the attempt to educate by mail through pamphlets as similar as are two peas. They advertize individual instruction but it is hardly so. And what is true of these educational medicine men is true of legitimate schools. They all leave no choice to the students mind. They never allow the latter an alternative. There is one effect, and one only, for every cause. There is a constant adhering to the wishes of the trustees and financial backers. If a man holds a contrary view of a subject to that of his instructor, immediately that man is put down for a radical—everything but what he is—a straightforward thinker. We should encourage youth rather to think different and be wrong than to compel them continually to say "c'est" because an instructor told

them so. More than half of the time the instructor himself doesn't believe the essence of what he teaches and it hinders true thinking by arbitrarily saying this is so and this is not so. It would be better to let the student discriminate between what is, and what isn't than to make him believe a thing which he'll have trouble to unlearn in after life. This method of arbitrary teaching is true of all schools, extension as well as resident. The schoolmen of to-day are little different from the schoolmen in the days of Aristotle. While they have accumulated a few more ologies and isms they have the same stock of platitudes and truisms they had two thousand years ago. In all their tutoring they never take into consideration the individuality but the mob—the class—always the mob. You can, it is true, lead sheep and other cattle with bells and shepherd dogs but you can't really educate nor really lead intelligent human beings with a crack of the educational whip. We shall soon learn (as business men are now learning) that it takes a long while to strip the men and women of to-day of class-room demonstrations. Had the students made these proofs within their own minds there would have been rather less necessity of ridding them later of these illogical inferences. Schoolmasters and school-mistresses of to-day reason one way. It must be always according to form and syllogism. If it is not according to prescribed order then it is wrong. Thus they reason. And which with modern methods of doing business has been outlived. We must allow our students the right of synthetically reasoning out every proposition rather than to harangue and to abuse them because antediluvian mentors and others of to-day concur in orthodoxy. The result of the present methods of instruction is like giving a scythe to one hundred men and expect each to cut the same amount of grain. By the law of large numerical averages they may cut pretty nearly the same but to expect one hundred students from any school equipped mentally the same to cut any figure in the world of business is idiotic. Teach them rather by mathematics, logic, or the sciences to think at all times for themselves. It will do the coming wheelwright as well as the coming engineer more good than a world of superfluous ologies.

These correspondence schools, in particular, take as a main premise one thing—and that is a similarity of brain functioning. (Though of course the gullibility of the mob is the premise upon which the correspondence school industry is founded.) It takes for granted no other convolutions in the brain of John Smith than it does in the brain of Jacob Isaacs. Each given a problem according to the mail method get one answer. All of the ramifications of that

problem never enter into the mind of either unless the student is exceptional. While such may be true for the exact sciences, viz: that if A plus B equals Z, then A equals Z minus B, etc., it is hardly true for any of the arts, but these advertising pedagogues assume this in every case. While I do not wish to detract from the commendable work that some few correspondence schools are performing I think it would be well to make adaptability tests and individual research (as a few colleges are now doing) before assuming they can force ability upon those who have it not. I grant that this would entail much work and also that it would tend to nullify the money making power of the institution but still they could enroll the prospective scholar in courses to which by a reasonable amount of persuasion and search they found him to be most fitted.

Many of the things above pointed out will cause a student to at all times, and not part of the time, depend upon himself. It will teach self-reliance. The present system makes too much for laziness. The resident student bones when he has to and so, too, does the home study man. The latter though is less remiss in this respect than the former. Oftentimes for this reason does the self-taught man do far better in the professions than does the college man. And this because he is compelled to shake off laziness. He is far from the scene of a classroom; he has less direct supervision; he has no fraternity "hops" to worry about; and he has more time for self analysis. He realizes his faults of education whereas the college man and others of their type are generally so puffed up with second hand ideas that they have no time for seeking within themselves the truth of a proposition. They very seldom, if ever, dispute a professorial syllogism, or constituted authority. They accept, *prima facie*, the evidence of the representative of the Delphi oracle, the *alma mater*, i. e., the instructor.

There is no greater need in our modern methods of education than the need to teach self thinking. The time was when the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic, the "Three R's" so called, were the fundamental principles of education. These fundamentals and these only did the average American of other years obtain. And from these quondam students have come some of the greatest lawyers, editors, physicians, statesmen and writers that America can boast. Not that I necessarily mean to infer that this humble form of education was the cause of them becoming great; they would probably have come to the estate they did with a college education, just as we have many college graduates, too, who have been exceptional, but they did have the aptness, the will, and the

character, and the need for self reliance was inculcated in them earlier than had they been later graduated from the higher schools.

As long ago as in the days of Montaigne some few educators and others have been ranting against the above methods of education but it seems as though no matter what means a writer may take to alleviate it the learned gentlemen of our colleges, high schools, and correspondence schools turn to it a deaf ear. The writer of this article makes no pretensions to being an educator; he makes no pretensions to any exceptional learning but he has been a business man and a fairly accurate observer of the errors in logical reasoning made by the average student-savant of these institutions of learning, and as a result, he, too, wishes to butt his head against a stone wall. He, too, must add his infinitesimally small voice of pretended philosophy against the teachings of the orthodox because logical reasoners are the exception rather than the rule. Though a large part of the method as taught by the "Emile" of Rousseau is now out of date it would be better to adhere to that system rather than the present one. A concerted effort on the part of parents and others interested toward abolishment of the present methods is the only thing that will make the majority, rather than the minority, retailers in new clothes and not wholesalers in second hand ones.

Thus you see that given equal fallow soil to plant your seeds of education you must consider all the things that I have before enumerated. No college, no detective school, nor any home correspondence course can have effect unless the individual is considered as one particular entity. As the one and only one in which to instill educational stimuli of any kind. Each man and woman owe to themselves this self analysis: whether or not they are adaptable; whether they have the requisite ability, and whether they have the common sense (which we all *think* we have). Fundamentals only should give a good grip upon the latter and no college, no accountancy school, no traffic course, or school of exporting can ever add to it.

We have all more or less been stung by this educational bee in one form or another—and if we haven't we shall live to see the day when we shall become members of a matrimonial agency or a post card club. But an examination of the reasons as set forth here should give ample proof of the fallacy and the inconsistencies in these educational courses.

The writer of this article has received circulars describing fully how to become rich by taking one hundred different courses in instruction. Electricity, Salesmanship, Languages, Chiropody, Telephony, Memory, Auto Mechanics, Finger Printing and dozens of

other pamphlets describing these courses have all found their way to the waste basket. The first gives a conservative salary of \$175 a week; the second, \$10,000 a year; the third unlimited return; the fourth \$20,000 a year and so on. Of all the bunco that ever happened, this educational one should be handed the grand prize, or as "Tad" would say "The Fur Lined Frying Pan." To imagine there are people who actually fall continually for this line of gilded chatter. Admittedly, there are instructors of all the arts and sciences who can teach these subjects but cannot practice them; they can explain but that terminates their ability as far as the art or science is concerned. But, while this is true of a good many instructors in colleges and high schools it is hardly the case with these advertizing quacks. Do you suppose the majority of these instructors are getting over \$40 a week, if that? Why do these instructors in these mountebank institutions go on working for a paltry \$40 a week when \$10,000 is ready for the taking? It's quite a mind feat to be able to encompass this fact. Also it is incomprehensible why expert finger print detectors and such like are not patriotic enough to lend their able assistance to the Government in this time of criminal strife. They are still pulling, and will go on pulling, the same old stuff of making great detectives out of village cut-ups by presenting him with a full set of instructions, a whistle, and a tin badge, all for the small sum of three bucks! Will America never grow up and get away from these puerilities? Will it never outgrow the shell game and three card monte?

THERE MAY I WORSHIP.

BY GUY BOGART.

Where cross and crescent meet
With swastica in mergence sweet ;
Where Isis and Jehovah wed,
And Olympian Jove's not dead ;
Where the thunders of Thor
Mid icy northland hoar
Echo the pipes of Pan ;
Where Karnak skirts the Druid wood—
There may I worship.
Where Jesus and Gautama (The Christ and The Budda incarnate)—
 One creative urge.
In understanding of the Logos divinely merge—
There may I worship.
Where life is ever,
And death is never ;
Where creeds and constitutions,
All forms and institutions
Yield to that brotherhood transmuted evil into good—
There may I worship.
Wherever a temple by hand of man or other natural impetus has
 been reared,
Albeit obscured by men-becoming-conscious ;
In synagog, grove, mosque, church or temple ;
Before idol or shrine,
Totem or symbol ;
Wherever the heart of man reaches out to God—
There may I reach within to the God—who is I.
Wherever a thot of the infinite springs—
There may I worship.

I can worship in the temples of men,
 But rather shall I worship in the hearts of men, where dwells the
 God who is I.

I believe in the Great *I am* (First cause, whom I understand not) ;

In cause and purpose in the universe ;

In the divinity of men and bugs and trees ;

In the brightness of yesterday and to-day and to-morrow ;

In the goodness of all men and the perfection of all paths to
 the goal ;

In the Christ within you ;

In the God-embracing all.

If you are an atheist I rejoice in your atheism.

If you are Catholic, Jew, Mohammedan, Protestant, Buddhist,
 Agnostic, Pantheist, Theist, Taoist, Brahman, Heathen,
 Idolator, Unitarian, Spiritualist, New Thotist, Christian
 Scientist, Theosophist, verily, Beloved. I am one with
 you in each of your faiths.

Are you on the mountain heights?

Some day I shall earn that viewpoint.

Are you in the valleys?

I climbed from those depths.

By memories or by aspirations I am one with all of you.

You cannot disagree with me.

For there is One Truth

Incarnate in the heart of all that breathes.

By realization we are one ;

By ignorance are we many—

But ignorance is passing, and realization will one day come to all,
 even as by some it has now been achieved.

Whoever you are,

Whatever your creed,

Whatever your color,

Whatever your nation,

Whether man, beast, plant or mineral,

Whether incarnate or spirit,

Whether evil or good,

You are my brother—

And wherever you are,

There may I worship.



HEAD OF BOY WITH VICTOR'S HEAD BAND.
Bronze of the latter part of fifth century B. C. Now in Munich.
(From Sauerlandt, *Griechische Bildwerke.*)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

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ATHENIAN RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING.

(FIFTH CENTURY B. C.)*

BY FLETCHER H. SWIFT.

"There is one god, supreme among gods and men;
resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind."

—Xenophanes, *The Fragments*.

"And Paul stood in the midst of the Areopagus and
said, "Ye men of Athens, in all things I perceive that
ye are very religious."

—Acts xvii. 22.

"Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this
place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the
outward and inward man be at one."

—Plato, *Socrates' Prayer*.

I. THE CONDITIONS OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING.

WHAT is the place of religion and morals in a purely cultural education? What place were they accorded in the educational system of the most highly cultured people the race has thus far produced, that people whose contributions to the culture of the modern world surpass those of any other race? To what extent were they factors in the production of that culture? The answer

*In the present account the authority for a statement or a quotation is indicated by placing after it in the text in parenthesis a numeral corresponding to the number of the work as listed at the close of the present article. Following such a numeral and separated from it by a colon are numerals referring to the specific volume and page. Large Roman numerals (unless preceded by the abbreviation Chap.) refer to volumes. Small Roman numerals refer to introductory pages in a volume. The letters a, b, c and d, following the page numeral indicate respectively the first, second, third and last quarter of the page. *Examples* (4:I., 22c-23b) means the fourth work listed in the bibliography, volume one, from the third quarter of page 22 through the second quarter of page 23.
—Ed.

to these questions must be postponed until the next chapter for it is impossible to consider them intelligently until we have gained some understanding of the elements in Athenian life conditioning religious and moral education; namely, the nature of Greek religion and morality and the political, social and intellectual characteristics of Athenian life.

The story of Greece is the story not of a single nation but of a large number of small independent sovereign cities, i. e., cities which were states and which are therefore generally spoken of as city-states (Grk. sing. *polis*; pl. *poleis*). Owing to the fact that these independent city-states never united in a nation, no general account of Greek life or of Greek education is possible. The most that can be done is to describe certain city-states in certain periods. The present account must confine its discussion chiefly to one city-state and to one period, namely, to Athens from the middle of the fifth to the middle of the fourth century B. C.

The Athenian polis, consisted of the city of Athens and a small surrounding territory belonging to it and known as Attica. The Athenian polis, like other city-states of Greece, was the last stage in a long process of political and social evolution extending over many centuries (5:163ff.)* At the dawn of history we find the Greeks living together in village communities (5:53d). Each village community is the habitation of a *genos* or clan, i. e., a "family in a wide sense" (5:53). These communities are not, however, independent of one another, but several of them are bound together in a loose aggregation or larger community known as the *phyle* (sing. *φυλή*; pl. *φυλαί*) or tribe (5:54). Intermediate between the *genos* and the tribe stood the *phratra* (*φράτρα*) or brotherhood, essentially a religious association formed by the union of several families (5:54). Out of the union of village-communities gradually arose the polis (*πόλις*) or city-state (5:56).

It is neither necessary nor possible to trace here the process by which the character, basis, and ties of these constituent organizations changed in Athens.¹ The important thing to be noted is that the social life of the citizens of Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. centered in a number of social and political associations for the most part bearing the names, and in certain cases preserving some of the traditions and customs of earlier social and

* All accounts of the evolution of the city-state are largely hypothetical. The conclusions summarized here are those of Bury.

¹ See 5:211, 212 for an account of how religious, political and geographical ties were substituted for the earlier blood tie.

political units, out of which the polis had arisen, and of which these various constituent social and political units were survivals, or Each tribe was divided into three trittys (Grk. sing. *τριττύς*; pl. same). The entire area of Attica was divided into between one and two hundred demes, or townships. Every citizen born in Athens in the fifth century was born into membership in a phyle or tribe, a trittys, a deme, a genos or clan, a phratra or brotherhood, and a which they had supplanted. The entire citizen population of Athens was divided for political and military purposes into ten tribes, household, as well as into the city-state itself. His relation to each of these groups carried with it a wide range of duties and activities, military, religious, administrative and judicial. Let us now try to picture to ourselves the life of this city-state at the close of the fifth century B. C.

The total population of the city-state of Athens, including the city proper and its surrounding territory, is estimated to have numbered approximately 250,000. Of this number not more than 35,000 were voters. The remaining population included the wives and children of the citizens, 10,000 alien residents, and about 100,000 slaves.² The alien residents were largely engaged in commerce and business enterprises. Many of them were exceedingly wealthy, but however great their wealth it was difficult for them to secure citizenship, as no alien could become a citizen of Athens unless made so by special vote of the people.

The government is a pure democracy. All male citizens over twenty years of age are members of the Ecclesia, or popular assembly, which elects and tries the most important public officers and settles all important questions relating to war, commerce, taxation, and foreign relations. Approximately one-third of the voters are organized into popular law courts, which settle all ordinary law suits and often act as courts of appeal. Every male citizen is also a member of the army, since one small city-state in the midst of a multitude of jealous sister states, must at all times be prepared for war. As a result of these conditions the life of each citizen is largely devoted to public affairs. It has been estimated that Athens demanded fully half the time of all her citizens. We to-day speak of men "going into politics"; every Athenian citizen was in politics, it was his life.

Athens, as has been said, was only one of many *poleis*, among

² Various estimates are given. The data given here are the estimates of Clinton, Julius Beloch for the year 431 B. C. as given in *Die Bevölkerung der Griechisch-Römischen Welt*, p. 99.

which the land and rule of Greece was divided. None, however, of all this multitude was destined to equal her in intellectual, social, artistic, and scientific achievements. Only the immediate events which made Athens the center of the intellectual life of Greece and the eternal source of art, philosophy, and culture for succeeding ages can be told here.

The apparent weakness of the land divided among a large number of small ununited, jealous city-states made Greece an inviting field for conquest to any strong outside people. In 490 B. C. Darius, king of the mighty Persian Empire, sent an army numbering perhaps 30,000³ against Athens. Upon the plains of Marathan 9,000 Athenians, aided by 1,000 Plataeans, defeated a Persian force from two to five times larger than their own. Ten years later the Persians again attempted to subjugate Greece and were victorious in the world renowned encounter at Thermopylae. However, in the two years following this defeat the Greeks overcame the Persians on sea and on land.

The victory over Persia resulted in greatly increasing the prestige of Athens among her sister city-states. A considerable number of *poleis* organized a league for future protection against Persia. Athens was given the leadership of this league which she gradually transformed into what was practically an empire, thereby gaining a position of great influence throughout Greece. The taxes of tribute cities filled her coffers, her navies swarmed the seas, the commerce of the world came to her ports. Architects and sculptors of immortal fame were employed to adorn her streets and her holy hill with temples and statues such as the world has never again produced. In her public places, rhapsodists chanted to the accompaniment of the lyre the sublime epics of Homer.

At the opening of the fifth century B. C. opportunities for intellectual education at Athens did not go beyond the elementary school. Before the close of this period, the Periclean Age (461-429 B. C.), the most brilliant period in the history of Athens, had come and gone. In public porticos and groves teachers come from afar and known as Sophists, in addition to offering training in oratory and logic, lectured to groups of eager youth and grown men upon the deepest problems of ethics, politics, and religion. Schools of philosophy and of oratory had become established and new and revolutionizing tendencies had penetrated the entire educational system. This era of commercial and intellectual achievement was attended by the

³ Estimates vary from 20,000 to 50,000.

rise of rationalism, a growing skepticism in religion, a decline of patriotism, and an increasing moral laxness.

Earlier generations had not ventured to question either the state religion or the traditional social and moral standards. By them "What Homer hath written," "What the state demands," "What law and custom ordains," had been regarded as final authorities. But the Sophists, coming from alien lands, entertained no respect for these time-honored authorities. Over against the state, its laws, its demands, its religion, they set the personal opinion and happiness of the individual as the final authority. They taught that neither in science nor in conduct is it possible to discover principles universally valid, but that what is right and what is true in science, religion, and morals are merely matters of individual opinion. Agnosticism, atheism, and moral chaos were the inevitable results of their teaching.

Athens was rescued from the spiritual chaos of the Sophists' superficial rationalism by a number of constructive teachers, the most important of whom are Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Nevertheless the old conditions could never be completely restored, personal happiness as the end of existence and personal development as the aim of education were destined to represent the life aims of many.

In the field of religion men become grouped into three main divisions: (1) the intellectuals, a small group of honest doubters, monotheists, skeptics, agnostics, and free thinkers—men whose vigorous minds forced them to question or absolutely discard the accepted religious beliefs; (2) the mass of intelligent and cultured citizens, who, though discarding the immoralities and absurdities attached to the gods by mythology, continued to believe in the gods themselves; (3) a third group composed of the constitutionally superstitious, who accepted without question all that was taught in legend and myth.

These changes in religion and morals had their due effect upon family life, and upon the training of children. Among the most important of the changes in education were a weakening of discipline at home and at school, an increasing antagonism to the sacred but myth-permeated Homer and Hesiod, decreasing respect for parents and teachers, the introduction of many new studies which had as their aim to prepare for a personal career rather than merely for serving the state.

Greek religion was primarily a religion of joyousness. It had

* Chthonic, pron. *thonic*.

its somber side, to be sure, represented by the chthonic⁴ gods (gods of the underworld). The pitiless chthonic deities must be appeased from time to time with sacrifices, and offerings of appeasement must also be made even to the gods of the upper air when some special circumstance seemed to indicate they had been angered, but the "normal form of worship" was the sacrifice, a joyous banquet, at which the gods were unseen guests (9:98). Whereas the religion of the Hebrews was dominated by lawgivers and moralists such as Moses and the prophets, that of the Greeks was dominated by poet, artist, and sculptor.


Greek religion was a gradual growth which paralleled and indeed formed a part of the social and political evolution. It claimed no divine founder such as Buddha or Jesus of Nazareth. It developed no priestly class with exclusive rights. Throughout its history the common people, as well as rulers and state officials, sacrificed at its altars.

With the exception of certain private cults it was a state religion,—supervised, supported, and protected by the state (9:315-321). Yet although its temples were state buildings, and its priests state officials, there was no state creed, no state religious dogmas, which must be accepted by all. "For one and only one period, (i. e., the fifth century B. C. in Greek history thinking men were brought into court on the charge of impiety." (9:262). The nearest approach to dogma was to be found in the myths of Hesiod and Homer, but no one was obliged to believe the myths for they were not religion, they were merely stories about the gods, which one might modify or reject entirely.⁵

What then was religion and in what did piety consist? Religion was essentially a matter of worship and piety consisted in observing with scrupulous care at home and in public the rites, sacrifices and festivals which law or custom prescribed. As long as one did this and did not openly proclaim any disbelief in the reality of the gods, or ridicule their rites, he might believe about what he chose.

The Greeks peopled the universe with a vast multitude of divine beings resembling mortals in characteristics and in form, hence called anthropomorphic. Every human instinct, every activity from horse racing and wrestling to writing poetry and painting was conceived to be under the protection of some guardian deity. Of this vast number of deities certain ones had gained positions of surpass-

⁵ In some instances, as in the Eleusinian mysteries, myths become incorporated with rites.



PRAYING BOY.

Bronze of the latter part of fourth century B. C. Now in Berlin.
(From Sauerlandt, *Griechische Bildwerke.*)

ing eminence during the seventh century. These were said to dwell on Mount Olympus, and were therefore called Olympian deities.

A striking characteristic of the Olympian gods is the variety of functions, spheres, and names assigned to each of them. Thus Zeus is the god of the storm, of battle, of the sky, and of agriculture, and Athene the goddess of wisdom, war and horsemanship. Not one but many temples were erected to the same deity, each honoring some different aspect or sphere of the deity. The local shrine was the fundamental unit of Greek worship: "Each shrine (temple or altar) is independent of any other religious authority, and the god of each shrine is ordinarily treated as if he were independent of the gods worshipped elsewhere," (9:22) whether in the same or in different cities. "At Athens Apollo Pythios, Apollo Patroos, Apollo Agieus, Apollo Thargelios, are practically independent beings for worship." (9:22).

"Each cult center in Athens is theoretically separate from every other; its forms and worship, its times of worship, its priests, are peculiar to itself. . . . (each deity) was treated in worship much as if no other gods existed." (9:23). This meant that all over Greece and in Athens itself there were in effect "as many religions as there were individual shrines," (9:23).

Every Greek worshipped his family gods, including his ancestors; local deities, including departed heroes; the patron deities of his deme, his phratra, his tribe, and his *polis*. He might in addition belong to some private religious society, organized for the avowed purpose of worshipping some foreign deity, and also to one or more of the many special, private societies, literary, athletic, or commercial, each of which had its patron deity, worshipped by its members, (9:126-128).

The Greek's gods were not separated from him by any impassable gulf. On the contrary, they were his ancestors and his comrades. He prayed to them, not kneeling as a slave or a subject, but standing erect with out-stretched hands, (9:89). His pleasures, his sins, as well as his struggles and aspirations were theirs. It was for their delight that he danced, wrestled, engaged in musical contests and took part in the chorus at the theatrical performance. The following table shows the names and chief province or characteristic of the more important Greek gods. As has been explained above, these divinities were not limited to one field, each presided over several departments or spheres.

I. OLYMPIAN DEITIES.

(Names arranged in alphabetical order.)

MALE		FEMALE	
NAME	PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS	NAME	PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS
Apollo	Light (the sun) Poetry, Healing Prophecy	Aphrodite	Love and Beauty
Ares	War (not strategic war)	Artemis	Moon, Hunting
Hephaestus	Fire	Athene	Great thunder storm goddess, Wisdom, Domestic Arts, War
Hermes (Messenger of the gods)	Wind, Eloquence, Athletics, Commerce, Thieves, Invention, Adroitness	Demeter (Earth- mother)	Agriculture, Harvest
Poseidon	Sea	Hera	Queen of Heaven Wife of Zeus Sky
Zeus	Father of the Shining Sky, Supreme god of gods and men. Chief god of Thunder Storm	Hestia	Hearth and Home

II. LESSER DEITIES.

1. Earth Deities.

MALE		FEMALE	
NAME	PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS	NAME	PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS
Dionysus	Wine, and the Vine Joyousness of Life		
Pan	Pastures Forests and Flocks		

2. Underworld Deities.

Hades (Pluto)	Departed Spirits Ruler over Hades God of the Earth's Wealth	Persephone	Daughter of Demeter— Wife of Hades
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III. MISCELLANEOUS.
Deities, Monsters and Heroes.

NAME	MALE	NAME	FEMALE
	PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS		PROVINCE OR CHARACTERISTICS
Aeolus	Winds	Three Fates	{ Clotho Alotters of Lachesis life and Atropos death
Centaurs	Probably Represent Rivers Ungovernable Forces of Nature	Erinyes Three Furies	Avengers of Crime — Especially Murder
Cerberus	Watch Dog of Hades	Three Gorgons	Sea Storms, Serpent-haired sisters
Cyclops	A Race of One-eyed Giants		
Eros	Friendship, Love	Nine Muses ⁶	Art, Music, Poetry, Drama, History
Heracles	Strength and Courage	Nemesis Principle of Balance or Distri- bution	Divine Retribution, Alotter of Good and Evil Fortune
		Scylla	A Whirlpool Monster with twelve feet and six heads
		Charybdis	A Sea Monster who sucks in the sea three times a day and discharges it again in a whirlpool.

The state religion, rich in rites and pageants, but destitute of any positive teachings, offered little either to those desiring a sense of spiritual union with deity or to those seeking assurance of a happy continuance of individual consciousness after death. It was inevitable that as the established religion became more and more a state affair and so more and more separated from the individual, men should look elsewhere for the satisfaction of their personal religious longings. A few found this in the worship of various foreign cults, introduced into Attica, but by far the greatest number obtained it through cults known as mysteries.

⁶ For a table showing the names and spheres of the nine muses see Fairbanks, Arthur, *The Mythology of Greece and Rome*, p. 106.

A mystery may be defined as "a secret worship to which only specially prepared people (*ἰμνηθέντες*) were admitted after a special period of purification or other preliminary probation and of which the ritual was so important and perilous that the 'catechumen' needed a hierophant or expounder to guide him," (11:117c). Many mysteries were cultivated in Greece but by far the most important both for Greece and for Athens were the Eleusinia.

The limits of the present account permit only a most meagre reference to these rites.⁷ The Eleusinia included two festivals, the "lesser mysteries" celebrated at Agrae in March, and the "greater mysteries" celebrated at Athens and Eleusis in September.

The "greater Eleusinia" lasted nine days. They began on the thirteenth of Boedromion (September) on which day a body of *epheboi*, (youths, ages 18-20), marched out from Athens to Eleusis (11:119) a distance of about thirteen miles, to act as an escort to certain holy things to be brought to Athens the next day. On the fourth day, two Eleusinian priests by public proclamation invited all who were eligible to join in the mysteries at the same time warning away all others. Rites of purification followed. The next two days were spent in Athens, sacrificing and continuing the fast begun on the first day. Presumably all of the 19th of Boedromion was spent in marching from Athens to Eleusis chanting hymns, and sacrificing at the many shrines en route. Arrived at Eleusis, days and nights of fasting, sacrifices, revels, and dances followed. The night of the twenty-second "was spent in the torch dances, and visits to the spots made sacred by the Demeter legend. The fast of the previous nine days was broken by taken a peculiar drink." The hierophant delivered a discourse, a mystic sacrament was performed, and a pageant or passion play was presented, in which were shown scenes representing the underworld, (9:134) and designed to take away the fear of death and to leave with those initiated the assurance of a hospitable reception by the deities, with whom through the rites of Eleusis they had been mystically united.

The significance of the Eleusinia from the standpoint of the history of Athenian religious education is manifold: (1) in them the personal religion of the Greeks reached its highest expression; (2) initiation into them came in time to be the supreme religious desire of every Greek, and they counted their adherents by the thousands:

⁷ Excellent brief accounts of the Eleusinia so far as their character is known will be found in the works of Davis, Fairbanks and Farnell listed at the end of this chapter. Of these Farnell's is the most scholarly; Davis' the most vivid, being written in his delightful and intimate style. Fairbanks gives also a brief account of the Orphic rites.

(3) they were open to children (15:267d) as well as men and women;⁸ (4) they were the most important representative of the almost sole species of Greek worship (the mystery) in connection with which definite formal instruction was given.

It is probable that the instruction given in connection with the Eleusinia dealt almost exclusively with the meaning of the symbols. Attempts to prove that it included exalted ethical teaching have aroused vigorous criticism. Farnell writes: "That the Eleusinia preached a higher morality than that of the current standard is not proved. . . . But on general grounds it is reasonable to believe that such powerful religious experience as they afforded would produce moral fruits in many minds. . . . Andocides (*De Myster*, p. 36, par. 31; p. 44, par. 125) assumed that those who have been initiated will take a juster and sterner view of moral innocence and guilt, and that foul conduct was a greater sin when committed by a man who was in the official service of Demeter and Persephone." (11:121d).

There was no phase of Athenian life, no activity, public or private, with which religion was not associated. Of this there are many evidences. Of all social and political bonds, religion was the strongest and the most enduring. The *polis* and all its constituent units, family, demos, phratra, and tribe were knit together individually and collectively by religious ties. Each of these associations had its own patron deity, and its own forms of worship. The earliest unions between separate city-states were amphictyonies,⁹ leagues formed to protect some sacred shrine, and the most genuinely national gatherings were the great national festivals held from time to time in honor of the national gods. It was largely out of religious feeling that Greek poetical literature arose. It was religion that furnished the themes for the sublimest of the Greek dramas. It was on religious holidays and only then that plays were presented. It was religious gratitude and devotion that erected on the Acropolis of Athens, as temples for her gods, those buildings which have immortalized her name.

It must not, however, be inferred that religion in any sense dominated Greek life. As Farnell has well said, religion "penetrated the whole life of the people but rather as a servant than as a master." (13:530c).

The moral standards of the Greeks were the outgrowth of social conditions and communal experience,—the man who fulfilled his duties to the state, and displayed the qualities necessary for the

⁸ Only the "lesser mysteries" were open to children.

⁹ Pron. am-fik-ti-on-iz.

preservation of the city-state and its constituent institutions, was considered the moral man. In morals as in religion, the state took little cognizance of the individual's private life. He might act much as he chose, so long as his conduct or example threatened no public institutions nor conflicted openly with social standards or ideals.

Athens was distinctly a man's state. The women of Athens had no voice in its affairs, and no opportunities outside the home for education. They were treated in every respect, intellectually, morally, politically and socially as man's inferiors. Almost the only women of independence, education and accomplishments were the *hetairai* (sing. *hetaira*) (3: 247, 465) women who had sacrificed their virtue in order to become the intimate associates of the men of Athens. Amid such conditions the moral code was distinctly double—chastity being demanded of wives and daughters but little emphasized in the case of men. "The men of Athens were only too prone to disregard the marriage vow, and their evil practices were usually regarded by the community with indifference, and looked upon as inevitable." (21; 44b.)

The evils growing out of this attitude toward wife and mother were many, ranging all the way from simple infidelity to vices so degrading as to be left unnamed in all ordinary treatments. Again in a state where the labor was largely carried on by slaves and where at least in the period under consideration, self development and personal happiness became the ends of life and of education, such virtues as compassion, humility, meekness, renunciation received little emphasis and were indeed by many considered servile.

The difficulty, however, of generalizing concerning Greek morals is apparent to the moment one compares the statements of scholars or attempts to grasp the Greek point of view. Such an incident as the putting to death, at the vote of the people, prisoners of war, the father's right, sanctioned by law, of casting into the street unwelcome new-born infants, are indescribably abhorrent to all Christian standards. Nevertheless, there is scarcely a brutal custom or incident of Greek life which is not offset by some counter-custom or incident. Thus against the story of Alcibiades wantonly cutting off his dog's tail, must be placed the protests of his friends, and the death sentence passed by the court of Areopagus upon a boy who had gouged out the eyes of his pet pigeons. As to war, Mahaffy asserts that thruout the history of Greek wars, there is no record of the massacres and outrages of women and children that have characterized the warfare of Christian nations for centuries.

Greek religion exercised little direct moral restraint. It pro-

claimed no Ten Commandments, it taught no Beatitudes. It offered no god of righteousness inspiring and demanding righteousness of his worshippers. On the contrary, the Greeks created their gods in the moral as well as in the physical image of man, and from the sixth century on it was the constant effort of the few advanced thinkers to elevate these gods, created by earlier generations, to the best moral standards of later, and ethically more advanced, generations.

Moreover the practices and customs of certain Greek cults, dealing with generation and the growth of vegetation, were marked by intemperateness and licentiousness.¹⁰ Symbols to the modern mind vile and revolting, were carried in religious processions¹¹ and occupied a conspicuous place in home¹² and temple.¹³ No doubt the circumstances and traditions surrounding such symbols made their influence less degrading than might at first appear.

A comparison of the relationship between religion and morality in Christianity with their relationship in Greek life makes evident at once the weakness and ineffectiveness in the latter case. Christianity offers, in terms intelligible to the masses, as fundamentals of religion, divinely illumined and divinely endorsed rules and principles of conduct. It boldly asserts that none but the pure of heart and those of upright conduct are acceptable worshippers to the all-righteous Father. In Greece, on the contrary, any sense of vital relation between religion and morality, any conception that perfect righteousness was an indispensable attribute of deity was reached only by the few.

The thought of rewards, and punishment in a future life played but a small part in Greek conduct. The life to come was vague, shadowy, joyless, dreaded. To be sure, Minos, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus passed judgment upon the souls of the departed. But for

¹⁰ For a brief but exceedingly vivid account of the Dionysic Orgies, see Fairbanks, Arthur, *A Handbook of Greek Religion*, p. 241. Such cults are common to most primitive peoples and were inherited by the Greeks of later centuries from primitive stages.

¹¹ For a significant passage indicating the general character of these celebrations, see Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, Berg. edition, lines 241-279.

¹² See the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th edition, articles on Dionysus, Hermes, Phallicism.

¹³ Rogers (20: p. XXIX) writes: "the pure and honorable maiden who coveted the distinction of bearing the Holy Basket in the procession of Dionysus, walked through the admiring crowds, accompanied by symbols of and songs of what we would consider the most appalling immodesty. Yet to themselves the question of decency or indecency would not even occur. It was their traditional religion, it was the very orthodoxy of the myriads who had lived and died in the city."



HEAD OF YOUTH.

Bronze of the fourth century B. C. Naples.
(From Sauerlandt, *Griechische Bildwerke.*)

the most part the rewards and punishments of the gods were thought of as meted out here and now. Moreover, such rewards and punishments were bestowed chiefly not upon a moral basis but upon the basis of ritualistic punctiliousness. It must not be forgotten, however, that with respect to certain crimes, it was the wrath of the Erinyes (furies) and the vengeance of the gods that the evil-doer most feared. But as Fairbanks points out, the very fact that the Greek mind found it necessary to create specific divinities as punishers of wrong doing, shows how little place such an element occupied in their conception of the gods at large, (9: 309d-310a). For the masses religion and morality remained for the most part distinct. Their gods were the gods of the myths of Homer and Hesiod, not the gods of the philosophers.

It would be difficult to indicate further than has been done in preceding paragraphs the final effects of Greek religion: with reference to Greek morality, however, a few concluding sentences may well be added. Many writers have called attention to the looseness of Greek morals even when judged by Greek standards. We are told that most of the lives of the greatest Greeks are stained by deceit and treachery and that such characters as Socrates and Plato must be regarded as rare exceptions. While giving full heed to the darker side of Greek life it must not be forgotten that the modern world owes much to the Greeks in the field of moral ideals as well as in the field of political and aesthetic ideals. The medical profession still turns to the Oath of Hippocrates¹⁴ for the expression of its ethical ideals. In like manner the Ephebic Oath embodies an ethical conception of citizenship far surpassing that of the masses of our citizens to-day. Moreover the care with which the Greeks provided religious and moral training, the standards espoused in the latter field, and the continuous supervision of the conduct of children and youth furnish abundant testimony to the importance they attached to morality and moral training.

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¹⁴ Hippocrates (fl. c. 460-370 B. C.) a Greek philosopher and physician. A translation of the Hippocratic oath will be found in *Monroe's Cyclopaedia of Education*, III, 281 c.

written, vivid in its picturing and the most popular in style of any work here listed. Number 18, long accepted as an excellent work for the general reader, is somewhat idealistic, and at many points presents a picture of Greek life which critical scholarship will not support.

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THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO JOHN.

BY SHERMAN D. WAKEFIELD.

THE most casual reader of the Gospel narrative as we have it in English must be struck by the remarkable difference in type and style between the Gospel according to John and its predecessors. As we glance at it, we are arrested by the decided differences in literary style, in the use of materials and in the theology of this most remarkable work. Several questions, then, at once suggest themselves to us: Is this version of the Gospel in harmony with the Synoptics? Does it come from the same religious life? Is it a product of the same experience? Does it portray the same vision of Jesus as its three precursors? Countless more questions of this sort manifest themselves to the observer as he reads through this extraordinary document.

It will be well at the outset to set down briefly the narrative of the Gospel of Jesus in accordance with the theory of the writer of the Fourth Gospel whom, for convenience, we shall designate as John. In the first place, in the beginning was the Divine Logos. It became flesh and was manifested to us (in the person of Jesus Christ, we infer). It dwelt among us, and we beheld its glory. In order to understand something of this Logos which had been made man, we must have an account of his life. Apparently the Fourth Evangelist deems the early life of Jesus of small importance, for we first meet him at the beginning of his ministry as a mature person, coming into contact with John the Baptist. For some reason, our author centers the ministry around Jerusalem, where Jesus indulges in long theological disquisitions, incurs many enemies in the Pharisaical and Sadducean camps, all of whom seem to have a happy faculty for plotting against his life, in which plots they seem at last to have been successful. Jesus is betrayed into the hands of his enemies by one of his disciples, Judas Iscariot; goes through the form of trial before the Roman procurator, Pontius Pilate, is

sentenced to death, and is crucified. A friend (the timid disciple Joseph of Arimathea) secures his body and has it buried in his own tomb. But when the faithful woman followers come to look for the body in order to prepare it for proper burial, behold, it has gone, and Jesus manifests himself to them in bodily form. So, also, does Jesus manifest himself to the apostles, and despite the disquieting experience of crucifixion, indulges in several other theological disquisitions. The Gospel leaves Jesus laying down his rules for the organization of the church, after which, the writer remarks, naively enough, that if all the things were written down which Jesus did, even the world itself would not contain the books that should be written. Perhaps so; but sometimes one thinks that already we suffer from *embarras du richesse*. This, in brief, is an outline of the story as we have it in the Fourth Gospel.

We are now in a position to make an examination of the treatise. In the first place, the Gospel as we now have it is not exactly as it was written, that is, there have been additions to it at a later date and by another hand. For example, the story of the woman taken in adultery (John vii. 53—viii. 11) is one of such, and the entire xxi chapter is another. The story of the woman taken in adultery is written in the style of Mark, and it is believed by some scholars that it originally belonged in that Gospel, following the 17th verse of the xii. chapter. The Fourth Gospel when written ended with the xx. chapter, which made superfluous any further addition.

We learn that the author of this Gospel version wrote with a purpose, not especially to write a life of Jesus as it occurred, but to put forth a theological idea regardless of facts. As Origen, the most learned early Christian Father, said in his "Commentary on John" (x. 2) respecting all the Gospels: "If all the four Gospels are to be received, we must recognize that their truth does not consist in their literal accuracy, and that when the writers could not at once speak the truth both spiritually and literally, they preferred the spiritual to the literal, since a spiritual truth was often preserved in what might be called a literal untruth." John himself (xx. 30, 31) gives his motive in these words: "Many other signs therefore did Jesus in the presence of the disciples, which are not written in this book: but these are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name." In other words, he selected his material for the purpose of inculcating a certain belief about Jesus, namely, that he was the Son of God. Did John the favorite disciple of Jesus do this?

The Fourth Gospel begins, before commencing the story, with a theological Prologue, extending through the xviii. verse, which is the most remarkable part of this unique document. It is about the Divine Logos or Word which was God but became flesh in order to dwell among us. Strangely enough, no further mention is made of the Logos, and there is evidence that the Prologue was written by another than the author of the main Gospel. Let us see if this Logos idea is a new one. We know that during the first quarter of the second century, when "John" was written, this metaphysical idea was quite prevalent, particularly in the Alexandrian school. It found expression in the philosophical system of Neoplatonism and in the writings of Heraclitus and Philo, as well as in the document under consideration. The Gods Apollo, Mithra, Hermes, Marduk, etc., were all called *Logos*. In fact, the Christian Father, Justin Martyr, wrote the following to the Roman Emperor Antoninus Pius in apology for his religion:

"When we say that the Word [Logos], who is the first-birth of God, was produced without sexual union, and that He, Jesus Christ, our teacher, was crucified and died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven, we propound nothing different from what you believe regarding those whom you esteem sons of Jupiter. . . . The Son of God, called Jesus, even if only a man by ordinary generation, yet, on account of His wisdom [Sophia], is worthy to be called the Son of God; for all writers call God the Father of men and gods. And if we assert that the Word [Logos] of God was born of God in a peculiar manner, different from ordinary generation, let this, as said above, be no extraordinary thing to you, who say that Mercury is the angelic word [Logos] of God."—*Apol.* 1, Chaps. 21, 22.

But there is an older idea: the Sophia or Divine Wisdom of God, which probably is the basis of the Logos or Divine Word idea. This may be found in the book of Proverbs, particularly in the viii. Chapter for the prototype of the Prologue in "John." In order to make this clear we will arrange in parallel columns the elements of the first four verses in "John" and the corresponding Sophia *thoughts* in Proverbs, which are not to be considered as literal resemblances:

JOHN i. 1.

"*In the beginning* was the Word (Logos)."—i. 1.

"The Word was with God."—i. 1.

PROVERBS viii 22.

"Jehoveh possessed me (Sophia) *in the beginning* of his way."—viii. 22.

"I was by him."—viii. 30.

"The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him."—i. 2, 3.

"In him was *life*."—i. 4.

"Without him was not anything made that hath been made."—i. 3.

"When he established the heavens, I was there."—viii. 27. Cf. Proverbs iii. 19.

"Whoso findeth me findeth *life*."—viii. 35.

"O Jehovah, how manifold are thy works! In *wisdom* hast thou made them all."—Psalms civ. 24.

The question still remains, however, how the Divine Wisdom became the Divine Word. In the first place, the words *Sophia* and *Logos* were more or less interchangeable. However, the use of *Sophia* had a definite Gnostic signification; and so, in order to avoid any phraseology that savored of Gnosticism, the author of the Fourth Gospel used the masculine noun *Logos*, the idea of which was virtually synonymous with the feminine *Sophia*.

But there is a collection of documents called the Sapiential (Wisdom) books, of which the Apocryphal books *Wisdom of Solomon* and *Wisdom of Iesus* (Ecclesiasticus) are the leading examples, and which furnish an intermediate stage between *Sophia* and *Logos* by using both terms. It will be seen that these books are based on the viii. Chapter of *Proverbs* also, when some of the most striking similarities are arranged in parallel columns thus:

PROVERBS viii. 11, 19.

"Wisdom is better than rubies;
And all the things that may be desired
are not to be compared unto it....
My fruit is better than *gold*, yea, than
fine gold;
And my revenue than choice *silver*."

viii. 30.

"I was by him, as a master workman;
And I was daily his delight,
Rejoicing always before him."

viii. 18.

"*Riches* and honor are with me;
Yea, durable wealth and righteousness."

WISDOM OF SOLOMON vii. 8, 9

"I preferred her (Wisdom) before
sceptres and thrones, and esteemed
riches nothing in comparison of her.
Neither compared I unto her any
precious stone, because all *gold* in
respect of her is as a little sand, and
silver shall be counted as clay be-
fore her."

viii. 3.

"In that she is conversant with God,
she magnifieth her nobility; yea, the
Lord of all things Himself loved
her."

viii. 5.

"If *riches* be a possession to be de-
sired in this life; what is richer than
wisdom, that worketh all things?"

viii. 12.

"I, wisdom have made *prudence* my dwelling,
And found out knowledge and discretion."

viii. 1, 2.

"Doth not wisdom cry,
And understanding put forth her voice?
On the top of high places by the way,
Where the paths meet, she standeth;
Beside the gates, at the entry of the city,
At the coming in at the doors, she crieth aloud."

viii. 31.

"My delight was with the sons of men."

viii. 22.

"Jehovah possessed me in *the beginning* of his way,
Before his works of old."

viii. 19.

"My *fruit* is better than gold, yea,
than fine gold;
And my revenue than choice silver."

viii. 6.

"And if *prudence* work; who, of all that are, is a more cunning workman than she?"

WISDOM OF JESUS xxiv. 2.

"In the congregation of the Most High shall she open her mouth, and triumph before His power."

xxiv. 6.

"In every people and nation, I got possession."

xxiv. 9.

"He created me from *the beginning* before the world." Cf. xxiv. 3.

xxiv. 17.

"As the vine brought I forth pleasant savour, and my flowers are the *fruit* of honor and riches."

The IX Chapter of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, however, is more nearly intermediate, the first four verses of which are as follows:

"O God of my fathers, and Lord of mercy, Who hast made all things with Thy *word*, and ordained man through Thy *wisdom*, that he should have dominion over the creatures which Thou hast made, and order the world according to equity and righteousness, and execute judgment with an upright heart: give me *wisdom*, that sitteth by Thy throne."

We thus see that the Only-Begotten Logos-Son is an evolution from the Only-Begotten Sophia-Daughter of God, and both can very well be used interchangeably.

The Christ of the Fourth Gospel is a composite metaphysical being, based on the Logos idea, as the Only-Begotten Son of God, and other pre-Christian elements which will be shown in due course. This Christ has very little in common with the Jesus of the Syn-

optics: in character, mission, or life on earth. He is concerned chiefly with himself, instead of the Kingdom of Heaven as is the Jesus of the Synoptics. He is not actuated by pity when he performs miraculous cures, but merely desires to show himself off or to give a "sign." His language is prolix, desultory and mystical; not brief, pointed and epigrammatic, the style which characterizes that of the man Jesus. He never uses the words "faith," "prayer," "repentance" or "forgiveness." The mission of the Christ is summed up in John iii. 14-17 as follows: "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth may in him have eternal life. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have eternal life. For God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through him." In the Fourth Gospel there is no mention of the miraculous birth, the baptism, the temptations, the Sermon on the Mount, the transfiguration, or the agony in the Garden of Gethsemane. The Christ tells no parables, cures no "demoniacs," and does not institute the Communion, all of which are given us in the Synoptics. However, he does do some wonderful things unknown to the man Jesus. He turns water into wine at a marriage feast, gives a theological dissertation to Nicodemus, heals a man blind from birth, and raises Lazarus from the dead. His public ministry lasted about three years and for the most part took place in Jerusalem, while that of the Synoptic Jesus was about one year and took place mostly in Galilee. We herewith give an outline contrast of the life of Jesus as narrated in the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel:

THE SYNOPTIC JESUS.

THE CHRIST OF "JOHN."

Genealogy.	
Early life.	
Born at Bethlehem.	
Dedicated at Jerusalem.	
Talks with doctors at Jerusalem.	
Is baptised by John the Baptist.	
Is tempted.	
Beginnings of Public Activity..	In Bethany beyond Jordan.
Wins fisherman followers	Wins early followers.
Delivers Sermon on the Mount.	In Province of Galilee.
Appoints twelve associates.	In Cana at a marriage feast.
Gives discourses on standards of	In Capernaum.

righteousness.
 On a tour in Galilee.
 Gives discourses on mission of disciples.

 Teaches and feeds the multitude....
 Crosses the Sea of Galilee.....
 Heals many sick.
 Withdraws to Tyre and Sidon.
 Returns through Decapolis.
 Heals deaf and dumb man.
 Heals and feeds the multitude.
 Heals blind man of Bethsaida.
 Foretells events at Jerusalem.
 Is Transfigured.
 Heals youth with dumb spirit.
 Discourses on standards of greatness.
 Departs from Galilee for Jerusalem.
 Discourses on Scribes and Pharisees.
 Gives injunctions for future of disciples.
 Teaches against concern about wealth.
 Teaches against anxiety about food and clothing.
 Teaches about the future.
 Tells parables of the Kingdom of God.
 Forecasts his death.
 Teaches at table of a Pharisee.
 Gives several parables and sayings.
 Heals lepers.
 Teaches on way to Jerusalem.
 Heals blind beggar of Jericho.
 Challenges Jerusalem leaders
 Enters Jerusalem on a colt
 Casts commerce from the temple.
 Tells parables in condemnation of Jewish leaders.
 Discourses in condemnation of Scribes and Pharisees.
 Gives discourses on events of the future.

In Jerusalem at the Passover.
 Casts commerce from the temple.
 Discourses with Nicodemus.
 In the Land of Judea.
 Departs from Judea for Galilee.
 In the Province of Samaria.
 Journeys to Sychar.
 Discourses with a woman at a well.
 Discourses with disciples.
 Stays two days in Samaria.
 In Cana of Galilee.
 In Jerusalem at a feast.
 Heals sick man at pool of Bethesda.
 Discourses on Judgment and Life.
 About the Sea of Galilee.
 Teaches and feeds the multitude.
 Crosses the Sea of Galilee.
 Discourses on the Bread of Life.
 In Galilee.
 At the Feast of Tabernacles.
 The adulterous woman.
 Discourses on the Light of Life.
 Discourses on Freedom through Truth.
 At the Feast of the Dedication.
 Heals a blind beggar of Jerusalem.
 Discourses on sheep and the shepherd.
 In the region of Jerusalem.
 Withdraws to Bethany beyond Jordan.
 Returns to Bethany near Jerusalem.
 Raises Lazarus from the dead.
 Withdraws to Ephraim.
 Was given supper at Bethany.

Challenges Jerusalem leaders.
 Enters Jerusalem on an ass.

Final hours with disciples	Final hours with disciples.
Celebrates Passover with disciples ...	Eats Last Supper with disciples.
Withdraws to Mount of Olives.	Gives farewell discourses and prayer.
At Garden of Gethsemane.	
Is betrayed and arrested	Is betrayed and arrested.
Judicial trials and crucifixion	Judicial trials and crucifixion.
Trial before Jewish authorities	Trial before Jewish authorities.
Trial before Roman authorities	Trial before Roman authorities.
Is Crucified (on 15 Nisan)	Is Crucified (on 14 Nisan).
Is Buried	Is buried.
Subsequent to his death	Subsequent to his death.
With disciples in country, in Jerusalem and in Galilee.	With disciples at Jerusalem and at Sea of Tiberias.

It will be noticed that although both the Synoptic Jesus and the Johannine Christ expel commerce from the temple, the former does it near the end of his career, after the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, while the latter performs the deed at the beginning of his ministry.

In the Fourth Gospel, from the very beginning, Jesus is recognized by everyone as the Christ. In the Synoptics Peter is the first to confess Jesus to be the Christ, but in the Gospel version under consideration both John the Baptist and Andrew precede him. John the Baptist in the Synoptics fails, until the very last, to recognize Jesus as the expected Christ.

A story that is found only in "John" is that of the cure by Jesus of a man at the pool of Bethesda, to which the author includes the feature of number symbolism, which is part of the metaphysics of Philo. In this story there are five porches around the pool to correspond to the five books of Moses, and the man was "in his infirmity" thirty-eight years to correspond to the thirty-eight years' wandering of the Jewish people in the wilderness. As a result of this miracle the Jews try to kill Jesus for healing on the Sabbath. In fact, the Jews plot the death of Jesus many times in the Fourth Gospel, a phase of the story quite unknown to the Synoptic narratives.

The greatest miracle of Jesus in the Johannine narrative is the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Although this story is quite unique to "John" a suggestion of it may be found in Luke (x. 38-42; xvi. 19-31). It is very evident that this story is inserted for the sole purpose of giving glory to Jesus for a great miracle. Jesus says this himself as follows (John xi. 4): "This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified thereby." It is certain that Jesus was not moved to compassion,

for he waited two days after hearing of the sickness before going to the rescue, during which time Lazarus died. In a discourse to his disciples Jesus even said: "I am glad for your sakes that I was not there, to the intent ye may believe." When Jesus finally arrived Lazarus had been buried four days. After a theological dissertation Jesus lifted his eyes to heaven and said, for the benefit of the multitude and before he had made any request to God: "Father, I thank thee that thou hearest me. And I knew that thou hearest me always: but because of the multitude that standeth around I said it, that they may believe that thou didst send me." This is one of the great dramatic elements of the Fourth Gospel.

The closest agreement between the Gospel according to John and the Synoptic accounts lies in the story of the Passion, but even here there are wide discrepancies between them. The Passion begins with the Triumphal Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem on an ass, both the "Palm" and "Sunday" features of which come from "John" exclusively. There is a pagan element in this for Dionysus also made his Triumphal Entry on an ass. In the Synoptics the Last Supper is the Passover meal, and Jesus institutes there the observance of the Eucharist. In "John" the meal is an ordinary supper without the institution of the communion, but instead Jesus washes the feet of the disciples and delivers one of his characteristic theological disquisitions. Following the Last Supper, in the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus retires to the Garden of Gethsemane, where the scene so dear to all Christians is enacted. All this is missing from the Fourth Gospel. The betrayal scene in "John" is different from the Synoptic account in that Roman soldiers are the companions of Judas, equipped with "lanterns and torches and weapons." Then, too, the kiss of Judas is omitted and a new element, that of the soldiers falling to the ground when Jesus admits his identity, is substituted. The judicial trials are alike in the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, except that John adds a trial before Annas. The Synoptic and Johannine accounts of the crucifixion are quite different from each other. In the first place, the date is different, John assigning the day of the Passover (14 Nisan) for the crucifixion and the Synoptics the day after. The reason for John's departure will be shown shortly. The Synoptics tell that when Jesus was led to the place of crucifixion one Simon of Cyrene was detailed to carry the cross, but John says that Jesus carried the cross himself. We are told in the Synoptic Gospels that the witnesses of the crucifixion were a few women who observed it from a distance, but the Fourth Gospel says that, among others, the mother

of Jesus and a disciple stood by the cross. The last words of Jesus, according to the Synoptics, were 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' while "John" gives his last words as "It is finished," which literally means "It has been perfected." What has been perfected we shall see when we consider Jesus as the fulfilment of prophecy. After the death of Jesus, we are told by the Johanne Gospel only, it being the day of the Passover, the legs of the two thieves who were crucified with Jesus were broken to hasten their death but those of Jesus were not broken. We will look further into this matter shortly. The Fourth Gospel is the only one which mentions the spear thrust into the side of Jesus while on the cross, the risen Christ's appearance to Simon Peter and others, the unbelief of Thomas, the capture of 153 fishes, and the commission of Jesus to Peter to feed his sheep. Neither do the Johannine and Synoptic accounts of the resurrection agree in details, and there is no mention in "John" of the ascension of Jesus into heaven.

The Jesus of "John" is a theological figure variously called the "Bread of Life," the "Door," the "Vine," the "Lamb of God," the Good Shepherd," the "Light of the World," etc. As the Vine he possesses characteristics in common with Dionysus and Bacchus, who also were vine gods. As the Lamb he becomes the anti-type of the Jewish paschal lamb, solemnized as a Christian passover. As such, there is great significance in the fact that Jesus died on the very day and hour when the paschal lamb was commanded to be sacrificed. The basis of the Jewish sacrificial system is found in Exodus xxix. 38-46, mediated to Jesus by Isaiah liii. 7. The oldest representation of Jesus is as a lamb, first standing alone, then on a cross as a crucified Lamb "taking away the sins of the world." It was not until the 6th Synod of Constantinople in 707 A. D. that the image on the cross was changed to that of a man. As the Good Shepherd Jesus has been represented as a youth with a lamb over his shoulders, the earliest portrayal as such having been found on communion cups dating from the end of the second century. The Savior as a Good Shepherd is clearly of Pagan origin, there being Buddhist representations 200 years earlier and Apollo and Mercury also having been represented as such. Hermes has been called *Poimander*, meaning *Shepherd of Men*, the Egyptian Horus the *Shepherd of the People*, and the Indian Christna the *Royal Good Shepherd*. As the Light of the World Jesus has Sun-god elements, for what could the personified sun say more truly than (John viii. 12) : "I am the light of the world : he that followeth

me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life," or "I am the light of the world" (John ix 5)?

I have spoken of Jesus as the fulfilment of prophecy. Although the Jesus of Matthew is more completely the fulfilment of the expected Jewish messiah, this element in John is well represented. I will do no more than list in parallel columns the references where can be found the prophecies and their fulfilment:

THE FULFILMENT.

John vi. 45.
 John vii. 42.
 John xii. 13.
 John xii. 14, 15.
 John xii. 38.
 John xii. 40.
 John xiii. 18.
 John xv. 25.
 John xvii. 12.
 John xviii. 1-9.
 John xix. 24.
 John xix. 28, 29.
 John xix. 36.
 John xix. 37.

THE PROPHECY.

Isaiah liv. 13 (Jer. xxxi. 34?).
 2 Sam. vii. 12 sq.; Mic. v. 2.
 Psalm cxviii. 25, 26.
 Zech. ix. 9.
 Isaiah liii. 1.
 Isaiah vi. 10.
 Psalm xli. 9.
 Psalm xxxv. 19; lxix. 4.
 Psalm xli. 9.
 Psalm xli. 9.
 Psalm xxii. 18.
 Psalm lxix. 21.
 Ex. xii. 46; Num. ix. 12; Psalm
 xxxiv. 20.
 Zech. xii. 10.

We thus understand the meaning of the last words of Jesus: "It has been perfected," namely, that the last fulfilment of prophecy had been completed.

We learn from John xix. 36 that the bones of Jesus were not broken, in order to fulfil the scripture that "a bone of him shall not be broken." We find throughout the Old Testament that the custom of preserving intact the bones of sacrificial animals was quite prevalent, and was due to the belief in their subsequent resurrection and reincarnation. We find that this practice and belief has been quite universal; for instance some savages of the present time preserve the bones of the animals they kill in order that they may come to life again. On the western prairies of the United States skulls of buffalos may be seen arranged in circles and symmetrical piles awaiting resurrection. On St. Olaf's Day (July 29) the Karels of Finland kill a lamb for sacramental purposes, the bones of which may not be broken. In general this belief is entertained by peoples living on the hunting and fishing plane of civilization. This belief has led to the practice of breaking or burning the bones when for any reason, out of spite or to prevent an in-

convenient return to life, a resurrection is not desired. The burning of the bones originated the bone-fire or the modern derivative *bonfire*. We thus see that it was very necessary in the theological scheme of things in the Fourth Gospel that the bones of Jesus should be preserved intact.

We find in the Gospel according to John that there are seven great "I Ams" and seven great "signs" which are a part of the symbolism of this Gospel. By the great "I Ams" is meant the titles by which Jesus calls himself, which are as follows:

- John vi. 35 "I AM the bread of life."
- John viii 12 "I AM the light of the world."
- John x. 7 "I AM the door of the sheep."
- John x. 11 "I AM the good shepherd."
- John xi. 25 "I AM the resurrection and the life."
- John xiv. 6 "I AM the way, and the truth, and the life."
- John xv. 1 "I AM the true vine."

The seven great "signs" are the miracles by which Jesus proves himself to be the Savior of the world. They are:

- John ii. 1-11 Changing of water into wine.
- John iv. 46-54 Healing a nobleman's son.
- John v. 1-9 Healing a lame man.
- John vi. 1-14 Feeding the multitude.
- John vi. 16-21 Walking on the sea.
- John ix. 1-16 Healing of a man born blind.
- John xi. 1-47 Raising of Lazarus from the dead.

Now why are there seven of each? Is it a matter of chance? We learn that the number seven has been sacred in many religions, especially in the Zoroastrian and Mithras, but also in the Buddhist, Jewish and Christian religions. Its sacredness dates back to the dawn of history in Akkad and Egypt, and has been well-nigh universal. The Babylonian story of Creation, from which our Bible account of Creation was taken, was written on seven tablets, which thus divides the story into seven parts, or seven days in Genesis, leading up to seven days in the week. In the ancient Roman religion the seven known planets, personified as deities, presided over the seven days of the week. These "planets," which included the sun and moon, were as follows:

- Sun (Sunday)
- Moon (Monday)
- Mars (Tiw, Tuesday)
- Mercury (Woden, Wednesday)

Jupiter (Thor, Thursday)

Venus (Friga, Friday)

Saturn (Saturday)

Those which have directly given their names to our days in the week are indicated. The other days in the week derive their names from the Saxon equivalents of the remaining Roman deities mentioned above. We hear of the seven-branch candlestick of the Jews, the seven wonders of the world, the seven heavens of Christianity, the seven virtues and seven deadly sins. Pythagoras viewed the number seven as a symbol of *light*, and Jesus symbolically speaks of himself as the *light*. Jesus, as the Good Shepherd, has been represented as surrounded by seven sheep and seven stars. It is very plain, therefore, that the seven great "I Ams" and seven "signs" are not a result of chance in the Fourth Gospel.

There are two texts in the Johannine Gospel, namely vii. 38 and xii. 34, which say they fulfil scripture but the sources of which can nowhere be found either in the Old Testament or any other Jewish writing. The question therefore arises: what are the sources of these passages? It may be interesting to some to find to these texts in John the following parallels from the Buddhist scriptures:

"He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, *out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.*"—John vii. 38.

"What is the Tathagato's knowledge of the twin miracle? In this case, the Tathagato works a twin miracle unrivalled by disciples: from his upper body proceeds a flame of fire and *from his lower body proceeds a torrent of water.*"—*The Way to Supernal Knowledge*, I, 53.

"The multitude therefore answered him, We have heard out of the law, that *the Christ abideth forever* (for the aeon.)"—John xii. 34.

"Anando, any one who has practiced the four principles of psychical power,—developed them, made them active and practical, pursued them, accumulated and striven to the height thereof,—can, if he so should wish, remain (on earth) for the aeon or the rest of the aeon."

"Now, Anando, the Tathagato has practiced and perfected these; and if he so should wish, *the Tathagato could remain* (on earth) *for the aeon* or the rest of the aeon."—*Book of the Great Decease*, Bk. 16.

The words underlined agree very closely in their originals. It should be noted that *Tathagato* is a religious term equivalent in meaning to *Christ*. The Fourth Gospel has quite a Buddhist tone and there is a high antecedent probability that its author was familiar with Buddhist theology. Another interesting comparison may be made further as follows:

"Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is from God, he hath seen the Father."—John vi. 46.

"I know him; because I am from him, and he sent me."—John vii. 29.

"Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love me: for I came forth and am come from God: for neither have I come of myself, but he sent me.... And ye have not known him: but I know him; and if I should say, I know him not, I shall be like unto you, a liar: but I know him and keep his word."—John viii. 42, 55.

"That man, O Vasettho, born and brought up at Manasakata, might hesitate or falter when askt the way thereto. But not so does the Tathagato hesitate or falter when askt of the kingdom of God (world of Brahma) or the path that goeth thereto. For I, O Vasettho, know both God and the kingdom of God and the path that goeth thereto; I know it even as one (1) who hath entered the kingdom of God and been born there."—*Long Collection, Dialog. 13.*

Many more parallels might be quoted, but this is sufficient to show that there is a Buddhist element in "John." The fact that the author expressly quoted two passages from scripture, the sources of which can only be found in the Buddhist canon, leaves the point not much disputed since the Buddhist scriptures were the most widely spread of all sacred codes in the first Christian century.

What have we learned? In a word, that the Fourth Gospel is a composite literary document, of dramatic possibilities, recording the sayings and experiences of a composite Christ produced for the purpose of inculcating a certain theological belief. This Christ is similar to the Jesus of the Synoptics only in so far as he is an element in the composite whole. Everything is omitted in "John" that might show a human side to this theological character. For example, the Synoptic Jesus tells simple parables and proverbs; the Christ of John talks like a metaphysician. This fact is well illustrated by the former's Parable of the Lost Sheep (Matt. xviii. 12-14; Luke xv. 3-7 and the latter's Allegory of the Good Shepherd (John x. 1-16). The former is simple, the latter elaborate. However, the Christ of John is the Christ of the Nicene Creed and thus the official Christ of the Western orthodox Christian Church. It is only the liberals in religion who ignore the theology of the Fourth Gospel and reject the deity of Jesus.

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萬物美仁

THE UNIVERSE IS BEAUTIFUL AND BENEVOLENT.

Translated and elaborated from the Chinese text of HSUN TZU'S¹ famous essay.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND,[†]

I. *The Common Man's Viewpoint.**

WE have in every age and country which can be called the least civilized those who live unique lives and by a profound observation of what is obscure and an unwearied practice of what is difficult have become experienced and skilful in peirastic inquiry.² These are our critical thinkers, our scientists and philosophers. They are certainly not those who regard daily affairs as unimportant nor those whose petty purposes value lightly the governing principle of the universe. They aim always to be open-minded and reasonable regarding the essential and recondite ways of nature. And being thus not unfamiliar with the seriousness of external affairs they are also in no wise melancholy over the cares of their inner life. They have no conduct which disdains the use of reason nor yet are they strangers to many dangerous situations. Altho not living outside the danger zones of life yet they are not those who have any personal anxieties.

Melancholy and apprehensive people are constantly complaining about their unfortunate position in life. They do not understand the relish which animals have for hay and grain. Their ears hear bells and drums but they do not understand their sounds. Their eyes see elegant sacrificial garments and beautifully embroidered robes but they do not understand their significance of design. They lightly value the warmth and friendly calm suggested by beautifully

† 馬彪論

* 庄人見

figured bamboo mats and their bodies know not the happiness of tranquillity. Therefore, even though they were inclined to seek the beauties and numerous excellences of the universe, they would still be incapable of holding reverent converse. Pretentious and yet desiring to realize, inquisitive and yet holding truth under cover, they are therefore incapable of either retiring or advancing.

Therefore, seeking to understand the beauty and goodness of the universe, they yet read into it a fulness of sorrow and anxiety. Seeking to comprehend the favors and benefits of the universe, they still consider it to be full of malice and injurious influences. Do people with such a disposition as this really know how to search into things? Do they ever improve their condition of life, seeing that their old age knows no other food than mush (abject poverty)? Is it even expedient to act thus upon the evidence or plea of inquiry?

Therefore pretentious ambition nourishes their desires but leads to a wrong manner of indulging their passions; it nourishes their natural dispositions but endangers their physical welfare. Ambition increases their pleasures in life but attacks their mental powers; it increases their reputation but confuses their righteous conduct. People who are like this, alas, although they may be feudal lords seizing a prince's throne, are veritable robbers, regardless of the apparent differences. Riding in a nobleman's carriage and bearing honor and respect for the time being or even consorting with him is quite insufficient to their covetous ambition. Alas, therefore, it is such as these who may be called self-serving or those who make everything and everybody minister to their selfish desires. Nature provides that they shall never know the ways of Heaven which are beautiful and benevolent.

They show no comparison with the tranquil mind and rejoicing heart peculiar to the laborer's exemplary mode of life, but are allowed to develop the vision necessary to see these qualities, even though lacking the energy and virtue to emulate them. Showing no comparison with the laborer's impartial attention and relish for musical sounds, they are yet able to develop the hearing necessary for such relish. Herbs cannot compare with vegetables and dumplings for food, and yet under the necessity or circumstance an appetite for them can be developed. Clothes of coarse cotton or hemp are common and do not compare with shoes with fine silk cords, but they just as well are capable of protecting the body. Although their residence is a cottage or a temporary covering of thatched bulrushes and straw sprouts they will do well to assume the laborer's humble attitude, esteeming it high and stately like an

elm tree shading a bamboo mat spread for a feast. Thus will they be able to develop a natural manner of life. Thus will they be able to look up to Heaven with a devout mind.

Alas, however, selfish people do not concern themselves about the beauty and goodness of the Universe and seem able only to seek ways and means for increasing their pleasure and ease. Lacking in the power to distinguish what constitutes true social position they seem capable only of increasing the vanity of fame. Folly like this is still being widely promoted throughout the world,—so much so that what indeed will soon become of the world!

Fortunately there are many who agree in regarding mere pleasure as really mean and vulgar. It is people like these who are serious thinkers on the affairs of life and whose sagacity leads them to decline the tempting rewards of government service. Without ascertaining what they say in expression of private opinions we never observe their good deeds and never hear of their plans for serving mankind. All princely men are sincere and considerate, acting carefully in regard to these principles.

II. *The Philosopher's Viewpoint.**

The universe is rational in every individual particle. It makes a path for everything and every creature to realize if it will the possibilities of its nature. The universe regards this path as quite singular, even onesided, while the individual thing or creature regards the universe as partial to its needs. Stupid people regard the individual creature or thing as onesided and act as though its very existence depended upon the partiality of the universe. Thence they themselves are unable to exercise energy to the utmost in any single duty or affair although considering themselves to understand the principle involved when they are really ignorant of it. Thence if they use such partiality regarding their understanding of the path of duty, how indeed can they have any true knowledge at all?

Shen Tzu³ has made observations on subsequent sages but did not look into the ways of the ancients. Lao Tzu⁴ has made some worthy observations on how to straiten out difficulties but did not adequately look into the meaning of faith. Mo Ti Tzu⁵ has made keen observations on uniformity and the principle of equality but did not look into the significance of odds and ends. Sung Tzu⁶ has made several remarks regarding the small and the few but has nothing to say about the great and the many. Therefore, under

* 儒師見

these several viewpoints, we have attention to later thinkers but not to the ancients, signifying that the multitudes of men have no school or profession in common; we have the overcoming of difficulties but no sincerity, showing that there is inability to distinguish the worthy from the ignoble; we have a doctrine of uniformity which overlooks the many crucial inequalities of life, proving that government administration nowadays is not permitted to distribute goods or give relief to the needy; and we have attention given to the small and few but not to the great and many, showing that the multitude of people are not readily reformed.⁷ In regard to these things the Shu King (Book of Records) says:⁸

"People who have not yet become good should be docile and follow obediently the principles laid down by the ancients, while those who have not yet become evil should follow the simple and virtuous ways of living practiced by the ancient rulers."

This is what the principle involved may be called. This is the vantage ground from which to view the beauty and goodness of the universe.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES.

¹ The philosopher Hsün Tzu,¹ or Hsin Ch'ing (Minister Hsün) as he is often called, lived approximately between the years 280-212 B. C. thus coming in contact with the reactionary aftermath of Mencius's influence as represented in the doctrines of "those two antithetical heretics," the epicurean Yang Chu and the altruist Mo Ti, whose opinions he commonly opposed. Hsün Tzu was a native of the Chao State but left there at 50 years of age, going to the Ch'i State seeking the association of philosophers and scholars. He there became chief libationer but through some covetous rival's intrigue he was impeached and withdrew to the Ch'u State where he was appointed magistrate of Lan Ling by Prince Ch'un Shen and in the comparative peace of his new post he became a teacher of philosophy and classical learning, and had as pupils the mystic Han Fei Tzu² and the jurist Li Ssu³ who subsequently became his great opponent, almost his nemesis. His numerous troubles and the career of periodical dismissals, intrigues and disgraces had made him a misanthrope, however, and perhaps accounts for his most famous essay arguing that "Human Nature is Evil at Birth." But the essay from which the present translation is a major selection Huang serves as part of the preliminary argument, and according to Huang Chen

¹ 荀子

² 韓非子

³ 李斯

Fu (one of the editorial collaborators on the *Pai Tzu Chin Tan*⁴ "All Philosophers' Noble Precepts," reprint of June, 1904, Shanghai) it is "a critical examination of education and the proper conduct of life which contains some of his best thoughts and arguments relative to the beauty and benevolence of the universe. Hence what is herein recorded should be regarded as of chief importance in the regulation of human affairs." In both the translation and these notes I have incorporated some of the principal commentary remarks of Chia Shan Hsieh⁵ whose critical edition (1786) of Hsün Tzu's philosophical writings is now included in a twenty volume set entitled "Twenty-Five Philosophers"⁶ (Shanghai, 1893).

²The two words *ch'ang shih*,⁷ ordinarily meaning "to try by tasting," are used by the Taoists and office-holding literati in the sense of testing one's skill as in performing tricks or at an examination. But with Hsün Tzu, Han Fei Tzu and their more philosophical followers the phrase is dignified with a usage which resembles that of our "inductive logic," "empirical science," or "critical philosophy," and always implies that there is or has been much sampling, trial and experiment bolstering the bare hypotheses of man's inquisitive speculation. Therefore I believe I am translating simply and yet adequately by using our term "peirastic inquiry" in the sense of Baconian or philosophical induction.

³Shen Tzu⁸ (c. 390-337 B. C.) was minister under Prince Chao of the Han State and became famous as an authority on criminal law, interstate jurisprudence and ancient codes of government administration. He also wrote learned interpretations of the mystic speculations of the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu, but it seems that the great flaw in his works on these two ancient sages was that of too much legal doubt, whence he devoted more attention to what later writers had to say than to the simple words and ways of the mystics. On this account, after harking back to the intelligent principles and clearcut precepts of Lao Tzu⁹ and his imperial predecessor, Shen Tzu was, strangely sidetracked and claimed neither to esteem them as virtuous men nor would he countenance the appointment to office of any man whose abilities were tinged with the least sympathy for Taoism. Thus, in commenting on Shen Tzu's scholarly attainments, Chuang Tzu,¹⁰ the great contemporary champion of

⁴百子金丹

⁵袁善謙

⁶二十五子

⁷嘗試

⁸慎子

⁹老子

¹⁰莊子

Lao Tzu's doctrines, said: "If such a doltish person as I do not neglect Tao, why should such a great scholar (as Shen Tzu) not strive to emulate the thoughts and motives of the ancients?" This refers directly to what Hsün Tzu a century later called "observing the subsequent but overlooking the previous." According to a work entitled "I Wen Chih"¹¹ (Collected Records of Arts and Crafts) published in the Han period about 100 B. C., Shen Tzu's work first appeared in 42 sections, but later editions reduced this number to 34. And Pan Ku,¹² the famous historian (native of An Ling, c. 20-92 A. D.), says that "the influence of the ancients extended unaltered to the time of the Han State (403-273 B. C., and hence nearly contemporary with Hsün Tzu's time), but since then and especially in our own Han Dynasty many scholars have arisen to challenge and weigh their claims." Thus it seems that Hsün Tzu was clearly anticipating what was subsequently proven.

⁴ I do not understand what sort of view of Lao Tzu's teachings could have led Hsün Tzu to say that he did not "adequately look into the meaning of faith (sincerity)." If I read his "Tao Teh King" rightly and am not mistaken about the very scholarly and delightful interpretations of Henri Borel, Dr. Paul Carus, and C. H. A. Bjerregaard, sincerity and various other articles of faith were the very cornerstones of Lao Tzu's philosophy. I have counted the word *hsin*¹³ (sincerity, faith, believe) no less than 15 times, and its several approximate synonyms about 25 times throughout his famous book. "It is a common necessity both to realizing the way of Heaven and following the footsteps of the sages."

⁵ Mo Ti Tzu,¹⁴ a younger contemporary of Mencius, was an impractical utilitarian who believed in universal love and utter self-abnegation. His views were in almost diametrical opposition to those of Yang Chu, and Hsün Tzu considers them to be simply the two horns of the same dilemma—that either selfish hedonism or self-sacrificing altruism will get us anywhere that is still not a worldly vale of folly and delusion. There may be a general uniformity of principles and moral imperatives but there are certainly few of the world's ephemeral details which do not hinge on injustice, falsehood, and the odds and ends of finite interest. And Hsün Tzu criticizes Mo Ti for attending only to the ideal uniformity while overlooking

¹¹ 藝文志¹² 班固¹³ 信¹⁴ 墨翟子

the more immediate problem of inequality and heterogeneity both in nature and in human life.

⁶ Sung Tzu¹⁵ was another younger contemporary of Mencius who regarded man's feelings as that which served to moderate his ambitions, whence if one's feelings are few and his power of sympathy is small (although he may quite possibly regard them as many and magnanimous), his private desires and public ambitions will become great and overbearing. The historian Pan Ku says that Hsün Tzu discussed this doctrine with Sung Tzu and pointed out that its principle had long ago been explained by the Yellow Emperor and Lao Tzu.

⁷ Chia Shan Hsieh's note on this point seems to try to reverse the situation, and yet in a way his comment carries the speculation further and can be considered permissible. He says:

"However, if a certain sort of desire (that for personal virtue or world-betterment, for instance) is enlarged and importance is given to its realization then it will be possible for us to use exhortations and kindly advice to influence and encourage such people to become good. But if everyone's desires are vulgar and their ambition small, who then will be able to reform them?"

In this remark I believe Chia shifts the meaning of the word *to*¹⁶ from "many" to "great and magnanimous," and of the word *shao*¹⁷ from "few" to "small and mean," for they are common words and have a very liquid usage which allows commentators too much latitude sometimes.

⁸ This quotation is from that chapter in the Shu King which embraces the ancient Viscount Chi Tzu's *Hung Fan*¹⁸—"Great Plan" which was the model system of just government which Chi Tzu¹⁹ bequeathed to Wu Wang upon the latter's conquest of the Shang dynasty. One of its provisions explains that if our virtue is partial and our love for the good is onesided then we will not be likely to follow the principles laid down by the ancients.

As a supplementary note I would like to remind readers of this magazine that if they wish a further and more general account of Early Chinese Philosophy just such a survey may be had in *The Monist* for July 1907, April and October 1908. It is capably and entertainingly written under the collaboration of D. T. Suzuki and Dr. Paul Carus.

¹⁵ 東子

¹⁶ 多

¹⁷ 少

¹⁸ 大範

¹⁹ 箕子

SOME MARGINAL NOTES ON LAUGHTER.

BY SAMUEL D. SCHMALHAUSEN.

Amico: I do not quite understand Professor Scott's contention that Henri Bergson's theory of the comic is tainted by "ethical pessimism." Professor Scott is molested by the thought that Morality may become a target of clever sharpshooters with a penchant for comic effect. To be laughed at for one's sincerity is, I submit, not an altogether pleasant experience. Why should there be a contradiction—a hostility—between customary morality and a sense of humor?

Amicus: That's a very nice point you raise. Let us begin with some general truths about personal conduct. Everyone knows that to laugh at a neighbor is easier and more congenial than laughing at one's self. Does everyone surmise why? I suppose the simplest explanation of the problem may be summed up in one sentence: Man takes himself more seriously than he does his neighbor. In other words, he feels more keenly for himself than he does for his neighbor. Laughing at himself would pain these personal and serious feelings. Laughing at his neighbor wounds no such feelings. The inference seems to be that laughter has its roots in callousness. A drunkard's reels and gyrations do move to laughter—but not if the drunkard happens to be your father. Dirty jests about sex do make men leer and giggle—but not if the jests are about their sisters or mothers. We all enjoy laughing—at somebody's else expense. Laughter is a species of callousness. Laughter, rooted in callousness, is a weapon of advantage in the struggle for prestige. Those who laugh gain a tremendous sense of power; the

power to confound, bewilder, diminish, hold aloof. Laughter is a mode of self-glorification. For example:—Our laughing at the foreigner, especially if he be dressed queerly or speak unintelligibly is due to our veiled sense of superiority to him. Perhaps we **really** do not laugh at him! We laugh, perhaps, only at **his** predicament. It's a kind of advantage-taking we **are** guilty of when we laugh. Note how true to fact this hypothesis as a distinguished, upper-class personage, we no longer feel provoked into unholy laughter. Respect in lieu of derision becomes our stereotyped reaction. In some way, subtle or obvious, laughter, in a majority of cases, I believe, is interconnected with a feeling of advantage. The gods are the best laughers.

Amico: Let me read you a brief powerful excerpt I have saved from a book review by a distinguished young writer: "In his theory of escape from the strain of civilized thinking, Professor Patrick has found a clue to some long-discussed mysteries. Why do we laugh at a man who slips on a banana peel, especially if he was just lifting his hat to a lady? Why do we laugh at Sir Isaac Newton for boiling his watch while holding the egg in his hand? Why does an audience always laugh when any character on the stage says 'Damn'? It is the spontaneous outburst of joy whenever the old and natural suddenly appears amidst the restrained and artificial." It is 'the sudden or momentary escape from the constant urge of progressive forces. It is release from the decorous, the proper, the refined, the fitting, the elegant, the strict, the starched, the stiff, the solemn. The mind runs riot for a moment in the old, the familiar, the instinctive, the impulsive and the easy, knowing that the inevitable claims of civilization must soon force it into servitude again. Laughter represents a momentary and spasmodic rebellion against civilization, just as play and sport represents more deliberate periodic efforts to escape from it by resting a while before resuming the burden.'" What do you think, Amicus, of this explanation?

Amicus: The theory, as stated, is too broad for specific accuracy and specific verifiability. The loose terms "old and nat-

ural," "restrained and artificial," "civilization," "rebellion," need re-defining, clearer points of fixation. For my part, I shall continue to believe that laughter, whether "civilized" or savage or barbarous, is grounded in a specific theory of torture. The specific experiences of the race have produced in our brains (what Dr. George W. Crile calls) "Action-Patterns" of malicious delight, released and expressed whenever a human—not of our own flesh-and-blood—is in torture. Laughter is always, I believe, an enemy-delight.

Amico: Don't you believe that we often laugh good-naturedly, without malicious intent? It seems so to me.

Amicus: Yes, but you must remember that laughter originated among semi-human progenitors, crude, cruel, incorrigible. Do you believe that they laughed at a tortured victim good-naturedly? The wholesome laughter you refer to is a comparatively recent invention. There is very little of it in the world (as we intimately know it). When the stress of primitive aspirings has become softened by security and sweet philosophy, laughter may become good-natured. In the company of equals (economic or intellectual) laughter tends to be rather genial and benign. Even in such homogeneous groups, the chances are that laughter has become apparently good-humored only because the whole confraternity is laughing at a competitor or rival, or at an "outcast" against whom they all harbor a common grievance or for whom they all have a sprightly contempt. Laughter is, say what you will, shot through and through with maliciousness. No doubt of that. Wholesome laughter is very rare—even in the recreations and frivolities of mankind.

Amico: You are too hard in your judgments, Amicus. When people laugh convulsively at a play, do you mean to say that they are behaving maliciously? You know that, after all, they *are* aware of the mock-serious nature of the drama. When people laugh boisterously at the sight of a fat man chasing his hat with gusto and concentrated fury, are they really laughing malevolently? Do they intend any harm to the hapless fellow?

Amicus: If you were willing to realize that the mind of the adult is as childish and cruel in its pleasures as is the mind of the five year old child, you would not find my judgments so unpalatable. The more heart-rending the predicament, the more intense the laughter. Note that fact. Only superstitious fear can choke off malicious laughter. People laugh never so uncontrolledly as when a person makes a trivial mistake in the midst of a profound utterance! Any little eccentricity or irrelevant gesture will move an audience to laughter though the speaker be all sincerity and eloquence and wisdom. So it is at the theater. The laughter is really an outlet for pent-up joy at the sight of bewilderment and bafflement. That the actor does not suffer the consequences of the outburst is beside the mark. For all we know he is suffering in his inner self. Perhaps the light and scoffing laughter reminds him of other days when he was "seriously" laughed at for slips of the tongue or for some left-handed gesture. Perhaps he is impersonating a character very like himself. Oh, yes, all laughter is a little vindictive, a bit malicious, a trifle supercilious, somewhat derisive. Suppose at the moment you were laughing your heartiest at the rain-swept lady struggling against the driving wind with umbrella, hat, skirts and bundle as impedimenta, you should suddenly behold a vitagraph picture of her confusion, her sense of shame, her impotence and her resentment? Do you believe you would still continue laughing at her? . . . All laughter tends to be mean and callous. I hope I'm not pleading for a world of solemn-faces. Oh no! On with the dance: let joy be unconfined! Let there be peals and peals of laughter. We are human beings, not saints. . . . Tell me, good Amico, why God and the good men (like the saints) are never pictured as laughers, nor ever thought of as such? Why not? . . . Oh, I know, there is virtue in laughter. Laughter steels the mind against spiritual timidity. In laughter there is strength.

Amico: Don't you believe that a man can laugh at himself good-naturedly? I do.

Amicus: Well, sometimes, when I'm off my guard (as it were). I do. Always, after digging down deep into the experi-

ence, I find that laughing at one's self is not without its malicious intention. I am convinced that too often a brilliant satirist laughs at himself only because in the fulness of his bitterness he finds sardonic pleasure in biting at his own heart. You, the dear spectator, enjoy his predicament. You laugh with him at himself. He wantonly pounced down upon you, abused you for your shallowness, turned the jest against you, laughed at himself only to laugh the more wickedly at you. He has caught you unawares. He who laughs last laughs best. The satirist will see to it that he gets the best laugh first and last. Beware of the man who can laugh at himself. He will tear the heart out of you with a double pleasure. If you begin by laughing at him, you will end by laughing (and weeping, too) at yourself.

Amico: As usual, we have indulged in mind-wandering. Let us retrace our steps. I do not see the necessary connection between customary morality and humorlessness. Why should a man who behaves in prescribed modes on ordained occasions be an object of ridicule to the satirist or to the philosopher of the comic? If it were quite universal, that attitude would convince me of the baseness and callousness of laughing men. From my experience I know that on solemn, conventional occasions people look serious, and, I trust, actually are so. I can't believe that the seriousness is a mock solemnity, a mask worn for the occasion in order to conceal grinning wit and sly humor. That conviction would make life seem grotesque and horrible. Think of a face congealed in laughter haunting you on your wedding day. Ugh! It would be like kissing a skull. Ugh!

Amicus: To those who accept its sincerity, conventional morality is not laughable. It is ludicrous only to the non-participants. Do you recall what I said about Man's taking himself more seriously than he does his neighbor?... Laughter is the contribution of the detached, of the unrelated, of the unsympathetic. Seriousness is the attitude of the sympathetic, the related, the closely attached. The satirist is engaged in objective judgment; he observes from a distance. He laughs at solemn routine and at

pompous repetition (the mode of all moral conduct), because they appear so lifeless and mechanical, likely at a moment's notice to go wrong and to involve the whole unresourceful company of practitioners in side-splitting contradictions and humorous impotence. The essence of conventionally-moral conduct is stereotypy. The procedure is formularized. . . . Laughter is fed by the emotion of doubt. The laughter doubts whether stereotypy can maintain its rigidity without cracking under the strain. The least slip or mishap may render the whole "Dumb Show" ludicrous. Confusion! Non-preparedness. Suppressed laughter! Solemnity, standing rigid and impotent, not knowing what to do or what to say! How fill in the breach? What to do to continue the illusion of solemnity? Sympathy is on the wane. Humor comes to the rescue. Laughter winks maliciously and enjoys the spectacle hugely. The desire to "find" fun at another fellow's expense is simply irresistible. I am certain that elaborate ceremonials are the funniest dumb shows in the world—to the satirist. You mustn't forget the part cynicism and natural pessimism contribute to ironic laughter. In our hearts we know people for what they are:—irritable little creatures, stuffy, sensational, wicked, moody, quixotic. How can we suppress the mocking laugh when they pretend to be as *perfectly* solemn as the Christian God and as rigidly proper as sculptured saints? The contradiction is devastatingly funny. Without the quaint relief of unholy laughter, even the formalists would have perished under the insupportable strain of their pompous poses! The retaliation of the formalist is torture. The reply of the informalist is laughter. Both modes are soaked in malice.

Amico: As I recall Professor Scott's critique in the *International Journal of Ethics*, it may be summarized as follows: According to Bergson's view there is the closest affinity between the Comic and the Moral. Professor Scott says: 'The pessimism of this doesn't need to be labored. To rule out the mechanical, the rigid, from the life which society wants is plainly to withdraw the good from out of the reach of common men and make it the aristocratic privilege of the few. According to Bergson, the good

life is transmuted into a piece of high art, or into a game of skill in which the winners are they who possess the gifts and have cultivated the skill.—The moral imperative does not even say 'be good.' It only says 'be adaptable.'" I gather from these interesting criticisms that Professor Scott perceives an irreconcilable hostility between the good and the comic. I suppose he voices the deep-felt attitude of a majority of moral persons who see puritanism in solemnity and in informality something akin to wickedness. There is no doubt that the greater part of mankind privately believes in the superior noble grandeur of formality as keenly as it believes in the quite inferior ungrandeur of informality. These distinctions arise undoubtedly from a repressed-theory of man's original depravity; the feeling that the "natural," spontaneous, informal man is lax and loose and trivial, possibly indecent and scoffing. On the other hand, any rigid excavation of facetiousness and of too candid bonhomie is sure to leave at the cleansed bottom of personality the fine sediment of repose, formality, good behavior. Artificial, fixed poses moralize depraved man, so it is tacitly assumed by the formalists.

Amicus: You know how contemptuously I spurn pose and formalism and uncritical conformity. Wax uniformity I simply abhor. Individuality, informality, uniqueness, freedom, originality, differentness—these more creative modes I love. I hate mechanism; I adore spirit—certainly in human conduct. You will understand how unsympathetic I feel toward any view of life, however democratic that view may appear to be, which by ousting informality champions and celebrates formality. If the democratic ideal is to be measured by arithmetical units, I fear there will be a heap of unlovely idealism passing current for worthiness, simply because the undifferentiated many subscribe to it. If the majority are routineers, lovers of wax uniformity, devotees of regimentation, victims of monotony and sameness, let us pity the majority; but for wisdom's sake, let us not emulate or worship the poor blind beasts. I know of no finer or more liberalizing ideal than Bergson's: "The good life is transmuted into a piece of high art." Every creative idealist, looking toward the deeper

fulfilment of to-morrow, loving his fellowmen for what they may yet be (not for what they are!) will gladly embrace the Bergsonian philosophy of morals. To live artistically—what more beautiful or more worthy aspiration? I have worked out a more elaborate criticism of Professor Scott's ethics which you may care to consider.

Amico: There can be no subject more important than morality. As Professor Dewey says: the plane of a man's thinking is measured by his attitude toward the problems of conduct. I shall be glad to follow your analysis of creative morality, especially in its bearings upon the conventional theory of good conduct, as expressed by Professor Scott in the article already alluded to. *Why does Bergson the more adequately express your own conception of conduct, of what the Greeks would call, the good life? Be as definite as possible, for clarity's sake.

Amicus: All right. Let me play Socrates to my dear Theaetetus Paraphrasing Bergson, Professor Scott says that "it is comical to act according to fixed habit." To which I humbly add: Of course it is—in a *new situation*. Now the intellectual impotence of your habitualist lies in his mal-adjustability exactly. He assumes the eternal validity of his conformity. How then can he anticipate or prepare for a novel situation? The answer is simply that he can't. Hence his ludicrous plight in an emergency. Habitualism breeds unawareness. Slaves of habit—moral or immoral or unmoral—are hopeless in an evolving society. Alertness is the touchstone of preparedness. Preparedness guarantees adaptability. Education is, creatively viewed, a research in anticipations. Habitualism has nothing to anticipate. Why worship it as a moralizing force (in a society increasingly self-conscious and purposive)? As soon as moral conduct has become habitual, it is no longer quintessentially moral: it is only mechanical. For the very core of creative morality is readiness to reinterpret one's conduct in relation to *new* situations. Truly moral men are not rigidly moral. So many humans turn rigid in their morality because the pose of self-righteousness is easier to achieve than a genuine righteousness. In fact, rigidity in conduct encourages posing and imposing. Why cele-

brate it? "It is comical to be like another mind," says Professor Scott, aiming a poisonless arrow at Bergson's "ethical pessimism." So it is, if your emulation or imitation is pure pretence. Who's the silliest creature on earth if he be not the parrot-disciple of genius? Some of our cleverest dramas are woven about this human weakness for pretence and pretentiousness. Being like another mind is comical as the voice of the ventriloquist is comical. The absence of the human element of individuality reduces man to mechanism and renders him a megaphone, or at best, a mood, not a mind. The assumption of mind where no mind is, *is* comical, precisely because pretence takes the place of reality: to the critic eye, always a humorous substitution. . . . "It is comical to repeat and insist" *Naturally*, when repetition and insistence evidently fall upon deaf and obtuse ears. Is there any person more comical—and strangely self-deluded—than the professional preachers, dinning solemnly-grand unlivable platitudes into the souls of benighted poor wretches ill-equipped to eke out a bare hand-to-mouth existence? The preacher is portrayed in drama as the cunning simpleton because he never does anything (except repeat and insist) to make his highfalutin ethics live and *realize* itself. He is intellectually blind to the irrelevancy of his good intentions. His folly is,—measured by realistic standards,—ludicrous.

Amico: To be sure, the most distinctively human attribute which neither animal nor god shares with man is the comic spirit. Perhaps it is just as well for us to recognize its high value as a spiritual purgative. I recall the delightful comment of Romain Rolland apropos of the function of humor among a self-adoring mankind. He says: "Intelligence of mind is nothing without that of the heart. It is nothing also without good sense and humor—good sense which shows to every people and to every being their place in the universe—and humor which is the critic of misguided reason, the soldier who following the chariot to the capital reminds Caesar in his hour of triumph that he is bald." Indeed, it is worth while inquiring what there is in the nature of customary morality to make it so hostile to the comic spirit.

Amicus: The comic spirit, rooted in callousness (that is, in a sense of detachment), achieves a mighty analytic purpose. It laughs to scorn those prevalent human poses and pretences which make of life a torpid dumb show, an unanimated panorama, a procession of automata. The cosmic spirit cleanses the soul of its duplicities. It annihilates shams and pomps and vacant ceremonies. From the lusty exuberance of the comic spirit, creative morality will suffer small hurt. Customary morality, conceived in fear and herd-imitation, perpetuated in habits of self-approval and customs of self-glorification, will undoubtedly suffer from the malicious ravages (so they must appear to the afflicted) of the comic spirit. . . . And the primary problem for ethicists is: Shall life be a work of art or a polished mechanism?

OCEAN I LOVE YOU.

BY GUY BOGART.

Ocean, I love you too,
Kissing the living sands where I sit.
Gray ocean, mist encompassed,
You are alive and soothing.
Your soul I know for I am the ocean,
And you, oh ocean, are myself.
Do not ask me how I know,
Dear sister waves,
Born of wind and water.
Your throbbing pulse beats and mine
Alike the Father registers.
You are a personality, dear ocean.
Your soul I know ;
Your voice I hear—not the swish and surge of surf,
But the still small voice in which you whisper to me thoughts my
eternal spirit understands but which my flesh-brain cannot
translate into written words.
You live
And I live—
So lives the universe.
There is life within your deeps,
But you are yourself alive.
Not in symbols do I speak
But in sober reality.
Live with me, dear ocean.
Thanks for your spray spore, wind-born and life-giving
That baptizes me
As the gulls and I share your gray benediction.

WHEN JESUS THREW DOWN THE GAUNTLET.

BY WM. WEBER.

THE death of Jesus, whatever else it may be, is a very important event in the history of the human race. As such it forms a link in the endless chain of cause and effect; and we are obliged to ascertain, if possible, the facts which led up to the crucifixion and rendered it inevitable.

The first question to be answered is: Who were the men that committed what has been called the greatest crime the world ever saw? A parallel question asks: How did Jesus provoke the resentment of those people to such a degree that they shrank not even from judicial murder in order to get rid of him?

The First Gospel denotes four times the persons who engineered the death of Jesus "the chief priests and the elders of the people." The first passage where that happens is connected with the account of the Cleansing of the Temple (Matt. xxi. 23.) The second treats of the meeting at which it was decided to put Jesus out of the way. (Matt. xxvi. 3.) The third tells of the arrest of Jesus. (Matt. xxvi. 47.) The fourth relates how he was turned over to the tender mercies of Pontius Pilate. (Matt. xxvii. 1.) The expression is used, as appears from this enumeration, just at the critical stations on the road to Calvary and may be a symbol characteristic of the principal source of the passion of Jesus in Matthew. The corresponding term of the Second and Third Gospels is "the chief priests and the scribes"; but that is not used exclusively in all the parallels to the just quoted passages. The Johannine equivalent is "the chief priests and the Pharisees." (John vii. 32, 45; xi. 47, 57; xviii. 3.) The scribes and the Pharisees form only one class of people. For the scribes as the founders and leaders of the party of the Pharisees were designated either scribes, or Pharisees. The testimony of the last three Gospels compels us to identify the "elders of the people" of the First Gospel with the scribes.

That conclusion will be corroborated when we consider the meaning of the term apart from its parallels. It reminds us of the Latin *Tribunus Plebis* and directs our attention to the distinction which the Jews drew between the priests and the people, the clergy and the laity. Our noun layman is derived from the Greek word for people used in our Matthew passages. We might call therefore "the elders of the people" the lay-elders. The Jewish elders of the New Testament are as a rule supposed to be members of certain courts of judicature. But elders are also mentioned that were not judges. Matt. xv. 2, Pharisees and scribes ask Jesus: "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?" Those elders were doubtless scribes. (Matt. xxiii.) They were not necessarily the scribes of long ago. For the tradition of the elders during the lifetime of Jesus was not yet a closed book. The hedge of the law was still in the process of growing. Besides, we find Matt. ii. 4 a significant parallel to the elders of the people in the expression "the scribes of the people"; and what is even more to the point, those men from whom Herod learns where the Messiah was born, are in Justin Martyr (*Dialogue with Trypho* 78B) "the elders of the people."

Mark and Luke, however, seem to prove that the scribes and the elders are two different classes of people. For Mark xi. 27, xiv. 43 and 53 we meet the phrase "the chief priests and the scribes and the elders." Nevertheless, Mark xiv. 1, the parallel of Matt. xxvi. 3 and Luke xxii. 2, reads "the chief priests and the scribes." The tripartite designation of the enemies of Jesus in those instances must represent a conflated reading, a combination of the Matthew with the Mark and Luke text. That is quite evident Luke xx. 1 where we come upon "the chief priests and the scribes with the elders." If there had been three different parties, the author would have written "and the elders." Moreover, Luke xx. 19 "the scribes and the chief priests" are named alone. "The elders" probably did not invade the Second and Third Gospel until they had been translated into Greek. Some Gentile Christian student, who did not know what "elders of the people" meant is to be held responsible for them.

The enmity of the scribes or Pharisees antedates the arrival of Jesus at Jerusalem. The latter encountered from the very beginning of his public career the outspoken opposition of the former who may be styled the Jewish orthodoxy. Their rancor was due partly to jealousy. For the people preferred the teachings of Jesus to those of the scribes because "he taught them as one having

authority, and not as their scribes." (Matt. vii. 29.) But there was a by far weightier reason why the Pharisees could not agree with the man from Galilee. They defined religion as the strictest obedience to the letter of each and every law of the Old Testament as expounded by their scholars. The latter were working with unremitting zeal and industry to lay down a definite rule of conduct for any possible emergency in which any given law might have to be kept. That constantly growing commentary on the law was called "the tradition of the elders"; and it was the main duty of a pious Jew to study and become familiar not only with the law **but also the tradition** and to keep informed as to new rules and definitions which were published from time to time.

The Jew did not distinguish between moral law and ceremonial law, but divided their laws into such as prescribed man's duties towards God and such as regulated man's intercourse with his neighbor. If a law of one of these two classes ever conflicted with a law of the other class, that is to say, if one had the choice of serving either God or his neighbor, preference had to be given to God. Thus it was praised as the acme of religious perfection to offer as a sacrifice at the temple what otherwise might have relieved the urgent wants of one's indigent parents. (Mark. vii. 8-13.)

Jesus shared the Pharisaic definition of religion as conscientious observance of the law of God. He demanded with his adversaries that every true Israelite had to obey the law and the prophets. But he rejected the tradition of the elders as useless and pernicious casuistry. He proclaimed instead of the hedge of the law the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" the beacon of the perfect will of God. He insisted that man could prove his love of God alone by loving his neighbor. Therefore, when somebody's divine and human duties apparently were opposed to each other, the divine had to give way before the human obligations.

In the controversy which was bound to rise over that question, Jesus acted not as the gentle, submissive, and self-effacing sweet soul as whom he is generally represented. On the contrary, he proved himself a man cast in a heroic mold. He never feared to state his convictions no matter what the consequences might be. He never hesitated to defend himself and to attack the Pharisees. No danger could cause him to shun his duty. The climax apparently was reached when Jesus entered a synagogue on a sabbath day and healed in the presence of his adversaries a man whose hand was withered. It was a trap artfully set and baited to convict Jesus of being a breaker of the sabbath. For the Mosaic law declares ex-

pressly: "Whosoever doeth any work on the sabbath day, he shall surely be put to death." (Exodus xxxi. 15.) The Pharisees evidently argued the man with the paralyzed hand was not, in immediate danger and could wait to be cured till the sabbath was past. But Jesus did not care to compromise, but held it to be of prime importance to stand by his principle: "It is lawful to do good on the sabbath day." The pericope is contained in all three Gospels. Matt. xii 14 tells us that after the healing "the Pharisees went out, and took counsel against him, how they might destroy him." Mark iii. 6 is virtually identical with Matthew; only it adds that the Pharisees took counsel "with the Herodians" against him. The Herodians are officers of Herod who had orders to arrest Jesus and bring him before the tetrarch. (Comp. Luke ix. 9 and xiii. 31.) Luke vi. 11 reads: "They were filled with madness, and communed one with another what they might do to Jesus."

In the eyes of the Pharisees the life of Jesus was forfeited. Only the multitude would not allow them to execute that judgement because they regarded Jesus as a prophet. So they had to postpone his punishment to a more favorable time. It goes without saying that the leading Pharisees of Jerusalem, the scribes who taught in the halls of the temple, were in full accord with that sentence. We know they had been informed of his dangerous activity and had come themselves to Galilee to see and hear Jesus.

Thus the deadly hatred of the scribes is accounted for, on the one hand, by the spiritual blindness of the orthodox Jews who neither could nor would see the truth preached by Jesus and, on the other hand, by the fearless aggressiveness of the latter. Since he knew his enemies, he was quite aware of the final outcome of the struggle. He foresaw they would make common cause with any other party whose enmity he might incur in order to crush and annihilate him. Even that certainty could not induce Jesus to change his course.

The motives of the chief priests are not defined so easily. They do not seem to have taken any notice of Jesus before he came to Jerusalem. If they did, our sources fail to inform us of that fact. According to what we know about those men, they were not interested in such controversies as that between Jesus and the Pharisees. The chief priests together with their dependents, the ordinary priests, the Levites, and all the other employees of the temple, formed the party of the Sadducees. From their standpoint the Jewish religion was identical with the temple service, upon which their social standing, wealth, and income depended. As long as the people paid their

temple tax, attended the great festivals, and offered the prescribed sacrifices, the priests were satisfied. What they hated were new ideas and religious innovation. For one could never tell what fundamental changes they might bring about. For that reason, they did not accept the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, which the Pharisees worked out during the last two centuries before the Christian era. Uncompromising conservatives, they were impatient of the tradition of the elders.

Although the Sadducees did not love the Pharisees, they could not sympathize with Jesus. Such a hot head, bent upon reforming their nation, was an abomination in their sight. Still, Jesus as prophet and teacher had little to fear from the chief priests and their henchmen. They would have ignored him just as they had paid no attention to the Baptist and as they endured the fanaticism of the Pharisees. But the very moment, he should attempt to interfere with their office and its emoluments, they would not hesitate to employ any measures to destroy him.

As to the Messianic idea, they remembered with pride the time when the high priest had been the autocratic ruler of the independent Jewish state. They would have recovered gladly their lost sovereignty. But they were too world-wise to risk their very existence in a hopeless struggle against the power of Rome. When at last their nation in the madness of despair rose in revolt, they proved themselves patriots and brave men. Yet as for the Messianic kingdom of the Pharisees, they remained cynical doubters to the end. For they could derive no profit from such a kingdom. The Messiah was bound to shear their office of all royal powers and prerogatives, inherited from the Maccabeans, and to reduce them to a subaltern condition such as the priests had held under king David and his successors.

Jesus, according to the Gospels, crossed the path of the chief priests only once in his entire career. That happened when he cleansed the temple. Of that event we possess four accounts, Matt. xxi. 12ff., Mark xi. 15ff., Luke xix. 45ff., and John ii. 13ff. Some scholars believe Jesus to have cleansed the temple twice, the first time at the beginning, the second time, at the end of his career. They do so because the event is related in the Fourth Gospel in the opening chapters, in the Synoptic Gospels in the closing sections. But these men overlook that the original frame around which the present Gospel according to St. John has been built up, relates only the passion of Jesus and commences just as the corresponding part

of the Synoptic Gospels with the cleansing of the temple. Moreover, the chief priests were not the men to see that done more than once.

Matt. xxi. 12-13, Jesus chases the sellers and buyers from the temple and overthrows the tables of the moneychangers and the seats of those that sold doves. He justifies that strange proceeding with the words: "It is written My house shall be called a house of prayer: but ye make it a den of robbers." The statement is a combination of Isaiah vi. 7: "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples" and Jeremiah vii. 11: "Is this house, which is called by my name, become a den of robbers in your eyes?" Mark xi. 15-17 presents essentially the same report, increased by some additions, which will be discussed later on. The version of the Third Gospel is rather short and deserves to be quoted in full. "He entered into the temple, and began to cast out them that sold, saying unto them, It is written, My house shall be a house of prayer: but ye have made it a den of robbers." Luke is not only silent as to the money changers and dealers in doves but also omits the purchasers of the goods offered for sale.

The Johannine account of the same happening is apparently independent of the Synoptic Gospels whereas the close interrelationship of the Synoptic versions is obvious. John ii. 13-16 reads: "The passover of the Jews was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. And he found in the temple those that sold oxen and sheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting; and he made a scourge of cords and cast out all of the temple, both the sheep and the oxen; and he poured out the changers' money, and overthrew their tables; and to them that sold the doves he said, Take these things hence; make not my Father's house a house of merchandise."

According to this report, Jesus does not fall like a raging Roland upon the salesmen. He uses his improvised whip, not to beat the men, but to drive out the cattle. The sellers, of course, follow their beasts. In this respect, the Johannine tradition does not contradict that of the Synoptic Gospels. It is richer by a few details which render the picture more distinct. The main point is, neither in John nor in Luke does Jesus chase the buyers from the temple.

This single feature establishes the superiority of the accounts of the Third and Fourth Gospel over that of the first two. It is easy enough to decide who the salesmen must have been. They did not sell general merchandise but exclusively animals needed for sacrifices, oxen, sheep, and doves, and shekels, or rather half-shekels

with which the temple tax was paid. A market of that kind in one of the temple courts must have been opened originally for the convenience of pilgrims from the Diaspora who could not bring along victims from their distant homes. The business was, of course, conducted under the authority and for the benefit of the chief priests, who appointed priests of a lower degree to do the selling. As long as the buyers were given a square deal, nobody could have taken exception to that commerce, and nobody would have supported Jesus if he had tried to stop it. Especially the Diaspora Jews must have felt thankful for finding within the temple a place where they could obtain at a fair price the animals they needed for their sacrifices, guaranteed officially to be without fault or blemish. The half-shekels had to be bought in the age of Jesus very probably by all Jews, including those of Palestine, from the priests. Since the priestly kingdom had ceased to exist, half-shekels were no longer coined and served no longer as medium of exchange in everyday life. (Comp. Luke xx. 24f.)

The salesmen retreated before Jesus without making even a show of resistance. That proves how unpopular their market was. If the mass of the pilgrims had not applauded the deed of Jesus and taken his part in the most outspoken way, the priestly traders would not have been afraid of the Galilean and his few companions. For having to accommodate hundreds of thousands of customers, they must have outnumbered the disciples many times. But the unpopularity of an institution which in itself is innocent enough and serves a want, spells flagrant abuse. What kind of abuse must have prevailed is indicated by the words of Jesus: "Ye have made it a den of robbers," vouched for by the Synoptic Gospels. The Hellenistic Jews as well as those of Palestine were very angry at the priests because they were robbed by them. Wherein that robbery consisted may be deducted from certain business practices that are in vogue even to-day.

The profits which the chief priests derived from the sale of victims to Jews attending the feasts from abroad, must have suggested to them the idea of making the purchase of those animals at the temple compulsory for all Jews without exception. It was not very difficult to do that. The Jews living in Palestine might bring their home-raised animals along and have them sacrificed. But the priests had first to examine them and decide whether they were perfect. If the priests had any doubts as to the proper qualification of the animals brought to them, they had to reject them. In that case, the owners could only sell them at Jerusalem and buy

others which would be acceptable to the priests. Such, however, could be found only in the temple market.

The chief priests could instruct their subordinates to accept for sacrifices only animals purchased in the temple and refuse all others under the pretext of having no time to examine them carefully during the rush of the feasts. As a result the chief priests could buy all the animals they needed far below the market price because there were no other purchasers. By selling those animals in the temple at the ordinary quotations, they secured very large profits; but those profits were stolen from the people. The pious Jews were defenceless against that systematic spoliation. They might compel the priests to pay the regular market price for the victims they needed by keeping them at home and waiting for the priestly purchasers to come after them. But in that case, the selling price at the temple would be high enough to cover all extra expenses and still leave a handsome surplus. As for the shekels, the chief priests owned and possessed the whole amount of those coins and sold them for what the market would stand, receiving back the sacred money as fast as it was handed over the counter.

The scribes to whom the people might appeal for help supported the priests. They might in their heart condemn their avarice. But they would tell the complainants: You offer your sacrifices and pay your temple tax, not to the priests, but to God. God can and will repay you in full for whatever the priests take away from you. He will punish the priests if they are wrong. But remember you cannot give too much to God. In sacred things it is better to suffer than to do injustice. Besides, the priests cannot be too particular with things to be sacrificed. They may be right in spite of appearances. For they prevent the offering of imperfect victims. That their method is rather expensive, and that the people have to bear the cost, cannot be avoided.

That must have been the situation which caused Jesus to challenge the chief priests. A more intensive study of the history of the Jews during the age of Jesus may bring to light direct testimony in support of the just given explanation. B. I. Westcott (*Gospel according to St. John*, London, 1901, I. 90) speaks of "the court of the Gentiles where there was a regular market, belonging to the house of Hanon (Annas)."

We are now enabled to decide whether the text of Luke and John or that of Matthew and Mark is to be preferred. In the first place, the testimony of two independent witnesses deserves greater credit than that of any number of almost identical copies of the

statements of only one witness. Besides, how could Jesus at the same time champion the cause of the pious people against their unrighteous priests and chase both people and priests out of the court of the Gentiles? Moreover, he needed the presence of the multitude for his own protection. With the multitude at his back, he could defy the chief priests with their temple police who were sure to appear upon the scene as soon as the report of the disturbance created by the man from Galilee, reached them. Therefore, we are compelled to eliminate the words "and bought" (Matt. xxi. 12) as well as "and them that bought" (Mark xi. 15) as later additions to the original Synoptic text. The party who penned those glosses did not understand the true significance of what Jesus did. He imagined the holy place to have been desecrated by the act of selling and buying within its precincts. Also the statement "and overthrew the tables of the money-changers, and the seats of them that sold the doves" of Matt. xxi. 12 and Mark xi. 15 is in all probability foreign to the original text, because absent from the Luke version. Those words were borrowed very likely from the Johannine account.

Mark xi. 16 contains still another spurious addition to the text: "and he would not suffer that any man should carry a vessel through the temple." These words have no meaning in the mouth of Jesus. Some commentators suppose the inhabitants of Jerusalem had become accustomed to carry all kinds of things from one quarter of the city to another through the courts of the temple in order to save time. By doing so they showed disrespect for the house of God in the estimation of Jesus. But a mere glance at the map of Jerusalem and the topography of the temple discredits that explanation. The temple and its courts formed a separate unit, a citadel. There was no shortcut across the temple area from one part of the city to another. The difference in height alone between the temple mount and the city proper excluded that. Another argument against the genuineness of the words under discussion is based upon the following reflection. That the temple was defiled by carrying a burden through it, was a Jewish belief and expressly forbidden for the inner court. But that is no reason why Jesus should have extended such a prohibition, resting as it does upon the Pharisaic conception of religion, even beyond the Pharisaic line. Jesus did not share the belief of the Jews that the temple at Jerusalem was the only dwelling place of God on earth. And the idea that sin had its seat and origin in matter and could be imparted to places and persons by merely bodily contact was absolutely foreign

to his way of thinking. In addition to all this, neither Matthew nor Luke confirm those words of Mark.

It does not suffice to point out glosses; their presence in the text has also to be explained. The just discussed additions to the Mark and Matthew text are apparently of Jewish origin. Some Jewish Christian reader did not grasp the true significance of what Jesus did. He imagined him to have taken offence at the careless indifference with which the holy place was treated and enlarged the text so as to emphasize his interpretation.

Also the words "for all nations" (Mark xi. 17) have to be crossed out. They are found indeed Isaiah lvi. 7; but Jesus was bound to modify the saying of the prophet. He was thinking not of Israel and the other nations but only of the incompatible contradiction between a house of prayer and a den of robbers. Somebody who was aware that Jesus cited Isaiah, took it for granted that he quoted the words just as they are written.

The present Luke text of our pericope has preserved the common Synoptic source more faithfully than either Matthew or Mark. Luke alone as confirmed by John enables us to comprehend the import of the cleansing of the temple by Jesus. But even the Johannine account arouses certain objections. It opens: "and the passover of the Jews was at hand." The date agrees with that of the Synoptic Gospels. But the expression "the passover of the Jews" is impossible in the mouth of one of the first disciples of Jesus. For he and his first followers were Jews themselves; and the latter remained Jews even after the death of their master. Somebody has suggested that the term "Jews" denotes in the Fourth Gospel the inhabitants of Judaea as apart from the Jews of the other districts of Palestine. While that may be so in some instances, it cannot be so in this case. For "the passover of the Jews" cannot be anything else but the passover of all Jews without exception. The Judaeans never observed a separate passover of their own. Westcott, in his commentary to the Fourth Gospel, referred to before, says: "The phrase (passover of the Jews) appears to imply distinctly the existence of a recognized 'Christian passover' at the time when the Gospel was written." While it cannot be admitted that the early Christians ever celebrated a Christian passover,—only the Christians of Jewish descent continued to hold the Jewish passover—Westcott is right in ascribing, although indirectly, the authorship of the words "passover of the Jews" to a Gentile Christian.

That strange term seems to indicate that John ii. 13ff. was composed by a Gentile Christian. In that case the author could not have

been an eyewitness. But how could a Gentile Christian furnish a report of the cleansing of the temple which is in most of its details so correct and objective? Even Jewish Christians, as is demonstrated by the Mark version, failed to appreciate the account of the old Synoptic source. That fact compels us to consider another possibility. The word "Jews" in our section may belong, not to, the author of John ii. 13ff., but to a later compiler who put the account of the cleansing of the temple into the Fourth Gospel. That conjecture is not invalidated when we look at verse 17 and 21-22. In both instances, the original text has evidently been enlarged. Verse 21-22 is a comment on verse 18-20. The commentator draws in verse 22 a clear line of demarcation between the disciples and himself. If he had been a member of their circle, he would not have said: "His disciples remembered that he spake this; and they believed the scripture," but rather: "We remembered. . . and believed." Verse 17: "His disciples remembered that it was written, Zeal for thy house shall eat me up," is another instance in which the writer does not identify himself with the twelve. Moreover, the scripture quotation does not fit the situation. It was not zeal for the house of God which prompted Jesus to close the temple market, but his righteous anger at the unworthy priests who robbed the pious worshippers. We observe therefore in verse 17 the same old misunderstanding of the deed of Jesus as in the additions to the Matthew and Mark text.

The words put into the mouth of Jesus in verse 16: "Make not my Father's house a house of merchandise" are subject to the same criticism. They are indeed in harmony with verse 17. But that does not recommend this reading. The term "my Father's house" reminds us of what the twelve year old Jesus asked his parents: "Knew ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" But the idea of God and the temple cherished by the boy was no longer held by the grown up man. He had put away childish things. To him the temple was no longer the place to which God's presence on earth was confined. The expression "house of merchandise" is just as objectionable as "my Father's house." Jesus cannot have called the temple a den of robbers and a house of merchandise at the same time; nor can the two expressions be treated as synonyms. The unanimous testimony of the Synoptic Gospels is in favor of den of robbers. The later additions to the text of the first two Gospels as well as to that of John demonstrate how little the ancient readers realized the true significance of the episode. Therefore the conclusion arrived at in the case of the first two Gospels and John ii.


17 and 21-22 must apply also to John ii. 16. The compiler of the Fourth Gospel changed the genuine saying of Jesus, which has been preserved by the Synoptists, so as to suit his idea of what the situation demanded. But as long as the offering of bloody sacrifices at the temple of Jerusalem was held to be a religious duty, the honestly conducted sale of victims and the exchange of sacred money in one of the courts of the temple could not be condemned as a sin.

A certain scholar has suggested, Jesus, in cleansing the temple, intended to abolish the Jewish sacrifices. (*Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, 1908, II, 712.) If that were correct, his disciples would have abstained from that very moment to offer sacrifices at the temple. But *The Acts* report not only that the first Christians attended the temple regularly, but also that the apostle Paul, at the advice of the leading Christians at Jerusalem, offered a purification sacrifice for himself and four companions. (Act. xxi. 26). The Gentile Christians ceased to sacrifice as soon as they became converted. They did so not because of any commandment or act of Jesus to that effect; but because they were taught to avoid the heathen sacrifices as idolatry. The Jewish Christians, on the other hand, continued to sacrifice at the temple until the destruction of that sanctuary put an end to those religious exercises. The Gentile Christians could not take part in those Jewish services since they neither were Jews nor intended to be circumcised.

The cleansing of the temple was a direct challenge of the chief priests by Jesus, a defiance of the highest religious dignitaries on earth the Jews recognized. Before the Babylonian exile, a Jewish king or a prophet favored by the ruler might have done what Jesus did; and the priests would have obeyed him. But when Jesus lived, there was only one who, superior to the priests, possessed the authority of interfering with the management of the affairs of the temple. That was the promised and expected Messiah, at least, in the estimation of the Pharisees and the people. A Messiah, equipped with divine omnipotence, would have been worshipped by the priests on bended knees. But Jesus was not such a Messiah; he displayed no divine powers. He quoted the ancient prophets and appealed to the moral judgment of the people and the conscience of the evil-doers. Would they confess their wrong, make amends, and receive Jesus as master? Their conduct during the last centuries demonstrated that they were resolved in the first place to retain under all circumstances all the privileges of their inherited position which assured them of the highest honors and a constantly growing income.

The cleansing of the temple is accordingly the key for understanding the causality of the crucifixion as an event of human history and accomplished by human factors. At that occasion, Jesus acted for the first time as the Messiah. But he had also weighed beforehand the unavoidable results of his daring deed. He knew the priests. They would not give way before him without a bitter fight. He was fully aware of what kind of weapons they would use against him. He himself could not drive out the devil by Beelzebub. He might have called the multitude to arms. But that was not his idea of how to wage a religious war. Thus he was in a position of foreseeing and predicting the fate which awaited him at the passover because he was firmly decided on the irrevocable step he was going to take against the chief priests.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]



BUST OF HOMER. ROME. VATICAN.

Frontispiece to the Open Court.

Phot. Alinari.

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ATHENIAN RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING.

(Fifth Century B. C.)

BY FLETCHER H. SWIFT.

II. THE PROCESS OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING. EDUCATION IN HOME, SCHOOL AND SOCIETY.

"Till Greece can be reproduced, fit educational environment for youth will not be complete." G. Stanley Hall. (18:II, 257.)

"I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the gods in heaven so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language." Plato, *The Laws*, Book VII, 821. (33:205a.)

GREEK education was never controlled by religion, and if by religious education we mean instruction in religion dis-associated from other studies and activities, there was little or no religious education in Athens, for of schools or classes for religious instruction the Athenians knew nothing. Viewed, however, from the larger standpoint of the unity of Greek life, and from the manner in which religious rites and moral standards and ideals were associated with all activities, both within and without the school, it may be asserted with equal truth that all activities and institutions were sources of religious and moral stimuli and consequently fundamentally educative in these two fields. Forms of worship and moral ideals were interwoven so harmoniously with all that went on in home, school or public life, that no special provision for training in either religion or morals was felt to be necessary.

How important the Athenians regarded morality and moral education is shown by provisions contained in their laws and by their appointments of various officials and teachers to supervise the morals of the children and of the youth of the city. The laws

made definite provisions to keep the children off the streets. The schools, like the courts, theater and other institutions, opened at dawn and continued until sunset. An ancient law, by tradition ascribed to Solon, (fl. about 594 B. C.) forbade the schools to open before sunrise and ordered them closed before sunset (1:Sections 9-11). To guard boys against contact with older men of uncertain morals, the traditional "laws of Solon"¹ provided further that no one over the age of boyhood except the schoolmaster, his brother, his son or son-in-law might enter while the boys were in school. The penalty for infringing upon this law was death. These same laws contained other important provisions concerning school age, the number of pupils per school, pedagogues, school festivals, and the supervision of boys training for contests in public festivals.

The public supervision of the conduct of boys and youth rested with the Areopagus, one of the highest courts, and with various public officials, the most important of whom were ten sophronistai, (sing. sophronistes) tribal guardians or supervisors of the youth, one being elected for each of the ten tribes. The Areopagus had special supervision as a court over the morals of minors and imposed penalties upon immoral children or upon vicious adults. The sophronistai had general supervision over the conduct of all minors but immediate and special charge over the epheboi, youth between eighteen and twenty, in training for citizenship.

There were in Athens several other classes of public tribal officials, not primarily concerned with the morals of the youth, but whose functions brought them into more or less intimate association with the youth, and who may in some instances, at least, have exerted considerable influence for good or for ill.² The most important of these were the ten strategoi (sing. strategos), ten choregoi (sing. choregos), and (probably ten) gymnasiarchoi. The choregoi, as a form of public service, supported and trained at their own expense for choral contests and dramatic performances groups of boys and men. The gymnasiarchoi in like manner provided the money, meals, and training for those preparing for the athletic contests at certain religious festivals. (30: VII, 1969-2004.) The strategoi, or generals, as a part of their conduct of the state's mili-

¹ Aischines, *Against Timarchos*, Section 9-11. These laws can hardly be regarded as Solon's: nevertheless, the fact that Aischines quoted them as such is evidence of their great antiquity. Moreover the regulations they embody probably represent the actual practice of a certain period.

² "Any Athenian magistrate could interest himself in the schools, no doubt, and intervene to check abuses". (13:71.)

tary affairs, (5: Chap. 61³) probably had the general supervision of the military training of the epheboi. (13:212.)

Athenian families, living in the midst of a slave population, were unwilling to trust their sons away from home during the long school day unless supervised by someone directly responsible to the household. As soon as the boy began attending school, a slave known as the *paidagogos* (lit. child-leader) was appointed to accompany him to and from school, to carry his school books and lyre, to remain with him throughout the day, to guard him against evil influences and to see that he conducted himself virtuously and



ATHENIAN RED-FIGURED VASE PAINTING. STAMNOS,
BRITISH MUSEUM.

in a manner worthy of a gentleman's son. The influence of such a constant associate can scarcely be overestimated. Though a slave, he was privileged upon occasion to flog his young master.

Athens was distinctly a man's state and her system of education was for the fortunate few, born into citizenship. Probably not more than one-fifth or one-sixth of her five hundred and twenty-seven thousand⁴ inhabitants were citizens. But not even to all of this small fraction of the population was education offered. For

³ Mitchel, J. M., considers this chapter probably a forgery. See his article *Strategus*, *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XXV, 985c-986d.

⁴ It should be understood that these numbers are merely approximate. For a more complete statement with sources of data, see above Chapter III.

to the wives and daughters of Athenian citizens, the schools, both private and public, were closed. Nor must it be inferred that every boy eligible from the standpoint of birth would complete the system of education to be described in the following paragraphs. Many a citizen's son would be obliged to leave school and go to work:—"At Athens a large proportion of free burgesses were compelled to accept hard and even menial work for their portion". (37:77). Plutarch asserts that one of Pericles' motives in his policy of erecting great public buildings was to supply work for the citizens. (34:I, 305-306.)

"Nowhere in the works of Greek authors do we read of educational institutions for girls or even of private teachers at home." (36:25d; 6:465.) The education of girls was confined almost entirely to domestic duties, morals and religion, the last of which included training in music and dancing sufficient to enable them to take part in religious festivals. The leader of the women's chorus in Aristophanes *Lysistrata*, describing her own childhood says: "When I was seven years of age, I at once took part in carrying the peplos (the robe carried in a religious procession to the temple of Athene); and then when I was ten years of age I prepared the sacred meal in honor of Artemis, and later, wearing the saffron colored robe, I took the part of a bear at the festival of Brauronia (in honor of Artemis.)" (3 (3): 641-645.) The home, theatrical performances, and public festivals were the chief channels through which girls received their meager education. Something of the character of their religious and moral education can be inferred from the following account of the education of boys.⁵

Preparation to fulfill efficiently, nobly, and beautifully the tasks and pleasures of citizenship in peace and in war is a brief but accurate description of the aim of this one-sex education. The wide range of the activities of an Athenian citizen has already been suggested. These activities made severe and continuous demands upon all the powers and capacities of the individual. As a result, a harmoniously unified development of personality came to be the ideal of life and of education. The Athenians recognized, both in theory and practice, that to achieve this ideal, it was necessary to provide in every stage of the educative process abundant stimuli and abundant opportunity for expressing every aspect of personality, physical, social, political, aesthetic, moral and religious.

⁵ For a fuller statement see Savage, A. C., *The Athenian Family*, pp. 25d-27.

The first seven years of a boy's life were spent in the home. The next seven years he divided his time between an elementary game school (Grk. palaistra) and a language or lyre school (Grk. didaskaleion). Following the completion of his elementary education, came a period which can be described best by the German expression "free years". This period lasted until the boy was eighteen, when he entered upon his Ephebia, a period of special civic and military training under the immediate charge of the state in preparation for citizenship. At the age of twenty, he became a citizen.

IV. RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION IN THE HOME.



GREEK MUSIC SCHOOL, FROM VASE PAINTING, ABOUT 450 B.C.

Religious influences surrounded the child from his earliest years. On the fifth, or according to some authorities, on the seventh day, after birth (14:297) by a ceremony known as the Amphidromia (17:72-73; 11:122) he was placed under the protection of the household gods. A father had the right to refuse to rear a newborn child, in which case the infant would be "exposed", i. e., secretly left in some public place within the city to starve unless rescued by some passerby, or carried outside the city to some desert spot to die of exposure or to become the prey of wild beasts.⁶ If accepted by the

⁶ For an excellent discussion of this topic see Savage, C. A., *The Athenian Family*, pp. 89-91. Needless to say, exposure was by no means general, nevertheless the father "often, and more frequently if it was a girl, . . . caused it to be exposed in the streets in a chytra, a large earthen vessel . . . or even ordered it to be put to death." Gardner and Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, p. 298. On the other hand, Becker states that though authorized by law, exposure was "not as frequent as has been usually supposed." (6:218).

father, the child was presented to nearest relatives and intimate friends on the tenth day after birth. At this time it was given a name, a sacrifice was offered to the household gods and a festive banquet followed. (17:72-73; 12:122.) It still remained for the child to be accepted by the father's phratra in the next October at the Apaturia, a three day annual festival. On the last day of the Apaturia, all children born during the preceding year belonging to the phratra were presented. One member, acting as priest, sacrificed a sheep on behalf of the father or guardian of the child. (17:74.)

During the first seven years of his life the child learned much of the gods, their names and their histories, from the myths told him by mother, nurse and slave. No doubt, he learned some prayers and some religious and some patriotic songs. In play with his doll-gods, imitating the doings of his elders, he copied many religious rites and ceremonies.

Fear was regarded as a wholesome incentive to good conduct and many of the stories of infancy were designed to frighten children into being good. "When the child grew to some understanding, the nurse told stories out of the great wealth of mythology and Aesopian beast fables; also ghost stories, chiefly to frighten and subdue, about the horrible bugaboo called Mormo, about Acco, who carried off bad children in a huge sack, or Lamia, once a princess, who ate children, or Empusa, a hobgoblin that took any shape it pleased." (17:75.)

Every home was a house of worship and consequently a center of religious training. Just in front of the main door stood a pedestal surmounted by a head of Hermes. In the main court of the house was an altar to Zeus Herkios. Here the head of the household offered daily sacrifice for himself and family. In side rooms off the main room were the family gods (11:120d.) In the andron (dining hall) the hearth itself was an altar to Hestia, goddess of hearth and home. (17:262-264a.) A continuous sense of reverence for, gratitude to, and dependence upon divine powers pervaded all home life. There was scarcely a room unadorned with the image of its appropriate divinity. (17-264.) Occasions for family worship were frequent and constantly recurring. Neither the most frugal repast nor the most sumptuous banquet was ever eaten without invoking divine blessing: acts of worship were performed on every occasion which emphasized the home,—“departing on a journey, or returning home. . . birth, death, the coming of new slaves”.

Perhaps the strongest element in the religious life of the family, as well as the strongest family bond, was ancestor worship. "All men who are about to die take forethought for themselves. . . . that there may be someone who shall offer sacrifices to them and perform all the customary rites." (22:Orat. 7, Sec. 30.) In these words Isaios reveals to us both the anxiety of Greek parents for children and the cause of this anxiety. The deceased person, according to Greek view "became immediately a protecting or an avenging spirit capable of giving or of withholding favors." (36:11a). Funeral rites were insufficient "to insure the welfare and tranquility of the departed. The graves must also be regularly visited, offerings to the deceased must be made at appointed intervals, and the tomb must be scrupulously cared for." (36:8).

The Athenian regarded filial piety as the cardinal family virtue, the cornerstone of the household. The family, public opinion and the law united in fostering this virtue and insisting upon its practice. During childhood the son must show reverence and unquestioning obedience to his parents, at all times. In adult life he must treat them with consideration, and not only shelter them and support them, but, so far as his means allowed, he must bestow upon them not only the necessities but the comforts of life. (36:96). After their death his duties did not cease, but were continued in regular visits to the family tomb, and in offerings to their spirits.⁷ Aristotle states that among the questions put to each archon-elect in the public examination which preceded entrance upon office are "whether he possesses an ancestral Apollo and a household Zeus, and where their sanctuaries are; next if he possesses a family tomb, and where; then if he treats his parents well?" (5:Sec. 55). "A person convicted of maltreatment of parents was considered *'atimos to soma'*, i. e., disfranchised. In other words, he was excluded from the agora. (Dem. 24, 63.) and was prohibited from speaking in the assembly (Aeschines, I, 28)" (36:96d-97a).

Socrates, upbraiding his son for filial ingratitude, says (39:III, 53): "Whilst the state does not concern itself with ordinary ingratitude or pass judicial sentence on it . . . it reserves its pains and penalties for the special case. If a man render not the service and allegiance due his parents, on him the finger of the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to hold the archonship,—which is as much as to say, 'Sacrifices in behalf of the

⁷ Cf. above page 10.

state offered by such a man would be no offering, being tainted with impiety, nor could ought else be *well and justly* performed of which he is the doer.'” “If a man fail to adorn the sepulchre of his dead parents the state takes cognizance of the matter and inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates.” “If once the notion be entertained that there is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one would believe that any kindness shown you would be other than thrown away.”

Since, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, Greek religion was almost entirely destitute of dogma and was essentially a matter of worship, it follows that religious education consisted almost entirely of learning the deity or deities to be worshipped with respect to the various situations and circumstances of life, the necessary rites and acts of worship to be performed, and the proper method of performing them. The following passage from the oration of Isaios⁸ “On the Estate of Kiron” is of great significance for the light it throws upon the religious training of boys. In this passage the claimants to an estate present as proof of their sonship the fact that they were associated with the deceased during his life time in the performance of the religious rites, a privilege open only to sons or grandsons.

“We, therefore, may mention other proofs also in addition to these in order that you may understand that we are the grandsons of Kiron: For how natural it was that since we were his grandsons he never offered any sacrifice without us, but whether he was offering sacrifices small or great, everywhere we were present, and participated in the sacrifice. And not only were we summoned to such sacrifice but also he always took us to the rural Dionysia.”

“And along with him we observed the spectacles, seated beside him and we celebrated with him all the festivals, and when sacrificing to Zeus Ktesios, in regard to which sacrifice he was especially zealous and to which he admitted neither slaves nor freedmen outside the family, but performed all rites himself in person, in this sacrifice we participated, and with him we performed with our own hands the sacred rites and aided him in placing the sacrifice (upon the altar). And we performed with him the other things (incident to the rites). And he prayed that there might be granted to us health and valuable possessions, as it was fitting he should do, since he was our grandfather.” (21:Orat. 8, Sec. 15-16.)⁹

⁸ Fl. first half of the fourth century B. C.

⁹ Translation of Mr. C. A. Savage, University of Minnesota: Cf. Sir. Wm. Jones (22:Orat. IX, 193-194.)

V. RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION IN THE DIDASKALEION AND PALAISTRA.

Between the ages of seven and fourteen the boy spent presumably the first half of the long school day in the didaskaleion or lyre school. Here, in addition to learning to play the seven stringed lyre and flute, he was taught to do easy sums in arithmetic, to read, spell and write. His chief task, however, was to commit to memory the poems of Hesiod, Theognis, Homer, and other Greek classical poets, set to music, and to learn to chant them to his own improvised accompaniment.

The afternoon presumably found the boy in the palaistra or game school, where running, jumping; hurling the spear, throwing the discus and wrestling were the chief activities. Through these



A GREEK YOUTH ACCOMPANIED TO SCHOOL BY HIS PEDAGOGUE. FROM A VASE PAINTING.

physical contests and games, he was trained in courtesy, self-control, courage and temperance.

The Greeks placed great emphasis upon the moral influence of music and for professedly moral reasons, as well as for aesthetic reasons, gave it a prominent place in both elementary schools. In the didaskaleion, the boy learned to play the seven stringed lyre. In the palaistra, most of the physical exercises were performed to the accompaniment of music for the sake (13:128d), in part at least, of introducing into them a quality of temperance and self-re-

straint. Gymnastics to develop courage and other warlike virtues, music to temper, soften, beautify and harmonize the soul,—this was a pedagogical commonplace of the Greeks.

All that a boy studied at school was inevitably destined to impress upon him his closeness to his country's gods. Were not lyre playing and poetry favorite pastimes of Apollo and the Muses and were not the games of the palaistra the delight of all the gods? Both elementary schools were decorated with the images of their patron gods: the palaistra with images of Hermes, symbolizing adroitness; Eros, symbolizing friendship; and Heracles, symbolizing strength; the didaskaleion with statues of Apollo and the Muses. Each school had its own religious festival in honor of its patron gods, when sacrifices and prayer mingled with athletic or literary contests.

The school festival of the didaskaleion was the Museia in honor of the muses. At this festival "parents in the name of their sons contributed offerings for sacrifices". (17:282). The school festival of the palaistra was the Hermea in honor of Hermes. "The boys were dressed in their best clothes, offered sacrifices, and were permitted unrestrained liberty in games and sports." (17:282). Plato in a few lines presents us with a charming picture of a palaistra festival:

"Upon entering (the palaistra) we found the boys had just been sacrificing and this part of the festival was nearly come to an end. They were all in white array, and games and dice were going on among them. Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves, but some were in the corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice which they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of lookers-on, one of whom was Lysis. He was standing among the other boys and youths having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty." (31:53.)¹¹

The chief texts for centuries in the didaskaleion were works permeated with religious and moral ideas. Hesiod's *Theogony* from one point of view might almost be called a primer of Greek religion. By the time a boy had memorized it, he knew the names, origin, and characteristics of approximately three hundred deities. Hesiod's *Works and Days* was devoted to myths, instruction concerning agriculture, navigation, vintage and other "works", and to the proper seasons, "days", for undertaking the same. All this was interspersed with religious and moral precepts. A quotation will make more clear the moral character and purpose of this work.

Hesiod on Industry.

"Labor industriously if you would succeed;
 "That men should labor have the gods decreed;
 "That with our wives and children we may live,
 "Without the assistance that our neighbors give,
 "That we may never know the pain of mind,
 "To ask for succor and no succor find." (20:Bk. II, 26-31.)

Another favorite text in the didaskaleion was a collection of Theognis' elegaic poems addressed to his young friend Kurnos, to whom the poet gives much moral advice, such as to be true to the good cause, to shun the company of evil men,¹⁰ to be loyal to his comrades and to wreak cruel vengeance upon his foes.

The most influential, the most inspiring, the most loved of all the earlier school texts was Homer. It was no uncommon thing for a boy to know all of the Iliad and the Odyssey by heart. Although there were certain valid objections to calling Homer the Bible of the Greeks, no other term expresses so clearly and forcibly the place occupied by this marvelous classic in Greek life and its influence as a national text book in religion and morals. The reasons characterizing Homer as the Bible of the Greeks cannot be discussed here.¹¹ They may, however, be summarized.

The Greeks regarded Homer

- (1) as divinely inspired (26:357 ff.; 13:228)
- (2) as written with a conscious purpose of teaching religion and morals (26:354)
- (3) as containing the elements of all knowledge worth knowing (32:608E; 3 (2): 1034-36)
- (4) because divinely inspired, as a final authority whose texts might be used to settle disputes both public and private.¹² (13:228)

The gods of Homer were far from ideals of morality. Zeus had murdered his own father in order to become the supreme ruler over gods and men; lived in constant discord with Hera, his jealous

¹⁰ Used in a political not a moral sense; by "evil men" Hesiod meant those representing democratic tendencies.

¹¹ These following positions, some of which may seem extreme, are presented almost without reservation by Freeman and Mahaffy in the sections referred to. Mahaffy is regarded by many scholars as idealizing Greek life. Freeman on the other hand, is generally cautious and accurate.

¹² "At the beginning of the sixth century an interpolated line in the Iliad was made the main support of the Athenian claim to the island of Salamis". (4).

wife, and was unfaithful to her as often as whim and opportunity coincided. The god Hermes, when only a few hours old, stole his brother Apollo's oxen and was worshipped in one aspect as the patron of thieves. Mahaffy claims that such immoralities were not in the original text. Were this true, the fact remains that they were in the text memorized by generations of Greek school boys and were an important cause of the opposition to Homer as a school text, an opposition which began in the sixth century with the criticism of Xenophanes,¹³ and which finally resulted in largely excluding Homer from the schools.¹⁴

The positive religious and moral influence of Homer undoubtedly greatly outweighed the negative influence just referred to. From Homer the boy learned the conduct which the gods approved and the punishments which overtook evil-doers. From Homer were drawn lessons in piety, hospitality, courage, temperance, and self-control. For example, from the story of Circe was taught the sinfulness of self-indulgence; Circe made the companions of Odysseus swine through their gluttony. Odysseus, through his own restraint and through following Hermes' advice, escaped the fate of his companions. Despite individual crimes, the conduct of the gods was, on the whole, noble,—they stand forth as the guardians of justice, hospitality, and domestic purity.

The Greeks were firm believers in corporal punishment. It was used vigorously, in fact, brutally, in home and in school and was thoroughly approved. Even the paidagogue, slave as he was, was privileged to thrash his young master.

VI. EDUCATION DURING THE FREE YEARS.

At about fourteen, the boy completed his elementary education. At eighteen, his public education would begin. Meanwhile, he might spend his "free years" much as he chose. He would devote such time as interest dictated and purse permitted to the private schools of philosophy and public speaking (rhetoric) where he might study (1) public speaking, (2) debate, (3) argumentation, (4) philosophy, (5) economics and other branches valuable to a man eager for a career in the Ecclesia and dicasteries. He would go to one of the public gymnasia for physical training. Under choregos or gymnasiarchos, he would prepare for festival contests. He might,

¹³ Pron. *ze-nof-a-nez*; fl. c. 570-480 B. C.

¹⁴ For an excellent summary of this opposition see 13:229-231.

in company with his father, also attend the Assembly, the dicasteries and other public bodies thereby gaining a knowledge of the customs and methods of procedure of these bodies.

This contact with various institutions of his state impressed upon the youth the moral standards of his state and its people, nor was there any more potent or subtle channel or religious influence than that which came through the city life. Athens was decorated from end to end, in the market place, in the theater, at the street crossings, with images and shrines of its gods. Sacred rites attended all public occasions and public meetings of every sort opened with some act of public worship.

Approximately every sixth day was given up to some religious festival.¹⁵ For many of these festivals, groups of men and boys must be trained to take part in pageant, in the contests in poetry and sports and in the religious dance. An impressive feature of every such festival was the private as well as public recognition accorded to the guardian deities of state and home.

That the influences of city life were by no means universally uplifting must be evident already from what has been said regarding the laxness of morals, the dual standard of morals, the hetairai and other topics.¹⁶ Of equal significance, however, is the vigorous effort made to shield the boy from evil influence during his childhood, and continuous though indirect manner in which the religious ideas and moral standards of his state were presented to him during adolescent and adult years.

To the Greek, dancing was a religious and patriotic exercise. "It may be doubted whether free Athenians ever danced except before the gods". (8:85). According to Lucian no religious rite was ever performed without dancing. (23: Sec. 15, 277 ff.) "There was a perpetual demand for boys from each of the ten (Athenian) tribes to compete in the great festivals in war dances and dithyramb". (13:147d). "The choregos . . . who collected the boys from the tribe to dance these dithyramb, could use compulsion if fathers refused to allow their sons to join his chorus." (13:145: 23: Sec. 11.) Learning to dance was a preparation for participation in religious exercises. Modern dancing would have been denounced by the ancient Greeks as vulgar, senseless and immoral. To him, dancing was essentially an expression and interpretation of religious feel-

¹⁵ For a table of the more important festivals, see Fairbanks, Arthur, *A Handbook of Greek Religion*, pp. 364-365.

¹⁶ See above Chapter III, 15-17.

ing. Through it, he portrayed religious and historic incidents, emotions, and ideas.¹⁷ "The boy who danced in honor of Dionusos¹⁸ was trying to assimilate to himself the god . . . He could act the sorrows of Dionusos, his persecution from city to city and his final conquest. Thus his dancing came to be a keenly religious observance." (13:144.)

Toward the end of the fifth century a new school of realistic poets and musicians arose in whose hands dancing became at times vulgar and even immoral. (13:145.)

The theater at Athens was state supported and state controlled. In origin it was, from one point of view, largely a religious institution, being erected to honor the god Dionysus, as well as to satisfy the aesthetic, literary and social instincts of the people. Dramatic performances were presented only during religious festivals. The performances were in themselves a species of offering, being performed for the delight of the gods believed to be present, as well as for the pleasure and edification of men. (37:221-241.) In the center of the space where the chorus danced stood the god's altar. The tragedies, founded largely upon the stories drawn from the sacred Homer, were written and acted to inculcate lessons in religion and morals. A severe censorship was exercised over the drama. No murder or deed of violence could be enacted on the Greek stage. (28:25.)

The Olympia, the Pythia, the Isthmia, and the Memea, the four great national festivals of Greece, reveal clearly and forcibly the unified manner in which the Greeks expressed their many-sided life. At these festivals, contests in poetry, oratory, drama, music and athletics were interspersed with rich sacrifices and resplendent pageants. Each of these festivals and all its activities and contests, like the dramatic performances, were for the pleasure of the gods as well as for the pleasure of man. He who entered a foot-race, chariot race or musical contest was happy in the thought that among his unseen onlookers were Zeus, Apollo, Athene and many other equally revered guests. "Men offered to the gods the exhibition of their strength and skill as an expression of the worship of all Greece." (11:119d.) The religious character of the games was kept in evidence by sacrifices, religious processions and the character of the prizes. (11:97.) At Olympia, the first day was marked by a

¹⁷ For vivid descriptions of Greek dancing, see 8:82-83; 14:144.

¹⁸ The spelling here is Freeman's.

great sacrifice to Zeus. On the fifth, the last day, after the victors had been proclaimed and had sacrificed to Zeus, "the embassies from the different states joined in a magnificent procession from one altar to another." (11:117-119.) Thus the great festival opened and closed with distinct recognition of the gods. The fact that all Greece¹⁹ assembled at these festivals made them in effect revivals of national religious feeling.

VII. ADOLESCENT EDUCATION—THE EPHEBIA.²⁰

The period between eighteen and twenty was known as the Ephebia. Every youth looking forward to citizenship must give up these two years of his life to a state military and civil course in preparation for citizenship. He now became a ward of the state, lived in state institutions at public expense under the charge of public officials and teachers selected by the Athenian Assembly. The most important of these included (1) a kosmetes, or director, having the general control of all the epheboi; (2) ten sophronistai or guardians, one sophronistes for each tribe; (3) two paidotribai, public teachers of gymnastics; (4) a number of instructors subordinate to the paidotribai, who taught the epheboi "to fight in heavy armour, to use the bow and javelin and to discharge a catapult." (4: chap. 42, 18-20, 22-24; 5:78.)

The sacredness of citizenship and the citizen's responsibility to his fellow citizens and to the gods of his nation were impressed upon the youth by a series of preliminary examinations, religious rites and by his ephebic or citizen's oath taken at the close of his first year. In order to be allowed to enter the group of youths preparing for citizenship, he must be accepted in turn (1) by his father's phratra (17-282), (2) by his father's demos (4: Chap. 42; Sec. 4-14), (3) by the Athenian Boule (the city-state council of 500) (Ibid). Each of these bodies must be satisfied that the youth was the legitimate son of Athenian parents and at least eighteen years of age. Religious rites and sacrifices were interspersed with these examinations.

Having passed the examinations of these three bodies and having been enrolled upon the registers of the phratra and demos, the youth became, in the eyes of the law, an ephebos. The examinations and enrollment completed, the epheboi were gathered together by

¹⁹ "No women were allowed at Olympia". (17:101d.)

²⁰ Aristotle's Athenian Constitution, Chapter 42, is entirely devoted to the Epheboi.

the officials elected to take charge of them. Under the conduct of these officers they, first of all, made a tour of the temples, then they divided into two groups, to go to the two state garrisons where they lived during the ensuing year. (4: Chap. 42:19-22; 5:78.)

During the first year the epheboi received special training in military tactics and drill, and in the use of arms. They, no doubt, spent much time in Athens continuing many of the pursuits and activities of their free years, such as attending gymnasia, the Assembly, the courts, the schools of philosophy and rhetoric. They preserved order at or took part in certain religious festivals, e. g., the Panathenea and the Eleusinia the epheboi were sent to Eleusis to bring to Athens the sacred objects. (12:119d.) They also escorted the image of Iacchus back to Eleusis from Athens. (12:119d.) At the end of their first year at the festival of the Greater Dionysia they gave a public display before all the people assembled in the theater of the military tactics and drill they had learned. After the review, each ephebos was presented by the state with a spear and a shield. (4: Chap. 42, 29-33; 5:79.) These state-given arms were regarded as sacred and to throw them away in battle-flight almost an act of sacrilege. (14:214, note 4.) After receiving these sacred arms, the epheboi took the following citizens oath:²¹

Ephebic Oath.

²² Text of oath and foot-notes all taken from 27:33.

(Required of all Candidates for Citizenship.)²²

I will never disgrace these sacred arms
Nor desert my companion in the ranks.

²¹ The entire subject of the ephebic training is replete with disputed questions. The footnotes on Chapter 42 of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* present many of these and should be consulted. It is unfortunate that Aristotle makes no mention of the administration of the oath. Many English writers, Freeman, Monroe, and others put the taking of the oath at the opening of the ephebic training. I am indebted to Professor W. L. Westermann of the University of Wisconsin for the position taken here. Professor Westermann (in a personal letter dated November 23, 1915) writes:

"The Ephebic oath was unquestionably taken at the *end* of the first year of the ephebic service. Compare the opening sentence of the oath, 'I will never disgrace these sacred arms' with Aristotle's statement 'The following year when the Ecclesia has met in the theater—they receive a shield and spear from the state'. I regard this proof as absolute. It is so accepted by the best authorities."

See also J. Oehler *Ephebia*, Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Encyclopadie V.* 2738:

I will fight for temples and public property,
Both alone and with many.

I will transmit my fatherland
Not only not less, but greater and better
Than it was transmitted to me.

I will obey the magistrates
Who may at any time be in power.

I will observe both the existing laws
And those which the people may unanimously hereafter make ;

And, if any person seek
To annul the laws or to set them at nought,
I will do my best to prevent him,
And will defend them both alone and with many.

I will honor the religion of my fathers.

And I call to witness Agraulos²³ Enyalios²⁴
Ares,²⁵ Zeus, Thallo,²⁶ and Auxof and Hegemone.²⁷

(27:33)

During his second year, the youth had abundant opportunity to exercise all the moral virtues in which he had been trained and instructed from his early childhood. Above all, he learned patriotism through serving his country, and honor for its laws and its gods by guarding and protecting their shrines. All Attica was studded with patrol stations. During this year, the epheboi acted as a state patrol force and were shifted from one station to another under the charge of the tribal sophronistes and other officials. The following transcript of a vote passed by the Athenians is an interesting and valuable record of the public honor bestowed upon a sophronistes and upon a group of epheboi who has acquitted themselves worthily :

Vote of the Athenian People.

“Hegemachos, son of Chairemon, proposed:—

Whereas the Epheboi of the Kekropid tribe stationed at Eleusis

²³ “Daughter of Cecrops and Angraalos. She threw herself from the Acropolis because an oracle had declared the Athenians would conquer if someone would sacrifice himself for his country”. (27:33).

²⁴ “A surname frequently given to Mars in the Iliad, and corresponding with the name Enyo, given to Bellona”. (27:33).

²⁵ God of war.

²⁶ Protector of the order of nature in the springtime.

²⁷ Auxo (increase) and Hegemone (queen) two graces worshipped at Athens. When the Athenian youth received his weapons of war, he swore by them.

do well and diligently pay heed to the orders of the Boule and Demos, and do behave themselves orderly, we pass a vote of thanks to them for their good discipline and behavior and enact that each of them be crowned with an olive crown.

"We also pass a vote of thanks to their Sophronites, Adeistros, and decree to him a crown of olive, when he has passed his scrutiny, this vote to be recorded on the offering which the Epheboi of the Kekropid tribe offered." (13:222).

With the close of the youth's nineteenth year, his formal education ceased. From his earliest years, state, school and home had united in holding before his eyes definite ideals of character and conduct and in providing him with abundant vital opportunities for giving expression in conduct to the feelings and standards pervading the community in which he lived. Eleven years of training and personal development followed by two years of devoted service to his state, this was his preparation for life. He had been trained and instructed to bless and reverence life and the divine powers which ruled over it. There was no aspect of life in which religion did not have a place and no aspect of his education into which it did not enter.

The persistence of the religious and moral elements in life and education is indicated by the place they occupied in the works of the Greek schools of philosophy. The first qualities which Plato demanded of his ideal rulers were moral qualities. His abiding interest in religious questions is everywhere evident. The noblest ideal of education which any people has ever developed is the Greek conception of the liberal education. This was not a philosophical theoretical ideal. On the contrary, it was a direct outgrowth of the many-sidedness of Greek life. The philosophers merely formulated and idealized what they beheld in the life about them. Throughout this education, most perfect and most complete, in practice, in theory and ideal, the religious and moral elements appeared as ever present factors, not because that these elements were a real and vital part of life and of education, and that to have ignored them would have been not only to have ignored two of the most important aspects of life, but to have given the child a defective, one-sided preparation for life. Religion and morals were included in the child's education upon the same basis that the physical and aesthetic were included, because they constituted a real part of the life of the child and the community and because they were indispensable to complete living.

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THE ILLUSION OF PEACE.

BY JAMES N. WOOD.

POPULAR discussions of international questions lack force, because founded on error. They assume a view of life that is purely fanciful. So absorbed do the participants become in their chimerical survey that any rational treatment of the subject is resented. They gravely announce that negotiations must preclude hostility hereafter, and that coming generations be assured the blessings of universal altruism. This is the imagination parading as reason. Men are not changed by war, neither does it alter the purpose behind hostility. Terms of peace are drawn to fix advantage; to further weaken a shattered enemy; to establish vantage points from which other conflicts may be undertaken.

Certainly peace is desirable at times. None seek hazard where conditions are unfavorable. Nations court war when they believe themselves ready; when they detect advantage. But what are nations? Peoples? Not at all. They are merely the vehicles of dominant personalities. It is their desires that count—and that govern the attitude of the mass.

Perpetual and intensive, war is between men of will and intelligence and its aim is not always obvious. The voice of the crowd does not proclaim it; the pronouncements of propagandists are equally irrelevant. Peace, indeed, has no place in life; strife is its one certainty. The form alters, that is all.

War is the mother of war, as ambition is the father. Only a relapse into passivity could eliminate aggressiveness. Governments are impelled by necessity, and this springs from the demands of positive elements. The man of will demands his own. He concedes the right of none other than those stronger than himself.

It is hard to conceive of a more clouded view of fact than that revealed by current debates over peace and future. The solicitude about the latter, the call for permanent quiet, neither of these has

behind it the smallest iota of good faith. The world is sick of war? To be sure, until it can prepare for another.

Witness the new budgets that already exceed, immeasurably, the vast preparations of England, France, Russia and Germany preceding the late struggle. Nor are the new armings illogical, for too many questions await replies that will take no other answer. The reorganization of Europe is only superficially an international question. The plight in which it finds itself is a repetition of others from which it has recovered. It is one which will be often enough repeated in the future, for this is a tax in permanence on every fighting race. Assuredly, it will accept what help it can. Expediency exacts no less, but its eyes are fixed—not on peace or war—but on necessity. For the time, the problem is recuperation.

The group whose ambitions and achievements carried Germany into war is quiescent. Beaten down, a lesser has replaced it. But the abler man is never defeated permanently and with his rise the possibilities innate in his particular view of the world renew themselves.

The immediate question is the issue between France and Germany, for the former finds an ancient enemy unarmed. This hostile attitude is of many days, and is not to be settled amicably. Alone, France is helpless. Powerful, for the time, through association and circumstance, she desires the utmost weakening of an adversary she dreads. Well may she view the future with concern, for it has become dependent on transient friendships. A century of democracy has thus abased her.

To England, the problem takes another form. The object of the triumvirate, Great Britain, Russia, France, has been accomplished. German commercial supremacy is no longer a threat. The status is satisfactory, and France is to be supported to the extent that she remains an auxiliary dependable in the future. For the moment, greater questions are to be faced. Germany must have some place in the commercial alignment of nations. Her obligations enforce such recognition, but if admitted it is to be with limitations. These are identical with her liabilities. The modern Sphynx propounds but one riddle: How is world exploitation to be accomplished? Freed from the menace of a Teuton challenge, England inclines towards a liberal policy. To create antagonisms between states has been a commonplace in her diplomacy, as it has been with all conquering races. These are assured, and with them a weakened

continent. For the time there is safety and certainty. Beyond, lies the world.

But if war is easily made its consequences are not so readily avoided. As a result of the ended difference the United States has become vastly rich, for to America the war was an occasion of unexampled profit. With inappreciable losses to mar the vista she, in turn, may survey a world ripe for her own projects. Thus the fall of one claimant only pushes forward another.

In a sphere of many dominions, all potent relatively, such an end is not remarkable. The causes underlying division are so similar as to be ordinary. That war should follow is not inevitable, but there persists, in the status, the active germ of possibility.

Each nation faces its own problems, and these are twofold. One, that of internal equilibrium; the other, its attitude towards the outer. Both involve friction. The commonwealth itself must be homogeneous, not otherwise can it become a purposeful instrument. Its strength must approximate, or surpass, that of the competitor that bars the way to expression in the world beyond. Each state is the symbol of a will group. It embraces the manifestation of the result of their toil and object. As a collectivity, it moves as this will directs. It can be no stronger than the governing factor. Its acts, in historical movement, are the efforts it makes to transfer to other states the ideas that have inspired it. This is its culture, the culture of a minority. It can be no higher than the will that has fostered it. Its strength is only the relative strength of this will.

Before any clarity of vision towards world problems can be possible all idea of majority intelligence must be abandoned. Majorities have no will. They move as they are impelled by superior minds. The propaganda by which they are affected never touches on reality. But, in the modern era, these majorities have to be organized and this organization involves an internal struggle that embraces issues of its own. The new industrial economy has furthered the interests of fresh claimants to political eminence, and slave masses have been divided into groups subordinated by them. This is so-called democracy.

Unfortunately, such a statement excites indignation, but this does not detract from its truth. Each modern state has experienced marked internal vicissitudes during the past few decades by reason of new tendencies, and situations have arisen that have modified the force of older dominant elements. Friction between rivals for mass control has sometimes led to a weakening of national progress of

aggression, but Europe has been more limited thereby than America. The late war brought out, at last, the consequences of a profound propaganda. Continental countries found themselves permeated by dissatisfied masses, governed by skillful leaders. Economic readjustment, and the setting aside of existing ruling groups were openly demanded. England learned of a radical sentiment among labor organizations, and of covetous eyes that glimpsed the very peaks of power.

These conditions have reacted on after war negotiations. Allies, militarily great, felt an impulse that hampered them in their attitude towards Russia, a country that had been boldly seized by a new caste, semi-intellectual, and for the time diverted from the manners and traditions of other lands. The extent of this spirit in countries supposed to be free from extreme radicalism was confirmed by the caution of the Allied Powers in dealing with an unpleasant dilemma, for labor pressure at home warned each that interference in Russia, on a scale of magnitude, would precipitate a serious crisis.

That this is true only brief reflection is required to confirm. Germany had proved the vulnerability of Russia and disposed of the myth of its impenetrability. Allied occupation was a simple matter from a military standpoint, but impractical from the political. As an international question it was transferred to the sphere of propaganda, and an effort was made to prove the final moral collapse of what remained of the Romanoff empire. Beyond this, the problem was left to the future. The attitude assumed was confirmatory of the strength of new power groups and of the precarious position of existing dominant castes. It is this that has marred a quick settlement of war issues along purely military lines, a course to which the nations were originally bound. The condition indicated has weakened Europe, as well as England, and the ability of the ruling caste of the latter to deal with internal issues has been taxed to the limit. But parallel movements had quite a contrary effect in America. There, the war brought into the open the real rulers of the nation and exhibited in full measure the bizarre means by which their power had been assured.

Moral propaganda had so thoroughly permeated the American system that every movement of consequence had made obeisance to it. Hysteria had become a pliant force in the hands of organizations that reached out to every part of the national structure. To these exponents of a super-morality world relations opened fresh fields, and the over-excitation of mass psyche by appeals to mere senti-

ment resulted in a frenzy such as is rarely encountered in history. Before its fury all the political, social and civil rights of non-concurring groups, or of individuals, disappeared. Of all the nations participating in the struggle it was the only one in which no minority party existed. Less concerned than any other power in the serious questions at issue, the pent up emotions of the masses turned against every manifestation of independence or manliness that appeared in any quarter. The dissolution of Congress was boldly advocated in newspaper editorials, and applauded by men who claimed they were fighting for democracy! In a written statement, a prominent clergyman demanded the emasculation of a race numbered in millions. In the period of temporary aberration, sudden assaults were made on national "immoralities"; tremendous suffrage changes were initiated in the name of patriotism; merciless war was conducted against groups that sought to voice economic discontent. Psychologically, the effects were beyond computation. For the time, at least, protest meant ruin, however intelligently expressed. The power of dominant groups, hitherto tentative, was confirmed, and theoretical democracy absolutely disappeared, although it was a crime to say so.

On the other hand, the capacity of the United States as a producer of war material was demonstrated beyond peradventure. The extent of its food resources astonished the world. The ready adhesion of its people to military demands was made clear enough to satisfy the most exacting. The disturbing factor was lack of technique in the finer lines of production. The air program was a sad fiasco. Economic waste reached new levels. In the military area new armies found few opportunities to test their efficiency against equal forces. Why a serious charge was made at the last moment against an enemy in full retreat still remains a mystery. But that the essentials of a successful military machine were present was too evident to be questioned. These, with their co-ordinate functions, were at hand in the event of the inauguration of a positive foreign policy.

Succeeding stages in the peace negotiations reflected the relative sense of stability among the nations concerned. In Europe, weakness was patent and the cry was for international alliances, by which the advantages of victory might be assured to those not strong enough to hold them alone. France eagerly pressed for a confirmation of a "League of Nations" and England warmly advocated a course in which she foresaw her eminence. America, at

first enthusiastic over the new theory, cooled as the realization of the changes that had transpired in her international status dawned on her. Apparently, the time of great dreams had come, and in them she beheld herself, a moral paragon, directing the course of civilization and imposing on the world a new ethical culture. Her power groups faced unforeseen trade advantages, backed by a patient and submissive electorate, responsive to every demand and remorseless towards any complaining voice.

There has followed a growing aversion to extreme peace measures, and a desire to participate more actively in new commercial programs. But great financial problems still remain, and these appear almost insuperable obstacles to world equilibrium. The future position of Germany looms as a disquieting factor. Economically, that country remains a baffling interrogation. None the less, it is the only visible source from which may be gathered some part of the colossal debt that defies settlement. But ability to pay can come only from trade that will hamper the commercial unfoldment of some of the triumphant groups. The most painful feature of the whole affair is this implied revival of Germany. Within what limits is it possible to confine it? Given time, that Lethean cup, will not the world forget, and the Teuton return to strength and greatness? To reduce the German proletariat to bond slavery, a return to ancient customs, was undoubtedly considered for a time, but the power of organized discontent among some of the Allies precluded too great a latitude in this direction. To Germany, the important matter is not so much the amount of the indemnity, but its terms of payment, for in its settlement lies the real path to industrial regeneration.

The war was only one of many that must follow, each a test of the stamina of the ruling groups among the respective adversaries. It is these that fight. The people have nothing to do with it, but they always applaud it, and always believe they are fighting for themselves. No regret need be expressed about this. The statement of a palpable fact implies no lack of feeling. The world is what it is and what it has been, and it will always be what it is and what it has been. Why, indeed, should it be otherwise?

At present, the dominant forces in America and England are secure, but those of the former enjoy a more complete control of their environment. They have to do with a race trained to respond quickly to new propaganda, a race easily molded. In England it is otherwise; there acuteness and dissimulation must be exercised in a

high degree to sustain the power of the remnants of an ancient caste. That caste has been frightfully wounded and its position made precarious by the bold attitude of those directly in control of the lower industrial elements. In America there is safety. Its ruling group has nothing to fear, other than the remote and improbable possibility of defection among their own moral propagandists, or misfortune in war.

This contingency will influence America to deal more leniently with the theory of the League, and even bring about partial participation in its acts. For the time being, the position of the United States is one of unqualified independence, but the real issues to be faced in the future can scarcely escape the discerning, and a policy of preparation on a scale of the first magnitude must henceforth form part of American legislation. Nothing would so quickly strengthen the hands of the groups laboring for control of the industrial forces of the country as military reverses. The proletariat would at once become a menace, where now it is scarcely a threat. In the background there are intelligent spirits alert to their opportunities.

The future, not to speak of the present, includes an interval that may witness unlooked for changes in the system of mass control, the problem of priority in all civilizations. Success in war would make the American master wills the most powerful and independent in the world. Yet, the alternative must be reckoned with, for it is stupendous in tragic possibility. Water no longer isolates and a single naval action lost may open the way to invasion. The skies, too, have become a highway for the nations. Remote as seem such contingencies, they must form part of the reflections of serious men. Preparations can only be intelligent when directed by intelligent foresight. Whatever sentimentalists may claim to the contrary, the present era is one of force, par excellence. Strength, alone, is respected. It is the age of the wolf, and the law of the pack tolerates no weakness. They who would be great must be wary, for vacillation is fatal.

A STUDY IN INFANTILE REGRESSION.*

BY T. SWANN HARDING.

THESE are the futile reflections of an unimportant member of the impotent minority upon a matter of no importance. With them the mighty and the powerful have naught to do. They are intended solely as a stimulant for that anaemic and tiny group called the intellectuals. They are set down with all possible humility as befits a member of a minority in a functioning democracy, but they are based upon the unpopular postulate that the most efficient and unimpeded mental and intellectual efficacy is a matter of paramount importance to true civilization. Let then those whose ears and eyes and minds are closed to ideas—the already dead, John Haynes Holmes called them this morning—beware.

When entering upon a study of two very prevalent types of infantile regression as exemplifying the sterility of modern civilization, it is necessary to set some criterion by which to judge the maturity of the human intellect. The most prominent differential characteristic between men and other animals is generally esteemed to be in the mind. Animals utilize knowledge wherein it possesses immediate utility; they are, in a sense, a mass of instinctive reactions to external stimuli; their state compares well with that of a high-grade human imbecile. As we pass from the imbecile through the moron grades and the sub-normal to the normal we eventually come to a type of mind which, as Soreley has expressed it, has an independent interest in knowing and places a valuation upon knowledge *per se*.

We address ourselves then to the difference between *savoir* and *connaitre*; between *wissen* and *kennen*; between knowledge *of* and knowledge *about*. We take as an axiom for this purpose John Grote's remarks in the *Exploratio Philosophica*—"Immediateness is confusion or chaos which reflection begins to crystallize or organ-

ize. . . . Immediate or intuitive knowledge is knowledge with the smallest amount of reflection possible consistent with its being knowledge. . . . Knowledge begins, when reflection begins, and no earlier, for in immediateness it is dormant." These assumptions place us in a minority painfully small, but known facts seem to prohibit us from assuming the more comfortable theory that rightness abides in numbers.

The question has very frequently been asked since the theoretical termination of The War, whether modern civilization is not on the verge of complete disaster. Wise men of the East are echoed by wise men of the West who really contemplate such a contingency as very much more than merely probable. Civilizations have arisen and fallen before—mighty and noble civilizations; and there is really no valid reason for presuming that the one which now encompasses us embodies the germ of immortality any more than those of the past embodied it.

The world of 1914 is absolutely gone, in spite of the sentimental reactionary glances turned toward it by the vast conglomerate of people led by that matchless master of the strategy of retreat, Warren G. Harding. We have witnessed the episode of a real world war to delight the hearts of the militarists, a catastrophic epilepsy which has seized modern civilization and which still clings like an incurable malady. Old ties have been broken; the former ideas of peace, security and civilian ethics have been replaced by an attitude of mind which lacks in great measure the quality of stability and which rebels against the man-fearing spirit.

This world-wide general murder and its mass psychosis have been brought to a nominal close but, pugnacity once unleashed, it has been found most difficult to quell the group of animalistic instincts a regression to primitive mindedness brings in train. The repressive agencies of modern civilization were deliberately cast aside by all nations in order to win the war. Men were cold bloodedly instructed to act in absolute diametrical opposition to the peace time ethic; they were trained to murder in the foulest manner, to steal, to lie, to be atrocious, to use women as a needful sex necessity, to do anything, in short, that might contribute to ultimate brute victory. The revaluation of all values was realized practically, and master morals became the order of the day.

Today these inculcated master morals impel the masses to menace what we are wont to call civilization. They do not desire to stop fighting. Men no longer care so much for the apparently

rather petty conventionalized limitations of civilian life. Such polite amenities seem quite out of place after one has been admonished to make a bayonet thrust and take what is desired—to *win* regardless of humanitarian considerations. Europe does not desire to stop taking while ever there appears to be anything to take; and American bankers, ever avaricious, send over the sinews of war disguised as charitable contributions for the suffering women and children. So easy is it to fool people who will not understand, whose minds do not function to the extent of seeing that when resources no longer permit fighting and starvation is actually at hand, people will go to work and reconstruction follows inevitably.

Crime in America reaches unheard of proportions. Things seem to be going to the dogs, and so we have very respectable people fearing a complete reversion to barbarism and the utter annihilation of modern civilization's mighty imposing structure.

This question is important. It is, however, secondary in importance to the question of depopulation. Procreation has been ground into us; we have made it a sacred part of our religious cult; it is strongly entrenched in our code of honor; it is a prominent theoretical tenet in our moral and ethical codes. Impelled as we are by the most imperative instinctive urge known to us, we see fit, in a prudish age, to account for it as a moral or religious or ethical obligation; and so we prate of the necessity for "continuing the race" and anathematize any tendency towards depopulation—all in an age which has found human life the very cheapest of commodities.

What, frankly, is the necessity for continuing the race and is it so overpowering? We may make any assumption that pleases us and bask comfortably in it, but what of the reality? Life is sweet; with all of its imperfections—with all that it contains of ill health, poverty, privation, frustration, disaster and miserable deaths—few desire to leave it. Schopenhauer refrained from suicide however justifiable he proved it. Even poor Barbellion enjoyed life and would have traded his personality for no other. There are those who lugubriously wish to die, but if you offer to kill them will they usually accept your invitation with proper alacrity?

But we have no warrant to assume that posterity will necessarily relish life and we cannot consult posterity upon the problem. I see no reason for assuming a deep moral necessity. For all we know we may be hapless pawns who have arisen by mechanical evolution in order to do some special work in cosmos, to release certain

necessary forces, at the behest of the greater, impersonal and unmoral force which may rule the universe. We feel important, but are we? We are inevitably egocentric, but what does that argue of universal significance?

We are here, then, and we go on bringing our kind into being for better or for worse. We have built up a something which we are pleased to call "modern civilization." Should it perish from the earth is this of cosmic, even of mundane—or even of race importance? Have we so tremendously perfect a civilization as we are all too prone to think? Might not the world wag along quite as well without it and might not even the race benefit by its disappearance? It is essentially a civilization based upon mechanics and immediateness of application and ignoring almost altogether that one spiritually enlightening realm where knowledge by reflection comes into being. Speaking animalistically it is a wonderful thing; but viewed from the heights of a human intellect what can we honestly say?

There are those pious in a modern way who find consolation in an hypothesis of cosmic evolution. There are those who see progress advancing by pendulum strides with a forward movement and a regression forever alternating. Both classes believe in the ultimate achievement of perfect good and both necessarily believe that our present state must be in advance of any previous world state. Do facts faced coldly and without sentimentality warrant such positive affirmations of optimism?

There comes the adumbrant memory of an American Indian who, after being incarcerated by the pale face government in a properly uncultivable reservation, returned to visit the farmer who had "bought" the land where he formerly lived. He was a very nice Indian and, instead of scalping the farmer, he talked pleasantly regarding their respective civilizations. The farmer was not really content to admit that two civilizations were under discussion. He admitted only his own. A wealthy urbanite with a proper comprehension of bridge, golf and ball room dancing, would not have considered the farmer civilized, however. And an intellectual would have found the wealthy urbanite but a thinly veneered barbarian.

However, the Indian said, in substance: "You have fenced in now both the little land that you can use and a great deal that you cannot use. You call it all yours. It is not yours any more than it is mine. The land was placed here like the sky, the air, the water, the plants and the animals—for the use of all; it cannot belong to

you as can a horse and some day there will be an accounting. You have brought with you expensive machinery and you farm in an elaborate and a complex manner. By working yourself and your entire family every day in the year you manage to make a bare living. I and my squaw lived on one-tenth this land. We worked perhaps one month in the spring and one in the fall; we fared bountifully and reared a large family. We were always happy while you are worried and fretful."

The farmer of course laughed because the poor Indian did not know enough to appreciate the blessings of civilization. The gentleman who told me this story was a Single Taxer and he was interested in Single Tax aspects of the situation. Perhaps the Single Tax is the ideal absolute remedy for absolute wrong, the grand panacea, the ultimate system of perfection for the remission of all sins. I am almost as dubious of ideal systems as is Theodore Dreiser, but I shall not deny the possibilities. The story had, however, another interest for me.

What constitutes the essential point in true civilization? Roughly speaking, man is differentiated from the other animals by the possession of intellect. It is in the peculiar functioning of his brain that he most differs from ordinary animals. It is normal mental functioning including the power of abstract reasoning and an interest in knowledge of its own sake which forms the real nucleus of civilization; it is this alone that is worthy of attainment. Mechanical advance is only justifiable in so far as it assists a still higher development. This peculiar human brain functioning is a quality which bears no direct relation either to culture or to education; it is pre-eminently the faculty of intelligence. It should be assisted by education and mechanical luxuries; it should eventuate in real culture; but it is synonymous with none of these things.

The mind of the Indian mentioned above functioned; the mind of the farmer was in a practical and conventional groove and it did not function. To make the difference still more striking and still more readily grasped—the farmer had a certain appreciation of knowledge in so far as it was of immediate practical application—in so far as it enabled him to satisfy the complexities of an existence which gave rise to more and more problems as its complexity increased. The Indian was in possession of a mind functioning as a mature human brain should; he had a disinterested interest in knowledge for its own sake; he actually saw that knowing possessed an inherent valuation per se, and he was able to take hold of

an odd and unusual problem, meditate about it and achieve definite results. The farmer had certain in-bred or spoon-fed ideas and he understood nothing else; the Indian had constantly new ideas of his own and lived on a more human plane.

This disparity of mental functioning is a world disease; I notice it more or less in nearly all of the foreigners all over the globe with whom I have corresponded to the extent of several hundred. Considering the mechanical perfection we have achieved our minds should be in a better position to function than that of an aboriginal and they should attain conclusions which would put a Socrates or a Plato to shame. We have every convenience and inducement. But we have mistaken the means for the end in view; we eternally make life more and more complex and then, as we solve piecemeal the problems this complexity generates, we imagine we are becoming civilized. We live a life which produces ills that only the most elaborate medical profession can manage even partially to allay, but after the modern diseases are produced and cured what have we accomplished in an absolute sense? Anything?

Our intellects, instead of being facilitated, have found out, it is true, the way to apply practically certain scraps of facts and certain rudimentary scientific laws, but they have almost lost the ability to meet diverse situations and find a way out in the manner constantly exemplified by the high-grade primitive man in the open. We have too much elaborate instruction, for instance, without enough learning. Pure intellect finds a way. I remember the time when the *Poet and Peasant*, and the *William Tell Overture* and the *Second Hungarian Rhapsody* were my idea of really heavy classic music. How was I ever to attain an intellectual appreciation of the best music?—a thing, be it understood, quite different from either a sensual or a technical appreciation. Sensual appreciation does not exist much above the human subnormal and technical appreciation is limited to professionals. I mean the ability to see the fruit of intellect in a piece of music and to find it intellectually suggestive and uplifting.

This appreciation was attained merely by insistently hearing till I understood and meanwhile cleaving to my taste as formed. Wagner, Straus, Ornstein, Strawinsky and Scott came into my ken and I appreciated; my intellect having been unbound from conventional precedents to achieve this. Today I feel the need of some deeper appreciation of art; I feel that I should comprehend some meaning in the most absurd drawing published by *The Dial*. cer-

tainly in the most baffling utterances of Rimbaud; I do not assume that *The Dial* is asinine; I cannot be certain that I am not myself terribly stupid and slow in mental functioning not to grasp such matters. I got beyond the *Unfinished* and *The New World* symphonies and I may get up to *The Dial* in time.

In this connection I remember attacking the French language in a manner quite savage. I ignored all the set rules and trusted unaided intellect to find a way when a reading knowledge of this language became necessary. I gathered together a French book and a French dictionary and, after reading the book, progressed rapidly until I could within a few weeks read anything in the language. If I had not been so assiduously educated, and had I not had so much rot to unlearn, I fairly believe that today I should be more than sub-normal in intelligence. Civilization that is true teaches the attainment of normal intelligence in a reasonable time.

What then can constitute the immense superiority of our civilization over that of an aboriginal who has attained a certain definite racial maturity and whose mind functions normally? We bring him a physician after we have taught him conditions of living which make the physician necessary. The surgeon can cut him wide open, handle his organs with nonchalant familiarity, sew him up and then not be sure just what was wrong with him and whether he will benefit from the operation. Or he can operate upon a native woman and tell her that she will never menstruate thereafter and that her stomach is fearfully delicate. Thereafter she menstruates more regularly than ever and can digest a portion of a crowbar if necessity arises. At very best, and with the utmost familiarity with an individual's anatomy, a physician will do well to ameliorate part of the physical ills, a majority of which arise from the complexities of this very modern civilization.

However, it is alleged that the native has unpardonable quacks called witch-doctors. It may be replied that the intelligent aboriginal always looks askance at these pests just as he views his native priests with amused tolerance, having meditated far beyond the narrow confines of the mass faith. Moreover, I do not know that we can point the finger of scorn very consistently so long as we complacently tolerate Christian Scientist practitioners, spiritualistic mediums and others of ill-fame who prostitute perfectly good psychology and psychiatry to cheap uses.

As noted, the aboriginal usually has his religion, quite closely adhered to and quite properly feared by the more ignorant—just as

among us civilized. We, however, inflict our religion upon him, telling him meanwhile that he is altogether at variance with the truth. Yet his faith is quite satisfactory to him and is certainly no more illogical and no greater strain upon credulity than our own. H. Fielding Hall illuminated this subject both directly and indirectly in his *Soul of a People*, written before he discovered his perfect world system in a later work, and thus ceased really to think and began to pack life into doctrinal compartments.

The story of native exploitation by unscrupulous whites has been the same the world over, and the desire to "spread civilization"—horrible words!—has been uniformly followed by disastrous consequences to the poor primitive. He is compelled to work beneath foreign tax masters who egg him on to attain a complexity of life which eventually kills him. He is made to cease thinking and being happy in order that he may get his nose to the grindstone and live less fully at the cost of infinitely more toil. Hawaii offers the best example of this process in miniature; here we have the complete destruction within a century of a perfectly satisfactory native civilization by the ferocious inroads of our vaunted civilization.

However, I do not mean to be a second Thoreau. I do not advocate that we revert to the simple life, don skins, enter a wigwam and bid goodbye to the amenities of civilization as we know it. We have been born into this condition and we can, if we wish, find a way to make it conduce toward a very high mental development; we can make it a means to an end rather than continually piling up more means. We must first of all realize that this civilization of ours is not the best simply because it exploits certain elaborate mechanical contrivances; and secondly we must be aware that there is no such thing as true civilization unless it assists minds to function properly.

It is not necessary to live at Walden to be civilized. It is not necessary to eschew books and symphony orchestras and great cities and art galleries. But it is absolutely a fact that a man may be more civilized without being able to read a word, more civilized in the truest and best sense, than some learned university dry-as-dust, some wealthy manufacturer of luxuries or some stupid business patron of an orchestra. It is quite probable indeed that slaves like Epictetus; men altogether ignorant of modern science like Socrates; flabby idealists like Gautama the Buddha and unlettered peasants like Jesus Christ, were all of them more civilized than

thousands of people who bask in all the multifarious conveniences of present-day life.

What we call "modern civilization" implies numberless mechanical appliances; it implies indeed the greatest mechanical advances that the world has ever known—but in doing so it necessarily implies the application of knowledge directly to practical uses, and a contempt for knowledge which presumes to a validity of its own; nor does it imply an ability to build anything worth while on the magnificent foundation we have laid. The fact that we have electric lights, automatically regulated heat, street cars and locomotives, automobiles and canned vegetables does not argue that we are highly civilized, however much our egocentric predicament may urge us so to argue. Plato was quite civilized without either a typewriter or a printed book. It is possible to be civilized today and yet to be unable to read. It is doubtless much better to know how to read, but this is not essential to what may truly be called civilization.

There is a certain complacently vulgar American city—and if a city is going to be vulgar it may as well be complacent about it—which today sits on its haunches, declares that its material ambitions have in some measure been accomplished and thinks that it is now about time to go in for a little culture. It reminds me of the way rural natives formerly "got religion," the idea being that it is in good taste to have a certain bowing acquaintance with such things just as a matter of "right-thinking." This city therefore bought up a loose Russian pianist of very considerable talent and purchased itself a symphony orchestra to cluster around him. He went sincerely to work and actually produced wonderful results, achieving on artistic perfection which does him worlds of credit.

Then the people of the city came to hear the orchestra because it was "their" orchestra, just out of a species of ridiculous local pride. And they sat stupefied through the symphonies and the tone poems and the arias and the suites and applauded vociferously at the end of the selection—or in between time whenever it sagged toward silence—partly to be doing the right thing, partly to encourage the musicians, but largely because they were frankly glad that that much of the program was over. When truly superior orchestras led by Stokowski and Strausky and Damrosch and Toscanini came to that city these people stayed at home or in the movies; for they went to "their" orchestra, not from mental functioning through an intellectual urge, but because music ought to be patronized

because it was, as a matter of purely practical business, a good thing for the city to get the reputation of having a fine orchestra; and also did not the papers continually repeat that the conductor got thirty thousand dollars a year?—it must be good! Likewise this city gave Ornstein and Rachmaninoff the compliment of empty houses while such popular ballad sobbers as Gluck and McCormack warbled to houses packed to suffocation.

Nevertheless—and this is where we attain our objective, infantile regression—it is to the rich, but empty headed, business men who find it profitable to support such ventures as symphony orchestras or community funds, that we must appeal for any effective assistance against the inroads of the animalism which is the real pernicious menace of true civilization. As twentieth century matters have been arranged the business man has the power; we have abjectly sold ourselves out to him, we seem to like to feel impotent in his fatherly hands; hence we must somehow manage to appeal to him in order to inject any spirituality and intellectuality into civilization.

The cultural impetus toward a deeper and truer civilization, we have a right to expect from the college and the university men. It is a hard but a true saying that it cannot come from them. The few functioning civilized minds in America today—and America must save civilization because no other nation can at present do so—are not university minds. The college and university atmosphere is truly stultifying to intellect; it is so largely devoted to practical applications and to the perpetuation of certain almost instinctive conventions.

To be absolutely truthful and candid it must indeed be admitted as a fundamental postulate that any study of the minds of business and university men is nothing short of a *study in infantile regression*. There are exceptions of course, but the primitive infantility of these two classes of minds is seldom appreciated at its full value.

There lives in a certain industrial city a business man who has the peculiar idea that life should be at least two dimensional—that it should have breadth as well as length. He has, therefore, permitted himself to investigate certain cultural matters which have no practical significance in his business and which may be dismissed as “*merely*” broadening. That man is a man set apart from his fellows and the other business men actually regard him as a mysterious creature altogether different from them.

This man has, for instance, attained the incredible erudition

which enables him to read understandingly *The Atlantic Monthly* and *The Freeman*. He has at times placed before his friends a column of editorial comment from the latter journal. These captains of industry have positively atrophied mentally to the extent that, in spite of their painful and sincere efforts, they have not the slightest idea what it is all about! They actually want to understand; their efforts to do so are nothing less than pitiable, but they altogether lack the ability.

The atrophic muscles in the ear of a horse will function. Those in the ear of a human being only in rare instances and then imperfectly. A business man can normally no more comprehend anything beyond the sub-moron level of the average newspaper editorial than he can wiggle his ears. To the world of ideas, to the world of human as distinguished from animal mind he is dead. He can be led in any direction and stampeded by anybody who lies plausibly or who makes sufficient noise, for national processes in any true sense are beyond him; he is delightfully uncivilized.

Yes, surely enough—he has put together a great business; he has made his millions; by a combination of circumstances more or less fortuitous he has organized a great corporation. But his mind does not function as the mind of a human being should and could. "Because they seeing, see not, and hearing, hear not; neither do they understand." Certain mechanical stimuli occur to his organism and he reacts in immediate practical applications; he obeys the impulse even as does the squirrel when burying a nut.

He reacts to golf or to yachting or to other animalistic sensational amusements. He will rally to a perfectly unintellectual and convictionless politician like Harding. He will make a member in good standing of almost any sort of church and will acquiesce in the most monstrous theological imbecilities because he has no power to reason. He even does the world's work, not to clothe and feed and assist human beings, but to make combinations of trade and capital and to acquire power. Of abstract thought, the only mental process which differentiates genus homo from the rest of the animals, he knows nothing. Such is the superman we have generated, he to whom we have sold out, at whose mercy we live and whom we uphold as the finished product of modern civilization.

Is the graduate much better? In December, 1920, there appeared an article of mine in *THE OPEN COURT*. A copy containing it fell into the hands of a college graduate I knew and he could never "get into it." An article of no philosophical pretensions at

all was too "deep" and too "high-brow" for him and he actually lacked the intellectual ability to read it understandingly? In *The Christian Century* of October 7, 1920, there appeared a still lighter article of mine of which the import was almost too obvious. This was read by another product of another American university and, upon finishing it, his comment was: "I don't understand it at all—what is it about?" Then it was that I found this educated young person was even incapable of comprehending when the matter was explained to him in the greatest simplification of detail. I could no more get him to understand the import of that simple article than I could explain the structural formula of manno-keto-heptose to a ten-months-old babe. There was no point of contact. However, he did know that the theology of the Presbyterian church was a perfect affair and that the Bolsheviki and Radicals all were incapable of anything but evil; he knew how to solve the European tangle and a very great deal about what Christ meant, but——

It was a third university which produced the young doctor of philosophy who asked me *what* Hume was! He apparently thought it either a game or the name of a kidney tonic. Two other universities brought into being those stupendous minds possessed by two other graduates who strove to read *The Hibbert Journal*, *The Philosophical Review*, *The Nation* and *The Freeman* as they came to my desk. They had certain vague notions that the latter journals were Bolshevik, but in general they lacked the slightest rudimentary knowledge of what the periodicals intended to convey and they gave up in gentlemanly despair.

Nor can I neglect to specify the young graduate of Wisconsin who brought me H. M. Wenley's *Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief*. It appeared that his roommate was a graduate of Michigan, and he told the gentleman from Wisconsin that his senior class had been told to read Wenley's book, but that not a single member of the class ever found out what Wenley was driving at! Knowing me to be a "nut" my Wisconsin friend brought me the book in order that it might perhaps find a reader sufficiently depraved to appreciate it. Needless to say, it was so clearly written that an intelligent girl of less than high school education read it with perfect understanding, because her mind, untrammelled by too much formal education functioned naturally. Unfortunately, modern American college and university educations too often contribute to intellectual atrophy rather than to mental resilience. What if these young men had been exposed to Kant or to Hegel or to Mill's *Logic*

or to Aristotle or to a good modern volume on metaphysics or even to Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God!* Not that I maintain that it is necessary to a man's soul salvation to read obscure philosophic treatises; God forbid! But it simply is a fact that if a man's mind functions properly he can read and follow an abstract discussion. That so many read but understand not is the explanation for the popularity of *The Hibbert Journal* and *The Christian Century* among people who would find these periodicals insidiously heterodox if they understood what they were reading. In the same manner a candid Methodist can preach Unitarianism from his pulpit and a popular lecturer can advocate socialism before "refined" people with perfect impunity, resting upon their collective and individual ignorance.

Of the university type I have seen hundreds. My way of living, or of making a living, has brought me into contact with four or five hundred of them from universities the country over. It is only in two or three instances that I have found evidence of independent thinking, unconventional mental functioning and real openmindedness. These men have generally been narrow minded, bigoted, opinionated, quarrelsome children without the redeeming feature of extreme youth to condone them. Indeed a healthy child, before it has been taught the prejudices and the hostilities and the hatreds of adults, is infinitely superior to them mentally.

Among other things it is typical of the normally functioning human mind that, in its utter disregard for the more remunerative aspects of applications commonly adjudged practical, it ignores such slight considerations as pecuniary reward and doggedly, but sincerely, goes its foolish way. I confess that I have long had such a beastly mind and, though it is of low potential, I feel that I confess rather to a liability than to an asset in having a pure love of knowledge while living in a crassly materialistic age. I too have been looked upon as a creature apart by my colleagues because I desired to broaden my interest in life.

During my college course I became addicted to the habit of writing numerous "letters to the editor" of *The Baltimore American* from sheer pressure of intellectual exuberance which demanded an outlet. In one of these articles I sought to demonstrate that Buddhists had as much right to inundate our shores with Buddhist missionaries as we had to inundate theirs with Christian missionaries; but I asked whether we would accept their propagandists as politely as we compel them (with a battleship, if necessary) to

accept ours. Several of my senior classmates saw this trifle tossed off and they passed it around. Ultimately they each and every one discarded it—politically, of course—but none the less decisively, saying that such “deep” matters they really could not get into! They could understand an article on baseball. They could give complex and devious figures for building a structure capable of making humans more comfortable. But their idea was not to make human beings comfortable or to assist them to function mentally; they wanted to make money and marry some girl just as quickly as possible, and that was all.

Indeed I remember just two teachers, one in high school and one in college, who made the slightest effort to get out of the rut and who suggested to me a single really important broadening field of investigation. Education does not teach a man what John Haynes Holmes also said this morning that education should—to hear to the very end the views of a man with whom we disagree absolutely. It does not produce such men today. A college professor who would do this—in fact a college professor who evinces an interest in any intellectual activity beyond his own narrow specialty—is looked down upon as “Oh, he’s all right, but then, well—you know what I mean.”

There is a thing called pure research in science and it is supposed to be the province of pure intellect; it was the field of Faraday and Ampere and Darwin and other great minds; but it is harnessed to business today and leaves little room for pure mental functioning.

There came to me recently from a university man an admonition as to my logic. I discovered that the correct university philosopher feels that our precise method of attaining a conclusion is of more importance than the conclusion attained. This is another aspect of the hopelessly conventionalized mind as it becomes systematically anything. It is the perpetual utilization of means for ends; it is precisely the same mind which made the winning of the war more important than the results of the war and which eventuated in a war won mechanically and barren spiritually. Our minds worked just as far as modern civilization encourages them to work, but they fell down miserably as soon as abstract reasoning became necessary. Modern education and modern civilization look upon such ideals as impractical moonshine; hence a war for a world which gave as its fruits hostility, frustration, debts, influenza and starvation.

It is needless to develop this thesis further in detail. Instances of both business and university infants spring to mind by the dozen. It is the general rule—whatever be the fortunate exceptions—that the mind of the average American business man and of the average American college or university graduate shows infantile regression. There is in each case a certain narrowly restricted area of interest in knowledge which will cash out. But there is little or none of the independent interest in knowing which characterizes the maturity of the human mind, and which alone can produce real civilization.

There exists in modern times a certain small minority of people who can properly be called the intellectuals, and who can properly be said to have the interests of true civilization at heart. They cherish the ideals of highmindedness, of true spirituality and of rational civilization which must be divorced from the view that mechanical perfection is synonymous with the greatest human attainment. They are practically insulated from the business man and the university man who must be moved before anything ameliorative of present conditions can be accomplished.

The intellectuals are insulated because these others can neither think nor, with the best will in the world, can they follow the processes of thought in another. They write and print certain books and periodicals of restricted circulation, and they manage somehow to keep the ideal of civilization alive, just as such intellectuals have had to do throughout the ages. But what possible point of contact with the powerful, uncultivated majority can they ever hope to make and what possible leverage shall ever be theirs?

The business man and the university man are both relatively infantile. They are likewise cowardly. They do not make good martyrs or human sacrifices. They are gregarious, easily led, readily hoodwinked and complacently pliable even regarding things they do not understand—provided they are first of all very thoroughly scared. Finally their accentuation of conventional and traditional moral, theological and patriotic values renders them easily scared by anything which tends to upset things as they at present are.

To prove these facts we need consider only religion or the past war. In both instances we have seen that the entrepreneurs or capitalists—the business man, and the products of modern college and university education, have always readily fallen into line and cheered for the "right" things. They have first had to have it impressed upon them that it would be a great deal better for them to agree to certain things which they but imperfectly understand.

What they are to believe is really no concern of theirs; they do not need even to try and comprehend. They are not accustomed to think; they are accustomed to react to stimuli. Therefore they must first be told that things will go bad for them unless the enemy is licked; unless the loans are subscribed in full; unless the Red Cross is assisted in its efforts to kill Bolsheviki by neglect; unless the tribal god is propitiated; unless the accepted religion is patted on the back; unless the customary theological dogmas in their respective social strata are swallowed hole; unless the world is made safe for something by their country or unless anything that you desire to have them agree to. Having scared them it is only necessary to retail your ideas and see them believed and insisted upon as true, just as fast as you wish and however imbecile and illogical you may care to make them.

The leavening of the loaf of true civilization must be the intellectuals who have normally functioning minds, and the ideals of culture, refinement, intellect and development for which they stand. Business men and the educated classes need to be scared in order to adopt a different set of ideas. Present conditions with the ghost of so-called "Bolshevism" in the wings are beginning to scare them. As European anarchy becomes more and more pronounced and as they see the good old times slipping away from them, they are doomed to become more and more frightened.

Now just at this point, when the dormant minds are afraid of something, it would be possible for the intellectual to jump into the breach, to slash this monster of materialism, to redeem the land from the single-track animalistic minds which have too long ruled it and to rejuvenate a healthful interest in ideas. We can actually lose more than half of the tawdry, shoddy, wasteful debilitating impedimenta which we call modern civilization; we can do without any number of things which we vaguely imagine to be indispensable. It is not the jeopardy of losing these things which menaces civilization; it is rather the suffocation of a disinterested interest in ideas beneath a welter of excrescent non-essentials.

The final question of course is, and remains—do we really desire to be truly civilized, or do we merely want to make life more automatic, more complex, more mechanical and hence more brainless? Or, in deference to Henry Adams' *Degradation of the Democratic Dogma*, a more pertinent question may be—has not civilization already attained and passed its zenith; is not the inevitable

regression of man now in process ; and may not protest against the operation of an immutable law be worse than futile?

*It seems best just to append here a quotation from W. R. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God* in the chapter on *Values*, which I found after writing the above and which admirably summarizes it—

"It is maintained by an active school of thinkers that truth is simply a concise expression for working efficiency, that it is capable of analysis into certain other values, and that all so-called intellectual values have their real value in relation to some other function than intellectual apprehension The view appeals for support to the practical interests which determine the beginning of knowledge. But it overlooks the independent interest in knowing which characterizes the maturity of the human mind. Truth has been found to possess a value which is not capable of being resolved into other and practical interests, and which must therefore be regarded as independent. It is the object and attainments of intelligence alone and can in this way be distinguished from happiness or goodness or beauty."

REFORMING THE MODERN STATE: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

THERE are in the revolutionary movement small groups of radicals who say that they hate the modern State and would destroy it root and branch. Argument would be wasted on these fanatics, most of whom are intellectually contemptible. The frank and honest enemy of the present State—Nicholas Lenin, for example—admits that what he seeks to destroy is the Capitalistic or Bourgeois State—the State which, as he asserts, is controlled and dominated by a relatively small plutocratic class. To a Proletarian State he has no objection, even when it is ruthless, tyrannical and autocratic. That Communism, unless wholly voluntary and based on the consent of all, implies the existence of a State, it is impossible to doubt. To abolish the State is to abolish compulsion and trust wholly to the better side of human nature for order, cooperation and equality of opportunities and rights. Perfect adaptation of mankind to social life, we are told by some Utopians, will render the State unnecessary. Perhaps, perhaps. But such faith or prophecy is utterly barren.

A very different case is presented by those who would refashion and reform the modern State in order to make it truly democratic, truly representative, as well as efficient and worthy of our support and respect. The shortcomings of the modern State all recognize. Their name is legion, and many of them are grave. But is the State worse than the average character of the citizens who compose it? Do we not see our own human faults and vices in the mirror formed by the State? Or are we much nobler and finer than the State, and is it possible to elevate and improve the State merely by a regrouping and reorganization of the many elements that enter into its make-up?

It has been affirmed by many writers that the ablest and most comprehensive exposition of the theory that the State can be thor-

oughly renovated, purified and reformed by means of certain structural and administrative changes, and without waiting for any improvement in average human nature, is found in a volume entitled *The New State*, the author of which, Miss M. P. Follett, is a new American figure in the arena of social and political controversy. According to certain reviewers, she has more clearly than any other writer pointed out and explained the crux of the political problem of democratic states and has made an inspiring and fruitful contribution to the philosophy and science of politics.

This is high praise indeed. The book, therefore, challenges serious attention, which, so far, it has hardly received. It should be analyzed, carefully studied in the light of history and contemporary experience, and candidly criticized where it is weak or superficial. It is easier to commend in general terms than to criticize with discrimination and honest frankness.

We have heard a great deal in recent years about the "great state" and the "efficient state." No one has told us how to achieve greatness or efficiency for our states. Usually the advocate of greatness or efficiency in the state has a pet theory or dogma of his own, and all that his plea or argument amount to is that, if the state will kindly consent to reorganize itself on the particular basis proposed by him, or her, it will shed all its faults and vices and become great and efficient. No evolutionist can take such pseudo-science seriously. It serves no useful purpose to talk vaguely about "the state." Reformers should consider and discuss voters, electors, average men and women, and the politicians, legislators and diplomats whom these men and women choose to act for and in the name of the state. "The state—it is I," said a tyrant. "The state—it is we, millions of men and women of all sorts and conditions," say democratic societies of our own day. To change the state, we must begin with the voters—or at least with a certain proportion of them—and induce them to seek and strive for greatness and efficiency in the state.

Now, the chief merit of Miss Follett's work is that it recognizes these basic truths and attempts to prove that the state *can* be vastly improved by organizing and using social groups, instead of non-descript and motley "crowds," as the foundations of the democratic body politic. In other words, we can get more and better results in politics without changing average human nature, simply by rearranging and regrouping the human materials and elements existent in the state. Let us form genuine groups: let us encourage them

to meet and think matters out collectively, to formulate their needs and expectations, and to send fit and faithful spokesmen to the local and general legislatures. When representatives represent genuine social, and not merely industrial or professional groups, or mixed crowds, we obtain something like a consensus of the competent and not lame and unsatisfactory compromises arrived at by log-rolling, lobbying, shifty and insecure attempts to placate all and avoid making enemies.

This, roughly, is the thesis of *The New State*. A few direct quotations may be given here to bring out more fully the author's quintessential contention:

"Democracy is not a sum in addition. Democracy is not brute numbers, it is genuine union of true individuals. The question before the American people today is—How is that genuine union to be attained? How is the true individual to be discovered? The party has always ignored him; it wants merely a crowd, a preponderance of votes. The early reform associations had the same aim. . . .

"We find the true man only through group organization. The potentialities of the individual remain potentialities until they are released by group life. . . . Group organization must be the new method of politics, because the modes by which the individual can be brought forth and made effective are the modes of practical politics." (P. 6.)

"The group organization movement means the substitution of intention for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire. It rests on the solid assumption that this is a man-made, not a machine-made, world, that men and women are capable of constructing their own life, and that not upon socialism, or any rule, or any order, or any plan, or any Utopia, can we rest our hearts, but only on the force of a united and creative citizenship. (P. 8.)

"I go to a committee meeting in order that all together we may create a group idea, and idea which will be better than any one of our ideas alone; moreover, which will be better than all of our ideas added together. For this group idea will not be produced by any process of addition, but by the interpretation of us all. (P. 24.)

" . . . We must live the group life. This is the solution of our problems, national and international. Employers and employed cannot be exhorted to feel sympathy one for the other; true sympathy will come only by creating a community or group of employers and employed. Through the group you find the details, the filling-out of Kant's universal law. Kant's categorical imperative is general, is

empty; it is only a blank check. But through the life of the group we learn the content of universal law." (P. 47.)

"Not socialization of property, but socialization of the will is the true socialism. The main aim in the reconstruction of society must be to get all that every man has to give, to bring the submerged millions into light and activity." (P. 74.)

The first question that occurs to a critical, though sympathetic, reader of the book is: What is a group? Miss Follett, strangely enough, does not give us a satisfactory definition of this term. She is at some pains to explain that she does not overemphasize the value of "neighborhood" organizations for political and social purposes. Neighborhood organizations are useful, no doubt, but they do not and cannot supplant all other types of organization. Parents may profitably meet to discuss the trials and needs of their children in the schools of the neighborhood. Residents of a given precinct may profitably meet to discuss street cleaning, police and fire protection, and like subjects of common concern. But such meetings and conferences will not do away with differences of opinion and feeling in respect to broader and deeper municipal, state, national and international issues. The holding of neighborhood meetings until doomsday will not convert all those participating in them to Free Trade, or Government Ownership, or Compulsory Social Insurance, or Limitation of Armaments, or a League of Nations to Secure Peace.

Again, I may be a lawyer and a member of a Bar Association. Is that association a group? Yes and No. It is not a "creative" group within Miss Follett's definition. Nor is a College Faculty such a group. Nor is a Medical Association, nor a local trade union.

Where, then, do we find the "creative" group that is to make a new state by its subtle and ennobling influence on its units? It does not exist, as yet, and it is, therefore, necessary to create it. Miss Follett finds some encouraging evidence of group action in contemporary legislation and contemporary cooperation, but there is nothing really new in her illustrations. Men always have cooperated and always will cooperate in various ways, wholly outside of the sphere of state activity. Men cooperate to build and maintain churches, to support Art Institutes, to provide themselves with diversion and recreation. Men form associations to protect their economic interests and promote their collective welfare. All these institutions and factors have admittedly failed to produce the *new* state. If we desire a new state, argues Miss Follett, we must begin

by "living the group life," and thus develop the true individual while at the same time, though indirectly, socializing the individual will. Hitherto there has been neither a true individual nor a true society, or state. There have been particularist individuals, self-assertive, vain, aggressive individuals, and there have been parties, factions, crowds, artificial and mechanical devices for the maintenance of peace and order in the crude and clumsy state. New parties, new platforms, new movements, no matter how radical they may be, will beget the same results so long as we treat our human material in the old way. Let us abjure communism, syndicalism, guild socialism, single-tax-ism, what not, since none of them has been spontaneously developed by creative group-life. We are putting the cart before the horse. Programmes and platforms will follow in due course if we but change our modes and methods of political and social organization.

There is an important and vital truth in Miss Follett's philosophy. It is this—that much of the intolerance, arrogance, bigotry, prejudice, misunderstanding that obstruct the way to sound social policies is the fruit of intellectual and moral isolation, and that the most urgent need of modern society is mutual understanding and the sympathy that results from such understanding. Miss Follett's reference to employers and employed suggests a striking illustration of this truth. Employers and employes do not understand, respect or trust one another, and this is the fundamental difficulty. Friendly intercourse in shop councils or otherwise is the parent of many improvements. Good will is released, directed into the right channels. It was there in the first place, but dormant, unapplied. Group discussion removed inhibitions, cleared minds of suspicion and bias, and the path was made smooth and pleasant, not for grudging, reluctant compromises, but for rectifications and adjustments heartily approved by all.

It is indisputably true that we cannot have too many opportunities for group discussion, for neighborly and amicable conferences of men of divergent views and aims. The results of such matching of minds, of efforts to grasp other points of view, of seeking counsel and light, are always and everywhere beneficial. They not only make for justice and righteousness, but they make for these ends in the happiest way. Solutions of knotty problems reached by amicable and tolerant discussion leave no bitterness behind them. On the contrary, they bring pleasure and comfort. Men

who yield to others after friendly conferences and discussions are *glad* they yielded; they are better and finer for the experience.

Take another illustration. There are a good many Free Traders who despise Protectionists and regard them as fools. The arguments for Free Trade seem to them so convincing, so unanswerable, that none but ignoramuses and brainless persons can persist in entertaining Protectionist opinions. On the other hand, there are Protectionists who plume themselves on their strong common sense, their hold upon fact, their contempt for sentimentality, visionary schemes and bookish learning. But bring Free Traders and Protectionists together, induce them to endeavor to consider patiently one another's arguments, unfold all the major and minor issues involved in the controversy, and what happens? Neither side is converted to the position of the other—though individuals may be converted—but each appreciates the other's case, finds something in it, and respect takes the place of contempt. The discussion thenceforth is elevated to a worthier plane, and if legislation be necessary in the premises agreements are more easily reached and in a far better spirit than under the "crowd" or "party" method of log-rolling and recrimination and distasteful compromises.

Still, Miss Follett's argument is open to serious criticism along three main lines.

In the first place, humanity has not stood still, but has progressed, despite the lack of "group life." The democracy of crowds, parties, votes, particularist individuals and schools has *not* prevented broad and deep changes in political and social relations. Slavery *has* been abolished, the French Revolution *did* take place, the Inquisition is no more, and unjust privilege is retreating before the advance of the embattled and enfranchised masses. We have no Perfect or New State, but the state we know is vastly better than the states that preceded it. We shall continue to have progress even if we continue to live the party, faction, crowd and sectarian life—the life humanity has lived since the dawn of history. The group life is highly desirable, but it is not the *sine qua non* of further progress. It is desirable because it saves time, energy and temper; because it lessens friction.

In the second place, there is reason to fear that a deliberate, mechanical, artificial organization of "groups" would fail to yield the best results of spontaneous group life. One cannot always be sure the groups called into being for creative purposes will function *creatively* and find the true man or woman in each of its members.

There are groups which destroy the best in the individual instead of nursing it to full vigor. There are groups that tend to confirm the individuals in their preconceived ideas and their class prejudices. And there are individuals who have the fatal power of poisoning minds, of preventing agreement, of arousing passions and breaking up promising negotiations. The organization of groups will not of itself eliminate these individuals. Nor will group life make every individual tolerant, intellectually honest, reasonable and willing to profit by frank discussion and good tempered criticism. There are persons who cannot work with others. Egotism, vanity, impatience, tactlessness, pettiness of spirit, jealousy and envy are motives or factors of which no amount of laborious effort to organize group life will rid us. In rejecting the Utopias of dogmatic reformers we should not fall into the error of assuming that every individual can be purged and ennobled by group life. Human nature as we know it in action is bound to retreat on any contrivances devised to circumvent its unlovely and anti-social attributes.

Finally, group life alone will not create the new society or solve our problems for us. The need for programmes, platforms, definite plans and intellectual formulas will remain. Take the wage system. It is true that group life and group discussion between employers and employed will arouse sympathy where now there may be hostility. But it is also true that sympathy alone will never solve the problem of industrial relations. If, for example, cooperation be superior to the wage system, and industrial democracy be the ultimate remedy for the ills of the modern industrial order, sympathy alone will not bring about the change from the one to the other. The "socialization of the will" will not solve our industrial problem unless the socialized will leads the intellect to study, develop and use the cooperative system. Solutions are worked out by the intellect and the reason. The good will *facilitates* the working out of the solution and its application.

The new state or new society is coming, but it is coming because the men and women of the present state or society, particularist though they may be, are seeking solutions of apprehended and realized problems, remedies for serious evils, wrongs, conflicts that are causing us pain and anxiety. And this being true, the new state is like Rome—all ways lead to it. It is the conscious goal of many, but the unconscious goal of many more. The thoughtful or curious will endeavor to understand the events and developments in which they live and move, and group life undoubtedly promotes such

understanding. Yet it is extremely naive to suppose that the right interpretation of life is impossible to-day because we are not thoroughly organized on the group basis. Now, we have in fact what may be called group thinking and group discussion even though the external forms of the group life are lacking. We have books, scientific societies, trade unions, clubs, forums, periodicals and newspapers. What one man says to-day, another man criticizes and supplements to-morrow. What one man says or writes in London, many men read, discuss, modify in New York, Paris, Rome, Geneva, Moscow, Berlin. Debate, though not always direct and formal, is carried on all over the civilized world. We cannot bring the debaters together and force them into Procrustean groups. Groups are national and international, and not merely local. It is quite certain that the narrower group life will not lessen the value of the discussion that is carried on *across* boundaries and frontiers.

And, since opinions are formed in mysterious and subtle ways, the individual who is aware of his kinship with all sorts of groups and yet is independent of all; the individual who has found himself by associating with others, testing his views in the light of suggestions, corrections and qualifications by others, will insist on finally registering his opinion and casting his vote *as an individual*. In the last analysis his opinion will be an individual opinion. Personality is not swamped by group life, but accentuated. Differences are not rubbed and polished out of existence. They remain, and they must be reflected and represented in any political or social organization that undertakes to deal with matters of common concern. Where unanimity is impossible—and this is the typical rather than the exceptional case—decisions must be made by majorities or by minorities. Group life, therefore, will not scrap our parliamentary machinery, our ballot boxes, our referendums, our ingenious schemes of proportional representation, our constitutions and by-laws. There will be more freedom in the new state, more toleration, more voluntary co-operation, more justice, and much less brutal compulsion. The pillars of the new state will be Education, Opportunity, Discussion and Respect for Personality. We must fashion, construct and erect these pillars with such instruments, and from such materials, as we have at hand, and while both these essentials, instruments and materials, are themselves capable of improvement, we cannot fold our hands and remain idle simply because the instruments and materials now available fall far short of perfection. New states are not built in a decade, or a century. Each generation must contribute its mite to the new state.

WHEN JESUS THREW DOWN THE GAUNTLET.

PART II.

BY WM. WEBER.

IT is perfectly clear what was to be expected as the first outcome of the attack of Jesus. The chief priests would hurry to the scene in order to arrest and punish the reckless offender who had denounced them before all the people as robbers. They had at their disposal a well disciplined temple police that, under ordinary circumstances, would not hesitate to execute the commands of their superiors and avenge the dignity of the priests. An attack upon priests in the temple, while they were performing their sacerdotal duties, was not a matter of slight importance. A personal encounter between Jesus and the chief priests could have been avoided only if the former had turned to flight and left the temple and the city before the latter could arrive. By doing so, however, he would have condemned himself; and his deed would have been judged the thoughtless act of a fool. But Jesus did not flee; he had not acted upon the spur of the moment. What he had done, had been considered carefully in all its details and consequences. For that reason, the account of the cleansing of the temple, provided it has been handed down to us complete, requires a continuation. The only question is where to find it.

The immediately following words of the First Gospel: "And the blind and the lame came to him in the temple; and he healed them." (Matt. xxi. 14) cannot be that continuation. The words are found only in Matthew and, thus, do not belong to the original Synoptic source. The people indeed may and must have recognized in what Jesus did a Messianic or, at least, a prophetic manifesto. Those who were present have certainly told afterwards their friends and companions who had not witnessed the act what they had seen and heard. But quite a time must have passed till the rumor of the great event reached the lame and blind and led them to Jesus. For the time being, all the eye witnesses would stay and await further

developments. The men who had been driven away were bound to hasten to the chief priests, report what had happened to them, and ask for assistance.

Verse 15-17 is likewise a fragment unconnected with the context. The statement is found only in the First Gospel. The words: "And when the chief priests and the scribes saw the wonderful things that he did and the children that were crying in the temple" refer partly to the healing of the lame and the blind; but otherwise the passage deals exclusively with the children that were shouting Hosanna. The question asked of Jesus is: "Hearest thou what these are saying?" Therefore, the words "saw the wonderful things that he did and" must be stricken from the text as an editorial addition and be replaced by the verb "heard." The original text read: "But when the chief priests and the scribes heard the children." The verses under discussion belong probably to the Matthew version of the Triumphal Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem and the temple, forming its end. They join verse 11 or rather the first sentence of verse 12 "and Jesus entered into the temple of God." Either these words displaced a similar statement introducing the cleansing of the temple, or the latter obliterated the former.

Mark xi. 18 we read: "And the chief priests and the scribes heard, and sought how they might destroy him: for they feared him, for all the multitude was astonished at his teaching." These words are certainly intended to close the cleansing episode, but fail to do so. Grammatically the absence of the direct object of "hearing" is suspicious although our translations supply that want by adding "it." But even if the Greek text contained the equivalent of that pronoun, we should expect the chief priests to enter in person. What is still more important, only the teaching of Jesus is mentioned. The cleansing of the temple cannot be called "teaching"; it was decidedly a valiant deed, an attack on the priests. Thus Mark xi. 18 in only an unsuccessful attempt of reconstructing the missing conclusion to verse 15-17.

The Fig Tree of Matt. xxi. 18-22 and Mark xi. 19-25 does not refer to the cleansing of the temple and is missing in Luke. Besides, what happened according to Matthew the morning after, occurred according to Mark partly before the cleansing of the temple. (Mark xi. 12-14 and 19-25.) Verse 19-25 by the way contain sayings of Jesus which were pronounced according to the other Gospels at a different occasion and are not connected with the withered fig tree.

Luke xix. 47-48 reads: "And he was teaching daily in the

temple. But the chief priests and the scribes were seeking to destroy him and the principal men of the people; and they could not find what they might do; for the people all clung to him listening." Here again a stylistic incongruity has to be noticed. The last group of people who are the subjects of the first sentence, the principal men of the people, stands in the wrong place. Our translations have corrected that anomaly, which indicates the hand of a glossator. But apart from that, the passage does not refer to the cleansing of the temple but to the daily teaching of Jesus.

Not before Matt. xxii. 23-25, Mark xi. 27-33, and Luke xx. 1-8 do we come upon a paragraph which may resume our interrupted narrative. In the first place, all three Gospels present unmistakable parallel accounts which agree to a large extent verbally.

Matt. xxi. 23 in its present condition is connected with the immediately preceding statement. It says: "And when he was come into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came unto him as he was teaching, and said, By what authority doest thou these things? And who gave you this authority?" But that question could not have been prompted by the teaching of Jesus. For the Jews at that period enjoyed that perfect religious liberty which enabled anyone to express his religious convictions even in the synagogue and the temple no matter whether those in control at those places agreed with them or not. When a Jewish stranger entered a synagogue on a sabbath, courtesy required the officers of the synagogue to invite the visitor to deliver a religious address. (Comp. Act. xiii. 15.) In the same way, the halls of the temple were at the free disposal of any Jewish teacher who could attract and hold an audience. That privilege was the great inheritance left the Jewish nation by their prophets. That alone, combined with the corresponding eagerness of the Jews to listen to religious discussions, enabled Jesus as well as after him his apostles to accomplish the prophetic part of their task. The chief priests not less than the rulers and members of the synagogues might reject certain teachings; the priests, the captain of the temple, and the Sadducees in general did so when the apostles proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus in the temple. Yet they could not prevent them from going on with their preaching. (Act. iv. 1ff.) Under these conditions, the question "By what authority doest thou these things?" cannot refer to the teaching of Jesus. He was not expected to possess a license to preach.

This conclusion arrived at with regard to the Matthew version

is true also with respect to the parallel Luke text: "And it came to pass on one of the days as he was teaching the people in the temple and preaching the gospel, there came upon him the chief priests and scribes with the elders." One expects rather to find the participles of the Greek text, which in our translation are rendered as temporal clauses, not in the genitive absolute, but in the dative case. For the verb meaning "come upon" requires the dative. The tautology of "teaching the people" and "preaching the gospel" is likewise apt to arouse suspicion. Both things suggest the hand of an editor or compiler.

Mark xi. 27-28 has a different introduction, confirming thereby the impression, gained so far, that these introductions do not belong to the original Synoptic text. It reads: "And they came again to Jerusalem: and as he was walking in the temple, there came to him the chief priests and the scribes and the elders; and they said unto him, By what authority doest thou these things? or who gave thee this authority to do these things?" It is hardly necessary to point out how little the occasion accounts for the question. To take a walk through the temple, with the exception of the part reserved for the priests, was the right of every Jew.

Consequently we cannot doubt but that the original Matthew version was: "And the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him and said, By what authority does thou these things? and who gave you this authority?" Mark read: "And the chief priests and the scribes came to him and said, By what authority doest thou these things? or who gave you the authority to do these things?" Luke found in his source: "And the chief priests and scribes came upon him and said, Tell us by what authority thou doest these things? or who is he that gave you this authority?" All three versions are derived evidently from a common source and all refer to what Jesus was doing just at that moment. As our Gospels tell of no other deed of Jesus except the cleansing of the temple, the question of the chief priests and the answer of Jesus must be the looked for continuation of that episode.

The double question of the Synoptic tradition is significant. There were two possibilities; Jesus either was acting on his own initiative; or he was executing the orders of somebody else. In the first case, his interlocutors wanted him to prove his right of interfering with their business or suffer the consequences. In the second case, they wanted to identify the person who had commissioned Jesus to attack them in order to get hold of the real culprit. Jesus

apparently avoided to answer that question. He said according to Luke xx. 3-4: "I also will ask you a question, and ye shall tell me, Was the baptism of John from heaven or from men?" The meaning of those words is determined easily enough. First of all, Jesus assumes full responsibility for what he had done. There was no man higher up. Furthermore, John the Baptist had come as forerunner of the Messiah. He had announced the latter's near arrival, and his baptism of his chosen ones in the Holy Spirit whereas his adversaries were to be baptized in fire. All who believed the message of the Baptist, were baptized by him in water and thereby were assured of belonging to the kingdom of God and His Messiah provided they brought forth fruit worthy of repentance. The priests could not misunderstand the meaning of the counter-question. Jesus claimed, while not expressly, yet very distinctly to be the Messiah of John the Baptist. The priests disdained to answer the question of Jesus. They were not prepared to discuss their ideas of the Messianic kingdom with him nor to admit the divine character of the baptism of John. To deny the latter in the face of the multitude that listened with the keenest attention to the bandying of threatening and defiant questions, would have exposed them to the danger of being stoned on the spot. So they preferred to keep their peace and leave the last word to Jesus.

The Mark and Matthew versions agree in all essential details with that of the Third Gospel. The statement "and I will tell you by what authority I do these things" (Mark xi. 29 comp. Matt. xxi. 24) is superfluous in view of the parting shot of Jesus (Matt. xxi. 27, Mark xi. 33, and Luke xx. 8) and only obscures the actual significance of the question of Jesus.

The words: "And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why did ye not believe him? But if we shall say, From men; all the people will stone us: for they are persuaded that John was a prophet," must not be taken too literally. They are a comment of the author, who in my opinion was an eye witness and one of the disciples. But as to the thoughts of the chief priests, he could venture only a guess. He knew, of course, what Jesus would have said if they had admitted the heavenly character of John's baptism; and what the people would have done if they had denied it. Jesus, by the way, may have said, "Why do ye not believe him?" Hebrew and Aramaic have no present, past and future tenses; thus the tense one chooses in translating a Semitic verb into an Indo-Germanic language depends to a

large extent upon what the translator thinks the text ought to say. If Jesus, by asking the priests for their opinion about the baptism of John, intended to intimate to them that he was the Messiah, he would have used the present tense: "Why do ye not believe?" As a matter of fact, the answer of the priests was "They knew not whence it was." That was, however, dictated less by fear and diplomacy than by anger and disappointment. They had hastened to the scene with their guards to arrest and to punish the impudent intruder who had dared to disturb the peace of the holy place. Their intention was not to argue with him whosoever he might be. But the people whom they found with Jesus in overwhelming numbers and ready to defend him against anybody, compelled them to hide their discomfiture behind a gruff question and cover their retreat with a surly reply.

The account of the cleansing of the temple is interrupted a second time at Luke xx. 8, Mark xi. 33, and Matt. xxi. 27. The parable of the Two Sons (Matt. xxi. 28-32) cannot belong to it, as little as that of the Wicked Husbandmen of all the three Gospels. The first parable is not an integral part of the oldest Synoptic source because it occurs only in one of the Gospels. A second reason for removing both parables from their present position is furnished by the circumstances under which they would have been told where they now stand. Since the chief priests were not disposed to argue with Jesus, they would not care to linger and listen to his speeches. They might order some of their agents to remain and report what Jesus would say and do. But their personal importance and dignity would not permit them to expose themselves to any further criticism by their aggressor.

The parable of the Two Sons treats of the attitude of the Pharisees towards the publicans and sinners. Jesus defends the latter because they had accepted the message of the Baptist while the former had paid no attention to John's call to repentance. It is this reference to the prophet which caused the compiler of the Gospel to insert the parable in its present place. As a matter of fact, it must belong to the very first days of the ministry of Jesus when he still had to plead the cause of the Baptist instead of having to defend himself.

The parable of the Wicked Husbandmen is found in all three Gospels in the same place and must have been combined with the oldest Synoptic source at a very early date. It is not necessary to examine it in all its details. It is sufficient for our purpose to call

attention to a few prominent facts. We possess three to some extent different versions of the same parable. That of Luke is the shortest and from an artistic standpoint the most perfect of the three. Everything added to it in Matthew and Mark is immaterial and even retards the progress of the parable. For that reason the Luke edition represents in all probability the original parable as long, at least, as we have to claim for a masterful allegorical narrative a mastermind as author.

The point of the parable is easy to determine. The beloved son who is killed by the husbandmen is Jesus, the Messiah, himself. But the purpose is not to render the idea of the violent death of the Messiah familiar to the hearers. The latter are evidently supposed to know what the fate of the son had been. The object of the parable is to announce the punishment which God has decreed for the murderers of Jesus. Strange to say that punishment is not inflicted upon his mortal enemies, the chief priests and the elders of the people, but upon the Jewish nation. It consists in the rejection of the people of Israel and the adoption of another nation by God. That is stated directly Matt. xxi. 43: "Therefore say I unto you, The Kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and shall be given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof." That was not a new idea. John the Baptist had pronounced it already when he warned his hearers not to trust in their descent from Abraham but to bring forth fruit worthy of repentance; for God was able to raise up children unto Abraham of stones. (Luke iii. 8.) The parable of the Great Supper (Luke xiv. 16-24), expresses a similar thought. Because the murder of the Son is treated as an accomplished fact, and because the whole nation and not the actual criminals are punished for it, the parable does not fit into its present place. It is even doubtful whether Jesus can be the author of the parable. It almost looks as if it belonged to the apostolic age, the time when the controversy between Judaistic and Gentile Christianity was at its height. In any case, it interrupts the pericope of the Cleansing of the Temple where it now appears.

There must be a closing sentence which informs us that the chief priests and their companions attempted to arrest Jesus but had to desist on account of the hostile attitude of the people. That conclusion is found in the First Gospel Matt. xxi. 46. Verse 45 "And when the chief priests and the Pharisees heard his parables, they perceived that he spake of them," was added by the compiler to connect the parables with what we read in verse 46. That is

confirmed by the term "the chief priests and the Pharisees" which occurs in all only twice in the Synoptic Gospels. The same is true of Mark xii. 12 where we read: "For they perceived that he spake the parable against them," and of Luke xx. 19 where the same words are used. In these last two instances, the statement is entirely at odds with its context. The whole Mark passage is:

"And they sought to lay hold on him;
and they feared the multitude;
for they perceived that he spake the parable against them;
and they left him and went away."

Luke has: "And the scribes and the chief priests sought to lay hands on him
and they feared the people; in that very hour;
for they perceived that he spake this parable against them."

The third clause in Mark as well as in Luke ought to occupy the first place. For it does not furnish the reason why the enemies of Jesus feared the people; but could explain only why they sought to lay hands on him. The original ending of our narrative must therefore have read Matt. xxi. 26: "And when the chief priests and the elders of the people sought to lay hold on him, they feared the multitudes, because they took him for a prophet"; Mark xii. 12: "And they sought to lay hold on him; and they feared the multitude; and they left him and went away." Luke xx. 19: "And the chief priests and the scribes sought to lay hands on him in that very hour; and they feared the people."

It is worth while to combine the three fragments of our pericope in, at least, one of the three Gospels and thus restore the complete text. The Luke version consists of Luke xix. 45-46 and xx. 1-8 and 19.

"And he entered into the temple, and began to cast out them that sold, saying unto them, It is written, My house shall be a house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of robbers. And the chief priests and the scribes came upon him, and they spake, saying unto him, By what authority doest thou these things? or who is he that gave thee this authority? And he answered and said unto them, I also will ask you a question; and ye shall tell me, Was the baptism of John from heaven or from men? And they reasoned with themselves saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why do ye not believe him? But if we shall say, From men; all the people will stone us: for they are persuaded that John was a prophet. And they answered, that they knew not whence it was. And Jesus said

unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things. And the chief priests and the scribes sought to lay hands on him in that very hour; but they feared the people."

Before closing this investigation, we have to examine the remainder of the Johannine account. In verse 18 "the Jews" ask Jesus: "What sign showest thou to us, seeing that thou doest these things?" That differs considerably from the Synoptic tradition. The men who address Jesus thus seem willing to recognize him as Messiah, as whom he had designated himself by calling the temple his Father's house, provided he could prove his claim by a miracle. The answer of Jesus is still farther removed from the Synoptic answer. He offers them a sign in saying: "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." There has been some discussion whether those words have to be taken in their literal or in a figurative sense. There are scholars who insist on the literal meaning. They point to the answer of the Jews: "Forty and six years was this temple in building; and wilt thou raise it up in three days?" But if the opponents of Jesus had been sure that Jesus meant the real temple, they would hardly have returned that answer. They would rather, as I am inclined to think, have denounced his proposition as a sacrilege and demanded sufficient guarantees. Therefore, the Jews must have misunderstood the words of Jesus on purpose in order to ridicule his apparently foolish boast. But Jesus never posed as a wizard who could erect gorgeous palaces over night by his magic art or the help of a jinnee as that is done in fairy tales. For the reason, the words ascribed to Jesus must have a figurative sense just as are told in verse 23: "He spoke of the temple of his body."

The answer of Jesus to those who wanted to be shown a sign means in other words: Take my life; you cannot kill me anyhow; in three days I shall rise again from the dead. But such a reply would fit into the situation only if his opponents had first threatened him with death. But such a threat is not mentioned. Therefore verse 18-22 does not continue the story of the cleansing of the temple. That conclusion is corroborated by the testimony of the Synoptic Gospels. For Jesus cannot have spoken the words recorded there and those of John ii. 18ff. at one and the same occasion.

There are a few more observations, pointing to the same fact. The Synoptic Gospels speak also of the craving for a sign, or a sign from heaven. (Comp. Matt. xii. 38f., xvi. 1-4, Mark viii. 11f., Luke xi. 16, 29f.) But Jesus refuses outright to give such a sign.

To quote the last passage, he said: "This generation is an evil generation: it seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah. For even as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation." If Jesus refused invariably to give a sign, how can he have promised a sign John ii. 19? Of course, Matt. xii. 40, the attempt is made to explain the sign of Jonah in such a way as to make it a counterpart of the resurrection of Jesus. But verse 41-42 as well as the above quoted Luke passage prove that the sign of Jonah was simply his message to the people of Nineveh. Verse 40 is a gloss as appears even from the fact that Jesus is said to have been three days and three nights in the heart of the earth while, as a matter of fact, he was raised from the dead within a little more than twenty-four hours after his burial according to Matt. xxviii. 1ff., Matt. xxvi. 61 Jesus is accused of having said: "I am able to destroy the temple of God and to build it in three days." Mark xiv. 58 the temple is modified, first, as made with hands and, second, as made without hands. These modifiers, of course, must have been added later on in view of the Matthew and John text. There is, however, one more important difference between the Synoptic and Johannine versions. According to the first, Jesus said: "I will destroy," according to the second, "Destroy ye." There exists probably some relationship between the two. But whether the Matthew and Mark passage is based upon John ii. 19 or the latter has been derived from the first two Gospels is hard to decide. It does not belong in any case to the oldest Synoptic source; for it does not appear in Luke.

One thing seems to be clear; the original continuation of the story of the Cleansing of the Temple in John was lost when that gospel was compiled; and therefore the compiler himself may have written John ii. 18-22 to round out his incomplete narrative. Echoes of the original end of the Johannine account are possibly found in several statements of John vii. as in verse 30: "They sought to take him: and no man laid his hand on him," verse 32: "and the chief priests and the Pharisees sent officers to take him," and verse 45-49: "The officers came to the chief priests and the Pharisees; and they said unto them, Why did ye not bring him? The officers answered, Never man so spake. The Pharisees therefore answered them, Are ye also led astray? Hath any of the rulers believed on him, or of the Pharisees? But this multitude that knoweth not the law are accursed."

A strange spectacle has been revealed unto us. The most

prominent men of the Jewish nation, the hereditary priests and the learned scribes, join forces for the purpose of annihilating Jesus. For he had exposed the latter as false prophets and the former as robbers. Jesus stands forth as a hero because he had not hesitated to challenge both powerful groups of people for the sake of truth and righteousness although he was fully aware of what they could and would do to him. It seems strange how history repeats itself. It was the sale of indulgences for the benefit of the chief priests of Rome, the people objected to in the age of the Reformation. That protest led to their rejecting some doctrines of the Church which had been designed to hold the nations under the yoke of Rome. At present our own Protestant Churches appear to be infected with the germ of greed. They vie with each other which organization can raise the largest amount of money for the furtherance of their own ends, as if the service of God were identical with the worship of Mammon. There is but one difference between the age of Jesus and our own times. At that period the chief priests and the scribes formed two independent bodies. To-day the chief priests of the golden calf hold also the office of the scribes and are therefore more powerful than ever before.



THOMAS AQUINAS

1225-1274

After a Painting in the Church of San Domenico at Naples

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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ARGUMENTA AB AMORE ET INVIDIA DUCTA.

BY HENRY BRADFORD SMITH.

“For, of a truth, Love and Strife were aforetime
and shall be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless
time be emptied of that pair.”

—Burnet’s translation of the
Fragments of Empedocles.

EMERSON once remarked, on the occasion of addressing one of Professor Child’s classes at Cambridge, “Gentlemen, in twenty years the ranking list will be inverted,”—the last shall be first and the first last. Emerson, you will say, was not the man to give expression to this truth, if truth it be, for he had graduated well down in the list of his classmates. The circumstance of his remark was further aggravated by the fact that Professor Child had himself taken all the junior honors within the reach of even the most extraordinary student.

There are at least three ways in which the scientist might test the validity of the Emersonian law. He might settle the matter sociologically by an appeal to statistical information. Or he might seek a psychological explanation. He might observe that white children of a certain age placed in the school-room with children of other races are far outdistanced by the latter; but that if the two groups were observed together at a later date it might be found that the positive difference first observed had not only vanished but had been reversed. And so it might be with college students. A man whose mental maturity is complete at twenty has no serious competitor in the man whose full powers have only begun to unfold themselves a decade later. Finally, the scientist might seek the deeper *raison d’être* among the facts of biology. He observes, for example, that the individual with the greater potentialities realizes these potentialities at the slower rate.

I have tried to give to Emerson's clever remark a certain verisimilitude, because I should like it to be granted for the moment that, in spite of the fact that he is prejudiced in its favor, he may yet have hit upon something like the truth. In point of fact, which of the two men, Emerson or Professor Child, would be the more likely to discover the truth, the one prejudiced at the outset in its favor, or the one who would naturally be set against it from the beginning? I am, in fact, about to attempt "in the teeth of general fame" a sort of justification of prejudice. I am going to attempt, as it were, an apology not only for the human value of human prejudice but in particular a defense of its scientific value as well. The truth just considered, if it be a statistical result, will not of necessity be verified in all of its applications. The case of Emerson would certainly be one that would bear it out; but Smith or Brown or Jones, if predisposed in its favor, might equally well discover it, even if their own cases represented exceptions to the rule. Here, then, the desire that something should be true would facilitate its discovery.

The pathway of science is strewn with illustrations that point the same moral. Had the Babylonians not believed that the stars of heaven controlled the high matters of human destiny they would never have found the patience, century on century, to record their observations; and Hellenism, one of the few sporadic attempts of man to surpass man, that renaissance of the oriental world, would have inherited no science upon which to build. Modern chemistry owes its present advancement in no small part to the persistent efforts of the alchemist to transmute the baser metals into gold, and the misguided attempt of the geometer to square the circle by the aid of rule and compass alone has left its mark on the science and furnished the clue to the discovery of unsuspected truths. If the world in which we find ourselves provokes our curiosity, it is because we build it up out of those aspects of reality that interest us. "Nothing has been accomplished in the world," says Hegel, "without interest, and, if interest be called passion, we may affirm that nothing great has been brought about in the world without passion on the part of the actors." But it is important to remark that the truth which beckons is not always the one finally verified, just as the benefit sought is rarely the one accepted in the end. The law of conservation of energy followed on the search for perpetual motion, and more wealth has flowed from the applications of chemistry than the alchemist could well have dreamed.

The intellectual crank is not altogether admirable and most of us entertain a normal dislike for the qualities that make him up. If we are not shrewd enough to put a finger on the mental screws that are loose in him, it is easy to fall back upon his social eccentricities. The world of Dante, with the earth at the centre of the universe and the seven heavens encircling it, with Jerusalem at the top and the mountain of Purgatory, displaced by Satan, as he plunged down from the Empyrean, at the bottom, was of course a normal conception for him. The astronomical crank of his day would be the man who espoused, as against this geocentric conception, the eccentric opinion that the universe is heliocentric at bottom, the evidence of our senses to the contrary notwithstanding. A man who could soberly express such views would be capable of inventing other absurdities and it was the custom of that day to put him quietly out of the way "without the shedding of blood." The majority of men has always insisted upon its inalienable right to deal as it sees fit with the "abnormal" minority which strays too far from the norm.

As all the world knows there is an ocean of humbug which circulates as current opinion and which passes unrebuked. Only this morning a contributor writes to a column of my morning newspaper: "In all the pros and cons set forth in the daylight controversy I have never yet seen advanced the thought that it must have an influence toward weakening the regard for truth in the young. Why do we want to teach and uphold the camouflaging of natural facts?" This person, you will say, ought to be burned at the stake in the interest of truth. But his view is based upon an ignorance that is generally shared. Its author gets off scot free because he stands with his majority. What is the human value of such a prejudice however universal and consequently human it may be? But,—it is so, the answer is simple enough. The opinion in question could never have been set down, if the author had ever consciously and habitually distinguished between natural fact, which is resistant to man's whim that it be otherwise, and human convention, which may be altered at will. Cap and bells, as so often before, has raised a philosophic question, has raised in effect a whole nest of difficulties. Let him continue to speak in your imagination. "Truth, yes truth, a fine word! But is there, then, an absolute truth, which accordingly demands an absolute respect? And, if truth be only relative, who then will designate the relative respect which is its due? And the young! How far may we dare to initiate

them in the mystery of truth while they are still young? Just how much does one's own infallibility weight in the balance against the infallibility of another " Decidedly, every morsel of simon-pure crankism serves its purpose if one may only divine the cosmic intent. The reiteration of banalities destroys the force of their meaning, and the selective as opposed to the acquisitive memory tends to slough them off and they drift towards their proper fate among the clouds of forgetfulness. One does not pursue the obvious for it waits upon his coming. It will still be there when he returns. The truth about nature loves to hide, said Heracleitus. You must catch it in its passage, because it is fleeting and rare. The instinct to collect butterflies is deeper than the collector's instinct.

No belief has a firmer seat in the mind of the day-to-day scientist than the one which says that the order of nature is independent of our human desires. Needless to say this attitude of mind is not one that has always been in the world. Springing up along side of the anthropomorphic and the anthropocentric conception of nature, it has made its way in face of the gravest difficulties and only after centuries of effort is its victory finally assured. That such a prejudice has been of priceless value to human progress will not have to be urged upon any mind that is well informed and the proof lies in the fact that it will hardly be recognized by anyone as prejudice at all. Nevertheless, stated without limitations, it is strictly untrue.

The belief that the order of nature is independent of our human desires expresses itself in certain of the maxims of scientific procedure. Whenever you desire to settle the truth or the untruth of any general statement about the world, the scientist will tell you, let the matter be put to the test of experiment. Seek not the issue of truth in the inner, but rather in the outer world. This view of the case seems sane enough until you examine it at closer range. Suppose that you inquire how the experimental evidence is to be gathered unless you are furnished beforehand with some hypothesis that you desire to be true, in whose favor you are already prejudiced at the outset. Or suppose you were to ask how the laws of chance could be established experimentally; or what kind of an experiment it would be that would tell us whether the space we inhabit is the Euclidean sort we learned to regard as absolute in school, or the Riemannian kind that we became acquainted with in later life. You may if you ply your scientist with these and similar inquiries compel him finally to admit that there may well be questions of

fact that cannot be answered by any direct appeal to natural facts. Is it not, then, more than possible that some of the basic features of the world may be subject to human choice and that this choice may be made to conform to deep lying human desires? "The heart hath its own reasons," said Pascal, "which are unknown to reason." Thus Riemannian space might be chosen as the space of our habitat for no better reason than that it makes the facts of celestial physics easier for us to grasp or our astronomical calculations easier to perform or even the evolution of living matter a simpler thing to understand. Living organisms have not yet been produced in the laboratory of the scientist but it is certain that they have somehow been created in the laboratory of the world. This may easily be because of some circumstance that operates in nature but remains outside of man's control, such as a difference of potential, or temperature, or pressure, of cosmic magnitude. The creation of life might require the condition of a "curvature" of space demanding stellar distances in which to operate, but inappreciable within the shorter spaces under man's control.

The sphere, in which personal bias plays perhaps its most notably useful and important role, is the writing of history. The "objective" historian, who opposes this view, we shall have with us always, like the rest of the poor in spirit; but his claims are readily exposed. According to this creature we must venture as little as may be beyond the "documents" themselves. We must stand by the *ipsisima verba* at the risk of perverting the truth. If he sticks to his guns,—he is *par excellence* the man who sticks to his dates—history is for him a colorless chronicle, whose only objective character is the "facts" and their chronological order. His task would then be to establish this order "without bias" and his history the documents set side by side. It is obvious from Euclid that his shelves, like the sentences of Kant, would have to be measured by a railroad engineer.

What he does, then, in practice is to foreshorten the picture; not, indeed, by abstractions, the "most trenchant of epitomizers," for that would be his personal medium operating to pervert the truth; but rather by leaving out of account the unimportant facts, the ones that have no bearing upon the drama in its larger outlines. But see you not, Sir Historiographer, that by this admission the whole humbug about objectivity and the impersonal narrative is exposed? You *choose* the facts. Very well, Sir, and how do you choose them and why? Because they illustrate some general point

of view, which is your own. Because they illuminate some personal insight suggested by your own personal bias and interesting in so far as your imagination is daring, colorful, shrewd and—objective. In this sense history is more than romance and only the poet can be safely entrusted to write it. Alexander Dumas pointed this out long ago but such seeds fall on stony ground. It was the novelist's own habit, when writing of an event, to construct, as the phrase goes, *a priori* all of its parts down to the minutest detail. He surpassed all other men in the range and in the accuracy of his topographical imagination; and whenever he took the trouble to visit the scene of his historical dramas, which he did upon occasion, when the historical accounts contradicted his own, he invariably discovered that he was right and that the historian was wrong. The search for objectivity, like the search for happiness, baffles all stupid folk, who know not how to forego the direct approach.

If it be true that the historian selects those facts which illuminate his private point of view, it is no less true that the facts themselves are amenable to his interpretations. Facts to the unimaginative are hard and fast things but to the spiritually-minded they are plastic. The mind of Plato is an historical fact. Who, then, was Plato? Was this mind best known to the author of the Dialogues? Beyond a doubt to Plato himself some aspects of it were pretty well revealed. But did he know it as it was really constituted? It is warranted that he possessed no such gift. I will wager that his illustrious pupil, Aristotle, knew its defects and its excellencies better than he knew them himself. Or was Plato the mind that was so well known to the scholars of the Renaissance? Each one of these points of view about the fact in question contains a measure of the truth but none is absolute. Round about every historical fact there circles a halo of ambiguity and it is within the limits of this halo that the interpretation of the historian may have free range. The rim of fact is clear-cut only for him who has no magnifying lens at hand.

SCIENCE, DOGMA AND BIAS IN SOCIAL REFORM.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

BIOLOGISTS, economists and sociologists are disposed to resent lay opposition to, or skepticism toward, their "scientific" judgments and conclusions. How dare uneducated, untrained persons question and even resist the verdicts handed down in the name of Social Science? Why are not economic, political, sociological or biological authorities entitled to the same respect and deference with which astronomers, physicists, chemists and geologists are treated by the general public? Why should not science be cheerfully accepted as the leader and guide in social reform? Why should not lawmakers consult men of science instead of heterogeneous, ignorant and prejudiced constituencies? Would not humanity advance toward its goal—that of Justice and Solidarity and Brotherly Relations—much more rapidly than it is advancing—if it is advancing at all—if the competent and the learned, the seekers of Truth for its own sake, and the disinterested were, by common consent, empowered to lay down policies and frame legislation for modern communities?

In view of the impatience of many radicals with the slow, "inert" majority, and of the readiness of many of them to resort to brute force and violence for the sake of their noble ideals, it may be well to answer the foregoing questions after putting one's self in the place of a true spokesman of the conservative majority. If the inarticulate average mass were to speak and explain its attitude toward social and political radicalism, what would it be apt to say?

In the first place, it would say this: "Social Physician, convert your brother physicians to your diagnosis and remedies before asking and expecting us to swallow the latter on faith. We may be ignorant, but we know that you doctors and scholars disagree on almost every important issue. Which of your factions or schools are we to follow?"

In the realm of social theory and proposed social reform there

are at least half a dozen schools of radical thought and some schools of liberal thought. Even the conservatives are not all intellectually bankrupt and negligible. Where, then, is that Social Science which lays claim to the role of master and sovereign guide?

"Produce your Science, secure its acceptance by the cultivated and trained," we may imagine the majority as saying, "and you will have a case worthy of our consideration." And who can answer this satisfactorily?

Yet the majority need not be, and is not, contented or complacent. It knows and feels that the present social order is in many respects repugnant to our sense of justice, of humanity, of decency. It knows that there is too much special privilege in society, and too much unmerited misery and suffering. It knows that too many of those who toil and practice the fundamental virtues are condemned to narrow, joyless, sordid lives, and that many others, though willing and anxious to toil, lack even the opportunity of earning their daily bread. Assuredly, the average conservative or moderate will say, there are great wrongs and iniquities in our system, and it behooves us to ponder the profound problem and work out its solution. But while awaiting that happy consummation, what is the majority to do?

Destroy the present system on the theory that nothing could possibly be worse, and that the majority has nothing to lose by taking a plunge into chaos? The human mind is too reasonable, the influence of common sense is too strong, to offer much encouragement to the insignificant groups of destructive revolutionists who proceed upon that theory. The majority has something, nay *much*, to lose, and will not gamble with the essential features of the present order. The majority will never adopt the fanatical slogan, "The worse, the better." Intolerable oppression and ruthless tyranny of individuals or small groups have at times provoked savage revolutionary outbreaks, but no sober-minded person will compare the conditions of modern society in Western Europe or America with the conditions which begot the French revolution or the Russian revolution of our own day. The evils and maladjustments of which we have spoken do indeed cause us anxiety and deep concern, but they are not of the kind, or degree, that cause violent social explosions. There has been, and there is promise of, too much evolutionary progress to warrant blind fury and resentment.

Talk of red terror and sanguinary social warfare is indulged

in, as a rule, by youthful and inexperienced enthusiasts who have read a few books, but have not had the discipline of human contacts and stubborn facts that check impulse, correct error and teach patience and give-and-take.

However, though the fulminations and empty threats of the destructive radicals need not be taken too seriously, this cannot be said of the smug satisfaction and shallow optimism of the unthinking conservatives, or of the blind and perverse obscurantism of the social Bourbons. These things must be taken very seriously indeed. They are dangerous, if sophomoric and derivative radicalism is not. It is to be borne in mind at all times that, though the burden of proof rests on the innovators and the reform agitators—and the majority instinctively places, and justly the burden right there—the correlative of receiving, considering, weighing the evidence and the arguments presented against the present order rests upon its supporters and defenders.

The immemorial controversy between statics and dynamics, the established and the new, the present and the future, is too often forgotten both by the conservatives and the radicals of a particular epoch. The former act on the implied belief that change is bad and undesirable *per se*, and that humanity longs for stability, safety, routine. The latter appear to think that humanity is restless, eager for change, hungry for adventures and dubious experiments. The truth, of course, is that humanity is always divided against itself, wanting change, yet disliking and fearing innovations that upset or disturb its habits and settled ways. Variety is the spice of life, yet most of us are reluctant to make hazardous experiments. We complain of the present, but flying to possible and probable evils we know not of, strikes us as quite unreasonable. Historic institutions, on the whole, are what they are because they fit human nature and the conditions under which they function. They are not accidents. They are growths and adaptations. They take root. They respond, however, to changes in the conditions which surround and nourish them, and gradually they may become so altered in aspect and composition as to be unrecognizable. But, in arguing for deliberate changes in institutions, we must demonstrate that the latter have ceased to fit conditions and human nature and have become, or are in process of becoming, obstacles and nuisances.

This is exactly what the sober-minded evolutionary reformer undertakes to do. He has no quarrel with the past. He has a sense of fact or reality. He merely contends and proves that, be-

cause certain developments have already taken place, certain other developments are certain to follow and ought not to be obstructed. The evolutionary reformer facilitates inevitable change by interpreting it, by preparing minds for it, by dispelling prejudice and misgivings. He is not arrogant, for even if he sees the situation steadily and sees it whole, and is in the main right in his diagnosis and prognosis, he is yet aware that no great social change takes place strictly according to philosophers' programmes and schedules. He is prepared for large concessions to his opponents, for modifications of his best-laid plans. Such a temper or attitude of mind is clearly incompatible with bigotry and fanatical dogmatism.

Thus we see that the slow, conservative majority has more reason on its side in refusing to be stampeded by revolutionists than the latter have for railing at or condemning the majority.

How ridiculous, in truth, are those impatient radicals who, because the majority does not swallow their notions and scrap the existing social order at their bidding, lose all faith in humanity and gloomily pronounce its doom! What engineer, architect or builder would first make plans, reach conclusions, and then, finding that he has not reckoned with his materials, savagely attack innocent parts of nature—wood, stone, iron, ore, etc.? The man of science first studies his materials and his tools. He does not undertake what he cannot execute. He is not disappointed or angry when he discovers that a certain pillar will stand only a certain stress. He does not indict nature. He does not "curse God and die" because facts fail to support fancies or working hypotheses. Why should the social reformer feel free to draw up Utopias, to devise plans, without first making perfectly sure that his materials and instruments, human beings, are ready to act the parts assigned to them?

Nothing is more common than the complaint that men are unduly governed by bias and by self-interest. As if human life could exist if there were no bias and no self-interest! Men simply cannot act contrary to their own instincts, intuitions, judgments, experiences. Even the grossest superstitions are based on what their victims believe to be the evidence of their senses, the processes of reason, the testimony of vital experience. No man will ever disregard what he feels to be a fact in favor of what some one else paints to him in rosy colors as a sound theory. The cure for superstition, in politics as in religion, is knowledge—that is, more and fuller experience, a deeper and better understanding of facts. The rational reformer does not ask those whom he seeks

to convert to accept some one's opinions blindly, but to consider them, weigh them, test them in the light of direct and vital experience, and accept them only if, after such analysis and testing, they appear to be true. In other words, the rational reformer does not ask men to lift themselves by their own bootstraps, or to put away their own ideas and sentiments in favor of those of other men. He asks them to study new evidence, new interpretations of facts, and to modify their opinion in obedience to the inner compulsion of their own maturer judgments.

To take one illustration. Many years ago Spencer argued that the scientific or philosophical study of sociological problems is rendered peculiarly difficult by the bias of class, nationality, race, clique, narrow conceptions of self-interest, and the like. He affirmed that there was a patriotic bias and also an anti-patriotic bias, a class bias as well as a bias begotten of pride of opinion and congenital intolerance and bigotry. But he did not conclude that for these reasons a science of sociology must always be impossible. He only argued that such a science must be cautiously and patiently built up, allowance being made for every sort of counsel-darkening bias and painstaking to check and correct any particular bias by honestly estimating the strength of any conflicting bias. Truth and equilibrium are eventually reached by such matching of minds, prejudices, theories.

Now, are there any alternatives to this course? Only two are conceivable. One, as was said at the outset, is a Dictatorship that frankly repudiates free discussion and education, that relies exclusively on physical force and in the name of Justice and Humanity practices ruthless tyranny and resorts to the most inhumane and ferocious methods. Russian Bolshevism deliberately elected this course—with what consequences all but the willfully blind can now see. Evolution along healthy and democratic lines was rejected with contempt in 1917 by the Bolshevnik chiefs. They demanded get-reformed-quick policies. They preferred civil war and proletarian supremacy; because of that fatal choice they have inflicted cruel and widespread misery on the Russian masses, including their pet "class-conscious" wage workers in the cities. Civil war, hunger, pestilence, a brutish and degrading competition for food and other absolute necessities of life—these have been the fruits of the insensate war on "Capitalism."

The other possible alternative is such an absolutely sterile and irrational mysticism as, for example, Bernard Shaw has been

driven to embrace in his latest freakish book, "Back to Methuselah." Mr. Shaw began political and literary life as a Fabian Socialist. He never had the patience and the philosophy which he preached to others. But he has always been fundamentally serious and earnest. A few years ago he announced a new theology, but ethically and socially he remained true to his conception of Evolution and of Christianity. The world, he contended, must return to Religion and must reorganize its economic and material life in accordance with the spirit and essence of Christian doctrine. In Fabian Socialism, he asserted, lay the solution of the world's tragic problems, for that form of Socialism alone embodies the ideals common to Christians and scientific evolutionists. But where does he stand today? He despairs of humanity. He abandons hope. Human beings, as he knows them, have neither the wisdom nor the character required by Socialism. They will fumble, muddle, blunder, and eventually destroy what civilization there is unless, unless they succeed, by wishing and willing, in prolonging the average span of life to three hundred years! And how would a generation of Methuselchs solve the great problem of human conduct? By establishing Socialism? No; by further willing to abolish the body and become pure spirit!

Count Tolstoy, in his final phase of mysticism, invited humanity to commit suicide by taking vows of celibacy and heroically putting an end to the reproduction of the race. Shaw, though in sympathy with Tolstoy, cannot urge such a counsel of perfection on his contemporaries. He knows them too well—and he has humor. So he postpones the catastrophe, but at bottom he is a pessimist of the extremest type. He cannot join the destructive radicals, so he evolves out of his inner consciousness a pseudo-scientific mysticism of his own. Science and human nature have cruelly disappointed him: he has recourse to magic!

Now, neither of these alternatives is even remotely related to science, to history or to common sense. Terrible are indeed the sins and blunders of poor, groping, perplexed humanity. The world war was an indictment of our culture, our science, our international labor and reform organization, our trade and commerce, that was hard—almost impossible—to meet. There is no occasion for astonishment in the fact that the war caused dismay, despair and bitterness even among persons of exceptional poise and breadth of view. But after further and deeper reflection what conclusion does the normal mind reach? Why, the conclusion

that humanity has the power and the opportunity to direct its own moral and social development, and to eradicate or mitigate practically all the evils which offend our sense of justice and our generous sentiments. Our problems are grave and difficult, but none of them is insoluble. Indeed, to use the words of Prof. Stewart Paton in a new book on "Human Behavior," "The hope for the progress of civilization today has probably a more substantial basis to rest upon than at any other period in the history of the human race." Tens of thousands of earnest men and women are grappling with the questions we have inherited from the past—racial, national and class questions. Democracy has many faults, but its one supreme virtue is its inevitable insistence on equality of opportunity and the elimination of special privilege. Peace and social harmony are incompatible with privilege, and there is but little doubt as to which will have to "go." Special privilege—that's the enemy. It must be routed in every field which it has invaded. It breeds war at home and abroad. It is the child of avarice and greed and ignorance. It is responsible for the substitution of exploitation for service and fair dealing. Fight privilege and you attack the tap root of the worst features of our civilization.

Having realized this truth, and having enlisted a greater army in the campaign against privilege than was ever organized to defend civilization, shall we fritter away our strength by quarreling violently about little paper schemes and ingenious Utopias? Shall we despair of humanity because of differences among reformers just when an opportunity is offered of putting aside minor issues and launching a world-wide campaign for international and inter-class justice?

The slow, inert majority, to repeat, will follow neither the wild and frantic revolutionists nor disillusioned mystics like Bernard Shaw, whose ideas are fundamentally anti-social and unhistorical. The majority will follow constructive and reasonable leaders who know how to appeal to the best instead of the worst elements in human nature: who expect no miracles but who have faith and courage; who build on the rocks of natural bias and legitimate self-interest—which are reconcilable with sound Altruism—rather than in the sands of an imaginary, super-human freedom from bias and self-regarding motives.

Humanity longs for such leadership and is certain to follow it in the long run. Fanaticism of the all-or-nothing temper, dogmatism and arid mysticism will have their small, local and ephemeral

triumphs. Pessimism may be fashionable among the "superior" few who refuse to accept humanity, if not the universe, as it is. But the generality of mankind will pursue the even tenor of its empirical way, profit by trial and error, cross no bridges before reaching them and applying no solutions to problems not thoroughly dramatized and realized. The true scientific spirit makes allowance for the conservatism of the mass and is only amused by the antics of the social quacks and the theatrical revolutionists. It has faith in human nature and in human reason.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT INDIA.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

I. VEDIC SPECULATION.

THE great difficulty attached to our customary search for an orderly chronological development of a nation's life and thought is, particularly in the case of ancient India, that the records which come down to us are so seldom in perfect series that we are at a loss to really understand what were causes and what were effects of any certain element in that series. The internal evidence of ancient Indian records is so vaguely given out or the method of their composition is so abstracted from related external events, that the thread of historical continuity is altogether too tenuous, too fragile to permit our weaving from it a very strong fabric of knowledge; nor, as is sometimes sadly the case with other ancient climes, can we tailor enough cloth to keep out the chill of our utter ignorance of past civilizations, religions and philosophies.

When dealing with the cultural heritage of Modern India, even when represented by the polished eclecticism of such leading lights as Tagore or the two Swamis Dayanand and Vivekananda, we cannot help noticing that this historical difficulty stands to the forefront to a greater degree possibly than with any other of the world's major nations. And as the early religious writers of ancient India, thru a limitation either of intellectual or practical interest, show an almost total lack of the historical sense, so does our attempt to find temporal sequence in all things valued culturally by them suffer in proportion to our own lack of definite historical data. It is therefore reasonable when proposing an interpretation of such a land of mystic calm and joyous exaltation, to take our pattern of treatment from the Hindus themselves. That is, to estimate their aspirations toward Reality and Wisdom, not as a chronological exfoliation but as a slowly developed psychological introspection into the exact nature of the human soul, its divine derivation, its hazardous evolu-

tion into maturity, its even more hazardous exercise of moral choice and purpose, and the necessity of its final redemption from the Karmic wheel of the finite world. If they were content to build their religious ideals on the ability of the individual to raise himself again to God, even tho temporarily torn away from Him by having been born into the material world, we should be content to build our interpretation of those ideals on the same or correlative grounds.

First, it is well to distinguish between those aspirational systems which are religious thru being expressions of faith in prayer, ceremony and codes of piety, and those which are philosophical thru being consistent endeavors toward a direct and reasonably intelligible understanding of Divine Law, Truth, Righteousness and all those sacred qualities ascribed to, derived from, or at least heuristic of the Supreme Self of the Universe. Under this distinction the religious and philosophical systems of ancient India may be ranged according to their general outline and characteristic attitude. Thus, as showing more elements of religion than of philosophy in what they aspired to experience and believe in, we may enumerate those expressions of reverence and devotion usually grouped with the literatures of exhortation and supplication variously indexed under such terms as the Vedas, the Upanishads, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Krishnaism. While those systems showing efforts more philosophical than religious in their expressions of metaphysical analyses and synthetic instruction would be arranged so as to include the Purva Mimamsa, Vedanta, Samkhya, Nyaya Vaisesika, Yoga, the Jains and Lokayätikans. In this order we seem to be following the course of popular development, perhaps not the chronological order but rather what seems to have been the order in which the different schools of faith and wisdom commanded the highest relish and widest pursuit in the minds and conduct of their respective devotees.

The first expressions of religious faith and aspiration which indelibly marked the noble souls of Ancient India were later known by the general term Veda, simply "knowledge" or "understanding," though originally called Trayi Vidya or "three-fold wisdom" of hymns (Rig Veda), tunes (Sama Veda), and prayers (Yajur Veda), the whole being later on supplemented with the Atharva hymns dealing with domestic relations and exhorting the people's attention to secular duties. They soon came to have a certain recognized ritual, but their expression and instruction was for a long

time altogether orally carried on and, largely by monopoly and genealogical privilege as I will point out presently, became the basis of the Brahman's religious theory and practice, of which development the worst and most worldly feature was the vicious idea of caste. Indian history has been almost completely a mere footnote to the shrewd ritual but inexorable laws of caste—that vicious system which allows political and economic ravine and injustice to flourish.

The first of the Vedas composed in a form approximating that of devotional hymns may be assigned to about 1500 B. C. and were offered up at the ceremonies celebrating such divinities as Indra, god of physical Nature; Agni, Fire; and Varuna, the personification of the serenity of the boundless heavens. These hymns were passed from generation to generation through "the richness of hearing" possessed by those who had memorized them, and as the traditions of vast virtue and noble endeavor were rendered immortal through vocal communication from knower to learner, so was there an actual kernel of truth in the Jaiminian doctrine of the *Sphota*, the phonetic eternity of spoken words (and sometime also of other sounds having significant or intelligible meanings). For almost a millenium there was neither a written hymnal nor a uniform ritual of religious practices and ceremonies, for although a crude form of written communication was perhaps used in the notes of daily affairs, there was no definite record made of religious rites or philosophical discussions. In this way then the Vedic hymns were held to a strictly mnemonic form of instruction and preservation, and were not recorded in any documentary form or manuscript until after about 600 B. C., when the sage Saunaka compiled a standard code of the grammatical and vocal peculiarities of the Vedic hymns and prayers, and thus ended whatever changes it is reasonable to believe had been often made by the endless array of memorizers and royal tutors. After Saunaka's time the religious literature for the most part consisted of theological and textual commentaries on these hymns and prayers, which are best to be divided into two classes: the *Brahmanas* (ritual codes) and the *Upanishads* (philosophical notes). The thorough understanding of either classification being soon beset by the false hermeneutics of esotericism and presumption.

The highest summit reached by these two forms of Vedic interpretation was respectively the exhortant worship offered up to, and the rationalized belief in *Prajapati*, Lord of All Creation, who,

under a sort of mono-pantheism of law and administrative intelligence, represented the cosmic energy which is so clearly manifest in the creation and faithful maintenance of the visible universe. In this respect the Vedas served the highest of intellectual ambitions as well as the most reverent of religious aspirations, and as is shown by many of the prayers it was not always a merely anthropomorphic divinity to which an appeal for succor was made. Brahma the world-soul was the one Supreme Reality, and acting through the psychical principle of his Infinite Self, Atman, he was able to perform the spiritual works of his eternal preservation of all creation. He supervized all three of the cosmic functions making up the circle of birth, life and death, and was supposed to sanction the varying vicissitudes of human destiny. But we may well doubt whether the original Vedic teachings were in any way at fault for the miserable caste system which the subsequent Brahman priests so industriously maintained under the supposititious protection of their arbitrary god.

II. UPANISHADS AND BRAHMANISM.

The name Upanished means "a setting down beside", and in this sense is justly applied to those brief philosophical notes which are the latest and most orderly compositions which were destined to survive the period of mnemonic instruction as brought to its highest development in the Vedas. They show the beginning of the transit from the visionary outpourings of the religious Hindu soul to a more unified attempt at bringing the diffused seeds of traditional wisdom into one consistent cycle of instruction, and in this unification were to be grouped up the esoteric meanings and speculative longings of the Vedists, worked out as psychological necessities to the purest and highest welfare of all humanity. For a long time, possibly about the four centuries preceding the time of Saunaka, this Upanishadic activity was going on orally from father to son, teacher to disciple, and it was not until the Sutra-writers began to flourish, about 500 B. C., that there was any written doctrine uniform and authoritative enough to hold its own. It was during this period that the so-called "Laws of Manu" were first codified and on his doctrine of Tapas, "meritorious pain," the cunning priests erected a whole ethic and sociology.

However, these sutra-writers were for the most part not spiritual but calligraphic innovators; the best of them were little other than plain compilers and editors of the Upanishadic teachings,

some of them giving emphasis to certain phases of these teachings, and others holding to a different attitude. It was thus that bases were laid for a various interpretation, and the two religions and the six or eight separate schools of philosophy arose. Some of the Upanishads are purely speculative and some are practical. A pure religious faith often shines through the fog of a gross polytheism while subjects of a cosmic philosophy are frequently drawn from the importuning testimony of secular affairs. But the general tone is one of upreach and glorious endeavor against the subtle evils and mediocre ambitions of our physical worldly life.

By virtue of the patient researches of both the native pandits and Western scholars there are now extant about 240 Upanishads, the most important of which are the Brihadāranyōkōpanishad and the Chandōgyōpanishad which are constructed respectively on the prayers and chanteys of the Yajur and Sama Vedas. But in the classical list, compiled about the first century B. C., there are about 27 or 29, the most philosophically important of which are the later compositions called the Vedantapanishad and the Yogopanishad, which originally consisted of esoteric remarks subjoined to the Brāhmanas, and thus making an advanced study of those sections known as the Arānyakas or Vedic speculative paragraphs. In these paragraphs various speakers are made to speculate on the nature and reality of Brahma's existence as the world-soul or divine principle operative in all things throughout the Universe; on the nature of Atman, the psychical principle manifested on earth the most highly in man, and hence to be analogously taken as the representative of the best and purest in the whole scheme of real things; and on the nature and function of Purusha, the Spirit of Selfhood which is not only the creative principle of Nature, but is also that power which makes knowledge and wisdom possible to human realization and practice.

Prof. A. E. Gough, in his "Philosophy of the Upanishads", tells us that the notion of the Samsara or transmigration was the prevalent belief of the primitive Hindus, and that this belief was encouraged for the most part by the pantheism of the earliest Indian theology. This then was the vague attitude toward the Deity until a few select philosophers began to recognize the necessity of ridding oneself of this vicious circle of existence from life to life and world to world. The one true remedy for this affliction is the attainment of perfect knowledge and divine wisdom, and there is a multitude of instructions on how this remedy is to be acquired and

put into practical use. Thus in the Mundäkyopanishad (II, 2-5): "Know thou that One Supreme Self who alone embounds the sky, the earth, atmosphere, mind, and all the vital breaths. Disclaim all other speech. This knowledge alone is the bridge over the gulf of this world to Immortality." In the Chandögyopanishad (I, 15-18): "What a person does and thinks, that he inevitably becomes. Verily, this is a law of the Self; for it is *of* It, *in* It, and forever obtains throughout Its Infinite Perfection. The selfcontrolled sage should constantly devote himself to this Supreme Self. A man is all of a certain Idea, so that whatever Idea a man cherishes in this world, that he becomes in the next. Fix thyself, therefore, in the glorious Idea of the Supreme Self." And this in the Brihadäranyokopanishad (I, 9-11): "Whoever has no worldly desire and is beyond this desire; whoever has his true desire reaching toward and fulfilled in the Supreme Reality; whoever takes this Reality as the highest object of all (his efforts), his breath is not short, his aspiration is not vain. For, being calm in the tranquillity of Self, he becomes the Self indeed."

Brahmanism may be said to have originated in the mnemonic period when it was necessary to develop the memory to such a state of perfection that it would be as reliable a recording medium as a written manuscript. Certain families "rich in hearing" then made it a practice to thoroughly know all the poems and tunes of their tribe and community so that they could be preserved to future use, and by virtue of this superior knowledge, handed down from father to son, they soon came to a feeling that they had a right to exercise priestly functions at those occasions when hymns and prayers were offered up to the gods. In course of time such men grew more and more apart from "the profane reality of daily life" and with speculative ambitions to be under-lords of Brahma, the Supreme Reality both of gods and men, they gradually erected that artificial but nevertheless insuperable barrier between their own fortunate existence and the miserable lot of those unversed in the Vedic instructions. A worship of the phenomena of Nature was too open to public knowledge and practice, and the priestly officials were clever enough to see that something must be introduced which would render their ability more esoteric and their power over the rest of the people more secure. This desideratum was finally decided upon as that of mental culture and control, and with a discouragingly complex language and method of education their dominance was secured. The people became as nothing, even the

wealthy military princes were regarded as of little importance except as means of conquest or protection, while the priestly devotees of Brahma became all-powerful through nothing but pure assumption and pretense.

This is the clearest conclusion to be drawn from that document known as "The Laws of Manu", which takes it as a matter of course that the actual practice of Brahmanism is the recognition of caste in all things. The humble toiling Sudra serves the common people or merchant class, the common people look up to the martial Kshatriya as their beneficent protectors, while the Kshatriya must swear allegiance to the priests of Brahma as their immediate counsellors and spiritual leaders. All inter-caste relations are provided for with peculiar care that the higher has preference over the lower, special advantages being allowed where any certain political complex would stand a consistent chance of disrupting the system. The question then is left open whether or not the priests really and in truth have a pure reverence for the Supreme Reality of Brahma's existence, and whether or not it is their rightful freedom to be able to monopolize the knowledge and confidence of the Deity. It was their universal custom to consider all devotees of other sects or anyone else who sought to question their authority, as *Nastikas* or unbelievers, an epithet quite as potent in its effects as the Mohammedan term *Zendik*; but this application of the word later became narrowed down to only refer to the (to them) heretical *Tärkikas*, Buddhists, Jains, and the materialistic *Chärvakas*. Such an unfortunate as a slave, a twice-born Sudra, or an illegitimate issue of any lower caste morganatic relation, even though he were the most eagerly hopeful and aspiring, was totally beneath the Brahman's pride to notice.

On all these points of Vedic and Upanishadic teaching which were properly and improperly taken advantage of by the early formulators of Indian Religion and Philosophy, I will refer my readers to J. Muir's "Original Sanscrit Texts"; Paul Deussen's "Philosophy of the Upanishads"; Sir M. Monier-Williams' "Brahmanism and Hinduism"; and J. E. Carpenter's "Oriental Philosophy and Religion".

III. GAUTAMA BUDDHA AND BUDDHISM.

It was the great distinction of Gautamä Siddartha Buddha (c. 620-543 B. C.) to come into the world at a time when this Brahmanical caste system was at its worst, and by instituting many

monastic centers of hospitable refuge he became known as far more a world-Saviour than the infinitely aloof Self of the Brahmins. A point was reached at this time when religious ceremonies and the securing of divine favor had to have a more practical bearing on public welfare and moral education. And as the distinction was now stringently emphasized between the chanting memory-power of the proud Brahmins and the ethical thinking of the few ascetics who were doing more real good in the world than the mere repetition of hymns and prayers could ever accomplish, it was an age well on its way to a new outlook on life and a keener inlook at the human soul, the power of its aspirations and the nature of its destiny. To be able to think and act nobly became now the ideal manner of life, and if it was naturally and really right that such a course should be pursued, it was with a new zest and delicious intuition that the monastic thinkers handled their mental and spiritual powers. It is a point of departure delightfully brought out by T. W. Rhys Davis in his scholarly works on the beginnings of Buddhism.

The singular character around which these spiritual changes came to their strongest focus was Buddha, the sage of the Sakya tribe, the enlightened one, he of the "accomplished understanding", to name a few of his various titles. Leaving aside all the various contentions of Buddhistic doctests and historicists, we find that he himself did not answer to the name Buddha, not even his personal name, Prince Siddartha, but cleaved rather to the far more modest title Arahāt, "he who has arrived". Probably due more to the proselyting ambitions of the Mahāyana sect than to the historical researches of the Hinayanans, there has been a great deal of controversy over the dates of his life, but so far as the haphazard Hindu chronology will allow, it seems fairly certain that he was born near the Nepaul border about 620 B. C., and died at Kusināgara about 543 B. C. or somewhere near his eightieth year.

Nevertheless, Buddha lived to be one of the great pioneers of the Ashtampada or Eight-fold Path of Truth and Righteousness which comprised a pure rectitude of viewpoint, aspiration, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and ecstasy; and aimed at knowing the true causes of human misery, and at knowing the exact and most practical method of freeing men from all this personal misery and worldly travail. It is assumed, however, that there are no "necessary evils" in the world, these being in truth those vices, delusions or other absurd customs which we are unwilling to give up, and which, from our assumption of necessary

intellectual content and actional maintenance, work great evil upon our otherwise glorious freedom of spiritual growth and aspiration. The attainment of this emancipation from delusion and evil is the one supreme purpose of all meditation, moral austerity and public duty or virtuous conduct. Of course, when we first assay to make personal reformation of ourselves, there come readily to our hand the Pancha Bala, or the five negative moral powers: faith in the divine, mental energy, memory, meditation, and worldly wisdom, which very usefully serve to prevent the increase of the evil that already exists, but do not and cannot do more than this. It remains for a deeper activity, a keener self-obliteration and a surer grasp of the true reality underlying the nature of things, to come to the actually accomplishing method of personal salvation.

Holding, therefore, that the very conditions and constituents which go together to make us up as individuals, are as well at the same time the very things which constitute the source of each individual's subsequent misery and travail; the emancipation from this suffering must somehow be brought about through freeing the mind and body of the desires and cravings which have become habitual to their affective natures. And the very first requisite is to see that these desires and appetites have become habitual and customary through our finitude of mind, through our self-centered pride and ignorance, through our shallow myopic view of life, and through even the source itself of these characters—the individuality of our personal selfishness. Accordingly then, the denial of all soul-theories, and even their actual negation in practice, is the first mental discipline to be achieved, for all further progress on the Path is impossible except as this first obstacle, or any other similar set of notions, is clearly understood and overcome. With Buddha and his immediate followers egoism was condemned, not because of its external evil effects upon our pursuit of the social *Ethos*, but for the ultimate reason that it brings about the unhappiness and lonely misery of the individual himself. Thus is there a personal appeal to everyone to correct his own shortcomings and take heart to save himself an eternity of futile toil and trouble.

In the Samkhya philosophy, which native tradition claims is older than Buddhism, but which chronologically appears to have been rather a worthy and significant contemporary movement, Kapila had emphasized the notion that there exists in every living being a soul which is uncreated and eternal, but Buddha denied the absolute eternity of soul, for when the individual, whether or not

conceived as a soul, has become purified and free of all desire and idea of desire, it has reached a state of non-psycho content, in other words it has reached Nirvana whose principal characteristic is that of Sunyatā, vacuity or nothingness. This destiny was very similarly regarded by the Jainists, except that Nirvana was not so much a zone of absolute negation as it was a sphere of absolutely non-human forms of being, reality and aspects of truth. Buddha further argued that there is no real existent known as soul; that is, no immortal substances or spirit, for such a reality or its concept is altogether incompatible, foreign and (properly speaking) inconceivable where all is individual existence in a sphere of finite mental power.

This feeling that we are living in a sphere of mental if not absolute finitude was the ground for Buddha, on the other hand, to agree with Kapila in holding that there is no adequate proof of the existence of a Supreme Deity, and of whom therefore we cannot predicate as being responsible for any so-called creation or first cause of the Universe. It was an "argument from below", that is from the finite, human point of view, resulting in short in what the dogmatic Brahmans immediately branded as atheism, for Buddha was going about teaching that there is no Being, Anatman, that rather that the whole Universe is a vast scene of pure Becoming, causing impermanence to be one of the foremost signs of our individual life, and that the Brahman's Sruti or Vedic Revelation as well as the Jainist Tattvika or True Possession (of wisdom) are at last only productions of our impermanent finitude. It was purely a remnant of truth which was possible to human attainment, and this was Moksha, freedom through moderate reason and contemplative diligence in the right perspective. Buddhism then was altogether negative in its metaphysic, but was serenely noble and positive in its ethic. As a speculative doctrine of Reality and non-human Truth it was its own most obstinate obstacle, but a practical meliorism of humanity's mundane condition it served many of our highest aims and secured to men the encouragement of upward effort.

Among the foremost followers and advocates of Buddhism may be named Maha Moggallāna (or Maudgalāvadhā) and Asōka Vārdhana, the Painless. Though a Brahman by birth, Moggallāna yet became one of Buddha's most able disciples, flourishing during the fourth century B. C. He became prominent largely through his elaboration of the notion of Iddhi or potency which,

as a worldly unenlightened power gives men the practical capacities for ruling as kings, performing miracles, or inventing useful things, as well as giving them talent for success in life and to be generally fortunate in all enterprises. But as a divinely enlightened and scrupulously cultivated power it makes us capable of religious wisdom, self-control, and a happy companionship with the gods of Nature, whence we may enjoy that rare freedom from worldly ambition, ignorance and selfish strife.

Asôka, however, was far more constructive while at the same time being truly representative of the original Buddhist principles. Being the grandson of the famous Chandra-gupta, the Moon-protected (the Sandrokyptos who successfully opposed the Macedonian invasion of India), Asôka became king of Kalingâ and was emperor of northern India for forty years, 272-231 B. C. Even with the great Brahmanical influences which in this regal capacity he was brought under, his conversion to Buddhism becomes all the more strange and unique owing to the fact that early in life he was a strict Saivist or devotee of the goddess Siva the Destroyer, and believed religiously in the propriety of animal sacrifice and the worship of the divine ruthlessness so manifest throughout the natural world. It clearly shows nevertheless that all mental growth is usually first a destruction of existent conceptions and institutions, and later begins to look for constructive elements and newer outlooks on life. Buddhism was not a flourishing religion before Asôka's time because there had been from the very start many sects wrangling over the authority each of them had or was supposed to have received from the Buddha himself. We might very well consider that the secret of Asôka's great success in unifying and stabilizing the contending factions of his wide domain was, not the pious passivity which characterized Buddha's famous protector, King Bimbisara, but the equally pious but far more positive and constructive achievement he made in the propagation of Jaimini's philosophy of Dharma, the Law of Right and Truth. According to the construction he put upon Dharma, the caste system was utterly rejected and a general toleration established regarding all the numerous political and religious variations of opinion even so including non-Buddhist and Srutist elements that they could not but value Asôka's reign as truly the Augustan era of Indian prosperity and culture. Eclectics and syncretists were in high demand.

However, this ethical law was not to be completely established

from without, as by means of legal regulation, but was introduced and encouraged on the ground that it must, if it was to be at all a real achievement, be ever supported from within, that is by means of an inward purification and sense of rectitude. For it is not mere law-obedience but piety of heart and modesty of mind that is destined to gain the righteous way in human life. Respect for the truth in all matters, respect for one's parents and the government under which life is preserved in peace and prosperity, respect for the rest of humanity, and a due regard for the right of every form of life to live out the natural course of its existence—these were the four primary duties; and in an ethical system such as Buddha taught and Asôka established, these duties were not to be rated nor yet practiced in any but a clear and reverent spirit, for was not their very foundation to be had only in purity of heart and calm serenity of mind? The substance of all this noble instruction was too enduring to be abandoned or lost, but Asôka desired a lasting impression should be made upon the people's memories. Hence are the principal points of the original Buddhist teaching preserved to us almost complete in their original form of expression which was the Seven Pillar Inscriptions in the near provinces, and the Fourteen Rock Edicts chiselled in rock about 256 B. C. at seven different places in the outer provinces.

A faithful and scholarly translation of these inscriptions has been made into English by Vincent A. Smith in a volume entitled "Asôko, the Buddhist Emperor of India" (1901).

(To be Continued)

THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

BY GRACE ROCKWELL.

IN recent years there has been a noticeable revival of interest in Scholasticism. Philosophers have professed to find the same logical and metaphysical problems in the writings of medieval thinkers that furnish the topics of their discussions. Whether much light will ultimately be obtained from these sources on the real philosophical problems of our day is a question that need not concern us here; but one fact may be regarded as established—namely, that the opinion which used to look down upon the work of the medieval thinkers as nothing but a congeries of theological sophistry, is utterly out of date. The Schoolmen strove as sincerely and earnestly to find the truth in their world as we are striving to find it in ours; if their world was so different from ours it was not their fault. So if only to be just to the thinkers of the past, and thus to be just to ourselves, a brief review of their problems, and of the solutions which they attempted, may not be out of place.

It is generally conceded that in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, Scholasticism reached the summit of its achievement. In singling him out for our purpose, we shall consider his contemporaries and immediate predecessors only as they contributed to shape his thought. It must of course be admitted that there would have been no St. Thomas, or at any rate a very different one, if it had not been for the work of the other great Schoolmen who preceded him, St. Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Albertus Magnus. For St. Thomas was, properly speaking, not a creator, but a systematizer and consolidator, giving final shape and place to speculations that had been growing in the course of centuries. Naturally, the particular needs of the Church in regard to philosophy, at the moment when he appeared on the scene, must also be taken into account.

St. Thomas was born at Roccasecca, the castle of his father, near Aquino, northwest of Naples, probably in the year 1227. Nearby was the famous monastery of Monte Cassino, where he studied with the monks to get his elementary training. He then entered the University of Naples, being only ten years old. His father, the proud count of Aquino, wanted him to join the order of the Benedictines, so he might some day become abbot of Monte Cassino, with all its rich revenues. But the boy, on leaving the university six years later, had developed ideas totally different on the subject, being determined to become a Dominican—a mendicant friar. In spite of the violent opposition of his family, who did not shrink from kidnapping him and keeping him a prisoner for a while, he carried out his resolution when he was hardly seventeen.

The unusual talents of the young man were at once discovered, and resolved to give him the best they had to offer, his superiors sent him across the Alps to study with one of their order, Albertus Magnus, the great Schoolman, who was then lecturing in Cologne and Paris. For three years Thomas pursued his studies under this master, at the end of which he received the degree of Bachelor of Theology. Meanwhile he took an active part in the controversies between his order and the University of Paris, foreshadowing his later distinction in subtle argumentation. When he was thirty, Thomas was made Doctor of Theology. After that he lectured on theological subjects in the universities of Paris, Rome, Bologna, and other cities, finally returning to Naples and settling there. Two years later, on a trip to attend the Council of Lyons where another attempt was to be made to reconcile the Roman and Greek Churches, he died at the monastery of Fossa Nuova, near Terracina, 25 miles from the place where he was born. He lived to be only forty-seven years old.

Thomas' greatness had been recognized by the discerning from the very first. Even in his lifetime he was distinguished by the surname "The Angelic Doctor." The archbishopric of Naples was offered to him, and when he declined it, the abbacy of Monte Cassino; but he preferred to lead the humble life he had mapped out for himself so early, preaching and lecturing every day, traveling in the interests of the Church and of his order, and meanwhile finding time to compose the voluminous writings that have immortalized his name, the *Summa theologiae*, *Contra gentiles*, his commentaries on various books of the Bible, on Aristotle, and so forth. The humility of his spirit was as remarkable as the acumen of his in-

telleet. He was canonized in 1323. In 1567, at the close of the great Council of Trent which had to define the position of the Catholic Church concerning the host of questions brought up by the Reformation, he was ranked by the Pope with the four great Latin fathers, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory. Finally, over six hundred years after his death, in 1879, Pope Leo XIII proclaimed his teaching the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church.

In spite of the modern significance thus lent to his work, Thomas' activity belongs to the thirteenth century, and we must study the thirteenth century to understand what he was mainly trying to do.

Since the days of Anselm (d. 1109) the philosophic situation in western Europe had changed in many respects. It is characteristic that Anselm's chief work, *Cur Deus homo*, should treat merely of an isolated question of Christian theology, the doctrine of atonement. His most famous achievement, the ontological argument for the existence of God, really did little credit to his sense of logic, and was, as a matter of fact, refuted five hundred years before Kant by St. Thomas himself. The naiveté with which he established faith as the sole basis of philosophic speculation could not but be promptly dispelled by a subtler generation. Perhaps by some law of contrast, Abelard already (d. 1142) taught the very opposite, making doubt the prerequisite of inquiry, understanding, and faith. The greatest change, however, was brought about by the influence of the writings of Aristotle which about this time became available to the Schoolmen.

Up to 1150, only the first two parts of Aristotle's logical treatises, afterward called the *Organon*, had been known in the West. Now, besides the rest of these, his *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Ethics*, and a great number of other writings, either by him or attributed to him, made their appearance. To complicate the issues even more, the Latin translations now first prepared were not made from the original Greek, but from Arabic translations obtained in Spain, the southern part of which was at that time still in the hands of the Moors. Naturally Arabian commentaries on Aristotle and other Greek writers, notably of a neo-Platonic character, were imported also, besides original works of Arabian philosophers.

As far as the Church was concerned, two chief dangers resulted from this influx of new ideas. One was mysticism, belittling the actual content of faith and questioning the divine origin

and value of the whole hierarchical order. To be sure, mystical tendencies are found as clearly as in Scotus Erigena (d. *ca.* 877) whose teaching was now revived; still, the peculiar neo-Platonic doctrine of the emanation of the world from the Godhead, and the doctrine of ecstasy as the reunion of the soul with God, are plainly discernible in the subsequent philosophical development, even after the condemnation of Erigena's system by the Church (1225), and the heritage from the Arabs must be considered the source. The other danger was rationalism, or, to be more specific, the problem resulting from the conflict between faith and knowledge, which, with Aristotle's world of thought in full view, could no longer be avoided and a few centuries later led to the final emancipation of philosophy.

In this respect the greatest impetus to Western thinking was probably given by the teaching of the Arabian philosopher, Averroës (d. 1198), the greatest expounder of Aristotelianism of his time. His writings were brought to southern France by Jews driven out of Spain by the conquering Christian Spaniards, and naturally could not be overlooked by anybody who studied the new doctrines. Averroës was perhaps the first to arrive at an interpretation of religion as a personal experience that, as such, had nothing to do with the truth-seeking of science. This led him to the introduction of a system which keeps the tenets of faith and the findings of science absolutely distinct, in this way assuring autonomy to both. When it is remembered that Anselm had taught "Credo ut intelligam," the challenge of this new concept will at once be apparent. The proper relation between philosophy and religion thus became an issue of paramount importance for any future Scholastic system.

Other doctrines of Averroës, his concept of the universal intellect and the somewhat neo-Platonic teaching of the highest bliss attainable to man, the merging of the individual soul in the universal intellect in this life, his consequent denial of the immortality of the individual soul, etc., had to be faced likewise, though, not being understood, they were hardly taken as seriously.

Above all, however, it was Aristotle, himself, who impressed the minds of the Schoolmen tremendously. "*The Philosopher*" he soon came to be called. The wealth of his materials of observation, the careful elaboration of his theories, the harmony existing between all the parts of his system, the all-comprehensiveness of his views were overwhelming. Unfortunately, one may say, they

also chimed in to perfection with the dominant demand of the medieval mind for order, organization, and authority, so that one is inclined to think that a smaller, less sensational find might have proven even more stimulating to independent thinking. But Aristotle supplied exactly what had been lacking in the medieval view of the world—a definite knowledge of the objects of our immediate experience. His metaphysical speculations, on the other hand, were found to leave sufficient room for interpretation to cover up all discrepancies when the Christian verities were reached, a subject on which the heathen thinker would have been “excused” anyway. Still, the free spirit of inquiry characteristic of the Greek mind could not but impress the ecclesiastics as something hostile, and it took the efforts especially of Albertus Magnus and his greater disciple, Thomas, to render Aristotle not only harmless for Christian orthodoxy, but to transform him into a veritable pillar of the Church.

Now, this is the problem that confronted St. Thomas: On the one hand, there were the plain facts of nature and human society, as summarized by Aristotle; on the other, there were the Christian revelations. Both were felt to be of equal reality, for in Aristotle the sum of earthly knowledge was believed to be as truly contained as salvation in the gospel proclaimed by the Church. But what relation between the two? Should the facts of nature be understood in the light of the facts of revelation, or vice versa? Or was there no connection between the two, as Averroës had taught? The choice seemed to be between mysticism, materialism, and, perhaps, skepticism.

St. Thomas found an entirely different way out. His central thought was a grading systematizing, and in this he found the neo-Platonic concept of emanation of great value. He taught that there were three realms: a lower realm of nature, and a higher realm of grace, each with its own verities, perfectly valid in their proper spheres; beyond both of them, however, the realm of God’s own presence. The realm of nature, St. Thomas taught, can be completely understood; but of the realm of grace, we have only glimpses vouchsafed to us by divine revelation. It will be seen that, according to this distinction, there could be no contradiction between the two, because the facts of the higher realm were, in their very nature, inaccessible to our reasoning. They were nevertheless true, and could be proven to be true, *to some extent*, by our reason itself. This was possible only because Thomas included

much in the realm of nature that is nowadays regarded as metaphysics: for example, the existence of God, the creation of the world in time, the immortality of the soul, all these were considered by him demonstrable by reason. The doctrines of the Trinity, however, of the Incarnation, the resurrection of the body, and some finer points of the Creed, he declared to be pure articles of faith. But what about the third realm, rising above the realms of reason and revelation? There existed, according to St. Thomas, the possibility of an immediate union with God, through the mystic vision. Why God should choose to manifest himself in this extraordinary way was another mystery of the faith, but too many of these visions had been recorded in the annals of the Church to be quietly disregarded. To obviate all undesirable consequences, St. Thomas taught, in addition, that this realm opened itself to us only in occasional solemn moments of ecstasy that the pious Christian could hope for, but not attain by any effort of his own. A perfectly reasonable attitude to take, and one in agreement with the facts even from a modern psychological point of view; but at the same time mysticism, while most highly exalted, was being made quite harmless from a practical point of view.

This is the philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas in barest outline. It can easily be imagined how many collisions of minor points had to be avoided, though the general scheme may seem plausible enough. But the logical method of Aristotle, thoroughly mastered by Thomas, helped to overcome all difficulties. By ever so many fine definitions and subtle distinctions he managed to make his points, and since formal logic was the only validity test applicable to a theory in those days, his system was doubtless the best-grounded so far devised.

There are many aspects to St. Thomas' teaching that cannot be gone into here because beyond of the scope of this paper. His attitude toward the Church as an institution; toward political, economic, and social questions; his ethical and even his aesthetic teaching would have to be discussed at length to do him full justice. Also, the whole controversy concerning the nature of universals, a strictly philosophical question, had to be ignored, the aim being rather to point out Thomas' central position in the struggle for the liberation of the human mind. For it must be acknowledged that, as Thomism was the culmination of Scholasticism, it was also the first step to the final dissolution of this philosophy.

Thomas had withdrawn the mysteries of Christianity from

rational treatment—a tremendous achievement, showing better than anything else how deep the influence of Aristotle and his Arabian interpreters had gone. But this pointed the way out for many other doctrines troublesome to scientific speculation, the existence of God, the creation of the world, etc., which he had retained in his realm of nature. And his successors, notably Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and William of Occam (d. 1347), were not slow in availing themselves of this opportunity, the latter arriving exactly at the position which Averroës had first taken: that the verities of faith and of philosophy are two utterly distinct subjects. In this way St. Thomas helped prepare, much against his own will, the way for skepticism, experimentalism, empiricism—the road of modern science. At the same time he created, in the recovery and complete assimilation of Aristotelian methods, an instrument for acute and accurate thinking that was as formidable as it was indispensable for the philosophical advance of mankind.

Thomas' system is so well balanced, so well adjusted, so equitable all around, that from this very fact one might be inclined to conclude he surmised some of the consequences liable to be drawn from his theses. If so, it does his honesty as a thinker the greatest honor to have gone as far as he did.

RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917.

BY N. ANDREW N. CLEVEN.

THE student of clericalism as a political factor readily comprehends the genuine repugnance of the Mexicans to the political activities of the church, and understands fully the reasons for the thorough and complete subordination of the church to the state in that country. The very grave wrongs and the large injury done the Mexican people by clericalism will be accepted by the student as ample justification for this complete elimination of ecclesiastical interests from the civil affairs of the state. A very large majority of the people have long desired to rid themselves, root and branch, of clerical domination admittedly the cause of a large share of the national ills. The historian will not fail to realize that these reforms are directed against clericalism, of whatever nature, and not against religion as such. He understands full well that the Mexicans are a very devout people and that the great majority of them—fully ninety-eight per cent—worship according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. The damage done to church property by the soldiery during the recent revolution was not committed because of hatred of Roman Catholicism, but rather was done as a protest against the pernicious misuse of the confessional by many of the conservative clergy for the purpose of spreading propaganda inimical to the best interests of the people. The reforms, therefore, are directed against those forms of religious activity, irrespective of creeds, considered a menace to republican institutions and a grave danger to the state. Very many of the reforms inserted in the constitution of 1917 will be found in the constitution of 1857, in the famous Laws of Reform (*Leyes de Reformas*) of 1874, as well as in the philosophical writings of *Gómes Farias*.

The complete control over all religious worship and all out-

ward ecclesiastical forms is placed in the federal authorities.¹ The privilege to embrace the religion of one's choice, and to practice all ceremonies, devotions, or observances of any particular creed, either in place of public worship or at home, is fully guaranteed, provided always that these do not constitute an offense punishable by law. Every act of public worship is to be performed within assigned places; and these places must at all times be under direct governmental supervision. (Article 24). The congress has on right to enact any law establishing or prohibiting any particular form of religion in Mexico. Moreover, "The law recognizes no judicial personality (*personaldad alguna*) in the religious institutions known as churches." All establishments of monastic and religious orders are absolutely forbidden. The ministers of whatever creed are considered merely as persons exercising a profession, and are accordingly subject to the laws governing professions. "Only a Mexican by birth may be a minister of any religious creed in Mexico." In addition, and with the evident purpose of controlling clerical activities of a political nature, it is provided that religious institutions of whatever description, and all ministers of whatever creed, shall have no legal capacity to acquire ownership in real properties or in water rights. Moreover, no religious institution and no ecclesiastic shall have a legal right to hold or administer properties or to make loans on real estate. All property in possession of religious institutions, and of all individuals exercising the profession of religion, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, are confiscated and the ownership of such property is vested in the nation. The state and territorial governments are to determine which of the religious buildings shall be used for temples of public worship, the number of such temples, as well as the number of ministers of each community. New structures may be erected only with the permission of the Department of the Interior (*Gobernación*). The temples so constructed belong to the nation and may be used for public worship only. Such temples are always subject to the careful supervision and inspection of the governmental authorities. The caretaker, together with ten citizens, is to be directly responsible under the government for the proper management of the houses of public worship. Moreover, it is provided that episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan

¹ *Contitucion de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* (official edition) and H. H. Branch: *The Mexican Constitution of 1917 compared with the Constitution of 1857*.

asylums, collegiate establishments of religious institutions, convents, and other buildings constructed or designed for the administration, propaganda, or teaching of the tenets of any religious creed, shall belong to the nation. All such buildings are to be used exclusively for religious services. In addition, all charitable institutions, private and public; all institutions for scientific research, or for the diffusion of knowledge; all buildings of mutual aid societies, or organizations formed for any lawful purpose, may in no case whatsoever be under the patronage, direction, administration, or supervision of religious corporations, institutions, or ministers of any creed, or of any of their dependents. It is furthermore provided that these institutions and persons may not acquire ownership in lands or make loans on real property where the terms of the contract exceed five years. No ecclesiastic may inherit either in his own name, or through any agent, real property of any kind. He is also legally incapable of inheriting by will any real property or money from a fellow ecclesiastic, or from any person to whom he is not related by blood to within the fourth degree. To prevent the resumption of clerical influence in politics, it is expressly provided that no minister has a right to vote, to hold public office, to be a candidate, or to take part in any way in political affairs. Meetings of a political nature may not be held in the temples of public worship. Religious periodicals of every kind are strictly forbidden to criticise the fundamental laws of the land, the public authorities, or in any way to interfere with the policies of the different governmental bodies. The same restriction is imposed upon the activity of the religious press in general. (Article 130).

In the field of education, there are likewise very definite restrictions upon the privileges of religious institutions and the ministers of all religious creeds.² Neither religious organization nor ministers of creeds may engage in primary instruction, either in private or in public institutions: all such education must be secular and gratuitous. (Article 3).

As if to put a finality to it all, trial by jury for the infraction of any of the laws dealing with religious matters is strictly forbidden. (Article 130).

² Neither religious institutions nor ministers of religious creeds may engage in primary instruction, either in private or in public institutions: all such education must be secular and gratuitous. (Article 3).

INTELLECT, RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSE.

BY H. R. VANDERBYLL.

I.

QUITE a number of people, especially those who fervently desire to find, and as a consequence generally *do* find, a veiled superior wisdom in the literary remains of our ancestors, seem to think that the ancients had progressed at least as far as we have towards solving the mystery of existence. But our ancestors did not possess the average intelligence that we possess to-day, even as our present gray matter is not of sufficient development to warrant its ownership by a thirtieth century human being. We should never look backward for equal or greater intelligence, nor ahead for deeper ignorance. Time, human experience, or evolution—call it what you will—labors hard to *develop* man's brain. The history of human development is the history of intellectual progress, and not that of the mind's inactivity or decline. A thousand years of history invariably bridge a greater and a lesser darkness. And the Present is always brighter, so far as intelligence is concerned, than the past.

I confess that it is an easy matter to make ancient manuscript read in perfect accord with our personal views on existence. This is especially the case with the so-called sacred scriptures. It being the modern tendency to find hidden meaning and cleverly concealed divine revelation in every single sentence of the Bible, we meet with a staggering number of Bible interpretations, and with an equally staggering number of blessed and sole possessors of the "key to the scriptures." But there are no more keys to ancient literature than there are to Emerson's essays. The single key necessary to interpret the Bible is the ability to think with the ancient writer's mind and to see the universe as conditions permitted him to see it. In order to acquire that ability one should study ancient history, ancient facts, rather than hang fanatically on the lips of a modern wizard who finds for one heavenly powers and eternal bliss in any of one's quotations from the Bible.

Of course, the ancients counted their bright men and leaders. Even the prehistoric man had his fellowbeing of superior intelligence who was keener than the average man in the matter of sensing an approaching storm, and capitalized that fact by pretending to call forth rain and thunder with the aid of his magical gifts. The magician is the intelligent man of the prehistoric age. And so there were among the Hebrews certain men who were able to make a correct survey of the present, something which the average man was unable to do, something, in fact, which the average man of to-day is incapable of doing. These men drew their conclusions concerning the immediate future from their observations of the present, conclusions that were often correctly and sometimes wrongly drawn, and were called, prophets. The prophet is the intellectual leader of biblical times.

There are at all times a few intellects ahead of the average intellect. History numbers its intellectual pioneers who knowingly or unknowingly cut a rough path through the wilderness of the immediate future. The average man is incapable of keeping pace with the leader, but follows the beaten track in spite of himself, and not without a great deal of delay and lingering by the wayside.

But it is folly to judge a people by a single individual. There was but one Jesus in his time, one Galilee in his, and one Newton in his. The English people are not composed of Shakespears, nor the German people of Goethes. Among the Hebrews there were certain men called prophets, who judging from their alleged sayings, were considerably brighter than the average man of their days. It appears that they had a little broader conception of deity and existence than the one which happened to be popular. And in Babylonian history we meet with a king named Hammurabi, alleged author of a Code of Laws. It strikes me that certain of these laws, although they were formulated between forty and fifty centuries ago, would not be entirely out of place even in our present civilization.

But not every Jew was a prophet, nor every Babylonian a Hammurabi. Prophets and Hammurabis were individual souls detached from the collective soul of the masses like the few stray clouds that precede the large body of storm-clouds. Our own present thinkers and teachers are able to descend to the level of the masses while the average man is incapable of raising himself to their intellectual and moral level.

We should not therefore go back a few thousand years to find

in the ancient Hebrews authorities on the subject of the mystery of existence. In the first place, they lacked the intelligence to be authorities, even their intellectual leaders who thought a century ahead of their time. And in the second place, we persist in reading and studying their literature with a fixed conception of the deity in our head, which conception we assume to have also been that of the old Hebrew. The result is that we are compelled to resort to interpretation, after which ancient Hebrew literature acquires the distinction of being the sublimest drivel that ever was circulated around the globe.

By assuming that the ancient Hebrew had our modern conception of deity, we enlarge his skull far beyond its natural limits. Let us consider that whereas we, of to-day, possess a full-grown deity and a ready made religion, the ancients had nothing of the sort. Contrary to a popular notion that the truth about God was revealed to man at one time in all its fullness, our Christian religion is the result of long and steady growth, and certain of our present religious conceptions found their origin in crude conceptions of dark, remote ages. Even our present ready-made, inherited religion does not escape an occasional touch of improvement, and indications are that a forcible touch is due at present.

What near-sighted person it was who first declared a collection of ancient manuscripts to constitute the "word of God!" He does not live in thought in an eternal universe wherein evolution is constantly weaving her web of progress, who imagines that the alpha and omega of truth is to be found in his favorite belief, religion or dogma. We have not begun to comprehend the divine marvel of existence, let alone the nature of the deity. Our doctrines are as yet fanciful children's dreams, and our worship has not yet lost its earmarks of superstition and myth-making. Nothing of which to be ashamed! Slowly but steadily, man is learning and developing, and each new century records an improvement in the condition of mind and in the nature of thought.

When speaking of human development, we should not have in mind a thing of secondary importance only, viz., the art of living and of prospering. Several thousand years before the Christian era, the Sumerians were sufficiently intelligent to dig canals for irrigation purposes. They fenced in their land, plowed it, sowed their seed, and reaped their harvest. More than twenty centuries before the birth of Christ, the Code of Hammurabi fixed among other things the wage that had to be paid for different kinds of

labor performed. It stipulated what a doctor was permitted to charge, and what a patient was compelled to pay, for different treatments and operations. It threatened the architect with a severe penalty who built a house poorly and thereby caused injury to the tenant. It condemned the judge to death who misused his high office and knowingly pronounced an unjust sentence. All these things indicate civilization and intelligence, but not necessarily an intelligence that is capable of traveling from home and of surveying a universe and its inexorable laws.

The few bright lights of ancient civilization are perhaps the brighter because they shine in an appalling darkness. Alongside of the wealth and the magnificence of Babylon we must place a list of Babylonian star-gods and consider certain revolting religious practices that originated in the worship of those gods. Solomon's temple, the crowning material glory of Hebrew civilization, contained practically every symbol belonging to foreign heathen worship.

That which we call civilization, something which we can trace back to people who lived seven thousand years ago, is not necessarily indicative of all-around intelligence. There is an intelligence which is the natural product of the subconscious desire for self-preservation. Many animals possess it, and probably inherit it from a long line of ancestors who gradually acquired it while fighting for their existence. Also man possesses it, and his intelligence grows as the problems of living with his fellow-being become more intricate. Man's former battle with nature was, and his present struggle for the possession of the purchasing dollar is, instrumental in developing it. It is the product of thought of self.

But to be a keen salesman, for example, does not necessarily imply high intellectual development. The intellect develops mostly in single directions. For instance, it may above all things discern the possibility of a profitable sale, or it may easily discover a method of successfully defeating an undesirable competitor. How many big business men, however, whose opinions are solicited on account of their prominence in the world of finance and business, reveal a gross ignorance of the laws of human nature and of those of nature in general?

Yet is it the aim of evolution to develop the intellect in every direction, in order that it may become a fit instrument with which to comprehend and to interpret the marvels of boundless existence. The ultimate goal of the intellect is the realization that man lives in an infinite-eternal universe whose unchangeable laws are such

and such, rather than the ability to build an all-destructive dreadnaught or to manufacture a desirable article of comfort and luxury. Many steppingstones lead to that goal, and the one which is to raise our intellect to the next one is our present toil, labor, business or profession.

Now, history records a constant broadening of the human mind, its tendency to develop in more than a single direction. The intelligence that originally centered upon ME and its wants and comforts, in modern times makes expeditions into the vastness of the universe. And as time and evolution more and more refine the originally coarse gray matter of the human being, the world about him becomes larger and larger. The earth begins to take shape, and suns to travel, through an immense world-abys. The less attention man pays to ME, the more ITS presence, the presence of the infinite universe, impresses itself upon his mind. It is what raises him above the level of the beast, this ability to at least partly ignore his belly and his ME, and to pay some attention to the universe of creatures, and flowers, and stars and dizzy depths that engulf him.

We may rest assured that the ancients dwelt in thought in a small universe bounded by their appetites and by their immediate personal interests. We may expect them, as a consequence, to have been ignorant of the laws of nature, blind to the existence of a marvelously governed universe. For no man sees the universe, much less studies it, who only sees himself.

When centuries of hardships, struggle and experience have coaxed them from their shell of intense self-centeredness, we may be prepared to look for broader thoughts, for a better understanding of the laws of nature, for a more universal conception of the ruling power of the world. It somehow seems that the flame of intelligence receives a new vigor and brightness from occasional calamities and hardships that rudely awaken man from his dream of self-centeredness. Thus we find that the exile of the Jews tore them away not only from their country but also from themselves. And the result was, as shown by the literature of that period, a considerably more universal viewpoint of existence.

II.

It is equally foolish, I think, to turn away in disgust from the ignorance of the ancients as it is to attribute to them a superior understanding of things divine. The main purpose of human evo-

lution being the development of the intellect, God only knows what ignorant and superstitious creatures we may prove to be to our thirtieth century descendants. If it be a mistake to seek the solution of the Great Riddle in the allegories, superstitions and myths of the ancients, it is a worse mistake to suppose that the final answers to all questions are furnished by religion in its present form.

A religion is not created overnight, and our own Christian religion has no distinct date of birth. Were it not for the fact that our minds are either too lazy or else too pre-occupied to inquire into the history and the origin of our religion, we should realize that its foundations reach through the numberless strata of ancient conceptions concerning the mystery of existence down to the very first explanation man ventured to offer of a natural phenomenon. These strata include the sun-worship of the Persians, the worship of the tribal deity, Jehovah, the moon-and-star-worship of the Babylonians. Their levels sink down into the night of historical times when the Sumerians and the Akkadians inhabited the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Their levels have left faint traces in the depths of prehistoric times when man centered divinity in his fellow-being, and bloody, human sacrifices were supposed to transmit divine power to the soil and call forth an abundant harvest.

And I suppose that in order to find the ultimate origin of our present religion, we should search as far back as the birth of human thought and reason. We should go back to the age of the Neanderthal man, to Dubois' Java man, and still further back to the twilight days of human existence when man ceased to act altogether automatically after having acquired the germ of reason. To-day is the composite product of a thousand yesterdays, and present thoughts are the blended affects of a million preceding causes of which the first one was man's first thought.

It is with a certain kind of emotion that we should read how thousands of years before the Christian era, man, equipped with a mere germ of brain, lived life to the best of his ability, asked himself questions about the mysterious universe in which he found himself, and answered them also to the best of his ability. And when reading about the thoughts and the conceptions of the ancients, we should bear in mind that man at all times acts and thinks as well as is within his power. The nature of his actions and his thoughts are dependent on the nature of his mental equipment. His activities, mental and otherwise, reveal a certain average degree of brain-development of which they are the necessary expressions.

Looking backward on the road of history, we must expect the earlier and cruder products of human evolution to reveal a deeper ignorance concerning the nature of the universe than we at present do. Their universe at first must have been a very small one, considering the insignificant powers of their undeveloped brain. Only such phenomena as apparently influenced their intensely self-centered existence, drew their attention and became the foundations for their beliefs, and for their bloody rites. Vegetation, especially in connection with agriculture, and weather-conditions, in particular the stormy sky with its thunder and its lightning, were principally observed by them.

Mysterious, divine power caused the seed to sprout and the harvest to be abundant. But the source of this divine power was not found in nature, her domain being too large to be surveyed by an intellect whose activities were naturally very limited. In one of his fellows the prehistoric man found the source of the power that was also able to bless him with a rich harvest. And so he proceeded to sacrifice his divine fellowbeing and to bury him in the soil from which he expected rich returns, thereby transmitting the divine power from the man to the soil.

This divine man also able to call forth the rain and the thunder from the sky, and in this case again, natural phenomena were considered to be creations of a human being's magical power.

We see then that man lived, at the beginning of his career of development in a very, very small universe, and that he possessed an equally small god. His god resided in the body of a man, who ate and drank and lived like a man, and was superior to the ordinary being only in this respect that he possessed magical gifts. We should bear in mind, however, that his beliefs, his worship, his rites—his religion, if you wish—were the direct result of his inability to see a universe, and of his faulty explanation of natural phenomena. To word this a little differently, his beliefs and his superstitions constituted an endeavor to explain certain phenomena of the universe.

It may be added, that religion at all times embodied such an endeavor. On account of man's inability to explain correctly, the elements of magic and of the supernatural interwove themselves with religious doctrine. Their presence was necessary in the absence of understanding and of logical explanation.

III.

Man's universe broadens with his intellect. There came a time when evolution had developed him sufficiently to enable him to see a little more than merely the rain that indirectly brought him food. Evolution's first endeavors aimed at tearing man away from thoughts of his belly, and its main endeavor at present is to tear him away from thoughts of ME. A preponderance of ME, or the autocratic rule of the belly, shut off the individual from the outside world, and prevent him from becoming conscious of the existence of a universe the mystery of which clamors for a solution.

Gradually and slowly, the distance between the human and the animal stage became larger and larger, until man's belly was no longer his sole concern. It was then that he lifted his gaze occasionally heavenward, and saw stars and nightdepths. These caused him to think.

His first explanations of the presence of the brilliant mysteries of the sky were naturally crude and childish. He began with associating the sun, the moon, and some of the brighter planets and stars with his departed heroes. The god who formerly dwelt on earth among ordinary human beings as a man endowed with miraculous powers lost a little of his ultra-materialistic nature. His dwelling-place was moved to the heavens, and his existence had become everlasting.

The identification of a hero with a star, or with the sun or the moon, often occurred centuries after some long-departed leader had become the subject of a myth or a tradition, and in time had acquired all the magical powers of a god. From his heavenly throne radiated his supernatural influence—for better or for worse. He was a god to be feared, and man tried hard to obtain his goodwill and his favors. He worshipped the god, and sacrificed to him. For in ancient days, more so than at present, a considerable deal of religious worship was prompted by desire and fear.

Thus we find the ancient Babylonians surveying a universe which was considerably larger than that of the primitive man. It included heavenly bodies, and even constellations. But it should not be imagined that they were astronomers. They lacked the intelligence to discover law and mathematics in the construction of our universe. They merely observed to the best of their ability, and proceeded to weave a web of imagination about the things that they saw. And although we may be inclined to scoff at their star-wor-

ship and at the appalling number of their deities, we must consider, as in the case of the pre-historic man, the source of their religion. Their observation of a part of the universe,—considerably larger than that of which the primitive man was aware,—and their inability to explain, resulted in their particular religion and worship.

But the mere fact that the stars caused the ancient Babylonians to think their child-like thoughts, constituted an important link in the chain of religious development. Long after the Sumerians and Akkadians saw their civilizations absorbed by Babylonian rule, history opened its doors to admit the Hebrews and their tribal deity, Jahveh, to the land of Palestine. The Hebrews were the people who were destined to solve the riddle of the universe on a higher level.

That they did not accomplish this immediately is amply proven by statements in the Bible itself. In fact, it would appear that the Hebrews were mentally living in a very much smaller universe than the Babylonians did. Materialistic and polytheistic as the Babylonian religion was, it at least penetrated into the depths of the universe. The same cannot be said about early Hebrew religion. The Jahveh whom the Hebrews took to the Promised Land was extremely limited in nature, and reflected an equally limited intellect of his worshippers. He belonged to a primitive people, nomadic people no doubt, whose universe did not travel beyond clouds and mountain tops, and among whose objects of worship must be counted trees, stones and walls. And it is unnecessary to repeat what others have pointed out so often, that the original Jahveh was a faithful picture of the selfish, cruel, warlike and vindictive Hebrew himself.

But the redeeming feature of ancient Hebrew religion was that it acknowledged but a single deity. Unfortunately, however, too much religious capital has been made of the fact, and the Hebrews have been raised by us to a false level of intellectual and spiritual development, which has hardly been attained by ourselves. The fact that they worshipped a single deity has tempted us to believe that they were monotheists. But they were no such thing. Absolute monotheists are hard to find even in these days. And if we have difficulty in trying to acknowledge the existence of a single and an only deity, what may we expect of the ancient Hebrews whose intelligence in comparison with ours places them on a level with babes?

The fact of the matter is that Jahveh had his contemporaries. The Hebrew acknowledged the existence of other gods who pro-

tected and favored their respective peoples in the same excellent manner that Jahveh protected and favored them. His deity's domain was far from being universal. Its boundaries changed with the movements of the tribes. Wherever the Hebrews were, there also was Jahveh. But he was not to be found anywhere else. Foreign gods ruled beyond the borders of the Hebrew Possessions, and it was advisable for the traveler in a foreign country to acquaint himself with the particular method of approaching its deity or deities.

Although Jahveh's nature, therefore, at the outset was very limited, it expanded by leaps and bounds until it had become universal in the days of Paul. To read the Bible, paying particular attention to the Prophets, is to see Jahveh and religion grow. This growth was brought about principally through contract with foreign people. After their conquest of Canaan the Hebrew shepherds learned to be agriculturists, and incidentally were tempted to worship agricultural deities of the Canaanites. This worship, however, in the course of time was transmitted to Jahveh, the nomadic god of the mountains, the clouds and the storm, whose power thereby became more universal.

But the greatest factor in the development of Hebrew religion was Babylonian mythology. Although this influence at first had the appearance of being an evil one, on account of the Hebrews dividing their worship between Jahveh and Babylonian star-gods, it finally extended Jahveh's domain beyond the clouds and mountain summits to the stars. This final result was undoubtedly brought about principally through the Prophets who vehemently denounced their people's idolatry, and urged them to return to the old worship of Jahveh. When the Hebrews resumed the worship of Jahveh, however, their deity of necessity was given the rule over the larger universe with which Babylonian star-worship had acquainted them.

It is but a small step in religious development from the worship of a deity who is sole ruler over earth, clouds and stars to the worship of an omnipresent deity. The deity of Paul, who was the deity of gentile and barbarian alike reflected an intellect that had learned to travel away from self and to explore the immensity of the universe. As that intellect was not a spontaneous creation but a product of slow and gradual development, so likewise was the God of Paul the final result of a slow and gradual development which kept pace with that of the brain.

(To be Continued)

RELIGION NOT A TRUE SUBLIMATION.

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER.

IN a recent article on: "The Theory of Recapitulation and the Religious and Moral Discipline of Children,"¹ Prof. Raymond Wells, of Washington University, defends the ancient valuations of religious education, with a near-minimum of the modifying influence of modern science. I wish to bring out the contrast between his view and my own view. The latter will perhaps exhibit the extreme consequences of the modifying influence of the psychoanalytic approach. By the "extreme consequence" I mean to indicate that I conceive myself to go farther than some psychoanalysts in the acceptance of a complete psychic determinism, and in the application of a larger concept of psychic evolution. I have not yet fully formulated these views of mine, but in a fragmentary way I have suggested something of my meaning in my efforts to introduce the psycho-genetic approach into the study and discussions of philosophy,² law,³ sociology,⁴ criminology,⁵ and religion.⁶

¹ *American Journal of Psychology*, 29: 371-382; Oct. 1918.

² "Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism," *The Monist*, 26 (No. 1): 86-112; Jan. 1916.

"Psychologic View of the Pragmatic Issue," *The Monist*, 28 (No. 2): 273-281; Apr. 1918.

³ "Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinion," *Calif. Law Review*, 6 (No. 2): 89-111; Jan. 1918.

"Psychology, Democracy and Free Speech," *Medico-Legal Journal*, 34 (No. 4): 1-6; July 1917.

⁴ "Psycho-genetics of Androcratic Evolution," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 2 (No. 3): 277-285; July 1915.

Democracy, Democratization and Evolutionary Psychology. (In Press).

"Psychic Aspects of Social Evolution," *Liberal Review*, 2 (No. 11): 9-13; June 1917; (No. 12): 16-21; July 1917. Also partly republished as: *Liberty Through Impersonal Service*.

"Psychology of an Ex-Kaiser," *Call Magazine* (Sup. N. Y. Call), (No. 166): 6; June 15, 1919.

"Anarchism and 'The Lord's Farm'," *Open Court*, 33 (No. 10): 589-607; Oct. 1919.

"Birth Control and the Great War," *Amer. Medicine*, 24: 789-797; Dec. 1918; Republished in: *Birth Control Review*, 3 (No. 3): 8-14; Feb. 1919; *N. Y. Call*, (No. 445): 5; May 25, 1919.

When persons of considerable scientific education are impelled to accept or defend religion, they seem to me to be out of tune with the stage of development to which religion (in the sense of the supernatural and superhuman) belongs. Therefore, I always suspect that attitude of theirs to be the product of an emotional conflict. In hystericals we find quite uniformly, that their emotional valuation of the superhuman, or of other mystical relationships, is compensatory for some feeling of inferiority. For them religion serves as the neutralizer of some fear or shame, with usually an erotic involvement.

THE EMOTIONAL CONFLICT.

Prof. Wells clearly exhibits an emotional conflict at work within himself, when he says: "Against such a view [as not teaching religion for reasons of its falsity] I would urge the teaching of religion for reasons of its value, regardless of its truth." From my viewpoint this looks much like a modern educator's resurrection and camouflage of the old and often discredited doctrine that "the elect" are justified in "lying for THE truth's sake". THE truth may be a different one than formerly, but the principle of conduct in relation thereto appears to be the same. Doubtless, Prof. Wells, better than I, can sympathize with St. Paul when he said: "If the truth of God hath more abounded by my lie unto His glory why yet am I adjudged a sinner?"⁷ Within a limited scope it is the old doctrine that: the end justified the means.

On the one hand Prof. Wells esteems his intellectual attainments too high to permit him to defend the value and the teachings

⁵ "Determinism, Conduct and Fear Psychology," *Psychoanalytic Review*, (No. 4) : 379-390; Oct. 1919.

"Criminology and Social Psychology," *Medico-Legal Journal*, 34 (No. 1) : 1-8; Apr. 1917.

"Political Crimes Defined," *Michigan Law Review*, 18 (No. 3) : 30-44; 1919.

"Theodore Schroeder in Defense of a Chinese," 11 (No. 8) ; 8-13; June 1916.

Everyman Magazine, (a plea for a pardon).

⁶ "Authorship of the Book of Mormon," "Psychologic Tests of W. F. Prince, Critically Reviewed." To which is now added a bibliography of Schroeder on Mormonism. Repr. *Amer. Jour. of Psychology*, 30 (No. 1) : 66-72; Jan. 1919.

See my essays too numerous to list, on the "Erotogenic Interpretation of Religion." Some of the reprints of these have bibliographies attached.

⁷ Roman iii. 7. For more of this see: J. E. Remberg's *Bible Morals, Twenty Crimes and Vices Sanctioned by Scripture*. Pages 3-8, for justified lying.

of religion on the ground of its truth. Yet something will not allow him to throw religion overboard for its falsities. The conflict is obvious. His argument will be later seen to be merely a justification for this latter compulsion. He *feels* that religion has great value, because he has a great need for it, to neutralize some other feeling. Perhaps his religiosity is required to overcome fear, or shame; or to compensate for some great feeling of inferiority engendered some time in the past. Some other persons have no need to hold or to exhibit Prof. Wells' high appreciation of the moralities, especially as to sex. Why? Perhaps it is because some outgrow the embarrassing "moral" conflicts of the period of adolescence, while others carry those emotional disturbances and their attendant immature and conflicting emotional valuations all through life. When our adolescent embarrassments need a mask, we may then be impelled to intellectualize and rationalize that compulsion by such a theory as that of Prof. Wells', above quoted. If we are but defending a compulsion of our emotional conflict we will usually be induced to make use of a special plea, which ignores factors of the problem, quite obvious to others not similarly compelled. When the need for "moral" support is great or increasing, just to that same degree will the sustaining moral theories acquire a certitude and a value, approaching to the absolute.

As I read the above quotation from Prof. Wells, I received the impression that when writing it he acted (perhaps almost unconsciously) as if "truths", especially "moral truths" must be either black or white. For him there seem to be no grays or browns. "Moral" ideas evidently appear to him as being either false or true, as measured by some existant absolute standard. There is nothing in his article to suggest the fact that all our concepts are only relative approaches to being accurate transcripts of the realities. But beyond this act of manifesting his subconscious compulsion toward seeing only absolutes of truth and of falsity, he appears to embody within himself a subconsciously conditioned personal absoluteness, more important than any "truth" about objectives. When confronted with these overwhelming subjective valuations of his religion and of his religious morality, all questions of relative truths are submergences. If Prof. Wells did not subconsciously consider his feeling-value of religious morals as approximately absolute, he could not have ignored the problem of relative "truth" as applied to his personal estimate of "value". This choice of Prof. Wells, which is obviously subjectively determined, exhibits the usual

mental mechanisms involved in every effort of hystericals to intellectualize an agreeable aspect of their emotional disturbance. The resultant rationalization is always a special plea. A feeling of inferiority subconsciously determines the intellectual methods for achieving compensation, by acts that seem to imply some subconscious partnership with or nearness to omniscience. Hence the tendencies to assume absolutes.

The situation looks different if persons are freed from emotional disturbance concerning religion, for then they no longer feel, act or write as if they gave a paramount "value" to any popular error. When persons think in terms of relative approaches to truth the tendency is to attach the greater values only to the maturer mental processes and the relative fulness of the data, by the coordination of which we may move a little farther away from absolute ignorance. The aim of education then becomes, in part, a matter of minimizing the relative influence of the emotional contribution to our sense of values. Now our educator's task is to manifest a greater and maturer devotion to the enlargement of human understanding as to the relations and behaviour among things, including the human animal, and of encouraging the desire to use that understanding as a *check* upon our primitive impulses, and upon the emotional valuations of immaturity. We may frankly confess our inability to "put over" on a child the last achievement of our own maturing. But, having become conscious of the trickery of their emotional conflicts, such persons will seldom camouflage their own ignorance, impatience or emotionalism behind theories of serving the child by falsehoods or moral sentimentalisms.

DOCTRINE OF RECAPITULATION.

Next, Prof. Wells quotes Haeckel's doctrine, that biologically the individual life is a condensed recapitulation of the racial life. Then he transfers that doctrine of recapitulation over to psychic evolution, in order to use it for the purpose of justifying the proposition already quoted. He adds: "The recapitulation does not occur after the beginning of adolescence." Evidently this limitation on the doctrine of recapitulation is only the creation of Prof. Wells' necessities. It obviously means that, at the time of writing, Prof. Wells was not conscious of any evolution of human desires or of mental processes beyond that which is habitual at the beginning of adolescence. For the time he excluded from consciousness the fact

that he himself has achieved such adolescent and post-adolescent development. Combining these inferences, I conclude that Prof. Wells' emotional conflict and fixation of interest came into being during the "moral" turmoil of early adolescence, and that his subsequent intellectual progress must thereby have been largely restricted to the making of more sophisticated and more erudite explanations and justifications for some aspects or compulsions of his adolescent conflict. The essay now under discussion exhibits that process. A different education, or psychic development might have brought about a reunification of his personality above the evolutionary level of the adolescent conflict. Had the growth of his own desires and mental processes evolved to a condition consciously beyond the adolescent stage, he could not have arbitrarily excepted the adolescent and post-adolescent growth from the general evolutionary recapitulation. Neither is it probable that then he could have justified the filling of the child's mind with enshrined "moralities" regardless of their falsehood or the falsehood of the sustaining theory of their superhuman origin.

This same lack of the larger evolutionary grasp is also evident in the following paragraph. "The plan of education on a recapitulatory basis is to furnish to the developing individual, as far as this is possible, the appropriate environment for his stage of development. In religious education this means *encouraging* the natural succession of religious beliefs, just as they have occurred in the history of the race." (p. 374, Italics are mine.)

If we co-ordinate this last quotation with the first statement above quoted, we can be quite logically led to conclude that Prof. Wells means that because it is useful the child is to be "*encouraged*" to believe as true *all* the succession of religious follies ever entertained during the childhood of the race. Nothing is to be done as a matter of education to show that we have profited by racial follies. Had Prof. Wells possessed a different concept of the recapitulation theory, he would have given more attention to the fact that this recapitulation is not known to be, nor generally believed by biologists to mean, an exact, detailed and perfectly complete reproduction. There are displacements, compressions, omissions, short-cuts. Surely on the side of the physical development Prof. Wells would not insist that his child needs to recapitulate *all* of savage life. One not inhibited therefrom, might be tempted to use also the racial experience in the matter of the religious development, to accelerate and improve the process of education by perfecting our

concept of psychic evolution and of sublimation, and by consciously encouraged omissions.

ACCELERATING RECAPITULATION.

When we seek consciously to accelerate the natural processes of evolution and use a fairly well developed intelligence to that end, we seek to shorten or eliminate those stages of evolution which have least permanent value. Even from the more orthodox point of view this might mean to hurry the child past some aspects of primitive religiosity. I wonder if even Prof. Wells would have his child "encouraged" to believe in all the phallic religions, demonology, witchcraft, religious sadisms, snake worship and scatologic rites³ as being both valuable and true because they were inevitable during racial development. I think I may assume that he would not. If he seemed to imply the contrary it was only because his emotional conflict, and the subconscious defensive needs of his autonomic system, compelled him to exclude these factors of religion from consciousness, so they would not discredit the seeming efficiency of his special plea, as a neutralizer of his suppressed adolescent fears.

It seems to me that, a greater freedom from emotional disturbance and a more mature view of the theory of recapitulation, as well as of the evolution of desires and of mental processes, would have led Prof. Wells into a different train of thought. Then he might have said that at each stage of development a child should *not* be environed by conditions suitable to that stage; but rather that the environment should be so unsuitable as to create dissatisfaction and a resultant desire to be guided to a higher stage of development. In religious education this does not mean the *encouragement* of a succession of religious beliefs such as have infested the childhood of the race. On the contrary, it would mean to encourage a distrust and disbelief of them. These matters, erroneously deemed valuable according to the emotional standards of primitive ignorance, are now to be rapidly outgrown, or skipped if possible. To give historical information and to *encourage disbelief* concerning primitive religions or all religion, I might deem of some value. This value would be proportionate to the amount of enlightenment which went with it, concerning the mental and emotional mechanisms involved in the formations of primitive religious beliefs and in their present rejection. A child thus educated in all likelihood would

³ For bibliography of these see my: "Erotogenesis of Religion." A bibliography. Bruno Chap Books, 3 (No. 2) : Feb. 1916: 59 p.

find it impossible in maturity of years, to write such a special plea as Prof. Wells has written, probably in unconscious explanation or defense of his unsolved adolescent emotional problems.

TABOO AND DIVINE MORALITY.

After a very brief descriptive classification of the religions of primitive humans, Prof. Wells continues his argument thus: "The early belief in taboo and growing out of this the belief in God-given codes of law, are instrumental to the maintenance of desirable forms of conduct during early life, and to the formation of good habits that will persist after the disciplinary beliefs that once supported them have disappeared. As it was with the race, so it should be with the individual. Moral education should begin with taboo and belief in a God of external authority as the strongest support of morality at the dawn of adolescence. * * * Children must have a sense of God as giver of laws whose demand is right because he wills it, and certainly at adolescence there must be religion to guide the moral life if at no other time."

I believe that such a statement could only come from one afflicted with a greater repression which required neutralization by becoming, toward the child a mouthpiece of God. Such a statement could only come from one who enjoys the influence which comes from being the assumed spokesman of a God of external authority. In the other aspect of the personal conflict such a person would doubtless loath that much of megalomania.

To instil in a child a religious (i. e. emotional) valuation of taboo is to plant the seeds of a sanctified ignorance, the source of all intolerance, and inquisitions. To give to childhood beliefs, an avoidable emotional value, or to ascribe to them a superhuman sanction, is to increase the difficulty in outgrowing childhood's errors. It is just this enshrined ignorance, grown intolerant under the supposed authority of omniscience, which has most retarded the evolution of the race. By the same process it will also retard the evolution of the individual. The development of such primitive emotional fixations in the present generation is an injurious inhibition against further intellectual development. Nothing can be more stultifying to a self-reliant and harmonious adjustment to evolutionary social processes, than a "belief in a God of external authority" unless it is a belief in a God of internal authority. Both beliefs are usually grounded in emotionalism and this tends to close the door of our understanding for natural law in social relations.

and tends to inhibit a cheerful adjustment thereto. Thus do our primitive "morals" and our social institutions achieve a relatively static position instead of a consciously accelerated growth toward a more intelligent mode of behaviour.

It is just during the stormy period of adolescence that we least need the support of the morality of authority, unless those who guide our development are incompetent to give us anything more illuminating. During adolescence we are most in need of real enlightenment especially about the behaviour of sex-emotions. If, however, we are so ignorant of the emotional disturbances which find their roots in unenlightened efforts to adjust to an ignorant moral authority, and this morality is enforced with consciousness of its falsity, then we may see no way out except through a more desperate adherence to our "inspired" and absolute moral authority and its primitive moral creeds. The same inadequate understanding of conflicting emotions, which imposes such a necessity even upon some college professors, also compels them to assert, with "many critics" that Freud probably over-estimates the role of sex-instinct in the economy of life." If these persons had a better psychogenetic view of themselves, a different estimate might come into being. Until they achieve the courage to submit themselves to thorough personal psychoanalysis they are not very competent critics of Freudian theories.⁹

SOME FREUDIANS AND SUBLIMATION.

There are some Freudians who have not adequately cleared up their own emotional disturbances, and others are so exclusively engrossed with studies of the pathologic states, that they have also failed to discover much psychic evolution beyond adolescence. These Freudians give color to Prof. Wells' next error which is: "On Freudian principles religion is a valuable form of sublimation, especially at the beginning of adolescence as well as earlier". From another viewpoint it is only a false sublimation. It consists only of the use of infantile mental processes, to supply a new self-explanation, which seems socially helpful chiefly because more in harmony with the demands of a relatively undeveloped society. We forget that acts may become socially more comfortable or even relatively useful without implying any true psychologic sublimation in the actor. Instead of getting out of trouble by the method of

⁹ For elaboration see my: "Psychologic Aspect of Free Association." *Am. Jour. of Psychology*, 30: 260-273; July 1919.

dealing more efficiently with the objective realities, the religionist finds compensations in a world of phantasy and an emotional identification with something supposed to be super-human and super-physical. Psychoanalysts with considerable of unsolved emotional problems may easily deceive themselves in believing that they have cured a case of pathologic dishonesty when, with the aid of religious intellectualizations they induce the patient to act on the other aspect of the conflicting impulses. Hypnotic suggestion, New Thought and Christian Science, have been making similar "cures". Pathologically "honest" persons may be more comfortable to live with because we can always and easily exploit them, but they are not cured. We need to bear in mind the difference between a "social recovery" and a psychologic recovery. The same comment applies to cases of other pathologic anti-social behaviour which may change to a pathologic devotion to law and order, or to a morbid attachment to social conventions and morality, or to philanthropy. As Freud conceived this problem, our maturer desire will be to outgrow the necessity for authoritative morals and to substitute therefore, an enlarged understanding of the relations and behaviour among humans. Prof. Wells' "moral" necessities probably kept him from searching where he would have found Freud's views as expressed in: "Modern Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness",¹⁰ To outgrow moral conflicts I conceive to be one of the objects of future education, on the part of those whose psychologic understanding and the necessities of whose autonomic system will permit it.¹¹ Then we will only have evolutionary classifications of the psyche.

Apparently Prof. Wells has many repressions of his own. In consequence of these the conventional moralities are very, very dear and very necessary to him, as a neutralizer of some fear, possibly based upon some persistent adolescent moral self-reproach, still working below the surface of consciousness. In consequence of this necessity, he quite misinterprets Freudian psychology. Of course, there are some avowed Freudians who also find themselves intellectually and emotionally unable to follow the deterministic psychology of their master to its logical conclusion.

¹⁰ *Amer. Jour. of Urology and Sexology*, 11: 291-305; Oct. 1915.

¹¹ I hope soon to elaborate this psychic evolution, under the title: *Before and after Morality*. Now see my: "Determinism Conduct and Fear Psychology," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 6 (No. 4); Oct. 1919. Also see for this general viewpoint, Kempf's: *The Autonomic System and the Personality*.

RELIGION IS FALSE SUBLIMATION.

Whatever may be the cause of Prof. Wells' extravagant appraisal of his moralities, I cannot agree with him when he further says: "Much of the early sublimations in later childhood would, in an ideal scheme of things, take place under the influence of religion of the legalistic sort." I would esteem this a very great and evil hinderance to a true sublimation. By "true sublimation" I especially mean a sublimation in the sense of an evolution in the psychologic aspect of desire and of mental processes, as that concept of psychic evolution is being developed by psychoanalysts. To this, of course, must come mainly by a growth in the multiplicity, complexity and diversity of objectives, relatively understood and consciously co-ordinated in each present judgment, and a corresponding lessening of the influence of the emotions. It is just the course recommended by Prof. Wells, which so often produces emotional and intellectual fixations at low evolutionary levels, and thereby creates hysterias, all forms of anti-social behaviour and some insanities. It is because of this that the emotional valuations of religious morals and their absolutism are esteemed a hinderance to true sublimation. It is upon this ground that Freud and some of the psychoanalysts discredit the moralities. Religious instruction, in so far as it is distinctively religious and religiously efficient, diverts the interest from, and so far discredits and necessarily tends to inhibit the greater interest in understanding the relations and behaviour among objectives, including the humans and their sex emotions. And it is a psychic development based largely upon a co-ordination of such understanding that I conceive to be the more intelligent object of education, and an essential factor of all true sublimation.

TRUE SUBLIMATION.

All education (true sublimation) is relative, and these relativities extend in many directions. There are relative degrees of development in different persons upon different subjects, according to different standards each measuring different aspects of the human relationship to nature in general and the human environment in particular. In evolutionary psychology the effort is to furnish criteria for determining relative degrees of maturing, away from the infantile status of desires, of mental processes, and of the relative understanding of a relative multiplicity, diversity and com-

plexity of objectives, and of the use which is made of such understanding.

From this viewpoint I think of education as a growth in which the intellect is instructed in the relations and behaviour among things, and is helped to make ready and joyous use of that understanding to check and guide the more primitive impulses of man, as these express themselves through and by the more or less unconscious automatisms of the autonomic systems, to the achievement of progressively more complete self-expression, ever more and more in harmony with natural law; that is, growth in the more efficient achievement of ever more mature personal ends, by the more perfect adjustment of the human physical constitution and the temperament to the requirements of the environment, which adjustments thus tend to unify the personal ends with social ends and with all natural processes.

The relations and behaviour among things which are to be understood, must therefore, include an understanding of the behaviour of the human passions and desires, and the mental and emotional mechanisms by which these are sought to be realized and justified, masked and evaded, as well as the mental processes and data by which they may be checked and developed. This understanding is not very adequate unless it includes an evolutionary concept of desire and of mental processes, and a relatively large understanding of the relations and behaviour among things, all properly integrated with the effective life, so as to compel the autonomic system to function according to highly evolved and ever-maturing methods for the accomplishment of aims which also grow ever more mature and more inclusive in the sense of social character-developing.

This education consists in the ever more efficient use of an ever larger understanding, for refashioning the will to a more harmonious and more conscious submission of the personality to the arbitrament of its inevitable determinants, both within and without the human animal. This involves some deliberate elimination of conflicting emotional compulsions, as by Freudian methods, the otherwise inevitable determinants. Individuals are truly educated (in the sense of having evolved to relatively mature character status) just to the extent that they are free from emotional conflicts and possess the consequent relative freedom from blinding feeling-compulsions, which tend to inhibit the use of cold logic processes such as might be otherwise applied to the products of

dispassionate observation, covering a growing multiplicity, complexity and diversity of natural objects in process of behaving; differing degrees of success being again measured by the relative achievement in co-ordinating the relative multiplicity, variety and complexity of such knowledge thus acquired, into one synthesis for immediate automatic application, not so much to the justification as to the checking and modification of the more primitive impulses and to the correction of the instinctive subconscious valuations and judgments and of its automatic reactions.

Thus we may measure relative degrees of education or efficient sublimation: (1) By the relative multiplicity, diversity and complexity, of objective and subjective data, concerning the relations and behaviour of nature's forces and things including humans; (2) The relative scope in point of time and space which is covered and included in the understanding of this data; (3) The number and variety of aspects of conditioning circumstances under which that behaviour is understood; (4) The relative degrees to which our concepts approach to being perfect transcripts of the reality conceived; and (5) The relative degrees of efficiency evinced in using the aforescribed intelligence as a check and corrective (instead of a rationalization and justification) of our primitive impulses. This then constitutes true sublimation as I conceive it, and it is scarcely on speaking terms with anything which I or Prof. Wells would consider religious education.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A RICH MEDIEVAL LIBRARY.

THE JOHN M. WING FOUNDATION AT THE NEWBERRY SOON TO BE
OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW.

Old wine, old friends, old books, says a philosopher, are our most prized possessions. Omar added "Thou" but Omar was suspected of heresy. Old wine, we now cannot; old friends we soon may not, for they are fast leaving us, but old books, like the poor, we have always with us—hence we are rich. And scarcely anywhere are they to be found in more aristocratic antiquity or in greater profusion than in Chicago. Mr. George B. Utley, president of the Newberry Library, announces that the John M. Wing Foundation is soon to be opened to the public. Mr. Wing came to Chicago in 1865 from Oswego, N. Y., when a young man, with barely a week's board in his pocket. Getting a reporter's job on *Storey's Times* he quickly made good and was given the city editor's chair. Doing correspondence for eastern papers he was engaged by the editor of *The Boston Herald* to conduct his son on a world tour. This gave the young editor the opportunity of his dreams—to travel and to buy books. And buy books he did, and his taste was singularly good. He died in 1917, leaving his collections, with a substantial fund for their care, to the Newberry Library. Pierce Butler, a qualified scholar, was placed in charge as custodian.

Dominie Sampson might well exclaim: "Prodigious!" To begin with, here is an "incunabulum", printing in its cradle, a genuine block-book, that is neither the work of the scribe or the typesetter, but is printed from solid blocks like a child's picture book, as indeed it is. It is catalogued as "*Apocalypsis S. Johannis*, about 1450. Impressions of 48 blocks, each leaf being printed on one side only. Figures colored roughly by contemporary hand, green morocco, extra gilt borders, inside edges tooled." Which, being interpreted, means that it is some book and its price is above rubies. There are believed to be only three others of the kind in this country.

"This volume," says Pierce Butler, "has a distinct and permanent value as an original document for the student of medieval art

and culture. It illustrates the popular religious manuals of the late Middle Ages which, though apparently produced in large numbers, survive in very few examples. These books, being designed for the edification of the common people, few of whom could read, taught their lessons through pictures with only so much printed text as was necessary to identify the various parts of the design. The drawing is vigorous and impressive though it shows but little sense of design or precision in execution. Similarly the colors, laid on by hand after the book was printed, seem to have been chosen solely to attract attention without much thought of their verity to nature. But it is an example of typography that the book will arouse the greatest interest. It represents the transitional stage between the manuscript and true printing from movable type. In the effort to devise a method of rapid and cheap reproduction of the written manuscript, two distinct methods were invented, the stencil and the stamp. Though used to some extent for book decoration, these two methods were found most useful in the manufacture of playing cards. The application of this process to the manufacture of picture books was easy and followed in due course. Just as the method of playing card manufacture had been extended and applied to picture books the new process seems to have been further developed and used in the manufacture of true books in which pages consisted of words instead of pictures. So far as we know, wooden types sawed out of block-book pages were never used successfully, but tradition seems to justify the assumption that unsuccessful experiments on this line first led men to the notion of casting individual letters and then fitting them together into words and sentences." The evolution may be expressed: manuscript, playing cards, block books, bibles.

After the block book we naturally turn to the work of the press of Mainz. Peter Schoeffer's connection with Gutenberg is well known. Suffice it to say that in the *Catholicon*, or dictionary, of 1460, the invention of printing is claimed for the towered city of the Rheingau, and from 1467 this claim was taken over by Fust's son-in-law, Peter Schoeffer, who in the colophons of his books again and again celebrated Mainz as the city singled out by divine favor to give the art of printing to the world; the original town booster. Fust and Schoeffer did not claim the honor for themselves, but for Mainz, from which it is inferred that the priority of Gutenberg was understood. There are five Schoeffer's in the collection, one being a fine Thomas Aquinas of 1467. This is the earliest dated book of European origin in the library. There is also a fragment of the *Catholicon* of 1460, a leaf printed on vellum, rubricated in blue and red, and probably salvaged from some ancient binder's later work. There are only eight examples on vellum of the 41 specimens of the Mainz printer known to exist. Showing how the old bookbinders cut up the used parchments that came to their hand, there is here the *Cosmographi Geographica* of Pomponius Mela, printed by Erhard Ratdolt at Venice in 1482, showing on a map of the world

where west meets east, a map which the Genoese sailor must have seen some years before 1492.

Of Fifteenth century Bibles the Wing library has a round dozen, nine of them being in Latin and three in German text. Of the former, two are from Strasburg without date, four from Venice, 1476 to 1480, two from Nuremberg and one Basel. The German texts are from Cologne presses, in the Low German, Low Saxon and Luebeck dialects. In the Newberry Library proper there is a magnificent Biblia latina printed by Franciscus Renner de Heilbrun on vellum, Venice, 1480, and bound by Grolier, "*magnifique, exemplaire imprimé sur velin, en petits caractères dits lettres de somme. L'exécution typographique est admirable. Edition précieuse et de la plus grande rareté.*" The rubricated initials are in gold and colors that time has not faded and the superb panels are in richly flowered designs. Miniatures, placed on the inferior margins, represent St. Jerome in the desert, the creation of Eve and the nativity of Jesus. Altogether it is one of the finest examples of Fifteenth century bookcraft and of the art of manuscript illumination as cultivated in the monasteries of the Renaissance. Among the missals is a fine Plantin, notable as being one of the more recent productions of that old Antwerp press when it was under the management of the widow of Francois Moretus, bearing date of 1765. It is printed in the "missal type" or "double primer" and the chants are in the antique square and lozenge. Four dignitaries of the church bear testimony to the correctness of the liturgy. There is another end older Plantin that is perhaps of more interest to the laity, an Emblemata of Andea Alciati, 1577, with curious woodcuts and handsomely cut Greek and Latin text. Alciati preceded both Pia Hugo and Francis Quarles in the curious cult of emblems.

We pass now to the *Chronicarum liber, cum figuris et ymaginibus*, etc. Nuremberg Anton Koberger, 1493. This is the first edition of the famous Nuremberg Chronicle, a comprehensive description of the world and its history, plus *ymaginibus*. The book, which is described as the best work of this old Fifteenth century Nuremberg printer, has over 2,200 woodcuts, most of them executed by Michael Wohlge-muth, to whom was apprenticed, in 1486, Albrecht Durer, "the evangelist of art." These consist of portraits of illustrious persons, characters of sacred and profane history, all bearing the rugged features and the costume of medieval Bavaria, and views of walled and moated cities from Babylon to Wurzburg. What if the portraits and the bird's eye views are a bit apochryphal, and made to do more than double duty. Have we not had our Mrs. Jarley, and have we not our movies?

We should not overlook the Caxtons. A rare and right noble volume is the Chronicles of England, from Bryan Fairfax's catalogue. It is in the number 4 type, 182 pages. Title pages were not yet in vogue and the work begins abruptly: "IN the yere of thycarnaeyon of our lord Jhu crist M/CCCC/Ixxx / And in the xx yere of the Regne of kyng Edward the fourth / Atte request of diuerse gentylnen I

haue endeouyryd me to emprynte the Cronycles of Englonde/ as in this booke shal by the suffraunce of god folowe" There is no punctuation but the long comma. There are no illustrations, as Caxton only began the use of woodcuts until the year following the undertaking of the Chronicle, nor did the cabalistic trade mark with the W C appear until 1487. The colophon reads: "Thus endeth this present booke of the Cronycles of Englonde / Emprynted by me William Caxton in thabbey of westmestre by london/ Fynnysshed and accomplysshed the/ viij/ day of Octobre/ The yere of the yncarnacyon of our lord God/ M/CCCC/lxxxij| And in the xxij yere of kynge Edward the fourth" The work is based on the "Cronicle of Brute" and brought down to the battle of Towton.

If these are considered dull or childish—the world was younger then—we may turn to a lordly copy of the *Tewrdannckh*, Nurnberg, 1517 (*De Greuerlichkeiten und einsteils der Geschichten des loblichen streyparen und hochberumbten Helds und Ritters Herz Tewrdannckhs*), a beautiful folio in black morocco, tooled, of course. This is the first and rarest edition of the famous metrical romance which records the chivalrous deeds of the emperor Maximilian the First, who is supposed to have furnished the incidents for the poet laureate to turn into rhyme. The long poem, or series of versified stories, was written by Melchoir Pfintzing between 1512 and 1516 for the pleasure of the young king of Spain, afterwards the emperor Charles the Fifth. It embodies in romantic and allegorical form the romance of the wooing of Mary of Burgundy by the young and knightly Maximilian, then archduke of Austria.

The Florentine Homer of 1488, Bartolomeo Libri's first edition, in two volumes beautifully printed and elegantly clothed in levant by Duru, is one of the gems of the collection. Aldus Manutius followed Libri in 1495, and of his famous press, the Wing Foundation, possesses eleven fine examples. Perhaps the most notable is the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* of Francesco Colonna, 1499. This noble volume has a story of archeological romance which appealed greatly to the dilettanti, for whose benefit Leonardo Crassus, a jurisconsult, commissioned Aldus to print it. Impressive from its size and the profusion of the 168 illustrations of various sizes, the extraordinary variety of the latter and the excellence of their cutting add to its attractiveness. The story, as the title is intended to indicate, "Strife of Love in a Dream," reveals, by the aid of the illustrations, the Renaissance interest in antique architecture and art. "*per proprii vocabuli ello desrive vum elegante stilo, pyramidi, obelisce, ruine marime di edificii, la differentia di columne,*" etc.

A folio Dante from the press of Nicolaus Laurenti, of Florence (Laurenz of Breslau), 1481, is one of the earliest examples of the use of copperplates, and of the difficulties encountered in their printing with type. The plates are twenty in number, or, more exactly, two copperplates and eighteen drawings, formerly ascribed to Baldini but now believed to be the work of Botticelli, preceding the more ambitious series which he designed for the manuscript executed for

Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco. This copy is one of four containing the twenty plates, which was not, as the blanks left by the printer show, the full number intended. These blanks indicate, probably, the departure of Botticelli for Rome, where he was engaged in the great work of decorating the Sistine chapel, in which his fame is joined with that of Michelangelo.


As the old monasteries had chained Bibles, the monks for their diversion had their *Gesta Romanorum*. One of these, by the anonymous printer of the 1483 Jordanus, is the medieval collection of stories told by travelers at the guests' bench in the monastery refectory; a later Arabian Nights' Entertainment, an earlier Canterbury Tales, the Bocaccio of the cloisters, more or less moral in their application, as befitted the shaven transcribers. A more venerable tome, though not so ancient, is the Cicero, *Cato maior*, Philadelphia, 1744, "Printed and Sold by B. Franklin." Adding to the interest of this little book is an insert of an order on David Rittenhouse, Treasurer, for 641, 5s., in favor of a widow pensioner, dated Mch. 15, 1788, signed by Franklin who was then president of the council.

But the patriarch of the collection is the *T'ung kien kang mu* of the Chinese scholar Chu Hsi, being an abridgment of the Mirror of History which cost Se-ma Kuang nineteen year labor in the Eleventh century. Of this *editio princeps*, blockprinted in 1172, the Wing Foundation possesses a complete copy. It is a rare and fine specimen of Sung printing and perhaps the most extensive work of that period now known. Mo Yu-chi, the Chinese bibliographer, says that the printing-blocks were cut in 1172, that the printing was done on pure paper, that each page has eight lines with seventeen characters for each line. The library also has the Manchu translation of the Se-ma Kuang history in a Palace edition beautifully printed under the patronage of the Emperor K'ang Hi, in ninety-six sumptuous volumes in imperial yellow. In addition to these the Newberry possesses several thousand volumes of Chinese, Manchu, Japanese, Thibetan and Mongol books and manuscripts, many of them unique, and all of inestimable importance to the student of Asiatic history, philosophy and religion. Mr. Utley, Newberry's librarian, is to be congratulated, in connection with Dr. Laufer, for extending the library's activities in this direction.

Strengthening the value of the collection as a typographical library are three notable original primers of the art of printing: an exceptionally fine copy of the *Champ fleury* of Geofroy Tory, Francis First's printer and bookbinder, 1529, the first book in any language to discuss letter design; Albrecht Durer's *Underweysung der Messung*, Nurenberg, 1538, bearing on the title page the great A surmounting the D, a gem from the DeVinne library; and, finally, Joseph Moxon's *Mechanick Exercises*, London, 1683,—the former being the first book in German to treat of letter design, and the latter the first book in English on that subject. Examples of work by the modern artist-printers are not wanting. As a corner-stone in this

class the Foundation has already secured a complete set of William Morris' Kelmscott Press.

When we recollect that there are in all the world but three great typographical libraries, properly so called; the Börsenverein Bibliothek at Leipzig, the St. Bride's Foundation in London, and that of the American Type Foundry's Company in Jersey City, we may understand the peculiar value of this library to typographical art in America. It may be observed that the Wing Foundation has the fortunate distinction of having a substantial sustaining fund so that it is able at all times to increase its collections. While it is yet too early to speak of its plans and hopes there is reason for the belief that the Wing Foundation will at no very distant day possess one of the largest and most comprehensive collections of typography anywhere to be found.



DANTE ALIGHIERI.

From a Print by Raffaello Morghen after a Picture by Tofanelli.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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DANTE'S DEVIL.¹

BY MAXIMILIAN J. RUDWIN.

"Oh, what a sight!
How passing strange it seemed when I did spy
Upon his head three faces: one in front
Of hue vermilion, the other two with this
Midway each shoulder joined and at the crest;
The right 'twixt wan and yellow seemed; the left
To look on, such as come from whence the old Nile
Stoops to the lowlands. Under each shot forth
Two mighty wings, enormous as became
A bird so vast. Sails never such I saw
Outstretched on the wide sea. No plumes had they,
But were in texture like a bat, and these
He flapped in the air, that from him issued still
Three winds wherewith Cocytus to its depth
Was frozen. At six eyes he wept: the tears
Adown three chins distilled with bloody foam.
At every mouth his teeth a sinner champed,
Bruised as with ponderous engine; so that three
Were in this guise tormented."

Inferno. Canto xxxiv.

Ecco Dite!

NO wonder that the Devil is not pleased with this portrait of his. In G. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* he is wroth both at Dante and Milton for having misrepresented him. These two poets are usually mentioned together because of their portrayal of the Devil. Both took Satan out of the realm of popular imagination and raised him into the region of ideas. But that is just about as far as they agreed in regard to the person of the Prince of Demons. In their descriptions of him they went in two opposite directions. The Dantean Devil and the Miltonic Devil are as dissimilar as are Dante and Milton, Catholicism and Protestantism, Italy and England, the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. It has often been said that each mind, each creed, each country, and

¹ To the Sexcentenary of the death of Dante Alighieri (1321-1921).

each century paints the Devil in its own image. Of the two poets it is by far the Italian who was the least flattering to his Infernal Lowness. Dante's Dis is so inferior to Milton's Satan that we blush to think how he could ever sustain a conversation with him or even show himself in his company. The first is as frightful as the second is fascinating. The English Devil is a bright and beautiful angel, but the Italian Demon is a foul and frozen fiend. The Protestant shows us the Devil in his vain struggle against an almighty power, and the Catholic presents him to us in his sullen and savage despair. Milton's Satan compels our sympathy and admiration, but Dante's Dis is an object of horror and hatred. The latter Devil is what the former has become after a long sojourn in the dread and dismal darkness. In beholding the Dantean Demon we would never think that he "one day wore a crown in the eyes of God". Every vestige of his past glory has long been effaced. The glamor which surrounded him in heaven has wholly disappeared. Even the three pairs of wings, which remained from his ancient seraphic state (*Is. vi. 2*), have dropped all their feathers into the Cocytus and now resemble the wings of a bat. Dis is irredeemably and irretrievably a Devil.

"The Imagination of Dante", says Chateaubriand, "exhausted by nine circles of torment, has made simply an atrocious monster of Satan, locked up in the centre of the earth".² His Devil is an incarnation of ugliness, foulness and corruption. As he stands half sunk into the frozen fastness of his pit, in all his pervading brutality and cruelty, malignity and monstrosity, he is an appalling rather than an appealing sight. We cannot enter into his psychology. The action of his mind or will is closed to us. We do not even know whether it is sorrow over his departed glory or impotent fury which wrings the tears flowing over his three chins. In Purgatory the Devil reappears in the traditional shape of a snake. (*Purg. viii. 98f.*)

Dante's portrayal of the Devil is essentially allegorical. The Dantean Dis is the personification of the evils of the period. In his conception of the rebellion in heaven our poet does not follow Church tradition and teaching. The Church fathers, Irenæus, Eusebius and Nazianzen among others, taught that Satan's sin consisted in pride and envy, but to Dante the Devil is the author of treachery. According to our poet's view Lucifer was banished from heaven not because he refused in his haughty spirit to bow before

² *Génie du Christianisme*, Bk. iv, Chap. ix.

the Great White Throne, but because he committed high-treason against his Creator by conspiring to wrest the crown of heaven from him. The Italian poet, who saw his country torn asunder by its own jealousies and rivalries, considered treason the greatest of all evils (*Inf.* xxxii. 106). That is why of all the world's greatest criminals the three selected for punishment by the King-Devil himself were traitors. For this honor Dante picked out the three greatest traitors the world had ever known: Judas Iscariot, who betrayed our Lord, and Brutus and Cassius, who betrayed the celestial Cæsar and conspired against what the Italian patriot re-



DANTE'S ICE HELL.
(By Gustave Doré.)

garded as the sacred Will of the Almighty, the establishment of the Roman Empire.

To treachery must be added tyranny as a dominant trait in the character of the Dantean Demon. Dis is the child of the mind of a man who fled from a country which was groaning under the tyranny of its rulers. Dante preferred to be exiled from the Florence he so loved than allow himself to be cowed by the cruelty of the party

in power in his city, and in the opinion of Mme. de Staël's Corinne it must have been exile which was our poet's real hell. "I have found", said the poet of *Inferno*, "the original of my hell in the world which we inhabit". Having observed that physical force reigned supreme round about him, Dante represented hell as ruled by the law of the mailed fist.

Another reason for the prevalence of the physical over the moral in the portrayal of the Dantean Dis is the fact that he is a demon rather than a devil. Although he has already, through centuries of Christianity, been brought into connection with moral evil, he still retains his original physiognomy of physical pain. Primitive man saw in the Devil a tormentor rather than a tempter, a nightmare of terror and not the mainspring of moral woes.

Although a Catholic and well versed in Church lore and Canon law, Dante, it must be borne in mind, pursued his path, in the main, away from Christian tradition. He sought his masters and models in ancient literature rather than in medieval legend and learning. The Dantean demonology is classical rather than Christian, mythological rather than theological. The ruler of hell in Dante's *Inferno* answers not to any of his biblical names. Lucifer, Satan and Beelzebub have been overthrown by Dis.³ This Virgilian personage is of Northern origin and was the god of darkness among the Gauls.⁴ Dis, however, has a Teutonic ring and may be a corruption of Teutates (Tuisto in Tacitus), the god of the Teutones. It is wholly natural that the god of one race should become the devil of another race. The Romans, who adopted Dis, identified him with Pluto, the king of the underworld in Greek mythology. This god also appears in the *Inferno* under his own name as guardian of the department for usurers and misers. Apparently Dante considers Pluto and Plutus as identical in person. Already in classical times the god of the underworld and the god of wealth were identical. The god who dwells in the hollows of the earth was soon regarded as the possessor of all the gold and silver and precious stones hidden there as in a vault. In this manner Satan is also imagined as the

³ Dis and Hades are applied to the realm as well as to its ruler just as, on the other hand, the infernal monarch is called Inferus in the apocryphal *Gospel of Nicodemus*.

⁴ "Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant idque ab druidibus proditum dicunt." (Caesar, *Commentarii de bello Gallico*, vii. 18.)



HEL, THE GODDESS OF THE NETHER WORLD.
(By Johannes Gehrts.)

guardian of subterranean treasures and possessor of unlimited wealth.⁵

In addition to Dis and Pluto the *Inferno* contains many other classical characters. The reader encounters Acheron, the ferryman of the Styx, Cerberus, the hell hound, Minos, the judge of the dead, Geryon, the guardian of the fraudulent and Phlegyas who burned the temple at Delphi. This Christian hell also has among its population



THE DOOM OF THE DAMNED.

After Luca Signorelli.

Centaur, half men and half horses, and Minotaurs, half men and half bulls. Naturally no hell can be conceived without the woman-faced and serpent-bodied Furies and the equally woman-faced and feather-bodied Harpies, both having with scandalous consistency always been described as members of the "gentler" sex.

⁵ Cf. also Algeron Sidney Crapsey, *The Ways of the Gods* (1921), p. 79.

It will not appear incongruous to find in a Christian hell classical characters, especially if they were already associated with the shadowy world in their pre-Christian existence. On this point the poet of the *Inferno* held the tradition of the Church, which regards the gods of mythology as fallen angels who beguiled men into worshipping them in the form of idols. Even Edmund Spenser in the sixteenth century described the Devil, as dwelling beneath the altar



THE FALLEN LUCIFER.
(After Doré.)

of an idol in a heathen temple and in his name performing miracles and uttering oracles. The Church fathers were very explicit on this point. Tertullian states unequivocally that all the old gods were devils (*De spectaculis*, 19). The resemblances between classical mythology and Christian theology were explained by the Church as diabolical counterfeits. Justin Martyr thought that by listening to the words of the inspired prophets the devils discovered the intentions of the Lord and anticipated them by a series of blasphemous imitations (*Apol.* i. 54). In this manner was explained the similar-

ity in creed and cult between Christianity and paganism. The diabolization of the Greek gods is well depicted in Mrs. Browning's poem *The Dead Pan*.

The individual features of the evil powers of pagan beliefs were transferred to the Devil of the Christian religion. His trinitarian head recalls Typhon of the Egyptians, Hecate of classical mythology,⁶ Hrim-Grimmir of the Edda and Triglaf of the Slavs.⁷ The Devil is described as a three-headed monster already in the apocryphal *Gospel of Nicodemus* and in the *Good Friday Sermon* of Eusebius of Alexandria, who addresses the Devil as "Three-headed Beelzebub". The trinity idea of the Devil was interpreted by the Church fathers as Satan's parody of the trinitarian God-head. This tendency on the part of the Devil to mimic the Deity in every detail of his character and conduct has earned for him the designation of *simia Dei* (God's Ape).

The conception of the imprisoned rebel is also a pre-Christian tradition. It may be found in many of the ancient ethnic religions. Ahriman, who fought against Ormuzd, was bound for a thousand years; Prometheus, who assailed Zeus, was chained to the crag; and Loki, the calumniator of the Northern gods,⁸ was strapped down with thongs of iron in his subterranean cavern. It would seem, however, that Satan has not allowed his imprisonment to interfere with his activities. No matter how often he has been bound and sealed at the bottom of the bottomless pit, his evil influence on the affairs of men never suffered any diminution. Satan apparently directs his work from his dungeon and despatches millions of messengers to carry out his will on this earth.

In addition to classical mythology the poet of the *Inferno* has drawn on medieval superstition to fill his hell. That mythical Spanish king Geryon was not raised to the honors of demonhood until the medieval times. The guardians of the fifth *bolgia*, the *Malebranche* (Evil-claws), are the roguish imps of folk-lore. These secondary devils have not wholly lost the comical and jovial character with which popular imagination endowed them. They are mischievous rather than malignant spirits, and they carry on in hell in the manner of drunken men during a bout in a medieval tavern.

⁶ Lucifer, as the bringer of light, is, in truth, a surname of Hecate, the goddess of light.

⁷ Cf. Paul Carus, *The History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil* (1900), p. 249.

⁸ Cf. Hesiod's *Theogony*, 735ff.



O Her: Jesu Chuste/der du als ein strenger vnd gerechter Richter der armē sündige seelē so sich von dir ist abwerffen/ein vnendliche hellische straff verordnet hast bey Lucifero vnd ander en sein mit verstoffene geistē vnd verdampfen: Ich bitte dich/verlyh mir an verdienstlich lebe sie in zeit der gnaden also sūten/dz ich teilhaffte d'cins bitterē sterben/entinnen mög solicher grausamē straff durch die grundelose barmhertzigkeit deiner allmechtigen genaden: Amen.

THE TYPICAL CONCEPTION OF HELL.
German woodcut of the age of the Reformation.

The horned demons in Dante's *Inferno* bring to our minds the little devils who, on the medieval stage, ran howling around the mouth of hell and even darted to and fro amidst the crowd to the great amusement and terror of our forbears. As in the medieval mysteries we also find in the *Inferno* a devil carrying a lost soul to hell. This incident, common to all forms of medieval literature, may be traced back as far as the apocryphal *Vision of Saint Paul*. The weeping Devil may also have been introduced into the *Inferno* from the contemporary mystery-plays. But the idea of a repentant rebel is an ancient tradition and was acquired by the Jews from the Persians from whom they took their Devil. The writer of the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (written between 30 B. C. and 50 A. D.) already represents the apostatized angels as "weeping unceasingly".

In addition to the rebel angels and rival gods of the Lord we find in the *Inferno* the Impartial Empereans. It is not so generally known that during the war in heaven the angels were not wholly divided into two opposing camps. There were many angels who, untouched by partisan passions, remained wholly aloof from the conflict and refused to fight in this war for glory between Jahve and Satan. These non-combatants have been placed by Dante in the ante-hell amidst the throng of egoists and self-centered individuals. The zealous patriot of Florence had no patience with men who demanded their right of keeping out of a war which they did not bring about and in which they had no interest whatever. The Russians with their individualistic bent of mind are inclined to be more lenient to the neutral angels. According to an old Russian legend the Lord did not cast the Impartial Empereans into hell but, in order to give them another opportunity to choose between him and his rival, sent them down to earth to which the scene of the battle had been transferred. From these angels, who married mortal maidens, there developed a race which has always shown a striking contrast to the human race. It has furnished humanity with its prophets and poets, with its reformers and revolutionaries. The descendants of this union between the sons of God and the daughters of men have always been in the first rank of those who seek peace and abhor murder. They have proven valiant warriors in the eternal conflict between the Good and the Evil for the mastery of the world. They have long ago redeemed themselves, but they will not return to heaven until they have also redeemed all men.

Of them was also Dante Alighieri, the exiled poet of loyalty and liberty.

DANTE'S JOURNEY TO HELL.

AMONG the travellers' tales which delighted our wonder-loving forbears the greatest popularity was enjoyed by reports of journeys to the realms of the dead. Visions too numerous to tell were invented for their delectation and edification. It would indeed be too great a task to follow the mythical stream of a Beyond flowing out of and into the hearts and imaginations of men. Its sources reach far back, to "a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary". It is found in Indian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian mythology. Many have been the visits of the living to the dead. Some went in the body and others out of the body. Some travelled by night and others in the light of the day. The first record of a journey to the World of Spirits is found in Plato. This Greek philosopher recorded the testimony of Er the Arminian to the effect that he had been admitted to witness the distribution of rewards and punishments to the souls of the departed and had been permitted to return to earth and tell his story (Rep. x. 614ff.). Homer described the descent of Ulysses to Hades to consult Tiresias (Odys. xi.). From Homer the idea descended to Virgil, Seneca, Ovid, Lucian, Statius, and other Greek and Roman writers. It also entered Jewish-Christian thought, the Church fathers elaborating it into a doctrinal system. The New Testament furnished the starting-point with its visions of the Beyond the Veil. The Book of Revelations offers many glimpses of the Unseen World, and in the Epistles we learn that St. Paul was caught up to the third Heaven (2 Cor. xii. 2). Details of this journey are suppressed by the biblical writer as "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter", but are given in the *Vision of St. Paul* (4th cent.). Other biblical passages (Acts ii. 31; Eph. iv. 8-10; Rom. x. 7 and especially 1 Petri iii. 19-20) were interpreted to mean that Christ after his burial descended to hell for the purpose of redeeming from infernal pain the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Dispensation. This idea was elaborated in the Latin apocryphal book *Descensus Christi ad Inferos*, which forms the second part of *Evangelium Nicodemi* (3rd cent.) and the Nicene creed.

But while Christ visited hell after his death, others journeyed thither during their life-time. Zoroaster is said to have made mid-



HEAVEN AND HELL.

The Gnostic Trinity Ideal of God Father, God Mother and God Son.

night journeys to Heaven and Hell, and, according to Jewish tradition, Moses also visited Heaven and Hell in his body.⁹ The Holy Virgin and the Apostle Paul wandered likewise through Hell and witnessed the torments inflicted upon the wicked. As a matter of fact, it would seem that when the ancient World of Spirits was divided by Christianity into two realms, an upper and a lower, the majority of travellers preferred to go in the downward direction. The idea of Hell seems to have had a fascination for the Christian mind. What wonder that Hell is writ large on the manuscripts of the monks and missionaries! Many were the visions of Hell in medieval times. What we call the Dark Ages were indeed spiritually a perpetual *séance* with lights lowered. We need but refer to Beda Venerabilis, St. Brandan, Tundalus, Albericus, Wettin and Hildegard. Prominent among the medieval pilgrims to the pit is Owaine the Knight. His descent into St. Patrick's Purgatory, as told by Henry of Saltrey, took place in 1153.¹⁰ The most distinguished visitor, however, that Satan ever received at his court was Dante Alighieri, the first and greatest of the poets of Italy.

Dante, to be sure, visited all the three realms, to which the Catholic Church assigned the dead. Thus his journey included Hell, Purgatory and Heaven. It would seem, however, that our poet was most impressed by Hell. Of his trilogy the *Inferno* undoubtedly commends itself most to our imagination. The *Inferno* is the most powerful poem in the *Divina Commedia*. Next in importance is the *Purgatorio*. "If Dante's great poem", says Mr. Francis Grier-son, "had been a description of Heaven, no one would read it. The interest centers in Hell and Purgatory." It was Hell and not Heaven which, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, had left the deep marks on Dante's face. It is Hell and not Heaven which is the most real in the consciousness of man. "There may be Heaven, there must be Hell", is the conclusion reached at the end of Browning's poem "Times' Revenges". A further illustration of this fact is the legend of three monks of Mesopotamia, who set out on a journey to the departed and who found Hell and Purgatory, but not Heaven.

Dante's conception of Hell is not original but universal. Many of his ideas were current in his days. The *Inferno* is but a highly

⁹ Cf. Louis Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews*, i. 309ff.

¹⁰ See *St. Patrick's Purgatory, an Essay on the Legends of Purgatory, Hell, and Paradise, current during the Middle Ages*. London, 1844.

poetical elaboration of popular medieval notions. Following all Roman writers our poet shows in his description of the Underworld a love of horrors and a delight in terrors for their own sakes. This predilection for scenes of bloodshed and corruption is especially typical of the art of the Etruscans.

The flaming and frigid divisions of Hell point to the two mythical currents, the Christian and the classical, which meet in Dante's vision of the Underworld. The essential element in the Christian Hell is fire. This idea rests upon many biblical passages.¹¹ It has been supported by Milton and other poets and rendered almost certain by the testimony of many a preacher now departed, who is not to be lightly doubted. And how can we scorn the testimony of the contemporaries of Dante, who pointed out to each other with holy shudder the marks which the scorching fires of Hell had left on this unhappy poet's face? In its conception of a flaming Hell Christianity, through its parent religion, had in mind the place Tophet in the Valley of Gehenna, where stood the idol Moloch with his fiery belly. This belief in a Hell of flames was confirmed by the sight of the smoking volcanoes. For notwithstanding the fact that a few theological astronomers wished to place Hell in the sun or moon or some other planet, the good orthodox theory has remained to the present day that Hell is at the earth's center. The Jewish-Christian Hell, however, seems to have been modelled not after Mulge, the Babylonian underworld, but after the Persian place of punishment, and Satan is but imitating Ahriman in making the sinners burn continually. It must also be borne in mind that Prometheus and Loki, Satan's cousins in other religions, had a great deal to do with fire.

The idea of a Hell of ice, on the other hand, is not in conformity with the teaching of the Church. By describing also a frozen region in Hell our poet is following not the Christian but the classical tradition. This element Dante introduced in Hell out of respect for Virgil, who served as his guide in Hell. But such a conception of Hell can only be the result of a Northern imagination. It is cited by Scandinavian scholars as a proof of the influence of Northern mythology on Southern thought.¹² M. Anatole Le Bras, the

¹¹ Is. ix. 17-18, xxx. 33, xxxiii. 14, 1.9-11, lxxv. 5, lxxvi. 24; Jer. xvii. 4; Matth. iii. 10, xiii. 30, 50, xviii. 8; Marc. ix. 43; Luc. xvi. 24; 2 Thess. i. 8; 1 Cor. iii. 15; Hebr. x. 27, xii. 29; Rev. ix. 2, xviii. 19-20, xx. 9-10.

¹² Cf. Paul Carus, *History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil* (1900), pp. 246-49.

Celtic scholar, may consider Virgil's conception of a cold Hell as another proof of his contention that the Roman poet was of Celtic origin.

This synthesis of Eastern belief and Western imagination is symbolized for the Teutonic races in the very name of the Christian Underworld. It is indeed an irony of etymology that the Eastern place of burning heat should bear a name which stands in the West for a place of cold and dreary darkness. "Hell" is the modern form of the name of the Scandinavian demoness Hel (Gothic Halja), daughter of Loki, whose abode was an icy hole.¹³

According to the Dutch folk-lorist and novelist, Dr. Frederick Willem van Eeden, Satan disclaims any connection whatever with these regions of alternating fire and ice. In the allegorical novel *De kleine Johannes* by this author the Devil maintains that the place of eternal torment which Dante visited was not his but the Other's. He accuses Dante of unfair dealing in ascribing to him properties which belong to the god in whose name the Inquisition was instituted. As Little Johannes on his spiritual pilgrimage enters the domain of the Devil he is astonished to find it so different from the general opinion prevalent on earth. "What is this place, really?" asked Johannes. "Hell? Is it here that Dante was?" "Dante?" asked the Devil. And all his retainers whispered and tittered and chattered: "Dante? Dante? Dante?" Surely resumed the king, "you must mean that nice place full of light where it is so hot and smells so bad, where sand melts, where rivers of blood are seething, and the boiling pitch is ever bubbling, where they scream and yell and curse and lament and swear at one another". "Yes," said Johannes. "Dante told about that". "But my dear little friend!" said the Devil affably, "that is not here, as you can very well see. That is not my kingdom. That is the kingdom of another who, they say, is called Love. With me, no one suffers. I am not so cruel as that. I cause no one pain'.

Dante has had many imitators who also ventured to visit the Lower World. Emmanuel Swedenborg is said to have journeyed to Heaven and Hell. Perhaps the most prominent guest that Satan welcomed in modern times was Heinrich Heine.¹⁴ Letters purporting to come from Hell appeared in Germany in 1843 and in Den-

¹³ Hel was the queen of the Underworld in Scandinavia as Bahu was in Babylonia and Persephone in Greece.

¹⁴ W. Müller von Königswinter, *Höllenfahrt von Heinrich Heine*. Hrsg. von S. Ascher. (=Neudrucke literarischer Seltenheiten. Nr. 4.)

mark in 1868.¹⁵ A very interesting visit to the infernal world has recently been paid by the cartoonist, Art Young, who introduced himself to "Sate" as a newspaper man from Chicago and who reported after his return that "Hell is now run on the broad American plan."¹⁶ All of which goes to show how much truth there is in the words of the old Goethe that

"Culture, which the whole world licks,
Also unto the Devil sticks."¹⁷

¹⁵ Gregorovius, *Konrad Siebenhorns Höllenbriefe an seine lieben Freunde in Deutschland*. Hrsg. von Ferdinand Fuchsmund. Königsberg, 1843. *Letters from Hell*. Given in English by Julie Sutter. With a preface by George MacDonald. London, 1886. 2nd edition, New York, 1911.

B. Piscator started a series of *Modern letters from Hell* (*Moderne Höllenbriefe*) with his book *Psychological Studies from Hell* (*Psychologische Studien der Hölle*), Berlin, 1907. On letters from Heaven and Hell see W. Höhler's article "Zu den Himmelsund Höllenbriefen in *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, vol. I (1902), pp. 143-9. Rachel Hayward published a novel with the title of *Letters from Là-Bas*.

¹⁶ Art Young, *Hell Up to Date*. Chicago, 1892.

¹⁷ For a bibliography on Dante's Devil see the present writer's *Bibliografia di Daemonologia Dantesca* in the October 1921 number of "Studies in Philology."

PRESENT DAY IDEAS ON REVOLUTION.

BY GILBERT REID.

REVOLUTION is a word used of late more frequently than any other. Its use by many classes of society and in so many parts of the world indicates a general unrest and discontent, the usual precursor of revolutionary movements, unless met half way by opposing and dominating forces in society and in the nation. Once let general discontent get started and revolution will not be long in coming.

Use of the word revolution has a wider application than ever before. There are all kinds of revolution, some good and some bad. It is hard to think straight in the midst of confusion of ideas over the meaning of a word as dominating as revolution. There have been national revolutions all through the past, but now we hear of schemes for a world or international revolution. Along with revolution, instigated by radicals, there is counter-revolution, instigated by reactionaries. Thus it is that devotees of monarchism and absolutism are at one time anti-revolution and at another pro-revolution.

Prolific discussion now exists concerning social revolution, industrial revolution, and even moral revolution and spiritual revolution. Those who support the existing order find revolutionists in abundance—among Socialists of the Left Wing, among advocates of the Soviet system, and among Bolsheviki, Spartarcides, syndicalists, communists, anarchists, I. W. W.'s, and other kinds of radical thinkers and busy agitators. These suspected revolutionists, rightly or wrongly, are looked upon by the intelligencia as of the worst and most dangerous type in human society. It seems as if every man's hand is against his neighbor. There must come a change, is the cry of the majority. The small minority, instinctively, stand trembling, lest their possessions as well as their rights be taken from them. If the conservative becomes more conservative

and the radical more radical, a clash is sure to come and with that, in the ordinary trend of events, a revolution.

We generally think of revolution as a sudden political change; anything sudden in its change is revolutionary. This kind of revolution has been an inevitable condition of the growth of every nation, of the aspiration of multitudes of human beings. The demand for political change of a drastic sort is just as apt to proceed from good men as from those who are bad. At its best it partakes of the character of reform, and reform receives its vitality from something that is ethical.

Revolution, if completed in its purpose and successful in its operation, consists of two parts, the overturning of that which is, and the establishment of that which is new and is to be. Without a new order revolution is stunted, is half-grown. It excites the execration of men rather than their praise. Society under such conditions has failed to complete its revolution around its centre—the centre of human justice; it has rather gone off on a tangent. Society whether of a majority or minority, has not yet gone the round of a complete revolution; it has stopped with an outburst, an explosion, an eruption, a revolt, a rebellion.

Revolution is generally preceded by a revolt or many revolts. The revolts often fail, one after the other, and are accompanied by great suffering, cruel opposition and pitiless blame. In due time, when society is made ready for the complete change, these attempts at revolt pass on into a complete revolution, sometimes with violence and bloodshed but just as often without them.

To discriminate still more closely, rebellion is organized resistance to constituted authority, while revolution is not only the overthrow of one form of government but the substitution of another. Revolution in its ultimate aim is therefore orderly and so far commands respect and secures adherence. Rebellion is less favored, for it seems to lack these good features of a laudable purpose; it is regarded by every government, by every State, as criminal. High treason is high crime. It is natural, then, that men should prefer to be called revolutionists, and not rebels. The taint of disloyalty is humiliating, while boastful professions of adherence to law and order whether just law or not and whether sound order or not, makes one secure from attack, from arrest and from suspicion.

If one examines history more carefully, he will find that re-

bellion, if successful, is the hand-maid of revolution. But it must be successful; if it fails, it is liable to the penitentiary or the gallows. As Andrew D. White once said, "rebellion is often revolution begun; revolution is rebellion accomplished". To be a revolutionist requires great courage, a kind of audacity, for he may be taken to be, not a revolutionist but a rebel. "Nothing so successful as success"; nothing so awful as failure, especially if it be found in the sphere of politics. One can never feel quite safe, till his new schemes of forms of government have been evolved into completion. Until that end is reached, lovers of the old order will persist in their claim, their charge, their battle-cry, that he who opposes the Government—or, in the United States, the Administration—opposes the State, and he who opposes the State "opposes the ordinance of", opposes God. Such an one is viewed as a traitor to his country and in rebellion to God. Should Time be patient and revolution complete its course, it will then be seen that he is the truest citizen who is loyal to the highest ideals of the State, and to the deepest significance of the Constitution, that he is one who overturns the existing order merely because it has strayed away from the best conception of the State and the real interest of the national Constitution.

There is of course, a presumption in favor of existing institutions. Mere criticism, mere complaint, mere talk, is not enough for one who aspires to be a revolutionist within the State. There must be a well-formed plan of getting something that is better, and better, too, for the mass of men and not merely for one's self or one's own group.

Great revolutions have more behind them than dissatisfaction with political theories and practices. They concern society and the thought of men. A government or a monarch is overthrown, when traditions attached thereto crumble away. The thoughts, the customs, of masses of men take on a new shape; the soul of a nation is being transformed by inevitable laws that come in from without, by the force of circumstances. Revolution then partakes of the character of a social revolution.

It was a century and a half ago that a change came about in the social environment of England, the birthplace of modern revolutions in Europe and the Americas. Even in those days there already existed an industrial revolution and a readjustment of wealth. The social changes which were taking place in England

left an impress even on colonial life. In the words of Brooks Adams, "as an effect of the Industrial Revolution upon industry and commerce, the Revolutionary War (of the American colonies) occurred, the colonial aristocracy misjudged the environment, adhered to Great Britain, were exiled, lost their property, and perished". The loyalists in those days were royalists, and belonged to the upper strata of society, to the privileged class in English society. In opposition to them were plain men, tillers of the soil, lovers of democracy. They were regarded by the existing order in England as disloyal and guilty of rebellion. On the other hand, in those days, it was no credit among the Thirteen Colonies to be classed as loyal, except as loyal to principle, to conscience, and to the rights of the individual.

H. M. Hyndman rightly says that "mere political revolts are not social revolutions". To have a real social revolution there must be "a complete change of the economic, social, and class relations" and a "reconstruction of society". This writer therefore claims that strictly speaking there are no revolutions in either Russia or China, but only "revolts". At best, he asserts, there is only a beginning of a true revolution. However, Bolsheviki revolution in Russia, different from that which overthrew the Czar or the Kerensky revolution, partakes of social features and deals with industrial classes more than any revolution which has yet taken place among the great nations of the world. The Soviet idea is that of governing by class groups rather than by territorial communities.

In the eyes of many the change going on among all the nations of Europe and in the United States, since the close of the Great War, is so startling as to forebode wide-spread disaster, a day of "tribulations". We are on the eve of the first great Social Revolution. It will surpass the conflict which has just taken place between nation and nation, government and government, and one political theory and another. The class war has already begun.

Others see in the signs of the times the awful approach of the war of the races—subject and oppressed races rising in their wrath against the domineering traits of the governing white race. This, if not guarded against by higher exhibition of justice, would become the most appalling of all kinds of revolution.

Whether a revolution be political, social, industrial or racial, its approach is of the nature of a threat; it creates feeling of alarm. It was Goldwin Smith who said: "Let us never glorify revolu-

tion". For many years it was the French fashion to magnify the French Revolution, at the close of the 18th century, and, as Andrew P. White has said "the consequences were the futile French Revolution of 1830 and the calamitous French Revolution of 1848. the monarchy of Louis Phillipp as the result of the first, the tyranny of Napoleon III, the Prussian invasion, the surrender of Sedan, and the Commune catastrophe, as the result of the second". Thus while some regard the French Revolution as glorious, others regard it as one of the most sinister events in French history. It is hard to see how any one with humanitarian instincts can glorify either the French Revolution of the 18th century or the Russian Revolution of the 20th century. One may look upon them as unavoidable—the decree of Fate—but one can scarcely find pleasure in the misery, pain, suffering, terror, and cruelty which have followed in their train. Would that the changes needed and demanded might come through appeal to Reason, along paths of peace, and in the spirit of humane sympathy!

There are those who are inclined to think, from the sad and awful experiences which take place in a revolution, that no revolution is right, just as they hold that no war is right. Others, and probably the larger number, are proud to call themselves revolutionists, just as the great crowd shout for war. Many are bewildered, in doubt, and wait to be convinced. As a rule it has been often said in the past that a revolution is justifiable, if there are justifiable circumstances. There must be unbearable wrongs, which nothing but violent methods can possibly redress. It has generally been recognized that every man and all people have what is called "the moral duty of resistance to tyranny and wrong". According to the Declaration of Independence, for the attainment of human rights, it is stated that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and (that) whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it."

Some thinkers distinguish between revolution and evolution; they say, "I believe in evolution, not in revolution". Andrew D. White nearly thirty years ago in an address at Michigan University, argued that revolution is within the law of evolution. "More and more it becomes clear that the same law of evolution extends even through national catastrophe". "We see clearly that the French

Revolution was but part of the great evolution of modern democracy".

Mr. White then draws a line "between development by natural growth and development by catastrophe". He prefers the former. As an example of the two kinds of development Mr. White cites first the American Revolution. "Evolution by right reason", as urged by Burke and Pitt, failed, and "the revolutionary method prevailed". "Every thinking man will now at least suspect that the evolutionary process—the peaceful development of constitutional liberty in the colonies—their gradual assumption of state and national dignity, would have saved great suffering to mankind and probably in the long run would have produced a stronger republic and a sounder democracy".

He then cites the French Revolution. Turgot "strove to develop free institutions by a natural process". But "the forces which made for progress by catastrophe and revolution" were too strong. "Could the nation have gone on in the path of peaceful evolution marked out by him (Turgot), it is, humanly speaking, certain that constitutional liberty would have been reached within a few years, and substantial republicanism not long after. What weary years would have been avoided:—the despotism of the guillotine, of the mob, of the recruiting officer;—twenty years of ferocious war,—millions of violent deaths,—billions of treasure thrown into gulfs of hate and greed"!

The third example is the American Civil War, a form of revolution. The pacificator was Henry Clay. "He proposed to extinguish slavery gradually, naturally, by a national sacrifice not at all severe: in fact, by a steady evolution of freedom out of servitude." But his plan failed. "Revolutionists on both sides opposed it". The result we all know: slavery was indeed abolished, but instead of being abolished by a peaceful process, involving an outlay of twenty-five millions of dollars, it was abolished by the most fearful of modern wars, at a cost, when all loss is reckoned, of ten thousand millions of dollars, and of nearly, if not quite, a million of lives".

How much more striking the revolution against the Czarist rule which was instigated in Russia as a blow at Teutonic power on the Eastern front. If men can yet think calmly, the intrigues of this revolution, as of the war, will yet be seen as an undesirable process of development, though thought to be a military necessity.

Only by a spirit of moderation on both sides of a controversy can revolution, war and bloodshed be avoided. The extreme attitude in the reactionary, that is, the radical spirit where least expected—the stubborn, unyielding disposition—is as bad as the radical spirit among those who are classed as liberals. When men are hot in debate or are threatened by foes, all thought of catastrophe and human suffering is cast to the winds, and revolution, like a declaration of war, is voted right, sane, necessary. He who says “Nay” is called a coward and a traitor.

At the present time those who oppose revolution and would restrain every revolutionist are of two classes. The one class, a small minority, consists of those opposed to war, commonly called “conscientious objectors”. The other class consists of those who favored the Great War, under orders of the Government, men who stifled conscience and shouted, “My country, right or wrong”. Thus pacifists and reactionaries find themselves in the same company in checking the spread of revolution. It is only surprising that the strongest antagonists of revolution, these conscientious objectors, are classed along with revolutionists by these other antagonists of revolution, the late advocates of the Great War.

Another strange circumstance is that so many of those who in all the nations are turning towards revolution as the goal of human happiness had at heart but little sympathy with the fighting of either side in the World's great struggle for political mastery and military triumph. That is, the opponent of war under all circumstances now aligns himself with the advocate of revolution and the protagonists of violence. Many are the lovers of peace who defend “direct action”.

In a word it is almost as hard to think straight about revolution as about war. The moral principle, the rule of conscience, the dictum of simple right, fails to exercise its authority.

Really the most logical and most consistent are those who look with disfavor both on war and revolution. How comes it, then, that these men and women are decried as fanatics and fools? Is it some strange eccentricity of the human mind that always arises when the mind is inflamed?

Generally the question of revolution is viewed from another standpoint than that of ethics or religion. Even in the realm of religion, the judgment passed is that of one's own conscience or religious theories and dogmas.

Several years ago the writer made a special study of the Sacred Books of all the Great Religions on this one topic of revolution; he went back to the teachers of the Founders of the Great Faiths. Here were men of deep spiritual insight, "wise men of the East"; what did they think of revolution? In the main they discouraged, but never stimulated, revolution. As with war, so with revolution, it may come only as a last resort. Some were opposed to all war as to every bloody revolution. These men may well be our guides today. The spiritual element should dominate all.

INTELLECT, RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSE.

BY H. R. VANDERBYLL.

[Concluded.]

I HAVE suggested that man's universe became larger as his intellect developed. But his inability to explain its construction and its natural phenomena caused him to imagine that existence of one or more deities who were responsible for what happened in his universal home. Considered from a standpoint of absolute truth, ancient conceptions can have but little value. It should be remembered, however, that the first step towards solving the mystery of the universe is to become aware of the fact that a universe exists. Quite a few among us, today, are not aware of that fact.

It is something to the credit of the Babylonians that they were capable of seeing stars when they looked at them. Had they possessed our modern intelligence, their star-religion would, of course, not have been. As matters stood, however, they crowded the deep of the world with their imaginary deities, who were, supposedly, the rulers of their destinies. Remarkable it is to note, in connection with this Babylonian star-worship, that many modern people do not travel far behind the ancients on the road leading towards understanding when they superstitiously embrace the pseudo-science of astrology.

The extraordinary universe that the Babylonians possessed interests us especially because they were instrumental in enlarging the limited world of which the Hebrew originally was aware. Certain passages, occasionally entire chapters, of the Old Testament point to the fact, that the Hebrew was acquainted with, and borrowed from, Babylonian mythology. These borrowed conceptions were gradually modified by him to harmonize more or less with his own religion.

The result is that we meet with two different conceptions of

Jahveh in the Old Testament. The one pictures the original, narrowly conceived deity, who reflects the mental and the moral qualities of the semi-savage. The other suggests a more or less universal deity who rules over a considerable part of the universe. One is rather baffled at first when finding these two conceptions side by side in the pages of the Bible.

Thus, in Genesis, we come across some fourteen verses devoted to the subject of the creation of the universe. They are garbed in a style that verily fits the subject of narration. And the universe of which the Hebrew is conscious includes "the face of the deep" and the "firmament of the heaven" with its greater and its lesser light. While the ushering in of Jahveh, however, fills us with expectation, we meet with disappointment, in the chapters that follow. From the universal Jahveh whose spirit moves upon the face of the waters, we descend to the Jahveh who dwells in trees and rocks and wells, to the Jahveh who repents his savage cruelty in the episode of the flood, to the tribal deity who reflects an intense degree of self-centeredness on the part of his worshiper.

The two conceptions of Jahveh hint at two different stages of intellectual development. The larger universe is new to the Hebrew but, in time, becomes his permanent home. In time, the universal Jahveh absorbs the tribal deity. There are, however, numberless stepping-stones that lead from the narrow to the larger conception. Many a superstition, many a barbaric rite, survive long after the old deity has been supplanted by the new.

We can not expect the larger universe which the Hebrew gradually beheld to be scientifically sound. Phenomena and facts concerning the universe when first observed by man, are never interpreted correctly. Their swaddling clothes are myth and child-like imagination. It is foolish, therefore, to inject scientific truth into the Biblical story of creation. Its unscientific nature is apparent to every unbiased reader. Is it necessary to point out that the Hebrew was unaware of the fact that the sun is the source of light? But why hold it against him that he created light and darkness first, and the sun and the moon afterwards? Why not realize that he was a pioneer in the infinite field of thought, and that he explained as well as he could? Is there anything discouraging, or sad, or immoral about that? There is not. But there *is* something discouraging about the fact that the ancient notion of divine revelation should still obstruct the path of intellectual progress.

The Babylonians who were instrumental in opening the Hebrew's eyes to the existence of a larger universe, were themselves not scientists. As a result we find a great deal of mythology and erroneous conception accompany the Hebrew on his excursions into the depths of the world. His universe was a mass of water, as was that of the Babylonians. The firmament created by Jahveh divided the waters above from those that were under it, so that the space between the earth and the heaven constituted a fairly dry locality. The Babylonians caused the waters of the deep to be inhabited by an army of sea-monsters, off-springs of the god Apsu and the goddess Tiamat. This strange population of the deep partly survived in Hebrew conceptions. There are many references in the Old Testament to Jahveh's struggle with such monsters. Rahab, Behemoth, the dragon and the serpent are animals which, according to Hebrew imagination inhabited the waters of space. And perhaps it is true that Jahveh's conquest of the dragon, even as the Babylonian god Marduk's victorious struggle with Tiamat's monsters, later symbolized the establishment of order in an original world of chaos.

For it is true in mythology as it is in tradition that beings and events that at one time are real to man, gradually lose their reality and become symbolical beings and events. Thus, Jahveh's rescue of the Hebrews from the land of Egypt in time came to signify deliverance from darkness and ignorance. Rahab and the dragon, in whose monstrous existence the Hebrew once believed, became symbolical of all that is evil and wicked. And in the course of time the universe of the Hebrews became purified of its mythological rubbish and of the star-gods that had temporarily shared with Jahveh the worship of the Jews. In the end there were left the more or less limited universe which the Hebrews were capable of perceiving and the deity, its creator and ruler.

After this purification of the universe, two possibilities naturally presented themselves. The first one was that man would continue to enlarge the universe to its actual dimensions. The second was that he would endeavor to discover its physical construction and its nature. But it was not given to the Jews to grasp these possibilities. They had penetrated into the universe as far as their limited intellectual qualities allowed. While they were still engaged in building Jahveh's throne in the depths of the universe, evolution stirred the minds of another people, who were to ponder

over the nature of the universe and to philosophize on its construction. The Greek philosophers began where the Hebrews had let off, and travelled on the wings of thought in a universe that was well nigh infinite. They did nothing more than the Hebrew and the Babylonian and the pre-historic man had done. They endeavored to account for the existence of the mysterious, magnificent universe, which is the home of man, and to give a reasonable explanation of its phenomena.

If they were more successful in their endeavors than their predecessors had been, it was due to the fact that they represented a higher degree of intellectual development. The distance that lay between them and the brute stage was to such an extent remote, that they were in many instances capable of forgetting self and of becoming absorbed in a universe of beauty and marvel. We find the immortal expressions of that impersonal contemplation of existence in their art and in their literature. Art for art's sake will mirror beauty, and thought for truth's sake, will mirror reality.

Right here I venture to observe that one of the differences between science and religion is this: science endeavors to explain for truth's sake, religion for the sake of ME. The one is dispassionate, the other selfish, in its endeavor to fathom. And as the ancient people were more self-centered than their successors, we find a preponderance of religion, in some shape or other, in ancient times, and the birth and development of science in more modern times.

After the Hebrews had conceived of their universal deity, they ceased to be interested in the universe and its phenomena that formerly had played such a prominent part in the building of their religion. They centered all their attention on the problem of self. Not that they had ceased, while pondering over the mystery of Jahveh's nature, to be self-centered. Religion rarely seeks deity for deity's sake. After Jahveh's nature had once been fully established, man's own problem became of all-absorbing interest to him.

In darker ages food was man's main concern, and deity, divinity and magic found their birth in that necessity. Man's crude religion in those days was inspired by his stomach. A higher expression of man's concern about himself is the religion that endeavors to account for the existence of trials and tribulations. The belly has become an insignificant part of ME, the personality, and the nature-deity who controlled the clouds, the wind, the sunshine, and the rain has acquired a more intricate and universal nature. A

yet higher expression of man's concern about self, is his conception of a future existence. He has sufficiently delocalized himself to be able to ponder over an existence after death, and his deity who formerly expressed his wrath and displeasure in the trials and the calamities of life, now becomes associated with an eternity that holds rewards and punishments for man.

The problem that immediately presents itself in connection with the conception of a future existence is man's behavior here on earth. How should he behave and what things should he not do in order to obtain a life of peace and happiness in the hereafter? Ethics became the keynote of the religion of the Jews towards the Christian era, and the doctrine of retribution and that the life after death furnished a foundation for the Christian religion.

And thus we see religion, at first gradually, and then completely, lose interest in the universe and its phenomena on which it had fed for many centuries. The beginning of the Christian era marks a parting of the ways; science and philosophy, born among the Greeks of the pre-sophistic period, study the universe and its phenomena, and travel in an almost opposite direction from that taken by religion which concentrates all its attention on an infinitesimal part of the universe, man.

V.

It is not my purpose to furnish a critical analysis of religion. Religion, I take it, is the baby-talk of the intellect. It is a substitute, and a valuable one undoubtedly, for the correct answer. The answer to what? The answer to the question which eternally confronts man in the infinite shape of a universe. He began with the clouds, the thunder and the lightning, proceeded to the moon, and the sun and the stars, and finished with leaving a deity to rule over the by him discovered immensity.

Science, the man-talk of the intellect, endeavors to furnish the direct answer. When it is incapable of doing that, it is silent. Substitute, in its opinion, is valueless. It furthermore studies the thing itself, the universe discovered bit by bit, by our forefathers and ancestors. The astronomer, for instance, reveals with mathematical precision the marvels of the universe, and expresses his admiration for star-lit immensity not in religious worship, but in facts and figures and laws that are eloquent enough. Being a scientist, he perhaps assumes an attitude of scepticism towards doctrines concerning things divine, and he may not fully accept as truth the deity and

the religion which we so conveniently inherited from our forefathers. Nevertheless, he is studying a stupendous reality. To study and interpret reality is the ultimate, if not the natural, occupation of the mind. The reality which the scientist studies is the reality of all realities, viz: the universe. The day is coming when intellect must perceive that it is an infinite-eternal reality. And when I write down, infinite-eternal reality, I mention all that conceivably is and can be.

Now I am not endeavoring to belittle the value of religion in order to exalt that of science. As I have said, religion is the baby-talk of the intellect. It is the average, popular interpretation of the riddle of the universe, whereas science is the interpretation furnished by the intellectual leaders of the human race. As milk is the right sort of food for babes, and meat that for the grown man, we should realize, that religion supplies a need. That need is a satisfactory answer to a question. That the answer is satisfactory is due to the degree of intellectual development of the questioner. Considered from his standpoint, religion is perfect.

Only when the religious man, himself, begins to ask the question, What is wrong with religion? as he is doing in these mad and turbulent days, may we suspect that it no longer supplies a need. Something has happened to the intellect of the worshipper whose questions have assumed a different nature and consequently require answers of a different nature. His intellect has probably outgrown the temporary necessity of faith and belief, and ventures on its maiden-trip into the universe for the purpose of discovering why religion's ethical teachings are true.

The ultimate aim of a truly broad religion can not be prescribing ethics only, no matter how admirable such ethics may be. Their blind acceptance on the part of the worshipper robs them of their divine truth, should they embody it. There is bound to come a day when man will ask himself why he should love his neighbor as himself and why he should refrain from killing. Explanation never accompanied the laws of human conduct as laid down by religion. In the days of Moses, when the Hebrew saw and heard Jahveh in the threatening storm cloud, when he heard his voice in the thunderbolt and in the roaring gale, when he perceived his chastizing hand in the calamities that befell him the command, "Thou shalt not," required little explanation. It was accompanied by a

threatening prediction, viz: That ignoring the command would cause the wrath of Jahveh to descend upon the guilty head.

The command, "Thou shalt not," changes into, "Thou shalt," in the days of Christ. Again, explanation is wanting, and perhaps not required. A promise, viz: possession of eternal life and admission into the kingdom of heaven, is explanation enough.

Nevertheless, ethical principles should own a background of truth or else in the long run become meaningless vagueries of the human mind. If it be true, for instance, that we should love our neighbor as ourself, there must be a reason for it. If it be true that we should not kill, why should we not? Jahveh's displeasure and Jesus' promise of eternal life are insufficient answers to these questions. It is unimaginable that the road which leads to deity is paved either with fear or selfishness. I cannot discover true and lasting value in ethical behavior that is inspired by selfish motives.

But, if religion does not explain, it fails to do so because the man who embraces it does not demand or require an explanation. If religion's viewpoint is narrow, it is so because the average man is unable to live in thought in the immensity of universe wherein he actually dwells. Religion, like all human institutions, is indirectly a creation of man himself. It is man who permits it to flourish by subscribing to its teachings. And he subscribes to its teachings because they reflect his own intellectual powers.

When evolution, therefore, adds to his intellectual powers, which it does every once in a while, his religion ceases to be their reflection. It becomes antiquated, and reformation along lines of modern conception is required. It must again be able to supply the sort of intellectual food which his brain is capable of digesting. And so does man himself mould and remould religion in accordance with his everincreasing intelligence.

The history of religion, back to the days when it was still in an embryonic condition, clearly reveals the gradual growth of human intelligence and the corresponding increase in size of man's religious structure. We have seen in the preceding chapter how the universe grew with the mind, and how the deity grew with the universe. The limit of growth of mind, and therefore of universe and deity, has not been attained. The average man lives to a considerable extent for and in himself and is totally blind to the existence of a universal immensity. His conceptions of existence must therefore of necessity be narrow, if not erroneous. And how can he pos-

sibly fathom the nature of his deity when he is not even roughly acquainted with the nature of the vast empire of universe which his deity is supposed to have created and over which he rules? Furthermore, how will he be able under such circumstances, to perceive the true relationship between deity and man, and to found his moral life on ethical principles that are the natural expressions of that relationship?

When religion became religion proper and, unwillingly enough, left the study of nature and the universe to science and philosophy, the average religious man started on the road towards refined self-centeredness. Of what ultimate benefit were his ethics and his theory of life after death with its retribution, in view of the fact that he accepted them blindly as coming from an authoritative source? Have these nineteen centuries of religious concern about self and its future changed him into the moral man whom we would expect to be a fair product of such ethics? They have not. We are still loving ourselves alarmingly more than we do our neighbor. There is still glory and honor attached to killing our fellow. But why illustrate the obvious?

The intellectual leaders of the human race, the scientists and the philosophers, were not so much concerned about self as well as about the nature of the star-lit universe, which the ancients had seen but had not understood. The history of science and philosophy records a constant broadening of the mind, a getting away from self, and an ever-increasing tendency to live in thought in a universe instead of in a shack or in a palace. Though the masses are ever slow to follow their intellectual leaders, and more often than not, condemn them to the cross (in a symbolical sense, of course) their more universal thoughts, in time, leave a dim but permanent reflection in the life of humanity. That this reflection becomes the permanent possession of the masses and slowly gains in brilliance, is due to the fact that the average intellect is, of course, also constantly developing in the direction of universality. Science and philosophy are ahead of the times and announce what the average man some day is going to know and think.

It is hardly necessary, of course, to point to the growth of the average intellect since the beginning of the Christian era. And it is equally unnecessary, I suppose, to remark that this growth was not encouraged by man's popular interpretation of the mystery of existence which is embodied in his religion. On the contrary, and

we may as well be candid about it, religion has done everything possible to prevent man from obtaining a glimpse of the reality of things. That, of course, was due to ignorance and stupidity; and we can not hold man responsible for being ignorant and stupid.

It is science and philosophy that stimulated the growth of the intellect and—strange to say—were instrumental in causing man to follow more and more the path of the Christian. They accomplished these things by suggesting to man to forget himself once in a while and to realize that there were other things and beings, in fact an immeasurable universe of things and beings, existing besides his own insignificant self. Perhaps Columbus was the first to start these suggestions. His imagination and perseverance were the attributes of a mind that was able to think beyond a few square miles of territory. His journey across the Atlantic was but the beginning of man's journey through the immensity of existence. He compelled people to think in terms of continents and worlds, and thereby made the subsequent invention of steamships and railroads, of telegraph and telephone, urgent necessities. Lusitanias and Imperators owe their existence to the discovery of the New World; or better; to the existence of a mind that was broad enough to venture away from home and self, and to explore the earth.

There were minds capable of traveling farther than across a terrestrial ocean. Copernicus is the Columbus of our Solar system. His mind journeyed on the sea of space, and transferred the boundaries of man's intellectual world to the limits of a sun-system. Of course, the stellar universe had been seen thousands of years before Copernicus and his illustrious successors ventured into its depths. It had been seen but not understood. Fantastic thought, a product of the infant mind, had made of it the home of countless gods and had interwoven its starry depths with the strangest myths and superstitions. The astronomers discovered system, mathematics, law, in the depths of the universe. They revealed to the world a marvelously law-governed and well-balanced universe. The word, rational, was first written by them in unmistakable characters across the heavens.

The achievements of science and philosophy stimulated the growth of the average intellect because they compelled the masses to live in thought in a constantly enlarging world. It was the broader mind that invented the telephone and the telegraph. But the telephone and the telegraph in turn caused the average man to

live in thought in a larger world. Likewise did certain facts discovered by astronomy become the intellectual property of the ordinary man. His world extended beyond the limit of the earth and had its vague boundaries somewhere in the depths of space. In short, science and philosophy, as I have stated, before, helped man to get away from his self occasionally, and to realize that an immense world of creatures and things existed besides his self. This getting away from self is absolutely necessary to the existence of unselfishness. In fact, unselfishness is its natural expression. If man, today, therefore is less selfish than his ancestor, if good will and brotherly love are at present more in evidence than they were in the past, this is due to the fact that man today lives in thought in a considerably larger universe than he formerly did. The point I wish to make is this: Ethics (and the sum and substance of all ethics is unselfishness, the opposite of thought of self) find their foundation in knowledge of the universe and in understanding of its nature. It is the man who has some conception of the immensity of existence who can not help but reflect something of that immensity in his actions and in his attitude towards his fellow-being. And it is the man who in thought lives close to self who is barred from becoming acquainted with the nature of the universe and with the laws that govern its members, himself included.

Religion does not explain why we should conduct ourselves in the manner prescribed by it. That is the reason why only those who lack the intellectual ability to survey the universe, accept its teachings in faith. Belief and faith are substitutes for knowledge and understanding and the man who is good because the church commands him to be good, is really not good at heart; he is neither good nor bad. To be good is to be good spontaneously. The good man can not help being good. He is good because he is what he is. Not all the teachers in the world, not all the codes of morals, can make him better or worse.

It is this failure to explain on the part of the church, which is the cause of so many new religions having sprung up like mushrooms during the last ten or twenty years. Leaving alone the question whether or not they teach truth, the fact remains that they supply an urgent demand viz: explanation. These religions teach neither dogma nor philosophy, but something that partakes of the nature of both. They should be termed more properly, philosophico-religions, and they should be considered to constitute the stepping-

stone that leads from religion to philosophy. They have taken thousands, hundreds of thousands of worshippers, away from the Old Church, and continue to take.

Of course, one method of accounting for this phenomenon is to say that these people have gone to the dogs and are advancing rapidly towards Hades' gates. Another, more accurate, way of interpreting it is, by stating that the brain of man is subject to slow and gradual development, and that a certain percentage of mankind have outgrown certain teachings that were excellent food for the brain some fifteen hundred or two thousand years ago. And it is an absolutely hopeless task to try to induce that certain percentage to return to the old faith. Not even the best of music, or the most expensive of advertising campaigns can accomplish such a task. The only way open left to the church, in order to maintain its influence upon the masses, is the one which leads to the intellect itself. It is for the church to find its worshipper, when the worshipper can not find his church.

The church is a man-made and a man-owned institution, and reflects average thought and conception, concerning the mystery of existence. But it does not reflect at all times the same thought and conception. The teachings of religion in the past have kept pace with the growth of the average intellect. And they will have to keep pace with the rapidly developing modern intellect if the church wants to maintain itself. In these days of science and popular education in schools, newspapers, magazines and libraries, it is a mighty difficult problem to interest man in ancient myths, traditions, and conceptions regarding life, death and deity, to such an extent that he will accept them as part of his religion. What school boy, for instance, who reads the simply written and absorbing articles on astronomy in the Sunday edition of a newspaper can help wondering where heaven or hell may be? Will he not smile the smile of a skeptic when he becomes acquainted with the religious conceptions of a dwelling place after death where the streets are paved with gold, etc., etc.?

It is no disgrace for the church to gradually remould its teachings along lines of modern conception and of science. It is no disgrace to adhere to the truth, even if former convictions must be discarded or modified. The one terrific obstacle to such proceedings would of course be that absurdity of absurdities, the infallibility of the Bible. But no sensible man today accepts the fairy-tale of

“revealed truth”, much less the authenticity of personal conversations alleged to have been held between the deity and some ancient Hebrews. Ancient history, and modern research work among the hoary ruins of Babylonia and Palestina, throw an entirely new and different light on the Scriptures. Astounding as the fact may be, it is nevertheless true that they ask of us to read the Bible as we would the Koran, or the Vedas, or any other literature, belonging to an ancient people. The Scriptures are simply thoughts expressed by a thinking people who lived thousands of years before our own time. They contain pearls of wisdom and nuggets of truth, even as the Koran and the Vedas. Also, and considered from our present degree of intellectual development, they contain an enormous amount of literary nonsense, even as the Koran and the Vedas or any other ancient literary production.

We therefore must conclude that religion should enlarge the thought-world of its worshippers beyond the century-old and narrow confines of dogma. If it be truth that man craves, and not merely the soothing promises of religion concerning the hereafter, then he is bound to enter into the realms of science and philosophy, which reveal truth as far as they are capable of knowing it. I shall word the statement differently, and say that the conscientious truth-seeker is compelled to study an ever-enlarging universe, the ultimate boundaries of which are infinite. For, science and philosophy reveal the truth about the universe, in part or as a whole. There is, it must be conceded, no other truth to be revealed. And if religion claims to possess or reveal another truth which concerns things that lie beyond the realm and beyond the nature of the universe, then its claims must be pronounced fantastic. A little logical thinking will readily convince us, *that there is nothing but universe.*

A POET'S SCIENCE.

BY MIRIAM ALLEN DEFORD.

JULY 8, 1922, will mark the centenary of Percy Bysshe Shelley's untimely end in the waters of Via Reggio. How many who will celebrate him then as poet and idealist, will remember also his keen interest and life-long delight in the problems of natural science?

Chemistry and astronomy were the only two sciences at all known to Shelley. In 1820, when he wrote that most charming of poetic epistles, the "Letter to Maria Gisborne", he expressed his passing interest in the workshop of her son, Henry Reveley, the engineer, with his

"Forms of unimaginable wood,

Great screws, and cones, and wheels, and grooved blocks"; but Shelley's enthusiasm for Reveley and his steamship, so rudely interrupted by a real or apparent attempt to defraud him, was more humanitarian than scientific. From the days at Eton, however, when the embryo poet set trees on fire with gunpowder and a burning-glass, or "raised the devil"—and his tutor—with electric batteries; even from earlier days, when he brought stained hands and singed clothing to the nursery at Field Place, and tried to "shock" his little sisters into a cure for chilblains; Shelley's great interest lay in chemical and physical experiments, that gave free scope to fancy and were too primitive to call for the exactness alien to the romantic nature of the experimenter.

Eton brought Adam Walker, the self-taught lecturer on natural philosophy, with his orrery and his talks on the planets. Shelley has spoken of the flood of joy and wonder that swept over him when first he realized the existence of a plurality of worlds. He purchased an orrery of his own, and a solar microscope, that, though it was pawned afterwards to relieve an acquaintance's dis-

tress, was recovered, and seems to have been the last scientific instrument that Shelley disposed of in his wandering life.

At Oxford, during his five meteoric months there, Hogg has described Shelley's rooms—a mass of retorts, phials, crucibles, mingled with books and personal belongings “as if the young chemist, in order to analyze the mystery of creation, had endeavored first to reconstruct the primeval chaos.” A spot burned by a chemical in the new carpet was being rapidly enlarged by its owner's frequent tripping as he crossed it. “An electrical machine, an air-pump, the galvanic trough, a solar microscope, and large glass jars and receivers, were conspicuous amidst the mass of matter”. It was a symbol of Shelley's wide and undisciplined researches in science. Natural history was always nearly allied in his mind to witchcraft; it was the romance, the strangeness and the mystery of life that seized upon his eager imagination. One lecture on mineralogy was enough—he could not even endure it to the end; and mathematics and the exact science were closed to such a temperament as his.

But this very romanticization and idealization of nature gave to Shelley glimpses into the future which are often amazingly accurate. If he dreamed of the philosopher's stone and the elixir of youth, he foresaw also the wonders of irrigation, of aerial navigation, of applied electricity. “It will be possible, perhaps, at no very distant date,” he said, “to produce heat at will and to warm the most ungenial climates—as we now arise the temperature of our apartments to whatever degree we may deem agreeable or salutary. But if this be too much to anticipate, at any rate we may expect to provide ourselves cheaply with a fund of heat that will supersede our costly and inconvenient fuel, and will suffice to warm our habitations for culinary purposes and for the various demands of the mechanical arts.” How Shelley would have greeted the thought of harnessing intra-atomic force!

Again: “What a mighty instrument would electricity be in the hands of him who knew how to wield it? What will not an extraordinary combination of troughs of colossal magnitude, a well-arranged system of hundreds of metallic plates, effect? The balloon has not yet received the perfection of which it is surely capable; the art of navigating the air is in its first and most helpless infancy. It promises prodigious facilities for locomotion, and will enable us to traverse vast tracts with ease and rapidity, and to explore unknown countries without difficulty. Why are we still so ignorant of

the interior of Africa?—why do we not despatch intrepid aeronauts to cross it in every direction, and to survey the whole peninsula in a few weeks?" This same Africa was to be turned from a desert to a garden by properly directed irrigation.

With the swift onslaught of disaster, following those Oxford months, and with the troubles and journeys of his too few years to come, Shelley never afterwards had opportunity for scientific investigation or speculation. Even so early, it was tinged, not only with poetry, but with philosophy and humanitarianism, the two other loves of his life. Chemistry was to open up the study of "things themselves", as opposed to their outward forms; the shadow the balloon that flew over Africa was to be the promise of freedom to its million slaves. For a brief time, in London, he thought of studying medicine as a profession; he even attended Abernethy's lectures on anatomy at St. Bartholomew's Hospital. His eager assistance to Reveley's ill-fated steamboat, his ardent interest in the casting of its giant cylinder, proved that his love of science slept: it was not dead. All his life he visited the homes of the poor who surrounded him,—not only as a friend, but more or less as a physician, tending them in illness with the scraps of learning remembered from the weeks he "walked St. Bartholomew's". But in every such enterprise, though the initial attraction—as in the building of the great dam at Tremadoc—might be purely scientific, before very long Shelley was caught by the philanthropic aspects of the undertaking.

Shelley's science was strictly that of a poet—not reasoned and classified, as Goethe's was, for example, but personal, exalted and speculative. Even so, however, it is a phase of the life and thought of a great writer and a great man that affected much of his most unrelated work, and that should not be left to die forgotten in the archives of biography, a hundred years after he went to find if it be true that "after we die we wander as spirits through the other planets."

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT INDIA.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

IT IS usual to notice that Western Philosophy, from Ionian speculation to the genetic thought of our modern day, is an evolution upward from a vague materialism to a rationally intelligible idealism. But with India it has been almost a reverse process, Hindu thought having first been engaged in a vague religious idealism and then passing through various philosophical speculations, has ended (i. e. in the classical age at least) in systems which are primarily materialistic. Thus, and quite apart from chronological difficulties, the genetic course of Hindu thought in its most prominent points was through the Samkhya, Nyaya, Purva Mimamsa, Voga, and the Vaiseshika schools. The strong psychologism which runs through all of the Hindu's intellectual operations always valued principles and methods of inquiry above the mere subject-matter with which they dealt, and in a system which proposed to lay before us the plan and purpose of Reality's construction, they could not help but give primary attention to the method of presentation.

A. KAPILA'S SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

The first thinker who seems to have given any orderly expression of philosophical method was Kapila, the Monkey-colored, who flourished during the sixth century B. C. and developed a sort of primitive common-sense philosophy in regard to individual psychic reality. The soul, according to him being a real existent having the particular function of purity and intelligence, is eternal in its universal continuity of being, but does not always have a corporeal body connecting it with physical Nature and by which it may manifest its presence in the world of life and action. Kapila's Samkhya philosophy derived its name from its enumeration of twenty-five scientific and metaphysical principles called tattva, twenty-four of

them being material through objective physical manifestation, and one being of an immaterial nature through subjective application and psychic control. In the theology which he constructed on the basis of these principles Kapila stood in opposition to Vedic doctrine by denying a special creator's existence or a god who had any intelligent purpose in mind at the time of the so-called creation of the Universe; and also in denying that the existence of pain and misery in the world makes no difference to our affirmation of the reality and knowability of a Supreme Being, or to our belief in the divine origin of the world. He anticipated by twenty-four centuries the Kantian dictum that the subjective can never be objective and hence what we know of one cannot reasonably be used to "prove" anything about the other. A further degree surely of Buddha's theory of individuality and mental finitude.

Another difference or opposition to Vedic doctrine was Kapilā's premiss of the Prakriti, an objective reality corresponding to what we call physical Nature and conceived, as existing independently of both Brahma and the Purushas or created souls. And yet, while thus allowing a dualism of material Nature and immaterial Spirit, he did not in any way approach so decided an atheism as was later charged against Buddhism or the Vedānta. His enumeration of the philosophical principles was not advocated in any absolute negation of *the* Deity nor of any *possible* element of the divine whatsoever, even though there was in his day a great diversity of opinion regarding the proper interpretation of the Veda and its Sruti or revelation. Rather was he more concerned to place a more strict emphasis and a purer reverence upon the philosophical knowledge which could be had of the Supreme Ruler by means of the triune possibility of acquiring that knowledge: through spiritual perception, logical inference, and Aptasruti or trustworthy revelation.

But, after all that we may read of Brahmanical counter-claims (and not a little priestly invective), the psychological fact remains that Kapila's divergence from strictly Vedic ideas arose chiefly through his thinking that the Veda was not a non-human expression of divinity and truth, but was merely a product of Aptāvakanā or human historical authority, or literally, trustworthy utterance. Even in his notion predicating concreteness of Astitva or Nature-Reality, he is directing his thought more in favor of objective existence and a sort of experiential method of deriving philosophical

criteria than he is of the Purusha, the soul-self advocated in the Upanishads and their later exposition known as the Vedānta. It was his objectivism of method and subjectivism of metaphysical ground which gave to the subsequent Charvakas their best weapon for championing a sceptic materialism, to the atomism of Kanāda its (perhaps) only real value as a philosophy of Nature, and to the jnana-yoga of Pātanjali its main argument for the unity or rather unification of the human soul with Nature through perfect knowledge. It was truly a vital proposition at that time to claim that men require a twofold measure of truth so as to cover both the inner and the outer processes of Reality, no one being rationally able to deny the actual existence of either domain of activity.

B. GŌTAMĀ AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC.

There is one other value which may be further interpreted as having obtained in the Samkhya system, and that is the fact that it served as a forerunner of preparatory culture for a subsequent rational attitude proposed as being more adequate to the need for finding more intelligible principles, self-consistency and unity of experienced operation at the basis of Reality and Truth. For the specifically avowed purpose of getting behind the vague and too-cumbersome mysticism of the Vedic wisdom, while at the same time to render philosophical aid to the emancipation-thinkers, the Nyaya or in-going philosophy of insight and logical induction was founded. Its reputed founder, Gōtamā Akshapāda, "the Biggest Ox in the Thorny Path", composed the Nyaya-Sutras about the fifth or second centuries B. C. according to the various accounts, but certainly before the time of Yoga development because the latter's Jnana depended on the prudent principles established by Gōtamā's Prāmāna or the proper methods of securing knowledge. To Gōtamā the Nyaya method of philosophizing was a source of delight as well as of instruction, a truly "precious refuge" Para Santi from the fallacies of delusion and personal motive, while to us it is one of India's most valuable contributions to the methodology of human aspiration. But like practically all the other Hindu systems it proposed no more than a negative ideal of the supreme good which is possible of human achievement, although it did embrace more positive elements than either Buddhism or the Upanishads could offer. Hence, in its own sphere this ideal was by no means a passive item of men's moral inertia even though negative in content, for it was not only the resigned blessedness of Freedom, but also the very

positive hardihood and morally sustained effort to achieve the wisdom so requisite to this Freedom and the inward bliss which places the wearying soul safely beyond the desires and anxieties of earthy life.

With Gōtamā this Apavarga or spiritual deliverance from worldly evil was to be secured by means of the practical and orderly use to which we must put the sixteen Padarthas or paths of righteous conduct both mental and moral. In the order of their importance and degree of required attention they are Pramāna, the principles of or proper methods for securing knowledge; Prameya, the proper object of knowledge; Samsaya, the nature and effects of doubt; Prayōgana, the purpose or intention of our every thought and action; Drishtānta, instances or examples (including metonymy and anagogy); Siddhānta, those truths or maximus which are already established; Avayāva, premises or assumptions of fact; Tarka, reasoning; Nirnaya, logical conclusion; Vada, argumentation; Galpa, sophistry; Vitānda, eristic wrangling; Hetvabhasa, fallacies both material and verbal; Kahala, quibbles; Gati, false or unstable analogies; and Nigrāhasthāna, the unfitness resulting from these last five erroneous practices.

It is easily seen that this list is composed of both positive and negative elements, and so did Gōtamā accordingly divide these Padarthas into two series: the first or positive series, 1 to 9 inclusive, is to be used for verifying the facts of experience and in vindication of the principles of human knowledge; while the second or negative series, 10 to 16 inclusive (although 10 is a sort of borderland character covering arguments of possibility), is for the guidance of dialectic discussion and logical procedure. Both a theoretical and a practical code of intellectual wisdom is developed as the primary requisite to any attempt at gaining philosophical deliverance either of knowledge or of oneself from the wheel of existence. And so, according to Gōtamā, a clear understanding and an honest practice of these sixteen topics will enable anyone to attain the heights of spiritual purification, the calm of true wisdom, and the freedom of eternal beatitude. The soul must be exalted above the crude foibles and sordid anxieties of its worldly life before there can be any true understanding, any real drama of virtue and love.

However, this philosophizing on the theory and utility of human knowledge was not introduced as a theological instrument, but

only as an abutment to our moral faith. It did not pretend to discover any *new* process of getting at the origin of Truth and Reality, but only served humbly as a credological or irenic device for harmonizing the numerous sectarian oppositions regarding variations of Vedic doctrinal interpretation. Though the Nyaya, as practiced and taught under the directions laid down in Gôtamā's Sutras, was not specific in denying the existence of a personal god with certain spiritual capacities, it did directly deny that such a god could have created the material Universe. It was the Naiyāyikas or logician-followers of Gôtama who were led by their interpretation of his terms to deny that any of the six *pramānas* were adequate to a proof of that existence, nor were they even sufficiently valid as means toward a proof of the most personally conceived of all gods, Iswara. He, quite independently of all our predications, might yet be in act and in fact the Supreme Creator and Ultra-Intelligent Ruler of the Universe (with material creation a function of lesser beings or forces); but this possibility must not be permitted in any way to interfere with the proper application of these six principles of knowledge, for they are properly adequate only to advise us in the belief or faith, *Bhakti*, we have in such a being conceived as Creator and Governor.

C. BADARĀYANA AND THE VEDANTA.

In the mythical age of much of India's religious thought historical records were unknown and we are at a loss to know the exact time of any particular beginning; but so far as internal evidence counts meagre and allusional as it is, it does not seem that we would be far wrong to say that the Vedanta or "end of the Veda" took its first step toward systematic form with the editorial work of the semi-mythical sage Vyasa the Arranger who is also reputed to have been the author-compiler of the Purānas and the Mahabhārata. On the same ground it is reasonable to believe that he lived about the time immediately preceding Saunaka, when the demand was becoming felt for a more permanent formulation of the mnemonic Vedism and the crude metaphysic of the Upanishads, and when the popular Hindu mind was beginning to make inquiries for itself into the *natural* as well as the supernatural constitution and causes of things.

The compilation made by Vyasa then was the official formulation recognized by the priests of Brahmanism during the century or two which elapsed between Vyasa's time and the advent of

Buddhism. It was some years after Buddha's powerful onslaught, but before the birth of Moggallāna, that Badarāyana "the one born of (or under) the jujube tree" arose to the rescue of the Vedānta and the somewhat modulated Brahmanism of its devotees. And he it was who made the distinction in the terms applied, holding that the early conclusions arrived at and compiled by Vyasa were now grown too antiquated and inadequate to the philosophical maintenance of Brahmanical theory, and that he should, somewhat after the manner pursued by Kapila's Samkhya, pick out and systematize the philosophical instruction embodied and remaining yet unmined in the Upanishadic writings. To this selectivism he gave the name of Uttara Mimamsa or "secondary investigation"; that is, it was considered secondary in importance to the Vedic Sruti or revelation of truth which was a subject of faith (Bhakti) and not a matter of intellectually acquisitive knowledge or power to understand (Tārkikajñāna.)

Bādarāyana entertained a negative notion in epistemology and developed the positive agnosticism which took as its basis the experiential inference that Truth and Realty cannot be specifically known as so-and-so, but rather as not-this, not-that. Both negative and affirmative reasoning are considered faulty, and as their fallibility arises from the finite sanction of their aims, so are we urged to realize that a hyper-individual sanction is the prime necessity to true wisdom and that this is what makes the Sruti or Vedic revelation a reliable source of knowledge. This was the substantial result of his Secondary Investigation and served as the foundation for the further philosophical result incorporated into the later Vedantism, according to which the principal doctrines are that the external material world is an illusion (Maya), that the human Soul-self is in its inmost nature identical with the Supreme Self of Brahma, and that Brahma is the only true self-existent Reality. Being the Supreme Cause of the whole infinite Universe, Brahma is therein conceived to be greater than the Christian God or manifested Creator of this world, which is merely one in a million. And yet in sacrificial practices, prayers and ceremonies attending political or economic supplications, Brahma was not beyond calling distance, for with all his Supreme Infinity, Brahma was still considered the attentive divinity who generously harkened to priestly supplication and ceremonial formality.

However, the elevation of the Soul-self up to an equal qualita-

tive rank with the Supreme Causal Reality was itself tantamount to an urgent recognition of the original divinity of man showing through and surviving the incrustations of Maya and Avidya, illusion and ignorance, which have grown up about him, perhaps through his unwarranted trust in the universal adequacy of the intellect to (supposedly) see into the nature of all things. It was pure Vedanta to announce that "Thou art *that*", meaning that the individual self or human soul is fully one with God, for as the Soul-self is indivisible and not known as a made-up-of-parts entity, so is it to be known as one with the indivisibility of Brahma, equally eternal and infinite. Kapila's Samkhya philosophy had held that the individual souls (purushas) were plural and existed separately and independently of each other, but the Vedanta orthodoxy ruled that they were quite thoroughly unified and homogeneous, and that they constituted the oneness of the World-Soul (Kaivālya Paramatman).

As a general doctrine this construction which Bādarāyana had placed on the Vedanta metaphysic and theology remained intact, as we might reasonably judge apart from quondam heresies here and there, until the time of his famous commentator, Sankara Acharya of Malabar who lived about 788-880 A. D. Sankara diverged from the early doctrine by claiming that Brahma, being infinite and unconditioned, cannot be known as one with the individual soul of man, which is personal, particular and finite; that the world is not the direct result or effect of Brahma's creative will, but is merely a product of the cosmic Nescience or Avidya which is fostered by a human subscription to the illusions and delusions of finite incarnated life. It was allowed, however, that the true solution of this life's problem still remained the same; Moksha or emancipation was to be secured only by means of Triya Dvara the three gateways of quiet meditation, virtuous attention to duty, and spiritual knowledge.

Sankara founded a school at Srīngagiri and while there composed his Brāhmasutrabhāshya or vernacular commentary on Badarāyana's Brahmasutras; he later became one of the greatest exponents of Vedantism and, according to the evidence supplied in the Sankara-dig-Vijaya or Sankara's World Conquest, he was also a great controversialist and held devoutly that both materialism and personal spiritism are figment of the individual soul's imagination and ignorance; that the material world is not a theoretically true

reality, but is real only in the sense of supporting corporeal life; that even the so-called creator, Iswara, is merely the ignorant soul's obstructed view of the Supreme Brahma; and that nothing is or can be created (in the sense of an absolute beginning from nothing) and that all things and the laws of their preservation are eternal. In his commentary Sankara was the first to fully elaborate the notion of Maya or cosmic illusion, and show that it is an illusion of the intellect in prospect of the external world of physical nature; that we posit the false panorama of external objects upon the true Reality of the Infinite Soul-Principle and thereafter are never at rest until we have rationalized an explanation of this fallacious and unwarranted position. He thought also that it is altogether unnecessary to admit the full import of Jaimini's doctrine of the Sphota as being the eternity of the spoken sound as well as the meaning of words, but held rather that it was philosophically sufficient to recognize the eternity of the words themselves, not as mere sound but as *formal sound*, which must be vocally produced if the meaning or communicative intelligibility which words convey is to be expressed. It was thus he drew up the *reductio ad absurdum* that with no letters (i. e., no alphabetical sounds) no words can be formed; with no words, no Sphota; and with no Sphota, there is no eternity of conveyed intelligence. Unknown to him the principle of this Sphota-problem was one of a homogeneous language-education, for if a group of people have not received the same instruction as to the intelligible meaning of words and their uses, all expression would be a Babel of confusion and Futurist rhetoric. It seems to me to have been a poor attempt to make metaphysical capital out of an exaggerated item of psychology.

Another powerful and devoted Vedantist was Mādhava Acharya, who flourished about 1300-1350 A. D., and whose name has been immortalized to us by his prodigious work entitled the "Sarva-Dārshana-Samgrāha," which was composed sometime during the second quarter of the fourteenth century and summarizes all the Dārshanas or "demonstrations", a general name applied to all philosophical systems primarily derived from the classical Upanishadic literature. This work has for nearly seven centuries served as the foundation for native as well as Western interpretations (from the Vedantist point of view) of the several Hindu religious and speculative philosophies. It was in this work that the Vedanta of Vyasa, as well as its successor, the Uttara Mimamsa

of Bādarāyana's Sūtras, was drawn out and perfected in what is generally now considered to be the orthodox form. In short it is now an exalted sort of monism harmonizing and unifying several eclectic elements, for it is found to embrace the ideals of the universal sacredness of all real things, the eternal and immutable existence of a cosmically conscious Being called Paramatman, and of the all-pervading beneficence of this spiritual principle in its capacity as Governor of the Cosmos. With the great Mādhava this Supreme Soul-Principle is not only the composite oneness of all purushas or individual souls, but is also the sum and summit of all Intelligence, Wisdom, Love and Truth; not only the plural separateness of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but also the universal connectedness of the cosmic continuum. It becomes the most subtle and thorough monism of all philosophies and all possible realities; it is surely the ultimate "conclusion and end" of the Veda's speculations and aspirations; and in a few generations it was like a tidal wave sweeping over the break-water of sectarian Buddhism, its devotees holding it superior to all philosophies, all books, all external attractions and disciplines; the Vedānta was *the only life!*

D. JAIMINI AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF DUTY.

As Bādarāyana had given his attention to the inquiry which he considered to be secondary in importance and authority only to the Vedic Revelation and which he developed as a sort of verifying theory of its speculative truth, so did it seem to Jaimini that there should be a *primary investigation* into the exact conduct and aspirational effort (Ashrāma) which are the prerequisites to an adequate recognition of that Revelation and to any valid theory of its truth. Accordingly he laid out the plan and structure of this inquiry, as well as an elaborate analysis of these two prerequisites, in a work which he named as above, the Purva Mimamsa, composed in twelve books about the middle or latter half of the fourth century B. C. Basing the structure of this inquiry on the practical interpretation that may be made from the Vedic instructions, Jaimini drew up thereon those beautiful ethical arguments which have been developed separately in the Dharma Sūtras and which dealt with exhortations to public duty, maxims of ethical law, and programs of religious regulation. They composed a foundation quite suitable for establishing a practical philosophy of our proper duties and sacrifices, of our proper desert for reward or punishment; and with the equation that Buddha's Dhammapāda is identical in moral tone

and teaching with his own Dharmapāda, he proved himself well-worthy of moral leadership. That is, if the eightfold path (Ash-tampāda) is constitutively the same as the path of Duty (Dhar-mapāda), then Dharma becomes the supreme ethical law and through our proper conduct in keeping this law we are enabled to see the religious value of duty and personal obligation.

There was another distinction emphasized by Jaimini and used as a furtherance of his exhortation to ethical rectitude; it was a negative anticipation of the "mouth to ear" principle adopted later by Pānini in constructing his famous Grammar and by Sankara in composing his vernacular commentary on the Brahmasutras. It was a distinction basic to the doctrine of the Sphota, already mentioned. Properly stated, this distinction was all that gave the Sphota its reality and actual or applicative truth. It was developed by Jaimini into the grammatical argument that as the meaning is inherent in the constitution of words, so is the instruction to be derived from hearing or reading words also inherent in the order and intelligible use of their meanings; that as this inherent meaning of orderly sounds is eternal, so is the derivative instruction likewise eternal and immutable, and does not depend upon cultural conventionalities, not even on any special grammatical education for its growth or recognition as was popularly supposed by the Lōkayā-tikans and by implication assumed by the Nyaya and Vaiseshika philosophies in their Pramāna treatment of the problem of knowledge.

Somewhat similar to Gōtamā's valuation of the first Padārtha, Jaimini in his scriptural epistemology taught that there were five instead of six Pramānas or legitimate sources (or principles) of knowledge, namely: Sabdasruti scriptural revelation; Aptāvakanā trustworthy oral communication; Bhakti, faith; Tarka, legitimate (i. e., not only logical but honest) reasoning; and Samādhi, meditation without a seed (i. e., without any ulterior motive such as personal desire, self-aggrandizement, etc.). And yet in that necessarily personal process which alone can secure an adequately practical degree of knowledge of the Dharma, he considered that the first or scriptural Vedic source (the sacred Sabda revelation of Truth and Right) was sufficient; it revealed not only the true ethical law but also indicated the proper manner of its conduct and keeping. In thus seemingly rating the practical over the theoretical, the human need over the divine abundance in Vedic speculation and exhorta-

tion, Jaimini was not an atheist, as was often charged; but strove manfully instead to more clearly justify the ways of God to man, and to show Him far less aloof from human affairs than had been shown by the Brahmanical priests, pseudo-philosophical Vedantists, Buddhists and Karma-theorists. His defense on this score is very ably pointed out and analyzed by Max Müller in his monumental work on the "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" (London, 1899).

E. PĀTANJĀLI AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF UNITY (YOGA).

While the Vedanta belongs, independently of its religious revival and under proper classification as an eclectic afterthought, to that series of Hindus systems which aimed at a theory and solution of the problem of illusion and ignorance, the Voga philosophy sprang up as an attempt to vindicate the superiority of Karma the law of works, both of the individual soul and of the evolutionary process, over Mimāmsa or the mere theoretical investigation of Reality. The Yoga was specifically a system of action as well as of knowledge, contemplation as well as passive perception; for was its very foundation not that greatest of all principles: the *unity* and identity of Soul and Nature, of Mind with Reality, and of man's spiritual intelligence with the Cosmic Intelligence of the Supreme World-Soul? As Kapila's Samkhya had made a thorough enumeration of the principles of human knowledge, so was it Pātanjāli's ambition to make of the highest human wisdom a theological argument in favor of the Divine. Thus it was that Pātanjāli's Karmayoga, unity through the ecbatic laws governing spiritual evolution, was, as a theory of practice, put forth on the presupposition that the prospective Yogi-devotee had already finished the development prescribed in the Samkhya, which Pātanjāli renamed Jnānayoga or unity through knowledge, as also that laid down in Jaimini's Dharma inquiry, renamed by Pātanjāli as Dharmayoga or unity through obedient performance of ethical duty. It took for granted the required accomplishment of secular talents, that we have already prepared ourselves in the way of knowledge and ethical construction before resorting to spiritual works and beneficence. Spiritual unity was an aspiring function, an *ascending* mode of life and evolution, not a mediocre affair of mere experience and weary livelihood.

The foundation of the Yoga philosophy was contained in the Yogasutras, most of which were very probably composed or first taught orally by Pātanjāli about the early part of the second cen-

ture B. C., (one account has it that he left no written record of his thoughts). This foundation was the instruction relating to the most efficient methods for controlling the thinking principle through patient practice and non-attachment to things either physical or intellectual. The most obstinate problem of human life is how to render oneself independent and secure from the attractions and distractions of material reality or worldly life, which is conceived to be nothing but a series of modifications of name and form (*nāmarūpaprātyajyēta*); for where there are five constituents out of which all objects whatsoever can be made, the three highest—Being, Wisdom, Bliss—compose Spirit, while the inferior two remaining—name and Form—made up the material world. The former are eternal and immutable while the latter are fickle, changeable and ephemeral,—nay, they are the subtle instruments of our illusion and ignorance.

The law of our life is that whatever we think and do, that we will surely become; and the problem arises on the question of what is the best and noblest possible of human attainment. This best-in-life is held to be Samadhi, spirituality or the pure intuition of universal Being; but as a constant human effort it is silent contemplation and the immutable preservation of one's inner tranquillity of soul. All material thinking is to be put aside by the complete identification of this silent bliss with the spiritual intuition of the supremacy of universal Being; personal, finite and particular reality becoming altogether negative and illusory in the calm security of Chidakāsa or cosmic consciousness. The fool is one who retains this material thinking and hence is confounded in the labyrinth of sense attraction and attachment. But the man of holy wisdom, even though he lives what we usually call "an active life", holds himself above these bonds of finite distraction, and goes peacefully and clear-souled on the identical journey which is so hazardous to the fool. It is a world-old contrast between wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance; even though one's previous course of evolution (*Karma*) makes his present action limited to the degree of perfection attained, yet it does not alter the *Jñānayoga* principle of *Kshetrākshetrajnāyanājan yat tajnān matān mamā* so emphasized in the *Bhagavad Gita* that "only that knowledge knows which knows the known by knowing the knower". The mind is so surely an ocean that it must very similarly and equally of necessity to our safety be charted, sounded, proper courses laid out and *traversed*.

for no one, not even a sudra or an idiot, is born without a share in this ocean of mind both its elements of conscious and subconscious activity.

As a theological complement of the Samkhya system Pātanjāli's Yogasutras interpreted Kapila's single immaterial principle as being identical with Iswara, the devotional and disciplinary god who is, in the Yoga philosophy, thereafter called Tāraka or ferry across the ocean of mind and the world of bodily life. But the original leading tenet of the Yoga system was that of the Samatva, a sort of Stoic practice of persistently holding oneself in equanimity, control, and meditative quiet. It was the exceptional goal aimed at by the triune Yoga method of Hatha, Jnana, and Raja, or physical, mental, and spiritual preservation and self-control. Thus it was then, that Pātanjāli's individualism and psychology of character-building outran the theology which it formally perfected. The devotional services offered up to Iswara became, accordingly, not the supreme attention; they were recognized only as means whereby the human soul could attain Kaivalya and Moksha, aloneness and freedom. The study of the appurtenances of self-control and contemplative calm became more and more exacting than the problem of Iswara's vague existence, and the personal item of mental tranquillity and virtuous conduct took on the aspect of our only true function in the world, it was the *summum bonum* and the *finis nobilis* of our individual life.

Iswara is to all intents merely another name for Brahma; he is equally aloof and unconcerned about the way the world is going. He is obscurely conceived to be a purely spiritual God supreme over all the Universe, but not in any sense its Father, Creator, or Protector, for He is considered absolutely independent and unconnected with any of the names and forms which the human intellect recognizes as making up material things, animals, men, or even the earthly powers of external Nature. Nevertheless, Pātanjāli's constant ideal is the unification of the individual soul with the evolutionary process of Nature. It is a gradual but eternal progress of the human spirit up toward the highest goal of aspiration—Perfection; and human perfectibility is by no means considered impossible, no more so than divine perfectibility. This progress is not to be secured through mere theoretical speculations on the nature of God or Truth or their respective reality in the Universe, but rather

by means only of a ceaseless effort, an indefatigable industry in the purification and ennoblement of one's mind and character.

Of course, this effort cannot be an efficient one upon immediate wish or intention; it must first be perfected itself before any higher accomplishment can be made. It is an effort that must be made habitual, and therefore must be *built up* gradually from the lesser to the greater function, one's spiritual structure altering for better or for worse in the same proportion and quality of one's habitual practice. The various methods and their proper spheres of application must be mastered in the proper order; thus, in the Hathayoga, rhythmic breathing (Prāṇayāma) and posturing (Asana) are important; in Jnanayoga, the sources of practical knowledge (Kārmavidyapramāna) and the non-duality (Advaita) of the monistic Vedānta are given primary attention; while in the Rajayoga, the Karma of devotion (Bhakti) and mental emptying (Bodhisunyātana) as well as introspection (i. e. subjective attention, Prātyāhara) and impersonal meditation (Samādhi) are among the principle items of Yogī practice. Although later adepts of this philosophy usually make a separate Yoga out of Bhakti and Karma, Pātanjāli taught them only as important steps in applying the "royal method" described in the Rajavoga. The ability to empty the mind is one of the Yogī's rarest accomplishments, and can be brought about only by a long-continued practice in *losing the seed* of the thinking principle. This *seed* as an innumerable variety of forms and fascinations: sometimes it is the desire for fame, wealth, power; often it may be the hope of the moralist to decide between what is good and what is evil; sometimes it is our sense of joy or the prospect of some future event; at other times it may be the philosopher's inquisitiveness into the nature of things, or the mystic's *wrapped-up* self-consciousness that he has a detached mind or an existence apart from the rancour and strife of the external world. In any case where personal affections are concerned we have no trouble finding some sort of "seeded thought".

Therefore, with the adept Yogī devotee the ability to lose *at will* this "seeded mediation" (Sāvijasamādhi) is the one high road to spiritual perfection; it is a form of pure being. It unifies one with the disinterestedness of Nature and identifies the human soul with the Supreme Spirit of Iswara. It makes for a severing of the cord of transmigration and frees the soul from its bondage of personal individual existence. The external material world and the

evils which append to our finite existence therein are no more; they are swallowed up in the infinite capacity of a new, regenerated being, a reborn soul.

These instructions were laid down either directly or by philosophic implication in the famous *Yogasutras* (supposedly written by disciples who wished to preserve Pātanjālis teachings), and if reports are true they became useful to a very rare severity of pursuit in the Karma of his own life's virtue and conduct.

F. KANĀDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARTICULAR REALITY.

About the beginning of the first century B. C. a thinker who had a reserved patronage for the Lokayātikān notions was heard advocating a specific philosophical method aiming at a more rationally intelligible conception of the material universe, its exact composition, its true nature, and even its possible destiny. This man's name was very probably not the one we have learned to call him, or at least it seems that the name Kanāda or "small eater", usually considered as arising because of his theory of atoms, but far more likely because of his rigid habit of fasting, is no more than a nickname used in default of the true one.

However this may be, he had sufficient ability to found the school of the Vaiseshika or specific method, a philosophy of the atomic construction of all material things, and a basic system of argument supporting the eternal truths of Nature. This Vaiseshika philosophy flourished for more than two centuries contemporary with the flourishing of Stoicism in Rome, and was developed to the noteworthy extent that its atomic theory and evidential theology served the two respective purposes: first, to refute the nihilism of the Lokayātikān materialists by disproving their argument of the *regressus ad infinitum* in the endless divisibility of matter; and second, to establish a logical ground for conceiving the eternity of matter along with that of Nature and Truth and Wisdom.

With Kanādas specific method there could be reached a cosmological proof of God's existence, made obvious and conceptually intelligible through the universal manifestation of His Work and Word, i. e., through the universe of Nature and the eternity of Truth. It therefore becomes Man's highest business in life to seek to know and recognize these attestations of the Divine Reality that is. But this search does not become efficient under any but very specific, if not very rare circumstances. Kanāda revived Jaimini's

ethical law by teaching that a strict attention to clean, righteous living will always lead to its natural consequence, its merited reward—a pure as well as a practical conception of Dharma, the law of righteousness and of a good and worthy life. From the practical application of this conception may next be derived (or experienced) an exact knowledge of the seven epistemological Padārthas or righteous paths, somewhat similar to Gōtamā's first series in the Nyaya system, except that the seventh, Abhāva (the unpremiered, as in distinction from the Avayāva or premises of the Nyaya), claims that the logical treatment of the problem of knowledge should also include a consideration of privation, negation, and absence as being of an importance equal to that of affirmation and inclusion. This exact knowledge, together with its proper use, serves in its turn to show us the structure both of material Nature (Astitva) and of the sacredness of Divine Truth (Siddhānta). All the possibilities, all the potential capabilities of the Atman or individual soul-self, developed to their highest and noblest perfection constitute Iswara the Paramātman, the Supreme Soul of the Cosmos. In this form all human nobility and aspiration to perfection is *one* with the Divinity of Nature, while those who are content to keep the lesser development of their individual selves make up the *Many* of a finite, worldly life.

(To Be Continued)

AMBROSIA AND NECTAR.

BY PETER J. POPOFF.

A COMPARATIVE study of eating and drinking makes a new chapter in the science of religions. Men eat and drink to live. Yet they die, because they have not nourishment that would give them immortality. Only gods have such food and drink, ambrosia and nectar, as the Greek mythology teaches. Eating and drinking, however, are considered as an absolutely necessary condition of life of all beings, be they gods or men. It is necessary to notice that this *anthropomorphic idea* is found in all religions. As creation of human imagination, all gods are endowed with human qualities: they eat and drink, enjoy sweet meats and perfumes, singing and dancing; they love and beget children, make peace and war. Evidently, workmanship clearly indicates the workman.

Here is a picture of life of the Olympian immortals:

"On the topmost peak of Olympus there was a great hall where gods and goddesses gathered for deliberations and *feasting*. *Ambrosia* was the food served at these banquets, and nectar, poured into the cups by Hebe, the goddess of youth, nourished the inhor flowing in the gods' veins instead of blood. The nostrils of the feasters were filled with rich *odor* of sacrifices offered on earth, and their ears were charmed by the songs the Muses sung to the accompaniment of Apollo's lyre. The Graces, adorned with spring flowers, presided over the feats and the dances, conducted by Terpsichore herself, the Muse of the choral lyric and the dance." (*Greek and Roman Mythology*. Jess M. Tatlock).

We read in the Iliad how once Vulcan, the god artist, treated the gods and goddesses to *nectar*:

"He said, and to her (Juno's) hands the goblet heaved
Which, with a smile, the white armed queen received.
Then, to the rest he filled; and in his turn,
Each to his lips applied the *nectared urn*.
Vulcan with awkward grace his office plies,
Thus the blest gods the genial day prolong,
In *feast ambrosial*, and celestial *song*."

(Book 1, p. 68).

Ambrosia means a thing giving immortality, hence the food of gods. It corresponds exactly to *the fruit of the tree of life*, spoken of in the Bible, for those eating of it shall live forever:

“And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as *one of us*, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and takes also of *the tree of life*, and *eat*, and *live forever*: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man: and he placed at the east of the Garden of Eden *cherubim*, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of *the tree of life*.” (Genesis, iii., 22-24). Here the author conveys the idea that “we”, who know good and evil, take of *the tree of life*, *eat* and *live forever*.

We read in the Iliad how Jove sent his daughter Minerva to *strengthen* Achilles who was refusing to take any food as long as Patroclus' body remained unburied.

“Ere *thirst* and want his forces have oppressed,
Haste and infuse *ambrosia* in his breast” . . .
To great Achilles she her flight addressed,
And *poured divine ambrosia in his breast*,
With *nectar sweet*, (*refection of the gods!*)
Then, swift ascending, sought the bright abodes.”

(Book xix., p. 401).

It appears then that “refection of the gods”, ambrosia and nectar, may be offered to mortals, too, of course with special permission of the “Father of gods and men”.

And the fruit of the tree of life giving immortality can be offered to men also: “To him that overcometh will I give to *eat of the tree of life*, which is in the midst of the paradise of God”. (Revel. ii, 7).

In the new Jerusalem there will be *water of life* and *the tree of life*, both giving immortality to the righteous, as ambrosia and nectar to the Olympian gods and goddesses.

“And he (Angel) showed me a pure river of *water of life*, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the *tree of life*, which bare *twelve* manner of *fruits*, and yielding her fruit every month. . . . Blessed are they that do His (God's commandment, that they may right to the *tree of life*, and may enter in through the gates into the city. . . . And let him that is

athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of *life* freely". (Revel. xxii. 1-17).

There are in the Bible other significant passages regarding celestial nourishment.

"Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou and reign over us. And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my *wine, which cheereth God* and man, and go to be promoted over the trees?" (Judges ix. 12-13).

Thus the *wine cheereth God* and man.

And here is a mention of "angels' food":

"He (God) had commanded the clouds from above, and opened the doors of heaven, and had rained down *manna* upon them (the children of Israel) to eat, and had given them of the *corn of heaven*. Man did eat *angels' food*; he sent them meat to the full". (Psalm lxxvii. 23-25).

"And the manna was as coriander seed, and the colour thereof as the colour of bdellium". (Numbers xi. 7).

The Lord appeared to Abraham in the shape of three men, and Abraham offered them meat and bread, butter and milk," "and they did *eat*". (Genesis ch. xviii). And whenever angels appeared to men, for instance to Manoah (Judg. ch. xiii), to Gideon (Judg. ch. vi) they were offered food and drink.

When Jesus "had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was afterward a hungered. And when the tempter came to him, he said, If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread" . . . Jesus sent him away: "Get thee hence," he ordered. "And, behold, *angels* came and *ministered* unto him." (St. Math. ch. iv). But how did angels minister? Ancient engravings represent angels around Jesus with *banquets of celestial fruits*. "Angels ministered to him a repast of celestial food,—a heavenly feast". (Milton, Book IV).

All ancient nations sacrificed to their gods, offering them meat and drink, and the gods expressed their satisfaction in receiving such offerings, as is stated in all sacred scriptures.

Thus "Noah builded an altar unto the Lord . . . and offered burnt offerings. . . . "And the *Lord smelled a sweet savour*". (Genesis viii. 20-21).

When the Jews returned from Babylon to their country, they were supplied with "both young bullocks, and rams, and lambs, for the burnt offerings of the God of heaven, wheat, salt, wine, and oil

... that they may offer *sacrifices of sweet savours* unto the God of Heaven". (Ezra vi. 9-10). So the God of Heaven smelled sweet savours of meats and wine.

The Bible says that, besides meat and bread, the children of Israel offered to God wine, oil, water and incense.

"And the three mighty men broke through the host of the Philistines, and drew *water* out of the well of Bethelhem, and took it, and brought to David: nevertheless he would not drink thereof, but *poured it out unto the Lord*". (II Sam. xxiii. 16).

In the Iliad we read about many sacrifices. Jupiter said to Juno:

"But mine, and every god's peculiar grace
Hector deserves, of all the Trojan race:
Still on our shrines his grateful *offerings* lay,
(The only honors men to gods can pay),
Nor even from our smoking altar ceased
The pure *libation*, and the holy *feast*".

(Book XXIV, p. 478).

There is a close analogy between sacrifices of the Hebrews and the Greeks.

In Hindu mythology *soma* corresponds to ambrosia and nectar of the Greeks. It is an intoxicating milk juice squeezed from the soma plant (*Asclepias acida*), and is *drunk by gods as well as men*, though the celestial soma is distinguished from the terrestrial one. The plant's true home is heaven, and it was stolen from the guardian demon by Indra's eagle, just as Zeus' eagle had brought the nectar, and Odin's eagle carried off the *mead*. Soma is considered as the king of plants, for it gives health, long life and *immortality*. The preparation of the soma juice was a very sacred ceremony, performed by the Brahman's according to the sacred Scriptures, the Rig Veda. Later on soma was personified and became the Indian Dionysos or Bacchus.

Homa in the Zend Avesta of the ancient Persians became what soma was in the Rig Veda of the Hindus. In this case Indian mythology was repeated in the Iranian myths.

In Scandinavian myths *mead* plays the same role as nectar, soma or wine elsewhere. The god Odin receives in his heavenly abode, Valhalla, the souls of those who had fallen in battle and whom had selected Valkyries, the divine maidens. Clad in full armour, they ride through the air, direct the battles and select the bravest war-

riors for Valhalla. There the warriors spend their time in constant fighting and *feasting*, in which participate gods and men. Evidently, in heaven the warriors continue their earthly life, only it lasts forever.

Mead is a drink made by the fermentation of honey mixed with water. Alcoholic drinks prepared from honey were common in ancient times, and during the middle ages throughout Europe. The Greeks and Romans knew of such liquor under the name of *hydromel*. Nectar too is said to be made of honey of the heath (*Erica Vulgaris*).

In the ancient China, where the ancestors were particularly worshipped, they regularly offered sacrifices, consisting of food, drink and perfumes. If the material parts of these offerings apparently remained unconsumed, then the odorous particles were believed to reach and satisfy the blessed souls of their ancestors.

In Egypt they deposited with the mummies some food: and on the walls of the tombs they made pictures representing food and drink, which by magic power could be converted into real things. They had also prayers inscribed or engraved on the tombs, which when read by the living friends or relatives, had the power to supply the souls with a thousand loaves of bread and as many measures of beer or wine.

The Babylonians held that all men shall die, but that in a secret place of the kingdom of the dead there is the tree whose fruits give youth and life, and also the spring of water which, sprinkled on the dead, restore them to life lasting for ever. It is from the Babylonians that the Hebrews adopted the story of the tree of life and the water of life.

Mahomet reserved to the righteous the use of wine in his paradise.

Man's longing for immortality made him imagine the existence of the tree of life, and the water of life, of ambrosia and nectar, two things which in some countries were reduced to one: soma, homa, mead or wine.

The angel Raphael declared to Tobit and Tobias: "All these days (about three weeks) I did appear unto you; but *I did neither eat nor drink*, but ye did see a *vision*." (Tobit xii. 15-21). This assertion contradicts the statement found in Genesis and elsewhere that when visiting men, *angels did eat and drink* (Gen. ch. xviii. and xix). This assertion in the Book of Tobit loses its weight and

significance in view of the firmly and generally established doctrine to the effect that both gods and men use food and drink, the tree of life and the water of life, ambrosia and nectar, soma, homa, mead or wine. What meaning has this doctrine—that is another question. It is an anthropomorphic conception.

Eating and drinking are believed to be essential for life of all beings, be they gods or men. And there is a covenant between the gods of heaven and the men on earth that the latter should furnish the former meat offerings and drink offerings, the sweet savours and the sweet incense, as if in return for the protection rendered by the immortals to the mortals. Hence there is a constant *union* between gods and men, a union constituting *religion*. Thus we come to the divine order illustrated in sacred Scriptures of all nations.

Evidently, in *anthropomorphism* we find the key solving all religious enigmas and mysteries.

MISCELLANEOUS.

MEDITATION.

BY GUY BOGART.

There are no cares in the world that are real. They are but the imaginings of fear in some guise or other.

Know! Know! Know!

The pathway of unfoldment is so simple and so difficult. The difficulty lies mainly in the attempt of the uninitiated mind to figure out *how* the divine law can operate. Suppose the seed began to think when planted, "how can such simple agencies as earth, water and sunshine develop me into a flowering bower of beauty?"

The simple path lies thru definite, regular and systematic meditation. There will be action, bless you, in plenty. It will be guided, however, and intelligent activity, proceeding from a calm center. The compass of the drawing student would make strange and erratic figures if some stable point were not selected as a center. Meditation is the centering of the compass point, that the periphic action may be measured equi-distant from one common point of divine contact.

Fast and pray. Meditation is prayer within the soul. Right action is prayer within the physical sphere. Right thinking is a prayer of the mental body. Thus you may pray without ceasing and yet function in a normal world.

Fasting and meditation may be likened to the developing of the photographer's plate. Your body, sensitized by the father-mother con-

tact, received the divine impress of the spirit. How is the world to know what fair picture lies concealed within the enigma of the plate until developed in the dark room of meditation and fixed by the path of human contact? Having developed his plate, the photographer can send broadcast to the world his prints. By fasting and meditation you loosen to the gaze of the world the spirit behind the body, within the body—the connecting thread uniting you with the divinity of the infinite, the divinity of the electron, and, most important of all, the divinity of every man, woman and child who ever was or ever shall be.

Take care of the thots, the atunement, and the actions and events are cared for by forces more mighty than you can create. The sailor hoists his sails and the winds of an entire planet speed his freighted vessel across the ocean waves. Focus your crystal lens and the sunbeams of the celestial concentrate at your service. Place your wheel within the stream and the rainfall of countless miles grinds your grain. Erect your dynamo and power station and the electric currents of a universe are at your command.

Be one-with-God—the enigmatic “X” if you like—and there flow thru you the currents from the universe itself. Sit by the crowded highway and the world passes in review before your gaze.

Meditation is the key unlocking the treasure chambers of earth.

Meditation is the signpost directing the steps to the main highway of realization.

Meditation is the summer cloud from which drops the refreshing rain, washing the face of Nature for its solic smile.

Meditation is the strengthening sleep fitting the body for its strenuous tasks of a day in the market place.

Meditation is the Mother-kiss sending you forth unafraid and hopeful to school.

Meditation is the calmness of the twilight when your Self sits with you.

Mediation is the silent pathway thru the forest which freshens you with the fragrance of wild flower and the caress of pine-blown breeze.

Meditation is the mountain top from which you gain a perspective of the towns and valleys thru which you must spend your precious life energies.

Meditation is the baptism of the Spirit, the ordination and the commission to go forth unto His work.

Meditation is the cooling drink at the oasis spring for the thirsty pilgrim across the deserts of the commonplace.

Meditation is the symphony of all Nature.

Meditation is the soulful wistfulness of the master violinist's communion with the Olympian chorus.

Meditation is the mystic touching of His garment.

Meditation is the linking of the Self with the outer and the inner realms, the clearing house of experience, the confessional, the lingering after the lecture hour for one more word of clarified explanation by the

teacher, the enfoldment within the arms of the mother when wearied and outcast, the couch of fair dreams and the pillow of far visions.

Would you rise unto the realms of ecstasy? Meditate.

Would you carry healing in your touch? Meditate.

Would you walk strongly, unfalteringly the rugged paths? Meditate.

Meditation is the pillar of fire by night and the pillar of cloud by day.

Meditation is a tool, a method, a way, a direction, a preparation.

He who does naught but meditate may sharpen away the tool ere it has seen service. Who shall say whether it is best that the scythe rust thru inaction, be broken thru misguided use, or worn to naught at the grindstone? Learn to avoid any of these ways, thru the golden mean of alternate meditation and action.

So simple and yet so difficult the way.

THE APPENDICES TO THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MARK.

A Study in Textual Transmission.

BY CLARENCE RUSSELL WILLIAMS.

New Haven: Yale University Press.

This masterly monograph is issued by the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences under date of February, 1915, but as it was printed at Weimar it did not see the light until 1921. So we now have at last a scientific statement of all the facts about the greatest literary problem of the New Testament. The last monograph that was anything like complete was Burgon's famous brief for the Roman tradition, which appeared in 1871. So slow is the progress of science that half a century must elapse between two monographs on a subject of vital import to the Christian religion.


Williams gives us all the main documents—or nearly all—in the originals, Greek, Latin and Armenian. But Coptic, Syriac and Ethiopic have no fac-similes, while the treatment of the Armenian leaves something to be desired. It should be stated that, in spite of a stereotyped Armenian text, about which the manuscripts differ little, yet there are two types of Armenian manuscripts which differ widely. One type omits "the son of God" in Mark I. 1, the Mark Appendix, the Adultery Section in John, the Bloody Sweat in Luke, etc., while the other type supplies these. These two types persist right down to the invention of printing in Europe, and even beyond it, for an Armenian manuscript at Oxford, dated 1657, omits all the passages named, while one at

Philadelphia, dated 1649, omits all except the Bloody Sweat. It is to be hoped that the learned essayist will make it clear in his second edition that the Armenians, alone among Christians, refused for twelve hundred years to corrupt the Holy Gospel. And it is right to apply the term "corruption" to the Mark Appendix, which Rendel Harris has called "this strange and awkward supplement."

The writer of this review, in writing to Harris before the essay appeared, stated it as his conclusion that the Shorter Mark Appendix was of Alexandrine origin. Clarence Williams has reached the same conclusion independently, thus strengthening its value. He also adds that the Longer Appendix, while originating in Asia Minor, owes its present popularity to the authority of the Roman Church. The present writer, in an article written in 1920, ascribes it to the commentary of Victor of Antioch. Both are right, for Victor's Commentary gave the Appendix currency in Greek, as Tatian's Diatessaron had already done in Syriac, and the Roman Church in Latin.

The learned research of Williams is beyond all praise, and when combined with the essay on the Resurrection of Kirsopp Lake, will go far toward establishing that keystone of the Christian Religion on a scientific basis.

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS.



THOMAS PAINE.

From *Memoirs of The Life of Thomas Paine.*

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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TOM PAINE.

BY M. JOURDAIN.

THE late years of the eighteenth century in England was lit by an optimism in the minds of some leading spirits that was surprising, considering the troubled waters of the current in which they were borne along. This confidence in the coming change was founded in an exalted belief in the supreme power of human reason. Why should it not, Godwin questioned, establish its control over our bodies, or over external matter; and indefinitely prolong human life "by the immediate operation of the intellect"? He reminds us, however, that the substance of the chapter in which this confident hope is expressed is given only as a matter of probable conjecture. This belief in the potency of reason induced simplification of the theorists' outlook, as well as a confidence in unprecedented advances. The way was plain before the feet: "The duty of man (wrote Paine) is not a wilderness of turnpipe gates through which he is to pass by tickets from one to another; it is plain and simple".¹ Reason was to make straight the way and remove all obstacles, and Paine prophesies an European congress to promote civilization and liberty. He turns aside from planning a constitution, saying that we must allow elasticity, for "there is a morning of reason arising upon man on the subject that has not appeared before".

Tom Paine—the familiar abbreviation dates from his life-time, when he was placed in an infernal triad with the Devil and the World—is the authentic voice of this confidence in the coming of a beneficent change. An English mechanic caught up in the storm of the Revolutionary years of the century, he was set in the heart of the disturbance both in America and France, and troubled the waters in England. But in spite of his considerable direct influence for a time in America and France, Paine was no visionary; and

¹ *Rights of Man*, Vol. II, p. 76.

showed no trace of the love of power, or that recklessness which Mr. Max Beer says is characteristic of the English intellect, a trait that, in periods of general upheaval, tends, he thinks to their throwing their mental ballast overboard. His characteristic qualities were a certain self-complacent shrewdness, limitation of out-look, and ruthless honesty. He was no incendiary, though his readers imagined in the background of his portrait a church in ruins and a guillotine waiting for priests, a spectacle that frightened the timid and conservative. In the *Rights of Man* Paine stood for an unflinching appeal to natural rights and a loud contempt for the English constitution and monarchical system, and what must have disturbed many of his readers was his assumption that monarchy and aristocracy would shortly disappear from the face of Europe. The alarm of the upper classes was increased when the rapid sale of the book was known, and by the startling growth of radical political societies.²

Paine, who gave in his brilliantly written *Agrarian Justice*³ an economic supplement to his *Rights of Man*, is an original but moderate reformer—so moderate that (as Mr. Beer has it) he would in the present age have been "a respected member of the Liberal Party". He raises his voice vigorously in the debate upon the merits of industrial civilization, and finds it wanting. Written after the French Revolution it has a strong undercurrent of socialistic thought. His plan for "meliorating the condition of man" was to create a national fund to pay to every person when arrived at the age of twenty-one years the sum of fifteen pounds, also ten pounds sterling per annum during life, to every person now living of the age of fifty years and to all others when they shall arrive at that age, to enable them to live in old age without wretchedness and go decently out of the world". The idea of old age and sickness pensions had been proposed not many years before by Dr. Priestly⁴ but with the difference that in the latter scheme the fund was to be made up by means of deductions from wages. Paine argues that by the principle of natural law, every man and woman was entitled to an equal share of the land, which is the common inheritance. Uncultivated land itself was of small value; the improved value only when in the hands of the cultivator, was that cultivator's property; but the

² *History of English Socialism*, (Eng. trs.) Vol. I, p. 112.

³ *Agrarian Justice*, 1797.

⁴ *An account of a Society for encouraging the Industrious Poor*. Birmingham, 1787, p. 15.

absolute right of property in land, which originated from a confused identification of the improvement with the land itself led to disinheritance of the majority.⁵ The community must therefore reclaim the ground rent in the form of a ten per cent death duty on all property, which would secure a fund to endow each person with a sum of money representing the share of land that would have fallen to him, and also an annuity. It is significant of the period that "old age pensions were to begin at the early age of fifty. By Spence, Paine's proposals were thought not thorough, and he accused him of endeavoring to sell the people's birth right for a pottage of lentils.

Paine was, however, more widely known in his day and immensely effective as a leader of the rationalist attack—defining rationalism with A. W. Benn as "the mental habit of using reason for the destruction of religious belief"; and for the first time the Christian scheme of salvation was assailed in print in language as plain as that of the hustings and barparlours. Yet he added no new thing to the current criticisms of religion and dogma. His zeal in refuting the Bible was greater than his knowledge. He tells us that he went through the Bible "as a man would go through a wood with an axe on his shoulder, and fell trees"; his aim is destructive, his axe a rough and shrewd historical criticism.⁶ His shrewdness led him now and again, however, on the right path, as when he pronounces the books of Jonah and Job poetical work of gentile origin. The *Age of Reason*, which is quite devoid of any feeling for the beauty of the Testament, is often very amusing. In the first part he admits with serene ostentation that he has not even a copy of the Bible, but before the publication of the second part he had provided himself with a Bible and a Testament and had found them to be "much worse books than he had conceived".⁷ He made obvious and direct criticisms of the Fall and the Atonement, the late origin of the Pentateuch, the cruelties committed by the Israelites, when acting, as it is alleged, under divine guidance, the irrelevance of the Messianic prophecies, the incongruity of certain chapters of Isaiah, the incredible improbabilities of the book of Jonah. Strangely enough he considered the book of Daniel as genuine.⁸ In his criticism of the New Testament narratives he repeats the charge of imposture and fraud against the apostles and evangelists, no doubt

⁵ *Rights of Infants*, 1797.

⁶ *Age of Reason*, Part II (ed. 1834) p. 137.

⁷ *Age of Reason*, Part II (preface).

⁸ A. W. Benn, *Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (1906), Vol. I, p. 216.

because he, with his contemporaries, considered the Gospels and acts were written by eye-witnesses. Though striking right and left at theology and the follies of literal belief in the Bible, Paine never swerved from his "almost unreasoned deism",⁹ and the description of him as a dirty little atheist by the late President Roosevelt could only have been made by one unversed in his writings. His contention was that the Christian and Jewish conceptions of the Deity were not consistent with the theism as revealed to man by his own conscience and by external nature. "From whence," he writes, "could arise the solitary strange conceit that the Almighty who had millions of worlds equally dependent on his protection should quit the care of all the rest, and come to die in our world because, they say, one man and one woman had eaten an apple".¹⁰ He insists everywhere on the sufficiency of natural religion, associating it with the teaching of science, which is his main contribution to criticism.

The keen partisan feeling which in the last years of the eighteenth century colored the controversy upon Paine's *Age of Reason* and *Rights of Man* tinged all record and criticism of his personal life. He was described by some of his enemies as having "filthy habits", and this is repeated by Leslie Stephen who roundly describes him in his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, as "as disreputable an old wretch as was at that time to be found in New York, drunk, filthy beyond all powers of decent expression, and constantly engaged in the meanest squabbles." Later Stephen admitted that this account was erroneous, adding that he was the more sorry to have been unintentionally an accomplice in defaming Paine's memory because in any case the charges were "but slightly relevant. . . . Paine's brandy is less to the purpose than Pitt's port, and much less to the purpose than Colledge's opium".¹¹ Among his contemporaries there is a mass of evidence favorable to Paine, ranging from that of critical onlookers, such as Wolfe Tone, to out and out admirers, such as Rickman. The former tells us that he liked Paine very well when he saw him in Paris in 1797. "He is vain beyond belief," he adds, "but he has reason to be vain, and for my part I forgive him. He has done wonders for the cause of liberty, both in America and Europe, and I believe him to be conscientiously an honest man. He converses extremely well, and I find him wittier in discourse than in his writ-

⁹ *Rationalism in the nineteenth century*, p. 216.

¹⁰ Quoted in Conway, *Life of Paine*, Vol. II, p. 186.

¹¹ *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1893.

ings, when his humor is clumsy enough". Rickman, Paine's guest in 1793, thus describes his simple and laborous life in Paris: "Sometimes to a select few he would talk of his boyish days, play at chess, whist, picquet or cribbage, and enliven the moments by many interesting anecdotes. With these he would play at marbles, scotch hops, battle-dores, etc., in the broad and fine gravel walk at the upper end of the garden, and then retire to his boudoir, where he was up to his knees in letters and papers of various descriptions:"¹²

A recently published diary of a Miss Wilmot, who traveled on the continent during the first years of the nineteenth century, presents an obviously unbiassed view of Paine at that date, busy with his mechanical inventions. "He lives", she writes, "up half a dozen flights of stairs in a remote part of the town. He received us with the greatest good humor and instantly set about exhibiting his playthings. Besides this model, he has various others, and is at present planning a method of building houses without permitting the damp to penetrate. A friend of his lives in the house with him, whose two little boys, children of four and five years old, he has adopted. During the entire morning that we spent with him they were playing about his room, overturning all his machinery and putting everybody out of patience except himself, who exhibited the most incorrigible good temper. His appearance is plain beyond conception; drinking spirits has made his entire face as red as fire and his habits of life have rendered him so neglectful of his person that he is generally the most abominably dirty being upon the face of the earth. He complimented us with a clean shirt and having his face washed, which Mr. Livingston said was one of the greatest efforts he ever was known to make. In spite of his surprising ugliness, the expression of his countenance is luminous, his manners easy and benevolent and his conversation remarkably entertaining. Altogether his style of manner is guileless and good-natured, and I was agreeably disappointed in him considering the odiously disagreeable things I was led to expect. It is a whimsical weakness in Tom Paine imagining that every woman who sees him directly falls a victim to his charms."¹³

Among Paine's claims for remembrance to-day is his fresh and vigorous English. We read him as we read Cobbett, for the manner of this presentment of his protest rather than the matter. He

¹² Quoted in Conway, *Life of Paine*, Vol. II, p. 68.

¹³ C. Wilmot, *An Irish Peer on the Continent*, (1801-3) p. 26-7

wrote from the heart. "What I write (he says) is pure nature, and my pen and soul have ever gone together".¹⁴ He never, according to Hogg, made any alterations in his writing, "his manner of composing, as I have heard persons who have heard him relate, was thus. He walked backwards and forwards about the room until he had completed a sentence to his satisfaction; he then wrote it down entire and perfect and never to be amended. When the weather was fair, if there was a garden, a field, a courtyard at hand, he walked about out of doors for a while, and then came in and put down the sentence which he had arranged mentally, and went out again and walked until he was ready to be delivered of another."¹⁵ His friends, knowing how much had been made of his grammatical errors, suggested that his manuscripts should be revised before publication. He would say, writes Richard Cumberland, "that he only wished to be known as he was, without being decked with the plumes of another". Directness, vigor, a bright and unencumbered clearness of statement, rising here and there to heightened eloquence are his distinctive and precious qualities. His retort upon Burke's sentimentalism about Marie Antoinette is well-known. "Nature has been kinder to Mr. Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of distress touching his heart, but by the showy resemblance of it striking his imagination. He pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird".¹⁶ Less familiar is a beautiful saying of his, "to believe that God created a plurality of world's at least as numerous as what we call stars renders the Christian system of faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the wind like feathers in the air";¹⁷ and his description of Nature, rises into imaginative fervor. "Bred up in antedeluvian notions (he writes) she has not yet acquired the European taste of receiving visitors in her dressing room; she locks and bolts up her private recesses with extraordinary care, as if not only resolved to preserve her hoards but conceal her age, and hide the remains of a face that was young and lovely in the days of Adam".¹⁸ His writings shine with phrases that became the simple armoury of his followers; such as that "man has no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow"¹⁹

¹⁴ Quoted in *Conway*, Vol. I, p. 88.

¹⁵ Hogg, *Life of Shelley* (Ed. Dowden) p. 517.

¹⁶ *Rights of Man* (1792), Part I, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Age of Reason* (Ed. 1834), p. 44.

¹⁸ Quoted in *Conway*, Vol. I, p. 239.

¹⁹ *Rights of Man* (5th Ed), Vol. I, p. 11.

and "government is for the living not the dead",—the kind of thing that was repeated by one workman to another, and passed round the inn and the workroom, and among the crowd at the street corner, and indeed the reverberations of his solid and effective eloquence are not dead today, after the passage of more than a century.

"SOME PRAGMATIC DEFENSES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS."

A CRITICISM.

BY WILLIAM J. MORGAN.

COINCIDENT with the weakening of the absolutistic premises in philosophic thought, has come the adoption of the pragmatic method as a modern apologetic for characteristic beliefs of the Christian religion. The adaptive capacity of pragmatism for this particular task might be claimed to inhere in the genius of the philosophy. The utility for religious faith of the theses for example embodied in James, "The Will to Believe" is entirely apparent and the fuller application of pragmatic principles to religious problems naturally followed. An excellent idea of the manner of procedure may be obtained from Professor Drake's critical examination of the subject in his "Problems of Religion."¹ The author points out with convincing detail the serious fallacies underlying the pragmatic contentions that we must trust a belief—1. "Because its untruth would be intolerable;" 2. "Because our hearts vouch for it;" and 3. "Because it works."

Examining the positions in the order named, Professor Drake reminds us that we have no right to assume "that the universe is constructed so as to comfort and inspire us."² Human hopes and desires have been thwarted too often to leave us any deep-rooted certainty that our interests, however precious, are unalterably subserved in the nature of things. Indeed much that is tragic in life inheres in this very state of affairs. It is to be remembered also that few, if any beliefs of mankind, have such unique value that their negation would be continuously intolerable. It is generally recognized today that the beliefs of men vary profoundly in accordance with their socially inherited world-views and extreme

¹ Durant Drake: *Problems of Religion*—Chap. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 333.

caution should be observed in investing any belief with the quality of absolute indispensableness. If some of life's appalling experiences are best described in the words of Guyau, "that there is no help against the inexorable, and no pity to be asked for in a matter that is in harmony with the interests of the totality of things" would not man give far nobler proof of his essential spiritual nature in some Russellian attitude of resignation or defiance than through a pragmatically supported evasion of the forbidding elements.³

The second demonstration of a belief's validity as quoted above, involves the heart's indorsement as a criterion of truth. The exact meaning of the concept of heart and the nature of its prerogatives in the problems of faith might be legitimately demanded. If the notion voices a protest against the old-fashioned exaltation of reason as an isolated, independent faculty of discernment, the position will evoke sympathetic response. Additional support for this second apologetic might be found in a paragraph from Professor Hoernle in which he reminds us that austere, negative beliefs are not necessarily any more in harmony with reality than the hopes of brighter hue and he sees no reason for us always to clothe cosmic desires in sack-cloth.⁴ The practical value of the attitude commends itself, but it does not fully exclude an obvious danger often latent in the "will-to-believe," that is, an indisposition to use the resources of investigation and criticism when the easier ways of decision by feeling stand invitingly open. In a few human problems perhaps the heart so-called may remain as the only arbiter but these situations should not be needlessly multiplied. If the bases of intellect are found to rest upon responses essentially emotional, the deliberative and judicial characteristics of the mental process are not consequently denied or its authority questioned. The hypotheses of the heart therefore will be seen to need aid from other sources. Professor Leuba has written in this connection: "All human needs have the same function in the discovery of factual truth: they constitute merely demands and incentives. It is the intellect which passes upon the validity of each proposition affirming, in the interest of any need, objective existence."⁵

The third reason stated, that is, the workability of a belief as its best rationale, is most deserving of comment because of its char-

³ J. M. Guyau: *The Non-Religion of the Future*, p. 535.

⁴ R. F. A. Hoernle: *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*.

⁵ J. H. Leuba: *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 9, p. 409. Quoted by Drake.

acteristic expression. Professor Drake admits that the assertion of the principle in its baldest form may represent "distortions or excesses of pragmatism," but he insists that the distortions have been responsible for much of the attractiveness of the doctrine for the popular mind.⁶ In an incisive analysis, the author takes prayer for an example and argues: "If a man prays, believing that God hears him, his belief comforts him and his prayer inspires him, whether his belief is true or an illusion."⁷ Giving a theological belief the status of a hypothesis, he contends that "a hypothesis is not proved true simply because it is a conceivable way of explaining certain facts" and notes that many explanatory scientific theories apparently well grounded have at length been forced into discard through the introduction of new facts.⁸ The author finds another difficulty in the recognition of "mutually contradictory faiths that have worked successfully" and inquires if the startling success of Christian Science is a proof of its truth.⁹

At this point perhaps the crux of the whole matter is reached and we believe that a solution may be discovered in a simple, though frequently overlooked explanation, of the reason that religions of the most diverse aims and contradictory claims have often been found to work. While account may be taken of the elements of some truth in the content of practically all religions, may not the greater emphasis be put upon two other aspects of the question, namely, the way in which a given religion has met the emotional demands of a human situation and the manner in which the message has been delivered. In reference to the first aspect, the words of Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson may be appropriately quoted, "the fact that beliefs afford a solution of the riddle of the world which to many minds is satisfactory does not in itself show anything about their truth or falsehood. It shows merely the tremendous bias under which criticism has to act."¹⁰ In other words, the avidity with which a belief is grasped and the objectivity of its content ardently affirmed, may be in direct proportion to the stubborn facts and the chilling reality which contradict it. Pragmatic proofs of this type are seen therefore to be far from assuring. The second aspect of the question receives amplification in recalling some of

⁶ Drake, p. 348.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 343.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 345.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 347.

¹⁰ G. Lowes Dickinson: *Religion, a Criticism and a Forecast*, p. 43. Quoted by Drake.

the basic cravings of the human spirit and certainly the demands for the authoritative in religion has been one of them. Coupled with this, the religious imagination has yearned for the *explicit* and when formidable bodies of divinity have been proclaimed with absolute undeviation and exuberant detail, men have invariably responded to the ultimacy of truth whose most paradoxical characteristic has often been its inability to outlast the believer's span of years. The past is too replete with wrecks of absolute systems that survived but for a season, to make temporary workability the criterion of truthfulness when the main reasons for the successful functioning are otherwise manifested. That pragmatism may have valuable contributions to make to a philosophy of religion, we do not question, but services of the nature thus far outlined are apt to become more devitalizing than helpful in the long run. Far better for religion to stand on foundations wholly naive, than to accept aid so specious.

Pragmatists of the Schiller type would in all probability strenuously object to the concept of objectivity being associated with religious belief and the believer's experiences, cut loose from all ontological considerations, would be made the one and only needed test of truth. Mr. Joseph Roy Geiger in a recent publication commits himself to precisely this position. He writes, "Furthermore it is not essential to the reality of the religious mode of experiencing to demonstrate its ontological status by any sort of dialectical proofs or apologetics. Religious realities are their own best and only evidence. There is then, no occasion for vouching for or for vindicating their ontological integrity."¹¹ Absolutistic philosophies, contends Mr. Geiger, have been responsible for religion's mésalliance with ontology. Religion, he continues, "left to work out its own attitudes and activities, has been concerned with the realization, preservation and promotion of concrete human values."¹² But this is so obviously only one side of the story and fails to do justice to the larger aspects of the case. Professor Adams presents the other view needed for a sound historic perspective: "The religious mind . . . has, from primitive religion through all of the historical religions, laid claim to possess something of cosmic and universal import: it has supposed itself authorized to make some assertion about the environment of human life and experience, and about some response which reality makes to the energies of our minds. Religion has

¹¹ Joseph Roy Geiger: *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism*, p. 37. University of Chicago Press.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 37.

claimed to be true as well as relevant to the interests which come to light in the life of mind and of reason. It thinks of itself as having not only a function within the domain of experience, of man, and of society, but also as pointing to and disclosing qualities and existences of the real world. Of all life's interests, religion has been the most obdurately metaphysical and realistic. Speak as you will of its pragmatic sanction, its utility, its character as symbolic of feeling and emotion, or of its functions in man's struggle for existence, if this other side of religion has escaped your analysis, then you have missed the heart of it."¹³ Social or sectarian communities, organized on the basis of definite relations with an unseen order, have given powerful reinforcement to the idea of the independent, objective existence of the supra-mundane powers or personalities supposed to constitute the transcendent realm. The persistence of religion in the race with its ever-recurring phenomena, the dramatic rise and fall of ethnic faiths, the historic theodicies and hierarchies with their varying fortunes, all unreservedly imply a supra-terrestrial regime. The soul-stirring discussions of the nature of Christ, the relation of the historic Jesus to the Trinity, the method of Atonement, together with the depravity and destiny of man, all contained tremendous, irresistible assumptions of the existence of God, a fact so patent that proofs of his actual being occupied relatively small space in the ponderous systems of divinity. May not the association of atheism with a feeble mind find its rationale in the conclusion that only a fool can doubt in the presence of so much to believe. Mr. Bertrand Russell has somewhere said that it takes a long training in philosophy to convince a man that the chair he is sitting on is not really present. Similar difficulties may be predicted for the pragmatist in his contact with unsophisticated religionists. Of course, if the latter never get disillusioned they will continue to furnish data upon which Mr. Geiger may try out the new psychologic technique he is so anxious to have us perfect. Might not the prophecy be made that when the ontological framework of religion is discarded, that men will not feel inclined to give social values religious labels, but will gladly adopt these values upon their own intrinsic merit. Religion might indeed furnish a mythologic background and coloring for the values and thus touch morals with poetry. Yet we cannot be certain.

The place of religion in the future economy of human interests

¹³ G. P. Adams: *Idealism and the Modern Age*, p. 42.

affords speculation at once difficult and fascinating. The persistent credulity of man in the face of the most contrary evidence, supports the supposition that the older religion may yet have a long future marked out for it; indeed its roots may be ineradicable. Further we must remember that the religious possibilities of an imaginative naturalism have been largely left undeveloped. Cosmic emotion might in time become no more of an esoteric possession than the more rarified mysticisms and Santayana has reminded us that the Dante of the Copernican cosmology must yet come forth. Religions have by no means been unadaptive in the long perspectives of their histories and great years may await those religions that will take their place in allied ranks, modernly accoutered and unabated in zeal, yet modest and chastened in the wisdom of a sobering past. In writing of this better day, Professor Dewey says: "The religious spirit will be revived because it will be in harmony with men's unquestioned scientific beliefs and their ordinary day-by-day social activities. It will not be obliged to live a timid, half-concealed and half-apologetic life because tied to scientific ideas and social creeds that are continuously eaten into and broken down."¹⁴

¹⁴ John Dewey: *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 210.

IDEALS AND IMMEDIATE SOCIAL PROGRAMMES.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

THERE are hosts of earnest and thoughtful persons who, philosophically speaking, live from hand to mouth—that is, without ideals and high hopes or visions. They may regard ideals as futile and Utopian, or they may simply have failed to form, or evolve, ideals. They have, on the other hand, definite objectives of a practical character, programmes and plans designated to ameliorate social conditions and remove certain recognized evils and wrongs.

There are also little groups of men and women who cherish ideals and are inspired by noble visions, but who have only the vaguest notions concerning the proper way of realizing their ideals and visions. These dreamers often ignore or completely misread the present. They live in the future, as they imagine it, and do nothing to bridge the chasm between the present and that bright future. They lead morally and socially isolated lives. They play no part in the struggles and efforts of their own period.

To be successful, a reform movement must have both an ideal and a programme—a set of proposals to work for in the present and the immediate future. It is hardly necessary to say that the several proposals or items of the programme must all constitute steps *toward* the ideal, not steps *away* from it. Stagnation is possible in social, political and ethical realms, and even retrogression is unfortunately not an infrequent phenomenon in human affairs. But, while we may have to bow to the inevitable, and resignedly bide our time, we need not and do not deliberately incorporate reactionary planks into our reformatory programmes.

In view of the havoc which the world war and its depressing aftermath have played with so many progressive movements and tendencies, it is perhaps advisable to take stock—to pause and ask ourselves what has become of certain social ideals as well as of immediate reform programmes. Has the logic of great events forced

a change in the spirit and tenor of progressive human thought? Has anything been learned, anything forgotten or relinquished, as the result of the war and its reactions and effects?

On the surface, matters social seem to stand about where they stood before 1914. Revolutionary and proletarian communism is a little more arrogant and aggressive than it was before the second, or Bolshevik, revolution in Russia, though as a matter of fact, there is precious little justification for arrogance in the experience of Soviet Russia under tyrannical communism. In Germany and in Hungary, and perhaps also in Italy, the extreme radicalism in the Socialist and Labor movements have been chastened in a measure and have been led to revise their schedules, so to speak. But apart from these developments it cannot be affirmed that the various established schools have shifted or modified their respective positions. The Marxian Socialists have remained Marxian. The Fabians have remained Fabians. The Guild Socialists have gotten hold of a new, fruitful and important idea—long familiar, however, to French and American followers of J. P. Proudhon—the idea of democratizing credit and abolishing the note—issuing monopoly and the virtual banking monopoly, but there is no causal connection between the tragic world war and this discovery. The Conservatives, the Liberals, the Trade Unionists, the Single-Taxers, the Philosophical Anarchists and the Syndicalists are severally writing and acting in their traditional and customary ways. If individual adherents of any of those schools dimly perceive that their dogmas require re-examination and revision, party loyalty and party pride prevent them from acknowledging their doubts and anxieties.

But there are always independent thinkers in the world, and more than ever at this critical juncture in human affairs. There are hosts of Liberals and even Radicals who have no axes to grind, no dogmas to uphold in the face of unpleasant facts, no factions or schools to support in obedience to misdirected loyalty or a fanatical consistency. These thinkers have learned something from the world war, and from certain pre-war phenomena that perhaps were not fully understood in reform circles until lately. These thinkers realize keenly that social ideas are not self-executory, and that sighing, longing, preaching, and scolding will not bring us a step nearer to our ideal or goal. They realize, further, that the present social order is neither dead nor sick unto death, but, on the contrary, enjoys sufficient health and vitality to last for many decades,

if not centuries, more, and that the course of wise, sober-minded and practical idealists is pretty clearly indicated by the stern logic of facts—positive as well as negative.

There are certain things, the independent students feel, which the men and women we know *will not do*. There is no excuse for persisting in agitations which have impossible objectives. It is idle to hug delusions and to hope against hope. Rational progressives abandon or modify proposals that time has tried and found wanting in the qualities that capture the imagination, convince the intellect or win the heart.

To be specific, it is now clear to independent observers that Marxian revolutionary Socialism is as obsolete or moribund as that Utopian, sentimental Socialism which it superseded and so mercilessly derided. It is equally clear that Tolstoyan Christian Communist-Anarchism has had its day. Even the Henry George Single Tax movement is steadily losing ground and there is no reason to expect a new lease of life for it. These and other movements should be "liquidated". They belong to history. Let the dead bury the dead.

But social ideals remain, and new programmes, adapted to new modes and habits of thought, answering to present needs, are beginning to emerge. It would be rash to assert that these programmes are criticism proof, time-proof. They, too, may undergo changes, revision upward or downward. But for the present they seem to hold the field.

Let us glance at some of them.

The first to challenge attention, beyond question, is the co-operative programmes of farmers and wage-workers organizations. Though the co-operative movement is by no means young, new vitality has been breathed into it in recent years, and literally hundreds of thousands of men and women have been aroused to its importance, its philosophical soundness, its combination of idealism and solid, practical sense. Radicals who used to sneer at this movement—it was too slow, or too "bourgeois", or too prosaic for them—now study it and speak of it with genuine respect. On the other hand, conservatives who thought it incompatible with a sturdy Anglo-Saxon individualism, or with the American spirit of the Frontier, now see in it the only means of economic salvation.

And no wonder. Facts and conditions, not theories, govern men's minds. Waste is a stubborn fact in modern industrial and commercial life, and society cannot afford waste. Waste is stupid

and criminal. It can be eliminated by co-operation, co-ordination, efficient management. Distributive co-operation not unnaturally precedes other forms of co-operation. It represents the line of least resistance. But co-operation in* production in the storage of commodities, in insurance against loss by hail or rain or drought, and in the creation and utilization of credit, one cannot doubt, is bound to follow—is already following.

We hear of small co-operative factories started by labor unions or by groups of individual workmen educated in unions. We hear of more ambitious co-operative plans in the more intellectual circles of organized labor. In every labor platform one now finds a plank advocating co-operation.

As for the embattled agricultural associations, state and national, the impetus which the deflation or slump that followed the termination of the artificial prosperity of the war period has given to co-operation as a remedy for farmers' ills hardly needs emphasizing. It is true that many farmers have looked to the government for temporary aid and relief in the form of loans, credits, improved machinery for the stimulation of exports, and the like. It is true that there has even been a tendency to revert to fiat-money fallacies. But these are ephemeral things. There is abundant evidence on every hand that American farmers, and the enlightened urban friends of the farmers as well, have at last perceived the beneficial possibilities of co-operation. The Non-Partisan League of North Dakota may have made serious mistakes in its alleged one-sided exploitation of the co-operative principle at the expense of the general body of taxpayers. Compulsory co-operation through the state always has provoked and always will provoke discontent, for certain elements of the electorate are forced to pay, or believe they are forced to pay, for privileges conferred on special classes. But whether the League is open to criticism or not, the essence of its platform is co-operation. Voluntary co-operation can serve every purpose which compulsory co-operation is intended to serve, and it is less precarious and less dependent on the tides of politics.

Co-operation, it may be noted, was the soul of good even in the most "heretical" of the grange and Populist demands. Many of the farmers' spokesmen said "cheap money" when what they really sought was democratized credit. Many demanded state elevators and state warehouses when what they wanted or aimed at, half consciously, was co-operative construction and use of such

essential facilities. It is not unnatural for farmers, or wage-workers, to turn to the state and ask its aid; for other classes are doing this and have done it ever since the state was first organized. Men think of the state as a co-operative agency, not stopping to distinguish between the compulsory co-operation it exemplifies and voluntary co-operation, and not realizing that taxation of minorities by majorities, even within the four corners of the law, may provoke just resentment.

If, however, as recent developments indicate, farmers and wage-workers alike are becoming aware of the fact that the possibilities of voluntary co-operation are vastly greater than those of compulsory, state-backed co-operation, and that if states put unfair, unwarranted obstacles in the way of the former, as some of them do, it is easier to remove such obstacles than to disarm opposition to state ownership and operation of industrial plants, we may expect rapid and world-wide progress in co-operation.

It is but just to acknowledge the debt of the co-operative movement to the Syndicalist and Guild-Socialist schools of radicalism. Orthodox State Socialism had no message for organized labor; the Syndicalists and Guild-Socialists, by insisting on workers', not state, control, of industry have directed the attention of hundreds of intelligent and imaginative labor leaders to the necessity of fitting workmen for "self determination", for democratic industry, for the exercise of the functions now discharged by capitalists and managers. The new social order must find labor ready, and the work of preparing and disciplining labor cannot begin too soon. "Teaching by doing" is an idea that appeals to all thinking persons, and if labor is to manage industry tomorrow, it had better undertake management today wherever possible. From this to the idea that organized labor might take over factories by agreement with employers, or build factories, or purchase stocks and mortgages and thus acquire interests in plants and establishments, the step is a short one. We find trade unions, for the first time, evincing a deep interest in the question of undertaking the management of factories, or using their friends for such purposes instead of viewing them solely as "war chests" to be used in times of strikes and lockouts.

Now, no tendency is healthier than this—the assumption by labor of the functions and responsibilities of management as well as of the investment of the collective and individual savings of wage-workers in the enterprises that, according to advanced ideas, are

ultimately to be socialized. It is a familiar complaint that managers, though only superior employees, have little sympathy with the rank and file and often indeed are more "plutocratic" than the capitalists in their attitude. Why should not labor train managers, then, and why should it not supply the capital needed in productive industry? If capital is only "surplus value", the fruits of expropriation and exploitation, as certain Socialists hold, why should not labor retain this surplus value wherever it can do so? If, on the other hand, capital under normal and fair conditions, at any rate, is entitled to some reward as an independent and indispensable factor in production, as many individualists contend, why should not labor earn in addition to wages the compensation claimed by capital where it possesses the capital and is able to spare it?

There was a time when Socialists rather metaphysically talked about an "iron law of wages" that precluded any substantial savings by the wage-workers. This notion is no longer entertained by thinking persons. Labor is not limited to a "bare subsistence". Labor is not "getting poorer". Labor saves and invests. Labor supplies capital by the hundreds of millions to industry and commerce. It supplies it indirectly, through saving banks, insurance companies, and the like. Speculative finance has been accused, with ample reason and justice, of using wage-workers' money to injure and defraud them. Labor is no longer under the necessity of intrusting its savings to speculative financiers. It can establish its own banks and finance its own enterprises. The capitalist system is not a close corporation. Labor is free to compete with capital in the latter's own sphere. It must learn to do this—it *is* learning to do it. And how infinitely superior such a policy is to a propaganda of destruction and chaos!

Turning from farmer-labor circles to those of the employing class, we shall not fail to note heartening signs of the times in that quarter. There is, for example, Lord Leverhulme of England, who is persistently advocating the "six-hour day", or rather the six-hour shift, for human labor and more intensive use of machinery, as well as "co-partnership", or co-operation, in some form or other appropriate to given industries and local conditions. Lord Leverhulme is a successful man of business, an employer of thousand of workers, and he has applied his doctrines in his own establishments. He disclaims philanthropic motives; he approaches industrial problems from the viewpoint of a practical but broad-minded and forward man. He is a champion of efficiency in industry, but he per-

ceives that under the wage relation and the handicaps imposed upon the mass of workers efficiency is an idle dream. A short workday and a direct "stake" to labor in industry are, he urges, the only means of enhancing efficiency and eliminating the many forms of waste in the processes of production, distribution and exchange.

Germany, or Germany's capitalistic and employing class, has produced an even more remarkable and picturesque figure than Lord Leverhulme—Herr Walter Rathenau, for many years head of the Allgemeine Electricitäts-gesellschaft, and now minister of Reconstruction in the Wirth government of the German republic. Rathenau is no impulsive convert to progressive and radical social-economic ideas. He is the author of a series of spirited, stimulating and thoughtful volumes dealing with the deepest and most anxious problems of modern society. He is at once practical and idealistic, cautious and courageous. He has little respect for doctrinaire Socialists and Utopian reformers, but he is thoroughly alive to the weaknesses and defects of the present politico-economic order and knows how to read the handwriting on the wall. In two little books, *Von Kommenden Dingen* and *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, he has presented his quintessential views as to the conditions precedent to the establishment on secure foundation of a human and just social order.

Mr. Rathenau advances two major proposals. The first he sums up in the formula, "Interchange of Labor". This formula, he writes, "requires that every employee engaged in mechanical work shall have the right to claim to do a portion of his day's work in intellectual employment, and that every brain-worker shall be obliged to devote a portion of his day to physical labor". The second proposal is that "a year of Labor Service be established, the year to be devoted by the whole youth of Germany, of both sexes, to bodily training and work".

Plainly, the second proposal is a corollary from the first, and is intended to make the first practicable. A year of labor service, under the proper conditions, would fit the brain-worker, or the leisure class, for the mechanical and physical work to be required of them.

The arguments elaborately set forth by Mr. Rathenau in support of his two proposals cannot be presented here, even in outline. Suffice it to say that the root of our industrial trouble appears to him to lie in the conditions of toil—the terrible monotony, the lack of joy or interest, the mindlessness and soullessness of the average

“job”. Modern industry, he affirms, dulls and stupefies the human spirit, until the day’s work has been ennobled and *vergeistigt*—invested with a spiritual quality.

Mr. Rathenau’s “year of labor service” reminds one of the late William James’s “moral equivalent of war”—a form of industrial conscription. The James idea fell on barren soil. Americans have little faith in either military or industrial service of the uniform, compulsory kind. But Germany, by reason of her pre-war national discipline and after-war difficulties, should be disposed to entertain the idea of universal industrial service with lively sympathy. If she is destined to become, as many think she is, the leading industrial and trading country in Europe, and to solve her problems without abandoning the cardinal features of the capitalistic and democratic system, she will need the inspiring, invigorating and unifying influences proposed by Mr. Rathenau. A plunge into revolutionary communism would be mad folly, of which the danger is past for Germany. But a too rigid adherence to the one-sided capitalism which Rathenau has weighed and found wanting would be equally fatal in the long run. Capitalism has inherent virtues than can modify and save it, but these virtues must be encouraged and developed by men of vision, sympathy and imagination.

I have just intimated that Rathenau is too radical for American habits of thought, but, after all, there is no little kinship between his advanced ideas and the burden of the recent report on Waste in Industry made by a special committee of distinguished American engineers to the American Engineering Society. This document is symptomatic. It is bold and yet thoroughly constructive. It is “capitalistic” in spirit, but it finds much to condemn in the present economic system and, indirectly, much to justify in the discontent with the system. It shows that labor has serious grievances, though labor is mistaken in thinking that the average employer deliberately exploits his employees. The trouble, or one trouble, with the present system, according to the engineers, is that it is appallingly wasteful. It is supposed to be efficient, and perhaps it is, as compared with slave labor or with bureaucratically directed and managed labor. But from a truly scientific point of view it is neither efficient nor economical. It wastes billions annually. Strikes and lockouts are forms of waste, and so is seasonal unemployment, and so is overtime work at “rush” periods, with inflated wages and long hours for the employees. If industry were properly organized, the billions

now wasted would go in part to labor, in part to the consumer, and in part to management and capital.

The engineer may be disposed to overemphasize the technical and administrative aspects of the industrial problem and to minimize its human aspects. He may assume a simplicity that does not exist in the actual situation and cherish too much confidence in the effect of a dry, intellectual, scientific approach to the problem of industrial relations. But there is no denying the fact that the engineer's approach enlists the interest and sympathy of many who are repelled by the social reformer and the humanitarian, whom it is easy to dismiss as visionaries and closest students.

Finally, never in modern history has as much stress been laid as now on the necessity of decent living conditions, adequate housing, popular education and wholesome recreation. Not all the liberal thinkers and statesmen of the world may agree with Mr. Bertrand Russell in the proposition that poverty can be abolished in twenty years if there be the will to do so. But many realize as never before that modern society, with its science, technique, art and organizing genius, has no excuse for tolerating slums, insanitary dwellings, parasitic industries and wage scales that absolutely precluded a human standard of living. During the tragic world war there was no unemployment and no misery among those able and willing to work. Why, men and women are asking everywhere, cannot society achieve the same results under peace conditions? War destroys wealth, and peace conserves it. Cannot society produce enough of the necessaries and comforts of life when all are engaged in *creating* wealth and accumulating capital? War brings an artificial and deceptive prosperity; cannot men, by taking thought, insure themselves a genuine and healthy prosperity—a prosperity based on useful labor, co-operation, equal opportunity and intelligent utilization of nature's abundant resources?

To put such questions as these insistently and earnestly is to answer them in the affirmative. The war may have destroyed illusions and dogmatic social creeds, but it has stimulated searching re-examination of the principles of social and economic organization and constructive thinking about the ways and means of setting the house of civilization in order and removing the prolific causes of strife, internecine and other disturbances.

EDUCATION—PRESENT AND FUTURE.

BY L. A. SHATTUCK.

“Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée, car chacun pense en être si bien pourvu, que ceux même qui sont les plus difficiles à contenter en toute autre chose n’ont point coutume d’en désirer plus qu’ils en ont.”

Descartes.

THE PRESENT.

IN the Year of Our Lord 1921, a quantitative analysis of the question of education in the United States discloses that we have an educational institution of some kind for almost every square block of our urban territory. There is not an art, a science, a phase of charlatanry, or any intellectual pursuit within the range of the human mind, that is not being utilized as a means toward a large monetary return—philanthropic or otherwise—or what is still worse—is being used as a feed hopper to fill the maw of the ever-needful economic machine. If the question were asked what these feeders turn into this machine, mediocrities would be the only answer that could truthfully be made. It turns out doctors, lawyers, engineers; untold legions of D. Ds., L. L. Ds., C. Es., M. Es., and innumerable other gentlemen well bespattered with literal honorifics. A constant stream of professional gentlemen, if you will, but mediocrities, nevertheless.

Thwing, in an address to the teachers of Minnesota some years ago, said: “Never rest till you have got all the fixed machinery for work the best possible. The waste in a teacher’s workshop is the lives of men. And what becomes of the waste? They live on and they hang heavy on the neck of progress; they form the cumberers of the ground, or worse, who drag down the national life”. What becomes of the waste, he asks. Is it not daily seen, this waste? The aforementioned lettered gentlemen, for instance.

Are not our cities sweltering with waste? And this waste is daily, like a volcano, letting off its poisonous gases. This waste is our demagogues of politics, the harum-scarum monkey trainers, and what-not. They spout, spout, spout, day in and day out, the faults of the world and the people in it. They are never appreciated, they will tell you. No, nor they never will be. Thus do we obtain our embryo American Bolsheviks. Our educational system has done for them just as it will do for millions of others if we do not change it.

We shall not deal here with elementary education, or with the reasons and causes for illiteracy, statistics of which will disclose to one who will investigate, the astounding news that one out of every five of our voting citizens in our Southern States can neither read nor write; or that one out of every twelve males in the United States with the suffrage privilege is in the same boat. But our subject here will not deal with these questions or people for no doubt our public school students and illiterates of today will be the absolutely law abiding citizens of the morrow. However, our subject is with the question of the so-called higher education, i. e., high and preparatory schools, colleges and universities, in every shape, form, and manner, and the whyfore that men and women returned from these institutions are mediocrities. Is it suppression of knowledge, or what? No, dear reader, it is not. It is attempting to impart too much knowledge of the wrong kind. It is the wrapping of knowledge around a square peg expecting it to fit into the round hole. It is suppression of the right kind of knowledge; in this respect it is as cruel as the mighty economic thumb-screw under which the serfs labored in the 15th Century. In ten folio volumes, brilliant type, we might say that the reasons for it were well laid bare but here we can only say: dogma, precedent, authority, and a thousand lesser influences which retard progress in this world.

Take, for instance, the system of teaching. There is no teaching of any system of logic to a boy or girl. There is no method by which they may distinguish the worse from the better reason. No teacher does ever, or did not in the writer's experience, make the students seek solutions to their own problems. They never make a boy or girl use their own intellect. The teacher is a prop, the connecting link between authority and nonentity, ever-ready to help their pupils toward parasitism.

We admit that help along life's highways is very altruistic but no help with the problems of school days is building anything

for the future structure to come—self-reliant men and women. There would be some justification for this help if the teachers were constantly implanting truths in the heads of adolescence. But they are not. And they know it. Unless their sophistication is at the same mental level as the youngsters.

When we take a bottle of truth and a bottle of falsehood, mix the two in another container, and then force our students to drink the resultant concoction the effect is nauseous—to them. To others, it likens itself to infanticide. With no emetic in sight our students go forth from their *alma maters* without one fear they will ever purge themselves of the odious mixture. But they do. If they do soon enough all's well—but otherwise—some more waste.

And the reasons contained in the forced-feeding belief is explained by the one word—docility. All the modern teacher asks for is this. Teachers themselves, being products of an educational system the principal dogma of which is authority, ask nothing from their students but that they conform to the same system of tractability. And the spawn of this system is quack doctors, legal shysters, poverty stricken engineers and professional hocus-pocus.

Most of our teachers are always laying down laws upon this or that. They are born dictators. They say to a student—this is right or wrong. Do it this way—not that—and so on interminably. They are what Shaw so aptly calls the “amateur pope.” It is this amateurish papal authority which is the bane of our educational existence. America is one galaxy of “popes.” From the demagogue with his political axe to grind down to the writer who has no axe but a large pile of lumber in his garret to cut—if you will pardon the unintended witticism—we all want to wear the papal crown.

A few decades ago, Herbert Spencer, in speaking of education in England, said it was what he would call a “moving equilibrium.” That is just what we have here in America today—our educational system is a “moving equilibrium”, though a root should be extracted from the “moving”.

Education is anticipative. Anticipation of the future of the student is the *sine qua non* of school-day training. As the great Lessing expressed it, education is to perform the same functions experience will perform only in less time. This being the duty to be fulfilled by education it is quite incomprehensible that Greek mythology is anticipative of the student's future life. Are the dead languages, which are still being taught in some schools, preparation

for the morrow? Is the ability to distinguish between three flats and an appoggiatura in a musical scale preparation for the morrow? Will the future be one long night of darkness to a student if he is unable to tell whether a buttercup is a flower of the genus *Ranunculus* or a container for a milk product? Will a student be helped if we prepare him with Dante's "Inferno"? No, for outside of the material Hell he will attain after school years are over there will be many moons pass by before there will be such a thing in his life as "Paradise Regained". We are not detracting from the benefit conferred upon prospective Haroun-al-Raschids by mythology, nor the effect upon coming bass-viol players in moving picture theatre orchestras in the study of music, nor botanical knowledge or bug knowledge upon tomorrow's botanists and entomologists. But we have few whose future aspiration is writing, fewer still who look toward music, and even less expectant botanists and entomologists. Why inflict this knowledge and spoil every young life for the benefit of the few? We are not deploring the value of these things but we are deploring the stunting of the mind and temper at the time of life when it is most receptive to the things upon which one's future depend. As Von Humbolt said: "Whatever we wish to see introduced into the life of a nation must first be introduced into its schools". And what do we wish to see in the life of this nation? The answer is self-supporting, self-reliant citizenry. And the knowledge requisite thereto *must* be introduced into our schools. Knowledge of bugs does not make for this nor does music. We should concentrate only upon the things that do make citizens and then if these citizens are thoroughly satisfied they wish to make a collection of such things—well, we will have performed our duty toward them, at least.

The foregoing being true as a right basis upon which to found our future education it is idiotic to use some of the text-books now used in our higher schools. Text-books which lend not one whit of weight to facts in the scale of life. Our object as teachers—if it is necessary that we retain our papal mantle—is to send our students forth to meet a modern Goliath and, as modern Davids, they will have to be provided with something more efficacious than the obsolete sling-shot if they wish to do any slaying on their own account.

Centuries ago Rabelais advocated a system of realistic education. And we are still pursuing the will o' the wisp of "cultured" self-preservation. As if there were such a thing. Culture has a

place in our life, it is true, but the opinion of the writer is that the cultural things may better be left until competency in the material things of life is attained. No matter how we may theorize about esthetics in this matter of fact world, it is solely a question of tending to the wants of the body first and the brain will have plenty of food—thoughtful and otherwise—afterward. Culture should be left to the unoccupied years of one's life seeing that it takes the first half of that life hustling for the pounds, dollars, and francs. There is plenty of time after school-days to delve into Epictetus and Aristophanes if one so sees fit, but for the present, the essentials, and not the finals, of mind building architecture are needed.

Also, there is the question of "fads", with which the curricula of our scholastic institutions are well sprinkled. Both philanthropy and politics are more or less the cause of them. A philanthropist or a politician may believe in phrenology, "jazz" music, absolutism, New Thought, Futurism, or anything of that nature and he will seek to introduce it into the particular school, or set of schools, he may select for his, unknown to him, animosity. We should do away with this species of public benefactor. An endowment made to a school with a provision that such and such a thing be introduced into the curricula is not philanthropy or public benefaction. It is sheer fanaticism and it is stultifying to the school which makes claim to education. On the other hand, politicians who have relations with school boards should interfere in no way with the prescribed course of study put in effect by the boards. The members of such are supposedly trained educators and it is safer to leave our engines with trained mechanics than it is to leave them with potters.

Dr. James Ward, in speaking of education, said that the laboring man wanted education because it would make them better, happier, and wiser men. Yes, and are they not better and happier men for economic independence? If they have attained to this latter they can then take up the classics, or art, or anthropology, if they wish, and they consequently become wiser men. Show us a man with economic freedom and we will show you a man with contempt for authority—not governmental authority unless it encroaches too much on his rights, but the authority upon which the improperly trained man of today takes everything for granted as long as one of the "amateur popes" says a thing. This does not make for citizenry. It makes sheep. Even the writer who for nearly ten years has been trying to put the halo thrown about "Heroes and

Hero Worship" out of his sight is occasionally bothered with the authority and precedent method of teaching. And does this nation want a population of thinkers or open-mouthed parrots?

A German writer once wrote: "Gentle reader, have you ever felt that the school you used to attend as a child really gave you the education which you now see would have been the best? Are your own youngsters at this very minute being educated so as to turn out quite healthy and able to do some good in the world"? Do you, gentle reader? Do you think that your education was in a large part rubbish or have you utilized every educational brick in building up your dwelling place of happiness in the world? If you have you are fortunate, we assure you.

The writer has not failed to notice that here in the United States, in speaking of averages, the earlier a boy leaves school the correspondingly greater his common sense in early manhood. Coming in contact with worldly forces sooner, which gives him a practical basis upon which to do later study, he is better fitted for retention of real knowledge than another whose schooling is not finished until the early twenties. Why this is so can only be attributed to the teaching system. It is obvious, also, that despite the immense strides forward, numerically, that our educational institutions have made, there has been no decrease in poverty and misery. If, as no man may gainsay, that education is the only method for breaking down the monopoly of wealth, why is it that we have done nothing toward this—education being so rampantly present? It is evident there is nothing wrong with the educational hypothesis as a whole but it is still plainer that there remains only the one corollary—that of wrong teaching or wrong subjects. We know there are various elements in America attributing this failure to ameliorate poverty and misery to everything from alcohol to indecent moving pictures. These are *not* the causes, if indications are worth anything. The causes are contained in our education. Thus Huxley, three or four decades ago: "At the cost of one to two thousand pounds of our hard earned money, we devote twelve of the most precious years of your lives to school. There you shall toil or be supposed to toil; but there you shall not learn one single thing of all those you will most want to know directly you leave school and enter upon a practical business life. You will in all probability go into business, but you shall not know where, or how, any article of commerce is produced, or the difference between an export or

import or the meaning of the word Capital. But at school and college you shall know of no source of truth but authority."

It may occur to the reader that we are quoting many authorities. That we are, in brief, doing the opposite to our sermon *au sucre*, but, we have to. The writer, too, is a product of the system—and for further reference to authority *Vide* John Milton's "Tractate" or the works of Bacon, Copernicus, Vives, Da Vinci, Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Grotius, Rousseau, Rabelais. Of the moderns we could quote a dozen: Oliver Lodge and Dr. Eliot, for instance. All of these were realists on the question of educational values if one would seek stronger authority than the writer.

A recent actual happening in the writer's experience gives a concrete example of the results of current pedagogical methods. The following dialogues took place between the writer and a man recently returned from college. They are metaphysical in their scope and no slur is intended by any of the interrogations:

Writer: "Mr. X, do you believe in the theories of Friederic Nietzsche"?

Mr. X: "No, I do not".

W: "Why don't you believe in them"?

Mr. X: "Because all my professors in college said Nietzsche was insane when he wrote his books".

W: "But, Mr. X, if an insane man writes that π is equal to 3.1416 or that two plus two equals four, it is just as true as if a mathematical wizard said it".

Mr. X: "Maybe that is so, but he *was* crazy, wasn't he"?

W: "Have you read his works"?

Mr. X: "No".

He admitted he had never read the works of Nietzsche and he accepted, *prima facie*, the evidence of some of his instructors that the German philosopher was insane. The sickening overdose of classics will ruin him for the rest of his days as a really intelligent man.

The second dialogue:

Writer: "Mr. Y, do you believe in the theories of Charles Darwin"?

Mr. Y: "No."

W: "Why don't you believe in them"?

Mr. Y: "Because I believe in special creation for every species".

W: "And why do you believe in this"?

Mr. Y: "Because I was brought up to believe in the Bible and several "profs" gave me ample proof of the truth of it while in college. They know more than you or I".

W: "But Mr. Y, untold numbers of famous men have believed in the Darwinian theory—all greater men than your 'profs'. For instance, Thomas Henry Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Ernest Haeckel, and Oliver Lodge. They believed in the transmutation theory. Aren't these men conclusive proofs of the errors of your instructors"?

Mr. Y: "Well, they might have been wrong after all. I suppose I had better look into the matter farther".

But he never does. His mind until his dying day will be a mass of chaotic ideas such as this—unless he, in army terms, "snaps out of it". It never entered his head during the discussion there have been thousands of famous men who have believed in the special creation hypothesis. He could have ended that part of the discussion *reductio ad absurdum* had he known the first principles of logical reasoning. At present he is a moron and at that level he will remain unless—.

But supposing the instructors referred to in the dialogues—if they insist that philosophy is needed in college—had said to the students: "Here are the works of Nietzsche, of Darwin, and the Old Testament. Truth may be relative. I do not know which of these books state the true facts of life. I have opinions, that is all. Use these books and draw your own conclusions". What do you think then would be the result? Would it be the hodge-podge with which our *ci-devant* students are encumbered and with which they gaily saunter into an unsuspecting world? They are at one with Comte in their positivism gleaned from—not philosophers—but "popes".

When the writer was a good little boy he attended a high-priced "prep" school not so many miles from New York City. All the other good little boys used to remove their hats when the headmaster took his afternoon stroll. Later, in college, all the "profs" used to hold an indignation meeting if any student anywhere, anytime, ever dared to dispute an august, professorial syllogism. But it is a peculiar thing that it is the school-room anarchists who "get by" in this rough, old world.

And the others—the docile lads who quote passages of Shakespeare by the yard; those who can refer you to line 6, page so and so, of such and such an authority, what becomes of them? Dear

reader, there are many hundreds of thousands of them walking our streets today either unemployed or earning a pittance compared to the preparations they made for a business career. These students who return from college with the ready-reference mind in respect to authority on bugs and flowers and Perseus and Andromache, in a word, the eukalele prodigies, are not wanted by business men. Business does not require this "junk", as it is called. Business houses want a man who can spell "believe" with the "I" and not "E" *after* the "L"; they want a man who can add a column of figures correctly. Logarithms, and calculus, and surds, and simultaneous equations, and all the rest of the mathematical syllabus is not much good if you cannot divide four figures by two. For engineering these things are very desirable—but for the average business house they are useless. In the business world today you cannot sell "junk". Commercial dreadnoughts are made up of first-class Bessemer steel. From bow to stern, cage-mast to keel, starboard to port, these dreadnoughts are masterpieces of the best hardened steel in the world. They have to be. Commercial supremacy is one long, sweet battle of competition. The result depends upon the sinews, i. e., the brains, behind and in the armor-plate.

In our schools let us get rid of the "junk". Let us not lay down laws—let us say, rather, student: "Here are the facts of life. You are reaching into a grab bag. There are so many black balls of untruths and so many white balls of truths contained herein. Now use your knowledge of the mathematical law of probabilities and take your pick. Each truth you pick will be one fact nearer life's happiness. Your teacher will not suffer if you pick wrongly."

What passes for scholarship has now become the possession of the many. No longer may we assail the fact that it is the possession of the few, but, we ask, is this kind of scholarship synonymous with knowledge of the right kind? Is any man in possession of a great mass of unrelated fact in possession of as great a pearl of price as a man who owns one fact relative to life's existence? Is not a man in possession of this one fact, which he can use advantageously, far better off in educational goods than a man who displays a stock-room full of unsellable garments? The answer is evident. Rather there is the question how we shall give our students facts and not fancies. How? By eliminating from our schools and colleges, the mentor, the text-book, the school-superintendent, the trustee, the philanthropist, the politician, the educational board, municipal or state, that didactically says this is so and that is so when they are

not sure they know what they are talking about. In brief, to put our education upon a sound basis let us rid ourselves of the dictatorial method in our teaching and let us do away with such things as botany, anthropology, and other like things.

These are our educational problems of the present. The solution we may leave to the great mass of educators in America who practice the greatest humanity for the sheer love of it. The rest will seek no solution nor will they ever *wish* to be confronted with the problem.

THE FUTURE.

The principal tendency of education at the present time is psychological. Every school and university throughout the United States is daily becoming more receptive to the psychological idea. Reactionary schools are becoming overwhelmed by the tons of psychological data which is being scattered broad cast by pamphlets and books of every kind and description. It is like a universal snow storm—flakes are sweeping through every ingress into our school houses. Schools, particularly those with obsolete curricula, are abandoning text-books, discharging superannuated teachers, and making paths for the new educational régime to come.

Naturally, the growth of this new idea in pedagogy has been slow. The voice of psychology, like that of philosophy, is hardly ever heard except as a whispering as from a remote distance, even though such whispering, were it properly attended by the people to whom it is addressed, would be more beneficial than would the combined roar of a million demagogues.

As heavy cannonading brings about the storm so has the verbal volleys of demagogues been the impetus for the raging storm of psychological facts with which ye olden time schoolmaster is now confronted. For years his head has been caught in the jam of the school-house door—like an ostrich, its head in the sand—always looking within the school-house, never seeing the storm without. But at last the coldness about his nether extremities has caused him to face the storm—or be blanketed forever by it.

For years psychology has unostentatiously been making its way through dogma and precedent until it stands as a science—young and withal healthy. One by one it has swept out of its way charlatanry of one kind or another. The phrenology of Spurzheim found it too rugged for battle, as did Spiritualism, hand writing and character analysis, and other buncombe. For years psychology

has been snowing us under with truths—truths—raw, naked and bleeding. Today, psychology is not a homogenous mass of perfect truth, but it is a heterogeneous mass of truth and half truth and surely that is better than congeries of half truth and falsehood.

In our old school days the proof of the extraction of a correct root from a quadratic was the multiplication of these roots. So with questions of education. If we extract educational roots from economic quadratics and these powers do not "prove" then the educational roots are wrong. And from a survey of economic conditions at present we should say these roots do not even approach the solution. On the one hand we have statistics on record which state that of one hundred men who are self-supporting at 25 years of age only four are independent at 55. Again, we have failed to seek the cause of what is known as casual labor—the great drifting army who are stevedores one day and members of a railroad construction gang the next. Some would impute the causes of this to birth, environment, and lack of character; others, to social evils—alcohol and the like. It is none of these. It is solely our failure to perceive that a high wage return does not make contentment and the only thing in which a man may find this is in his right vocation. There is not an interest—mother, father, wife, children, country or home that transcends this interest, notwithstanding the romanticists' howl to the contrary. If we wish to see dogged pertinacity let us watch a youth who has found his life's work; he will never swerve to right or left until he has attained his goal. And is there a man in the world who has not one paramount interest? The psychologist of the future will point it out.

Labor troubles today, which we claim are being caused by insufficient wages, poor housing, supply and demand, and economic catch phrases without number, are caused sheerly by this one thing—discontentment. Discontentment—not with wages, not with housing, nor with the whole gamut of the verbal economic syllabus, but solely with the kind of labor itself. We have been attributing to labor, unions, and capital the causes for economic unrest as we sympathized with one or the other of these three sides of the industrial triangle. Capital imputes to labor too great wage demands; labor's rebuttal is that wages are insufficient; the surrebuttal to which is that both are partly wrong. Labor under the condition of contentment as before pointed out would be willing to accept less wage return; capital, under the same condition, due to greater production, would be willing to pay more. We have maintained

through centuries the outworn doctrine of fitting the man to the job instead of fitting the job to the man. If labor's demands are high, so will they be higher. We have been trying to make return to the worker in money the return we should make in felicity. Money can only pay for his material needs; it can never pay for his mental ones. This is the indispensable condition toward settling labor disputes—find if your man is adapted for the work or not. No arbitration or conciliation boards can ever make peace in the industrial world until by psychology or other means we have classed individuals into a vocational status. If capital would spend as much money in psychological laboratories as it does in strikes and lockouts a few brief years would see the end of present troubles.

We are not claiming that psychology will be infallible in these tests. But if not infallible neither will it be profuse in its promises. Science cannot—or will not within its knowledge—lie. It will hold out real and not utopian value to its purchasers. And this is surely better than shooting at targets with guns, the inventors of which claim will shoot around corners. And when the hit or miss method of education has been done away with we shall see such things as Marxism disappear from sight like chaff before a hurricane.

If today laboring men "eat up" Socialism and Bolshevism and other *isms* of the verbal artists it is because their mental energies have been misdirected. If the psychologists had been put to work on them in youth as they shall be in the future the doctrines of Engel or Marx would be treated by them as super-imaginative mythology.

But in the past what have we been doing but digging with the wrong end of the shovel? Instead of attempting to find a level for our youths—or even allowing them to find their own—we have been preaching determination, persistence, "a rolling stone gathers no moss", and other copy book maxims to them until by repetition even we elders believe our own platitudes. We have told our youths, in brief, if they would only stick to a thing long enough they would surely find the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. But they find no gold nor will they. If youth finds its *metier* there is no necessity to advise "determination". If youth has a predilection for one particular vocation it will have more determination and "stick-to-it-iveness" than will ever be found in the lexicons of its admonishers; there will never be a time it will cease to gather moss, if we are sure that is what should be gathered.

We have been literally digging graves for our sons by "our"

and not "their" liking for a vocation—or using the guide posts of science. If our sons rise from these graves they become highly successful carpenters—which is much better than remaining buried as mediocre lawyers. Mother says: "I wish son to be a doctor". Father says: "I wish son to be a dentist". And poor son, who is the center of the opposingly-pulled wishbone, is never considered in this vitally important (to him and to society) matter. We have been training blacksmiths for carpenters, bricklayers for passementerie workers and vice versa. If you don't see how impractical it is try to imagine Francis Bacon planning Napoleon's battle of Austerlitz, or imagine that military genius writing the "Novum Organum". When we see a man persisting in what we believe impossible of accomplishment we call him several kinds of a profane fool but when we see him giving up the unequal battle of trying to accomplish something just as impossible, i. e., become efficient in a work to which he is not adapted we say he has no determination or he lacks character! In the future, psychologists will save parents this trouble—and the concomitant burial rites.

In the future we may look to psychology to bring peace and happiness to many spheres. The haphazard method in education and employment problems is now out of date in this age of progress. The laws of Mendel and Galton plus the laws of psychology are sufficient in number and scope at present to look toward the future with equanimity.

An interpretation of our past economic history is sufficient upon which to base general predictions as to the future. The predictions of Marx have, we know, over a period of sixty years, failed to materialize. Upon results of past statistics we know that monopolies instead of becoming more centralized are really becoming less. This is sufficient ground upon which to say that man is becoming more and more his own economic prop, i. e., independent as an economic factor. The future may disclose even greater decentralization. As real education grows and as psychology becomes more the *modus operandi* toward settling industrial disputes the more man will cleave to the class which divides him from others above and below him, viz.: the artisan will wish to remain the artisan, the herdsmen or agriculturist will wish to remain as such and it will be impossible to uproot the vocational need of any man.

The right method of education is the only thing to break down the monopoly upon wealth. Wealth will commence to be more evenly divided only when the vast intellectual differences between

man and man begins to disappear. Wealth will always, as long as we believe in the moral doctrine of right making right, remain the rightful possession of the individual earning it; assuredly it will never become society's until the latter earns its right by efficient labor—and by efficient labor we mean labor that works to the limit of its ability—insofar as it is psychologically possible to work to that limit—either manually, mentally, or mechanically. Consequently, there will never be an economic upheaval that is not first preceded by an educational upheaval.

Every year this country spends thousands upon thousands of dollars in Americanization propaganda. This money would be better spent on strictly American problems; the alien problem will then take care of itself.

JESUS AND HIS DISCIPLE PETER.

BY WILLIAM WALLACE MARTIN.

THE man of Nazareth in Galilee laid the foundations of an universal religion. Jesus heralded a religious faith, that opened a way for every man to have access to God. The authority of His teachings rests upon the belief, that He was son of God. Mark opens his gospel with the words "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ son of God." Ecclesiastical authority has placed in its Canon of the Holy Scriptures only Four Gospels. There were many others but they were not preserved. The facts of the Life of Jesus must be gathered from these Gospel-writings. An account in them is given us of His parentage, birth, the visit of the wise men, the flight into Egypt and the return to Nazareth. Barring the parentage, there are no reasons why all these occurrences, connected with His infancy, may not be historical. The going to the Passover, when He was twelve years of age and His conversing with the rabbis in the temple, are events, which have no inherent impossibility. Jesus is unknown to history from this time until He is thirty years of age. He then appears on the stage of action, shows Himself to be the master religious thinker of His time, a most subtle reasoner, and a popular orator of the first order. He also is a most accomplished physician. It is idle to say that Jesus acquired this mastery of the broadest education in the small and despised village of Nazareth.

The modern thinker, trained to scientific reasoning upon facts and accustomed to scientific discoveries—prophecies belonging to matter and mind—will be slow to accept, if he ever does accept, such an abnormal development. The theologian, who is at home with miracles, may accept the Nazareth-genesis of Jesus, but the scientist will do a whole lot of searchings and suffer a whole realm of doubtings before he believes in Jesus as the marvelous product of Nazareth environment. Cuvier, the great French naturalist, took the

few scattered bones of extinct animals, found in caves, and reconstructed their skeletons. He was thereby able to tell their manner of life and their habitats. But we have a biography of Cuvier and find that early in life his bent was natural phenomena; his early friend was Tessier, the agriculturist. He at twenty-six was appointed assistant to the professor of comparative anatomy at the Museum d'Historie Naturelle. The modern thinker finds no difficulty in accepting any reasonable statement of the attainments and achievements of Cuvier in the realms of Comparative Anatomy so far as it relates to species whether extinct or existing. Our exacting modern thinker regards Jesus as a natural specimen of the human race with quite limitless ability to fathom the religious nature of man and to grasp a tenable and helpful understanding of God. He accepts the only records of the life of Jesus we have. He notices in the Gospels an almost complete absence of biographical reference, which would make reasonable the attainments and achievements of the man of Nazareth. This modern thinker asks the scientific investigator of religious phenomena to take the few fragments we have of the words and works of Jesus and reconstruct his early life so that these words and works are normal products of a human life. The day of the ecclesiastical Christological theology has passed. The present is awaiting a scientific Christology.

The synoptic gospels give us the manner of life which Jesus lived. He went about as a physician and also as a teacher. As a physician He healed (therapeuei) others. His cures were diseases, demoniacal possessions, death. Whence came His knowledge of medicine? When and where did He study. The ecclesiastical Christological theology answers, "He was the only begotten Son of God and so knew all." The answer is not adequate, the scientific student will reply. The time when Jesus could have studied must have been during those thirty years which the gospels have left practically blank. The scientific student, if he is adequately informed, will also tell you that for two centuries and a half Alexandria had the finest medical university in the world. It was of Grecian origin. He will add that in Galilee round about the inland sea were many cities wherein the finest palaces were reared all aglow with splendors of Grecian architecture. Indeed the Sea of Galilee at that time was a pleasure pond for the Roman rulers of Syria. There were splendid inland cities also which the Grecians built. They were not alone centers of fashionable civic life; but Grecian learning thrived in them. Jesus could have walked from

Nazareth to Tiberias in about six hours. He would behold there the glories of the Roman rulers, side by side with the grandeurs of the Seleucidian dynasties. The Aramaic, native inhabitants, a mixed Semitic people, were the hoi polloi. Reminders of the greatness of the Semites were all about the Sea of Tiberias, but they were only ruins. Fleets then sailed the sea, where today the boats can be counted on the hand. Witnesses to the majesty of Rome are seen in the Herod-built city of Tiberias, built when Jesus was some sixteen years old and named after the Roman emperor. When Jesus was some twenty-seven years old Philip the tetrach of Ituraea and of the region of Trachonitis rebuilt Bethsaida which is east of the Jordan and called it Julias, in honor of the daughter of Augustus, emperor of Rome. The love of Jesus for the sea and the cities on its border is attested by the fact that He spent so large a part of the short active life which we know as a teacher in these parts and also that three of His disciples were residents of another Bethsaida, a Semitic fishing village. The cosmopolitan Jesus must have spent long seasons of His youth and early manhood with His relatives in this Semitic Bethsaida, making excursions from there to the cities around and near the Sea of Tiberias. It was a matter of but a day's journey from Nazareth to Ptolemais (Akka); and there the memories of Hellenized Egypt were abundant. Carmel lay south of Akka some three hours' journey. The erudite Jesus must have visited these places and we doubt not that he went further south, even to Alexandria. Jesus, as a youth and young man, could easily have mastered Greek and Latin; the Aramaic was native to him. His studiousness as a lad is shown by His conversations with the rabbis in the temple at twelve years of age. Ample opportunities for the acquisition of medicine were within His reach. Luke tells us that during His youth "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man." The Greeks sought wisdom. Knowledge of medicine was with them one of the greatest departments of wisdom. The word "stature" is evidence that Jesus was comely and of impressive personality. His worshipfulness brought Him favor with God; His educated humanness won Him favor with man. The miracles of Jesus which may be classed as diseases and demoniacal possessions (barring those of raising the dead) may be explained by His knowledge of therapeutics and the propensity of the Constantine-educated ecclesiastics to redact the gospels so that they would make a common cure, made by Jesus, to be surrounded with the miraculous. The words of Jesus can have no adequate background

unless we assume that he had been a traveler in Greece and a resident in Rome. Perhaps some day will furnish us with evidence that Tiberius had as intimate friend Jesus of Nazareth. The noblest of Roman faces was that of Tiberius. And it is yet to be unravelled the reason He left Rome against the will of Augustus and remained seven years of His life, in His prime, and dwelt at Rhodes. In this island He was surrounded with the monuments of the most advanced ancient peoples and was in the very atmosphere of those noblest civilizations, which had been built on the Euphrates and Nile. It was in that island, where the memories of world-ruling empires were treasured up in inscriptions and in wonder-inspiring architectural remains. Jesus, with His Semitic and Hellenic culture, would have had a fascination for this most accomplished, most maligned, most wise Roman emperor. The character of Jesus can alone find satisfactory explanation by making Him the child of the Semites and the Hellenes, and the Romans. Our God and Light and Law were the three gifts, which He received from these mightiest of civilizations.

The words of Jesus may be classified with sufficient accuracy as parables, discourses, dialogues and conversations. The parables are but striking excerpts from popular discourses, generally spoken to a popular audience. Crowds followed Jesus. Crowds came to listen to Him. These large gatherings must have been orderly, else Roman authority would have put them down. They must have had as their drift a moral culture such as would lead to good citizenship and good tribute-paying dependents upon Rome; also they would have been prohibited. Jesus, the Orator, indeed must have had an irresistible fascination for those who were well and needed no physician. Most of His parables required no larger acquaintance with human history than could have been gathered in Aramaic and cosmopolitan Galilee. There is not an inflammatory demagogic teaching to be found in any parable. He rang true to His words, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." Jesus as a dialectician has scarcely a parallel among the scholars of Greece or Rome. The wisest doctors of the law could not entrap him. The narrow sharp-minded schools of the rabbins could not give the world-grasp, which Jesus possessed. Greece and Rome were His teachers. It is evident that the so-called Sermon on the Mount was no single discourse. I would venture to call them a collection of the subjects of many discourse, which Jesus spake in Tiberias and the cities and countries around the inland sea. If we only had the com-

plete discourses, we would have a social literature, which would be priceless. But mastery of the matter contained in them required acquaintance with the classics of Greek and Rome, both in history, oratory, and philosophy as well as accurate acquaintance with the Semitic literature of the Euphrates and the Nile. The conversations of Jesus were mainly an illumination of His words to His narrow and limitedly cultured disciples and followers. We will rightly grasp the wonderful personality of Jesus only when we leave the easy explanation of His work and words, which theologians proffer in their doctrine that being Son of God He had no need of doing anything but carpenter's work until thirty years old and then go out and blossom into the God-man. When we leave this easy explanation we shall follow Him in that unwearied labor, which led Him to be the "wandering Jew," until He had mastered the problems of civil, social and religious life for man, by observation and study of the great civilizations of the world.

A purely local man, genuinely religious, reader of the scriptures and a follower of the Temple-ritual, until the influence of Jesus set him free from the bonds of religious ordinances and the Pharisaic cultus was Peter. There is no reason to doubt that he was a resident of the fishing village of Bethsaida, that he caught fish from the waters of the Sea of Tiberias, that the new Roman life about the sea and the older Grecian mode of living were well known to him, but only as such an onlooker, as a poor toiler at the nets would acquire. The synagogue was his Sabbath assembly-place; for the regular festivals he went to Jerusalem. There he beheld the glorious place of Herod and the temple he built; and the Roman circus, probably the king's work was under the shadow of the Holy Place. But religious habit and family traditions held this Peter to his ancestral faith, the newer Roman ways and the culture of the aesthetic Greek always waged war, in his practical common mode of thinking, with the exclusive narrow Ezraitic Judaism, which was his creed and cultus. The view that Jesus lived in the house of Peter's father in Bethsaida seems best, when Mary after the death of her husband, Joseph, went with her children by him to Bethsaida, leaving Nazareth. All of her children save Jesus became fishermen. Peter would then have knowledge of the search of Jesus for knowledge, would also know how he "grew in favor with God and man." He would wonder at His proficiency in medicine, at His cosmopolitan culture. When Jesus offered him and his brother Andrew another calling, knowing His power and accomplishments,

they followed Him. It was not in obedience to any divine authority due to an abnormal parentage which controlled these two sensible fishermen.

Peter saw Jesus heal his wife's mother, saw him resuscitate the daughter of Jairus, saw Him, when on the sea amid the storm, absolutely calm and without fear, and bidding those in the boat to put away their fears. Peter saw Jesus when He was transfigured and talked with Moses and Elias, saw Him, when in Gethsemene He wrestled in prayer, sweating as it were drops of blood. It was Peter who said first, "Thou art Christ the Son of God." This Peter went about with Jesus, kept close to Him, helped Him in doing good. He watched Jesus in His healing services to His fellows without pay; he heard Him plead for good morals, good citizenship, and all because it was well pleasing to God. He saw diseased bodies recovered by the physician's care, he saw men and women awaken to newness of life, leaving worldliness and building character under the words of Jesus. The high priest and the Pharisees, whited sepulchres, lost their hold on this rugged religious man. Peter later saw a band of men seize Jesus and drag Him before Pilate; he was around when the high priest condemned Jesus to death; he fought for Christ in the Garden of Gethsemene and denied him in the courtyard of the judgment-hall. It was at the end catastrophe for Peter. The scholar, the orator, the physician, the man who had had crowds follow Him to hear Him, to have His medical help, this man Peter saw condemned to death, without a friend near by, without a disciple around except himself. Peter might well ask, "Where is His kingdom? How can His disciples sit upon thrones?" Then too no help came even from God His Father. Peter might well have said, "I know not this condemned, this friendless man, this man of sorrows." Peter left the judgment-court with a heart full of grief and without faith in Christ the Son of God, if this creed meant a God-man, empowered, yes panoplied with all the power of God. But what his eyes had seen, he could not deny; he had seen the most gifted man, the most skillful physician, the most winsome person of His time, whom the poor and the rich followed after. He knew Jesus taught that good morals, good citizenship, and great brotherly love, embracing every man, were the sacrifices acceptable to God and also that man might be born again and through the new birth have access by his own prayers to God and so talk with God as a friend. But his hope in Jesus, as a political leader, as the establisher of an earthly kingdom, had perished.

The appearances of Jesus after His death and burial to Peter himself, to the women, to other disciples, and the ascension of Jesus, rebuilt the ruins of the faith of Peter and gave him a fuller creed, which was, Jesus, Son of God, crucified, and arisen from the dead. The little company at Jerusalem met together, refreshed their memories of Jesus; and they knew that they alone were left to herald the gospel, which Jesus attested by His life and His death. The Acts of the Apostles give us the fullest accounts of the activities of Peter. The footsteps of His Master he almost literally follows. He seems to tell us that he like Jesus was sent to the lost sheep of the House of Israel. A matter of unclean meats keeps him from accepting Cornelius, the Roman centurion, until a vision comes to him, correcting his error. A matter of circumcision makes difference between him and Paul. This local man Peter has a new creed for the guidance of his life; but in matters of ceremony he follows the customs of his family and people.

Peter, who had denied Jesus, is His witness at the Pentecost gathering, when three thousand were converted to faith in the Crucified One. Peter traveled through Judea, Samaria, Galilee, over the same territory in which Jesus journeyed often. He preached at Antioch, at which place Paul and Barnabas won great numbers of Gentiles to faith in Jesus Christ. The charm of Peter for believers in these places, where he went, was the intimate personal knowledge which this plain bold disciple had of Jesus. He loved the temple at Jerusalem as a place of prayer, not as the sanctuary, where daily sacrifices were offered for sin. The priesthood of the Jews and the Pharisaic burdensome religious observances he discarded. He retained circumcision, it was sign of Abrahamitic descent; he administered baptism, it was the ordinance established by John and approved by Jesus. This ordinance was testimony to a changed mind in matters relating to God. No photograph of a man can be truer than the portrayal of Peter in his two epistles. The style of these writings is that of a man, surcharged with an ardent love for Jesus Christ. It is addressed to Jewish Christians, which were dwellers, not citizens, in cities of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, Bithynia. Tiberias had banished the Jews from Rome, Caligula had persecuted them; Claudius had shown them little favor. The rabbis and Pharisees cared for the Temple and the Ezraitic Jews; to the Christian Jew the most helpful word would come from Peter; and when old he sends to them these unparalleled epistles of the new Testament. These Christian Jews according to

Peter were a chosen generation, being called in Jesus Christ; a royal priesthood, having the anointing of the Holy Spirit; a holy nation, for the Christ-call is to good and right living; a peculiar people, singled out by their manner of worship in assemblies, by their loyalty to the emperor in matters of Cæsar, by their obedience to employers in matters of service, by exemplary conduct in matters of the home-life, by continuance in well-doing in times of stress and persecutions. Every day's experience, whether in prosperity or adversity, was to be an occasion of joy; for they were doing the will of God in Jesus Christ: It is in vain that we seek in these writings of Peter any world-wide mode of expression, such as we find in the cosmopolitan Paul. The environment of Palestine moulded Peter so far as his education was concerned. The close companionship, he held with Jesus, consecrated all his practical sense and resolute independence to the furtherance of faith in Jesus Christ, Son of God, who had risen from the dead. Our everyday man, who in these times seeks help in the toilings of his life, will place his hand in the hand of Peter and follow him in the way which Jesus led. The Theologian with his dogma-fetters will laud Paul; but their will-of-the-wisp vagaries, coming from Constantine-theology, fascinating as they are as mental fabrications, become shattered when they fall upon the rock-like practical religious faith of Peter. The theology of Paul will ever be stimulating to the educated Christian, but the Constantine and Mediaeval Pauline theology have had their value in days gone by; to-day they have ceased to be vitalizing forces in our strenuous life. We are on the eve of a new Pauline interpretation, which will open up a greater day for the Christian religion; but until this interpretation has been given us, the Petrine theology is the salvation of today's world, and it is summed up in these words, Serve God, Serve your rulers, Serve your employers honorably and for God's sake; Retain good morals in the family, in the state, in your own life; Believe in the Son of God, in His resurrection, in your own resurrection and in access to God the Father; and Wait in patience for the revelation of the glory of the sons of God.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT INDIA.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

(Concluded)

V. JAINS AND LOKAYĀTIKANS.

THERE were also two sects not included in the list of orthodox systems, but which yet exercised a very noticeable influence upon the readiness with which those systems were received into the minds of later generations. In religious heterodoxy (so-called by the major religions) the foremost was the Jain sect founded by Mahāvira an older contemporary of Buddha. Like early Buddhism it was a monastic religion which denied the authority and moral sufficiency of the Vedic traditions; and yet its greatest "heresy" was its difference with the Buddhists on the point of the soul's real existence, for the Jains emphasized that the soul's permanence in the cosmic frame is all that will enable it to still be a soul when it has survived this earthly vale of ignorance and the latter's incurred bondage of worldly illusion. This phase of positive psychology, as well as the defense of *free truth* against logical necessity (Nyaya), was, it seems from the Jainist practice commonly made, the prime business of their philosophy. It appeared in practically every argument favoring the Tattvika, the "real possession" or "true principles", which advocated their notion of what constituted absolute freedom of inquiry into a preconceived Reality (which, by the way, when compared with our western standards, seems about two-thirds irrational). . . . A good philosophical account of the principles and practices of the Jains may be found in Alfred F. R. Hoernle's "Uvāsagadasāo", published in Calcutta, 1890.

But with the Lokayātika, "those who turn to the world of sense", the foundation as well as most of the procedure was altogether different. Our sense-experience of Nature does not qualify us to hypothesize any sort of spiritual or psychic Over-Soul; even

individual souls are little else than tenuous postulates. The doctrine of empirical sentiency may have been less easily nullified or adequately opposed by the orthodox systems, but by arranging it into a philosophical and systematic form the materialists had a seemingly tenable position and the purely speculative intellectualism commonly held by the other Hindu thinkers was put to a more than merely negative exertion to refute it. The great majority of so-called refutations amount to no more than arguing that the Lokayätikan materialists must be considered Tarkikas, sophists or sceptics.

Another name for these materialists is Chärvakas, after a mythical ogre in the Mahabhārata on whom is placed the responsibility for this maddening heresy. But I think it is probable that some real historical character by that name lived about the time the doctrine took shape and perhaps shared in the ideas if not the establishment of this teaching. Nevertheless, it is claimed that in founding this school of philosophical materialism (presumably about three centuries before Kanāda's time) Chärvaka had the capable collaboration of Brihāspati, chaplain to the Vedic gods someone tells us, but at least a scholarly man whose doctrines are supposed to have been collected together and edited in the Bārhaspätya Sutra, a document long lost except for a few scattered quotations in not-always-reliable commentaries on the rival dārsanas or schools. It is perhaps only an etymological account of the school's name.

However, it remained for the most part a negligible movement until the advent of Makkhäli Gosāli, "the Sage with the Hairy Coat", who was possibly a contemporary of Pätanjāli. If the numerous accounts are reliable Makkhäli was an intellectual paradox; a sort of Timon who had faith in the efficacy of doubt, and whose cynicism was not grounded so much on vicarious pejorism as on the *crève-coeur* underlying all self-culture. The burden of practically all his inconsistent notions is given in one of the few remarks which have been preserved to us: "The human soul, as the Brahmans say, may very well be of an individual nature; but is no more than the best form to which our material parts have so far felt inclined. . . . There is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or vigor. . . . Beings are essentially material structures and are bent this way and that by their fate (Daiva, organism) and by their individual nature (Atmanya, selfhood)".

This sceptical sage was in no way ambitious to be a *custos morum* among his fellows, but admitted himself to be simply a Loka-

yätikan or "sense-world devotee". And yet in his doctrine that religion had its origin in the imposed notions of a few cunning priests, there was a two-thousand-year anticipation of an almost identical point of view remarked upon by the encyclopedic deists Diderot and d'Holbach in their theological doctrines.

VI. KRISHNA AND THE BHAGAVÄD—GITÄ.

Early in the first part of the second century B. C. when Asôka's ethical laws had become widely adopted into the customs of northern India and the Samkhya-Yoga philosophies were coming into vogue, that singularly inspirational poem called Bhagaväd-Gitâ or "Song of the Holy One" was first inscribed. The Vedantism which is now to be found here and there in its lines is the result of later interpolations, the last of which being made possibly about 200 A. D. Nevertheless it remains to us a poetic summary of the best and noblest teachings, consolations and exhortations to be derived from all the preceding religions and speculative philosophies from the earliest Upanishads to the latest Yoga Sutras. Garbe's German translation brings out the pure monism of its philosophy while Sir Edwin Arnold's English translation emphasizes the almost Christian tone of its religion and ethics.

However, its clearest value lies in the sturdy yet tender character of its great expositor and instructor, Krishna "the Adorable One", who takes human form and appears in time of dire need to Arjuna chief of chariots under the blind king, Dritarâshtra. With Krishna, a man in the moral whirlpool of war is in most urgent need of philosophic and righteous instruction; he must be taught and cautioned to see things in their true perspective, be faithful to divine truth and considerate of his highest ethical relations and duties. With Krishna, the *doctrinal* foundation for this instruction is to be had in the Samkhya's advocacy of an ontological dualism, of a mutually independent pair of realities, Brahma and Prakriti; and in the Samkhya-Yoga's two-fold manner of knowing truth—first, by the subjective means of the renunciative ability and immutable calm of Brahma; and second, by means of the meditation and concentrative intelligence of Purusha (individual soul) dealing objectively with Prakriti (external universe).

And yet on this latter point Krishna held that the Purusha and the Prakriti are but two elements in a more profound and *real* unity of the Cosmos. The *philosophic* foundation was that this monistic argument leaves no room for Purusha as an actual reality in the

universe, nor does it countenance any finite source of activity as adequate to attain any knowledge of truth nor hence any actual redemption from the misery of life. Purusha, as individual mind, is finite both in structure and in function; it operates in the limited zone of the conditional and relative; its whole art and apparatus is subject to the empirical laws of time and space, whence it becomes also subject to the Maya of sense-phenomena and the Avidya of trusting in their deliverances. In such case the Prakriti exercises the superior action; it acts on and tyrannizes over the Purusha which is thus rendered inferior, passive and weak when considered in relation to any real knowledge, practice of virtue, worship or freedom. The Purusha then is a fit ground for illusion and error. It is open to all manner of affection and disaffection, acting both irrational and immodest. It is perhaps so thoroughly affected by the wonders of the phenomenal world that it will try to "rationalize" its errors and illusions into a (specious) system of truth:—a point very shrewdly brought out in a philosophical play by Krishna's famous namesake, Krishna Mishra who flourished about 1150 A. D. In this play, entitled Prabôdha Chandrodâya or "Moonrise of Intelligence", *King Error* gives out results of mental illusion as points of philosophy, and is refuted only when the wisdom of Brahma is shown superior to the Hinyana (worldly wise) Buddha and the Hatha (materialistic) Yoga.

But in the Bhagavad-Gitâ Krishna is the "pure-tongued" spokesman who reaches far beyond this finitude of individual mind, looks through the sense-presentations of things and reads profoundly the deeper principles which underlie the pluralism of apparent reality. As against the notions of the Sarvâstivâdas or maintainers of all existent realities (one of the four Buddhistic Vaibhâshikas, a sect of "vernacular interpreters" supposed to have been founded by Rahula, son of Sakyamuni) a Krishna sees in these super-finite principles the one eternal Type of Divine Reality supreme over the separateness of individuality and the relational foist of human intellect. This Śupreme Reality is the ultimate fact of all being (Astitva, universal is-ness); not only of the real existence of the actual Universe as an omnipresent monistic root like the Paramatman of the Iswara-philosophers, but also of human beings and the imaginary beings which are supposed to inhabit the intermediary realms.

Ever since the time of the Samkhya Prarâchana or the "Samkhya philosophy preëminently established" (six lectures by Iswara

Krishnāna on Kapila's Samkhya Sutras), the great problem of humanity has been reduced to the single question of how to do away with the subtle difference, implied herein, between consciousness (which is finite and mutable) and being (which is super-finite and indestructible). The sure-footed manner of answering this question is perhaps the honest if not the only true reason why Krishna has been habitually considered by the old theopathic Vedists to be the eighth incarnation of Vishnu "the Worker" god of the ancient Hindu trinity.

Nevertheless, as we read the noble Song itself, we find that Krishna takes on the form of a charioteer in Dritarāshtra's army and lays down to the immediate attention of Arjuna a practical solution which aims to free humanity from its vicious circle of physical bondage and make the finite self-soul of man one with the boundless Soul-Self of Brahma. Like Vārdhamāna (c. 490 B. C.), one of the first Jain disciples and reputed successor to Mahāvira, teaching his true followers (the so-called Svetambāra Jains who were really "white-robed" Brahma-Buddhist ascetics) the ceaseless practice of stern resistance to the six leading obstacles to human freedom: Kama, lust; Krupa, anger; Maddha, pride; Matsāra, vindictiveness; Lokānyana, worldliness; and Lopa, greed;—Krishna also laid down the laws according to whose keeping mankind may be redeemed from its gross worldly pledge, the illusion, ignorance and passive error of individual existence. And by constant conformity to this functional redemption the soul of man may be rendered one with the positive activity of Brahma's universal Reality, his Immutable Goodness and his Self-Realizing function of control, balance, peace, perfection, and creative harmony in both the human and the divine realms. This condition or state of being is called Nirvana (non-void), the absolute equilibrium of Brahma himself; and yet it is a state of being which is quite possible of human attainment, for (in the eleventh and fourteenth songs) does not Krishna identify himself with the highest Brahm with an "I am it" revelation? Surely here was Jaimini's Sabdasruti personified.

Furthermore, Krishna might very well qualify to replace Varuna who, from the earliest Vedic times and long before the quasi-rationalism of the Upanishadic speculations, had been considered the most celestial god in the Hindu pantheon, the founder of the mundane moral order, its preserver in the conscientious heart of man, and the detector and forgiver of human error and transgression. It was in a similar capacity that Krishna served the practical

guidance of mankind in view of the possibility of the apotheosis of soul, of the identification of human and divine Intelligence. This possibility is founded on the three principal paths of human aspiration; positive action, faithfulness (love or devotion) and meditation-without-seed. Each of these paths is in turn to be directed and qualified by its degree of control, simplicity, and concentration of all our energies, physical, mental, and spiritual. Whence, with the proper application of attention and industry, these three paths are sufficient to lead the Seeker to the Holy Truth, the Divine Goodness, and the Spiritual Beauty of the Cosmos. Only in the efficiency of their constant pursuit do they become a means adequate to our glorious destiny.

Like Bhārata (the poet-sage of old who by his pious life and penance won the generosity of Sarasvāti, wife of Brahma, goddess of speech and music, and inventress of the Devanāgarī Sanskrit), Krishna rated the practical as more primarily important than the theoretical. He emphasized the point that to gain the positive power of the Paramātman or Supreme Soul-Self, the seeker must have ceaseless and tireless control over his petty, personal aims, desires and motives; that to attain the blissful state of Spiritual Love, Brahmabhākti or devotion to the Deity, the aspiring seeker must be simple and humbly pure of heart and mind, not self-assertive, luxury-loving nor possession-grasping, which are the worst perhaps of all human vices. In a nut-shell Krishna made it a practical necessity of the moral life that in order to be enabled to reach the highest ideal, the plane of Divine Wisdom and Spiritual Being, the aspirant must renounce totally and absolutely the oblique demands of the Manas or lower mind and its sensuous imagination. He must irrevocably turn away from this lower mind and embrace the higher, the Path of the Three Reasons, Triyatārkadhārma; like the true Jnanayogī he must constantly meditate on the eternal truth of Brahma's Reality, and concentrate all his energies to a focus on this 'threefold path to Divine Wisdom.

This is the life of Nirvana and Immutable Bliss as Krishna described it and to which he exhorted Arjuna in one of the world's greatest documents of religious instruction—the Bhagavad-Gītā. As the Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā system had been emphasized as the pattern for the only religio-philosophical life, so Krishnaism was soon looked upon as its peer, for here were practical ethical laws to supplement the bare theoretical chronicle of Reality. Where the Vedānta had been founded upon the hymnal aspiration of the Vedas and the

Upanishadic speculations, Krishna adopted the ground established by the Sutra writers and the ascetic sages of old, and based his religious education of man, not on mere ceremonial priestcraft and idle presumptions of finite acquisition, but on honest ethical construction, practical religious effort, and true ennoblement of soul.

RETARDED EVOLUTION.

BY H. R. VANDERBYLL.

IN THE May issue of *The Open Court* a splendid article appeared under the title, "Retarded Evolution", by T. Swann Harding. It is not my purpose to criticise the article in question merely for the sake of being critical. I heartily sympathize with Mr. Harding's main viewpoint. His ideas concerning healthy development of soul and intellect coincides with my own. But, somehow, Mr. Harding's article, to me at least, embodies not so much a statement as well as a question. That question is: why does the average man not like the things that are instructive to the mind and elevating to the soul?

It is a question which has been asked by all those who meditate on the mysttry of being and who love the beauties of the universe. It is also a question which has seldom been answered in an impartial manner. The emotions which a Chopin aroused in me once served as a standard that judged and condemned the apparently crude emotions of my fellow man. Goethe, Shakespeare, Emerson, brought out in somber relief the stupidity and the perverseness of the average man.

But the simple truth is, though our prejudice rather stubbornly refuses to recognize it, that man cannot be educated, coaxed, or threatened to like certain things. His likes and dislikes are part of his make-up. Or, better, they betray its nature. They roughly indicate how far along the road of human development the individual has traveled.

In this case, as in all problems touching on human existence, we must consider individuality. It is something which we do not consider enough. We admit that there are no two people alike. But we fail to see the fundamental truth of nature at which our admission hints. And we certainly retard our admission every time that we judge our fellow by ourselves, i. e., our mental, moral and artistic selves. For this is really what we

do when we think of our erring fellowman in connection with Emerson or Beethoven. *We* are the ones who seem to be capable of appreciating the great thinkers and composers, and it surprises *us* that the average man fails to appreciate them, and that he is not the least bit interested in what they wrote or composed.

Our likes and dislikes, however, whether they concern literature, music or recreation, roughly hint at a certain degree of human development. And there are as many degrees of human development as there are stars in the sky—a fact which we admit to be true in theory but not in practice. Theoretically, we divide humanity into races that represent different degrees of civilization. We dimly recognize that one nation belonging to a certain race is superior, intellectually, morally and artistically, to another belonging to the same race. Thus we place milestones along the road of human progress. We err, however, in that we do not line this road with an unbroken, closely packed row of such milestones. We do not seem to grasp that there are innumerable products of human evolution that gradually fill the intellectual and moral gap between ignorant, beastly John and brilliant, unselfish Harry.

The supreme mistake which we make in practice is that we do not consider individuality at all, with the exception perhaps of our own. We are deeply impressed with what *we* do, think, or like, and seem to take it for granted that it is possible and desirable that our fellow being does, thinks, likes or dislikes as we do. And so we send missionaries to savages to present them with a religion which is absolutely foreign to their nature and understanding. Not merely this! We actually ignore the existence of stepping stones between the savage and the genius—stepping stones of intellectual and moral development. We would present a heterogeneous humanity, with a billion degrees of brain-development, with a single religion. It's impossible, of course, as facts clearly prove.

But not only religion, also literature and music, painting and art in general, would we choose for and force upon our fellow being. Fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, we are never successful in an undertaking of this sort. We generally end with bitter criticism or condemnation, realizing inwardly that we are face to face with a hopeless task. If we could only realize that thoughts, ideals, conceptions of beauty, reveal the inner man, the mysterious personality which is evolving, should we not then be more willing to let nature take its course? Or should we conclude

that evolution in many cases is slow and sluggish, or that its progress has been retarded in some inexplicable manner?

I think that such a conclusion can only be forced upon us by our impatience, by our ardent desire to see humanity on a single intellectual and moral level, which also is our own. Impartial observation and reasoning should impress us with the fact that evolution, which is the deity's eternal weaving of the web of existence, must be beyond reproach and above criticism. There is only one present possible. It is here, now. To imagine a different present than the one existing is to imagine the gross imperfections of the nature of that which is perfect.

Evolution never jumps. It follows the alphabet of creation in a mathematical and logical manner. If to-day it says *a*, then tomorrow it will say *b*, not *x* or *z*. Humanity does not consist of blackguards and saints, of savages and genii. There are innumerable intermediate stages of human development that link these extremes. Between ignorance and wisdom, how many different combinations of ignorance and wisdom can be found? Immorality and morality meet almost imperceptibly. And likewise in music, there are instances where the naked rhythm that charms the savage blends with melody to produce music. In poetry this rhythm becomes the background against which the sublimity of thought must loom up.

The closer man is to the savage state, the cruder and the more primitive are his thoughts, his morals, and his art. If we have had an opportunity to dive into the depths of humanity, we must confess that quite a bit of the savage is still clinging to us. Manicures and tailor-made clothes cannot hide that fact. And the sort of music that we like, or the books that we love to read, or the nature of our recreations, will reveal it. Judging from the indifference displayed by the average man towards the great writers, thinkers and artists, humanity is not as remote from the savage state as we sometimes fondly dream. We have but to analyze popular literature, music, or recreations, to find the primitive in man hidden in a veneer of modernity and civilization.

How does the savage in man express itself? In love for self, in intense self-centeredness. In pre-historic times when evolution operated through simpler channels the *belly* was the individual's main concern. His feelings were reached through his stomach, and his mental life, his art, and his feasts were founded on appetite. To-day it is ME which concerns the individual most. And so long as this thought for and of ME is all-predominant, true civilization

is still in an embryonic state. When I stated that there are as many degrees of human development as there are stars in the sky, I had in mind the innumerable degrees of love for ME which we encounter. It is what evolution secretly tries to moderate, this originally intense self-centeredness. Its gradual destruction means growing enlightenment, increasing knowledge of the universe, greater appreciation of and love for beauty.

The most intense self-centeredness we find in the savage, the least intense in the highly developed human being. If we so desire, we may penetrate beyond the domain of man into that of the animal kingdom and find a still deeper darkness enveloping the individual. Further than this, we may consider the vegetable kingdom, say, a tree. There it stands, rooted in the soil, its limbs reaching towards the warm sky, utterly unaware of the existence of an infinite, many-membered universe. It is only sensitive to the impressions that benefit or harm its being, such as are caused by the sun, by the wind, by rain.

On a higher level of evolutionary development, among human beings, we find impressions that reach the individual from the external world limited to just a few that immediately concern his ME. Such a person is undeveloped. His being is surrounded by darkness, and the one thing of which he is constantly aware is his ME. Impressions and emotions are few and unvaried, experience is of a simple and uniform nature, and knowledge of the universe is of course almost completely absent. We find his particular degree of development revealed in his thoughts, his actions, his likes and dislikes, his loves and hates.

The being of the little self-centered person is highly sensitive to impressions from the external world. An infinite universe exists to him, stirs his soul, arouses his intellect. To him exist, as a consequence, mystery, thought, knowledge, emotion, experience, sadness, beauty. We admire him on account of the astonishing absence of thought of self in him, on account of his utter devotion to science, to art, to philosophy, or to humanity. We praise him for his intelligence, his goodness, his unselfishness, his great love for beauty. But there is no praise due him. His intellectual, artistic or moral qualities belong to him as perfume belongs to the rose. They are the necessary expressions of his particular being.

Here is the point that I wish to emphasize. No man is ultimately responsible for the manner in which he expresses himself in life. The simple truth is that he is not the author of his being.

The emotions that penetrate into his soul do so because his soul is what it is. The thoughts that awaken in his brain are determined by the quality of his gray matter. We unthinkingly wish that our neighbor would devote himself to the study of the philosophers, that he would read serious and mind-cultivating literature. These days, opportunity for intellectual development presents itself almost everywhere. And why then does he not avail himself of that opportunity? Perverseness, we say, or indifference, or laziness. Nothing of the kind! He turns his back to opportunity because he does not recognize it. It is not opportunity to him and for him. It offers intellectual development which is not required by his particular intellect.

Give the fishes their water, and the birds their air! Milk for babies, and meat for the grown man, says the Bible. Also, render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. Allow the individual being its corresponding expressions of ignorance or wisdom, of ugliness or beauty. If knowledge be a pearl, shall not he who is incapable of assimilating it trample upon it, if not viciously then at least blindly? Was it not Jesus, the Christ, who fully recognized and considered the limitations of man as an individual being? His disciples were carefully chosen by Him. And if we translate the symbolic and poetic language of the Bible into plain, modern English, we read that He addressed them as follows: "Gentlemen, you are fortunate in being able to grasp the mysteries of the universe. I, your teacher, therefore speak to you plainly, calling things by their right names, acquainting you with all that I know. But the average man is incapable of understanding such matters. For that reason do I speak to him in parables. He will extract from these parables such truth as his brain is able to digest."

There is a very, very old saying: Where there is a pupil, there is a teacher. This saying embodies one of the most marvelous laws of life, viz., the law of intellectual and moral supply and demand. What most of us do not realize is that the things needed for the immediate development of our intellect and of our soul are scattered through life and through the universe. The fact to which we are completely blind is that the human being himself, in most cases unknowingly, from that unlimited supply picks the very things needed for his immediate intellectual, moral and spiritual development. The supply in question consists in many instances of experience with its resulting impressions and emotions. In other instances it is represented by books, teachers, music. In short,

contact with life, ultimately with the universe, is what develops the human being.

Experience teaches us daily, yearly, and has taught man through all the ages, that action, thought, likes and dislikes, cannot be prescribed for the individual. Yet there are teachers, it will be remarked, instructive books, and other instruments of education and development. So there are. But whether there shall be a pupil depends entirely on the nature of the individual whom the teacher desires to teach. Our pride in the successful conversion of a human soul to higher and better things is pardonable. However, if credit be due the teacher, an equal amount of credit is due the pupil. For it is the pupil who creates the teacher and not the teacher the pupil. The pupil being what he is, mentally and morally, demands the teacher's instruction for his immediate development were he representing either a higher or a lower degree of intellectual and moral development, the teacher should have nothing to teach him.

There are, of course, many such teachers whose words fall on deaf ears, either because they are above or below the average development of their audience. They have an audience nevertheless, to whose minds and souls their thoughts and ideas are necessary tonics. Souls and intellects are not alike: they are similar. They differ in degree of development. Hence many religions for many groups of souls that huddle together on certain sections of the road of human progress. Each religion reveals the average development of its worshipper, and furnishes the sort of intellectual and spiritual food which his nature demands. Take it away from him, his religion, and what will you give in return? A better one, one more closely approaching truth? He shall refuse it, with a shrug of the shoulders, or he shall pronounce it of the devil. A Dutch saying has it, that the peasant does not eat what he does not know.

And so we can never hope for a single literature for a single humanity. There are all sorts of written things for all sorts of people. What one person likes, the other does not like. Such likes and dislikes are determined by what a person is, fundamentally. They tell you how far evolution has progressed in moulding his particular being. His literature is the language that he speaks. Address him not in a language foreign to him! And the music which he likes is the song of his soul. Give him different music, and you produce a discord!

But because there are many people who love foxtrot music

only, and who limit themselves to the reading of cheap literature, we should not conclude that they are the representatives of a retarded evolution. We are tempted to arrive at such a conclusion because we know of Chopin and Beethoven, Goethe and Emerson, and because we are able to appreciate their genius. But the leaders of the human race do not point an accusing finger at evolution, no more than Jesus, the Christ, embodied a living condemnation of the entire human race. On the contrary, they hint at the definite plans of evolution concerning the moulding of the individual. They furnish us with an idea regarding the nature of some of the materials to be used by her in her future moulding process. As evolution, however, is a slow and gradual process, and not a series of spontaneous creations, we may not expect either of the present or of the future to produce nothing but lovers of Emerson and Beethoven. The clay which the mysterious potter is kneading at present is coarse or refined or of intermediate quality. And a long, long time will be required before the coarse clay shall have been manipulated sufficiently to produce a high-grade vessel.

Human society, moreover, would be an impossibility were every one of us capable of appreciating and understanding the great artists and thinkers. Society needs its rag-time lovers and prize-fight fans as well as its pilgrims to the shrine of a Beethoven. The community must consist of members who represent different degrees of development in order to be a community. For the activity of the member, as well as his literary and artistic taste, express what he is, fundamentally. And he is usefully active in behalf of the community in accordance with the nature of his being. It would be a calamity to business if the businessman were constantly pondering over the mysteries of existence. Neither Mr. Harding nor I would write the kind of articles that we write were we businessmen at heart.

No, there is nothing wrong with evolution. Evolution works on individual cases, and cannot be expected to raise a heterogeneous mass of humans to a common high level of development. There must be degrees of development lest the community perish. There must be degrees so that each member of society, being usefully active in accordance with his nature, may contribute towards preserving the whole. It is for that reason that man cannot coax evolution to work faster, to skip a few stages of her moulding process. Human evolution is first of all *in* man, not outside him. Man evolves himself, merely by being what he is, and by rubbing

gently or violently against life, nature, the universe. The manner in which the external world shall impress him depends entirely on the nature of his being.

There is an average development, of course, lying midway between the lowest and the highest. It expresses average thought, average ideal, average moral, average taste. It not only expresses these things, but demands them. Rag-time music and religions are made by man. He permits their existence by patronizing them. Governments, good or bad, are not forced upon him: he tolerates them. Thriving newspapers and magazines owe their success to the fact that they supply something which the average man wants. Leagues of nations are failures because average humanity has not developed sufficiently to desire them.

Unhappy the man who imagines that he can give man what he does not want!

Unhappy Wilson who foolishly and vainly tried to raise the level of development of the human world to his own regions of idealism! Unhappy "Tiger" of France who continued to hear thunder and war when the average man had sickened of the noise! Unhappy any man who gives his best mind and soul for the vain purpose of influencing the activities of wise evolution!

That we are compelled to let nature take her quiet and wise course, should not be a source of discouragement to us. If we are observant, we do not merely notice progress in individual cases, but we see average development reaching out for higher and better things. Here in California, which is my home, such groping for the ideal is very noticeable. Mr. Harding being a lover of music, I shall refer to this subject. In the City of San Francisco there are innumerable cafeterias where the seventy-five-dollar-a-month clerk eats his frugal lunch. Many young patrons cannot afford to spend more than twenty-five cents for their meal. However, there is music with their meal, which is an attraction. The nature of the music is surprising. There is a great deal of Wagner, of Schubert, of Schumann. There is also an occasional splash of ragtime, of course.

There are moving picture halls in that city—admission twenty-five and fifty cents—where a fifty-piece orchestra plays beautiful Sunday morning concerts. None of the great composers is omitted from the program. Again, occasionally, a rag-time piece is offered. The same procedure is being followed every Sunday in Golden Gate

Park—classical music with a dash of foxtrot—where the immense crowds of listeners would suggest the existence of a city of lovers of good music.

Such symptoms must seem encouraging to the good-music lover. They reveal the fact that the average soul is gradually becoming finer strung, and that feeling and emotion are in the process of evolving. Nor should it be imagined that circumstances, conditions and surroundings retard or alter the course of evolution. That which is in a man will express itself in spite of external conditions. I know of a department of a local oil refinery where four of its fifteen employes are thoroughly acquainted with classical music. The man who runs the air-compressors has heard most of the world's famous singers and pianists. On the graveyard-shift, when things happen to be dull, discussions take place on chemistry, physics, astronomy, philosophy, that would startle the superintendent, were he able to hear them.

On the whole, I find the moving finger of evolution more visible among average men than among the wealthy and so-called educated people. The *people* of America are evolving visibly. I have no doubt about it. And that they have already evolved beyond the intellectual and moral level of the average European man will be revealed by a close study of the people on both sides of the Atlantic. I do not deny that great intellectual and artistic geni were and are being produced in Europe. I honor them in silence, and greedily accept the gifts of truth and beauty which they offer to the world. But these men are like mountain summits rising high above the level land, their peaks hidden in an impenetrable mist. The intellectual gap between the European worker and the European leaders of thought and art is too immense. The same thing cannot be said about the American people. Perhaps it is true that Emerson should be read more widely. But I have found many of Emerson's thoughts in the minds of plain, common people who had never read his essays. I have seen those people *live* their thoughts. And I have come to the conclusion that the *average* development of the American people is higher than that of any other people. Why should this not be so? Evolution surely finds favorable conditions on American soil for the purpose of producing a better race. If my contention be true that higher human development means a less intense degree of self-centeredness with its corresponding expressions of broad-mindedness, unselfishness, and love for knowledge, shall we not

naturally seek this development here? The vastness of the country, the struggles with and the conquests of nature, the various thoughts and emotions contributed by immigrants, are not these things harmonious with the presence of a broadminded, generous people?

MISCELLANEOUS.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

DEVIL STORIES: AN ANTHOLOGY. Selected and Edited With Introduction and Critical Comments. By *Maximilian J. Rudwin*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921. Pp. xx-332. Price: \$2.50 net.

Starting from the supposition that in all the regions of mythical imagination "the Personality of Evil has had the strongest attraction for the mind of man", the author of this book, well known to our readers through a number of diabolistic studies which he has been contributing to *The Open Court*, has started the publication of a remarkable series of volumes on the various aspects of diabolical literature to be issued under the general heading of *Devil Lore*. Of this series the present collection of devil stories is the first.

The twenty tales brought together between the covers of this book have been taken from many lands and languages and represent a wide range of satanic tradition and lore. They extend from the Middle Ages to the present day and are from the literature of Italy, Spain, France, Russia, Germany and other countries as well as from that of England and America. A number of the stories are familiar to the ordinary reader, although the greater part is out of his reach in any other edition. It is, however, the conception of such a compilation that makes it unique. For the first time has the vague and varied diabolical literature been presented in a convenient and comprehensive collection. The author has approached a new and hitherto unanthologized field. A book of this sort has never appeared in English or in any other language, for that matter. This effort is particularly interesting now in the contemporary vogue of supernatural and psychical subjects. But while the interest in ghost-stuff, which is now being thrust upon the reading public, is an indication of the revival of superstition, the interest in Devil Lore is to be accounted for on other and far more romantic grounds.

The selection is judicious. In this wonderfully interesting collection of short stories you will find many masterpieces of mirth and marvel, of mystery and magic. As to the quality of the stories—the names of their writers fully guarantee their literary value. The list of the authors is the roll-call of the masters of fiction. Among the names are Machiavelli, Maupassant, Daudet, Baudelaire, Anatole France, Fernán, Caballero, Gógol, Górký, Thackeray, Richard Garnett, Washington Irving, Edgar Allan Poe, and John Masefield.

In addition to the interest in good stories well told, an opportunity is offered, as they rub shoulders in this book, for observation of the different aspects in which the devil has been viewed by the various authors. For each story reflects the personal, national and temporal traits of its author. This collection of devils are the self-portraying creations of their authors, their countries and their times. It is interesting to learn how the personification and presentation of evil will draw out the most hidden thoughts of man. Washington Irving's Old Scratch is a typical New Englander, while the devil of Poe is redolent of the Southern soil. Gógol's fiend is as typically Russian as Hauff's is German, and he is as much of a Ukrainian peasant as Górký's is a melancholy, morbid Russian intellectual.

The collection opens with Oscar Francis Mann's highly poetical tale "The Devil in a Nunnery", a modern version of a medieval legend. The Devil enters a convent, disguised as a pilgrim, and plays on his "cithern" for the entertainment of the nuns. Slyly he drifts into the most voluptuous music and the nuns are overcome with memories, memories that should be dead. The effect is so disastrous that a fast is ordered as expiation for the next day. The next story is "Belphegor, or The Marriage of the Devil" by Niccoló Machiavelli, who was himself regarded in England as an incarnation of the Devil. The story opens in the infernal regions. The judges in hell are perplexed. Almost every man that arrives complains that his wife was responsible for his downfall. They wish to be fair in pronouncing their sentences upon the sinful men, and appoint a committee of one to investigate the matter. Belphegor is delegated to go up on earth, stay there ten years, get married and come back and report. What happened to this poor devil in his matrimonial adventures will have to be read in full to be appreciated.

Of the other less familiar stories "The Devil's Round", translated from the French of Charles Deulin, and prefaced by a note of Andrew Lang, is a jolly tale about golf as played in Flanders in olden days. Dr. Richard Garnett's "The Demon Pope" is an excellent humoresque on popery, and his "Madam Lucifer" represents the devil in the unenviable role of a henpecked husband. In Fernán Caballero's "The Devil's Mother-in-Law" the poor devil is as helpless against this marital appendage as most mortal men. The American story "Devil-Puzzlers" by F. B. Perkins is a satire on woman's wear. The devil loses a wager, after guessing the most difficult metaphysical puzzles, because he cannot tell which is the front of a woman's hat.

The stories have been arranged in strictly chronological order to show how permanent and persistent has been the appeal of this puissant personage to the story writers of all times and of all tongues.

The texts have been most adequately and accurately edited, and the book is almost wholly free from typographical errors.

The Introduction presents in succinct form the evolution of the idea of the Devil through the history of literature. It is most interesting to follow the author in his differentiation between the medieval and the modern devil. The latter "differs from his older brother as a cultivated

flower from a wild blossom". The Satan of the romantics, the author holds, is "the symbol of the restless, hapless nineteenth century". To quote further from the author's definition of the New Devil:

"The Spirit of Evil is better than he was, because evil is no longer what it was. Satan, even in the popular mind, is no longer a villain of the deepest dye. At his worst he is the general mischief-maker of the universe, who loves to stir up the earth with his pitch-fork. In modern literature the Devil's chief function is that of a satirist. The fine critic directs the shafts of his sarcasm against all the faults and foibles of men. He spares no human institution. In religion, art, society, marriage—everywhere his searching eye can detect the weak spots."


Last but not least in the volume are the critical comments on each story. These Notes deal with the Devil in myth, tradition, institution, belief and custom, art, music and literature. In them may be seen the amazing breadth of the author's researches in seeking material. These Notes will be of great value especially to the students of the supernatural in literature, to whom the volume is dedicated. But even the average intelligent reader will derive much pleasure and profit from them.

The author has highly specialized in his field of study, and is internationally known, through his many books and magazine articles, as an authority on the supernatural and diabolical in literature.

The book is wholly free from controversial or compromising matter. It contains nothing to offend moral or theological sensibilities. It is strictly *virginibus puerisque*. The author may be commended for the delicacy with which he has handled this difficult matter. There is great danger in the attempt to bring under critical analysis any phase of religious belief, and especially a phase of this sort, that the method of treatment may appear unsympathetic, if not irreverent. To the credit of Dr. Rudwin be it said that his treatment of the subject leaves nothing to be desired. The objectivity and impersonality, to which the readers of this journal are accustomed in the author, stood him in good stead in his preparation of this book.

A word may be said in conclusion in regard to the appearance of *Devil Stories*. The book has properly been wrapped in red jackets and bound in cloth about which also hovers a glow of deeply smouldering infernal fires. This is wholly in keeping with the motto from Heine placed on the title-page,

"Mortal, mock not at the Devil,
Life is short and soon will fail,
And the 'fire everlasting'
Is no idle fairy-tale."



HENRI-FREDERIC AMIEL.

Frontispice to The Open Court.

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HENRI-FREDERIC AMIEL, 1821-1881.

BY LEWIS PIAGET SHANKS.

NOT often are we called upon to record the centenary of a school teacher. It is a melancholy fact that the teacher passes like the musician or the actor—though hardly so noisily; and even were he a clarion voice as well as a storehouse of the world's experience, his reputation dies with the memory of that voice. To leave more than a bronze tablet on a wall is given only to the scholar, the actor-dramatist, the musical composer: *litera scripta manet*. But the professor of whom we speak left no monument of scholarship and no mark as a teacher; while the half-dozen little volumes of verse which he offered to the Muses fell one by one into oblivion, silently as autumn leaves in some frozen abyss of his native Alps.

Henri-Frédéric Amiel was the child of autumn, fated to suffer from her early frosts. Born at Geneva, the twenty-seventh of September, 1821, a son of French parents and a grandson of Huguenot refugees, he was destined to lose his mother at the end of 1832, his father in mid-autumn of the second year after, and to grow up, in his uncle's house, apart from the sisters he dearly loved. Yet the education given him was lacking in nothing that seemed needful to develop a talent already manifest; he traveled for many months in Italy and France; he spent four years in Germany, at Heidelberg and in the University of Berlin. At twenty-eight he returned, half-loath, to Geneva, won a *concours* for a vacant chair in the Academy, and there for more than thirty years he taught philosophy, publishing at intervals several short essays and the books of verse mentioned above. Never married, knowing the joys of a family life only in the house of his sister—where he lived for eighteen years—a valetudinarian and a solitary, with few intimates, wholly unrecognized by cultivated Genevans—who classed

him with the radicals to whom he owed his appointment—he knew all the isolation of the professor, and died as he had lived, obscure. But he left a journal of 17,000 pages, which friends reduced to a thirtieth of its bulk and published as he had directed; another friend, the eminent Swiss critic Scherer, prefixed to this selection the essay which planted on an humble grave the laurel of posthumous fame. Given to the world immediately after his death, Amiel's *Fragments d'un Journal Intime* prove both the positive value of friendship and the potential value of isolation.

I.

All confession is interesting, if the writer have the gift of original thought, or vivid sensations, or imaginative style. Endowed with all these gifts and fusing all in the glow of a high spirituality, Amiel fascinates and absorbs the mind curious of other minds. For such readers indeed he lives again in his diary, more real and more convincing than the personality of many a living friend. Although a tragedy of impotence, this record is so full of poetry, so full of pathos in its self-acknowledged weakness, so imbued with idealistic yearning, so heroic in its pictured battle with encroaching infirmity, that it cannot leave unimpressed even those of an opposite temperament, as we may see in the case of Matthew Arnold. Amiel's was a mind too fine ever to attain popularity, were it possible thus to estimate genius. But happily we have not quite reached the age when pint-measures may use the right of majorities to reject all that they cannot individually contain.

The *Journal Intime* is the mirror of a soul, a soul of especial distinction, and absolutely sincere. Except in Rousseau's Confessions, we have nowhere else in modern literature so careful and unsparring a "portrait of the writer". A philosophical spirit, Amiel naturally paints a psychological likeness, and the dairy form gives us progressive "states" like those of an etching. Let us try to exhibit the first "state", to see this portrait at thirty, before the burin of fate and the aquafortis of thought have ploughed the lines of failure there. This is the moment when he returned from Germany, "loaded down with knowledge", as Scherer describes him, "but carrying his burden lightly; charming in physiognomy, animated in conversation and without affectation. Young and alert, he seemed to be entering upon his career as a conqueror", to hold all

the keys to the future. What lay behind this brilliant exterior may be seen in the Journal.

He came back from Berlin aflame with philosophic idealism, dazzled by the infinite vistas of Hegelian thought, rapt in the august serenity of days when, rising before the dawn to study or meditate, he would light his lamp and go to his desk as to an altar. There, he aspired to "look down upon life and himself from the farthest star", to view the world *sub specie aeterni*, secure in the consciousness that he too is a part of infinity. But in Geneva he found an atmosphere far different from that of university days, an atmosphere which would have chilled had it been free from all hostility. And Amiel, never physically robust, was quick to feel discouragement. Four days after his examination he writes—possibly in doubt as to its issue: "I have never felt the inward assurance of genius, or a presentiment of glory or happiness." This is for him a sign of his incapacity; his part in life is "to let the living live and draw up the testament of his mind and his heart", in a diary which may at least justify that life to posterity.

Yet to him, as to all of us, ambition called. Musing on the death of great men he had known, he heard the summons of fate to mount the rostrum in his turn. The expedient of a journal was but a compromise with his divided impulses, a compromise between the artist and the philosopher. It was the sort of postponement of hard creative effort one expects from the latter, living his real life in books; with Amiel, the philosopher's passion for speculation involved a veritable horror of action. Believing that "every hope is an egg which may bring forth a serpent instead of a dove", he finds reality "repugnant or even terrifying, and the life of ideas alone sufficiently elastic, immense, and free from the irreparable." The absolute poisons all attainment which falls short of his dream: "what might be, spoils for me what is, what ought to be, fills me with sadness."

Thus the idealist justifies a real defect of character, resting upon a deeper cause. For like all the imaginative who are not gifted with something of Balzac's gross sanguine exuberance, Amiel was at heart timid—though he does not admit the word. "I have no trust in myself, no trust in happiness, because I know myself." To know oneself too well at twenty-seven may prove intellectual acumen, but it means despair. The physical force of youth gives merciful spectacles of rose-color to most men's eyes, or the world

would cease to exist. Not so with Amiel. "All that compromises the future or destroys my inward liberty, all that subjects me to things, or that assails my notion of a complete man, wounds me to the heart, even in anticipation." Finally, the boundary of thirty passed, he comes out frankly. "Responsibility is my nightmare. To suffer through one's own fault is a torment of the damned, for grief is envenomed by the sense of the ridiculous, and the worst of that sense is to shame one in one's own sight." Yes, as he says, he expiated his privilege of viewing as a spectator the drama of his life, of watching his rôle upon the stage with the passive self-detachment of a mind familiar with the whole tragedy, a mind in the confidence of the Author. He will not act in order to preserve his freedom, but of what use is a freedom save by abstention from living?

We must not, however, dwell too long upon the shadows of the portrait. This is no misanthrope, cloistered in selfishness, but a man of heart and sense, vibrant to all the manifold beauty of life, and describing his impressions with the warmth of a poet. Like Faust, he loves to refresh a soul weary of thought in a bath of nature; the dawn and the night alike speak to him; dewy sunrise gives its translucent energy to his mind, the starry sky of midnight tells him of the infinite of his constant pursuit. Some of these pages are prose-poems. "Walked half an hour in the garden in a gentle rain", runs one of them. "A landscape of autumn. Sky hung with grey enfolded in various tones, mists trailing over the mountains of the horizon, the melancholy of nature. The leaves were falling on all sides like the last illusions of youth beneath the tears of irremediable grief. A brood of chattering birds were chasing each other through the shrubberies, and playing games among the branches, like a knot of hiding schoolboys. The ground strewn with leaves, brown, yellow and reddish, the trees half stripped, wearing tatters of dark red, scarlet and yellow, the shrubs and the bushes growing russet; a few flowers lingering, roses, nasturtiums and dahlias with dripping petals, the bare fields, the thinned hedges, the fir-tree alone vigorous green, stoical—eternal youth braving decay—all these innumerable and marvelous symbols which forms, colors, plants and living beings, the earth and the sky, offer unceasingly to the eye which knows how to look: all seemed to me filled with charm and significance. I held a poet's wand and had but

to touch a phenomenon to have it tell me its moral symbol. Every landscape is a state of the soul."

His attitude toward nature is in fine a romantic one: in most of these pictures one discovers the observer's mind, with its joy or its pain or its self-questioning. His sympathy with nature is not all-sufficient: at thirty, the approach of May fills him with the languors of adolescence. "This morning the poetry of spring, the songs of the birds, the tranquil sunlight and the breeze from the fresh green fields—all rose within me and filled my heart. Now everything is silent. O silence, thou art terrible! Thou showest us in ourselves abysses which make us giddy, needs never to be satisfied. . . . Welcome tempests! Welcome the storms of passion, for the waves they left within us veil the bottomless depths of the soul. In all of us, children of dust, eternity inspires an involuntary anguish, and the infinite a mysterious terror: they seem to us like the kingdom of the dead. Poor heart, thou cravest life, love, illusions; and thy craving is right, for life is sacred." All of Amiel is seen in this reaction to spring at thirty—the price he paid for his monastic intellectual ideal no less than its joys. For he continues: "In these moments of personal converse with the infinite, what a different look life assumes! We seem to ourselves mere marionettes, puppets playing in all seriousness a fantastic show, holding gewgaws as things of great worth. Berkeley and Fichte are right in such moments, Emerson too; the world is but an allegory, the ideal has more reality than the fact; fairy-stories and legends are as true as natural history, and even more true, for they are symbols of more transparency. The only real substance is the soul: consciousness alone is actual and immortal: the world is but a piece of fireworks, a sublime phantasmagoria destined for the soul's delight and education. Consciousness is a universe, and its sun is love."

He should of course have married—espoused an active affection instead of a journal which made him feel at times as abstract as its own pages. Instead of that he only plunged the deeper into study and meditation. The page continues: "already I am falling back into the objective life of thought. It delivers me—no, say rather it deprives me—of the inner life of feeling: reflection dissolves reverie and burns its delicate wings. . . . Ah! let us feel, let us live and not analyse for ever. Let life have its way with us. . . . Shall I never have a woman's heart to rest upon? a son in

whom I can live again, a little world where I can let all I hide within me come to bloom? I draw back in dread, for fear of breaking my dream; I have staked so much on this card that I dare not play it. Let me dream on."

It is an "ideal" love for which he is reserving himself—"the love which shall live by all the soul's forces and in all its fibres". Believing that only such a passion could fix and condense his hopes and energies, not finding in his feminine friendships this miracle of personal transformation, he waits, "calling for this grave and serious love", fearful of "mismating his soul." At thirty and in the materialistic eighteen fifties, he still cherishes the romantic dream of an elective affinity. In fact his whole mind is incurably dyed in Romanticism. His melancholy uses at times the very language of Lamartine; his pessimism that of Obermann. Amiel is at heart one of the disenchanted sons of Werther and René; like the French Romanticists, he is a Latin soul poisoned by too much cosmopolitanism—by too deep a draught of a heady Northern vintage, unfamiliar and toxic to one naturally a dreamer.

This heritage of Romanticism, no less than his idealistic longing is a cause of his spiritual isolation. Reaching maturity in the dawn of the Age of Science, when man dreamed of solving the riddle of life by the conquest of facts, he cannot take to his heart this new deity, illumined only by the cold white light of the *amor intellectualis*. He feels the need of a warmer ideal, the lack of a cult and a church wherein he may content his whole nature, in a communion no longer solitary. "My religious needs are not satisfied", he confesses, "they are like my need of society and my need of affection". He consoled himself by a manly resignation, evolving a sort of Christian stoicism. For Amiel the religious view-point alone could give dignity to life, energy for living. "One can only conquer the world in the name of Heaven". He means the victory of renunciation: even at thirty he shows the Buddhistic leaning so evident in his later years. "Human life is but the preparation and the way to the life of the spirit. So keep vigil, disciple of life, chrysalis of an immortal being; labor for your escape to come. The divine journey is but a series of metamorphoses ever more ethereal. . . . A series of successive deaths—that is the life divine."

Such is Amiel at the end of his third decade: a thinker and a poet; a man buried in self, yet ever seeking escape from feeling in the objective world of thought; a student and a dreamer, torn by

the poet's desire for expression, yet fearful of the limitations of cold print; a mystic and an idealist, absorbed in the Absolute and disdainful of all else: "nothing finite is true, is interesting, is worthy of fixing my thoughts." His youthful portrait is no figure to inspire commiseration: faults recognized may be corrected or at least subdued by a personal adjustment. Rather does he arouse our envy of his keenness, of his range of thought, of his imaginative power. Where else can we find pages of such a cosmic sweep? What would we not give to share his visions, "divine moments, hours of ecstasy in which the soul flies from world to world, unravels the great enigma, breathes as largely, easily and deeply as the respiration of the ocean, floats serene and limitless as the blue firmament"? At such times, it was his to know "the tranquil intoxication, if not the authority, of genius, in those moments of irresistible intuition when a man feels great as the universe and calm as a god!"

II.

An etching in the "first state", lightly sketched, ethereal, rich in possibilities, is a delightful thing, a thing to set one dreaming. But the "second state" is more significant, for thereafter lines can rarely be added to alter the expression of the drawing. What happens to our portrait of Amiel in the next ten years, so vital in every life? What new lines are added by the graver, what shadowy promises defined beyond all hope of change, by that long immersion in the corrosive acid of his thought?

The lines lacking were recognisable by the artist, although the portrait on his easel was his own. No illusion clouded the mirror of his introspective vision. Deficient in will, he might have found a substitute in imagination and its emotive force, as he in fact divined. "What seems impossible to us is often only a quite subjective impossibility. The soul in us, under the influence of the passions, produces by a strange mirage gigantic obstacles, mountains and abysses which stop us short. Breathe upon the passions and that phantasmagoria will vanish." But he feared passion for its bottomless gulf, its vertigo. "Our liberty floats wavering over this void which is always seeking to engulf it. Our only talisman is our concentrated moral force, the conscience." Timidity and a protestant conscience are the bonds of his inhibition.

His timidity it was that kept him from marrying, in his middle thirties, the muse so deeply regretted in the sonnet beginning: "Tout m'attirait verstoï".

Que n'eût pas fait alors ta tendresse, ô Sirène!
 De tout ce qui languit dans mon coeur soucieux?
 Ton amour m'eût donné tout, même le génie!
 Quand il venait à moi, pourquoi l'ai-je évité?
 Hélas! c'est un secret de tristesse infinie.
 L'effroi de ce que j'aime est ma fatalité:
 Je n'ai compris que tard cette loi d'ironie. . . .
 Le Bonheur doit m'avoir, tout jeune, épouvanté!

This was the one serious love of his life, regretted ever afterwards by the lover who had not dared to decide. But he celebrated the lady's marriage in fitting verses before he returned to his books, in a home where a sister's love and the presence of two little nephews mitigated his loneliness. After all it was a spiritual loneliness, and he knew now, that souls were in their inner essence, impenetrable to other souls. At forty, his solitary fate is sealed; he was to have many feminine friendships and yet remain a Platonist; even the loss of his home and the machinations of wily friends are of no avail. He notes in his diary: "I whose whole being—heart and intellect—thirsts to absorb itself in reality, I whom solitude devours, shut myself up in solitude and seem to take pleasure only in my own mind". According to his own confession, he has let his life be set upside down by his spiritual pride and his timidity; he is "a victim of that instinct of death which works continually to destroy that which wishes to live". He has become the slave of his Calvinistic denial of life.

Nor does the ideal task, longed for as ardently as the ideal mate, present itself to this temporiser, although these ten years saw the publication of two of his six little volumes of moral and philosophical verse. In the first are found a collection of *Pensées*—extracted from his journal—which had he known it, showed him his real path. Extended and given a more personal note, the note first struck by Rousseau and repeated *ad nauseam* in modern "confessions", these pages would have given him celebrity at once. But such a self-revelation during his life-time is impossible to imagine. "Quand le rêve est divin, la réserve est sacrée." The poet, like the

potential lover, fears to speak out. He devotes himself to technique, preferring short lines and intricate verse-forms, which provide difficulties to overcome and "turn his attention from his feeling to his artistry". Shy and timid, he can only "practice scales"; paralyzed by conscience in the guise of literary scrupulousness, he can only put off from day to day the masterpiece he dreams of. The analysis of his infertility concludes, sadly, "I can divine myself, but I do not approve of myself." The reader wonders if the epigram he sharpens against the presumption of so-called latent genius—"what does not come into being, was nothing"—shows confidence in destiny so much as a realization of a fancied mediocrity.

All confession is dangerous, even to a diary, for the mere act of giving expression to a fault in a way absolves. That is the price man extracts from his self-respect. When Amiel ascribes his terror of action to timidity and his timidity to an abuse of reflection which has destroyed his spontaneity, when he speaks of his vulnerability to pain, his incurable doubt of the future, his feeling of "the justice and not the goodness of God" (oh Calvinist!)—he does not forget a sort of idealist's apologia. "Might it not be", says the casuist, "might it not be at bottom my infinite self-respect, the purism of perfection (!) an incapacity to accept our human condition, a tacit protest against the order of the world, which is the centre of my inertia? It is the Whole or nothing, Titanic ambition made inactive through disgust, the nostalgia of the ideal, offended dignity and wounded pride which refuse all homage to things they feel beneath them; it is irony . . . it is mental reservation . . . it is perhaps disinterestedness through indifference . . . it is weakness which knows not how to conquer itself and will not be conquered, it is the isolation of a disenchanting soul which abdicates even hope. Our highest aspirations prevent us from being happy."

Even the word "weakness" is not too unflattering, provided it "will not be conquered". But why blame Amiel for any illusion which helped him to live? Would that the perception of his own subtlety, seen in the notes of October, 1853, had given him the illusions of vanity and confidence, saved him from always measuring his inferiority with others' accomplishment and urged him to write some book of objective scholarship. He did revise his lectures constantly, keeping up with all the new publications in both French and German, but metaphysics merely exaggerates faults like his, and increase of knowledge brings only sorrow. "La tristesse

soucieuse augmente", he notes so early as 1858. Finally the result of all this study and speculation, unmixed with any tonic creative effort, is for him a sort of evaporation of the self: he complains that yesterday is as distant as last year, that all his days are merged and lost in his memory, like water poured into a lake; he feels "stripped and empty, like a convalescent (who remembers nothing".) "I pass gently into my tomb, still living. I feel as it were the peace of annihilation and the dim quiet of Nirvâna. Before me and within me I experience the swift flow of the river of time, the gliding past of life's impalpable shadows, and I feel it with the tranquility of a trance". As he admits, this pleasure is deadly, it is slow suicide. So, at forty, he comes to the realization that self-criticism had not helped him as a literary training, (as he had hoped). Like Psyche's, his curiosity is punished by the flight of the beloved. The mind must work on things external or destroy itself. When he writes: "par l'analyse je me suis annulé", we may already divine the Amiel of five years later, surprised at his survival through all his disillusion. "And yet I read, I speak, I teach, I write. But no matter, it is as a sleep-walker may do". He is become a ghost in a world of living men.

III.

You have seen those etchings whose margins are enriched by a multitude of little sketches, expressive heads, exquisite glimpses of trees or lakes, wherein the artist records some personal truth or fancy of the moment. The "final state" of our portrait, with its deeply bitten shadows, the darkened face now turned towards eternity and lighted only by faith, with eyes resigned but still regretful of lost youth and its dreams, with lips set by a ten-year struggle against infirmity, may be for a time laid aside, in order to consider the cameos of criticism and landscape which distract the etcher's eye and mind from a portrait seen too closely. After all they prove his intellectual joys and his communion with nature; life is never so dark as one paints it in a library, in a student's cell. Life is never so hopeless as when one is examining one's conscience, and Amiel, re-reading a section of his journal, is surprised at the gloom he has diffused over the portrait. We must remember what he often tells us, that writing down his sadness dispelled it. Nor must we forget that other portrait of the philosopher-poet left us

by his pupil and biographer,*—the amiable old gentleman who loved to read poetry to his fellow-vacationers, and even to compose acrostics for the ladies. There was another resource against melancholy: "le plus petit talent peut être d'un grand bien". How much this love of versifying meant to him may be seen in the mere bulk of his volumes. Nor are they throughout so mediocre as has been asserted; his rhymed translations are faithful re-creations of the original; even his occasional verses are clever; and once, when the mailed fist of Prussia seemed to threaten his fatherland, in 1857, his inspiration gave the Swiss a national hymn, "Roulez, tambours". Not passionate enough to write many pages of real poetry, he found in the brief life of the dragon-fly and the fleeting glories of soap-bubbles symbols which fill him with a breath of genuine poetic feeling; one would like to quote the latter entire:

Perle que traverse le jour,
 Qu' emplit l'orageuse espérance,
 Au chalumeau qui te balance,
 S'enfle ton ravissant contour;
 Et tout un tourbillon de choses
 Roule en mon âme, et je revois
 Passer, comme aux jours d'autrefois,
 La ronde des métamorphoses. . . .

Bulles de savon, globes d'air,
 Illusions d'or et de flamme,
 Vous charmez l'oeil, vous touchez l'âme,
 Vous humiliez le coeur fier.
 Que faibles sont nos différences
 D'avec vous, hochets gracieux!
 Nous nous prenons au sérieux
 Et nous sommes des apparences. . . .

Et quand, sous un coup d'éventail,
 La bulle, s'ouvrant affolée,
 S'éparpille en une volée
 De sphérules au vif émail,
 Alors, sous les voûtes profondes
 Du ciel, où l'univers germe,
 Alors nous croyons voir Brahma,
 Brahma jouant avec les mondes.

*Mlle. Berthe Vadier: *Etude Biographique*, Paris, 1886.

It is true that he dallied overlong with difficult rythms, after the example of Gautier, but as he says, "réussir rafraichit, et créer met en joie". Had he written only for himself, he would still have found verse a greater consolation than his diary, for in the squirrel-cage of introspection the mind which stops to view its progress always finds itself at the bottom of the arc. The artist has, however, another mode of escape from hypochondria, as the journal shows. A country road, a glimpse of a city park, a tree drooping leafy branches over a red brick wall is itself a talisman if beheld with a poet's eyes. And such certainly were Amiel's. A June morning makes him joyous as a butterfly; never does he fail to note the coming of spring and his response to the rising sap. Even the year before he died, he sets down with delight the quality of the spring sunlight and air, the song of the birds, the special timber of distant sounds, a youthful, springlike note. "It is indeed a Renaissance. . . . The Ascension of our Saviour is symbolized by this flowering forth of nature in a heavenward aspiration. . . . I feel myself born again; my soul looks out through all its windows". Scarcely less loved are the effects of autumn, in which he distinguishes the vaporous dreamy landscape and the scene full of living color. This season tells him that he too is entering into the autumn of life, but that October also has its beauty. One is not surprised that a poet's pictures of summer are fewer, yet here is one which must be cited entire:

"Returned late beneath a deep sky magnificently filled with stars, while fires of silent lightnings flashed behind the Jura. Intoxicated with poetry and overwhelmed with sensations I walked slowly home, blessing the God of life and sunk in the beatitude of the infinite. One thing alone was lacking—a soul to share it with, for emotion overflowed from my heart as from a cup too full. The Milky Way, the great black poplars, the ripple of the waves, the shooting stars, the distant singing, the city with its lights, all spoke to me in a divine language; I felt myself almost a poet. . . . My God, how wretched we should be without beauty! With it, all is reborn within us, the senses, the imagination, the heart, the reason, the will. . . . What is happiness, if not this plentitude of existence, this intimate harmony with the life of the universe and of God?"

Many a page of the diary might be set beside this prose nocturne, for the night speaks to the philosopher no less than to the

poet. A star-filled sky is to him a concrete glimpse of the Absolute; he is "God's guest in the temple of the infinite", he feels the earth floating like a skiff beneath him on that ocean of blue." He marks the effect of cloudless moonlight on the mountains: "A grave majestic night. The troop of giant Alps is sleeping, watched by the stars. Through the vast shadows of the valley sparkle a few roofs, while the eternal organ-note of the torrent booms through this cathedral of mountains vaulted by the starry sky". He prefers the Alps wrapped in the glamour of rolling mists, as he prefers a rainy landscape or a day of silver fog. There he can enjoy a concentration of his timid personality, dispersed and annihilated under the flaming sunlight of midsummer afternoons. The everlasting onrush of nature's energy appals him; but how fine his picture of Lake Lemman, "serenely melancholy, unvaried, lustreless and calm, with the mountains and clouds reflecting in it their monotony and their cold pallor." The lake tells him "that a disillusioned life may be lighted by duty, by a memory of heaven", speaks to him of "the flight of all things, of the fatality of every life, of the melancholy which lies beneath the surface of all existence, but also of the depths beneath their moving waves". After all he is essentially elegiac, taking his pleasures in the romantic fashion, a little sadly. Is great sensitiveness ever joined to a bluff pagan virility? One must not ask a poet for incompatible qualities, and Amiel's harp is capable of effects unknown to the bards of bass-drum and bassoon.

In fine, nature is for him a book of symbols, vocal with meaning, plain to his inner vision. The hoar-frost in the November woods, turning the spider-webs among the fir-branches into little fairy-palaces, suggests to him the spirit of the Northern literatures, the vaporous lines of Ossian, the Edda and the Sagas. "Each element has its poetry, he says somewhere, "but the poetry of the air is liberty". He has the vision of a child—unblurred by use and wont; he has the sensitivity of the musician, and music is to him "a reminiscence of Paradise". There are some fine pages of musical criticism in the *Journal*; the best are certainly the comparisons of Mozart with Beethoven. These pages show clearly his nice balance between a love of classical form and a joy in romantic expressiveness.

But Amiel as a critic is better portrayed through his literary judgments, more numerous and of wider range. He would have made a successful critic, could he have forgotten philosophic love

of synthesis and abstraction long enough to clothe his admirable summaries with the flesh and blood we require in a portrait. His sympathies are very catholic; he possesses that faculty of intellectual metamorphosis, of entering into the soul of the writer, which he rightly calls the first faculty of the critic; he understands types so different as Montesquieu and Alfred de Vigny, penetrates alike the spirit of Goethe and Eugénie de Guérin. He shows the French love of form, of style—the classical inheritance—and knows half of LaFontaine's fables by heart. But he lays an unerring finger on the pompous artificiality of Corneille's heroes, puppets galvanised by rhetoric, "rôles rather than men". He prefers Racine and Shakespeare—a pairing which proves the breadth of his classicism. Significantly, he fails to mention Molière, being too subjective to enjoy the comic; his omission of Rabelais further evinces his delicacy of taste. Taste makes him conscious of the lack of elegance and distinction in that master of Swiss writers, Rousseau; hailing Jean-Jacques as a precursor in every type of literature, he indicts his work for its sophistry, its abuse of paradox and its morbidity. Paul and Virginia, on the other hand, or Lamartine's Jocelyn, make him thrill with tender emotion; at heart he is mildly Romantic. With all his generation he admires René, but not its author, and he blames Victor Hugo for his spasmodic eloquence, his lack of measure, taste and sense of the comic. To be merely dazzled or blinded does not impress him; he prefers the mountain to the volcano, the beautiful to the sublime, and Alfred de Vigny to the chief of the French Romanticists.

A similar type, one might object. But Eugénie de Guérin is also a similar type to his own, and with all his sympathy for her work Amiel finally rejects it for its narrow intellectual horizon. No, he loves Vigny for his classical reserve: sensibility does not bandage his eyes to the really great. He admires Goethe, especially in Faust which he calls the "spectre of his consciousness", but he cannot approve an Olympian egoism for which charity and love of humanity are non-existent. His taste finds repellent the algebraic stiffness and chemical formulas of Taine's style, but when he hears the Frenchman lecture he notes his qualities of simplicity, objectivity and love of truth. Taste makes him prefer Renan's more elegant pen, except when it touches the figure of Christ, and his constant moral preoccupation rejects all the literature of Naturalism for its cynical physiological attitude toward man and his ideals.

Taste leads him to prefer Art to Science, a fine page to the discovery of a new fact. But his taste is cosmopolitan, and dominated by pure idealism. A citizen of a republic, he points out relentlessly the moral levelling of democracy, characterizes equality as "a hate masquerading as love". His cosmopolitanism shows no preferences—the idealist can see the defects of every race. He has the independence of so many of the greater minds in small countries; he is never swept away by mass-judgments. Far from Paris and London and Berlin, the critic has the right of self-determination. If this timid dreamer failed in practical life because his love of liberty held him aloof from action, in his diary too that spirit of freedom glows as brightly as when it led his ancestors to a haven in Switzerland.

IV.

This is fundamental, and it explains Renan's failure to understand a writer who was after all French only in language and artistic preferences. Born in Geneva, Amiel is Genevan by a protestant conscience which insists on thinking for itself; and like Scherer, he remains a protestant even in his criticism. His philosophy and his cosmopolitanism—the impress of his travels and his study abroad—save him from the religious intolerance of Calvinism; he knows not the suspicion of others, the hard irony of his fellow-Genevan Rousseau. Both Amiel and Jean-Jacques lack the practical character of the typical Genevan: both are discontented idealists, descendants of those who from the sixteenth century gave to this city of refuge the name of "cité des mécontents". But his discontent is lifted above Rousseau's by a purer vision, a greater spirituality. Finally, both are Genevan in their lack of Gallic vanity and in that Swiss pride which quietly disdains opinion: both too are essentially and profoundly religious.

This is the side which comes ever more to the front as the Journal progresses to its end. However deeply he plunges into philosophy, seeking in vain a harmony of science and religion, despite his dallings with the nihilistic systems of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, he always finds a way to justify the faith and the revelation of God which he feels within. A protestant desire to solve for himself and with his own reason the riddle of the universe, a Celtic imagination which loves his *maladie de l'idéal* underlie in

him that German passion for speculation which repels his critics—a trait whose only value, Bourget remarks, is to show us how the mind spins from its own substance the spider-webs of a philosophic system. A Catholic, he would have escaped all this disquiet, felt no dread of responsibility, found his imagination satisfied and his heart at peace. Does he not criticise his church for its want of sympathy, of “*suavité religieuse*,” of mystical sense? A former Catholic, he would have fallen quietly, like Renan, into the Temple of Science and the joys of an intellectual dilettanteism.

But no! he must work out the problem personally, by the methods he has learned in protestant Prussia. And being a poet and a mystic, he often falls into the language of mysticism. With this, Matthew Arnold has little patience, and by the simple means of cutting from their context sentences almost untranslatable, contrives to present a portrait of the man which almost makes him a candidate for the mad-house. But it is palpably foolish to blame a professor of philosophy for thinking about his subject and for using its vocabulary; why should he not seek a living relation between the things he teaches and the life he has to live? Why should a philosopher refrain from philosophizing? One concludes that too many enthusiasts had asked Arnold if he had read Amiel, and that the aged critic resented their excessive praise. In any case Arnold did not read the book in his youth, so to condemn the fire of idealism which burns through the smoke of over-mystical pages. Those who came across the *Journal* in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century found in that heaven-mounting flame and smoke the symbol of their own spiritual inquietude, an inquietude common to every soul left stranded by “the bankruptcy of science.” From beyond the tomb Amiel spoke to the future, to the youth of a new generation, and to them he still speaks of a time no longer dream but memory.

For himself the vision was at once the torture and the joy of his life, and if he paid for it, as all things must be paid for, by moments of despair, this dream merged at last into the vision divine; he did not die unreconciled with God. His resignation, his consciousness of increasing infirmity, his very despair were but stages in his progress toward a final goal. He died in peace and without regret, like a stoic or a Christian saint. He sleeps now in that Infinite for which he thirsted; he is one with the earth which he loved in its tender April beauty and in the rich pall of its vintage

purple. He has proved the truth of the Spanish proverb that no evil lasts a century: *no hay malo qui dure cien años*.

He did not succeed in finding his literary form—the real touchstone of genius, and failing in this, lacked the crown of approval which confers the kingship of faith in self. But how many of his lesser brothers, how many of those who have vainly hitched their wagon to a star, are drawn to him by these almost lyric struggles of a poet's impotence? Success would have destroyed his self-doubt, made him a different man: and nothing is sadder than his '*omnis moriar*', three months before he died. But he was too clear-sighted not to see that destiny can shatter us by accomplishing our desires no less than by refusing them, as he tells us on the last page of his Journal. "He who wills only what God wills, escapes both catastrophes. Everything turns out to his good." The faith of his death-bed recalls Dante's line: "In la sua voluntad é nostra pace."

A failure? Perhaps all lives are failures judged in the light and glory of those youthful ideals which Amiel never quite laid aside. The practical man achieves only a practical success, and the pursuit of the practical pushed to its limits resulted in the world-war. Better than that—if we must choose an extreme—an impractical goal, a goal among the clouds, better even Nirvāna and the Wheel of Illusion, however such a search for the infinite be decried by Occidental pragmatists. Better to return now and again to Amiel, if one feel oneself in danger of forgetting the days when one knew how to dream, when one was capable of being touched by dreams like his.

JESUS THE PHILOSOPHER.

THE GREAT TEACHER WAS A MAN IN MIDDLE LIFE AND OF
PHILOSOPHICAL TEMPER RATHER THAN A RE-
LIGIOUS ENTHUSIAST BARELY TURNED
THIRTY YEARS OF AGE.

BY REV. ROLAND D. SAWYER.

WITH a thousand-fold more books written about Jesus than of any other figure in history, and with hundreds of thousands of preachers and teachers giving their lives to the study of his life, it at first seems venturesome to suggest any revolutionary teachings about the Great Galilean; but let us remember that theology holds its cramping hand on the minds of these many preachers and teachers, and over the authors of these many books. It is as recent as 1863 that the first book was written about Jesus, which treats him as an historic, and not as a theological, figure. Renan's *Life of Jesus* was the first attempt to interpret Jesus as an historical figure, and it had tremendous influence in reviving interest in Jesus as a real man among men. What we speak of as the Reformation made no study of Jesus; even as a theology, it created no Christology; it accepted the views of the church without question. Writers and teachers of the Reformed churches were theological rather than scientific in their aims, and we could expect no new light to come forth from their work.

Renan sketches the figure of Jesus as he found it in older writings, and he gives us a young, enthusiastic, religious leader of rare personal charm, who easily drew about himself sincere disciples. This Jesus was a poet, a dreamer, a seer, a sort of larger Shelley. In the main, scientific lives of Jesus since Renan, have followed his outline. The only variation has come from the socialistic lives of Jesus, where we see Him as a fiery, young revolutionist; a man of utter unselfishness, devoted to the ideal of freeing the oppressed; in the hands of this class of writers Jesus becomes a larger Robert Emmet, ready to go to the cross for the poor and weak.

Jesus was a poet, a dreamer; He was unselfish and willing to die for the poor and weak; and He was more than these things—He was a wise, well-balanced teacher; a man of over forty years, who had watched life closely, brooded, reflected, learned wisdom by patience and experience, and thus we have in Him not only the supreme literary genius, the hero to honor, we have in Him the teacher from whom we may learn forever; the philosopher who tells us of ourselves and our problems.

No one reading the gospels would for a moment think that the sayings therein collected and attributed to Jesus, were the words of a young man. They are not. They give us the mature thinking of a man of mature years; they are not unlike the words of the greater moralists and philosophers of classic Greece and Rome. The calm, patient treatment of the situation which Jesus uses in the incident recorded in Luke vii. 36-50, is that of the man of middle life rather than that of the young man. Most of what Jesus says is entirely un-natural if we think of him as a young man.

Again it is an un-natural thing for a young man to gather about himself a group of older disciples. All the teachers of ancient Hebrew-land, of Greece and Rome, were men of mature years, who gathered disciples who were younger. Probably the only disciple in Jesus' group, that was near His own age, was Peter; this perhaps accounts for the position of authority which Peter held.

And again Jesus is more than all other of ancient teachers, closely associated with women; they supported Him, were His friends and followers; His relations with these women seem to be such as we would find in a man of forty-five, rather than in a man of thirty.

The enthusiasm of radical German scholarship for the views of Weiss and Schweitzer quite led astray the scientific scholarship of the Christian world. These men held the view that Jesus was an enthusiastic exponent of Jewish Apocalyptic conceptions—that His own conception was to announce Himself as the Messiah and that the eschatological kingdom was at hand. It is evident that the Jewish followers of Jesus who originated the churches, shaped a gospel to preach, and edited the gospel records in the form we now have them, did believe that Jesus was the Messiah. But a careful and critical selection from the gospel-records of the words and ideas of Jesus, does not verify any such view. The original form of Matthew, as best we may reconstruct it, has no messianic con-

ception, but is a collection of lofty, moral philosophy and religious trust. And in Mark, which is probably little changed by later hands than the author, there is very little which connects Jesus with the Apocalyptic Messiah. And one of the sayings of Jesus, brought down without change apparently, (Mark xii-35) shows that Jesus rejected messianic conceptions as the Jews held them, and did *not* regard Himself as the Messiah. Such history of Palestine as we may find, and especially the works of Josephus, show to us that in Jesus' day there were varying streams of lives meeting in the best thought of the serious-minded. Roman religion, Persian cults, Greek philosophy, all had sent their ideas into the general stream. While the Hebrews refused to mingle their religious ideas with those of Romans and oriental cults and Greek mythology, yet how far they accepted Greek philosophical views is seen by the work of Philo and the Wisdom literature.

Jesus went with this group. He sought to modify prevailing Messianic conceptions; He thanked God that the larger light had been given Him, (Matt. xi. 27-29); He was a wandering philosophical teacher; His first followers were disciples, and while later followers taught Him as the Messiah, and put Messianic claims into their accounts of His sayings, it is quite evident from the writings of Justin the Martyr, and the Gospel of John, that there were many of His followers who still upheld Jesus the Philosopher, rather than Jesus the Messiah.

Freeing our minds from the theology of the early disciples, the church of the centuries, the pre-conceptions of modern critics, we find that an unprejudiced reading of the records, would seem to indicate that Jesus was a man who had reached middle life at least. Let us now examine the direct question of His age as we may find light thrown upon it in these records. The only direct reference to His age which is made either by Himself, or by a contemporary, is when in a controversy with the Jews, they rebuke Him by saying, "Thou art not yet fifty years old". Such a statement is unnatural unless Jesus were in the decade between forty and fifty: had he been under forty they would not have thus spoken. All gospel accounts state that Jesus took up the work of John, began his public ministry, when John was cast into prison for protesting against Herod's marriage to Herodias. Recent dates in Latin history seem to fix that marriage as in the year 34. Accordingly Jesus ceased to be the village rabbi, and became the itinerant teacher soon after.

Pilate was recalled in 37, hence Jesus could not have been crucified later than 36, and we can put the time of His public ministry between 34 and 36.

A date for Jesus' birth as early at least as 8 B. C. has a growing number of supporters. Only by putting the birth early can we establish the historic character of the account in Luke. Luke says the birth of Jesus was "when Quirinius was governor." Roman history puts Quirinius in Syria 10—8 B. C. Or taking Jewish history and reckoning back from the service of the priests as we have it for the year 70 A. D. reckoning back to the course of Abijah, to which Zacharias belonged, and to whom came the first intimation of the events leading up to Jesus' birth a few months later, we come to July in the year 9 B. C. Clement of Alexandria puts the birth of Jesus as in the year 9-8; Tertullian says it was when Sentius Saturninus was governor: Sentius was for a while co-governor with Quirinius, and displaced him in the year 8 B. C. Thus it is evident that the early fathers accepted the early date for Jesus' birth.

Accepting this early date for the birth of Jesus we can not get away from the fact that Jesus in the days of His ministry was over forty years of age. Looking further into the testimony of the fathers as to the age of Jesus during His ministry we find that Irenaeus says that Jesus was forty years of age when He sent out the disciples, and Clement working out a careful chronology accepts the statement without question. How then arose the popular error of thinking Jesus was barely turned thirty at the time of His ministry. It comes from the statement of the gospel that Jesus was about thirty years of age when He was baptized by John. Believing John's ministry to have been unimportant and of a few months duration, the rest followed. Dean Alford carefully points out that the general statement "being about thirty years of age", admits of much latitude either way; that Jesus might have been thirty-two or twenty-eight. The gospel-record gives much prominence to John, and Jesus pays him splendid tribute. Jewish estimates give good space to the work of John, and Josephus indicates his ministry covered a considerable time. Hence the truth seems to be, that John's ministry covered a space of perhaps ten years; that Jesus was baptized and became a follower of John when about thirty, during which time He was a follower of John, and that in 34 when John was imprisoned, He moved to Capernaum and entered His ministry.

This would throw light upon Clement's statement that the ministry of Jesus was over ten years in duration.

Again there are instances in the records where Jesus appears to be older than His disciples. At the well of Samaria He rests and waits while His disciples go into the village for food; he was unable to bear His cross where younger men carried the heavy beams; He died on the cross in a few hours; all of which things shows Him to have been a man past the vitality of thirty years of age.

We may thus safely conclude that Jesus was no youthful reformer; he was a man of mature years and experience; a far-seeing, prophetic soul; in fact a philosopher who walks with Socrates, Lao-Tze, Buddha, Confucius, Seneca, Zoroaster—only He is far ahead of them all. He stands unique among the greater teachers of mankind. His insight was clearer, His teachings more scientific, His ethics more lofty, His views more definite, His literary style superior to all other teachers, ancient or modern. The clearness of definition in those short moral epigrams which we call beatitudes, the beauty and appeal in the parables, the alertness in discussion, the power of his moral judgments to stand unquestioned after centuries—these stamp Jesus as the greatest of moralists. Franklin, Jefferson, Goethe, Emerson, Carlyle, Thoreau were all right in speaking of Jesus as the great moral philosopher. Jesus lived a limited experience, but He faced all the great questions of human life; and while His wisdom has its limits, yet His mind was so keen and His insight so deep, that He never faltered from speaking eternal truth about the bigger things of life. In the intellectual courts of the world Jesus must be accepted as the wisest we have known, and the wisest men among us in various generations have been those who most closely followed Him; Benedict, Francis, Fox, Tolstoy, these men have been our wisest leaders. Looking at Jesus as a man, and not as a theological entity, we must admit that His philosophy is the truest, and has power to best influence men, and when men accept it they live human life at its best.

We protestants in our ignoring the Apocrypha, forget that ancient Hebrewism developed a philosophical movement as well as a religious movement. The "Wisdom" literature which grew with great power after the return from the exile, was largely a philosophic movement, in which the thoughts of foreign philosophers modify the ancient Hebrew religion. The book of Sirach is dis-

tinctly the work of a philosophical moralist; and the fourth book of Maccabees shows us a pious Hebrew giving heed to philosophy. In the Greek translation of the Apocrypha the words of Plato "nous" and "sophia" are used. The controversy which raged in Germany over the Apocrypha, was finally decided against admitting the books into the evangelical canon, because they were philosophical. Andre, the French scholar, said (1903) "The wisdom writings are the first attempt at a systematic Jewish philosophy". Philo was profoundly influenced by the work of philosophical writers, and if Philo—why not Jesus? We may conclude then, that in the time of Jesus, intellectual Hebrews were turning philosophy to become the handmaid of religion. The "Wisdom" writings were bringing an influence down alongside the work of the prophets and the olden code. Jesus became the fairest flower of this movement. He not only reached higher in idealism and trust than any of the olden prophets, but he reached down deeper into the soul in his philosophical thinking, and hence his teachings become for the world of men, not only our highest development of religious aspiration, but they are as well, our truest philosophy of life.

MAZDAK.

The Persian Bolshevik of the sixth century, whose teachings had a far-reaching influence upon the economic, political and religious life of Western Asia.

BY PAUL LUTTINGER, M. D.

I.

IN the colorful and riotous history of Asia, there are few events which surpass Mazdakism in significance and timely interest. And among the great leaders who stood at the crib, if not at the cradle of civilization, there were not many endowed with a more magnetic personality and whose end was more tragic than that of Mazdak, the son of Bamdad. To this day, his teachings still find expounders and disciples among the Persians and Arabs; and the readiness with which Central and Western Asia is embracing the tenets of Russian Bolshevism could be traced to the profound impression made by the Persian Communists of the sixth century. Archeological findings, as far west as Tripoli, show the extent of Mazdakian propaganda and the high place which Mazdak's name occupied among the Gnostics of the West, might explain the infiltration of communist ideas among the Bohemian and other mediæval sects of Central Europe.

Yet, nothing is more pathetic than the heavy shroud of oblivion which has settled upon Mazdakism and the widespread ignorance concerning one of the phenomenal epochs in the history of civilization which prevails among modern European and American students.

A gigantic political, economic and religious movement which rocked the foundations of the powerful Persian Empire of the Sassanides and the Abassides and drew into its tumultuous vortex the largest part of Western Asia, remains unmentioned in our textbooks of history. The Encyclopedias do not devote any special articles to Mazdak, and the Britannica only mentions his name in a casual way, under Persia. To complete this conspiracy of silence, Mazdakism is completely omitted from the Students' abridged

edition of Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Wm. Smith, LL. D., Editor, American Book Co.) under the specious pretext that "the theological disputes of the oriental sects" would not interest the student.

Theological disputes, forsooth! One might as well refer to Russian Bolshevism, of which Mazdakism was an early forerunner, as a theological quibble!

This inexplicable failure of modern historians to understand the communist movement initiated by Mazdak, might explain the lamentable lack of comprehension of events of a similar character which are swaying Persia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Turkestan, Russia and Egypt at the present day. There is no surer method of mastering contemporary conditions than the diligent perusal and analysis of similar occurrences in the past.

That Mazdakism was considered by its contemporaries as a movement of prime importance can be readily ascertained from the large space it occupies in the chronicles of the Greek and Oriental historians of the sixth and succeeding centuries. Theophanes, Procopius, Eutychius, Tabari, Mirkhond, Abulfeda and others devote long dissertations to Mazdak, Babak and the various insurrections engendered by their teachings. The famous Persian poet, Firdousi, celebrates the stirring events in his glorious national epic, the *Shahnameh*, in stanzas that have become immortal.

The real facts, however, like those of the modern communist movement, have been obscured by a mass of uncritical narrative which varies, not only according to the nationalistic or economic prejudices of the respective historians; but shows contradictions of the most glaring character in the text of one and the same writer.

From this maze of controversial, tendencies and legendary reports, I have attempted to glean the few historical facts and to interpret them in the light of modern criticism. My aim is to visualize the state of affairs which gave rise to Mazdakism, to analyze the causes of its meteoric propaganda and apparent failure and, thereby, contribute to the deeper study of modern movements of the same social and economic character.

II.

The state of Persia at the time of Mazdak was not unlike that of Russia during the European War. The last half of the fifth century might be characterized as a period of famine, pestilence,

atrocious religious persecutions, civil war and foreign invasion. The treaty of 422, between Persia and Constantinople, had guaranteed, to Christians, the free exercise of their religion; but Yezdegerd II, a zealous Zoroastrian, embarked upon a series of relentless persecutions and savage pogroms against Manicheans, Nestorians and Jews. They were forcibly impressed into military service, forbidden to use fire in their dwellings and houses of prayer and, under penalty of death, were interdicted the burial of their dead. The Jews were not allowed to observe the Sabbath, as a day of rest, and could not practice the ritual slaughtering of cattle in public slaughter-houses. The murder of Christian bishops and Jewish rabbis became a daily occurrence and the persecutions aroused the non-magian population to such an extent that public prayers were offered for the sovereign's death. The legend represents him as having been swallowed by a serpent.

Perozes (459-486) went still further in his determination to establish Zoroastrianism as the only religion in Persia. He is said to have been even more cruel than Sapor who had slaughtered 22 bishops with his own hand. The Jews and Christians were declared to be outlaws and were turned over to the mercy of the magi: their children were forcibly removed to the fire-altars for instruction in the Persian religion. Half of the Jewish population of Ispahan were slaughtered and Huna Mari, son of Mar Zutra I, was publicly executed, in spite of the fact that his father was the officially recognized prince of captivity. A brother of Perozes, sickened by these atrocities, rose in rebellion; the ensuing civil war further decimating the distracted population. The crazed citizens of Ctesiphon, the new capital of the Empire, firmly believed that the year 468, "the wicked year" would see the destruction of the world. In the meantime, the Albanians had invaded the northern provinces of the Empire and were reducing to ashes the cities in their path. The Armenians who had embraced Christianity were forced to abjure, *en masse*, after several unsuccessful insurrections. Even Vahan, the ranking Armenian prince, embraced Zoroastrianism; receiving, as the price of his apostasy, the position of *Sparapet* (Commander-in-chief) of Persarmenia. Before the Albanians could be checked, a fresh enemy, the White Huns (Ephthalites, Haintab, Nephthalites) swooped down upon the eastern boundary and with fire and sword decimated the population and burned the crops. Finally, the wild Arabs, from the south, began those fierce periodic raids which, hundred and fifty years later, culminated in the con-

quest of Persia by the Mohammedans. In order to have a free hand with his "unbelieving" subjects, Perozes had to submit to the terms of the Hun and pay an enormous indemnity and yearly tribute to the Khan.

Furthermore, as if nature had conspired to ruin the pleasant land of Fars and to destroy its miserable inhabitants, the most dreaded scourge of the East, a drought of seven years, accompanied by its ghastly twins, famine and pestilence, spread its deadly mantle over the Persian Empire. The frightful consequences of such a calamity could only be visualized by those who have witnessed periods of absolute aridity. The earth becomes as dry as parchment and the garden soil takes on the hardness of concrete; the grass, and later all vegetable life, even the trees, disappear and the smiling countryside is changed into a dull, lifeless desert. The wells and cisterns dry up; the fountains and rivulets cease to flow until the largest rivers are reduced to mere threads of the life-giving fluid, dejectedly trickling between its anemic banks. Gaunt Famine now stalks in and the poor begin to die by the hundreds and thousands. The unburied corpses fill the air with pestilential emanations and the plague carries away those who had been spared by hunger. The rich who manage to sustain life by stealth, on food and water imported from other countries, succumb to the contagion which issues from their poorer brethren and as the aridity lasts, neither wealth nor position is of any further avail. In those rare instances of absolute drought, lasting for more than a year, even the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air perish: wild animals and reptiles succumb to the inexorable aridity. And in order to complete the desolation of the land, the locusts, those winged messengers of God's wrath, had destroyed the vegetation from the few remaining oases of the Persian desert.

Perozes is said to have imported corn from Greece, India and Abyssinia and that for every poor man who died of hunger, he threatened to execute a rich man from the same community. This would seem to indicate that while the poor must have suffered terribly, the wealthier classes had managed to get along pretty well; Persian profiteers were probably as conspicuous as our own modern brand.

No sooner did the famine relent, than the persecutions redoubled in fury; but Perozes realized, like so many tyrants before and after him, that he could not prevail against the spiritual convictions of his victims. Many Jews emigrated to more tolerant

countries. Joseph Rabba led a vast number of pilgrims to India, where they still maintain their community life. Being unable to extirpate Christianity, Perozes reluctantly permitted the schismatic Christians of his realm to call a synod (483 A. D.) and recognized the Nestorian sect as the official Nazarene church of his dominions. He, thus, succeeded in splitting off a large contingent from the church of Rome; a breach that has not healed to this day.

A new invasion of the Huns resulted in the death of Perozes and the accession of Balash who had to pay a heavy indemnity and continued to bleed the country white by constant civil war against his brother Zarech. It is interesting to note that Kush-newaz, the chief of the White Huns not only used trenches in his war against Persia, but had anticipated modern warfare by the judicious use of "propaganda behind the front." This did not consist of the famous "fourteen points" but in the exhibition of the treaty that Perozes had broken.

Finally, the people of Persia, unable to endure their miserable state, rose against the King and nobles and proclaimed his nephew, Kavadh, who had fled to the Ephthalites and who obligingly furnished him with an army to obtain the throne.

The nature of the revolution which put Kavadh (Cabades I) on the throne seems to have been entirely unrecognized by the Greek chroniclers of the time. Those who copied them must also have had only a rudimentary knowledge of economic problems. After half a century of civil war, persecutions, famine and pestilence aggravated by the rapacity of the magnates, the revolution could only be explained on economic grounds. Thus, we learn from other sources that the land tax consisted in as high as one-third to one-half of the produce and that the farmer was not allowed to touch his crop or even the grape on the vine before the tax-gatherer had taken his share. Tabari tells us a characteristic story of King Kavadh and the peasant woman who did not dare pluck a fruit from the tree, in her own garden, for fear of the government. The people were groaning under the burden of maintaining the vast multitude of tax-gatherers, priests, military and civil officials. The reforms later introduced by Chosroes show how the poor peasant and artisan were oppressed by the wealthy, and also the rampant venality of the officials and the widespread bribing of judges and governors. He is said to have executed eighty tax-collectors in one day, for extortion. At the time of Kavadh's accession, however,

the people's sufferings and indignation had reached frenzied proportions and the time for superficial reforms had passed. Something absolutely radical had to be done and it had to be done immediately. The failure to understand this desperate state of the people of Persia has led the chroniclers of the time to also misjudge the nature of the second revolution which drove Kavadh out of the capital; a counter-revolution led by the magnates and the clergy. Finally, the proper comprehension of the two revolutions would explain the third which put the crown back on Kavadh's head and also the conflicting policies of his reign.

III.

The revolution which put Kavadh on the throne was a spontaneous uprising of the people in which probably all classes took part. It was not unlike the first revolution against the Czar of Russia. The farmers on account of the taxes, the city dwellers protesting against extortion and mismanagement of the officials; and the magnates because of the weakness of the government and of the king. The first reign of Kavadh lasted about seven years (488-496) and during this time the various elements that took part in the revolution began to realize that it had not fulfilled their respective expectations. A new king was apparently not sufficient to bring about the millenium! The poorer classes had to starve and slave, as before; while the nobles and the wealthy were smarting under the curb which Kavadh was trying to impose upon their rapacity and resisted any reforms which would limit their privileges or income. This must have resulted in more discontent among the people, who were now ripe to listen to any proposition that promised them instant relief. Under the pressure of socialistic agitation, the king had to accede more and more to the demands of the people and alienate to himself the powerful magnates of the empire. These became more and more insolent and arrogant and with the help of the higher clergy must have threatened to depose him. As the nobles grew bolder, the common people became more violent until they no longer were satisfied with socialistic reformers, but gave ear to the Bolsheviki, the communists, who preached a radical change in the social and economic system of Persian society. It is Kavadh's leaning to and final acceptance of the Communists' program, which he recognized as the strongest party, that led to the counter-revolution of the magnates, his deposition and

the accession to the throne (for two years) of his brother Djamasp (496-498).

The cause of the revolution is ascribed by Firdousi to the execution of the Grand-Vizier, Souferai, who had been Prime Minister under the previous reigns and who had ruled the empire with an iron hand until Kavadh became of age. First of all, Kavadh came to the throne long after he was 21. All historians agree that he died in 531 A. D., after a reign of 43 years, aged 82; he must, therefore have been at least 39 years old when he began his first reign. A king, at that age, does not need, nor does he fear, the tutelage of an old man. Secondly, it is not customary for a Oriental people to revolt on account of the somewhat sudden demise of a vizier. The son of Kavadh, Chosroesi, who would have learned from his father's experience, did not hesitate to execute his own Grand-vizier without causing the slightest political ripple. Some two hundred years later, Harun-al-Rashid beheaded his Prime-Minister, Jaafar the Barmecide, together with 1,000 members of his family and, although the reason for this cruelty was never known, nobody stirred against the authority of the Caliph.

There is another reason which renders doubtful the argument of Firdousi and the historians from whom he copied his data. He relates that after his deposition, Kavadh was handed over to Rezmihir, the son of Souferai, so that he might revenge himself upon him for his father's death. Rezmihir not only spared his life, but escaped with the king and five other men to the Heitaliens. Furthermore, in passing through Ahwaz, Kavadh fell in love with the daughter of a Dikhan (freehold farmer), a descendant of Firidoun, the national hero of old Persia who delivered his people from the monster tyrant Zohak. Rezmihir actually wooed the girl (who later became the mother of Chosroes) for his sovereign and brought her to him in his exile. The episode points to the fact that through the endeavors of Rezmihir (who probably belonged to the new party: while his father had been a reactionary) the bulk of the nation which was composed of the dikhans had espoused the cause of the King. It is quite possible that the execution of Souferai should have precipitated the revolt of the nobles, who beheld in his disgrace the fate that was awaiting them; but it cannot be said that it was the cause of the counter-revolution, anymore than the murder of Sarajevo was the cause of the European war.

The share of the nobles in the deposition of Kavadh can be

readily appreciated from an incident related by Procopius. While the fate of the king was being discussed, one of his officers, Gunastades, taking out the knife with which he was accustomed to pare his nails and showing it to the assembled chiefs, exclaimed: "You see how small this knife is; yet, it is big enough to accomplish a deed which a little while hence, not twenty thousand men would be able to manage." His advice was not followed; why?

Kavadh's life was spared for the simplest of reasons: The magnates felt themselves too weak and were afraid of the retaliation which would be visited upon them by the communists. They feared the power of Mazdak and the Mazdakites; but who was this man Mazdak?

IV.

Mazdak was a native and archimagus of the city of Nishapur, in Khorasan. According to Mirkhond and others, he was born in Persepolis or in Irak. Firdousi calls him an eloquent, educated, intelligent and ambitious man who announced himself as a reformer of the Zoroastrian religion and became the king's Destour, guardian of the treasure and treasurer. The career and deeds of Mazdak do not seem, however, to point to any religious activity. It is not the habit of religious teachers to become treasurers of the realm or Grand-viziers of the king. If he invoked Zoroastrianism at all, it must have been in relation to the economic problems of the country. The various abuses of the Magian church, like those of the Catholic and Orthodox churches in France and Russia, were some of the many causes of the Persian revolution of the sixth century; just as the others contributed to the upheaval of the French and the Bolshevik revolutions (compare the monk Rasputin).

The essential tenets of Mazdakism, as reported by the Greek and Arabian historians (and detractors), seem to have been as follows: All men, by God's providence, were born free and equal; none brought into this world any property or any natural right to possess more than another. Property was, therefore, theft (compare Proudhon's: *la propriété, c'est le vol.*). Property and marriage were human inventions, contrary to the will of God, who requires the equal division of all good things, among all the people, and forbids the appropriation of particular women by individual men. Adultery, incest and theft were really not crimes; but the necessary steps for the re-establishment of the laws of nature, in

a corrupt society. This last view has been distorted by the chroniclers into the express command to commit incest, adultery and theft; while Mazdak simply condones them as products of a corrupted system of society. This "twisting of the truth by knaves to make a trap for fools" has been closely paralleled by the "nationalization-of-women" *canard* sent out broadcast by the enemies of the Russian Bolsheviki.

Mazdak also preached the sacredness of animal life, the absence from animal food other than milk, cheese and eggs; simplicity in dress, moderation of all appetites and devotion to the primordial cause of all things. These ascetic and communistic views, akin to the teachings of the Hindu Brahmists, show the desire of Mazdak to revert to the simple life of his forefathers. It is the system of society under which the great Iranian people lived on the central Asiatic plateau, before the great cleavage which resulted in the migration of the two main branches of the Aryans into India and Persia, respectively.

Thus, we see the ascete Mazdak, like our modern teachers Tolstoy and Lenin, preach a doctrine of apparent laxity and self-indulgence; not from base or selfish motives, but from a profound conviction and devotion to truth. Eudoxus of Cnidus, the Greek astronomer who calculated the solar year and invented the sundial had entertained similar views, 400 years before Christ. Naturally enough, Mazdakism was enthusiastically adopted by the young of all ranks; by the lovers of pleasure (by the free-lovers, as we would say, nowadays) and by the great bulk of lower orders, the exploited from time immemorial. But there is one point which is not clear, namely the reason which induced Kavadh to become the most ardent supporter of Mazdakism. What could the king gain by embracing a creed which levelled him with his subjects and absolutely incompatible with the monarchical principle? He was no youngster and he was not poor and still he worked with all his might to introduce Mazdakism as the official state polity of Persia. Upon this point all authorities agree; but upon the circumstances of his conversion and extreme zeal there is either complete silence or contradicting opinions.

Mirkhond conjectures that the confidence of Kavadh was gained through an elaborate and clever trick. An excavation was dug beneath the fire-altar and a metal tube inserted so that it debouched on the altar where the perpetual fire was burning. A confederate was placed in the cavern who, in stentorian tones, invited

the king to approach. Mazdak was then supposed to talk into the fire and the answers he received could not have failed to convince the monarch that the prophet was in direct communication with God; the fire being the symbol and embodiment of the deity. This puerile explanation of a mighty revolutionary movement stands unsupported by the other chroniclers and it is contrary to reason to believe that such an acute mind as Kavadh's could be deceived by a rather coarse imposture, akin to ventriloquism. In Persia, where the priests were past-masters of magic and sleight-of-hand tricks, such rough work could not pass as a miracle. Moreover, the character of Mazdak, from the few details we possess, seems to have been too lofty for such subterfuges and we find nowhere the claim that he was on speaking terms with the Almighty.

According to Firdousi, Mazdak used his great gifts of oratory and sincere persuasion. His account is much more rational, albeit too detailed and partial. There was a great drought and famine; the rich as well as the poor incessantly besieged the king's palace, asking for bread and water. Mazdak, who already seems to have been in attendance at the court (as a minister without portfolio, perhaps), calms the populace by telling them that the king would show them the way to hope. He then went in to the king and asked a series of questions, among them were the following: "A man has been bitten by a snake and his life is in danger. Another man has an antidote, but refuses to give it except at an exorbitant price which the poor man cannot pay; what should be done?" The king replied: "That man is a murderer and should be killed before my door by the relatives of the victim of his greed". The next day, Mazdak asked the king: "A man's feet are bound in chains and he is hungry; what should be the punishment of the man who, having surplus bread, refuses to share it with the famished one?" The king replied: "The miserable wretch is responsible for the hungry man's death by his inactivity and greed!" Mazdak then kissed the ground before the king and going out to the people exclaimed:

"Go wherever there is hidden corn, take each a part and if the price is demanded, destroy the village!"

He gave the example by delivering to the people everything he possessed, himself, and when the guardians of the royal stores complained to the king about the pillage and the latter spoke to Mazdak about it, the latter reminded him of his answers to the two

parables and added: "Surplus of wealth is sinful!" Firdousi continues:

"The king was impressed with the words of Mazdak which *seemed* so true; he saw that his heart and head were full of what the prophets, the priests and chiefs of justice had said in olden times. Mazdak treated old and young as his equals, he took from one and gave to another and the king exalted him over all his servants".

We cannot assume that the king was carried away by youthful enthusiasm; he probably was impressed with the sincerity of Mazdak and specially by the power which he had over the people. He was too good a politician to go against the rising tide and he was anxious to avail himself of the revolution to curb the turbulence and arrogance of the nobility. Thus, we saw, before the European War, the King of Italy hobnobbing with the proletarian *hoi polloi* and declare himself in sympathy with the economic theories of Socialism. It is better to be a socialist king than no king at all!

V.

The Greek historian Agathias states that the people revolted against Kavadh because he was a tyrant and they preferred his brother Djamasp, because the latter was known for his mildness and love of justice. Tabari, on the other hand, says emphatically that Djamasp did not administer justice satisfactorily. Both statements are vitiated by the fact that Djamasp seems to have been a child who was tenderly treated by Kavadh after the restoration. Everything seems to point to the conclusion that it was the reactionary party of the magnates that deposed Kavadh and that they felt too weak to murder him. Instead of following the advice of Gunastades, the king was cast into the prison known as the *Castle of Oblivion*.

His escape from prison is differently related by the various chroniclers. According to some he escaped by disguising himself as a woman and fled to the Ephtalites who gave him an army with which he reconquered his throne. According to others, his wife seduced the warden and remained in prison, while Kavadh was carried out by a slave, in a bundle of bed-clothes. It is questionable whether he really fled to the Huns or not. From the story of his wooing the Dikhan's daughter and the fact that Djamasp relinquished the crown without putting up any resistance, it seems

that he remained for a considerable time within the country where the bulk of the farming and nationalist elements rallied to his support. The Mazdakites, subsequently, opened the doors of the capital, upon his triumphal return.

It is significant that neither Mazdak nor his followers were molested. One writer claims that Mazdak was also imprisoned; but his adherents rose and freed him by breaking the prison doors.

The attitude of Kavadh towards Mazdakism, after his return, has been variously related. According to some authorities, he remained as zealous as ever; according to others, although an unwavering adherent, he would not countenance any violence. The result being that Mazdakism languished as a harmless speculation of some enthusiasts who did not venture to carry out their theories into practice. Finally, Procopius claims that the crown prince, Chosroes, put a check to the fanaticism of the Mazdakites. Neither view would stand criticism. Chosroes was an infant at the beginning of Kavadh's second reign and the further developments will prove that the communists had not abandoned the principle of direct action. What probably did happen was some kind of a compromise entered upon by the king with the center parties of the farmers by which a *modus vivendi* was established between the moderate elements and the radicals. Later, when the king needed men, officers and money to fight the Romans, the Khazars, the Huns and the Arabs he must have made further concessions to the nobles. These concessions led to the recrudescence of Mazdakite disorders in the third decade of the sixth century.

In the meantime, the astute king must have placated the communists with the usual promises and seems to have amused them and occupied their minds by numerous debates, dissertations, parades and such baubles. The bulk of the population were probably satisfied by a few judicious reforms. There is a record of one of these parades which must have taken place about 520 A. D., during which thirty thousand Mazdakites were reviewed by Kavadh, sitting on a throne outside the city. During this demonstration, Mazdak, according to Firdousi, remarked to the king that the crown prince, Chosroes, did not seem to share the Communistic view of his father. In his Address to the Throne, Mazdak expatiated upon the five vices which deviate the human race from the path of righteousness: jealousy, revenge, anger, necessity and covetousness. All five were due to superfluous wealth and superfluity of women. He, therefore, exhorted the king again to declare the

common ownership of all surplus wealth; he would then witness that all men could become virtuous. The prophet attempted to take the crown prince's hand; but Chosroes withdrew it, indignantly. This incident probably points to an attempt made by the Mazdakites to win Chosroes to their cause or to the crown prince's repudiation of a pact, previously entered upon. Chosroes now asked his father for five months of respite and that on the sixth he would confound the doctrine of Mazdak in a public debate. This shows that the Mazdakites had the upper hand in the affairs of the realm; otherwise force, instead of spiritual arguments, would have been used by their enemies.

At last, the day of the great disputation arrived and a vast throng of people filled the great hall of the king's audience room. The greatest authorities had been assembled by the diligence of Chosroes. Old Hormuzd, the centenarian dean of the Magian priesthood, was induced to leave his retreat in the fastnesses of Khorasan and to lend dignity and weight to the opponents of Mazdakism. Khourrehi-Ardeshir of the University of Istakhar (Persepolis) and the Persistan philosopher, Mihr Ader, had been invited with thirty of the latter's famous disciples. A so-called neutral board composed of the great teachers of the various academies, among whom were Resmihr (Zer-Mihr?), Khorrad, Ferrahin, Benhoui and Behzad were to act as judges of the contest.

Arguments advanced by the various debaters against Communism (the points in favor of it are not recorded) sound strangely modern. On reading them, one has the haunting impression that he had read them recently, somewhere; perhaps in the editorial columns of a great metropolitan newspaper or in a backwoods weekly of a prosperous farming county.

One of the mobeds, for instance, exclaims:

"O thou, Mazdak, who seekest the truth! Thou hast introduced a new faith into the world; thou hast put in common women and other property. But how will a son know his sire and how will the father recognize his children? If all were equal in this world and if there were no difference between the great and the small, who would serve and how would power be exercised? Who would work for thee and me and how would the good distinguish themselves from the wicked? When a man dieth, to whom shall his home and fortune belong, if the king and the artisan are equal?"

Another speaker said:

"The world will surely become a desert and I pray God that such a misfortune shall not overtake our glorious Iran!"

One of the debaters asked the following questions:

"When all are masters, who would be the wage-earners? When all will have treasures, who will be the treasurer?"

Finally, the hoary Hormuzd ended with an imprecation:

"Never has any founder of a religion spoken as thou, Mazdak! Thou hast done the secret work of Divs (Devils). Thou leadest man to Hell as thou reckonest not as evil the crimes of the human race!"

According to Firdousi, who reports some of the details of the disputation, the king was convinced of the wickedness of Mazdak's views and turning to Chosroes, said:

"Don't speak to me about Mazdak any more, do as you wish in this matter!" He then delivered into his hands all the Mazdakites, among whom there were 300 nobles. That a debate could have changed Kavadh's views would be as great a fallacy as to believe that he was converted by tricks of prestidigitation. Everything seems to point, on the contrary, to the fact that the Mazdakites won this debate as all others and that their influence began to wane only when other than spiritual arguments were injected into the issue. It is a well known psychological fact that no educated man is ever convinced by a public debate; both sides marshal apparently irrefutable arguments and their "facts" cannot be verified on the spur of the moment. The presence of 300 nobles, among the Mazdakites, would have, in itself, prevented the king from meeting out summary justice. As to the presence of those magnates among the Mazdakites, they can only be explained on the ground of the sympathy that all generous natures have always had for the under-dog. Thus did Prince Kropotkin abandon the Russian Court and throw in his lot with the Communist-Anarchists.

The real causes which led the Mazdakites to jeopardize their standing with the king were of a different nature than theoretical debating. From indirect evidence, these might be classified as general and personal. The general causes were the external wars, the passive and armed resistance of the Christians Arabs and Jews to Mazdakism; while the personal reasons were the advancing age of the monarch, the opposition of Chosroes and the plots for the succession to the throne. Contrary to the chroniclers, all these

factors only made themselves felt towards the end of Kavadh's reign and not at the beginning, as they invariably assert.

VI.

The influence of foreign wars upon the internal conditions of a country need not be stressed. These wars were probably prevented in the early reign of Khavad by the influence of Mazdak; but as each fight has two sides and the power of the communists was unable to reach to Constantinople or to prevail spiritually against the wild Khazars and Huns, the Persians were ultimately forced to fight, in self-defense; the Mazdakites, as their modern followers, the Bolsheviki, being probably in the first ranks of the army. Later as these wars and invasions became chronic and the internal troubles multiplied, the king must have come to rely more and more upon that section of the population whose business it was to fight, the professional warriors or magnates. As in all human relations there is more or less of give and take, the king must have gradually compromised with the nobles and returned to them, step by step, some of their former privileges; this in turn must have aroused the Mazdakites against the king and a vicious circle was thus created.

The passive and active resistance of the magian, as well as non-magian population of Persia, to the doctrines of Mazdak must have become increasingly determined as the economic situation of the country began to improve. We do not know, except in the case of the Jews, how far this resistance went; but it must have been considerable and ever present. The Armenian Christians rose *en masse*, several times; but were always suppressed. The Nestorians and Arabs probably helped the Jews in their armed insurrection as they all lived near each other, in Babylonia, Assyria and Hira. A more subtle anti-communist propaganda must have been carried on by the Jewish and Christian traders who traveled all through the empire, and to whose commercial interest it was to abolish all vestiges of political theories in restraint of trade. That the Nestorian Christians were zealous propagandists of their faith can be seen from the fact that in 505 A. D., their missionaries had reached as far as China. They and the Jacobites, together with the Armenians, who had been schooled in the endurance of persecution by two centuries of repression, looked upon Zoroastrianism as the most abhorrent of religions and upon Mazdakism as the acme of abomina-

tion. The Syro-Christian population of Persia were strict monogamists and the report that Mazdak had preached the community of wives and had obtained even the king's wife and sister, must have filled them with dread and abhorrence.

Christianity had permeated large classes of Persian society; the Persians always having been prone to religious and philosophical speculations (compare Mithraism, Manichaeism, the Zervanites, etc.). Although most of the propaganda was done underground, it nevertheless had gained many adherents and if it had not been for the spread of Al-Islam, Persia might today be as Christian as Armenia. The extent of the propagation of the faith may be learned from the fact that Nushizad, one of Chosroes' sons was a Christian, a rebel and perhaps a martyr. There is good circumstantial evidence to believe that the Persian Christians had contributed a good deal to the suppression of Mazdakism.

The role of the Arabs is not well defined. We know that Kavadh had deposed King Mondhir II, of the principality of Hira, on the western bank of the lower Euphrates and, therefore, in close proximity to Babylonia, where most of the Jewish and Christian settlements were situated. It is quite possible that Mondhir helped them to revolt. Another Arab chieftain, Arethas, of the Gassa tribe, was probably antagonistic to Mondhir who was a protégé of Chosroes. The mother of Mondhir, known as Celestial Water, owing to her remarkable beauty, might have had something to do with her son's decision to oppose Communism.

VII.

The relation of the Persian Jews to Mazdak and their reaction to his teachings, deserve a special chapter; first because of the interesting and positive data we have upon the subject and secondly on account of the character of the reaction which was a successful war for independence.

It seems to be an irony of fate that the Jews, who, in modern times, have been accused as well as praised as the foremost propagandists of the subversive creed of Bolshevism, should have fought, with arms in hand, as the bitterest opponents of the Persian Bolshevism of fourteen hundred years ago. Not only did they fight the Mazdakites with words and swords, but they actually succeeded in establishing for themselves an autonomous state, the duration of which is variously estimated at from seven to twenty years.

The Jews of Persia and especially those who had settled in Babylonia were probably the most powerful and cultivated of the Diaspora. They had always enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy and their Prince of Captivity or Exilarch (Resh Galutha) was a hereditary prince who was credited with being a scion of the royal house of David. The exilarchs had surrounded themselves with royal pomp and received the homage of the presidents of the Universities which were in the most flourishing condition. The Talmud had just been completed (501) and the decisions of the rabbinical scholars of Babylonia were honored and obeyed by all the Jewish communities in the world. The chief seats of Persian Judaism were in Babylonia and centered around the academies of Sura, Pumbedita, Nehardea and Mahusa. The latter city was the seat of the Exilarch's Court and only three parasangs (about 12 miles) to the south of Ctesiphon, the capital of the Empire. The citadel of Koke is mentioned in the Talmud as well as the luxury and the passion for jewelery which characterized the inhabitants of the city. Their intelligence was ascribed to their drinking the water of the Tigris (Ber. 59b) and their opulence and charitable inclinations had become a household word (B. K. 119a).

Twice a year, during the months of Adar (March) and Ellul (September), a huge crowd of extra-mural students would assemble in the University of Mahuza to pass their examinations and receive their stipend for subsistence and their release from the payment of taxes. These general assemblies, at which as many as twelve thousand students would attend, were regulated by formalities and an etiquette worthy of Byzance or China. Facing the President or Dean of the University were the seven chiefs of the assembly (*reshe kallah*) and their three associate members (*haberim*). Each of them was attended by ten full professors (*allufim*) and the seventy, sitting on ten benches formed the body known as the Sanhedrin. Behind them sat the assistant professors and the students.

One can readily imagine what effect Kavadh's proclamation to adopt Mazdakism must have had on this wealthy and cultured center of Judaism. A population, steeped in the learning of the Torah who "treasure their maidens as the apple of their eye", could not allow itself to be sullied by "pagan filth". There must have been a spontaneous flare of insurrection, the immediate cause of which, according to Graetz, was the murder of Mar Isaac, the dean of one of the academies. Whether Mar Isaac was killed by

Persian Mazdakites or by Jewish Communists (the very wealth of the city implies that there must have been a corresponding exploitation of weaker brethren) is not on record. According to Hebrew traditions, only four hundred warriors were able (with the help of a miraculous fire-cloud) to defeat the king's troops, sent to quell the insurrection, and to set up an independent state which endured for seven years and was ruled by the youthful exilarch Mar Zutra II.

This was not the first time that the Babylonian Jews had struck for their independence. Five hundred years, previously, they had taken up arms in defense of their religion and the purity of their family-life. At that time, led by the two patriots and scholars, Asinai and Anilai and by the inevitable fire-cloud, they successfully withstood the Parthian idolaters and drove them out of their settlements. But when those Jewish soldiers had abandoned the tenets of Judaism by adopting loose morals and by drinking unclean wine, the fire-cloud had disappeared together with their independence.

The four hundred warriors who fought against the armies of Kavadh should be taken with a grain of salt. Forty thousand would be a much nearer estimate, as the number of students alone must have been near fifteen thousand. The Jews were probably helped by the Christians of the vicinity and perhaps by the Arabs, under Mondhir, whose territory bordered on Babylonia. As the Jewish prince is said to have laid the non-Jewish, as well as the Jewish population of Irak, under tribute, it would mean that the new state embraced considerably more than the Jewish pale. Irak was the western division of the Persian Empire and comprised Babylonia, Assyria and Mesopotamia.

With all this, it is still a puzzle how an independent state could be allowed to exist, at such close proximity to the Persian Capital. It could only be explained by the fact that during the first few years of his reign, Kavadh was too tolerant to impose his views upon an alien population and that Mazdak probably shared these views; expecting that they would gradually be converted to the new order of things by recognizing its superiority from practical demonstration. Later, when the troubles of the succession started and the Mazdakites had become incensed with the concessions to the nobles, they probably insisted that Kavadh send a strong expedition to Mahuza which put an end to this thorn in their side.

According to the Hebrew legend, the career of Mar Zutra had been foreordained in heaven. His father, the Exilarch Huna, had been at odds with his father-in-law, Mar Hanina, the President of the University. He had punished the holy man by forcing him to stay outside the city gate during a whole night. The prayers or imprecations of the pious rabbi resulted in the death of every member of the Exilarch's family, save his wife, the daughter of Mar Hanina. In a dream, the latter saw himself destroying a forest of beautiful cedars and as he was about to uproot the last tender nursling, King David appeared and interfered. This dream was interpreted as a warning and when his daughter gave birth to a posthumous child, he was reared and educated by his grandfather. The tender care and careful training resulted in a remarkable precocity of the young prince, who, at the age of fifteen, had all the faculties and knowledge of an adult. He was then taken to Navadh who invested him with the title and prerogatives of the office of Exilarch (511).

This tradition is somewhat at variance with the actual facts given by historians. The young prince seems to have been born in 496 A. D., and became Exilarch in 511; but his father, Mar Huna VI, became Exilarch in 488 and reigned till 508; in other words he was invested in his office when Kavadh came to the throne, the first time, and not after the death of the tyrant Perozes as some state. If this date is correct, and it has everything in its favor, then Mar Zutra, his son, was twelve years old when his father died and the exilarchship was under the regency of Huna's nephew, Pahda, for only three years. It seems that Pahda was reluctant to give up his regency and either by bribes or perhaps by declaring himself in favor of Mazdakism, he might have prevailed upon Kavadh to defer the coronation of his youthful cousin. Hence, the insurrection must have taken place in 511. The arms of the independent Exilarch, Mar Zutra II, bore a fly, the insect to which the death of the wicked Pahda had been attributed. This would indicate that Pahda had played a greater role in the matter than it is generally assumed.

When the final assault was made upon Mahuza, the young Exilarch was, therefore, not older than 24. The Hebrew records give him only 22 and set the date of his execution at 520 A. D. As an example to the population, the young prince was crucified, together with his aged grandfather, on the bridge of Mahuza.

His infant son, Mar Zutra III, was carried to Palestine, where he became an archipherecites. Most of the male inhabitants were slaughtered, the women were distributed among the harems of the Guebres (Zoroastrians, Habrim) and the remainder of the population was impressed into the Persian army. A poll-tax was laid upon all Jews and Christians, 20 to 50 years old, and the rabbis were dispersed. The talmudical academies were razed to the ground and the last great teachers, Ahumai and Giza, had to flee to Arabia and Palestine or to the River Zab. The greatest part of the city of Mahuza was reduced to ashes and its glory was ravished for more than a hundred years.

Thus ended the Jewish revolt against Mazdakism, drowned in the blood of its best manhood and the shame of the daughters of Judah. But the insurrection had not been in vain. The victory of the Mazdakites must have spurred them on to fresh demands and Kavadh must have begun to think of some means by which he could curb the turbulence of his erstwhile comrades. Theophanes speaks of Mazdakite troubles in the year 523 which coincides with the growing power of the Communist party, with the beginning of the second war against Rome and the personal factors, mentioned above, which finally led to their destruction.

VIII.

Of the numerous progeny of Navadh, there were four principal sons who could lay claim to the crown: Kâoses, Zames, Phtasuarses and Chosroës.

Kâoses, as the eldest, had the natural right of primogeniture and of the established custom; but, for some reason or other, was disliked by his father. It may be surmised that he was either intellectually inferior or that his mother was not a favorite. Perhaps because he had Hunnish blood; his mother being probably the daughter of the Khan whom Kavadh married while a hostage.

Zames, according to Procopius, had the respect and good wishes of the people; but is said to have had a physical defect (cataract on one eye?) which according to Persian tradition excluded him from the succession.

Phtasuarses had pledged himself to the Communist party and was naturally supported by the Mazdakites. As the party grew stronger, they must have clamored more and more vehemently that Kavadh make up his mind about the succession and designate his

third son as the only one deserving to sit on the Turquoise throne. This must have been one of the strongest causes of Chosroës' hatred for the Mazdakists.

Chosroës, who was endowed with great physical beauty as well as remarkable mental and strong will power, was the darling and favorite son of Kavadh. To his personal qualities were probably added those of sentimental association with his mother who was the king's most beloved wife, all which induced the king to design the reversal of the natural and customary order of succession in his favor. To add lustre to his name he had ordered his ambassadors in Constantinople to propose to the Emperor Justin, who was childless and nearly seventy years old, the adoption of Chosroës as his son. This singular proposition seems to have fallen through mainly on account of the opposition of the questor Proclus, who feared that it might induce the Persian prince to claim the throne of Byzance.

A good deal of intriguing must have been going on, which probably gained in recklessness as the king was approaching the age of eighty. Finally, in a desperate mood, the friends of Chosroës must have hit upon the sympathy of the Mazdakites towards Phtasuarses as a possible means of forcing the issue. The story of Pocock that Chosroës' enmity towards Mazdak dated from the day when the latter was offered the mother and sister of Chosroës for his harem; and that Kavadh only desisted from his plan after Chosroës had entreated him, with tears in his eyes, does not deserve serious credence. It was not humiliation, but ambition that was at the bottom of Chosroës' hatred of the Mazdakites.

Kavadh was probably made to discover accidentally an imaginary plot against his life with the object of placing Phtasuarses on the throne. Upon the advice of Chosroës, he invited the Mazdakites to a solemn assembly, at which he was to confer the royal dignity upon their candidate. This stratagem so much similar to the one employed by Jehu (2 Kings, x. 18-28) proved a complete success. The unarmed multitude was surrounded by the soldiers and cruelly massacred. Their bodies, according to John of Malala, were dipped in boiling pitch and planted, head downwards, along the walls of the royal gardens (529 A. D.) As the name of Phtasuarses does not appear again in the chronicles of the time, we may surmise that he was either publicly executed or privately murdered. Mazdak himself does not seem to have been molested; either because he took no part in these seraglio intrigues or that

he was shielded by the personal friendship of the sovereign. According to Firdousi, Chosroës showed Mazdak, the rows of corpses planted, like trees, along the walls and exclaimed:

"Look upon the wonderful crop that your doctrines have brought forth!"

IX.

Kavadh had a paralytic stroke on September 8th and died September 13th, 531, after a reign of 43 years and two months, at the age of 82. His death removed the only rampart between the meek leader of the communists and the vindictive cruelty of Chosroës. His first concern, however, was the problem of the succession.

Käoses having claimed the throne, the grand-vizier intervened with the axiom: "No one has the right to the Persian throne, until assigned to it by the assembly of nobles." Upon his acquiescence, Mebodes produced Kavadh's testament and eloquently exhorted the nobles to accept the brave son of a brave and successful father. His eloquence swayed them to acclaim Chosroës; but fearing Chosroës' restlessness and dreading his cruelty, they regretted the hasty decision and as Zames was disqualified physically, they reconsidered their action and proclaimed the son of Zames as the King of Persia and appointed his father Regent. Zames was supported by several of his other brothers and even by Chosroës' maternal uncle; but Chosroës could not be caught napping and after seizing the leaders of the conspiracy, he executed Käoses, Zames and his brothers together with their entire male offspring, the young puppet king, Kavadh, alone escaping to Constantinople.

After the pretenders and their supporters had been effectively removed, Chosroës turned his full vindictiveness towards the Mazdakites. More than a hundred thousand communists were rounded up and their martyred bodies blackened the gibbets of the capital for weeks. Mazdak himself was seized and hanged, head downwards, and his body shot through with arrows. No greater historical jest has ever been perpetrated than the bestowal of the title "Anushirwan" (the blessed, the just) upon the perpetrator of these inhuman cruelties. A few weeks after these wholesale executions, he put to death the life-long friends of his father, the grand vizier to whose eloquence he owed his throne and a host of veteran generals who had incurred his displeasure for some trifle.

X.

During these executions, a comet was seen in the heavens accompanied by a remarkable paleness of the sun. From modern calculations we know that it was probably Halley's comet whose appearance had then been recorded for the fifth time in the history of civilization; but the superstitious magi saw in its appearance a foreboding of ill-omen, pointing to Persia's ruin. Nor were they wrong in their prophecy. In the south, a new power was rising who, led by a new prophet, was destined to conquer the degenerated empires of Persia and Bysance. Before the century had drawn to its close, the Arabs, under the banner of Mohammed had invaded Syria and Irak. In 633 all Persia was under their heel.

But the tenets of Mazdakian Communism did not perish with its founder. Three hundred years later (808) we find Haroun-al-Rashid and his son Mamun vainly contending with the Mazdakites in Azerbaijan and Media. Under the Caliph Motasim they waged a three-year war against Al-Islam and the *Mohammira* ("Reds", "Redmakers") as the disciples of Mazdak had been either nicknamed or called, nearly wrecked the Empire of the Abassides.

"If you are a wise man, do not follow the path of Mazdak!" sang Firdousi; but the poet lived in the shadow of the tyrant Mahmoud, whose dynasty was threatened by a powerful uprising of the *Khorrami* or *Khorramdini* ("followers of the pleasant religion"), a reincarnation of Mazdakites in the eleventh century.

And now, after fifteen hundred years, we find the subversive teachings of Mazdak, rising phoenix-like from its ashes and fanned into a conflagration by the fierce Russian north wind. The community of wealth and the abolition of privileged classes which he so earnestly advocated is again gaining adherents in central Asia; but whether the present movement will be more successful than its predecessors, it is not within the province of a modest historian to prophesy. *Qui vivra, verra!*

THE EVOLUTION OF EXPRESSED THOUGHT.

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

IN writing to a friend, did you ever stop to think how wonderful it is that you can thus convey to your friend the duplication of your thoughts, the innermost workings of your mind? Probably you have not. Familiarity with wonderful things breeds a species of contempt for them. We accept writing and printing, travel by rapid train or in an automobile or aeroplane, the sending of wireless messages, all these things as mere matters of course, and marvel not. With writing it is much as with all the other inventions that have been carried to a high degree of perfection and simplicity. We are so far from the clumsy beginnings of the thing, we are so very familiar with it only in its perfected form, that few of us ever bother our minds as to how it came about or the steps through which it has progressed to its present perfected state. Had it not been for writing, "speaking signs", in some form or other and of however rude a character, what would we know today of what took place yesterday or a hundred or a thousand years ago? Yet less than a century ago it was still impossible to write the correct history of those signs, the forerunners, or the forebears, of our modern writing; but researchers into archeology, and learned philologists have delved into the antiquities of Egypt, of the Orient, of Mexico, and the older civilizations, and have been able to decipher the meanings of the signs and writings they found, and have done it so well that today we have positive information where even but a few years ago all was conjecture. The findings of these men make interesting reading.

In the earliest times, man sought to leave behind him or to communicate to his fellows his thought or a simple record of what he had done. To accomplish this he had recourse to the most elementary means, fit only to give the slightest idea of the fact he wished to state. He associated the idea with the physical object made or observed by him. Later on, as he grew wiser, he discovered a

mnemonical aid to his own remembrance of what he had done or to the perpetuation of that information to others in the shape of fashioning out of natural objects, boulders, tree limbs, etc., rude representations of this or that. Later still he began to draw rough outlines of animals or men, with dried clay, upon the smooth surface of rocks. Then he discovered several pigments, and filled in solidly with color between those outlines he had learned to draw.

The artist, Alexander beautifully illustrates this process of evolution of the art of writing, or, as he shows it, printing, in his masterly series of paintings in the lobby of the Library of Congress at Washington. In one panel he depicts a lot of primitive men building up a heap of stones by the seaside, a "cairn" to mark the stage in the journey of that tribe. In the next panel is shown an Arabian story-teller declaiming to his people "tradition". Following these panels is one wherein an Egyptian workman is cutting hieroglyphics over a portal to a temple; then follows an American Indian "picture-writing" or telling the story of his people's wars by depicting warriors, horses, and arrows in distemper color upon the crudely dressed skin of a deer. Next is a monk in his cloister cell, patiently toiling away at illuminating a manuscript, telling us the story of the Middle Ages; and then comes Guttenburg and his assistants at work about his printing press, the most useful invention of all times.

But, to get back to our great-grandfathers' fore-fathers. From drawing upon smooth surfaces, it was but a step to incising similar pictures with a sharp instrument upon trees, or even engraving them upon rocks. Some primitive tribes, however, had the draftsman's bump so little developed that they never got to the picture stage, but were content with certain rudimentary combinations of straight and oblique lines, that meant something to themselves, and that it has taken us an age and many sulphurous exclamations to decipher. They traced those lines upon skins and upon dried leaves, and did get far enough along to cut them into trees and rocks. Others used bits of grass-woven string, knotted here and there to mean certain things. The fellow who ties a knot in his handkerchief to remember something he has to do during the day, is but reverting to the expedients of his ancient tribal forebears.

Chinese tradition has it that this knotting of strings and also the cutting of little twigs to varying lengths originated in Hoango, and, as a matter of fact, the more or less barbarous tribes, the Miaos and others of southwestern China, still use those modes of

communication. In Peru, under the Incas, knotted strings of different lengths and colors were the mediums of a really high order of "speaking signs", in which much subtlety of expression was possible.

One of the sacred books of China, the Y-King, describes a lot of mysterious signs invented by their famed king, Fou-hi, that were nothing more than representations of knotted strings affixed to twigs that in turn were notched. These notched sticks, khi-mous, were used by the Tartar chiefs in transmitting their orders until the introduction of the ouigour alphabet of Syrian origin. When the Germanic peoples first became acquainted with the Latin letters, they called them *buchstaben*, associating them in their minds with the notched sticks of their ancestors. And the Scandinavians still have their *bak-stafin*, or divining-rods, undoubtedly traceable back to the same origin.

Our North American Indians intercommunicated, and recorded events, by means of as rudely drawn picture-signs as we were guilty of in our early childhood, before we graduated into the colored pencils and ground-glass stage of our existence. Yet they managed to convey much information by those self-same rough pictures, their history, their mythologies, their medicine prescriptions and a host of other matters. The farther south you trace these Indians the higher cultivation do you find, and the nearer approach to refinement of expression as well as of execution in their pictures. When Cortez first penetrated into Mexico in 1519, he found that the people had carried their picture language to such perfection that it was indeed an art. In this ideographic painting, they used the same tropes and figures of thought as we do in speech, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. In that they resembled the Egyptians; could they have been of common origin? Both peoples used a part to represent a whole, or even an entire class. For instance, did they wish to convey the idea of retreat, they merely drew a lance or an arrow and a pair of human legs running from the lance. That was as clear to them and to our scientists today as if they had drawn two full bands of warriors, one fleeing from the other. Certainly it involved much less work, a sort of Pitman stenographic system, that gives us an arm brandishing a sort of hatchet against another arm protected by a shield to show that such a man successfully withstood the attack of such another. This manner of abbreviation must not be confounded, however, with the Chinese hoei-i signs or combinations. The two

systems are radically different. With the Chinese it was merely a qualification, a sort of constant adjective formation. With them a bird and a human mouth pictured together meant to sing; an eye in water, tears; an ear between two flaps of a screen door, to listen, etc.

With the more cultivated nations, this picture language soon grew into a veritable science, too involved and subtle for the ordinary mortal; it became the mode of communication between the official and the priestly classes, and its deciphering today involves the greatest research into, and most intimate familiarity with, their ways and ideas. Unless you know that they thought the vulture bred from the female alone, how could you surmise that that bird was the Egyptian symbol of maternity? Or that the goose stood for filial devotion, if you had not learned that the Nile goose was supposed to care for the parent bird until the latter finally shuffled off into the green lotus fields of goose heaven?

This picture painting and engraving was not only done upon rocks and tree trunks, but was used architecturally to decorate the portals of the temples; in fact, whole fronts of buildings were so covered, and became lasting inscriptions; aye, complete histories of the times and the people. But these were immovable books, so to speak. A demand arose for something that could be carried away if the people were attacked, or that could be moved if they found a more fertile country; some durable record, but one that could be transported more easily than could a temple or a tree. So they took to drawing their figures upon dried skins, broad palm leaves, and rudely woven stuffs. Some enthusiasts, notably the Polynesians, used their own skin for that purpose. That, possibly, was the beginning of tattooing. Upon those stalwart islanders you could read the story of their lives, their feats of valor, their exploits, even the records of their obligations and debts. We still brand our cattle with certain signs that set them apart as ours, our sailormen still tattoo certain signs of their trade upon their chests and arms, and it was not so many centuries ago that our fathers branded criminals with a letter that stood for the crime of which they were found guilty. Some one has said that it takes a thousand generations to completely eradicate all trace of a custom!

Soon these peoples, as conditions changed and civilization progressed, wrote or made signs and figures more and more frequently, until by dint of freedom in drawing, practice, and much abbreviation, they reduced their different series of figures to merest

signs, a system almost tachygraphic, and to us, at this date, bearing little resemblance to the forms they are supposed to represent. They grow more and more cursive. Witness the hieratic writing upon some of the older papyri. This again was improved upon, and all semblance to the old forms is lost in the writings we find that were executed under the later Pharaohs and Ptolemies, demotic writing.

In China these picture-signs were even more conventionalized than among the Egyptians or Mexicans. They became mere up and down strokes, with a few side ones thrown in to keep peace in the family. The writing ceased to be figurative to become purely semiographic or formations representing clusters of ideas or ideograms. And thence grew the cuneiform writing, each sign bearing no longer any semblance to a picture, but having a defined value mnemonically, and many of them even phonetically.

We are passing from one system to another,—half an hour to cover all of them! Do you want an idea of the time taken for the evolution of picture writing? From the time we know some peoples were using it—there is every reason to suppose, too, that others used it centuries before that—to the period we have just glanced at, when it began to be cumbersome and grew into cuneiform and other conventional lines, over fifteen centuries had elapsed.

Our scholars have deciphered nearly all of these forms, excepting only the Hittite inscriptions and the katoun signs upon some of the Yucatan monuments that still remain closed books to them and, needless to add, spurs to redoubled efforts toward getting at their true meaning.

It is an interesting but too long a task to trace this transition, where a sign ceases to represent a real object and simply recalls to mind the sound of the word that has been selected as its name, all through the inscriptions and papyri and clay tablets of the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Chinese, the Babylonians, and the Medes.

The Chinese language and writing of today has grown but little from that old form. They have no grammar, at least as we understand the term; a word can mean twenty different things, dependent upon its position in a sentence. And so it is with the old phonetic writing. A sign meant this or that dependent upon its position with other signs; and then again minor signs accompanied it to still further explain it. Note the terra-cotta tablets found at Nineveh; they are veritable graphic concordances. There are three columns of signs: the central one is composed of the cuneiform

characters to be explained, the column to the left gives the phonetic form, and that to the right the Assyrian equivalent.

The Egyptians were the first to drift into some semblance of an alphabet system, but they gave up their old ideographic forms most reluctantly, and only because commercial and other necessities demanded the clearer, and in every way better mode of intercommunication; for those old forms had religious and historical significance, and, in some cases, were really objects of veneration. Indeed, some of them were believed to have been revealed to them directly by their great god, Thoth!

Such transitions were easier far to a people less susceptible to the claims of tradition. The Japanese, for instance, about the third century of our era, borrowed, we may say, the Chinese language in its entirety. They took its idioms and syllables and comparatively new form of alphabet, impressed upon all of these their own phonetic sounds, and where the Chinese used but monosyllables, they, a polysyllabic people, fixed up the words of more than one syllable by as many single signs as they had syllables and for centuries have gotten along with the old manyo-kana of the forty-seven borrowed Chinese characters.

But we are getting ahead of our story.

The Mexicans, the Chinese, and the Assyrians did not get beyond the idea of a syllable. The Egyptians went marching on. They conceived the notion of letters that represented not only vowel but consonants, a sort of abstraction of the vocal sounds that allowed of what might be called "clearer motion". Their vowels, as we may notice in the Coptic of our own time, were vague sounds.

The Phenicians completed the work, and gave the world an alphabet of twenty-two letters, a dozen of which may be traced back to the old hieratic writing of two thousand years before our era.

All the modern alphabets, excepting perhaps the Korean,—that takes its characters from the earliest Chinese figures,—are Canaanitish in their derivation, and it is well established that the Phenician alphabet is the male ancestor of all the alphabets of Europe and Asia.

The most archaic of Grecian alphabets, attributed by them as a heavenly invention of that fabulous personage, Cadmus, are manifestly borrowed from Phenicia. The oldest Greek alphabet that we know of, that given us in the inscriptions found upon the island of Thera, dating back to the eighth century before Christ, proves

this most conclusively. The Greeks soon modified these configurations and characters, and before long their writing lost all semblance to its prototype. The Greeks always were great fellows to borrow something particularly good from their neighbors, and then perfect it to the point where the lender could not recognize it.

At first they, like the Phenicians, wrote from right to left. Then they took the notion to write the first line from right to left, the next one from left to right, and following down so, alternately, first one way and then the next. Presumably they did that to imitate as nearly as they could on a flat surface the serpent-like inscriptions they were then engraving on their vases, beginning at the top at the right and winding on down around and around. Later they adopted the left-to-right system altogether. Kirchhoff has cleared up many cloudy points about the early Greek writing, how those in the West adopted an alphabet of twenty-five letters, while those of the East stuck to their original twenty-six, the Ionians using but twenty-four, whereas the Eolo-Dorian alphabet had twenty-eight. About the fifth century before our era, and as a consequence perhaps of a great convention of school-teachers (?), they abandoned all these different alphabets, to settle upon one, a modified Ionian of twenty-four letters, and made it the standard for all Greece.

The Hellenic colonies that settled in Sicily and toward the center of Italy, carried thither their Eolo-Dorian alphabet, and it is the root of the Etruscan and Latin alphabets from which all western European alphabets have sprung.

If you have time and opportunity, follow the Phenician inspiration, as it might be called, through all those early ramifications. You will be able to trace it through the famed inscriptions of Mescha, the king of Moab; that other inscription you will find upon each of the bronze and iron weights of Nimrod, and that inscription upon the sarcophagus of Eschmounasar in the Louvre. You can trace it down all through the Semitic writing and the early Hebrew,—not that square Hebrew we are used to and dates back only to the first century of our own era, but the good old Hebrew untainted by Greek and other Gentile influences.

The Syrians were the first to join their characters together as we do in writing, and from them sprang the Auranian and Sabian alphabets, examples of which writing we have in the inscriptions found about Sinai: they, in turn, were the progenitors of the Arab

alphabet that, unchanged today, is used in the later magnificent manuscripts, the veskhk or "copyists' alphabet".

The influence of this Syrian formation is seen even in the Chinese and other Oriental alphabets. In the seventh century A. D., certain Nestorian monks penetrated into Tartary and did much to improve if not change the people's inscription of Si-ngua-fou. The Mongols, Manchus, and Kalmucks followed suit.

Interesting, but too confusing and long, are the twistings and turnings of the Phenician root through the magadhic and other alphabets of India, of Numidia, and of Ethiopia. Nor can we take the time to even glance at Zendish, the Pahlavic, the Himyaritic, and the other thousand and one subdivisions of our subject.

As peoples and religions grew in strength, so, in the same ratio, was their mode of writing learned by or imposed upon other peoples; hence it is that one epoch in history shows the preponderance of one system or language over that of another, perhaps inferior to the former. It was evolution, if you wish, but not an evolution based upon scientific progression. Now no nation penetrated further into the "contiguous territory of the enemy" than did the Romans so it can not matter for much surprise that the Latin alphabet was carried so far and wide. And where it was not implanted on the point of the lance as it were, made the "official" alphabet of the conquered region, it was more peacefully introduced by the apostles and early missionaries of the church.

The formation and application of the Latin alphabet, with its resultant writing, may be divided into three sections for our study. The first comprises the period from its beginning up the thirteenth century A. D.; the second on up to the sixteenth century; and the third to our own times.

During the first, and much of the second period, capitals were used in all inscriptions upon all coins and other important places, but they had lost much of their majestic form and regularity; they hardly bore any resemblance to the fine old lettering found upon the friezes of the earlier temples and basilicae. They became well named; they were called "rustic". To hide the fact that people could not draw them as accurately as of old, the corners were rounded off, exaggerated tails were fixed, and much flourishing was resorted to. Besides, much less capitalization was used; little letters predominated in the manuscripts of that period. The goose-quill came into use about the seventh century and was responsible for much cursive, scratchy writing.

The second period might be called a perfecting, upon almost entirely new lines, of the first's debased forms. What we call the "Gothic", a really pretty writing, came into vogue. It lent itself admirably to the art of the illuminator, who reached the very top-most rung of the ladder of perfection in the fifteenth century. The missals and Bibles and public documents, yes, even the private letters done by the scribes of those days, were marvels of pictorial as well as of chirographic art.

The multiplicity of deeds and other legal forms, the exigencies of commerce, and the growing tendency to record events and impressions, and the awakening of the people from the literary lethargy of the Middle Ages, impelled inventors to devise something easier, cheaper, and quicker than fingers and pens to make books and copies. Guttenberg supplied the needed improvement, and from his time may be dated the downfall of writing as an art. Stenography and the typewriter have completed the work.

Some scientists are craning their necks awaiting the coming of some new form of writing or alphabet. They argue that we have reached but another step in the evolution of language and expression; that Volapuk, Esperanto, or some other mode of expression and signs not now thought of, will be the perfected outcome of their efforts. Our best authorities agree, however, that we have built the completed structure, that nothing better can be done. We may devise new and more rapid typesetting processes, and speak into phonographs that will reel off finished books at the other end, but our alphabet, our expression, our form of speech and its reduction to legible duplication can not be improved upon. And why are they not right? Is it not so with art, for instance? We have photography, engraving, lithograph, for reproducing pictures; automatic tools, pneumatic carving appliances for statuary, wonderful facilities for building that our fathers knew not of; but I think the reader will agree with me that the limit of perfection and beauty and originality in painting, in sculpture and in architecture was reached some time ago.

At times it is with regret that I contemplate all this typewriting and printing and dictation to feminine or mechanical ears. It all robs us of the great advantage there used to be in "reading writing". As we can trace the civilization and refinement of the early races through their inscriptions and papyri, so we used to be able to trace the characteristics, the nature, the very thoughts almost of our correspondents when they used to write to us. To-

day all letters are the same, they all wear the blue or green masked type-face and are words, merely words! The character, the soul is not there. I have before me, as I write—I am an old-fashioned fellow and have not yet learned the new-fangled typewriting or dictation system, and may I long be preserved from it!—the original or fac-simile writing of many celebrities, and how clearly that writing shows me their personality; writing is indeed an open book with double indexes to character. There is the small, neat and legible handwriting of Grover Cleveland. You think a great man, a big man in every sense of the word, must needs write a great dashing hand? Not at all. Look at that writing. To the uninitiated it looks "clerky". It is the writing of a thinker, an original thinker, a man who can and will do big things and who brooks no opposition while he is doing them. Another writing not unlike this is Edison's, small and almost "copper plate" in its regularity, and the two men are not unlike. There is Sarah Bernhardt's, written not a year ago, getting a wee bit shaky, but still the scratchy, nervous jabs of genius. See how dissimilar is Chamberlain's from Salisbury's; and could two men be more unlike? Note the painstaking and exact yet sure writing of Pasteur and Jules Verne's is of the same order; the gentlemanly and self-satisfied writing of Lowell, and who would take Thomas Carlyle's writing for anyone's else or for writing at all for that matter? And Robespierre's and Napoleon's, the lamented Victoria's and McKinley's, and Hanna's and the rest of them, the mighty ones; interesting all, and sad the thought that this art of writing is so fast becoming obsolete. Scarce have we a man's signature now to gauge his character by; and what will future generations do when they wish to trace this or that trait through the present age, when they have nothing to judge by, save the everlasting same Remington or Underwood or Smith, or the hundred other indistinguishable blue or black, English, French, German or Italian marks we are making today? Mere "speaking signs" indeed.

THE MEANING OF LIBERAL STUDY.

BY HENRY BRADFORD SMITH.

THE historical connotations, which words acquire, yield many times a true insight into the habits of men's thought. The word "liberal" in its origin and, when attached to a substantive, means "free". When is an intellectual pursuit free, catholic, humane, disinterested? Such synonymes are often used to suggest a meaning when analysis has failed, but suggestions they remain, as prone to lead us astray as they are to clarify our thinking.

They point, however, to distinctions, which may well be considered in their turn. An insight is *catholic*, when it is alive to more than a single point of view and when it is aware that points of view conflict. One possesses this trait, if he can step into another's boots, if he can with sympathy look out upon the world through other men's spectacles. If our souls were less intimately chained to our corporeal being and could from time to time take up their abode in other clay, prejudice would no doubt be moderated and that decentralization of the ego, which is the first condition of a catholic taste, would be supremely aided.

A mind's attitude is *humane*, when it has come to rate its own point of view as of no more worth than that of other minds. It may rate its own opinion higher than another's but not because it is its *own*. A not uncommon illusion is that one which tells us that there is something unique about our private insights and it is this illusion, which a humane culture will dissipate.

The pursuit of truth is *disinterested* when it has ceased to serve and gratify our merely private desires. A condition of this pursuit is a recognition that the order of nature does not invariably conform to human wishes, that this order possesses a dignity that surpasses one's own small place in the world, that demands, accordingly, something that approaches an absolute respect.

Our tentative analysis, then, yields this result: A man is free in so far as this decentralization of himself has been profoundly brought about and liberal studies are precisely those best calculated to produce this same effect. It is clear that our list of liberal pursuits will contain none that produce merely vocational aptitudes, for these have an eye to private and, indirectly, an eye to public advantage of a different sort. A man may gain his private aims the more effectually because of a liberal education or he may renounce his private aims the more intelligently for the like reason. It is not the purpose of a liberal education, if our analysis be correct, to effect these or any other concrete ends. Rather it will leave the result in the case of each one the less determinable, the less easy to predict. In a word it will leave one *free*. It will provide one with so many sided an outlook upon the world, that his decision to make of himself what he will, will be based upon what may fairly be called a rational ground. He will have become a responsible agent and will accept the consequences of his decision as those of his own choosing.

Suppose on the other hand that the public curriculum has become "vocationalized", in recognition of the fact that the majority can never receive a liberal training. You propose to prepare this child, who is the father of the man, for "life", you say. Yea, for life, but not for a life of his own choosing. You have got hold of him, too young to judge, and by a special education, you have settled his destiny in advance, you have made the possibility of future choice abortive. This is the essential sin against the holy spirit of man. It is also the stuff of which social revolutions are made, for deep down in his heart he will harbor his resentment. His destiny has not been one of his own making and he is in no way bound to accept its consequences. In point of fact where lies the richest soil for social unrest? Is it not among the class of vocationally trained, who feel that they have been some how deprived of their spiritual birthright? In this direction lies one of the most deep-seated causes of moral discontent.

Liberal studies then are those that produce the free man and the free man is he who can justify his acts and in some sense his very destiny on rational grounds. Suppose a man, who is by temperament a non-conformist, impelled to oppose some social convention which he judges to be false. His effort fails and the community regards him as a crank. That is to say, he is rated not a person of sane judgment and so not as a free man, but rather as the victim

of his own misguided temperament. The man himself, however, knows his family history. He reflects that his father and some of his remoter ancestors had experiences like his own; that they not infrequently espoused a cause which failed at first but which triumphed in the end. "I am a chip of the old block", he says to himself and finds no little satisfaction in the thought. And why? Because his own behavior is no longer an isolated fact. It has been rationalized because shown to be a case of something that is operating in a universal sense. He is so far a free man and a responsible being because he has given his act an abstract meaning. Everyone who commits a crime will attempt a moral justification, because behavior that has not been rationalized is not the behavior of a free agent. The adolescent child would be less troubled by the emotions which stir him, if he should understand that they are normal concomitants of his development.

Royce somewhere remarks in substance, that it is those misfortunes of life that cannot be foreseen, which particularly discourage us—those slips of destiny, the fruit of a seemingly hard and unrelenting providence. A man must be an optimist indeed, who imagines that scientific prophesy will one day banish all the tragedy, with which our common human nature is beset. Now liberal studies are those which create the free man and they do this by saving him from the grasp of grosser circumstance. They prepare for life but for no particular life, for no special vocation. Their applications will, accordingly, be incidental to their pursuit and not ends in themselves. They will purport to furnish a general theory of the universe, to which the particularities of daily life may be attached. The world of common experience is a collection of concrete objects largely out of conscious relation to one another. The liberally trained mind is forever seeking out the connections of things, uniting the discreet parts of the world in one intelligible whole, interpolating, filling in, creating continuity, bringing individual facts under an abstract point of view.

It is clear that our list of liberal studies will contain besides the philosophical disciplines the pure as well as the experimental sciences. But it will not be manifest that literature in its various forms will fall within the scope of our definition. A few considerations, however, will be enough to show that such is really the case. De Quincey was fond of distinguishing between what he termed the literature of knowledge and the literature of power. It is the literature of power that stirs the fancy, that gives wing to the imagina-

tion of man. But this distinction is relative, for be it known that every act of knowing is as much an act of the imagination as the recognition of a fact. There is a deal of knowledge which cannot be expressed in the technical language of a science, for example, those insights into human nature which satire reveals. Such truths are but partially expressed, they may even remain inarticulate, in the absence of any genuinely literary art. Insight and the art of expression must go hand in hand. A good style is so far a wasted acquisition if it be not the instrument of a fine intellect.

The disinterested interest in truth for its own sake, which it is the end of a liberal training to awaken and foster in each man, is in some rough sense a measure of his intellectual power, for it feeds upon success. A liberal training is a voyage of discovery among the islands of abstraction, among the facts and fancies of the representative intellect. For the most the routes are charted in advance. The traveler must serve his nautical apprenticeship before he ventures into unknown seas. The higher adventures reserve themselves for those who have the will to seek them out and the wit to carry them through.

But the disinterested interest in truth for its own sake is more than all this. It is the very soul and substance of our human progress. Had the Greek geometers professed no curiosity in the properties of conic sections, the science of navigation and many another science would not have been born. There was no domain in the vast regions of pure and applied mathematics, which Carl Friedrich Gauss did not enrich with his masterly contributions but he was impatient of the demand that theory should justify itself by applications. "No one, thank God, has yet been able to apply his knowledge practically in this field", he said in substance of that non-Euclidean geometry, whose existence he was the first to recognize and whose content he was the first to develop. The work of Marconi became possible for the first time, when the theoretical labors of Faraday, Maxwell and Hertz had been consummated. The American genius for practical inventions, of which we are prone to boast over-much, depends upon scientific research, which calls for genius of a rarer sort. Industrial triumphs occur as almost necessary incidents, when liberal knowledge has reached its full fruition.

Today we profess an unbounded faith in the power of public education to cure our social ills, but we may well fear lest the stream become polluted. The more enlightened men are the more free will they become. The eighteenth century, a time in which so much

of our political liberty was won, might yield us many a warning. That supreme optimist, the Frenchman Condorcet, says: "Political enlightenment is the immediate sequence of the progress of the sciences". But "let us not challenge the oppressors (the princes) to league themselves together against reason; let us carefully conceal from them the close and inevitable connection between enlightenment and liberty; let us not teach them beforehand that a nation free from prejudice soon becomes a free nation."

NEW ALTARS.

BY ETHEL TALBOT SCHEFFAUER.

She with her iron hands
To whom the peoples bowed,
Throned above all the lands,
Once called aloud:

Bring unto me the young men,
With flowers and with mirth,
Bold songs shall be sung then
In all the earth.

Honor and fame will I buy them,
They that are young and brave,
After, I will deny them
Even a grave.

They shall be flung like rain
Over the wailing ground—
None of these many slain
Shall more be found.

And men came to her altars,
Young men and old,
And women with fiery psalters
And flowers and gold.

Fools, caught by her wonder,
Thronging over the lands,
Saw not her claws of plunder,
Nor her iron hands.

The blood-wave heavy and tidal,
Swept over many a race.
Would it had taken the Idol
And rolled her from her place!

That the repentant nations,
Slowly, each one alone,
Might seek in forgotten patience,
Stone by stone.

Slabs for the new altar
Where the new god shall reign,
Before whom the old gods falter,
Hallowing his fane.

Whose words are pity and sorrow,
Whose words can build
The temple of to-morrow
For freedom's guild.

With no mistrust of a neighbor,
Nor hate, nor envy, nor fear—
A white altar of labor,
A gold altar of cheer—

An altar of freedom and peace,
Glowing out of the sand,
And bidding the tumults cease
In every land.

This is the new fane,
With tears of longing wet—
But the peoples hope in vain,
For none is building yet.

MISCELLANEOUS

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

L'Évangile Arménien: édition phototypique du manuscrit No. 229 de la Bibliothèque d'Étchmiadzin. Publiée sous les auspices de M. Léon Mantacheff. Par Frédéric Macler. Paris: Geuthner, 1920, 4to., pp. 27+464.

Another Gospel study of 1914 has reached us at last. Professor Macler, of the National School of Living Eastern Languages, has given us the famous manuscript of 989, in the Patriarchal Library of the Armenian Church on Mount Ararat. This is the codex which inserts the words, "Presbyter Ariston's" between Mark xvi, 8 and 9, thus ascribing the spurious Appendix to another hand. The significance of this has been already well debated, and the latest authority, Clarence Williams, discounts the insertion on the score of the late date and its utter isolation in the Armenian records. It is, he thinks, the remark of a reader of Eusebius, and this is in line with a similar remark, in a London manuscript, on the Adultery Section in John, ascribing it to the Syrian Gospel and the influence of Papias.

The present codex is the first to introduce the Mark Appendix and the Adultery Section in John into the Armenian Holy Gospel. Apart from these additions, the manuscript belongs to the ancient type, omitting "Son of God" in Mark I.1, the Bloody Sweat in Luke, the angel stirring up the water (John v. 4) and of course the double refrain about the undying worm (Mark ix. 44 and 46). The Adultery Section in John it has in an unusual form, and we already knew that this apocryphal paragraph was liable to such free treatment.

Professor Macler, in 1919, also published the Armenian text of Matthew and Mark (*Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études*, Vol. 28), but no copy has yet reached me.

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS.



GIORDANO BRUNO

1548-1600

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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GIORDANO BRUNO—HIS LIFE AND MISSION.

BY ALBERTA JEAN ROWELL.

WHEN one contemplates the turbulent albeit noble life of that illustrious Italian, Giordano Bruno, whose uncompromising devotion to Truth—which love the philosopher Locke regarded as the “principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seedplot of all other virtues”—culminated in the stake, the memory, by the exercise of that most infallible law, which Aristotle first discovered and designated as the Law of Association, invokes the venerated names of some few other exalted ones. They are Socrates, Jesus, Savanarola and Voltaire, whose unswerving loyalty to the Ideal, compelled the gods to grant to them the palm of immortality!

On the hundredth anniversary of Voltaire's death, Victor Hugo delivered an eloquent and impassioned oration. The former, like Giordano Bruno, was the implacable enemy of a despotic, overweening priestcraft, which would coerce the ignorant, irrational, superstitious and trembling rabble into an acceptance of incomprehensible dogmas and petrifying creeds. The mission of Voltaire was the mission of Bruno. In his characteristic vivid, dramatic and terse style, Hugo dilates upon the function of Voltaire.

“To combat Pharisaism; to unmask imposture; to overthrow tyranny, usurpations, prejudices, falsehoods, superstitions; to demolish the temple in order to rebuild it, that is to say, to replace the false by the true; to attack a ferocious magistracy; to attack a sanguinary priesthood; to take a whip and drive the money-changers from the sanctuary, to reclaim the heritage of the disinherited; to protect the weak, the poor, the suffering, the overwhelmed, to struggle for the persecuted and oppressed—that was the war of Jesus Christ! And who waged that war? It was Voltaire.”

Bruno was born in the year 1548, in the vicinity of the little idyllic, Italian town of Nola, when Naples was knowing anxieties and tribulations from fear of a premeditated introduction of the Spanish Inquisition within the boundaries of her fair and peaceful city. Gioan and Francesca Bruno named their baby son Felipe (Philip). Yet he was to be known to the world not as Philip, but Giordano, a supremely dignified appellation later conferred upon him by the monastery of St. Dominico. Nola had gained a lasting renown from its heroic resistance to Hannibal after the slaughter of Canae. Here, where the air was sweet and balmy and the skies were azure blue; where the bountiful vineyards yielded the vermilion grape and the plains were rich and golden with the gleaming corn; where the dying day sighed its last along the purple hills and at eventide surrendered her kingdom to the moon and stars—the little Felipe spent his early years. Endowed with the susceptibility of the poet to all living beauty, he early drank draughts of the heavenly nectar. The simple, volcanic and pleasure-loving Nolan folk, sensitive likewise to the all-prevading glory of their native place, had called it Campagna Felice (the happy fields). When in later years, Giordano Bruno, a homeless wanderer upon the face of the earth; when like his noble predecessor Dante he had come to realize how 'savoreth of salt the bread of others and how hard the climbing up and down another's stairs, a mighty longing would well up in his soul again in the retrospect of detached and melancholy moments for those happy, golden plains of his birthplace which he had deemed only justly comparable to the garden of the Hesperides. But it appears also that in common with other Nolans, Bruno was inclined to be superstitious. In the ancient and deserted temples, the Nolans witnessed the fitful visits of earthbound souls, while Bruno himself maintains that he beheld spirits on hills where the beeches and laurels grew.

Even as Renan has imaginatively depicted the youthful Jesus, in a reverent posture, wrapped in holy mediation upon the lofty mountaintop, which revealed to him an appalling and infinite vista, so the child Bruno would pass many a night on the mountain Cicada and under the dream-mellow rays of moonlight and the distant lamps of Heaven, abandon himself to solemn musings. The stars signified to his awesome and pious soul the infinitude of Time, Space and Experience. His favorite expression—"My thoughts are stitched to the stars"—which his English contemporary, John Lyly, originated, rendered him impervious to calumny, penury, per-

secution and pain. The latter recalls the Emersonian dictum—"Hitch your wagon to a star." Said Latini, who pointed out to Dante the way to find Eternity, "Follow thy star and it cannot help but lead thee to a glorious port." Mazzini, the great Italian patriot and religieux, when imprisoned in a vile dungeon, through a small aperture was enabled to contemplate the sea and sky, two sublime symbols to him of the Infinite. The latter was a profound consolation and an eternal source of inspiration, which sustained Mazzini in moments of direst distress and poignant sorrow. He was thus enabled to transcend all sensibility to inharmony and pain.

At thirteen years of age, Giordano Bruno entered the monastery of St. Domenico. For nearly thirteen years he studied natural science and recondite philosophy, familiarizing himself with classical and ancient lore. He absorbed Neo-Platonism with avidity. He was particularly fascinated by the Neo-Platonic doctrine of illumination. Plotinus and other Alexandrian scholars had declared that Truth or the Absolute could be comprehended by intuitive insight only and not by discursive thought. Porphyry said that Plotinus in ecstatic vision, experienced mystic communion with the Absolute, which he defined as "a flight from the alone to the alone," wherein there is "an absorption in a sublime tranquility." Moreover Bruno acquainted himself with the Pythagorean symbolism of numbers and the Orphic wisdom of Greece.

In his eighteenth year Bruno began to doubt the church doctrine of the Trinity. He regarded the Father, Son and Holy Ghost as attributes of the Deity or One. In the Inferno of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, the frightful picture of Lucifer, the arch-fiend who is imbedded in ice, exhibits a triple aspect. The three persons of the Holy Trinity—Power, Wisdom and Love—have their hideous counterpart in the three faces of Satan. On the right, the sallow visage which munches Cassius in the mouth, typifies weakness, the antithesis of Power; on the left, the face as black as night, which chews at Brutus, signifies Ignorance, the opposite of Wisdom; the central, red visage, from the mouth of which Judas Iscariot, the arch-traitor is dangling, expresses Hate which is opposed to Love. Dante lived in the thirteenth century and was an apostle of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose writings he studied with zeal. Even St. Augustine was rather adverse to the literal interpretation of the Divine Trilogy of Persons. In fact all subscribed to the doctrine of the "language of accommodation"—that the bible "condescends to a comprehension of our faculties."

But the thinker who exercised the most potent influence upon the career and philosophy of Giordano Bruno was Copernicus. The physics and cosmogony of Aristotle, then popular with the schoolmen and incorporated into the dogmas of the church, were administered a mortal blow by the new cosmology of Copernicus. But the works of Copernicus found favor neither with the enlightened intellects of the Renaissance nor the Church; the former because they believed the dignity of man would be violated by an infinite extension of the heavens; and the latter because they believed that all ecclesiastical dogmas would perish with the refutation of one. But a perusal of the works of Copernicus demonstrated to Bruno his life's mission—that of promulgating a new theology and metaphysics which would correspond to the new cosmology. It was within convent walls that Giordano Bruno first realized his lofty destiny.

After attaining his twenty-fourth year, Bruno spent three years performing his priestly functions, reading masses and delivering sermons. His comedy, "The Chandler," depicts in a bright vivid style and pungent satire the demoralization of contemporaries, exposing the Personifications of the three vices, Stupidity, Rascality and Hypocrisy to the utmost ridicule and contempt. A satirical poem, "The Ark of Noah," also appeared in 1570.

On ascertaining that works by so-called heretical writers were found among his possessions at Naples, Bruno quickly severed all connection with his order, and as an excommunicated and fugitive monk, wandered forlorn and almost destitute about the Roman Campagna. In the year 1576 he broke his monastic vows and pledged himself to follow the "white star of Truth" whithersoever she might lead. It was then Bruno commenced his protracted wanderings throughout Europe, which lasted over fifteen years. The missionary zeal, the spiritual energy and inward fire to proclaim the truth, which consumed his spirit, would not permit him to settle for any length of time in one place. It was while in old London, England, that Bruno wrote some of his most important philosophical works. Nevertheless his attack on Aristotelianism landed him in numerous difficulties, even in tolerant England.

While in Paris, prior to his landing in England, Bruno by reason of his marvelous gifts, had aroused the interest of King Henry III who summoned him to appear before him. Bruno possessed a prodigious memory. He demonstrated to the satisfaction of the king that he had acquired the latter by natural means. He

also dedicated a pamphlet to his majesty, entitled *The Shadow of Ideas*—a dissertation on the Lullian art, for it was from Lulla he derived the fundamental principles for his system of mnemonics. In addition to presenting an improved art of remembering, *The Shadow of Ideas* contains an outline of the philosophy, then embraced by the writer. The doctrines expounded in his book are Neo-Platonic. Bruno accepts the theory of universal animism,—that the spirit of the One or God pervades every atom of the cosmos. But God is transcendent as well as immanent. Bruno bases his system of mnemonics upon the following main premise: our ideas being shadows of truths, we use the shadows (words) of these shadows (ideas) in mnemonics.

Throughout this work, Bruno is constantly reinforcing his own arguments by truths culled from mediæval and ancient philosophy, even not disdaining the classical myth, for with Dante, Swedenborg, Madame Blavatsky, Emerson and other mystical and philosophical writers he believed all present truths symbolic of higher truths. Truth in the Absolute was an unattainable star. Madame De Stael, the French authoress who has been called the child of the French Revolution, subscribed to an analogous theory. She contended that between reason and Truth an eternal and indissoluble harmony pre-exists. The style of Bruno is rough-hewn, possessing the spontaneity of an abundant imagination with something of the elemental fire of Aeschylus. From sparks and smouldering fires he bursts into mighty conflagrations. He is constantly diverging from his main theme, to which he returns again with lightning-like rapidity, after a brief skirmish in its thought vicinity. Although his bombast, dogmatism, often to the degree of harshness, his vulgar buffoonery and obscenity might antagonise the admirer of modern literature, his contemporaries utilized the identical setting, for the age deemed its entertainment considerably enhanced thereby.

The comedy entitled *The Chandler*, which he wrote ten years ago, he rewrote during his residence in Paris. Although the characters are abstract types and the play is redundant with indelicate allusions, still these artistic foibles did not detract from its eminent uniqueness, for it has been adjudged by the foremost critics as quite "sui generis"—presenting an innovation in the comedy. The vivacity of its dialogue has been compared to the French dramatist Aretino. *The Chandler*, in addition presents many similarities in style and mode of treatment to Plautus, Moliere and

Cyrano. Also its light, rollicking humour suggests Rabelais. In the play, Bruno exhibits the affectation, vanity and mental limitations of the foolish, pretentious pedant, Manfurio, who was the prototype no doubt of Holofernes in Shakespeare's *Love's Labour Lost* in all its gross indelicacy, vulgarity and aesthetic repulsiveness. Bonifacio and Bartolomeo typify the over-credulous who place a profound and unquestioned trust in the occult powers of alchemists, magicians and the "powder of Christ" of designing members of the priesthood who made merchandise of the fetishes of childish, superstitious and ignorant minds. In the dedication of the *The Chandler*, Bruno propounds his doctrine of The One: "I need not instruct you of my belief; Time gives all and takes all away; everything changes but nothing perishes; One only is immutable, eternal and ever endures, one and the same with itself. With this philosophy my spirit grows, my mind expands. Whereof, however obscure the night may be, I await daybreak, and they who dwell in day look for night Rejoice therefore, and keep whole, if you can, and return love for love." Believing as he did in the immanence of God, Bruno regarded the vices as inversions of their corresponding virtues, nay their necessary counterpart even as the gross matter of the candle furnishes the radiant flame.

Bruno's ardent, fiery temperament, with its absolute disregard for his own safety, coupled with his missionary zeal, urged him to depart from France and promulgate his doctrines on English soil. Accordingly equipped with credentials from the French king, Bruno presented himself at the home of Michel de Castelnau de Mauvissiere, French ambassador in London. At Oxford, Bruno introduced himself by issuing a pamphlet, *Thirty Seals*. There he lectured on the Copernican system, the Pythagorean Symbolism of numbers, the immortality of the soul and his own doctrine of the infinitude of the solar systems. His ideas couched in a self-assertive and tortuous language aroused tremendous opposition. On those pedants who clung obstinately to the tenets of Aristotle, also excusing the "defects of their divinity," Bruno conferred the satirical sobriquet of "parrot."

In conformity with the pompous and voluminous diction of the age, Bruno, in his superb contempt of censure and convention, and boundless self-confidence, penned the following high-sounding epistle to the Vice-Chancellor and dons of the university of Oxford, prior to his brief instatement there: "Jordanus Bruno

of Nola, lover of God, doctor in a more perfect divinity, professor of a purer and more harmless wisdom, a philosopher, known, esteemed and honorably entreated by the foremost academies of Europe, a stranger to none but churls and barbarians, the awakener of souls from slumber, the queller of presumptuous and recalcitrant ignorance, one who showeth in all his actions, the love he beareth to all men, whether Briton or Italian, female or male, whether bearing the mitre or the crown, the gown or the sword, the cowl or without one; but who chiefly yearns for the man whose converse is peaceful, human, true and profitable; he who seeks not for an anointed head or a crossed brow, for the washed hand or him that is circumcised, but for those true lineaments of man which be his soul and trained understanding; one who is abhorred of them that spread foolishness and are but petty dissemblers, but whom men proven and in earnest love, and who is applauded by the nobler sort"

The bourgeois character of the dons did not escape the observation of Bruno nor evade his caustic and bitter sarcasm. He had stated that the dons knew much more about beer than they knew about Greek, which no doubt contained a grain of truth. The Oxfordians in their turn retaliated by giving vent to a sneer at the "excitable, gesticulating foreigner, hairy as Pan."

Bruno, despite the fact that his soul was replete with the music of lofty and immortal thoughts; in spite, too, of his profound gratitude and penetrative insight, was not without his shortcomings. His supreme self-confidence and missionary zest rendered him irritable, vain, resentful, passionate and indiscreet. But like the Crippon, that mythical animal who possessed the head and forepart of an eagle with the body of a lion, symbolic of the divine and human, Bruno, borne aloft upon his eagle pinions, could mount heavenward to the stars or with eyes bent in fixed gaze upon the earth, remain oblivious to his noble destiny! The great, even with the common herd, partake of the sum of human weaknesses to a greater or lesser degree. What Robert Louis Stevenson observed of the life of Goethe, who ranks with the immortals, may be appropriately applied to Bruno. The extreme ethical opposites revealed in the conduct of Goethe, demonstrated to Stevenson how greatness and weakness may co-exist in the one soul without diminishing admiration one whit for the expressed virtues.

In company with the French ambassador Castelnau, Bruno repeatedly appeared at the court of Elizabeth. There he was espe-

cially welcomed, for Elizabeth boasted of her knowledge of Italian and took a pride in surrounding her court with gentlemen who had visited Italy and rendered themselves conversant with Italian literature. The extreme enthusiasts returned to their native England to display some "strange, antic tricks," which was the unmistakable indication of an Italian education. Shakespeare immortalized these superfluous mannerisms through the mouth of Rosalind: "Look you lisp . . . , etc., etc., or I will scarcely think you have swam in a gondola." The queen, Bruno eulogized in extravagant terms, well-nigh exhausting the language of adulation, in that age a point of etiquette when addressing monarchs. He named her the great Amphidrite. While at the court Bruno came into close touch with Sir Philip Sidney, a devotee of Petrarchism, who dedicated sentimental and romantic verses to a lady from whom he had stolen a kiss in youth. With his characteristic tactlessness, Bruno made some supercilious observations, adjuring him to substitute a worship of imperishable wisdom for the perishable charms of body or personality.

It is said that Bruno had the Horatian contempt for the rabble. In fact he even went so far as to maintain that sublime truths should be invested in the obscurity of symbol and allegory, that it might not confuse the crass ignorance and stupidity of the vulgar mob. The hatred of the English for the foreigner is traditional. Bruno evidently was not beloved of the English populace, for in a chain of abusive epithets he describes them: "England can boast a common people which will yield to none other in disrespect, outlandishness, boorishness, savagery and bad bringing up."

Bruno's *The Ash-Wednesday Supper* gives a vivid if repelling picture of the English savants, who with "the souls of geese that bear the shape of men," regale themselves on a miscellaneity of viands, after which they discourse on the Copernican cosmology whilst defending Aristotelian physics and cosmology with its division of space into a celestial and earthly region, upon which Dante based his *Divina Commedia*. At this supper Bruno explains his theories relating to the heavens. He maintained that the scintillation of stars is due to the fact that they give forth their own light while Venus does not twinkle because it simply reflects light. Also the atmosphere of the earth rotates with her. His truly sublime theory was the doctrine of the infinitude of worlds. According to Bruno the center is the middle around which any-

thing revolves, but the doctrine of an infinitude of worlds implies an infinitude of centers. Moreover Bruno believed that the planets were inhabited, thus considerably weakening the fundamental, orthodox doctrines—that of fall and redemption through grace.

Bruno published numerous philosophical works in England and indeed his residence there was the most productive period of his life.

Germany next called to the restless zealot. There he spent a tolerably peaceful period, still disseminating his ideas as he traveled from place to place. He predicted a high destiny for the Germans: "Here," he said, "is being prepared the soil for the transplanting of wisdom from the lands of Greece and Italy. May Jupiter grant that the Germans may recognize their strength and strive to aim for the highest, and they will be no longer men, but rather resemble gods, for divine and god-like is their genius."

At last in an ill-fated moment Bruno accepted the invitation of the oscillating, weak, treacherous and irascible Mocenigo of Venice, to share his home and teach him the liberal arts and the sciences. His stay with Mocenigo was of short duration, the latter finally betraying him to the Inquisition for his refusal to stay longer with him.

He was incarcerated in the prison of Ancona for seven years, which living death was finally terminated by the dire doom inflicted upon him by the Roman Inquisition. In the year 1600, February 16, Giordano Bruno departed from this bourne of Time and Place upon a pyre which the flames greedily consumed, in the Campo dei Fiori (the field of flowers). He rendered up the ghost with those memorable words of Plotinus upon his lips: "Vast power was needed to reunite that which is divine in me with that which is divine in the universe!" Bruno was martyred in Jubilee year, when all Rome resounded with the merrymaking of good and bad and penitential psalms arose to Heaven.

But Bruno was the apostle of pain. He deemed sorrow a necessary mode of realization. This negative aspect of eternal joy is the golden spur. He had written with such a noble ardour: "O difficulties to be endured! cries the coward, the feather-head, the shuttle-cock, the faint-heart The task is not impossible though hard. The craven must stand aside. Ordinary, easy tasks are for the commonplace and the herd. Rare, heroic and divine men overcome the difficulties of the way and force an immortal palm from necessity. You may fail to reach your goal.

Run the race nevertheless. Put forth your strength in so high a business. Strive on with your last breath." Again he says, in defining his mission: "The Nolan has given freedom to the human spirit and made its knowledge free. It was suffocating in the close air of a narrow prison house, whence, but only through chinks, it gazed at the far-off stars. Its wings were clipped, so that it was unable to cleave the veiling cloud and reach the reality beyond."

It would be well to conclude with Bruno's own rapturous song, of which Boulting has rendered an excellent, free translation:

"Rising on wing secure, with burning heart,
 What fate may scare me, smiling at the tomb,
 Bursting all bonds and scorning gates of doom,
 Whence few are chosen for such lofty part?
 I soar beyond the mortal years, and start
 For regions where grim iron casts no gloom
 Nor adamant restrains. Forth from the womb,
 Free from the darkness, free and passionate, I dart.
 I dread no barrier of banished spheres;
 I cleave the sky, and other suns behold;
 Celestial worlds innumerable I see;
 One left, another company appears;
 My pinion fails not, and my heart is bold
 To journey on through all infinity."

PASSIVE RESISTANCE OR SOUL FORCE.

BY BLANCHE WATSON.

“Without Swaraj there is now no possibility of Peace in India.”
M. K. GANDHI.

WHAT is “Swaraj?”

According to Mahatma Gandhi, it is the right of a people to manage their own affairs, i. e., it means Self-government. It has been said that India is not fit to govern itself. To this Gandhi replies, “He who has no right to err, can never be forward. The history of the commons is a history of blunders.” “Swaraj”, says this great leader of the Indian people, “can only be built upon the assumption that most of what is national, is on the whole, sound.” This means that back of and above Swaraj must be the “Swadeshi” spirit, the spirit that is symbolized more particularly by the wearing of the national dress made of Indian-made materials, but which means the cherishing of whatever is inherent in the development of the national life.

In the introduction to his little book *Hind Swaraj** or “Indian Self-Government” Gandhi says:

* Published by S. Ganesan & Co., Triplicane, Madras, India.

“It teaches the gospel of love in place of that of hate. It replaces violence with self-sacrifice. It pits soul-force against brute force. The booklet is a severe condemnation of ‘modern civilization.’ It was written in 1908. My conviction is deeper today than ever. I feel that if India would discard ‘modern civilization’ she would only gain by doing so.”

This book is a difficult book to interpret with justice both to the author and the reader one sets out to reach. The Western mind needs to re-orient itself to take in the thought and particularly the spirit of this man whose own personal life may be said to have been modelled after the “Sermon on the Mount.”

Godliness, to him, is the fundamental requisite for the carrying out of a scheme of non-co-operation wholly by means of non-violent methods backed by the power of Love.

"Khilafat cannot be saved," he says, "The Punjab humanity cannot be redressed, without godliness—for godliness means change of heart,—in political language changing the angle of vision."

In his own words here is his program:

- (1) Cultivating the spirit of non-violence.
- (2) Setting up Congress organizations in every village.
- (3) Introducing the spinning wheel in every home and manufacturing all the cloth, required for our wants, through the village weaver.
- (4) Collecting as much money as possible.
- (5) Promoting Hindu-Moslem unity and
- (6) Ridding Hinduism of the curse of 'untouchability' and otherwise purifying ourselves by avoiding intoxicating drinks and drugs.

Such a program, followed in the letter and the spirit, Gandhi has said would establish Swaraj in India in nine months. It would do more than that, it would revolutionize Revolution—indeed it would sooner or later revolutionize every phase of the world's activity!

The words "otherwise purifying ourselves", as Gandhi uses them, are of great significance and are capable of wide application. In answering his critics, who had misinterpreted his views on medicine he says:

"The present science of medicine is divorced from religion. . . . A clean spirit must build a clean body. Let us hope and pray that we may witness a definite attempt on the part of physicians to bring about a re-union between the body and the soul."

Article 2 of Gandhi's program may well be taken to heart by all who would in any way change the existing order of things. "What is really needed," he says, "is not a large measure of sacrifice but ability to organize and to take simple concerted action." The reader will notice that he says organize in 'every village.' Every home, he asserts, must have the spinning wheel and 'every village should become self-supporting for its cloth.' And this means Swadeshi!

But it is Article 1 of this remarkable program that rivets one's attention. In a recent issue of his paper, "Young India", Gandhi says:

"The success of our movement depends upon our ability to control all the forces of violence on our side. . . . I want India to realize that she has a soul which cannot perish and which can rise

triumphant over every physical weakness and defy the physical might of the whole world. . . . Non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering."

How people have murdered each other from the beginning of history is a matter of record, Gandhi points out. "But", he says, "if this were all that had happened in the world it would have been ended long ago. . . . The fact that there are so many men still alive in the world shows that it is based not on the force of arms but on the force of truth or love. . . . In spite of the wars of the world it still lives on."

His statement that history as written "Is a record of an *interruption* of the course of nature"—that soul force is natural and so, not noted in history—brings to mind the comment of Mr. H. G. Wells on Napoleon, to the effect that he was an "aggravated interruption" and a "pestilential nuisance." And Gandhi's characterization of passive resistance as "refusal to do a thing that violates one's conscience" recalls Thoreau's oft-repeated answer to Emerson's question as to why he was in jail on the charge of refusing to pay his taxes. In this connection it is interesting to note, that, among the books which Gandhi recommends for study and reference are two essays by this little-read and much under-estimated American writer, namely, "Life Without Principle" and "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience." The following words of the great Indian leader are strangely reminiscent of Thoreau:

"A man who has realized his manhood, who fears only God, will fear no one else. . . . If man will only realize that it is unmanly to obey laws that are unjust, no man's tyranny will enslave him. This is the key to self-rule."

Strength, to Gandhi, means the absence of fear, not the quantity of flesh and muscle in one's body, nor the keen edge of one's sword. "Passive Resistance," he declares, "is an all-sided sword; it blesses him who uses it and him against whom it is used. Without drawing a drop of blood, it produces far-reaching results. . . . It is the weapon of strength and power. . . . Those who defy death are free from all fear. That nation is great which rests its head upon death as its pillow!" The English expression "Passive Resistance," Gandhi has declared more recently does not give the exact meaning of what he has in mind. *Satyagraha*, i. e., Truth-force conveys the meaning more correctly. It is soul-force as opposed to the force of arms.

"Both soul force and force of arms," says he, "have received

their due meed of praise. . . . They respectively represent forces of God and Evil. The Indian belief is that there was in this land a time when the forces of Good were predominant. That state still remains our ideal. Europe today furnishes a forcible illustration of predominance of the forces of Evil."

The principle of non-co-operation which is in reality the machinery by which Gandhi's program is being put through in India, was an outgrowth of the twenty-year struggle in South Africa where, with 160,000 of his countrymen behind him he fought for, and gained the full measure of recognition that they had demanded of the British government. Setting aside the negative form of the word, Non-co-operation is in reality the positive part of this singular revolutionary program. Non-co-operation means complete boycott of everything English—an amplified boycott that makes it an act of wrong-doing for an Indian to buy and use anything of English manufacture, to attend English schools, enter English courts or accept honors of any kind from that government.

In a word the rejection side of the program is not all. It is, to be sure, a process of retracing and unlearning, but it is more than that, for concurrently—it provides for the building up of a virile, independent India. It is a call to the Indians *not* to co-operate with the present environment that they may build a new and better one. Side by side with the rejection of the one thing is the acceptance of the other—which is nothing less than a better life, new life and more life for the down-trodden masses of their country. It demands that India return to itself, which must result in the creation of a free self-governing state to supersede the present dependent state. It means the building of the Panchayat or Village organization system, the reviving of Indian industries, the establishment of Indian arbitration courts, the starting of new schools; the creation of the will to live as a free nation. It is a call to the Indians not to co-operate with the present environment, but to build a new one. Says Gandhi to the English:

"Why should we operate with you when we know that by so doing we are being daily enslaved in an increasing degree? . . . I recognize your bravery and know that you will yield to bravery. . . . Bravery on the battlefield is impossible for us. Bravery of the Soul still remains open to us. I am invoking that bravery."

And this does not mean that Gandhi is narrowly nationalistic. Like all weapons Non-co-operation is to be laid aside as soon as it shall have served its purpose. Co-operation with all nations of

the earth must come after India has proved her worth and taken her right place in the family of nations. A program that is predicted on Love could not conceivably call for national isolation.

And now a word about Gandhi himself. Conel Wedgwood, an Englishman, writes of him in the London *Nation*:

"This saint or Mahatma has India at his feet. The intelligentsia differs from him in private, rarely in public: property differs from and trembles: the Government differs from, because he goes to the root of all government and thinks it best to wait. He is as serious as a child and as pure. One does not think it blasphemous to compare him to Christ. He is a Jain, particularly averse to taking life; and while still a child had already found the efficacy of non-resistance. Such cotton clothes as he has are hand-spun, hand-woven, and hand-made. His food (when not fasting) is too simple to create fear of goal fare. All this shows why he has a hold on India, the land of resignation, and why the fear of him grows."

The remarkable thing about his man is, that while he fights he loves. He is saying to the English, "I would not raise my hand against you even if I had the power. I expect to conquer you by my suffering." It is with the coin of suffering that Gandhi expects India to purchase its freedom. He wants the absolute independence of India, not for the benefit of the India people alone, but for the good of all human kind. The message that was Christ's two thousand years ago is Gandhi's today. On it rests the future of the world,—a word purged of violence and wrong. Gandhi is saying:

"Let the bugles sound the Truce of God to the whole world forever. Not to one people, but to every people let the glad tidings go."

MORAL PROGRESS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY.

BY VICTOR S. YARROS.

MUCH has been written lately about the imperative need of doing something in order that civilization may be saved or "salvaged." Humanity, we have been solemnly assured, is doomed, and our culture may perish, unless we accept this or that remedy for our social, economic and moral ills.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader of serious scientific literature dealing with social problems that the learned doctors disagree, as they have always disagreed in the past, concerning the nature and elements of the remedy required by the patient, civilized mankind. The patient would be deeply perplexed indeed were he, or it, to endeavor to follow the insistent advice of the physicians. However, the latter do agree that humanity is sick unto death. They shake their grave heads pessimistically. They are most anxious and depressed.

This mood of theirs does them credit, morally and emotionally speaking. They have the noblest of intentions. But are they justified in their pessimism? Is the patient as sick as they believe he is?

It is clear that an answer to these queries cannot be evolved out of one's inner consciousness. Freud and the subconscious cannot help us, either, to a sound, satisfactory answer. To find such an answer *we must go to history, to the human record*. Has humanity been in better health than now? If so, when, and when did it contract its present dangerous malady? What has happened to it?

Let us interrogate some one who has made an earnest and special study of our patient and knows the history of the case. Mr. H. G. Wells has given us his *Outline of History* for the very purpose of enabling us to draw comparisons and contrasts, to judge of the condition of humanity today in the light of its condition at various past stages of growth and development. We are in no wise obliged to accept Mr. Wells' own interpretation of historic events

and phases. We are free to ignore his lessons and morals, and to study his facts and charts with an open mind.

Let us contemplate some of the facts. Let us, so far as possible, clear our minds of prepossessions, fixed ideas, uncritical notions, and permit the facts to speak for themselves.

In the first place, then, as Mr. Wells observes in many relevant connections, "no man today is more than four hundred generations from the primordial savage." Civilization, therefore, is still in its infancy when we compare it with the age of our planet or the beginning of animal life upon it.

And what were the ways, habits and notions of the primordial savage? There have not been wanting efforts of sentimentalists and political metaphysicians to idealize the savage or the "state of nature." But what are the facts? To quote Mr. Wells:

"The idea of property arises out of the combative instincts of the species. Long before men were men the ancestral ape was a proprietor. Primitive property is what a beast will fight for. The dog and his bone, the tigress and her lair, the roaring stag and his herd, these are proprietorship blazing. No more nonsensical expression is conceivable than the term "primitive communism." The Old Man of the family tribe of early Palaeolithic times insisted upon his proprietorship in his wives and daughters, in his tools, in his visible universe. If any other man wandered into his visible universe, he fought him, and if he could, he slew him. The tribe grew in the course of ages, as Atkinson showed convincingly in his *Primal Law*, by the gradual toleration by the Old man of the existence of the younger men, and of their proprietorship in the wives they captured from outside the tribe, and in the tools and ornaments they made and the game they slew. Human society grew by a compromise between this one's property and that. It was largely a compromise and an alliance forced upon men by the necessity of driving some other tribe out of its visible universe. If the hills and forests and streams were not *your* land or *my* land, it was because they had to be *our* land. Each of us would have preferred it to have it *my* land, but that would not work. In that case the other fellows would have destroyed us. Society, therefore, is from its beginning the mitigation of ownership. Ownership in the beast and the primitive savage was far more intense a thing than it is in the civilized world today. In the natural savage and in the untutored man today there is no limitation to the sphere of ownership. Whatever you can fight for, you can own—women-folk, spared captive, captured beast, forest glade, stone pit or what not. . . . Men found themselves born into a universe all owned and claimed—nay, they found themselves born owned and claimed."

So much for the idea of property as entertained by the savage

and the untutored man of our own day. One may dispute Mr. Wells' affirmation that the idea of property arises out of our combative instincts, for it is possible to maintain that the will to live and the instinct of self-preservation, which, as we know, may lead to mutual aid rather than to warfare, give rise to the idea of property. But of the passion for property, the intense devotion to it, the readiness to fight for it, there can be no doubt. Even the men who give very generously when appealed to in the name of humanity, and who cheerfully tax themselves for all manner of public and semi-public enterprises of a benevolent character, will fiercely resent the slightest suggestion that their property, that to which they have a legal and an acknowledged right, may be taken from them *without* their genuine consent.

Now let us glance at the picture drawn by Mr. Worthington Smith, an authority cited by Mr. Wells, of "the very highest life in the world some fifty thousand years ago." What kind of a life was it? "Bestial," says Mr. Wells, and we cannot demur to his strong adjective. To quote from Mr. Smith's *Man the Primeval Savage*:

"The primeval savage was both herbivorous and carnivorous. . . . Primeval man would not be particular about having his flesh-food over-fresh. He would constantly find it in a dead state, and if semi-putrid, he would relish it none the less—the taste for high or half-putrid game still survives. If driven by hunger and hard pressed, he would perhaps sometimes eat his weaker companions or unhealthy children who happened to be feeble or unsightly or burdensome. . . .

"The savages sat huddled close together round their fire, with fruits, bones and half-putrid flesh. . . . Man at that time was not a degraded animal, for he had never been higher; he was therefore an exalted animal."

What were the family relations of this savage? Mr. Wells, following several authorities, gives us the following picture:

"The Old Man is the fully adult male in the little group. There are women, boys and girls, but so soon as the boys are big enough to rouse the Old Man's jealousy, he will fall foul of them and either drive them off or kill them. . . . Some day, when he is forty years old perhaps, or even older, and his teeth are worn down and his energy abating, some younger male will stand up to the Old Man and kill him and reign in his stead. There is probably short shrift for the old at the squatting-place. So soon as they grow weak and bad-tempered, trouble and death come upon them."

But all this is true only of the primeval savage! Well, we take a leap across the ages and pause to glance at the ways and practices

of the Neolithic man seven, six, five and even four thousand years ago.

The Old Man had developed into a tribal god, who had to be propitiated by sacrifices, mutilations and magic murder. "Neolithic man"—to quote Wells—"under the sway of talk and a confused thought process killed on theory; he killed for monstrous and now incredible ideas, he killed those he loved through fear and under direction. They not only made human sacrifices at seed-time, but there is reason to believe that they sacrificed wives and slaves at the burial of chieftains; they killed men, women and children whenever they were under adversity and thought the gods were athirst. They practiced infanticide."

Another leap brings us to the "aristocracy of the human race," the Israelites of Judea and Palestine. What a revolting, sanguinary story is that of the Hebrew nation! Wars of aggression, melancholy failures, disasters, humiliations; then kingship, the intrigues of David against Saul, and the story of David, which, as Mr. Wells says, "with its constant assassinations and executions reads rather like the history of some savage chief than of a civilized monarch." Solomon's reign opened in as bloody a manner as his father's. He was a wasteful and oppressive ruler, concludes Mr. Wells, and in religion unstable and superstitious. After the brief glory of the Hebrew state under Solomon we have a "tale of wars, of religious conflicts, of usurpations, assassinations and of fratricidal murders to secure the throne"—a tale "frankly barbaric."

From the Jews we turn to the Romans. In 264 B. C. the first gladiatorial combat took place at Rome, but the taste for these horrible combats grew rapidly, and "until the time of Seneca, first century A. D., there is no record of any protest from moralists or statesmen against this cruel and brutal business. The gladiators at first were prisoners of war; later criminals under death sentence were used; then slaves were freely sold to the trainers of gladiators; finally, dissipated young men adopted the trade. Gladiators fought by the hundred, and those of them who objected because of fear or for any other and better reason "were driven on by whips and hot irons." The organization of murder as a sport and show speaks eloquently of the standards of Roman civilization.

Another measure of that civilization is supplied by the way in which the slave and gladiatorial uprising under Spartacus was suppressed. Six thousand of the captured followers of Spartacus

"were crucified—long miles of nailed and drooping victims—along the Appian Way."

These and similar atrocities, it may be urged, were exceptional, and the true test must be sought, in fairness, elsewhere—in the life, material and mental, of the average Roman citizen. What, then, was the lot of the common man during the age of the Antonines—an age of comparative prosperity and peace?

We quote from *The Outline*:

"There are signs of a very unmistakable sort that the great mass of human beings in the empire, a mass numbering something between a hundred and a hundred and fifty millions, was not happy, was probably very acutely miserable beneath its outward magnificence. . . . Life for the great majority who were neither rich nor official, nor the womankind and the parasites of the rich and official, must have been laborious, tedious and lacking in interest and freedom to a degree that a modern mind can scarcely conceive. . . .

"People refused to have children. . . . In modern states the great breeding ground has always been the agricultural countryside, where there is a more or less secure peasantry; but under the Roman empire the peasant and the small cultivator was either a worried debtor, or he was held in a network of restraints that made him a spiritless serf, or he had been ousted altogether by the gang production of slaves. . . .

"Education in republican Rome was the freak of the individual parent and the privilege of wealth and leisure. . . . The ordinary Roman was not only blankly ignorant of the history or mankind, but also of the conditions of foreign peoples; he had no knowledge of economic laws or of social possibilities. Even his own interests he did not clearly understand. . . .

"From the second century B. C. and onward everyone is remarking on the ignorance of the common citizen and his lack of political wisdom, everything is suffering from the lack of political solidarity due to this ignorance, but no one goes on to what we should now consider the inevitable corollary, no one proposes to destroy the ignorance.

And what of the political life and institutions of Rome, even under the republic? Says Wells truly: "If republican Rome was the first of modern self-governing communities, she was certainly the 'Neanderthal' form of them."

It could not be otherwise. There were no newspapers of any kind; no use was made of the principle of elected representation; there was no statecraft; the voting system was grotesquely ineffective; the great mass of voters in Italy were disfranchised by distance; the Roman voters were mostly men of a base type, easily

corrupted by demagogues and selfish politicians; and outside voters, whenever they attempted to enter the city and claim their rights, could be, and were, intimidated and attacked and massacred on the pretext that they were conspiring against the republic.

Rome fell and nothing could save it. Sounder and better states and communities gradually grew up. But what shall we say of *their* moral and intellectual standards? A few facts and references will suffice to answer this question. To wars and civil wars it is hardly necessary to allude even, any more than it is necessary to speak here of the corruption and cynicism of kings, diplomats and ministers, or of the oppression of the peasants and burghers by the privileged aristocracies.

In 1618 the civil or Thirty Years' War broke out in Germany. During that contest the looting of towns and villages was the rule rather than the exception. "The soldiers," writes Mr. Wells, "became more and more mere brigands living on the country, and not only plunder but outrage was the soldier's privilege. After the close of that contest "so harried was the land that the farmers ceased from cultivation, and great crowds of starving women and children became camp followers of the armies, and supplied a thievish tail to the rougher plundering." Central Europe "did not fully recover from these robberies and devastations for a century."

In 1791 the Jacobin revolution occurred in France. The terror soon followed, and the world shuddered at the excesses and horrors of that regime. But, to quote Mr. Wells:

"In Britain and America, while the terror ruled in France, far more people were slaughtered for offences—very often quite trivial offences—against property than were condemned by the revolutionary tribunal for treason against the state. A girl was hanged in Massachusetts in 1789 for forcibly taking the hat, shoes and buckles of another girl she had met in the street. Again, Howard, the philanthropist, found, about 1773, a number of perfectly innocent people detained in the English prisons who had been tried and acquitted, but were unable to pay the jailer's fees. And these prisons were filthy places beyond effective control. Torture was still in use in the Hanoverian dominions of his Britannic Majesty King George III. It has been in use in France up to the time of the National Assembly."

Human slavery was not abolished *till the middle of the nineteenth century*. As for child labor, in 1819 the English factory act, the first of a series, prohibited the employment of *children of nine*

in such establishments and limited the working day of children above that age to *twelve hours*.

Let us conclude the examination of the human record with several fragmentary and detached citations.

"It is not more than five hundred years since the great empire of the Aztecs," says Mr. Wells in his summing up, "still believed that it could live only by the shedding of blood. Every year in Mexico hundreds of human victims died in this fashion: the body was bent like a bow over the curved stone of sacrifice; the breast was sliced upon with a knife of obsidian, and the priest tore out the bleeding heart of the still living victim."

Discussing the introduction of Negro slavery into New England, Mr. Wells, while noting that the conscience of the American colonists were never quite easy on that score, calls attention to the fact that all attempts to restrain the slave trade were checked by the great proprietary interests of the mother country. As to the sort of institution these proprietors, nominally Christian and humane, thus protected and defended, Mr. Wells writes:

"In some respects the new gang slavery was worse than anything in the ancient world. Peculiarly horrible was the provocation by the trade of slave wars and man-hunts in Western Africa, and the cruelties of the long transatlantic voyage. The poor creatures were packed on the ships often with insufficient provision of food and water, without proper sanitation, without medicines. Many who could tolerate slavery upon the plantations found the slave trade too much for their digestions."

These practices show how thin was the veneer of civilization and religion as late as the early 17th century. In the latter part of the 19th they would have been impossible in America, or in Europe. But what of Africa, of the Congo? To quote Mr. Wells again:

"By 1900 all Africa was mapped, explored, estimated, and divided between the European powers, divided with much snarling and disputation into portions that left each power uneasy or discontented. Little heed was given to the welfare of the natives in this scramble. The Arab slaver was indeed curbed rather than expelled, but the greed for rubber, which was a wild product collected under compulsion by the natives in the Belgian Congo, a greed exacerbated by the pitiless avarice of King Leopold, and the clash of inexperienced European administrators with the native populations in many other annexations, led to horrible atrocities. No European power has perfectly clean hands in this matter."

We complain, and with much reason assuredly, of the administration of law and justice in the courts, civil, criminal and equit-

able, that are maintained by all civilized states. The law's delays are proverbial. The bias of judges, the passion of juries, the influence of mob intolerance on the course of justice—all these things give us deep concern, as they should. Yet compare the administration of justice in our day with the State Trials of so recent a period as the Elizabethan in Great Britain! Read Macauley on these famous, or infamous, trials, and ponder the contrast! Judges spoke and behaved like bitter and ferocious prosecutors in those days. There was no pretense of impartiality or of judicial independence. The Crown dictated verdicts and packed juries.

Or, glancing at law and justice in earlier periods, before and after the Norman invasion and conquest of England, any good textbook on jurisprudence will give the modern reader a tolerably adequate idea of the "trials" of cases under primitive Anglo-Saxon and Norman law. We learn that those trials were never investigations of the facts and honest efforts to apply principles to issues. "Trial might be by compurgation, by witness, by charters, by record, by ordeal, or by battle." To quote from Prof. Roscoe Pound's *Introduction to the Study of Law*:

"Trial by ordeal took place by cold water, by hot water, hot iron or the morsel. Each was preceded by a solemn religious ceremonial in which the party was adjured not to undergo the ordeal unless in the right, and Heaven was invoked to decide the dispute.

"In the ordeal by cold water the party was cast into the water, which was asked to cast him forth if guilty, but receive him if innocent. If he sank there was judgment in his favor. In the ordeal by hot water the party plunged his arm into a vessel of hot water and brought forth a stone. His arm was then bandaged for three days. If at the end of that time his arm had healed, there was judgment in his favor. If it had festered, there was judgment against him. In the ordeal by hot iron the party was required to carry a hot iron for nine feet, when his hand was bandaged and the result determined as in the ordeal by hot water. In the ordeal by the morsel the party was required to swallow a bit of bread or cheese weighing an ounce. If he did so without serious difficulty, there was judgment in his favor; if he choked, there was judgment against him. In trial by battle the parties, if they were infirm or incapable of battle because of age or sex, their champions—that is, kinsmen or other appropriate persons who knew the case—fought with staves in a ring before the justices from dawn till the stars appeared or one of them yielded. If one were vanquished, or if the party having the burden of the issue did not prevail in the time fixed, there was judgment against him."

Trial by jury has been called the palladium of liberty, and Prof.

Pound writes that "it was the first thoroughly rational mode of trial to develop in the modern world." The evolution of trial by jury was not achieved fully until the 19th century.

Such, briefly, is the human record—the record almost to our own period. In the light of the facts thus recalled, what conclusion emerges? Is a belief in human progress justified? Does the past of mankind support it? Is there any actual basis for current talk regarding human decadence and degradation? Are the most advanced of human communities—notably the United States—rushing gaily to destruction?

The true answers to these queries can hardly be in doubt after a sober consideration and pondering of the evidence in the record. Whatever tests we apply—political, economic, social, moral, artistic—the result is the same. There has been progress in every direction. Some of us, in our impatience and haste, may complain of the rate of this progress. It has been slow, if we measure it with an arbitrary standard. Why, we cry, did not men and women follow, or remain loyal, to such seers and guides as Gautama Buddha, or the Hebrew prophets, or Jesus of Nazareth, or St. Francis? Why have all the great religions been corrupted and smothered in irrelevant and superstitious dogmas and empty ceremonies? We might as well ask why the average Englishman or American does not write like Shakespeare or Milton. Moral genius is as rare as poetic and literary. The human race has advanced at the only rate at which it has been able to advance. It is what it is, and we cannot help accepting it. The question is not what another species might have accomplished with like opportunities, but what our species *has* accomplished. And it has accomplished much.

Take property. We still cling to property, but many of us are collectivists, communists, syndicalists, Single-Taxers, advocates of equality of opportunity, champions of co-operative production. Most of us recognize the obligation to share our possessions with the destitute. Even the most selfish among us dare not denounce public and private charity. We frown on anyone who protests that he is not his brother's keeper. We take the ground that unemployment is a community problem, and that he who seeks work and cannot find it must be supported at the expense of the body politic and social. We have, in truth, traveled far from the notions and practices of the primitive savage in respect of property—its rights and sanctions.

Or take the life of the average community. Can we call it

"bestial?" We still have slums, homeless families, unclean and insanitary dwellings, indecent overcrowding. But for these conditions the mechanical and industrial revolution, which in so relatively short a time abolished the cottage and home industries, erected large factories, and reduced tens of thousands of artisans and craftsmen to the status of wage-workers in concentrated establishments, is largely responsible. The movement for better housing, for "garden cities," for individual and co-operative home-owning is world-wide and effective, though the great war naturally interrupted it.

We have unemployed at all times, and during "hard times" this evil becomes acute. But we also have, or are planning to provide, insurance against unemployment, local and central agencies for the relief of the destitute among the unemployed, and engineering and other bodies that are earnestly grappling with the questions of seasonal work, waste in industry, co-ordination of public and private measures designed to reduce unemployment to a minimum. And we have socially recognized the obligation to feed, clothe and shelter those who are willing to work but unable to procure it.

Still with us is the disgrace and evil of child labor, but who can compare the child labor of today with that of fifty years ago? Compulsory education laws, continuation schools, vocational schools, junior colleges and many other things of like purpose and design are the order of the day. Certainly public sentiment, religious and secular, condemns child labor and the lingering opposition to its eradication is felt to be futile.

In America, at any rate, according to recent figures, children are no longer sent to prison for any ordinary offence, either before or after trial and conviction. Detention homes have been established for children, and though they are far from perfect, no one will assert that they are physically or morally as pestilential as the jails and prisons of our cities and counties.

But, some may object, all these improvements are of slight consequence because fundamentally the wage-worker is still a serf and the average man is still oppressed and exploited by the privileged classes! Genuine progress means a constant increase in the freedom and opportunity of the average toiler.

Granted, and most heartily. But what are the signs, portents and tendencies in the industrial world so far as relations between employers and employed are concerned? There are some reactionary employers, of course, especially in industries that depend almost entirely on foreign, un-Americanized labor. But the trade unions

are stronger than ever; the campaign for the "open shop," or the shop closed to organized labor, has failed in America; machinery for adjudication of labor disputes is being fashioned and installed in many industries; "shop representation" and shop councils are being established even by powerful corporations in avowed recognition of the claims of "industrial democracy" and the principles of mutuality and justice; tens of thousands of employes are investing in industrial stocks and receiving dividends in addition to wages. The significance of all these and similar symptoms is unmistakable. Even the opponents of social and trade-union radicalism, so-called, are promoting radicalism unconsciously. They are helping to supplant the wage-system by some form of co-operation.

Meantime organized labor itself, long indifferent to voluntary co-operation and disposed to depend unduly on state aid and paternalistic legislation, is beginning to turn to co-operation, productive and distributive, as a partial solution of its problems. If labor leaders are wise, or if they become wise, trade union funds and workmen's savings will seek more and more direct competition with capitalism in the great fields of production and distribution. There is no reason why thousands of small factories should not spring up in every industrial country. Co-operation is more efficient than capitalism—and more equitable. Labor for decades has had to fight for its rights. Now it is beginning to think of its opportunities this side of Utopia, opportunities under capitalism and private property. Labor hopes to control the political state sooner or later. Numbers and organization may give it such control in certain countries. Why should it wait, however, for that consummation? Without controlling parliaments and governments, labor can use its own capital and its own credit to build up co-operative industries and demonstrate their superiority both to monopolized or to excessively competitive industry. Capitalism could not prevent such development of co-operation if it would, and only very shallow persons imagine that it would deliberately seek to obstruct and prevent the development of co-operation if it could. Here and there, of course, short-sighted and greedy groups of local bankers, or of entrenched monopolists, have fought, and will again fight, co-operative enterprises, but the same thing is true of innovations essentially capitalistic. Ignorance and blind selfishness always resist improvements, even when they are not at all radical. The point is that capitalism would not rise in its might to fight and defeat co-operation.

It is idle to bewail the "degradation of labor." Labor in mod-

ern society is more independent, more militant, more intelligent, more cohesive than it ever was. Mr. John Galsworthy, a true and sincere humanitarian, who has arraigned many of the defects and vices of the present social-economic order in his novels, plays and essays, and who demands for labor more comfort and more beauty than it is now enjoying, is constrained to acknowledge, after a fresh indictment of society, that "in spite of everything this is still the best age, on the whole, that man has lived in."

In this connection a few sentences from Mr. Wells' *Outline*, contrasting the rôle of labor prior to the Industrial Revolution with its rôle since that momentous change are highly pertinent. "The power of the old world," writes Mr. Wells, "was human power; everything depended ultimately upon the driving power of human muscle, the muscle of ignorant and subjugated men. . . . A vast proportion of mankind in the early civilization was employed in purely mechanical drudgery. . . . Modern civilization is being rebuilt upon cheap mechanical power. For a hundred years power has been getting cheaper and labor dearer. . . . As the 19th century advanced human beings were wanted now only as human beings. The *drudge*, on whom all the previous civilizations had rested, the creature of mere obedience, the man whose brains were superfluous, had become unnecessary to the welfare of mankind."

Glancing for a moment at political relations of men, who can deny that the change from autocracy, monarchy, oligarchy to modern democracy, with its equal suffrage, direct primaries, frequent elections, initiative-referendum systems, recalls, popular assemblies, constitutional conventions, and the like, represents very real and great progress? We complain, and rightly, of the shifty opportunism, the cowardice and the subserviency of the majority of modern lawmakers and executives. But what is the implication in these complaints? Clearly, that representatives fear the voters and seek to please them, to feed their prejudices, to reflect their notions. The average legislator is alas, not very superior intellectually and morally to the average body of his constituents, but democracy should lead us to expect this and to accept it with resignation, or, rather, with the determination to elevate the electorate in order to elevate its public servants and delegates.

We have lately realized the weakness of territorial representation and are beginning to consider sympathetically the alternative of functional representation—of selecting men and women on the basis of their work and service rather than on that of accidental

residence. There may be much promise of improvement in this idea—as the writer thinks—or there may be little. But there is nothing to prevent modern democracies from experimenting with functional representation. Political changes are far less difficult of accomplishment than changes that directly affect property rights and vested interests. At any rate, whether we reorganize our legislative chambers or not, any considerable element in a modern community, if it is sufficiently intelligent and persistent, and if it takes the trouble to organize, can even now secure fairly adequate representation in most of these chambers.

No; history does not lend any real support to the pessimistic conclusion of those thinkers who hold that progress is an illusion or a dogma. On the contrary, history irresistibly forces on us the conclusion that the human race is essentially a progressive race, and that progress is in truth a law of its nature. The belief in absolutely continuous, uninterrupted progress was dogmatic. Lapses, interruptions, periods of stagnation there have been, and there will be. But these periods are becoming shorter and less frequent. Humanity is not Bourbon. It learns and it forgets—somehow. Acquired characters may not be inherited by the offspring of the beneficiaries of valuable acquisitions. Biology has rendered no final verdict on that important issue. But civilization, culture, improvements are handed down by generation to generation; the torch is never extinguished or lost.

The late Alfred Russell Wallace called the Nineteenth Century “the wonderful century.” Wonderful it was, and not merely on account of mechanical and scientific achievement. The century of constitutional changes, of liberal reforms, of suffrage extension, of the establishment of popular and secular education, of trade unions, of factory legislation, of the rise and development of Socialism in its various forms, of cautious but important applications of science to punishment for crime, of the development of daily, weekly and monthly journalism, of the free and circulating libraries, of cheap editions of the most humanizing and elevating forms of literature; the century of Godwin, Fourierism, Owen, Comte, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Carlyle, Mill, Toynbee, Ruskin, Maurice, Kingsley, Morris, Marx, Mazzini, Emerson, Thoreau, Gladstone, Bright, Cobden, Henry George, and a host of other sincere and penetrating thinkers and critics of social maladjustments—that century was marvellous in a social, ethical and economic sense as well! And it planted seeds that have yet to yield rich harvests in many fields. True, the

present century seems so far to have brought only disillusionment, reaction, loss of faith and generous enthusiasm. The world war, utterly unnecessary, which the madness and littleness of a few men clothed with brief but unlimited authority inflicted upon civilized mankind, has caused many to despair of humanity and pronounce the doom and fall of our proud culture. But these views are superficial. They are based on misconceptions and arbitrary assumptions. The world will ere long take a fresh start on the road to justice and righteousness, unity and peace. The problems that face civilized societies have never been so well understood as now. None of them are insoluble, and this means that humanity can and shall solve them—not in a decade, or even a century, perhaps, but within calculable time. To quote Mr. Galsworthy again, "There is in human nature, after all, the instinct of self-preservation, a great saving common sense." This instinct and this sense have not prevented catastrophes and tragedies, to be sure, but they have extracted moral profit from the catastrophes and tragedies. Because of them good has often come out of evil, and bitter experience has not been wholly wasted. Because of them, and only because of them, the golden rule in social and economic relations is not a mere dream or illusion. Human nature may not change; it does not need to change. Environmental and institutional changes will answer. There is enough intelligence and enough sympathy, imagination and right feeling in humanity to bring about the requisite changes in the institutions that have outlived, or are outliving their usefulness, or that offend the sense of justice and the reason of the average body of human beings. The seers, the guides, the interpreters of life must address unceasing appeals to justice and to intelligence. There is no other fountain of justice, of mercy, of solidarity.

EAST ASIATIC WORKS IN THE LIBRARY.

BY JOHN T. BRAMHALL.

AN East Asiatic library in Chicago! Que bono? The Chinese Wall is being demolished, not by the Chinese, nor by the Mongols, but by peaceful scholars of the West. The barred gates of Lhasa have been opened also. Scholars are interchanging between Harvard and Chicago on the one hand and Peking and Tokio on the other. The Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893 was the academy of tonsured heads of all the world. *Om mani padme hum* was translated into Pope's Universal Prayer:

Father of all, in every age
In every clime adored,
By saint, by savage and by sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!

Ex orient lux. Out of the East comes light. Into the spiritual darkness that has fallen upon the West, covered with murky war clouds, comes a gleam of divine light from the East to a suffering world. Such is the hope of many, as it was aforetime to the shepherds who gazed from Bethlehem upon the star in the east when Herod ruled in Judea. The enthusiastic reception accorded to Rabindranath Tagore in Europe and America is not without significance, for it was not as a literary lion that he was received, but as a religious teacher. In Utrecht he was welcomed with an address in Sanscrit, which is taught in all the Dutch universities, and at Rotterdam he was invited to deliver his lecture, "The Meeting of the East and the West," from the pulpit of the principal church, an unprecedented honor. His reception at Christiania, where he was presented with the Nobel prize, outdid, both in honors and in popular acclaim, it is reported, any ovation ever given to king or commons in Skandinavia.

Nor can we mistake the meaning of the Eastward facing of Germany, in these post-war days, a spiritual *Drang nach Osten*. It

is possible that Goethe's *Westostlicher Divan*, like Fitzgerald's *Omar*, was not wholly inspired by the Sufi wine, but we have his own declaration: "All that I had preserved and cherished that was similar in sense and substance" (to the *Divan of Hafiz*) "came forth, and with all the more vivacity because I felt constrained to escape from the actual world which threatened fresh troubles into an ideal one, to live in which with satisfaction all my will, pleasure and capacity were pledged." And again: "The Mohammedan religion, mythology and manners allow to poetry a scope which suits



The *Ise Monogatari*, "Tales of Ise," Printed in 1608 during the period Keicho.

my years." (They were seventy!) "Unconditional submission to the immutable will of God, cheerful survey of the mobile affairs of earth which are ever returning spirally upon themselves, love and inclination oscillating between two worlds, all the real now clarified, now dissolving to symbols—what needs the Grandfather more?"

But we need not go back to the Germany of Goethe, or of Schopenhauer, of Max Muller, or of Neumann, to demonstrate the interest that Germany has taken in Oriental literature and religions. The recent publication of Spengler's "Decline and Fall of Western Civilization," and Paul Cohen-Portheim's "*Asien als Erzieher*" has

turned the attention of studious minds from the distraction of politics to the restful philosophies of the East. These works were recently reviewed in *Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts Zeitung*. "Popular interest," said the reviewer, "is not turning so strongly toward the ideals and teachings of Asia out of mere weariness of the world and of life—which superficial thinkers are so ready to ascribe to Buddhism—but in search of satisfaction for positive spiritual needs."

Our scholars are not satisfied, and they should not be, with translations and abridgments, however faithfully made. They ask for sources, and of these we have, naturally, all too few. For the East is a strange world and its people are *sui generis*. They might indeed be likened to beings of another planet, so entirely have they been isolated these many centuries from the people of the West. It is not alone a matter of distances, of deserts, or of oceans. Their manner of thought and vehicles of expression are the antipodes of ours. Literally do they stand upon their heads to us and think and write reflexively. Like the nether side of the moon they have been concealed, and have concealed themselves from the enquiring gaze of the West. Nor can it be said that the West has displayed, until quite recently, an eagerness to know them. For countless millenniums life and culture have been expanding on the two sides of the globe, in each separately and diversely. Only but yesterday the Venetian merchant carried his pack to Cathay and the Portuguese sailors were thrown by a storm on the coast of Zipangu. Then appeared the cowed brothers, Francis and Dominic, carrying the cross, and sundry men in cocked hats with demands for trade in opium, rum, clocks and cottons. And so began our acquaintance with the East. But both commerce and religion necessitated a knowledge of the languages. For diplomacy, indeed, it mattered little (note "this is not grammar," in the British Yang-tse business). Have we a key that shall unlock the treasury of the East? How may we interpret them, and us to them?

In 1907, Dr. Berthold Laufer, while conducting investigations in the Far East for the Field Museum of Natural History, of which he is the distinguished curator of anthropology, was commissioned by the Newberry Library to gather for them a representative collection of East Asiatic works on religion, philosophy, history, etc., and by the John Crerar Library to collect works on geography, law, the natural sciences, etc. The result of this commission, for the Newberry Library, was the acquisition of over a thousand

works, making a library of over twenty-one thousand volumes. And while the collection cannot be presumed, says Dr. Laufer, "complete in any section, so much has been attained by including the majority of all important works that the student will be able to carry on serious and profound research work in any of the branches of knowledge enumerated, and it may therefore be considered a truly representative collection of the Chinese, Manchu, Tibetan, and Mongol literatures." As to language, the Japanese is represented by one hundred and forty-three works, Tibetan by three hundred and ten, Mongol by seventy-two, Manchu by sixty;



The *T'ang Liu sien sheng wen tsi*, block book of the Sung period, 1167 A. D.

the rest are in Chinese, the most extensive and important literature of the East and the one from which the light of the others (Tibetan possibly excepted) radiate. In Manchu literature, says Dr. Laufer, Chicago has one of the richest collections in existence. Among the most notable works (no other copies being known), may be mentioned a commentary on the Four Classical Books (*Se shu*) by the Emperor K'ang-hi, in twenty-six quarto volumes (the Palace edition of 1677), a commentary on the Book of Mutations, *Yi king*, also by K'ang-hi (Palace edition of 1754), and a commentary on

the Ancient Book of History, *Shu king*, by the Emperor K'ien-lung (Palace edition of 1754). These are all in Manchu, in its most elegant style, which is radically different from the Chinese, being a Turanian or Ural-Altai language allied to the Mongol and Turkish. These works, it is said, seem never to have been placed on the book-market and to have come out of the Palace in consequence of the panic following the death of the Emperor Kwang-su and the Empress Dowager in 1908. It is a curious circumstance, comments Dr. Laufer, that just at that time the Peking book-market, which offers no customers for Manchu literature, was flooded with rare Manchu books. It was evident, however, that they were not "loot," being regarded by the ignorant Chinese authorities as valueless and were publicly sold by them for quite a nominal sum. Among other treasures in this unique Manchu library is a Palace edition (1741) of the Four Classical Books, *Se shu* (not the K'ang-hi commentary mentioned above); the Manchu translation of the historical work, *Tung kien kang mu*, a great rarity, in the Palace edition of 1681, in ninety-six volumes, and a collection of Buddhist charms and prayer formulas (dharani), in Chinese, Manchu, and Tibetan, in ten volumes, a splendidly printed book with fine large wood engravings executed in the Palace during the K'ien-lung period (1736-1795). This K'ien lung, it is to be noted, besides being a valiant soldier who cleared the empire of the Mohammedans, was a devoted scholar who wrote incessantly, both poetry and prose, collected libraries and republished ancient classics of great value. His campaign furnished him with themes for his verses, and in the Summer Palace was found, when the allies entered Peking in 1860, a handsome manuscript copy of a laudatory poem he composed on the occasion of his victory over the Gurkas.

The richest harvest of Tibetan books was made in the ancient Buddhist monastery of Derge in eastern Tibet, and others were picked up in Sze-ch'uan and in the Kuku Nor region which was visited by the Abbé Huc on his way to Tibet. The only serious attempt at a Tibetan bibliography, as pointed out by Dr. Laufer, was the work of the celebrated Hungarian scholar, Csoma de Koros, consisting of an analysis of the Kanjur, or collection of the sacred books of Lamaism made by King Kri Song Tsan in the Eighth century. The Newberry copy of the *Kanjur* was printed at the monastery of Narthang (Tashilhunpo) in central Tibet in 1742. Tibetan books, we are told, are not ready-made, but printed only as ordered by the Abbot and the printing blocks are kept under lock and key

in the temple and the shop is opened but once a year. There is, accordingly, a great variety of paper and ink in the editions and the Newberry copy is, fortunately, of the best in every particular.

The Tibetan translations (of the Buddhist scriptures) are almost literal (I again quote from Dr. Laufer) and prepared with the greatest care and accuracy, and as most of the Sanskrit originals are lost, they become a primary authentic source for the study of Buddhism; even in those cases where the Sanskrit texts are preserved the Tibetan documents always provide considerable assistance in making out the correct Sanskrit reading. To one equally versed in Tibetan and Sanskrit and familiar with Buddhist style and terminology, it is even possible to successfully restore the Sanskrit original from the reading of the Tibetan text. The vast stores of this collection (the *Kanjur*) have in part been repeatedly ransacked by scholars interested in the history of Buddhism. Franz Anton Schiefner, the Russian linguist, and Leon Feer, the French orientalist, have made extensive use of it, and H. A. Jaeschke was enabled to make a version of the New Testament in Tibetan. W. W. Rockhill, American traveler and diplomat, has skilfully utilized it for a life of Buddha and a history of Khotan, but the bulk of its contents still remains unstudied.

The minds of men, providentially, differ, and there is no such thing possible as uniformity in religion, either in the Jewish, the Buddhist, Roman Catholic, or the Mohammedan church. Buddhism does not form an harmonious unity in China, in its cradle country India, nor its nursery Tibet, nor in Japan where it is exotic and where claims are actively put forth to send missionary coals to Chinese Newcastles. As for Buddhism, which casts its influence over all of eastern Asia, the key is found in the study of the sectarian formations of the Lamaism of Lhasa and Urga. So it is that Dr. Lafer urges that only by a thorough investigation of the history of these various sects can we ever hope to penetrate into the mystery of Lamaism. The history of the collections embodied in the *Kanjur*, "The Translation of the Word" (of Buddha), can only be fully understood through the history of the sects, and the latter subject will shed new light on the formation of the Canon. What is hoped for, therefore, is a critical concordance of the various editions of the *Kanjur*, the literary history of which is recorded in their lengthy prefaces, and finally a collation of the works in the Tibetan with those in the Chinese *Tripitaka*, a Tibeto-Manchu-Chinese concordance.

Besides a large collection of the writings of the Dalai Lamas, the Newberry has secured a number of beautiful Tibetan books printed at the imperial press of Peking in the reigns of the Emperors K'ang-hi (1662-1722) and K'ien-lung (1736-1795). Especially noteworthy is an ancient and splendid copy, written in silver on a black polished background, of the famous *Mani Kambun*, "The Collection of Precious Laws," a treatise chiefly on religion, but which also contains an account of the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet and of the closing years of the reign of Srong Tsan Gampo (to use the simpler spelling of Prof. Davids), the first his-



Commentary to the *yi king*, (Book of Mutations). Written by the Emperor K'ang-hi, Manchu.

torical Tibetan king and the founder of Lhasa. As the copying of sacred books is considered a great religious merit, writing in vermilion insures a higher merit than work with black ink, while silver and gold writing surpass both.

The edition of the Chinese *Tripitaka* which the Newberry has the rare good fortune to possess is that which formerly reposed in the temple at Wu-chang and known under the designation of the Buddhist Canon of the Ts'ing or Manchu dynasty. Until the close of the Tenth century the Chinese Canon was preserved in manuscript only, but was finally printed (*nota bene*) in A. D. 972 by order of the Emperor T'ai-tsu. Thereafter it was printed

repeatedly from wooden blocks which were as often destroyed by fire or in the course of wars. A few copies of editions coming down from the Ming period have survived in some temples of northern China and one preserved in a monastery in Shan si is said to be complete. The K'ien-lung Palace edition now in the Newberry was drafted in 1735 by the Emperor Yung-cheng and on his death was completed by his son and successor, the indefatigable editor and publisher, K'ien-lung. The printing of the work extended over three years and was completed at the end of 1738. The printing blocks are still preserved in the temple of Po-lin-sze, near the great Lama temple in Peking. The temple record says that it required 28,411 blocks to engrave the entire work, which is composed of 55,632 leaves. It consists of 7,920 oblong flat volumes bound in 792 wrappers. Each volume is illustrated with a fine wood-engraving of delicate tracing and elegantly bound in silk brocade of various designs of peculiar rarity and artistic value.

A work of great importance, and at the same time the earliest printed book in the Newberry Library, is the *T'ang Liu sien shêng wên tsi*, dated 1167, in twelve volumes, containing the poems and essays of Liu Tsung-yüan (A. D. 773-819), one of the most celebrated poets of the T'ang dynasty. This edition, in forty-three chapters, is fully described in the Catalogue of Lü t'ing and has a commentary by Shi Yin-pien. The margins of the pages show the peculiar black ornament, or "stamp" of the Sung period (called "black mouth"). The pages have twenty-six lines of twenty-three characters and are printed, of course, from a single block, three centuries before Gutenberg.

Another work of the Sung period of which the Newberry boasts (figuratively, of course), is the *Tse chi t'ung chien* (Laufer) by Se-ma Kuang (A. D. 1009-1089), which corresponds with the *T'ung Chien* of Dr. Giles of Cambridge University in the Encyclopædia Britannica. To quote Professor Giles: "There is one (work of history) which stands out among the rest and is especially enshrined in the hearts of the Chinese people. This is the *T'ung Chien*, or Mirror of History, so called because 'to view antiquity as in a mirror is an aid in the administration of government.' It was the work of a statesman of the Eleventh century, whose name by a coincidence was Ssu-ma Kuang.* He had been forced to retire from office, and spent nearly all the last sixteen years of his life

* Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-87 B. C.), grand astrologer and historian edited the Shih Chi, or Historical Record and other works recovered by the first Han emperor, after the burning of the books.

in historical research. The Mirror of History embraces a period from the Fifth century B. C. down to A. D. 960. It was revised by Chu Hsi, the famous commentator, who flourished A. D. 1130-1200, and whose work is now regarded as the standard history of



Title page from the Tibetan *Kanjur*. Block printed at the Buddhist monastery at Narthang, Tibet, 1742.

China." It was first published in 1172 under the title *Tung kien kang mu*, and it is a complete copy of this edition, says Dr. Laufer, that the Newberry now possesses. It is a rare and fine specimen of Sung printing and perhaps the most extensive work of that period now known. The Newberry also has a beautiful Manchu translation in a Palace edition of 1681 in ninety-six large volumes.



Characteristic Frontispiece to Buddhist Works.

Dr. Laufer, wisely no doubt, makes no allusion in his monograph on the collection, to the suspicion which has been cast by Allen and Giles upon the genuineness of the Book of History, the Confucian Canon and the Tao Te Ching and other works edited by Ssü-ma Ch'ien in the First century B. C. Perhaps some of the monumental works in this great library of original sources may shed some light on the story of the Burning of the Books, the secret repository of forbidden books in the wall of Confucius'

house, and the studious inaction of the Board of Erudite Scholars in those shadowy days now nineteen centuries past.

Limitations of space forbid even brief mention of the literary and artistic treasures of Japan and Korea contained in this collection, the extent of which has merely been hinted at in the foregoing sketch. It is a door opened into another world, whose historical, anthropological, literary and religious wealth is not easy for us to comprehend. With such facilities for research, together with those now possessed by the John Crerar Library and the Field Museum, it is quite reasonable to say that Chicago may offer better opportunities for scholars in Oriental research than can now be offered in either Lhasa, Peking or Tokio.

HOMER AND THE PROPHETS.

OR

HOMER AND NOW.

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST, M.A., M.P.D

PERHAPS the best approach to Homer today is by means of the "Movie," at least, a young university scholar who has seen the film of *Odyssey* tells me what would argue this happy conclusion. He says that it is a "thriller" of the first order, and that when it was given in his university town, it attracted large and increasing crowds of townsfolk and students before its run of a week was over, not at all because it was "scholarly stuff," and "highbrow," but because it has a strong human appeal. Its action rushes along carrying spectators with it though new to the story and foreign to Greek traditions. Even the gods and fabulous monsters seem real, because they are seen with the physical eye—in this respect the new art of the moving picture is at an advantage as compared with the ancient art of the Bard, though Bards acted the parts as they sang them. Miraculously, in a mist, a god can appear, and then vanish miraculously.

A great improvement, this of attending a "Movie," instead of thumbing a dictionary and grammar laboriously, pondering roots and points of construction as the means of approach to the story. Every move of the thumb, every act of acquiring knowledge, every judgment passed distracts the reader's attention from characters and situations so that he cannot realize them intensely. If he is to get the full effect of the story when a "Movie" is not available, a dramatic reading will be the next best approach, with an epic pitch and tension. Those who have had the good fortune to hear Professor Clarke's dramatic reading of *The Descent into Hades* will realize much of the human appeal of the *Odyssey*. Two small boys whom I took to hear it sat congealed during the reading and agreed later that this was the greatest "show" that they had ever seen.

It would not be possible for spectators and hearers to remain unmoved by the epic hero of Homer if they realized his character

and situation. He is bayed about by a large band of desperate conspirators who threaten his life, and his wife; he is endangered at every turn by alluring sorceresses and monsters; and false and hostile gods block his way when he tries to return home after the war. But friends and righteous gods rise up to help him, and Wisdom, personified as the goddess Athene, gives him guidance and pleads his cause, in Olympus, on Earth, even down in Hades, whither he has to go to learn all that a mortal may know. It is a thrilling sight to see him go down and learn it.

As a background and foil to Homer's great hero, strange and horrible monsters appear, as man-eating Polyphemus, a terrible one-eyed giant. The enchantress Circe changes her victims to swine by means of a magic drink; two evil water spirits, Scylla and Charybdis, half women and half snakes, wreck sailors on the rocks and in the whirlpool; alluring Sirens charm men to destruction with their beauty and their songs. These, out of many, are strange and horrible enough, and Odysseus escapes from them all by moral strength, courage, resolution, and craft; but stranger and more horrible are those whom he meets in the Lower World. There the Dead are not men, but pale shadows without substance, as he learns when he tries to embrace his own mother, whom he finds among them, she having died since he left home. Pale shadows are his companions who died in the war, or since, and they weakly and pathetically complain of the wrongs they have had to endure. Others are suffering penance for the sins they committed when they were alive, as Sisyphus, who rolls a great rock forever up a hill, for when he gets it nearly to the top it rolls down and he has to do his work all over again,—a good allegory of the life that men lead, forever rolling stones up an incline, but never reaching the top. Near him, Tantalus is forever thirsty because the water that rises almost to his lips is siphoned out of his cup just before he is able to drink it—again an allegory, of us poor thirsty mortals who see the waters of our hopes recede just when we expect to drink our Desire. Tityus is tortured by an Eagle, which comes every day to tear his liver out as fast as it grows again—we say that our *heart is torn*, meaning the same.

On earth, the human characters range from very villainous villains, the Suitors, who are plotting dishonor and death for the hero, to the hero and heroine, Odysseus and his Penelope, who are almost too good to be true. In the background lie dark tragedies of the House of Atreus, a House "baneful and driven to ruin" as its name signifies derivatively,—will the House of Odysseus go down in

tragedy as dark? Can Odysseus arrive in time to save his wife from the Suitors? and will he be able to hold his own against such odds if he does?

The first scene is laid in heaven, where the righteous gods are discussing the fate of Odysseus and decide to help him to return. This foreknowledge does much to sustain us through the many harrowing scenes that follow, which might be too harrowing to simple-minded hearers. The next scene shows Odysseus' home, where his steadfast wife is weeping and praying for his return and his handsome young son, Telemachus, the image of his father, except that he is young and tall, is dreaming apart about the day of his father's return. The Suitors are lying around, leading their customary vicious life, gambling, drinking wine, talking unwisely, and doing nothing useful. Now the goddess of Wisdom appears, in the guise of a middleaged man who was Odysseus' friend. Telemachus welcomes her and cares for her comfort in every way with extreme politeness, and accepts gratefully her wise advice that he shall no longer remain inactive like a boy, but rouse himself to act like a man. From this moment he deserves the epithet that Homer gives him, *discreet*, and his name, *Telemachus*, which signifies derivatively, *The Perfect Warrior*. To the joy of his mother and the confusion of the Suitors, he announces his majority, orders the Suitors to leave, calls the gods to bear witness and to give him help against them should they refuse, calls an assembly of the people, makes his charges before them, and announces his purpose to go in search of his father. This is not starting a battle, but a campaign. Every word and act is wise, and will win the approval of Wise Odysseus on his return.

The many scenes in which Odysseus meets his trials are varied and effective, laid on enchanted Islands, at the fireside, in a Swineherd's cottage, in a palace, out at sea. The scene of his shipwreck, where the winds and the waves toss his frail raft about until it sinks—he is saved by a kind seanymp who lends him her wimple for a life-preserver—is followed by a charming idyllic scene on the shore of an inland rivulet where a young Princess, Nausicaä, is washing the family clothes in company with her maidens. They have finished trampling them in the washing-pool and have spread them out on the sand to dry, and now they have refreshed themselves from the baskets that they brought with them and are playing a game of ball, when Odysseus appears before them, a shipwrecked stranger, unclothed except for a broken bough of a tree, which he holds before

him in lieu of a figleaf apron. A sorry plight for a world-hero! Athene befriend him and Apollo inspire him, so that he can win the young Princess to take up his cause!

They do befriend him. A marvellous grace is shed about him and words of wisdom flow from his lips. The Princess listens, encouraged by Athene, and is persuaded to give him some of her brothers' beautiful clothes, along with sage advice as to how he can reach her mother, Queen Virtue, and win her heart to his cause. Under the guidance of Wisdom, the Princess Nausicaä, who had turned like a child to flee at sight of the stranger, takes the part of a perfect woman. As Telemachus is the model for all Greek boys, so Nausicaä is for the girls, able to meet a difficult situation with perfect success, maidenly, modest, gentle, affectionate (she calls the King, her father, "Papa, dear"), brave, kindly, courteous, helpful, generous, prudent, wise—we must name all of the virtues for women and show that she was possessed of them all from evidence in the text. A Princess but not above doing the family washing! Such should all maidens be! Telemachus will doubtless marry her, and their house will be, through them, the happiest ever, protected by the righteous gods to the happiest of conclusions—nothing *baneful, driven to ruin* there!

It begins to be clear why the Greeks made their Homer the foundation book for the education of their young. Their best ideals were here, implicit in characters and situations, possibly more effective, certainly more attractive, than if they had been set forth in didactic form. Not only Odysseus and Penelope, but this mere youth and maiden, "follow Wisdom like a guiding star," an inspiration for others also to summon resolution and endure to Victory. Homer holds forth a promise of honor and reward for following Wisdom as clearly as did the preacher to the youth of Israel, in Proverbs:

Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore, get wisdom.

Exalt her and she shall promote thee; she shall bring thee to honor when thou dost embrace her.

Hear, O my Son, and receive my savings; and the years of thy life shall be many.

Enter not into the path of the wicked and go not in the way of evil men,
For they eat the bread of wickedness and drink the wine of violence.

Involuntarily the question rises when we see the perfect accord in Grecian and Israelitish ideals. Did Homer's epics inspire the writer of the Proverbs? Did the writer of the Proverbs inspire Homer to write his epics? Nice questions of priority and influence

as between Homer and Sacred Books of Israel are not for us, but we shall count it sufficient to see that Homer and the writers of the Sacred Books of Israel are in accord in the praise of Wisdom, rewards for Wisdom, and punishment for evil.

The same questions rise as to the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, which is assigned by scholars to the period of Homer, ± 800 B. C., and which, like *Proverbs*, was didactic in its purpose. The main themes presented in *Proverbs* and *Works and Days* are *right social relations, work, and piety*, these in the form of exhortations, or injunctions *to be kind to the stranger and the suppliant, to be just to the fatherless, to respect another man's property, to regard another's bed . . .* and these are the very themes that Homer presented in narrative form. Odysseus was a *stranger and suppliant* at the palace of Alcinous and the cottage of the Swineherd, who treated him kindly, and afterwards at his own palace, where the Suitors treated him ill; the depraved Suitors scorned to do honest *work* to maintain themselves, but quartered themselves on Telemachus and devoured his substance, he being then practically *fatherless*, while they threatened to force his mother to choose one of them in *marriage*, though if she had consented she would have been considered guilty of violating her *husband's bed*; for it was the Law of Babylon, and doubtless throughout the East, that if a man failed to return from a war, perhaps because he was held as a slave in some foreign land, his wife must stay true to him in case he left property sufficient for her support. If she were unprovided, she was free to marry again. Unlike the Suitors, all who are good in Homer's stories are *workers*, even the Queens and Princesses are busy, spinning and weaving cloth, and washing the clothes. In the end, all who do evil in any form are punished: "Finally Zeus imposes dear requital for the wicked man's unjust deeds," say Hesiod, and this a most careful scrutiny of characters and incidents in Homer proves true.

It need not surprise us that this most artistic of storytellers has perfect retribution, or poetic justice in all of his stories, for early, unsophisticated ages, like that to which he belonged, love a moral, as unsophisticated children do. As late as the period of Solon, didactic poetry was loved in Athens, and Solon won much of his influence in the city by the didactic verses that he wrote. It seems to be the mark of a degenerate age to rate low the didactic and the moral in works of art, but to care overmuch for manner and method. As to Homer, a person bent on sermonizing, could get as many texts

for sermons from his writings as he could from *Works and Days*, or from *Proverbs*—of course, Homer does not preach them.

In general, the basic idea of Homer's poems is that men and nations, nay, even gods, are punished when they do wrong. So the hundreds of wicked Suitors who abused the hospitality and wooed the virtuous wife of Odysseus when he was away after the war suffered death as a just retribution at his hands when he came home; so Prince Paris of Troy, who led Queen Helen astray when he was a trusted guest in the home of her husband, King Menelaus, suffered final defeat and death in the course of the Trojan War, which resulted from his act; so Priam, the aged King of Troy, along with all of his family and his nation, went down to utter destruction because they unwisely protected the guilty pair in Troy instead of punishing them, their city burned to the ground, their women enslaved; so Aphrodite, though a god, met humiliation and defeat at the hands of the righteous gods because she misguided these mortals and tried to protect them with the aid of War, Ares, her own false, secret lover. Against these false gods, (1) Zeus fought, because he protects the rights of hosts, of guests and of nations; (2) Athene fought, because she protects the wise and must punish the foolish; (3) Hera fought, because she guards the hearth and home; and (4) Apollo fought because he does poetic justice and sends retribution, and had warned Priam by prophets not to protect Paris in Troy.

Let us examine closely the conduct of Priam and the Trojans to see just who were guilty, that the righteous gods visited all with doom. When Paris broke the law of the righteous gods by leading away another man's wife (his name is derived from *I sleep beside*, the term used for committing adultery), the Trojans were morally bound to punish him, to drown him, in the river if they followed the Law of Babylon, to stone him to death, if they followed the law of their near-neighbor, Israel, at least to expel him from the city, if they followed the warning sent them by Apollo before Paris committed his crime. Priam showed perfect willingness to obey the god at first, and sent Paris out of the city, but later he weakened, and admitted him when he came to Troy leading Helen, the Shining One, by the hand. The derivation of these names makes our assurance doubly sure in the interpretation. As *Paris* is derived from the term for committing adultery, so *Helen* is derived from a root cognate with that in *Helios*, the Sun, and it puns upon the infinitive meaning *to lead by the hand, to seduce*, a fact which explains the ancient vase-paintings, where Helen and

Paris are represented as *hand in hand*. Homer calls Paris also by the name *Alexander*, a contraction of the Greek, *I am defended of men*, a name which is a reproach to both Paris and those who defended him, for this defense of the guilty was an exceedingly grave offense in the eyes of the righteous gods, as it was to Jehovah in Israel, to be punished with destruction of the city.

In the Sacred Books of Israel many instances are given of cities destroyed for harboring this sin of Paris, or others like it. Among these was Israel herself when she turned from the worship of the gods of the fathers to Ashtaroth, an Eastern "false goddess," parallel with Aphrodite, as is told in Judges ii, 14, 15.

And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about, so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies.

Whithersoever they went out, the hand of the Lord was against them for evil, as the Lord had said and the Lord had sworn unto them, and they were greatly distressed.

This punishment of Israel was earlier than the fall of Troy, and other still earlier parallel incidents are told in the bible, in which cities conquered by Israel were punished because they also had been guilty of this law. Such parallels are shown in Leviticus xviii:

(1) And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying,

(2) Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them, I am the Lord thy God.

(3) After the doings of the Land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their ordinances. . . .

(2) Ye shall not lie carnally with thy neighbor's wife, to defile thyself with her. . . .

(24) Defile not ye yourselves with any of these things, for in all of these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you.

(25) And the land is defiled: therefore I do visit its iniquities upon it, and the land herself vomiteth forth her inhabitants.

A still further example of punishment inflicted upon a city for a sin very like that of Troy, is the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah:

And lo, the smoke of the country went up like the smoke of a furnace.

The cities destroyed for their wickedness, especially Sodom and Gomorrah became "a proverb and a by-word" in Israel, as did Troy among the Greeks, therein receiving the *Curse for Disobedience* pronounced upon breakers of the Law in Deut. XVIII:

Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by-word among all nations.

If, on the contrary, they had obeyed the law, they would have received the *Blessings for Obedience* promised:

And all people of the earth shall see that thou art called by the name of the Lord, and they shall be afraid of thee.

Here we are again struck by the fact that Homer and the ancient Greeks were in perfect accord with the Prophets and writers of the Sacred Books on this important question of morals, both holding the conviction that a city giving obedience to God's law will receive a blessing, as a city disobeying will receive his curse. *Athens*, named in honor of *Athene*, is an example of a city called by the name of the Lord and confident of power in any righteous cause; *Troy* is an example of a city called by the name of an evil one and weak against its enemies, being the name of the hated winter dragon and his lair, of labyrinth, who imprisons the Princess of the Sun every year until the assaults of the Spring set her free. Of this we shall have occasion to speak more fully later. Throughout the ancient world this myth of a hated labyrinth destroyed was told, and celebrated in spring festivals, so it might well be taken by a Bard to supply a moral background for his story of a city punished for its sin.

Was King Priam alone guilty of bringing destruction on Troy? Were the brothers of Paris guilty? Were the Counsellors? Were the young warriors? Were the women? It is marvellous how conclusively the poet gives answer to these questions in what he tells in the famous scene at the Scaean Gate, where Paris meets Menelaus in single combat on the plain below, while Priam, Helen and the old Counsellors watch from the walls.

(1) The aged Counsellors bore tribute to Helen's exceeding fairness, though at the same time they condemned her:

"Now when they saw Helen coming to the Tower they softly spake winged words one to the other, 'Small blame it is that Trojans and well greaved Achaeans should for such a woman long time suffer hardships; marvellously like is she to the immortal goddesses to look upon. Yet even so, though she be so goodly, let her go upon their ships and not stay to vex us and our children after us.'"

Blaming her, though lightly, and not guilty of wanting to protect her in their city, they are still guilty of not raising their voices actively in council for the death or expulsion of Paris and Helen from the city according to the warning of Apollo and the law. There are ways of putting pressure on a king, as the scenes representing councils show, and they might use them, so they must be held guilty of the destruction which follows.

(2) The sentiment among the people in Troy was against Paris

and Helen and they would willingly have betrayed Paris to Menelaus :

"They surely in no wise hid him from kindness, could any have seen him, for he was hated of all even as black death.

It will be noted that the people were the soundest of head among those in Troy. But they remained inactive against Paris.

(3) The rank and file of warriors in Troy were willing to see the wrong-doer punished, for before the combat began they prayed thus :

"Father Zeus, that rulest from Ida, most glorious, most great, whichever it be that brought this trouble upon both peoples, vouchsafe that he may die and enter the House of Hades, that so for us peace may be assured and trusty oaths."

But they made no active effort to fix the guilt or to inflict punishment upon the guilty persons, so they also were not guiltless of the destruction of their city.

(4) This is particularly true of Hector, the oldest of the king's sons, the natural leader of the young men of the city, whom they love. In the powerful speech that Hector makes to Paris before the combat, he heaps reproach and scorn upon him for bringing Helen to Troy :

"Evil Paris, most fair in semblance, thou deceiver, woman-mad, would thou hadst been unborn or died unwed. . . . It would be better far than thus to be our shame and looked at askance of all men . . . to bring back a fair woman from a far country . . . that she might be a sore mischief to thy father and city and all the realm, but to our foes a rejoicing, and to thyself a hanging of the head! . . . Thy lyre will not avail thee, nor the gifts of Aphrodite, those locks and thy fair favor, when thou grovellest in the dust. But the Trojans are very cowards, else long ere this hadst thou donned a robe of stone for all the ill thou hast wrought."

So sternly an Israelite might speak, imposing the penalty of the law, *a robe of stone*, that is, *the death by stoning*. The last sentence has bitter significance :

"*The Trojans are very cowards, else long ere this hadst thou donned the robe of stone for all the ill thou hadst wrought.*"

Accusing the Trojans of being cowards for not stoning Paris, does not Hector here include himself? Since he was the daily witness of the crime, and the leader of the people, he must feel that he should have led in the stoning. Being a true and a brave man, since he has failed in his duty he must admit the truth that he has been a physical coward, afraid to face Achilles in arms, and a moral coward, afraid to face his father in protest when he is doing a wrong that will wreck the city. Priam has been a kind father, but this

* Lang, Leaf and Myers translation of *Iliad*.

son must feel that now the one hope of the city is in his opposing his father, and, if that should be necessary, of deposing him from his throne. In the days of the Patriarchs of the Oldest Dispensation, it had been a son's duty to obey his father unquestionably, but this speech shows that in Hector's mind his sense of duty to his father and king is now in conflict with his sense of duty to his fatherland. It is for him to save Troy, or to bear God's retribution when the city falls, when his white-haired mother, his wife, and his child, will be led away into slavery as a consequence of his father's foolish doting. If Hector should call in the name of the law and the righteous gods of their fathers, the young men would rise with him and purify the city, perhaps they have even invited him to it, for they call his little son *Astyanax*, king of the city, though the name that he had given the child was *Scamander*, after the name of the river at Troy.

Mistakenly, Hector decides to obey his father and to fight for him in the cause that he judges wrong. His decision is not ignoble, and for his nobility of spirit Apollo still loves him and does a great deal to assist him. Prolonging the war as a just punishment upon Agamemnon, he can still give Hector a chance to distinguish himself and win fame which will never die; and he lets Hector fall before that last dark day when the city falls, when his aged father will die by violence and the women he loves will be driven forth. Even Hector's pitiful death, when wisdom has betrayed him, and the violence done his dead body after Achilles has killed him, are a gift of Apollo, to make of Hector a noble "Song in the ears of men" . . . and a warning.

The moral truth that a son must set himself against his father and his brothers when they are wrong is implicit in Homer's character of Hector. Three centuries later the theme of a son in conflict with his father and his brothers was dramatized on the Athenian religious stage in the myth of Prometheus, where the hero will not help his father and brothers do wrong and is made to endure a kind of crucifixion because he will not yield. This is what Hector should have done, and if he had done it, he would have found himself a victor, even suffering crucifixion. The martyr's death would not have been so cruel to him as any death which he must suffer in Troy, self-condemned. But this light had not broken on him, and it was more than a thousand years after Troy fell before the teaching that a son must rise against his father was not only made explicit, but put in the form of the strongest command, when Jesus said:

I am come to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

And a man's foes shall be they of his own household.

He that loveth father and mother more than me is not worthy of me, and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.

And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me is not worthy of me.

He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.

That sermon might well have been written to cover the case of Trojan Hector, for his love of his father and mother, his wife and his son led him to do what he knew was wrong; it also covers the case of his sister Cassandra, who denounced Paris, inspired by Apollo to do so, and thus set herself against her father and mother; it also covers the case of Andromache the Queen's daughter-in-law, who agreed with Hector as to the guilt of Paris, whom his parents would not expel; it also covers the case of King Priam, the father who loved his son Paris so well that he defended him knowing that he was wrong. Did the Supreme Teacher have Troy in mind when He spoke these truths, and the sword that should have been drawn within the city, to save it? "I come not to bring peace but a sword"—not unity, but division would have saved that city, and divine wisdom has it, even in Homer by implication, that victory could come only by giving up the defense of what was wrong.

Priam himself was also divided against himself as to defending Paris, as we have said, having first expelled him and then admitted him with Helen. In the speech that he makes to Helen at the Scaean Gate, he is shown still divided against himself, for he clearly admits that she was wrong, but lays the blame for what she did on the gods:

"Come hither, dear child, and sit before me, that thou mayest see thy former husband and thy kinsfolk and thy friends. I hold not thee to blame; nay, I hold the gods to blame who brought on me the dolorous War."

This is sophistical, and Homer does not agree with Priam, for in the first scene of the *Odyssey* he represents Zeus himself as denying that the gods are to blame for evil, and stating that evil-doers must bear the blame themselves since the gods have given them laws and even special warnings by prophecy, he using the case of Aegisthus as an example, who also was guilty of adultery and had been punished by the just gods for it. The speech of Priam blaming the gods would be blasphemous if he realized it, at the least it is pathetic, and the retribution sent upon him is certainly sufficient—the death of many of his sons before his eyes in battle, including noble Hector, for sheltering one evil son in his crime. With tender

pity the poet tells of the gray-haired father humbled to beg the mutilated body of his son Hector from the victor—even Zeus feels pity then and sends Iris down to command Achilles, under severest penalty, to be merciful to the poor old man.

And Helen . . . how human and appealing Homer made her without for a moment blinking her crime, or condoning it! When Hector taunted Paris, it will be remembered he referred to Helen as "a fair woman from a far country," "a sore mischief to thy father and city and all the realm, to our foes a rejoicing, and to thyself a hanging of the head," and we know that he was more merciful in his treatment of her than the other members of the king's family, except Priam himself. So Helen's life in Troy had been like that of the "strange woman" of Proverbs v, "as bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword."

When Homer first shows Helen at the Scaean Gate, where she watches the battle with Priam, she has learned from bitter experiences to be very humble and very apologetic. She is no haughty beauty, but very gentle, and she has formed the habit of self-accusation. Speaking to Priam, she refers to herself as "shameless me"; she calls herself "worthless me" when she talks of herself to Telemachus, in the Odyssey, in the presence of Menelaus and the party of wedding guests. And nobody, excepting doting Priam seems to gainsay her. On her part, this may be artful and intended to disarm her critics and forestall them, but how sad a consciousness and a sub-consciousness her words reveal!

All of the incidents in which Helen appears, show scorpions in her mind, as that in which Hector is urging Paris to enter the combat with Menelaus:

"My brother, even mine that am a dog, mischievous and abominable, would that on the day when my mother bare me an evil storm-wind had caught me away to a mountain or a billow of the loud-sounding sea, when the billow had swept me away before all these things came to pass. . . . But now, my brother, enter in and sit here upon this seat, since thy heart hath been troubled chiefly for my sake, that am a dog, and for Alexander's, on whom Zeus bringeth evil doom, that in days to come we may be a song in the ears of men."

Hector refuses her pathetic appeal and invitation with a curt and cold rebuff:

"Do not bid me sit, Helen; thou wilt not persuade me of thy love."

If she had invited any of his brothers, the answer would have been worse than curt and cold, as we see from what Helen says brokenly at the bier of Hector, in her lament,

"Hector, of all my brethren far dearest to my heart! Truly my lord is

godlike Alexandros who brought me to Troyland—would I had died ere then. . . . Never yet heard I evil or spiteful word from thee; nay, if any other haply upbraided me in the palace halls, whether brother or sister of thine, or brother's fair-robed wife, or thy mother . . . then would thou soothe such and refrain them by the gentleness of thy spirit and by thy gentle words. . . . No more is any left in wide Troyland to be my friend and kind to me, but all men shudder at me."

Her speeches reveal gulphs of suffering and despair. She despises and hates herself and, what is worse, she despises and hates Paris, and struggles to break the bonds by which Aphrodite commands Helen to return to him, but Helen speaks wild, rebellious words to the goddess:

"Strange Queen, why art thou desirous now to beguile me? . . . Thou comest hither with guileful intent. Go thou and sit thou by his side, and depart from the ways of the gods; neither let thy feet ever bear thee back to Olympus, but still be vexed for his sake and guard him till he make thee his wife, or perchance his slave. But thither will I not go—to array the bed of him; all the women of Troy will blame me hereafter; and I have griefs untold within my soul."

Here are glimpses of untold griefs; that she had broken from the ways of her own home people, that her feet never bore her back to her childhood home, that she had doubted his keeping his promise to make her his wife, that she had felt only his slave, that she had no friend among the women of Troy, only shudderings among strangers and griefs in her own soul.

She has come to judge Paris inferior to even Menelaus, as she tells him to his face after his combat:

"Thou comest back from the battle; would thou hadst perished there, vanquished by that great warrior that was my former husband. Verily, it was once thy boast that thou wast a better man than Menelaus dear to Ares, in the might of thy arm and thy spear. Nay, I, even I . . . bid thee not to attack him recklessly lest perchance thou fall on his spear."

This for his physical cowardice; to Hector she shows that she understands the evil of his heart:

"Would that I had been wedded with a better man, who felt dishonor and the many reproaches of men. As for him, he has no sound heart now, nor will he ever have."

Her ideals are not bad, and she is not a light woman as has been generally supposed. Her husband was not lovable, and she made the tragic mistake, like Guinevere, of giving her love to a less noble man supposing that he was nobler. If she had been wedded to a man like Odysseus, or like Hector, she might not have been tempted to leave him for a man like this Paris. As it is, the Apple of Love with which Aphrodite tempted her has turned out to be that Apple

of Sodom, fair to the eye, but ashes and dust on the tongue. Poor Helen!

Helen of Troy led a darkly tragic life even when Paris and Priam lived, and it continued to be darkly tragic. After Paris was killed, following Hector, it is told that Helen was given in marriage to Deiphobus, who was a notable coward, for his name is expressive of constant fear. With him she must have been even less happy than with Paris, for Aphrodite had not moved her to love him and marriage with him would not soften the judgment against her in Troy.

Poor Helen! When Troy fell and Menelaus carried her back to Sparta instead of subjecting her to the penalty of the law, she was never to be happy there. Perhaps his motive in letting her live was, as has been suggested, a hope he harbored of attaining eternal life through her, for she was of the immortals, being a sister of Castor and Pollux—his words in the *Odyssey* make this theory probable; perhaps, as has been suggested, his hope of keeping Helen's regal dowry was contingent on his keeping her. At any rate, his motive cannot have been love. He had never shown that he loved her, and incidents told of him make it certain that he could not have won her love, or even commanded her respect. He had drawn her by a lot, then he had tried to get out of marrying her because he was afraid other Suitors might make him trouble if he did marry her, and he finally made her his wife only when his companion kings promised that they would stand by him if trouble should come of the marriage—what a contrast to Kingly Odysseus, who stood ready to protect his wife single-handed against hundreds of hostile suitors! Helen must have realized that her marriage with Menelaus was far from perfect, and far from sacred. Under such conditions, it is not very surprising that when Prince Charming came, with "fair looks and fair favor," and offering her the golden Apple of Love, she was strongly tempted to give him her hand, unwise though this conduct might be.

How wretched the life of Helen was after Menelaus brought her back to Sparta is shown in the scene at their hearth when Telemachus visits them. She is evidently trying to make the best of her husband, paying him compliments as "a man who looks for nothing, either in mind or person," and telling other pitiful lies with a show of devotion, while she abases herself by calling herself "worthless me." She pretends that when her heart had turned back to him before Troy fell she gave aid to the Greeks who came into the city as spies, so making herself a traitor to Troy for his sake. But

Menelaus shows that he does not believe her story and follows it at once with an incident which would prove that she was, instead, actively treacherous to him and the other Grecian chieftains, and tried to betray them to their enemies to the last day that they were in Troy. The incident is this: When the Greeks lay concealed in the wooden horse and within the walls of Troy, Helen came alongside the horse, followed by "godlike Deiphobus," and spoke each chieftain's name, in turn, mimicking the voice of his wife, trying to get the Greeks to answer and so betray them into the hands of their foes. In telling this incident, Menelaus addresses Helen as "wife," and the manner of his retort seems courteous, but this is only the more cutting, an example of withering irony. Was the incident that he told true? It has the earmarks of being invented, a lie to outmatch her lie, a stab into her heart, a blow in her face. She makes no denial or explanation, but takes his browbeating silently, gently bidding the maids prepare the couches for the night. Verily, in her soul she carried "griefs untold"!

Homer is very just to Helen, possibly generous in giving her such a husband, for he makes her conduct seem natural, at least, where he might have made it seem simply revolting. So Aeschylus, also, in the *Agamemnon*, makes that of Clytemnestra, by showing the very unlovely husband she had. In this, the poets both seem to be saying, "Given such husbands, the wives will be tempted, so: Moral, for husbands as well as for wives."

Poor Helen! Her soul was to suffer increasingly until the end—like that of the "strange woman" in Proverbs V, her parallel:

Her feet go down to death: her steps take holds on Hell.

Euripides shows Helen's own father refusing to give her protection and the common people hating her so that she dares not show her face on the streets for fear they will do her violence, but ventures forth only at night and veiled. Her legend tells that finally, after her unhappy life with Menelaus, she suffered a horrible death. When Menelaus died, his sons, along with those of Nicostratos, *the victorious people*, drove her forth from his palace. She fled for refuge to the Island of Rhodes, but there was refused protection by Polyxo, the queen, whose husband had died in battle in the Trojan War. Hating Helen for the sorrows that had come upon the world by reason of her sin, the women of Polyxo disguised themselves as Furies and fell upon her while she was in the bath. Finally they dragged her forth and hanged her on a tree.

Helen's death was thus more sad and ignominious than the

death decreed by Babylon and Israel for the sin she had committed. Except for the speeches of Priam and the aged counsellors, no touch of wavering in condemnation of Helen occurs in the literature of Greece, so far as I have seen, and these suffered grievous punishment for their un-Wisdom. Homer, like the Prophets, is thus of the old dispensation, though he presents the character of Helen in such a way as to wring the heart with pity. It remained for the merciful Saviour to speak the word of pity for such as she, when the woman taken in adultery was brought to him:

Let him that is without sin among you cast the first stone. . . . Neither do I condemn thee, go in peace.

This is of the new dispensation, founded on love and a justice deeper than Apollo's. Had Homer's pitiful Helen helped to prepare the world to accept the new law?

Agamemnon is pictured in his home as an even less worthy husband and father than Menelaus was, no more of a man. There must have been a long record of base deeds done by this king to warrant Achilles in taunting him, when they quarrelled, with having *the face of a dog* and *the heart of a stag*. We know some of the things he had done: (1) He had angered Apollo by injuring the family of a priest, and thereby brought pestilence upon his army in retribution; (2) he had outraged and estranged the best of his warriors by doing him an injustice, depriving him of his prize; (3) he had sacrificed his own daughter to secure military success; (4) he was not regardful of the feelings of his wife, as Odysseus was, and was bringing to her home a captured Trojan Princess and the children she had borne him. Then Clytemnestra struck him down "like an ox in the stall," having disarmed him first and quieted his fears by warmly welcoming him home. The character of Agamemnon would justify Clytemnestra if anything could do so, but Homer does not justify her, and all praised her son Orestes later for putting his mother to death in retribution. The gods also approved this act, and when Orestes' own heart was driven toward madness with doubt as to whether, even in such a case, he should have raised his hand against his own mother, tradition tells that Athene and Apollo set his conscience at rest—the goddess of wisdom came down to Athens in person and founded the Court of the Areopagus to try his case, and Divine Justice, Apollo, acted as judge.

In happy contrast with these unhappy kings, who wrecked their homes by their own unworthiness, and were wrecked by their wives, stands wise Odysseus, and in contrast with their wives stands his Penelope, faithful and "heedful" Penelope. When the story opens,

it is many years since Odysseus went to war, but Penelope has not forgotten. She still weeps for him, and she prays. She has brought up her son in his father's ways and to dream his father's return. She entertains all passing strangers so that she may learn from them any rumor about him that they may have heard, "a rumor sent from Zeus." She is sought by a host of suitors, but does not consider their offers of marriage; and, where she dares not reject them definitely because that would probably bring on a struggle among them and her forcible abduction by the victor, she holds them off by her clever stratagem of the web that she is weaving—a windingsheet for Odysseus' aged father, promising that she will announce her decision when she takes it from the loom. But every night she unravels the work that she has done in the day, and never announces her decision. It is this incident which gives her her name, for Penelope is derived from *a web, to cover or wrap up*.

And Odysseus deserves her devotion. Where Agamemnon and Menelaus make plural marriages and keep concubines, Odysseus considers the feelings of his wife so much that he does not even take the good nurse, Eurycleia, as Homer tells. When plural marriages are no reproach, how good that Penelope cares so much, and that Odysseus cares that she cares! He gave her a monogamous home, and she made that home so happy that he did not want to go to the war. When they came to conscript him, they found him busy plowing salt into the earth to prove that he had gone crazy and ought to be exempted—a wily ruse! But they knew his wiles so well that they suspected him, and tested him by placing his baby on the ground where the plow would strike him. Odysseus turned aside so as not to plow the child under, so they concluded that his mind was sound and led him away to the ships. This incident does well to illustrate his love of home, but it is post-Homeric and does not do justice to Odysseus' profound belief in the righteousness of this war, which Homer shows in many incidents.

The personal love that his home-folk give to Odysseus is proved more than justified when we come to see this Zeus-praised, Athene-protected world-famous hero in the incidents of the Epics. In the first scene where he appears in the *Odyssey* he is a captive, held by a goddess who wants him to be her husband, and who would make him immortal if he would consent to remain. But he is not tempted to do so, and, when the curtain rises upon him, the greatest of heroes is seen sitting in tears on the shore of the sea, his face turned toward his little island kingdom, longing but to see the smoke rise in the distance from his own hearthstone. He is not thinking of the glory

he won in the war and scheming for more riches and power, he is thinking of how to reach home, and this is the more to his credit because more than one goddess had offered him her love.

Circe had tried to enchant him and hold him with her, but he had resisted and forced her to do his bidding; even the Sirens could not win him, though he listened to their songs, for he had wisely restrained himself against their enticements. With women, as with goddesses, he won an instant success. His godlike bearing, his gentle courtesy, his manly strength in making a plea, his sincere use of compliment, his freedom from all that would characterize the male-flirt, or "lady-killer"—these win him a way to the hearts of good women. Instantly, Nausicaä feels confidence in him, as later her mother, Queen Virtue, does, and as her father and his sage councillors do. From the moment when Odysseus comes as a suppliant among them, seats himself in the ashes of their hearth to signify his utter need, and reaches up his hands to the knees of the queen in appeal for assistance, he wins them all.

Stripped of every advantage of pomp and circumstance, he makes them feel his worth, not only of character, but also of physical power. He knew that he could win in their contests, but he held himself in the background modestly and would not enter until he was forced to do so by the taunt of a bystander, and even then he would not enter a contest against any member of the family of his kind entertainer. In all of the physical contests except running and dancing he won—it would have been unhuman if no defect whatever had been shown in this greatest of heroes, too discouraging for the coming generation of fellow-mortals. There was no flaw in his wits, in his heart, in his action; no other man could equal him in strength, or even draw his bow; no other equalled him in manly beauty, except in one important respect—the lower part of his body was out of proportion to the upper, being too short. It was this one defect that prevented him from being the first in dancing and first in single combat, as he was easily first in council, in shooting with the bow, in hurling the javelin, and in putting the shot. In that age, success in personal combat came to him who was most determined, courageous, skillful, and powerful, but also fleetest of foot *and longest of leg*, for he must be able to overtake his enemy who tried to flee, or to outstrip him if he for the time being tried to do the fleeing—Grecian warriors often chose to postpone a combat, and they counted it no disgrace to turn the back on an enemy, and run. It was Achilles, who was the fastest runner, who fought the single combats for the Greeks, a man counted less than wise and without high ideals, but

the glory of bringing the war to a close was by common consent given to Odysseus, who planned the strategy with Wisdom.

So Odysseus was first in war, as he was first in building a home in peace, and certainly first among the kings in the hearts of all wise and good men. He and his household prayed often to the righteous gods, but no prayer to Aphrodite or Ares by either him or Penelope is reported by Homer, nor did any other of the high-souled heroes of Troy pray to them, a final proof, if one were needed, that they condemned them, along with the frail mortals whom they misled. The love which is wise is the love of Odysseus' home.

This condemnation of Aphrodite that we find in Homer, we find strengthened, if possible, in the myth of Cupid and Psyche, which was developed several centuries after Homer, but in harmony with his spirit. In this beautiful myth, which was one of those presented among the most sacred mysteries at Eleusis, Cupid (Eros, Desire), is the son of Aphrodite but has so transcended his mother that he is the lover of the soul, Psyche, whereas she represents love of the body only. There is nothing about Eros of the naughty little flutterer who shoots his arrows so as to make a Midsummer Madness of loving,—*in-and-out, out-and-in! Presto! Change about!* So Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus, late and degenerate Grecians might picture him, or degenerate Roman poets, who laughed at vows broken by lovers, and at discord between husbands and wives. To the Eleusinian worshippers, as to Homer, life was serious and earnest among men who were wise; to them, as to Penelope and Odysseus, love is devotion through long years of trial.

In the myth of Cupid and Psyche it is told that Cupid gave his love to a mortal maiden, the Soul, against the wishes of his hateful and low-minded mother, and that he was constant in his devotion though Psyche proved to be far from perfect. When she did not trust him though he loved her truly, he flew away, for love cannot live with suspicion; but while she was suffering the long and hard punishment which Aphrodite inflicted upon her, he watched over her secretly, won friends for her in her need, and finally came back to her when she had proved herself worthy. Such love as theirs was judged worthy of immortality, so a council of the gods at last decided to give her the butterfly wings and translate her to heaven, where she was fed on ambrosia, the nectar of Olympus. The meaning of this myth as a whole is that love, purified of earthly imperfections, is immortal. In the time of Homer the Greeks had not expected a happy life beyond the grave, but this myth is evidence that a hope of immortality had risen *for those souls that had loved*

and suffered steadfastly. Thus poetic Justice was satisfied, that a soul like Penelope shall not wander in blank forgetfulness in a sad, dark underworld, and that an Odysseus can have the immortality for which he would not sell himself to a goddess.

In this myth, the butterfly wings would not signify any lightness of character in Psyche such as we are accustomed to ascribe to the butterfly, but only an analogy between the soul that rises from earth to heaven through purified love and that beautiful winged thing that has experienced transformation through stages of caterpillar and chrysalis. The caterpillar sometimes even descends into the earth, as into a grave, to make its chrysalis, and seems dead, but from it there issues forth the very beautiful winged creature, which rises above the earth where it crawled and lay buried, to live a new life in a finer and rarer element, feasting on nectar. The Greeks doubtless adopted this nature-allegory and belief in the immortality of the soul from Egypt, where the Sacred Beetle had been used as the symbol of rising from literal corruption into incorruption. As the Egyptians buried scarabs in tombs, wrapped their dead in grave-cloth (like the gossamer in cocoons), and laid the mummy to repose in a sarcophagus which imitated the chrysalis of the Sacred Beetle in markings and design (as Fabre has pointed out), so the Greeks adopted the custom of carving a butterfly on the stone that marked the restingplace of the dead. The interpretation of the butterfly wings in the myth of Psyche to signify immortality is therefore beyond question.

Like the myth of Prometheus, Fore-Thought, the god who bore torture for saving man, this myth of the Soul immortalized by true love became a stage to still higher religious teaching. It was presented, as we have said, in the Mysteries at Eleusis, an institution developed three centuries after Homer to present the highest religious themes, the ways of gods to men, the immortality of the soul, the brotherhood of man, and the fatherhood of God. Along with the solemn initiations and the sacrament of the breaking of bread and the drinking of wine at Eleusis in sign of mystic brotherhood, these religious myths presented there helped to prepare the way for the fuller religious truth and the deepened mystic signification to be given to the world five centuries later in Palestine where the mystic brotherhood consisted of those who stood ready to take up their cross, and the bread and the wine were given the meaning of self-sacrifice to the point of the body broken and the blood shed.

The fact of a connection between Grecian and Hebrew thought was forgotten by Western writers in later centuries, but patristic

Grecian writers had made much of it on the affirmative side, for theological and practical purposes. To one who looks for it, the line of growth is as clear in Grecian thought as in Israelitish between the prophets and their fulfillment in Jesus—both show what is called in Christian terminology the *working of the Holy Spirit*, in scientific, *an evolution*.

In the light of these profound moral and religious truths of Homer, we see how inadequate and often false are the ideas commonly held as to the ancient Greek religion. It seems that many of our ill-considered opinions on the subject have come to us from early Christians, like Saint Augustine, who rightly condemned the myths of degenerate Roman Vergil, but did not thereby, as Saint Augustine was careful to state, condemn the myths of the Grecian dramatists, or of Homer. Vergil's gods were Homer's false gods, for Vergil exalted Venus (Aphrodite) and Mars (Ares) and showed them triumphant, where Homer had shown them ignominious and defeated, Vergil's motive being to flatter the Romans and his patrons, who had adopted Mars (Ares) as an ancestor of Romulus and Venus (Aphrodite) as an ancestor of the Caesars.

Other ill-considered opinions have come down to us as with authority from the scholars who revived the study of Greek at the time of the Italian Renaissance, under the patronage of the powerful princes and business men of the period, and under the influence of Vergil. These scholars did not draw fine distinctions in interpretation, and the princes were no more of Athene and Apollo than Vergil had been, though they gave Apollo lip-service and amused themselves with his arts, which is a very different thing from creating a high art under his inspiration. The real gods of their daily devotion were Aphrodite and Ares, Hermes and Hephaestos, False Love and War, Trade and Manufacture. . . . again, the false gods of Homer. Such a spirit as this has never created a high art. The Borgias, the DeMedici, and the D'Estes took little real interest in morals and religion, extended their power unscrupulously (Machiavelli told the truth about them in "The Prince"), and led riotous lives in their luxurious palaces, less like Odysseus' than like the Suitors'. To use the word art for their pseudo-Grecian product, voluptuous, languishing Venuses, sportful, naughty Cupids, riotous ramping Satyrs, and the like, is little short of profanation. These were in spirit the opposite of high, austere, Apollonian Homer, whose truly great art served nothing less than the exalted Sun, Apollo, the Destroyer of evil. The patrons of the Renaissance took from degenerated mythology

only what suited their own views of life, and imputed these back to Homer. Love and war, private luxury and display, collection and investment were the purposes of their pseudo-Grecian art (?), as it has been of those rich patrons ever since whose real interest in life is the getting of money and power, and more and more money and power. All of this is offense to Apollo, whose great art in ancient Greece, from Homer to Pericles, was fundamentally religious and public, to serve the gods and lift men above their lower selves by inspiration.

The truly great art of the Renaissance in Italy was Christian, not that of the pseudo-Grecians, not for private luxury and display. Like Athenian art it was fundamentally religious, and largely public, an expression of the best ideals of that day in literature, public buildings, temples for the worship of God, statues and pictures to adorn them. The ideals of this great Christian Renaissance art are also those of Homer, and the opposite of pseudo-Grecian.

Judged by the standards of Homeric, Appolonian, and Christian art, Dante is to be ranked among the highest artists, along with Homer. Unlike Vergil, he was no flatterer of princes, and he was certainly not Aphrodisian; unlike the pseudo-Grecians, he was of the austere school of Homer and the prophets, being Vergilian only as he honored Vergil because Vergil was mistakenly believed to have prophesied the coming of the Saviour and so to have been a kind of pagan-prophet and herald of Christianity. This was a great mistake of those uncritical times, for Vergil's prophesying applied to the Caesars, who were assuming divine honors in imitation of the rulers of the East, and his expected Saviour was Augustus, whose "Roman Peace" was to be attained by means of war, and world-conquest.

Great as Dante was—he has been well called the voice of ten silent centuries—he was far less of a power and an influence among his people and those of the following centuries than Homer is seen to have been in Greece, for Homer was a national poet who not only gave his nation a voice, but became its religious leader by presenting wisdom and justice in such a way, embodied in Athene and Apollo, as to form, or determine its later religion, politics, and art. Athens would not have been more glorious than other nations if Athenians had not built their institutions on wisdom and justice more than other nations, more than our foremost modern so-called democracies in various important respects, not only in the arts, but also in the wisdom and justice of their law and their administration of land, courts and finance. The Athenian passion for wisdom and

justice we may credit to Homer, and also the practical fruits that came from this passion, including the influence that Athens has had upon the whole civilized world. When we add to this, that Homer, with the prophets prepared the way for Christianity, we begin to understand how great a moral and religious power he has been, and still is, indirectly, though his ideals have been mistakenly identified for centuries with those of Vergil.

When these points become clear, we must revalue Homer, and assign him the foremost place among poets, a place very near to the prophets, so giving to him the honor that the middle ages gave to Vergil by mistake. If there was a pagan-prophet and herald of Christianity, it was Homer.

MISCELLANEOUS.

DOES SCIENCE UNDERSTAND NATURE?

(An appreciative footnote to Mr. H. R. Vanderbyll's articles on "Intellect, Religion and the Universe" in the *Open Court* for August and September, 1921.)

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

PEOPLE as a rule live from day to day without the least venture of speculation as to what keeps their bodies alive and healthy, and their minds conscious and rational. Work and food and sleep, and the occasional pastime of conversation make up the principal items of interest in practically any home or community within our public observation. Even in the private studios and laboratories where intellect and mechanical devices are less ephemerally concerned but more directly in contact with the obstinate facts of Reality, the *same* physical and mental functions of our vital economy are largely in the ascendent. The scientist has the same senses and faculties as the man in the street, but he exacts greater accuracy and more patient effort from the use to which he puts them. While the latter conceives life to be little other than a turbulent zone of livelihood and ephemeral utility, the former regards it as a clearing-house for functional values and phases of development.

What degree of spirituality then is actually and durably present in human nature? What proportion of our intelligence is devoted to the

non-utilitarian investigation of the hows and whys of Life. Do those whom we dignify with the name of scientists really deserve this dignity through having obtained any actual understanding of Nature? And is there any possible way of adequately verifying this understanding in view of the fact that practically all our so-called knowledge is empirical, sensual, dative and hypothetical? Such questions as these have fired the imaginations of philosophers for years. The very audacity of such inquiries is what piques our self-sufficiency and we join in the general clamor for debate and possible solution.

But is a solution of any determinable degree of accuracy possible? We do not even know this. All we can do therefore is to continue theorizing, searching, experimenting, and analyzing. No current synthesis is final; no syncretism, however elaborate and inclusive, is truly universal and pantological. All such systems of generalization, even when rationalized to the degree of harmony with every known science, are yet finite surveys of life in the natural world, and of Nature in the vast *infinitude* of the Universe. What bond of philosophical validity can be said to exist between the human mind (as the subjective instrument of inquiry and understanding) and this universal infinitude (as the external object of such inquiry and understanding)? This is the pivotal question in practically every philosophical attempt from Anaxagoras to Bertrand Russell; and especially does it take on an unusual significance in the cosmological approach to Dr. Boutroux's very suggestive volume on the "Contingency of the Laws of Nature."

Some thinkers even complicate the question further by pointing out that even the elements of one person's inner life constitute part of the external world for some other person. And I would emphasize also that any hypothesis of existence is still finite through being derived from that co-ordinated series of *human* viewpoints called consciousness. For no one, at any certain moment, is conscious of *everything*. Hence it may be argued that what passes for science is but a refined sort of nescience which has been systematized and indexed, while what is usually called understanding is only a group-reflex of instinct and vital impulse. The series may be progressive, but the ratios are constant and the sum is always finite.

Even our concepts of Nature are limited to the space of this earth's superficial crust, supplemented by a few observations on starlight and atmospheric phenomena. Nature herself, showing forth so shyly within our narrow ken, is but *one* of the provinces of Reality (i. e., the material province); while Reality (including so far as we know matter, mind, spirit, law, etc.) is but *one of the categories of phase* in the Universal Infinitude. Another turn of the wheel of cosmic existence will probably reveal an altogether strange and dissimilar form of life and law and purpose—for example, that possible after-life to which physical death is the transition. Were this not so we would have no anticipations of change, no tychastic theories of human destiny. Our knowledge of Nature would not then, as now, depend so largely on physical experience and intellectual lucubrations of empirical data. In

view of a little respect for simple metaphysical possibility, any element of bigotry in the realm of science is quite unwarranted.

We are all acquainted with the English scientists during the Boer War who could not cope with fevers and natural conditions nearly so confidently well as did the ignorant (?) and superstitious natives. Then there are the many unaccountable miracles of occult workers who cannot be said to mock natural law *all the time* with their apparent magic and fraud. Now comes the Polish mathematician, Count Korzybski, repudiating our "animal theories" and propounding a dimensional system of conceiving life and spirit in the world. What he claims for the time-binding faculty of man is but a preface to what *might* be claimed its sequel and superior—the Nature-binding power of God or (practically) of any superhuman form of intelligent existence.

If the divine is but a sublimation of the best that is possible of attainment in human nature, what super-Nature (to us quite enigmatic but not necessarily unknowable) would be possible in *another phase* of the Universe where all existence is a sublimation of the divine? To answer questions of this order certainly requires that we leave our little man-made gods and creeds behind, repudiating ephemeral interests, joys and sorrows; and try to live after the manner of heavens high serenity. That is, not only be capable of taking both space and time into our intellectual embrace, but to be Nature-lovers and Nature-conquerors as well. For this I have no gruff and ruthless conquest in mind, but rather figuratively to take Nature by the hand and count the stars but stepping-stones to the wider life of man's immortal spirit.

The sum of human knowledge is bound up in the several sciences and is ornamented now and then with the individual insights of romanticism and genius. But to claim that man's mind or apparatus exhausts Nature, or even that we fully understand what little measure of the natural world our faculties are capable of compassing, is folly if not bigotry, and a position which is therefore indefensible. Such an attitude is even culpable for greater intellectual wrongs, for it indicates either of two things: sheer ignorance or proud assumption. Hence, I think that everyone with the least ambition toward manly thought should always consider that the Universe is bigger than anything human; for its laws and magnitude even antedate and overreach anything we can predicate of the Trinity. The whole inadequate scheme of our modern philosophical approach, even with its clumsy bolster of scientific materialism, founders on one simple question: If we do not yet know the simplest codes of natural law in our own particular province of Reality, how can we defensibly presume to read the Word of God, understand the highest sublimation of phases (non-human, ultra-cosmic, super-Nature, etc.), or even see the last Horizon of our great Sidereal Domain? I often wonder whether future Science will be able to qualify for this supreme inquiry.

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