

THE OPEN COURT

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VOLUME XI.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
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SALUTATORY.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN THE OLD SPIRIT, but in a new garb, in the shape of a monthly instead of a weekly, *The Open Court* enters upon the eleventh anniversary of its career, and both publisher and editor hope that the change will serve to extend its circulation and carry the message which it announces to the world, farther than before.

The message of *The Open Court*, to state it briefly, is that science is a religious revelation; science is the unfoldment of the spirit, and its truths (if they be genuine scientific truths) are holy. If God ever speaks to his creatures he speaks to them in the truths that they have learned from their experience, and when truths are systematised and formulated with exactness, which is the province of science, they do not become less divine, but more divine. Therefore the application of scientific exactness to the various problems of religion is a religious *duty* which, if obeyed, may destroy some errors that have become dear to us, but will in the end unfailingly lead to the most important religious reform.

If science is applicable anywhere it is applicable with all the rigidity of the most searching critique to the problems of the destiny of man, his origin, and his future. What would be the use of science if it were not applicable to religion? Of what profit are the various conveniences of life and the material advance of the age if our soul is to be fed on the husks of tradition, which, unless we re-transform them and make them our own, are nothing but the leavings of the religious aspirations of previous periods.

Science is the light of life; shall we not use it? Science is the bread of the spirit; he who does not partake of its soul-nourishing gifts will spiritually die of starvation.

Science should not be conceived as forming any contradictory

contrast to religion. Woe to that religion which ignores or even antagonises science! It is science that leads to new truths and reveals to us more and more of the wonders of the universe. Thus if Christ's promise of the comforter¹ is being fulfilled at all it is fulfilled in the evolution of science.

If science is the Holy Spirit, if the truths of science are religious revelations, how can religious people remain deaf to the voice of science? It is a sad fact, but it is true, that there are many Christians who look upon science as an enemy to their religion and harden their hearts against the results of scientific inquiry because it collides with their conceptions of God and of Christianity. The consequence of such a condition is the doom of degeneration. Unintellectuality (especially if it be a wilful hostility to intellectual progress) is as much a sin as immorality; error is as much a perversion of the soul as criminality. Error and stupidity are punished with no less severity, nay, with more severity, than trespasses against the Ten Commandments. Indeed, the sin against the spirit, as expressly stated in the Scriptures, cannot be forgiven, and those who persist in it will be blotted out from the pages of the book of life.

Considering the religious importance of science, we call a recognition of the stern rigidity of scientific truth and of its indispensableness in all the domains of life, in the workshop as well as in the social relations of man to man, The Religion of Science.

The Religion of Science is not a new religion, but simply a new interpretation of the old religions. Nor is it a new movement in the sense that it introduces a new motive into our religious and moral life; it is simply a revised statement of the old faith, rendering that clear which from the beginning of the religious evolution in the history of mankind lay always at the bottom of man's holiest aspirations. Therefore we claim that the Religion of Science does not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

The Religion of Science combines in a consistent system the boldest radicalism with the most deliberate conservatism. It proposes to purify religion of the dross of error, but it would not reject the gold. It would retain of the old religions all that is true and good, and would add to the old truths a new significance by throwing upon them the bright light of modern science, which allows a clearer vision and gives a deeper insight than has heretofore been possible.

The Science of Religion (that is to say, a scientific treatment

¹ "When the spirit of truth is come he will guide you into all truth." St. John, 17, 13.

of the religious problems) leads to the Religion of Science, which is briefly the trust in truth ; and the Religion of Science is a principle which, wherever recognised, will reconcile not only religion with science, but also the various religions with one another ; for on the basis of this principle a comparison is rendered possible, and this comparison will lead to a final settlement of the controversies of religions with the same necessity as the controversies between various schools of scientific theories are decided, not by any authoritative dictum, but by weight of evidence, by experiment, by argument, by proof.

* * *

The Open Court, with its message of the Religion of Science, has been criticised by representatives of both extreme parties. Dogmatists of the old school condemn science as profane, and claim that it is untrustworthy as a guide in matters of morality and religion, while the so-called freethinkers denounce our conservatism of retaining the words God, soul, and immortality as pouring new wine into old bottles. We reply to the latter, to the freethinkers, that the various terms of religion originated in response to definite needs and that their significance can be traced in the realities of life. If we abolish the traditional terms we should have to invent new terms. It will therefore be wiser to retain the old names and define their meaning with more exactness, always replacing hypothetical assumptions as much as possible by a definite description of facts. But to the former, the dogmatists, we say if Science and the Religion of Science "are the work of men, it will come to naught ; but if this council and this work be of God, ye cannot overthrow it."

In propounding the Religion of Science, *The Open Court* has never identified itself with any party within or without the various churches ; it has kept aloof from both the liberals and the conservatives, and has delivered its message independently and fearlessly, neither for the love of nor in spite of any one ; but in doing so it has gained friends in all countries of the world, among the ranks of all churches, among the unchurched, and even among the devotees of various non-christian religions.

The Open Court is, in certain respects, at variance with both the liberals and the conservatives. It is dissatisfied with the conservatives because they are not truly conservative, and with the liberals because they are not truly liberal.

If a father wishes to preserve his children, he educates them and gives them all the chances of a mental and moral growth. For

evolution is the law of life, and there is no better preservative than growth. As soon as the conservatives, for the sake of preserving certain truths or convictions or institutions, shut out progress and keep intellectual life in a stagnant condition, they cease to be truly conservative and virtually promote degeneration. Therefore he who is truly conservative is progressive; he believes in growth and is willing to learn new truths. The Religion of Science, for the sake of conserving the advances already made, must encourage progress, and, in doing so, will be more conservative than the ultra-conservatives, whose conservatism practically consists in retrogression.

The Open Court is conservative, but not stationary or reactionary; it proposes to utilise the advances made in the past for further progress, and thus combines conservatism with progressiveness.

The word "liberal" has two meanings. Firstly, when spelled with a small initial, it denotes a moral attitude. Liberal is he who shows a willingness patiently to listen to views which differ from his own and who weighs every opinion impartially and without resorting either to violence or to harsh words. Secondly, when capitalised, Liberal is used as a party-name to designate those who have cut themselves loose from authority of some kind. In this sense "Liberalism" denotes the surrender of traditions, doctrines, or old allegiances; and the more a man has given up of his beliefs, the more Liberal he is accounted. Thus Liberalism as a party name has come to stand for negativism, and liberal religion is practically used in the sense of looseness of religious conviction.

The Open Court means to be liberal in the first sense; but cannot properly be called "Liberal" in the second sense. Instead of surrendering the old religious allegiance to what in theological language is called God, it proposes to make this allegiance sterner and more earnest than ever. God is the God of truth, or he is not God at all. The various liberal movements of our age not only very frequently pursue an extremely narrow-minded policy, but they also exhibit reactionary tendencies which more than the dogmatism of the conservatives blockade the progress of mankind. This may be surprising news to many, but it is true, nevertheless, and we are ready to explain why it is true.

* * *

Liberals are negative spirits, who are characterised by a readiness to discard traditions of all kinds; they attempt to reject the errors of the past, but in the vain hope of attaining infallibility themselves, they reject also the aspiration of having definite opin-

ions. This tendency has bred the main disease of our age—agnosticism.

Agnosticism is negativism with a vengeance, for agnosticism (as defined by its two greatest representatives Professor Huxley and Mr. Spencer) is that doctrine which declares that the main problems of philosophy, the problems of the existence of God, the nature of the soul with its immortality, and the basis of ethics are insoluble; in a word, agnosticism identifies the unknown with the unknowable and makes of the most important questions on which the regulation of man's conduct in life depends, absolute mysteries. Such a philosophy is a more effectual check on religious and scientific progress than the methods employed by the Inquisition. The Inquisition had the power to put a few independent thinkers on the rack, and for a time gagged the others; but agnosticism attempts to poison the minds of whole generations: it makes people drowsy and indifferent; it makes them despair of the possibility of finding the right solution, and induces them to abandon the search for truth.

In religion, the Liberals show a strong inclination to reject the ritual and the doctrines of the past. They object to the symbolism of the Church, but also command advancing thought to halt before their negativism. Thus, the founder of the Societies for Ethical Culture dispenses with ritual of any kind, he no longer uses the word God, but he also claims that science and philosophy cannot teach ethics; indeed, he is especially severe in denouncing the endeavor of founding ethics upon science, and he loves to dwell on the mysticism of the ought, which, according to him, does not develop naturally, but comes to us from spheres transcendental. His Liberalism carried him so far that he was accused of atheism, yet he retains the philosophical error of mysticism which is the root of innumerable superstitions. When he left the synagogue there were many rabbis remaining in their old vocation who were more progressive and philosophically further advanced than he, but they being more liberal as to ceremonies, felt no compunction in preaching in the synagogues and making use of the traditional phraseology.

A strange superstition of modern Liberalism is to spell energy with a capital E and speak of it in terms of awe and reverence. What is there venerable in energy that it should take the place of God? Energy is an abstraction of a high order, it is a term of very wide but very simple circumscription. Energy is capacity for work, either by reason of position or actual motion. The falling of the

stone, the power of a cataract, the tension of a spring—all these are instances of energy, and all energy is measurable in footpounds. Energy becomes venerable only when it appears as moral purpose, that is to say, when it assumes that special form wherein it is combined with consciousness and directed by a right conception of the world. Energy is divine only when it appears as a will guided by the truth; when it is an incarnation of duty bound to fulfil its mission in life.

The same that has been said of energy applies to the deification of matter.

Less crude, but not less unphilosophical, is the deification of the First Cause, spelt with two capitals to do it reverence. While energy and matter are at least ideas possessing reality, a first cause is as much a self-contradiction as a final effect. Every effect has its cause, and every cause its effect, every effect being the cause of the next following effect. By cause we understand that change in a given condition of things which introduces a new arrangement of its parts. The first cause in a longer chain of causes and effects has not the slightest higher dignity than any subsequent cause. The first cause in the creation of our solar system may, according to the Kant-Laplace theory, have been a disturbance of the distribution of nebular substance, resulting of necessity in a rotation of its mass. Yet those who use the term do not mean the first cause in the sense of the incipient motion of the evolutionary process of our world-system, but the decision of God to create the world. Granted that God, like a master mechanic, had said to himself: "Let us create the heavens," his resolution would have been the product of a previous deliberation, and certainly he must have existed before, and if he existed he must have been active, which means that there was in God's being a series of causes and effects prior to the first cause of the world's existence. There is no need of entering into further explanations of the self-contradictions of the notion of a "first cause," which originates through a confusion of the ideas "*cause*" and "*raison d'être*;"¹ but this much may be added, that the fallacy in question is the product of a materialistic view of causation, which regards a chain of causes and effects not as transformations, but as a series of objects following one another like the cars of a railroad train. A philosopher like David Hume, who adopted this conception of causation, is consistently driven to scepticism, or, as we now would say, agnosticism, which means a bankruptcy of philosophy and science.

¹ For details see *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 79-109; and *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 137-172.

The phrase First Cause was first used by Liberals who sought for a convenient word which might take the place of the term God ; but nowadays the word is used even in prayer.

The Infinite, the Eternal Energy, the First Cause, are mere idols, but altars are built to them because they produce an astounding confusion in the minds of their worshippers.

Mankind judges too much from externalities. Religion to the masses is identified with the observance of days, of pulpit-slang, of dressing in special vestments. But the main thing which is the underlying conception and interpretation of all these things, the philosophy of religion, is scarcely ever alluded to ; and yet it is the soul of it, on which everything depends.

The same religion, in fact the same sectarian formulation of a religion may differ very much according as it is interpreted in the light of different philosophies. It may, under the guidance of a right interpretation, produce such noble men, martyrs, heroes, and conquerors, as were the Huguenots, who, when driven from their homes, arrived in foreign lands in abject poverty. Yet how quickly did they recover their loss ! What blessings did they spread by the example of their industry and moral earnestness ! And wherever they went they prospered and were respected and beloved by all with whom they had any dealings. But the same Calvinism, with the same confession of faith, the same sturdiness of purpose and sternness of determination, could under the sway of another philosophical interpretation (after the precedent of their leader) kindle the faggots and burn witches as well as dissenters !

Let us heed externalities only in so far as they directly and unequivocally express a definite interpretation of essentials ; otherwise, let us always go down to the significance of the doctrines. And it is strange that to discard established rituals or make innovations in the externalities of a religion is exceedingly difficult, but to introduce a new conception of both the old ceremonies and old doctrines is comparatively easy. The reason is here again that the masses being incapable of comprehending the philosophy of a religion, judge from externalities and no one would take offence at the most radical Church reform, if only the clergyman would don the same gown and preserve the old liturgy.

* * *

A prominent clergyman of the Church of England¹ declared that while the Reformation of the sixteenth century had been a moral reform, the present need of the times was above all an intel-

¹ Rev. Dr. Haweis in an article published some time ago in *The Contemporary Review*.

lectual reform of the Church. This is very true, and what can the desire for an intellectual reform mean otherwise than a longing for the recognition of those principles which we define as the Religion of Science. Yet in spite of the great importance of emphasising the intellectual aspects of religion, our Liberals as a rule urge people to limit religion to practical issues to the neglect of theoretical questions. They drop theology and preach love, without being aware that love, be it ever so actively applied in practical life, without the intellectual guidance of theoretical principles, degenerates into sentimentalism. Clergymen who hold the dogma of eternal damnation in abhorrence are apt to pray with great unction. But I for one should find more edification in reading the sermon of a time-honored Presbyterian describing the horrors of Hell so vividly that we fairly smell the burning brimstone, than in listening to the prayer of such liberal pulpитеers, who sugar their theology over with the fictitious sweetness of a divine Father in Heaven. There is at least iron in the mental make-up of the old-fashioned believers. I grant the interpretation of their belief in Hell is out of date, but a new interpretation will find much truth in the dogma, for sin, if persisted in, leads irretrievably to eternal perdition, and no amount of the divinest love is able to prevent it. It is difficult to say how many Presbyterians, if there are any, still retain the literal belief in the lake of fire, as it is so drastically described in the Revelation of St. John; but who can be so blind to the facts of life as to deny that there is in life an unspeakable abyss of sin and of the curses of sin, and that the doctrine of Hell symbolises a very obvious and very important truth? How inconsistent is that kind of liberal religion which literally accepts the eternal bliss of a heaven-locality and ceases to retain its correlate symbol, the doctrine of the doom of error and sin!

* * *

At the latest Liberal Congress held in Indianapolis one of the speakers mentioned as the sources of religion "the awe of the mysterious" and "the sense of absolute dependence." If such were indeed the sources of religion, the scientist whose duty is to explain the mysterious, and the man of independent mind would be excessively irreligious. A religion that does not help us to do away with the mysteries of life and to make us more and more independent, is a false light; and it seems to me that the success of Christianity in former centuries greatly depended upon its having made an important step forward, a step away from the bondage of a religion of

ceremonies, sacrifices, and codified law toward what Luther calls "the glorious liberty of the children of God."

When Christianity made its first appearance in history, it announced itself as the solution of the problem of life, and claimed to ransom, redeem, and liberate mankind. It was Schleiermacher, one of the best liberal theologians, who first pronounced the definition of religion as "the sense of absolute dependence" (*das Gefühl schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit*); and Schopenhauer spoke of Schleiermacher as "a veil-maker."¹ Truly, if liberal theology cannot walk on the path of progress, it would be better to remain with the strict conservatives; for it would not be wise to undo the advance that has actually been made. Otherwise we might tear down with the iconoclasts the whole fabric of religion and have to start the evolution of man from savage life on over again, after the fashion of the unschooled social reformers whose panacea as a rule consists in the abolition of civilisation involving a return to some primitive state of barbarism.

* * *

While the Liberals upon the whole show an aptitude to retain the mistakes of the past, while they ignore or even antagonise the advances that have actually been made, the conservatives in their turn are beginning to imitate the faults of the Liberals. They accept the main errors of Liberalism and parade them before their congregations as a sign of their readiness to progress with the times.

Here are a few instances.

The principle of agnosticism, which was invented for the purpose of keeping the claims of dogmatism in check, is now frequently pronounced from pulpits of all descriptions. The phrase, "The finite mind cannot grasp the infinite," wrong and nonsensical though it be, is repeated *ad nauseam*. The phrase is used only by unclear thinkers, by men who may be very learned but who know nothing of exact logic and less (if that be possible) of mathematics. The infinite is by no means anything incomprehensible, indeed it is less incomprehensible than the finite, for the infinite is a simpler idea than the finite. It is true that God, the power that constitutes the order of the world and whose way is the highest law of ethics, is infinite in his various dispensations; but for that

¹ While criticising Schleiermacher's definition of Religion, I feel urged to say that I am not blind to the many noble thoughts which he has uttered in his sermons, especially his monologues on religion.

reason the quality of infinitude is not any more divine than the limitations which give definiteness to concrete things and events.

The infinite is a quality involving an unlimited continuation or the capacity of an unchecked progress, or inexhaustible applications and potentialities; it is a condition, but never a complete and concrete thing. Of course, it is a mistake to think of the unfinished as finished, of the incomplete as complete, of that which is in a state of becoming as rigid being, of that which moves as being at rest, of that which lives and develops as absolutely stable; but those who try to conceive of the infinite as a finite object are bewildered; and in their confusion they imagine that infinitude must be something incomprehensible.

The infinite as such is not God. Man, too, is infinite, for the potentialities of every soul are unlimited and illimitable. Nay, things less sacred are infinite; space is infinite; time is infinite, or, as we commonly express it, eternal; $\frac{1}{2}$ is infinitely large; $\frac{1}{4}$ is infinitely small; and every mathematical line is infinite. Is there any mystery in infinitude? Is there any holiness in it? Is the notion of the infinite an idea of moral importance? If it were, we should write that pretzel-like emblem (∞), which is the exactest expression of the infinite, upon the altar of the church of the future and bow down and worship it.

The interpretation of the traditional doctrines has slowly and almost imperceptibly been changed, but we find that at the same time the aspiration after catholicity and orthodoxy is being abandoned. How often is the "spirit of orthodoxy" denounced on the ground that orthodoxy is wrong in principle, which in other words means that truth is unknowable.

Orthodoxy means rightness of doctrine, and catholicity means the universality of truth. What we need is not the abolition of orthodoxy, but genuine orthodoxy; not the disavowal of catholicity or a peculiar and particular kind of catholicity, an Anglican, or an Italian, or a Russian catholicity, but true catholicity. We need rightness of doctrine and a truth that is universal.

And how frequently is theology denounced,—not a special theology but theology in general. We hear sometimes voices that come from the conservative ranks clamoring for religion without theology. Theology is blamed for all the vices of heresy trials and witch-prosecution, while religion is extolled as being the sole thing needed. And yet theology is nothing but the old name for "the science of religion." It is now quite fashionable among conservative clergymen to join in the hue and cry of the liberals which is

raised against theology in favor of a mere sentimental practice of devotional religion, and which has contributed a great deal to prevent progress and to keep religious evolution upon a lower plane where the intellect is regarded with suspicion.

What we need in religion is not less theology but more theology; we need a thoroughly scientific investigation of the religious problems. We need a radical and fearless application of the scientific spirit to religion.

The Open Court does not belong to any party, but endeavors to form the third unpartisan party which shall unite the two extremes of the belligerents; and the method to accomplish this end consists, briefly, in taking religion seriously. We should neither take the traditions of the churches simply as a matter of course, nor ever surrender the hope of making headway in the comprehension of the religious problem. We should investigate boldly though reverently. We should seek the truth earnestly, assiduously, and with due discrimination, and cherish the confidence that if we seek in the right spirit with right methods we shall at last find the truth.

The cornerstone of the aspirations of the Religion of Science is a trust in truth. We believe that truth can be found and that the truth, whatever it may be, will be the best, better than the dearest illusions of our fathers or of our own making.

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We should not conclude this review without at least outlining and recapitulating the solution which *The Open Court* offers in reply to the most important religious problems, the problems of duty, of the soul, of immortality, and of God.

We endeavor in religion as well as in other domains of life to dig down to the facts from which our abstractions and generalisations, direct and indirect, are derived and upon which our convictions rest. We propose in the science of religion, as well as in the various branches of natural science, to replace theories by simple statements of fact, which means we reduce our terms to the experiences which they are meant to embody.

We have sense-impressions which cause our soul to respond in various reactions. Sometimes we feel pleasure and at other times come to grief. We encounter resistance and try to overcome it. We love and we hate. We struggle, and, when the hostile forces are too powerful, we combine for a more effectual struggle. There is struggle everywhere, even within us. Our will is not one and the same always; we consist of various impulses which frequently come in conflict, and then the question arises,

Which impulse shall have its way, and which one must be suppressed? The maxim which for such situations recommends itself is our conception of duty; and the conditions which demand an implicit obedience to duty, whether or not its performance be pleasant, is that power which since times immemorial has been called God. God is not anything unknown or unknowable; his manifestations are nearer to us than our heart-beats; he is knowable, and we can with the usual methods of science investigate the character of his dispensation.

Besides the experiences in the domain of our aspirations, we face conditions that affect our sentiments. We grow old and die, and in the face of death we long for self-preservation. We become conscious of the fact that life is a fleeting phenomenon, and we seek for that which constitutes its permanence. We thirst for immortality. And here is the main problem of religion: Will our life extend beyond the grave, and, if it will, what does the life to come consist in?

In order to solve this question we must analyse our soul and trace its origin, for the origin of the soul teaches us its fate after death. Some claim that the problem of the soul is insoluble; but have we not the records of history, can we not study biology and all the other sciences that explain to us man's being? Does science teach that the soul is an ephemeral phenomenon which did not exist yesterday and will be gone to-morrow? Impossible! Here we are a living reality, and can our soul rise from nothingness simply to return again to nothingness? What is the nature of our soul? How is it produced, how does it grow, and what are the moulds in which it is shaped? These problems clamor for a solution that must be based upon a rigid and critical investigation.

The main difficulties that encounter us here are the materialistic and sensualistic tendencies, which naturally present themselves first and commend themselves to superficial inquirers. The materialistic view leads us to think that our self is the sum total of all the material particles of which we consist at a given moment, and the sensualistic view induces us to identify our soul with our feelings or with consciousness, yet both views neglect the paramount importance of form. That which constitutes our self in its peculiar idiosyncrasy is the form of our body and our sentiments. We are not vitality of a certain amount of energy, but a certain kind of vitality, a certain kind of consciousness; we are a combination of definite impulses and aspirations, and that special form which gives a special character to our peculiar constitution is the most essential

part of our existence. Our thoughts are not nerve-activity of a certain quantity, but of a certain quality. The quality of our being is our self; all the rest is of secondary importance. The matter that constitutes our body and the energy that is spent in the physiological functions of the brain are passing through our system in a rapid and constant change. They are going, always going; they become mere waste material at the very moment when they do their work, while that which is characteristic of every action is preserved as a peculiar formation or disposition which is the condition of memory. Our bodily and mental make-up consists of innumerable dispositions which are the product of functions. Our constitution, in all its parts, is memory, partly conscious, partly subconscious, partly unconscious; and the functions which we perform contribute their share in adding to or modifying the present constitution.

This analysis of the soul shows the immortality problem in a new light. While the material frame of every organism is destined to be dissolved in death, its peculiar type continues to exist; its soul reappears in new formations in a process of continuous growth. Bodily forms are transmitted to the new generations mainly by heredity, but the spirit of man has still other and higher avenues left to immortalise itself. Example and education insure the continuance of the most precious features of every life, preserving them in the same way that a thought which we have been thinking once continues to be a part of ourselves as an ever-present memory which, when not specially needed, slumbers in our subconsciousness, but can at the slightest provocation be reawakened to the full blaze of conscious activity. My soul, in its peculiar idiosyncrasy, is the present phase of a definite life-evolution; my soul not only existed before in various previous forms that contributed to shape its present incarnation, but it is ultimately conditioned in the cosmic constitution of the All which moulds its rationality and determines its ideals and moral aspirations. My soul is a more or less perfect incarnation of God. As the past generations, with all the special features that constitute their personal character, continue to exist in the present generation, in the same way the present generation will live on in the future generations, preserving the identity of all that is essential to their being. As the life-experiences of an individual man remain with him in the shape of his memory, increasing the proficiency of his work, so all the lives of the race are living stones that build up the temple of humanity and continue in it, in their personal and distinctive specificness as ever-present pres-

ences which cannot be annihilated. The body may be destroyed, but not the soul. All the representatives of a new idea, of an inconvenient truth, of an unwelcome aspiration, may be burned, but ideas, truths, aspirations, cannot be burned. Our life may be cut short, but the spirit that stirs in us is indestructible. Considered as a combination of material atoms, man is mortal; but that of man which has taken shape in his bodily system, that which constitutes his personality, his soul, is immortal.

* * *

The problem of the soul stands in a close connexion with the problem of God. God is the creator; God is the eternal mould which forms man's soul. God is the prototype and the norm of all those aspirations which lead to a higher and ever higher unfoldment of life. God is the reality of which truth is the picture and at the same time the standard of righteousness, for righteousness is nothing but truth applied to practical life.

The God of the Religion of Science is not a new God; it is the same God who revealed himself with more or less perfection in all the prophets and moral teachers of the world. The newness of the conception consists only in being a new definition which is more guarded and avoids the contradictions into which some of the old definitions are apt to involve us.

According to the Religion of Science, God is that authoritative presence in the All which enforces a definite moral conduct. God is that something which constitutes the harmony of the laws of nature; God is the intrinsic necessity of mathematics and logic; God above all is what experience teaches us to be the eternal lesson that leads to righteousness, justice, morality. This presence is both immanent and transcendent: it is immanent as the constituent characteristic of the law that pervades the universe; it is transcendent, for it is the condition of any possible cosmic order; and in this sense it is supercosmic and supernatural.

We do not say that God is impersonal, for the word "impersonal" implies the absence of those features which constitute personality; it implies vagueness, indefiniteness, and lack of character. God, however, as he manifests himself in the order of the universe, is very definite. He is not vague, but possesses quite marked qualities. He is such as he is and not different. His being is universal, but not indeterminable. His nature does not consist of indifferent generalities, but exhibits a distinct suchness. Indeed, all suchness in the world, in physical nature as well as in the domain of spirit, depends upon God as here defined, and what is the

personality of man but the incarnation of that cosmic logic which we call reason? God, although not an individual being, is the prototype of personality; although not a person, thinking thoughts as we do, deliberating, weighing arguments, and coming to a decision, he is yet that which conditions personality; he possesses all those qualities which, when reflected in animated creatures, adds unto their souls the nobility of God's image, called personality. Therefore we say that God is superpersonal.

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The Religion of Science re-establishes the ideals of orthodoxy and of catholicity upon a new basis; it introduces into religion the principle of positivism, not of the Comtean positivism, which is agnostic, but of a new positivism which grounds itself upon the rock of facts; it embodies in its doctrine all the truth that the old religions can teach us and reads their sacred traditions in the light that a scientific world-conception affords. Above all, the Religion of Science emphasises that the doctrines of the churches as formulated in their symbolical books are symbols, and must be understood in their symbolical nature.

Symbols are not lies; symbols contain truth. Allegories and parables are not falsehoods; they convey information; moreover, they can be understood by those who are not as yet prepared to receive the plain truth. Thus, when in the progress of science religious symbols are recognised and known in their symbolical nature, this knowledge will not destroy religion but will cleanse it of error and bring us face to face, more intimately than ever, with that Divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will.

The Religion of Science does not reject tradition, it only refuses to recognise tradition as an ultimate and infallible authority. We must judge the worth of doctrines, dogmas, scriptures, and practices according to their agreement with truth. We must prove all things and choose what is good. We must investigate and hold fast to the truth. In this way only can we ground our faith upon the foundation stone of the eternal logos that constitutes the irreversible law of the moral world-order.

ON TRADE AND USURY.¹

AN ADDRESS BY DOCTOR MARTIN LUTHER.

TRANSLATED BY W. H. CARRUTH.

THE HOLY GOSPEL condemns and points out all sorts of works of darkness, as Saint Paul calls them, Romans, 13, 12; for it is a bright light that shines for all the world, and teaches how evil are the works of the world, and shows the right works which one should do towards God and his neighbor. Wherefore certain among the merchants have aroused themselves and become aware that in their occupation many evil tricks and harmful practices are in use, and that there is fear, it is true here, as Solomon the preacher says, that merchants can scarcely live without sin. Yea, I believe the saying of St. Paul strikes here, I. Timothy, 6, 10:

¹ Martin Luther's address on "Trade and Usury" exhibits on the one hand his implicit faith in the Gospel, and on the other hand an unusual perspicacity and common sense. The way in which he reconciles the one with the other, where apparently they come into conflict, does honor to both his religious earnestness and his insight into the conditions and practical demands of life. Luther accepts Christ's ethics of non-resistance to evil, of lending where there is no hope of recovery, and of giving freely to those in need. These maxims, however, are practicable only in a society where all people are good Christians. If they were indiscriminately applied in this actual world of ours, which must be governed by a strong hand, the bad would soon take advantage of the pious and presume upon their patience. Luther therefore comes to the conclusion that business should be conducted strictly on cash terms with a view to reasonable profits. How little Luther would have people yield to goodnaturedness or sentimentality appears from his condemnation of going surety as a foolish self-indulgence. At the same time he calls attention to the dangers of buying and selling on time; he exposes the methods of fraudulent bankruptcy, of the artificial raising of prices by combinations, of cornering the market, and all other illegitimate business tricks which, it appears, were as common in his days as they are now.

Luther speaks with authority, because he makes himself the spokesman of the nation's conscience; and his sermon is remarkable for the loftiness of his conviction and the purity of his motive. Nevertheless, it contains some serious shortcomings which, even granting the divinity of Luther's mission, are due to the fact that the great reformer was after all a child of his age and limited by the narrow horizon of his time. In many respects he towered high above his contemporaries, but like most German clergymen of the sixteenth century he had a child-like belief in the paternalism of the government, which was expected to right all the wrongs that originated through the vices of bad people.

The pamphlet "On Trade and Usury" appeared in 1544; the same subjects in part had been

"Greed is the root of all evil;" and again, verse 9, "Those who desire to become rich, fall into temptation and the toils, and into many vain and harmful desires which sink people into destruction and damnation."

Now, although I think that this my epistle will be almost useless, because the mischief has made such inroads and in all matters gained such headway in all lands, and since, moreover, those who understand the Gospel might themselves judge in their own conscience what is right and what is wrong in such simple and plain matters; nevertheless, I am admonished and besought to touch these practices and to bring some of them to daylight (although the mob does not desire it), so that certain of them, though but few, may be rescued from the jaws and gorge of greed. For, indeed, it must be that certain are still to be found among merchants, as well as among other men, who cleave to Christ and would rather be poor with God than rich with the Devil, as the Thirty-seventh Psalm, verse 16, says: "A little with the just is better than great goods with the godless."

Of Foreign Luxuries.—Well then, for the sake of these we must speak. But now, this cannot be denied, that buying and selling is a necessary thing which we cannot do without, and which can be used in a Christian manner, especially in those points serving need and honor, for thus also the patriarchs sold cattle, wool, butter, milk, and other goods. They are gifts of God which he gives out of the earth and distributes among men. But foreign merchandise which brings from Calicut and India, and the like places wares such as precious silks, and jewels, and spices, which serve only love of show and no useful purpose, and drain the land and people of their money, should not be permitted if we had a government and princes. But I do not propose now to speak of these things; for I think that these things will needs be dropped of themselves finally when our money is all gone, as well as the

treated by Luther in his "Sermon von dem Wucher," 1519, and again in the [Grosser] "Sermon von dem Wucher," 1519, as well as in the great address "An den Adel," 1520.

Our ancestors saw the world divided by a distinct line of demarcation into a material domain and a spiritual domain, and the dealings of the merchant still appeared to Luther to possess no aim beyond the satisfaction of bodily needs and the acquisition of wealth. Luther is not as yet conscious of the worldly importance of the duties of a clergyman and of the spiritual significance of worldly pursuits. This dualism, which began to break down on the day of Luther's marriage, was still lingering with him, being the reason why, upon the whole, the lesson which he taught in his sermon on "Trade and Usury" is still negative, why he lacks a positive appreciation of the nobility of commerce, and why he has not as yet comprehended the moral dignity of business life. Had he seen the solidarity of all human affairs, he would have recognised the spiritual significance of trade as a moral factor in the evolution of civilisation, and would therefrom have derived the positive duties of business men, the final purpose of their calling, and the part it plays in the general economy of society.—*Editor's note.*

display and gluttony; indeed, no writing or teaching else will do any good until need and poverty force us.

God has brought us Germans to that pitch that we must needs scatter our gold and silver into foreign lands, and make all the world rich and ourselves remain beggars. England should indeed have less gold, if Germany left her her cloth; and the king of Portugal also would have less, if we left him his spices. Reckon thou how much money is taken out of German land without need or cause in one Frankfort fair, then wilt thou wonder how it comes that there is a penny left in Germany. Frankfort is the silver-and-gold-hole through which everything that sprouts and grows among us, or is coined and stamped, runs out of German lands. If this hole were stopped, we would perchance not hear the complaint how on all hands there is naught but debts and no money, and all provinces and cities are burdened and exhausted by interest-paying.

But let it go; it is bound to go so; we Germans must remain Germans; we do not stop unless we have to. We propose to speak here of the abuses and sins of merchandising in so far as it touches the conscience. How it touches the loss to the pocket, as to that we will let princes and lords have care, if perchance they may do their duty.

Of Unrighteous Prices.—In the first place, the merchants have a common rule among them, it is their motto and bottom of all their practices: I shall sell my ware as dear as I can. This they hold to be their right. But it means making room for greed, and opening the door and window for hell. What else is this than saying: I will give no heed to my neighbor, if only I may have my profit and greed full; what do I care if it brings my neighbor ten ills at once? So you see how this motto goes so straight and shamelessly against not only Christian love, but against natural law as well. What good could there be in merchandising? What should there be in it but sin where such a wrong is the motto and rule? By this token merchandising can be nothing else than stealing and plundering others of their own.

For on this ground, when the rogue's eye and the greedy-gut mark that any one must have their ware, or that the buyer is poor and needs it, they make their use and gain out of it, they look not at the worth of the ware, nor at the value of their service, nor their risk, but simply at the need and want of their neighbor,—not to help him, but to use these for their own advantage, and put up their ware which they would leave at low price if it were not for the necessity of their neighbor. And so through their greed, the

ware must have a price as much higher as the need of the neighbor is greater, so that one's neighbor's need becomes the mark and price of the ware. Tell me, is that not unchristian and inhuman action? Is not thus the poor man's need sold to him together with the ware? For since he has to pay so much the more for the ware on account of his need, it is the same as though he had to buy his own need. For not the simple ware is sold him as it is in itself, but with the addition and increase wherewith he is distressed. Behold, this and the like abominations must follow when the principle stands: I will sell my wares as dear as I can.

Of Righteous Prices.—It should not be: I will sell my wares as dear as I can or please, but thus: I will sell my wares as dear as I should, or as is right and proper. For thy selling should not be a work that is within thy power and will, without all law and limit, as though thou wert a god, bounden to no one; but because thy selling is a work that thou performest to thy neighbor it should be restrained within such law and conscience that thou mayest practise it without harm or injury to thy neighbor, but heed rather that thou do him no injury which is thy gain. Yea, but where are such merchants? How few should there be of merchants, and how should merchandising fall off, if they would correct this evil law, and put it in just, Christian fashion!

Askest thou then: Well, how dear shall I sell it, then? How shall I strike what is right and just so that I may not overreach my neighbor? Answer: That is indeed framed in no speech or writing; no one has yet undertaken to fix the price of every ware, and raise or lower it. The reason is this: wares are not all alike; one is brought farther than another, one takes more outlay than another, so that in this matter all is uncertain and must remain so, and nothing can be fixed, as little as one can fix one certain city whence they shall be brought, or a set outlay for all, since it may happen that one and the same ware, from one and the same city and brought on the same road, may cost more to-day than a year ago by reason of the road and the weather being worse, or some other chance that causes more outlay than at another time. But it is right and just that a merchant should gain so much on his wares that his outlay, his pains, work, and risk shall be made good. For even a plowboy must have keep and wages for his labor. Who can serve or work for nothing? Thus saith the Gospel: "A laborer is worthy of his hire."

A Commission to Fix Prices.—But, not to pass over the matter in silence, the best and safest way would be that worldly authority

should appoint and ordain in this matter sensible, honest people who might consider all wares and the outlay upon them and set accordingly the mete and limit of their value, so that the merchant might then add his service and get his decent living from it; as indeed in some places the price of wine, fish, bread, and the like is set. But we Germans are too busy with drinking and dancing to give heed to such control and regulation. Since, therefore, such regulation is not to be hoped for, the next best counsel is that we value the wares as the common market gives and takes, or as the custom of the country is to give and take; for in this the saw holds good: "Do as others do, and thou'lt do no folly." What is gained in this wise I hold to be honestly and well earned, especially since there is a danger here that they may lose on the wares and the outlay, and are not likely to gain too richly.

But where the price is not fixed, or where the ware is not current on the market, then must thou set a price. Verily, there is but one doctrine here, it must be laid upon thy conscience that thou examine, and overreach not thy neighbor, and seek not thy greedy gain, but only thy decent living. Certain ones have sought to set metes here, as that one might gain one half on all wares; some, that one might gain one third; and some otherwise. But none of these is safe or sure, unless it were established thus by worldly law and common right; that would be safe. Therefore must thou determine in such traffic to seek naught but a decent living, and consider accordingly outlay, pains, labor, and risk, and then thyself fix, raise, or lower the value of the ware, so that thou mayest have the reward of such pains and labor.

Prices a Matter of Conscience.—But I would not in this matter so dangerously ensnare souls, nor enmesh them so tightly as to say that one must needs set the mete so closely that there should not be a farthing's error. For that is not possible,—that thou shouldst hit so exactly how much thou hast earned by said pains and labor; it is enough that thou endeavor with good conscience to strike the limit right, though the nature of trade is to make this impossible; the saying of the wise man will probably hold true in thy case: "A merchant can scarcely deal without sin, and a tavernkeeper may scarcely keep a righteous mouth." Now, if thou take unknowing, and not intending, a bit too much, let it go into the Pater Noster, where we pray: "Forgive us our debts;" for no man's life is without sin. And besides, it may come that thou take too little for thy pains, and let that make it quit and balance for taking too much.

As, if thou hadst a trade that in the year amounted to one hundred florins, and thou shouldst take over and above the expense and due pay for thy pains, labor, and risk, one, two, or three florins a year, I call that the error in trade that one cannot well avoid, especially spread out thus over a year. Therefore burden not thou thy conscience with it, but bring it to God in the Pater Noster, like any other unavoidable sin that cleaves to us all, and leave it with Him: for to such an error drives thee the need and nature of the work, and not wilfulness and greed; for I am speaking here of goodhearted and godfearing men who would not willingly do wrong. Just as conjugal life cannot be without sin, and yet God tolerates it for the necessity of the work, since it must needs so be.

But how high thy reward is to be set, which thou art to have from such trade and labor, this canst thou not reckon and judge better than by considering the time and the greatness of the labor, and taking comparison with a common day-laborer, who does any other work, see what he earns a day; then reckon how many days thou hast spent in getting and fetching the ware, and how great labor and risk thou hast undergone, for great labor and much risk should have a greater reward. Closer and better and surer one cannot speak nor teach in this matter; let him who is not pleased with this do better. Paul says: "Who keeps the flock shall drink the milk." Who can travel at his own charge and cost? Hast thou better reasons, I am pleased.

Of Surety.—Secondly, there is another common fault which is a current custom not alone among merchants but in all the world, that one becomes surety for another. And though this seems to be no sin but rather a virtue of love, yet it commonly destroys many people, and brings them to irretrievable injury. King Solomon condemns and forbids it repeatedly in his proverbs, saying: "My son, if thou art become surety for thy neighbor and hast bound thy hand to a stranger, if thou art snared with the words of thy mouth and caught with the speech of thy mouth, then do thus, my son, and save thyself, for thou art fallen into the hands of thy neighbor: hasten, urge, and beset thy neighbor; let not thine eyes sleep nor thine eyelids slumber; save thyself as a roe from the hand of the hunter, and as a bird from the hand of the fowler." And again he says: "Take his garment from him that is surety for a stranger, and put him under pledge for the sake of the stranger." And again: "Be not one of them that bind their hands and are surety for debts." Behold how the wise king in the Holy Writ

forbids so sharply and strongly to become surety for others. And the German proverb agrees with him: "Sureties shall be throttled." As though it would say: "It serves the surety right that he is pinched and has to pay, for he acts lightly and foolishly in becoming surety." So that this is the will of Scripture, that no one shall become surety unless he has the means, and is entirely willing to be debtor himself and to pay. Now, it seems strange that such an act should be wicked and condemned. For that it is a foolish act has been felt by many who have had to sweat heaviest for it. Then what is the reason that it is condemned? Let us see.

Suretyship is an act that is too high for a man, and not fit, for it clashes presumptuously with the work of God. For, in the first place, the Scripture forbids us to trust men, and rely on them, but only on God. For human nature is false, vain, deceitful, and fickle, as Scripture says and experience teaches daily. But he who becomes surety trusts a man, and puts body and goods into danger and upon a false and fickle foundation, and hence it serves him right that he fall and fail, and through the danger perish.

Again, he is trusting to himself and making himself a God, for that on which a man relies and trusts, that is his God. But inasmuch as he is safe and certain of his life and goods no moment, still less of him for whom he has become surety, but all is in God's hand alone, whose will is that we shall not have power and control one hair's breadth in the future, or be sure and certain of it one moment, therefore he is acting unchristianly, and it serves him right, because he is pledging and promising that which is not in his power, but in God's hands alone.

Such sureties act just as though they did not need to thank God or consider whether they would be sure of their life and property to-morrow, and even act without the fear of God as if they had life and goods from themselves, and could control them as long as they pleased, which is naught but fruit of irreligion.

Four Fashions of Christian Dealing.—Sayest thou then, How then shall people deal with one another if suretyship is condemned? Many a man would needs fail who might otherwise get ahead. Answer: There are four ways in which to deal in outward Christian fashion with others.

The first is that we let our goods be taken or plundered from us, as Christ teaches: "If any man take thy cloak, let him have also thy coat, and demand it not again from him." Now, this method is despised among merchants, and indeed it has not been regarded and preached as common Christian doctrine, but only as

advice and good suggestion for clerks [clergymen] and perfectionists, who, however, observe it less than any merchant. But real Christians will observe it, for they know that their Father in Heaven has promised them to give them their daily bread each day. And if this were done, not only would numberless abuses be avoided in all bargains, but many would not become merchants, because reason and human nature flee and shun such danger and harm most diligently.

The Second Fashion.—The second fashion is to give for nothing to everybody who needs, as indeed Christ teaches. This, indeed, is a high Christian work, wherefore it is not much esteemed among people, and there would be fewer merchants and less merchandise if this were set going. For he who would do this must indeed lean upon Heaven, and look ever to God's hands and not to his own stores or goods, knowing that God would and will feed him though every cupboard-corner were empty. For he knows that it is true what God said to Joshua: "I will not desert thee nor withdraw my hand from thee." As the saying is: "God has more than He has ever given." But this takes a real Christian, the rarest beast on earth, despised of world and nature.

The Third Fashion.—The third fashion is lending or loaning, so that I give my property, and take it again in case it is brought back, and go without if it is not brought back. For Christ himself had in mind such lending when He said: "So lend, that ye hope nothing from it." That is: Lend and take the risk whether it come back or not; if it come back, take it; if it come not back, regard it as given. So that giving and lending according to the Gospel had no difference but this, that giving takes nothing back, but lending takes back if it comes, yet runs the risk of its being giving. For whoso lends, expecting to receive better or more, is an open and condemned usurer; while not even those act as Christians who lend expecting and demanding back just what they gave, instead of freely risking whether it come back or not.

And as I think, when one considers the course of the world, even this is a high, rare, and Christian work, and would, if it came into practice, powerfully reduce and hold down all sorts of merchandising. For these three methods hold masterfully to the point of not presuming upon the future, and of not relying on oneself or other men, but of clinging to God alone, and in this way everything is paid for in cash, and recalls the word: "If God will, so be it," as James says. For thus we act with people as with those who

may fail us and are uncertain, and give the goods for naught, or risk the loss of what we lend.

Here it will be asked: Who, then, can be saved? and where shall we find Christians? For in this fashion no merchandising would remain on earth; every one would find his own taken or borrowed from him, and the door would be opened to the wicked and lazy gluttons, of whom the world is full, to take everything, cheat and steal. Answer: You see it is as I said, that Christians are rare people on earth. Therefore a stern, hard, civil rule is necessary in the world, that will push and force the wicked not to take and steal, and to give back what they borrow (although a Christian should not demand it back), lest the world become wild, peace vanish, and commerce and common interests be destroyed, which would all come to pass if the world should be ruled according to the Gospel, and the wicked were not driven and forced by laws and constraint to do and permit what is right.

Therefore the highways must be kept clear, peace maintained in the cities, and law administered in the land, and the sword be drawn promptly and unhesitatingly against violators, as St. Paul teaches. For this is God's will that the heathen be checked that they do no wrong, or no wrong without punishment. No one need think that the world can be ruled without blood; the civil sword shall and must be red and bloody, for if the world will and must be wicked, the sword of God is rod and vengeance against it. But of this I have said enough in my book on Civil Authority.

Of Christian Borrowing.—Now, borrowing would be a fine thing if it were done between Christians, for every one would gladly repay what he had borrowed, and the lender would gladly go without if the borrower was unable to repay. For Christians are brothers, and one does not desert another; nor is any one so lazy and shameless as to wish to depend without work on the goods and work of another, and live in idleness on the property of another. But where there are not Christians, there civil authority should drive the borrower to pay; if it does not drive but is lax, then the Christian is to suffer the imposition, as Paul says: "Why do ye not rather suffer wrong?" But let the heathen dun and demand, and act as he will, he cares for nothing because he is a heathen and heeds not the teaching of Christ.

And then thou hast this comfort, that thou art not holden to lend, save what thou hast over and canst spare from thy needs; as Christ says of alms: "What ye have to spare, that give as alms, and all things are clean unto you." Now, if so much were to be

demand of thee that, in case it were not returned, thou must needs perish, and thy necessities could not spare it, then art thou not holden to lend; for most of all thou art holden to furnish the necessities for thy wife, child, and household, and not to take from them what is due them from thee. Therefore is this the best rule: When the borrowing seems to be too much for thee, give rather something for nothing, or lend as much as thou wouldst gladly give, and take the risk even should it be lost. For John the Baptist spake not: "Let him who hath a coat give the same away;" but: "Let him that hath two coats give one to him that hath none, and him that hath food likewise."

The Fourth Fashion.—The fourth fashion is buying and selling, and that with cash, or paying ware with ware. Now let him who would follow this fashion be prepared to depend upon nought in the future, but upon God alone, and to deal with men who err or deceive. Hence this is the best advice: that he who sells give nothing on credit, and accept no security, but take his pay in cash. But if he wishes to give credit, that it be to Christians; otherwise that he take the risk of its being lost, and give credit no further than he would otherwise give and his necessities will permit; or, where civil law and authority will not help him to his own, that he call it lost, and take care not to become surety for any one, but rather give what he can. That would indeed be a real Christian merchant whom God would not desert because he trusts Him so fairly and deals so light-heartedly with his uncertain neighbor and takes the risk.

Of Merchandising.—Now if suretyship were not in the world, and free gospel lending were in vogue, and only cash or ready wares current in trade, the greatest and most harmful dangers, errors and weaknesses were out of merchandising, and it would be easy to be a merchant, and other sinful devices could be checked the easier. For if such suretyship and guaranteed lending were not, many a one would needs remain on the level and be content with moderate living who, as it is, depends on lending and suretyship, and strives day and night to climb the height; whence also it is that everybody wishes to become a merchant and grow rich. And thence follow of necessity such swindling, wicked tricks and wiles as now are found in troops among merchants, so that I have already despaired of its ever being corrected, but it has been so overlaid with wickedness and deceit, that it cannot endure long, and must fall of itself.

Hereby I wish to give to everybody a brief warning and in-

struction in this great-tangled, far-reaching business of merchandising. For if it were to be allowed to go and remain so that every one might sell his wares as dear as he could, and lending and borrowing for a consideration, and suretyship were conceded to be right, and yet we were to give counsel as to how any one is to be a Christian withal and keep a good and sound conscience, it were as much as if one would advise and teach how wrong could be right, how evil could be good, and how one could live and act according to Holy Writ and at the same time against Holy Writ. For these three errors: that one give his goods as dear as he please, and lending, and suretyship are like three springs from which all abominations, wiles, tricks, and wrongs flow so far and wide that if one would try to check the flow and yet not stop the springs his pains and labor would be lost.

The Devices of Greed.—Therefore I propose here to enumerate some of these tricks and evil devices such as I have myself observed, or have been pointed out to me by good and pious hearts, whereby it may be felt and seen that my reasons and declarations above made are supported and must stand if there is to be any help and counsel for conscience in merchandising. And also that all the other evil devices not here enumerated may be known and estimated by these; for how were it possible to number them all? since through the three aforementioned sources doors and windows are opened to greed and to wicked, tricky, selfish human nature, and room and play given, power and permission to practise freely all sorts of cunning and deceit, and daily to devise more, so that the whole business reeks of greed, yea, is soaked and sunken in greed as in a second deluge.

Of Time Sales.—In the first place, some make no bones of letting their wares go on time, and selling them thus dearer than for cash. Yea, some prefer to sell no wares for cash, but only on time, and that simply that they may make more money by it. Now, thou canst see that this performance is rudely in conflict with God's word, against reason and all justice, and from pure, unadulterated greed he sins against his neighbor, whose harm he nothing heeds, robs and steals from him his own, and seeks not his own just living, but only greed and gain. For in divine right he should not credit or sell on time dearer than for cash.

Furthermore, this, too, has been done: some sell their goods dearer than they are worth in the general market, or in prices current, and thus raise the price of their wares for no other reason than that they know that there is no more of them in the land, or

is not likely to come presently, and yet people must have them. That is the knavish eye of greed that considers only his neighbor's necessity, not to relieve it, but to profit by it, and to become rich through his neighbor's loss. Such dealers are merely public thieves, robbers, and usurers.

Of "Corners."—Furthermore, there are some who buy up altogether the goods or wares of a certain kind in a city or country, so that they alone have such goods in their power, and then fix prices, raise and sell as dear as they will or can. Now I have said above that the rule is false and unchristian that any one sell his goods as dear as he will or can; more abominable still is it that any one should buy up the goods with this intent. Which same, moreover, imperial and common law forbids and calls monopoly; that is, selfish purchases which are not to be suffered in the land and city, and princes and rulers should check and punish it if they wish to fulfil their duty. For such merchants act just as if the creatures and goods of God were created and given for them alone, and as though they might take them from others and dispose of them at their fancy.

Of Joseph.—And if any one were to cite the example of Joseph, how this holy man gathered all the grain in the land and afterwards, in the time of famine, bought therewith for the King of Egypt all the money, cattle, land, and people, which indeed seems as if it were a monopoly or piece of selfishness, the answer is this: That this purchase and bargain of Joseph's was no monopoly, but a fair bargain such as was common in the land. For he hindered no one from buying at the proper time. But it was his wisdom, given by God, that he gathered in the king's corn the seven years when harvests were good, while others were gathering nothing or little. For the text does not say that he alone gathered corn, but that he gathered it in the king's cities. If the others did not do this it is their own fault; just as the average man is apt to live without forethought, or at times has not the wherewithal to gather.

Just as we see still to-day, that unless princes or cities provide themselves with supplies for the benefit of the whole land there is no provision in the home of the common man, or very little, for he is wont to consume his yearly income from year to year. And such gathering is not selfishness and monopoly, but good Christian foresight on the part of the community for the benefit of others. For it is not as though they took everything for themselves, like these merchants, but from what the common market or the yearly harvest offers common to all, they gather the surplus,

whereas others will not or cannot gather of it, but only supply their daily needs from it. Moreover, Scripture does not report that Joseph gathered the corn in order to sell it as dear as he pleased. For the text says clearly he did it not to satisfy greed, but in order that land and people might not perish. But our merchant sells as dear as he pleases, and seeks his own profit solely, without concern whether land and people perish.

But that Joseph thereby brought all the money and cattle, all the fields and people under the king does indeed not seem to be a Christian action, since he was under obligation to give to the needy for nothing, as the Gospel and Christian love teach. But yet he did right and well, for Joseph was conducting the civil rule in the king's stead. Thus I have often read that one cannot rule the world according to the Gospel and Christian love, but by strict laws, with force and the sword, since the world is evil and accepts neither Gospel nor love, but acts and lives according to its fancy unless it is restrained by force. Otherwise, in case any one were to practise simple love they would eat and drink and live high from the goods of others, and no one would work, since every one would take from his neighbor what was his, and such a state of affairs would result that no one could live because of his neighbor. Therefore Joseph did right, because God so brought it about that by a fair bargain such as the times allowed he got control of everything and caused the people to submit to the constraint of civil law and sell themselves and all that they had. For in those lands there has always been a strict government, and the custom of selling people like other property. Besides, being a pious man, he doubtless let no poor man die of hunger, but as the text says, after he had upheld the king's civil rights and rule he gathered this corn for the use and benefit of the people and the land, and sold and disposed of it so. Therefore the example of the faithful Joseph is as far from the actions of faithless, selfish merchants as Heaven is from Hell. This much aside for this subject. But now let us return to the practices.

Of "Bears."—Another one is that when certain ones are unable to establish their monopoly and selfish purchases, because there are others on hand who have the same wares and goods, they proceed to sell these goods so cheap that the others cannot meet them, and thus force them either to stop selling or to sell as cheaply as themselves to their ruin. So they come after all to their monopoly. These people do not deserve to be called men or to live among people, nor do they deserve to be instructed or admon-

ished, since envy and greed are so coarse and shameless in this case that the man brings harm to others through his own injury merely in order that he alone may hold the field. Here civil authority would do right to take from such all that they have and drive them out of the country. It might be unnecessary to enumerate such performances, but I determined to mingle them with the others that it may be seen what great knavery there is in merchandising, and be brought to daylight for every one how it goes in the world, so that he may guard himself against such a dangerous occupation.

Of Futures.—Again, this is a knavish performance: when one sells to another in words the wares in his sack which he really has not. Thus to-wit: A strange merchant comes to me and asks whether I have such and such wares for sale. I say yes, though I really have none, and sell him such wares for ten or fourteen florins, whereas they can be bought for nine or less, and promise to deliver them in two or three days. Meanwhile I go and buy such wares where I well knew beforehand that I could buy them cheaper than I sell them to him, and deliver the wares to him and he pays me for them, and thus I deal with the money and goods of other people without any risk, pains, or labor, and become rich. That is a cunning way of living on the street by other people's goods and money without needing to travel land and sea.

Of Bearing a Market.—Again, this, too, is living on the street, when a merchant has a purse full of money and no longer wishes to undergo adventures with his goods over land and sea, but to have a sure deal; so he remains ever in a great commercial city, and when he knows of a merchant who is being pushed by his creditors so that he must have money to pay withal, having none, yet plenty of good wares, then this man procures some one to buy the wares, and offers eight florins where they are usually worth ten; if the man is unwilling then he procures another person, who offers him six or seven, so that the poor man fears the goods are about to fall, and is glad to take the eight, so that he may obtain ready money and not incur too great loss and disgrace. It even happens that merchants in such need seek out such tyrants and offer them the wares for the ready money wherewith they may pay. In this case the latter hold stiff until they get the wares cheap enough, and then sell as they please. Such financiers are called throttlers, or cut-throats, but are considered important and shrewd people.

Of Combinations.—Then again, this is another trick of selfish-

ness, that three or four merchants have one or two sorts of wares in their control which other people have not or have not for sale. Now when they note that the said wares are worth much money and are daily growing dearer because of war or as result of accident, they combine and allege to others that such wares are much sought and few have them for sale. But if there are some who have them, they put up a stranger to buy up all these wares. Then when they have the wares entirely in their hands they make a compact together in this wise: We will hold these wares at such and such a price because there are no more on hand, and if any one sells them cheaper he shall forfeit so and so much.

This performance, as I hear, is carried on most grossly and frequently by English merchants in selling English or Dutch cloths. For it is said that they have a special council for this business, like the council in a city; and all Englishmen who sell English or Dutch cloths have to belong to it under some certain penalty. And by this council it is determined how dear they shall sell their cloth and what days or hours they shall offer the goods. The chief in this council is called the courtmaster, and is held not much lower than a prince; behold in this what greed can do and dares propose.

Of Forced Sales.—Further, I must note one more performance: I sell to a certain person pepper or the like on six months' time, and know that he is obliged to sell the same immediately in order to get ready money. So I go myself, or accomplish it through others, and have the pepper bought from him again for cash, but so that what he bought from me at twelve florins on six months' time I buy from him at eight. Meanwhile the current price is ten. So I buy from him two florins cheaper than the market price, and he has bought from me at two florins dearer than the market offers. So I gain behind and before, and simply in order that he may get money and keep up his credit, lest he experience with shame that no one else would give him credit.

Of Bankrupts.—As for those who manage or have to manage such devices as is the case with those who buy more on credit than they can pay, or when one has a capital of scarcely two hundred florins and does business to the extent of five or six hundred florins, and cannot himself pay if his creditors do not pay, why here the mischief eats deeper and deeper, and one loss comes upon another the more such devices are practised, until I see that the gallows is in sight, and I must run away or sit in the tower. So I keep still and give my creditors good words, and claim that I will

pay them honestly. Meantime I go and obtain as much more on credit as I can and turn this into money, or otherwise get money on my draft, or borrow as much as I can. Then when it is most convenient, or my creditors leave me no rest, I lock my house, arise and run away, hide myself in some monastery where I am exempt, like a thief or a murderer in a churchyard. Then my creditors are glad that I have not left the country and quit me every second or third penny [half or one third] of my whole debt, and I am to pay the rest in two or three years. They give me this under seal, and I come home again and am a merchant who has gained (by his getting up and running away) two or three thousand florins, which I could not have obtained otherwise in three or four years by running or trotting.

Or where this will not work and I see that I must run away, I go to the Emperor's court or to one of his governors; there I can get for one or two hundred florins a *quinquenelle*, that is, an imperial letter under seal to the effect that I may be free and do what I please two or three years for all my creditors, because according to my account I have incurred great damage; as though the *quinquenelle* had a nose and could find out whether the proceeding were right and godly. Yea, this is knavery.

Of Interest.—Then another trick that is current in companies. A citizen deposits two thousand florins with a merchant for six years; therewith he is to do business, gain or lose, and pay the citizen two hundred florins interest annually, and what he makes beyond this is his own. But if he does not gain he has to pay the interest just the same. And the citizen is doing the merchant great service in this, for the merchant expects with the two thousand to gain three hundred. On the other hand the merchant does the citizen a service, for his money would otherwise lie idle and bring no profit. That this common practice is wrong, and simple usury, I have sufficiently shown in the Sermon on Usury.¹

I must tell one more thing as example of how false lending and borrowing leads to misfortune. There are some who, when they see that the buyer is shaky and does not come promptly to time get themselves paid most cunningly in this fashion: I put up a strange merchant to go to him and buy of his wares for a hundred florins or like matter, and say to him: "When you have bought all the wares, then promise him cash or refer him to a certain debtor, and when you have the wares then bring him to me

¹ The "Sermon on Usury" was reprinted in the same volume with the address "On Trade and Usury."

as that debtor, and act as if you did not know that he was in debt to me ; so I am paid and give him nothing." That is financiering, and means ruining the poor man together with those to whom he may be in debt. But that is what is to be expected when unchristian lending and borrowing is carried on.

Of "Deaconing."—Then again : They have learned to put or lay goods where they will increase, as pepper, ginger, or saffron, as in damp vaults or cellars, so that they gain in weight ; so, too, to sell woolen goods, silks, marten pelts, and sable in dark stores or booths, and to exclude the air, as is the custom everywhere, so that they have a particular sort of air for every kind of goods. And there is no kind of ware with which some advantage is not taken, be it measuring, counting, with yard-stick, bushel or weight, or giving it a color which it has not by nature, or they lay the best at top and bottom and the worst in the middle. Thus there is no end of such deception, and no merchant can trust another farther than he can see or feel.

Of Robber Barons.—Now merchants are making a great outcry against noblemen or robber knights, saying that they have to trade under great danger, and are liable to be caught, beaten, ransomed and robbed. Forsooth, if they suffered this for righteousness' sake, the merchants would be saints. Although it may happen that once in a while one suffers a wrong before God, and has to pay for the company he is in, and suffer for the sins of others, yet inasmuch as such great wrongs and unchristian thievery and robbery have been brought upon the world through merchants, and are even practised among themselves, what wonder is it if God brings it about that such great properties, gained wrongfully, are again lost or plundered and they themselves cracked over the head or imprisoned ! For God must exercise justice, since he declares himself to be a just judge.

Not that I would have highway robbers and bushwhackers excused or free to carry on their robbery. It is the duty of the rulers to keep the roads free, for the benefit of the bad as well as the good. It is the business of princes to punish such unrighteous merchandising with proper power, and to check it, so that their subjects be not so shamefully skinned by the merchants. Since they do not attend to it, God uses highwaymen and robbers, and through them brings punishment upon the merchants, as though they were his devils, just as he torments Egypt and all the rest of the world with devils, or ruins by enemies. So he chastises one knave through another without wishing it understood that the

highwaymen are less robbers than the merchants, though the merchants rob the whole world daily, while a highwayman robs one or two persons once or twice in a year.

Of Combinations.—Of combinations I ought really to say much, but the matter is endless and bottomless, full of mere greed and wrong, so that nothing can be found about it that can be pursued with a good conscience. For who is so stupid as not to see that combinations are mere outright monopolies? which even heathen civil laws condemn as a plainly harmful thing in all the world—I will say nothing of divine right and Christian law. For they have all wares in their control and manage as they please, and pursue the above-mentioned practices without shame, raising and lowering prices at pleasure, oppressing and ruining smaller dealers as the pike does smaller fish in the water; just as if they were lords of God's creatures and free from all the laws and obligations of faith and love.

Thence it comes that in all the world we have to buy spices as dear as they will. To-day they raise the price of ginger, next year saffron, so that the bend always fits into the angle and they have no loss, harm, nor risk; but if ginger fails or is spoiled they make it good on saffron, so that they are sure of their profit. Which is contrary to the fashion and nature not only of merchandise but of all temporal goods, which God means to have subject to risk and uncertainty. But they have devised that through risky, uncertain, temporal wares they obtain sure, certain, and constant profit. But thereby all the world must be drained empty and all the money run into their funnel.

Of Great Fortunes.—How should it come about rightly and with God's will that one man in so short a time should become so rich that he could buy out kings and emperors? But as they have brought it about that all the world must deal with risk and loss, gain to-day and lose next year while they for ever and eternally win, or make good any loss with increased gains, what wonder is it that they gather in the goods of all the world? For a perennial certain penny is better than a temporal and uncertain florin. Yet these combinations never risk their perennial and certain florins against our temporal and uncertain pennies. How then can there be any wonder that they become kings and we beggars?

Of Great and Small Thieves.—Kings and princes should look into this, and prevent such performances by strict laws; but I hear they have hand and part in it, and it goes as Isaiah says: "Thy princes have become the companions of thieves." Meanwhile they

have thieves who have stolen one florin hung, and associate with those who rob the whole world and steal more than all the others ; that the proverb may be approved : " Great thieves hang small thieves," and as the Roman senator, Cato, said : " Humble thieves lie in dungeons but public thieves go in gold and silk." But what will God say to it all at the end ? He will do as He promises through Ezekiel : " Princes and merchants, one thief with the other will he melt down like lead and copper, as when a city is laid waste with fire, so that there shall remain neither princes nor merchants," which state, as I fear, is at hand. For we have no purpose to better ourselves, however great the sin and wrong, and He cannot let the wrong go unpunished.

Hence let no one ask how with good conscience he may have part in combinations. There is no other counsel than : Let it alone ; only wrong can come of them. If combinations are to remain, right and honesty must go down. If right and honesty are to remain the combinations must go. The bed is too narrow, says Isaiah, one must needs fall out, and the cover is too short, it cannot cover both. I know, indeed, that my writing will please them ill, and they will haply throw it all to the wind and remain as they are. But I am unburdened, and have done my part, so that when God comes with His rod we may see how fairly we have deserved it. If only I have instructed herewith one soul, and saved it from the pit, I shall not have labored in vain, though I hope, as I said above, that it has grown so high and heavy of itself that it cannot go longer and will have to be given over. In fine, let every one look to himself. Let no one abstain from these practices for love or service of me, nor let any one adopt or keep them for spite and harm of me. Thou art to decide, not I. God illumine us, and strengthen us to do his good will, Amen !

SCIENCE IN THEOLOGY.¹

BY CARL HEINRICH CORNILL.

GENTLEMEN:—Allow me to begin with the conscientious assurance that I should have been heartily glad if I had been spared the necessity of speaking on this matter; but since the “Motion Against the Professors” has been made and opened for discussion, I may not, being the only professor of theology present,—I must not keep silence, for to do so would be, not evidence of a peaceable and conciliatory spirit, but cowardice and a denial of the station and calling in which God has placed me. Therefore I must speak, and prepare the way only by saying that as I belong to no faction or fraction of this synod, neither do I speak in the name or under commission of any fraction, but solely in my own name and that of my calling.

To be sure, when I consider the letter of the motion before us, which refers to “appointment in evangelical-theological faculties of such professors only as stand within the confession of the Church,” it might appear doubtful whether I really am called on to speak, for personally I do not feel that the letter of the motion touches me at all. Gentlemen, I stand within the Confession of the Church, this I can say unhesitatingly. For I stand firmly and

¹ By the courtesy of Dr. C. H. Cornill we are favored with advance proofs of his address on the *Professorenantrag*, or Motion Against the Professors, given on the 30th of October before the sixth session of the Fourth West Prussian Provincial Synod, as prepared by him for publication in the *Danziger Zeitung*, No. 22,281. Von Puttkamer-Plauth, who advocated the motion, had preceded Dr. Cornill, and though speaking in a conciliatory tone, and denying any purpose to assail free research, had declared that the advocates of the measure distinguished between freedom of research and freedom of instruction; no one would think of restricting research, but it was a menace to the Church, and not to be permitted, that the professors of theology should forthwith teach their results, and announce to the young theologues as accepted scientific truths undemonstrated hypotheses on which the Church had not yet passed judgment. Dr. Cornill's high standing as an investigator, his position in the University of Königsberg, and the fact that he spoke as delegate of the theological faculty of Königsberg, lend interest to the views expressed. He resolutely places theology among the sciences, and denies its subordination to the Church. This address has been translated by W. H. Carruth.—[Editor.]

clearly upon the foundation of the Apostles' Creed,—the Apostles' Creed without higgling and haggling, without distortion and subtilising. And in case this does not suffice, and you demand a more specific sectarian confession,—well and good, as a genuine old Huguenot, in my whole church feeling and consciousness I belong to the strict Reformed¹ Confession. If there were in this synod a group of the Reformed Church, I should have felt constrained to ally myself with it, and should have done so as flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone.

But despite this, I may say without presumption or conceit that wherever the Motion Against the Professors is discussed by those who are acquainted with current theological literature, my name and person will not be among the least. For indeed, I am considered in the widest circles as an especially wicked and dangerous specimen of the species of professor against whom this motion is directed.

This is to me the clearest proof that your motion goes farther than the letter of it says, and that it is in reality directed against theological science and free investigation. This "wicked criticism" is to be stifled and driven out of the Church. Hence you must permit me to treat your motion from the point of this its ultimate aim; and I wish to show you that your motion begins with a wrong premise, that it seeks its end in a wrong way, and that, even if it is carried, it will do no good, but rather infinite harm.

* * *

Your motion starts from a wrong premise. Expressed or suppressed, it is based on the theory that science has a tendency to systematically assail and deliberately undermine church doctrine. But this premise is entirely erroneous.

Science has no tendency whatever, but is solely the search for truth. To find the truth, or at least to seek it, is its only aim, and for the attainment of this sole aim it has for means and ways the approved method of scientific research. Whither this search shall lead, it never knows in advance, and is therefore not answerable for the results. A problem arises; it must be solved. If we can assure ourselves that this solution was reached by the path of strictly methodic research, we must submit to the result, and submit unconditionally, whether or not it be agreeable to us personally. And, gentlemen, this truth which science discerns, or thinks

¹ The Presbyterians or Calvinists call themselves Reformed in Germany. The members of the synod are Lutherans; but both confessions, Lutherans and Presbyterians, are united in the State Church, officially known as Die Evangelische Kirche, having a common church government, under which, however, both parties enjoy a perfect freedom of worship.—[Editor.]

she discerns, it is my *solemn duty*, as a servant of science, to proclaim. I will not quote here the familiar student song about him

"Who knows the truth and hides its light,
[He is a pitiful cowardly wight]."

But this much I must say: if the commission to teach were limited by such a condition, then as an honest and—pardon the harsh word—a decent man, nothing would be left for me but to resign my professorship. To say to us: you professors may investigate as much as you will, but you must keep the results of your investigation to yourselves, that is to forbid us to teach what we have perceived to be the truth,—this amounts simply to forbidding us to lecture, if we wish to keep our self-respect. We never will and never can agree to that. It is our sacred right to announce the truth which we know, even before our students; we shall not let it be taken from us; with that we stand or fall. But if a divine power, which has for goal solely the search for truth, is to be suspected and crowded out of the Church, it looks indeed just as if the Church had reason to shun the truth, and could not endure it. But this is quite inconceivable.

Jesus Christ called himself the truth and the king of truth, born and come into the world to bear witness to the truth, and his greatest apostle writes: "We can do naught against the truth." No truth, not even scientific truth, is a menace to the Church of Jesus Christ, the King of Truth. He, in whose mouth was no guile, promised his Church that not even the gates of Hell should prevail against it. And in the face of such a promise you fear that what the gates of Hell can not achieve might be done by a few professors of theology? No, gentlemen, I think higher of the Church of Jesus Christ, and more modestly of us professors.

The Church must be able to bear every and any truth, and indeed it can. I would remind you of the time when the Copernican cosmogony was appealing ever louder and more urgently to hearts and minds. Many serious and pious Christians believed then that if Copernicus and Galileo were right, it was all over with the Scriptures and the Church for all time. But the Church has endured the Copernican cosmogony, for it is the truth, and stands to-day unmoved and unmovable.

Moreover, the way in which you propose through your motion to attain your end is not the right one. I know and recognise how delicate and questionable a proceeding it is to apply the words of Jesus to oneself and one's own circumstances, but even at the risk

of being misinterpreted I must confess that in the face of the Motion Against the Professors the saying keeps coming into my mind : "If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me?" Yes, gentlemen, if we have spoken evil, prove that it is evil. Science is a spiritual power which can be met only with spiritual weapons, and not with laws and police regulations. Science, too, is a manifestation of the spirit of which Paul the Apostle writes to the Thessalonians : "Quench not the Spirit."

This spirit, it is true, sometimes cuts strange capers, and in science, too, there are not alone gold, silver, and precious stones, but also wood, hay, and stubble. But even if the spirit manifests itself in a way to rouse apprehension, and if you consider it harmful and dangerous, remember the parable of the wheat and the tares, "let both grow together until the harvest." And this you can do with all confidence, for this harvest and the judgment in general do not wait until the Last Day, but are being accomplished even now. Science bears its own corrective within itself. In science, too, "the dead ride fast"—terribly fast. And precisely the extreme and unsound tendencies are the ones which experience shows to have had a particularly swift decline.

It is exactly twenty-four years since *The Old and the New Faith*, by D. F. Strauss, appeared. You will all recall the tremendous excitement which it caused at the time ; and where is it to-day, after twenty-four years? Submerged and forgotten. I think even the most innocent small-beer Philistine would be ashamed and feel antiquated in culture if he caught himself quoting or mentioning this book. And to cite a more significant and thoroughly serious scientific manifestation : Thirty-six years are fled since the death of F. C. Baur, the head of the "Tübingen School." For a whole generation it was believed that the Tübingen School would annihilate Church and Christianity, and where is it now? Dissolved in smoke and wind, while the church of Jesus Christ remains. Not in vain, indeed, did Baur and his Tübingen School labor and investigate, but that the foundation theory of Baur was wrong, and his inferences therefore unsound, is recognised to-day frankly and unreservedly by the most critical investigators. Science has passed by him to the "order of the day." Therefore leave science without anxiety to the ordeal of history. Without the aid of us weak men to turn the cranks, God's mills grind surely, and in this field, perhaps, more swiftly than elsewhere.

But, you will reply, until such a tendency has run its course it may do infinite harm, confuse minds and poison souls. Let me an-

swer this objection with a bit of personal experience. When I began my instruction in Königsberg ten years ago with a course of lectures on Genesis, I had among my hearers a young man, the son of a well-known clergyman. At the end of the semester the young man gave up the study of theology and turned to jurisprudence. Thereupon I was taken to task, not indeed by the father of the young man, but by the most authoritative person at that time in the East-Prussian provincial Church, as being to blame, and having by my lectures on Genesis unsettled the young man's faith and driven him away from theology. My reply was: "If this is really true, which, however, I will not believe until I have it from the young man himself, then I think I have done a service to theology and the Church; for one who is unsettled in his faith in all Christianity and the Church by the fact that Moses did not write Genesis, will be of no use to us in this fearfully serious and trying time." The ultimate development of the affair, which brought me a complete vindication, I have thought and still think it indelicate to report, because I regard it as a sacred personal secret between the young man and myself; but this much I may say, that the late General Superintendent of Prussia, after I had had a thorough understanding with him in the matter, became and remained to me until his death a truly paternal friend.

No, gentlemen, in a time of combats in all directions, such as Church and theology have to wage, we have no use for semi-invalids and cripples, but only for strong, whole, thoroughly tried men. A wavering reed that is blown hither and thither by the wind may, if God will, become anything, only not a theologian, and if we help such to a clear perception of the fact that they are not fitted to be theologians there is no harm done.

And even if you carry your motion you will not attain the end in view. Even if you succeeded in shutting out from theological professorships all scientific investigators you have not thereby stifled scientific research itself. For we shall investigate afterwards as before, and will publish the results of our researches, and is it likely that the printed word will have less effect than that spoken from the chair? Then you would needs suppress the printing of books; and consider well, even our laymen read scientific books, and, as a result of the widespread efforts at popularising science by lectures, journals, and books for the masses, laymen become acquainted with the results of scientific research.

And now suppose the case, that such a layman, interested in science, has read a book or hears a lecture, and comes to his pas-

tor and asks for instruction and explanation: "My dear pastor, how is this? I have read and heard thus and so, and in Bible history we learned quite a different story." What shall the pastor do with such a layman? Shall he simply fall back on the dogma of inspiration and answer the layman: "Friend, that doesn't concern me, and needn't concern you, for 'it is written,' " etc.? If he acted thus he would, to speak frankly, play a miserable part, and hopelessly compromise himself and the church. At every turn he finds himself face to face with modern science, and it is *a power once for all* against which the tactics of the ostrich will avail nothing.

It is wholly impossible to shield young theologues from contact with modern science; it simply cannot be done in this day and age of the world.

In the First Epistle of Peter it is said: "But be ever ready to give account to every one who demands a reason for the hope that is in you," and this apostolic admonition applies especially to the theologian, the clergyman. But in order to be ever ready to give account to every one the clergyman must know modern science, he must have assimilated it and inwardly taken position regarding it. And if this is his most sacred duty to himself and his office, if on this very account he must know science and dare not abstain from intimate acquaintance with it, well, then it is by all means best that he make this acquaintance through authorised servants and representatives, from whom he will receive the impression that the chief concern here is not frivolous mockery, not satanic delight in negation and destruction, but serious wrestling and striving for truth.

This measure, therefore, will not only do no good, but will do infinite harm. For organisations are sustained only by the powers which gave them birth.

Repeated reference has been made to-day to Luther and the reformers. Those, too, were professors; they searched in the Scriptures and the history of the Church, and when this research had led them to the conclusion that the Church of that day did not correspond to the norm of the Gospel, they did not keep this revelation to themselves because the Church of the time had not yet approved it, but they proclaimed it loudly and freely to the benefit of millions and millions of truth-seeking souls. The right of free research, limited only by God and the conscience, made the evangelical Church: to banish from it the right of free research is giving up the palladium of the Reformation, and forcing the Church back to the point from which our divinely favored reformers, by their labors as professors, happily freed it—and then rather let us simply

return to the fold of St. Peter ; for the Catholic Church knows how to get rid of science and bridle its professors : through the close-laid walls of that gigantic structure flows no breath of freedom and criticism.

Up to this point I have treated the matter altogether negatively and on the defensive ; but I cannot close without adding a positive word. For it is a necessity and a pleasure to me to speak of it : At the bottom of your endeavors there is a justifiable motive. That the Church shall exercise an influence, and that a decisive and determinative influence upon the training of its future servants is not merely a proper demand, it is a necessity. But let it be done in the right way and in the right place. Precisely as professor of theology, I feel obliged to confess that the simple academic instruction is not sufficient for the training of theologians, but that it absolutely needs a supplement which only the Church can give. It is not important whether a man knows a few Hebrew vocables more or less, or a few dates more or less in Church history, but that he can preach and minister to souls. And precisely in this most important matter academic instruction fails us. Even assuming the greatest excellence in the professor of practical theology—by two or three sermons given in the homiletic seminary, with his fellows and the critical professor for congregation, a student cannot learn to preach, and for practice in parish duties the university as such offers him no opportunity at all. There is a proper idea in the plan which formerly was in vogue at Giessen, where practical theology was excluded from the university on principle and left to the ministers' seminary in Friedberg, which every young theologian was required to attend. Here at this most important point the Church must enter the breach ; here it has a sacred duty and an inalienable right. If you would all apply the strength and energy, the activity and persistence which have been expended upon the ill-fated "Motion Against the Professors," to agitating for more ministers' seminaries, at least one for each province, and the requirement that every theologian, without exception, undergo a term, and not too short a term, as curate, then indeed you would be working in the interest and for the benefit of our beloved Evangelical Church.

And be assured that under this banner you would be followed enthusiastically by all who bear the evangelical name ; then you would find even the heretical professors shoulder to shoulder with you in the front rank. I can confidently assure you of this, not only for myself but also in the name of all my colleagues, for we, too,

wish nothing more urgently than a clear-cut and peaceful division and a co-operation based on mutual respect and recognition between science and the Church.

As men of science, we must demand that to science be given what to science belongs ; but we are just as ready to give to the Church what is the Church's. You introduced your motion from highly worthy motives and as earnest Christian men forced in conscience by the motto, *Videant consules ne quid detrimenti ecclesia capiat*. But in the same spirit you in turn must permit me, without any personal consideration and purely from love for the Church, which I, too, love truly and with faithful heart, to beg this honorable synod not to make this motion its own. For with this proposal our Church would come upon an inclined plane ; but if the ball once begins to roll, it will roll in obedience to the law of gravity, irresistibly and ever swifter—*downwards*. And as the end of this inclined plane I see a condition described by the fearful phrase—Culture paired with unbelief, Christianity with barbarism ; and from that may God in mercy guard and defend His Church.

[A CONTROVERSY ON BUDDHISM.

BY

RT. REV. SHAKU SOYEN, OF KAMAKURA, JAPAN.

REV. DR. JOHN H. BARROWS, OF CHICAGO, ILL.

REV. DR. F. F. ELLINWOOD, OF NEW YORK CITY.

I.

Rev. Dr. John Barrows, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR SIR :

Friends in America have sent me a number of the *Chicago Tribune*, dated Monday, January 13, 1896, which contains the report of your second Haskell lecture, delivered at the Kent Theatre in the Chicago University. The subject is "Christianity and Buddhism," and I anticipated a friendly and sympathetic treatment of Buddhism at your hands, for I do not doubt that you desire to be just in your judgment. Your utterances are of importance because they will be received as an impartial representation of our religion, since you, having been Chairman of the Religious Parliament, are commonly considered to have the best of information about those religions that were represented at this famous assemblage. I was greatly disappointed, however, seeing that you only repeat those errors which are common in the various Western books on Buddhism. You say, "The goal which made Buddha's teachings a dubious gospel, is Nirvâna, which involves the extinction of love and life, as the going out of a flame which has nothing else to feed upon." Now the word *Nirvâna* means "extinction" and it means the eradication of all evil desires, of all passions, of all egotism, so that the flame of envy, hatred, and lust will have nothing to feed upon. This is the negative side of Nirvâna. The positive side of Nirvâna consists in the recognition of truth. The destruction of evil desires, of envy, hatred, extinction of selfishness implies char-

ity, compassion with all suffering, and a love that is unbounded and infinite. Nirvâna means extinction of lust, not of love; extinction of evil, not of existence; of egotistic craving, not of life. The eradication of all that is evil in man's heart will set all his energies free for good deeds, and he is no genuine Buddhist who would not devote his life to active work, and a usefulness which would refuse neither his friends nor strangers, nor even his very enemies.

You say that "human life does not breathe, in Buddhism, the atmosphere of divine fatherhood, but groans under the dominion of inexorable and implacable laws." Now I grant that Buddha taught the irrefragability of law but this is a point in which, as in so many others, Buddha's teachings are in exact agreement with the doctrines of modern science. However, you ought to consider that while the law is irrefragable, no one but those who infringe upon it groan under it. He who understands the laws of existence and especially the moral law that underlies the development of human society, will accommodate himself to it, and thus he will not groan under it, but in the measure that he is like Buddha he will be enlightened, he will be a master of the law and not a slave. In the same way that the ignorant savage is killed by the electric shock of lightning, while an electric engineer uses it for lighting the halls and streets of our cities, the immoral man suffers from the moral law, he groans under its inexorable and implacable decree, while the moral man enjoys it, and turning it to advantage glories in its boundless blessings.

This same moral law is the source of enlightenment and its recognition constitutes Buddhahood. This same moral law we call Amitâbha-Buddha, the boundless light of Buddhahood which is eternal, omnipresent, and all-glorious. We represent it under a picture of a father, and it was incarnated not only in Gautama-Buddha, but also in all great men in a higher or lesser degree, foremost among them in Jesus Christ, and, allow me to add, in George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and other great men of your country. Allow me to add, too, that Buddha's doctrine, far from being scepticism, proclaims the doctrine that man *can* attain enlightenment and that he attains it not only through study and learning, which, as a matter of course, are indispensable, but also and mainly through *the earnest exertions of a life of purity and holiness.*

There are many more points in your lecture which I feel tempted to discuss with you, but they refer more to Christianity than to Buddhism, and may imply a misunderstanding of Christian

doctrines on my part. I am anxious to know all that is good in Christianity and the significance of your dogmas so that I may grow in a comprehension of truth, but I have not as yet been able to see that mankind can be benefited by believing that Jesus Christ performed miracles. I do not deny the miracles nor do I believe them; I only claim that they are irrelevant. The beauty and the truth of many of Christ's sayings fascinate me, but truth does not become truer by being pronounced by a man who works miracles. You say, "We can explain Buddha without the miracles which later legends ascribe to him, but that we cannot explain Christ—either his person or his influence—without granting the truth of his own claim that he did the supernatural works of his father." We may grant that Jesus Christ is the greatest master and teacher that appeared in the West after Buddha, but the picture of Jesus Christ as we find it in the Gospel is marred by the accounts of such miracles as the great draft of fishes which involves a great and useless destruction of life (for we read that the fishermen followed Jesus leaving the fish behind), and by the transformation of water into wine at the marriage-feast at Cana. Nor has Jesus Christ attained to the calmness and dignity of Buddha, for the passion of anger overtook him in the temple, when he drove out with rope in hand those that bargained in the holy place.

How different would Buddha have behaved under similar conditions in the same place. Instead of whipping the evil-doers he would have converted them, for kind words strike deeper than the whip.

I do not dare to discuss the statements you make about Christianity for fear that I may be mistaken, but I am open to conviction and willing to learn.

I hope you will not take offence at my frank remarks, but I feel that you, if any one in Christendom, ought to know the real teachings of Buddha, and we look to you as a leader who will make possible the way for a better understanding between all the religions of the world, for I do not doubt that as you unknowingly misrepresent the doctrines of the Tathagata, so we may misunderstand the significance of Christianity. We shall be much obliged to you if in justice to the religion of Buddha you will make public this humble protest of mine, so that at least the most important misconceptions and prejudices that obtain among Christians may be removed.

I remain with profound respect

Your obedient servant,

KAMAKURA, JAPAN.

SHAKU SOYEN.

II.

Rev. Shaku Soyen,

MY DEAR BROTHER :

Your interesting letter of March 1st has been sent to me from Chicago. I am to be here for the next six months. In December I go to India and I expect to spend next April in Japan, where I hope to meet you and the other friends who came to the Parliament. I send you a pamphlet giving a little sketch of my tour.

Your letter I will send to-day to a friend in America, asking him to have it printed in an important journal so that you may give American people the opportunity of your views.

I have been looking over the lecture to which you refer. Only a small part of it was printed in the *Tribune*. If you had read it all you would have found it full of appreciation both for Buddha and his ethical system. My interpretation of Nirvâna is that of some of the most friendly students of Buddhism who have gained their views from reading the Buddhist Scriptures. But if modern Japanese Buddhism teaches conscious personal life after death and believes in a personal Heavenly Father, full of love, its divergence from Christianity is not so marked as we had supposed.

What you write about Christianity would require much more time for a proper reply to it than I can possibly give it at present. I am on the point of going to Paris to deliver an address on "Religion, as the Unifier of Humanity." I think that the work that was done in Chicago shows how religion may help to draw men together.

Will you remember me very kindly to the Buddhist friends who came with you from Japan. How pleasant it would be to meet again in Paris in 1900 !

Very faithfully yours,

GÖTTINGEN, GERMANY.

JOHN HENRY BARROWS.

III.

Rev. Shaku Soyen.

DEAR SIR :

I have been asked to reply publicly to a letter addressed by you to Rev. John H. Barrows, D. D., of Chicago, under date of March 1, 1896. I have not seen Dr. Barrow's answer to you, but I have consented to reply to some of the points in your letter to him.

I have been pleased with the courteous spirit of your communication no less than with your admirable use of the English language. Though firmly believing with Dr. Barrows (if I may judge from an address which I heard from his lips on the eve of his departure for India) that Christianity is the only religion that is adapted to the universal wants of mankind, and the only one that offers real salvation, yet I have long cherished and widely advocated a tolerant spirit toward other faiths, and have endeavored to give full credit to the ethical or religious truths which they inculcate. But since the close of the Parliament of Religions in Chicago I have realised more than ever the need of candid and accurate language in speaking on this subject, instead of giving way, either to hasty and ignorant denunciation, or to lavish expressions of approval for courtesy's sake which might be construed as a surrender of one's own opinions. Our American hospitality toward the representatives and the religious systems of other lands was carried to such a degree by large numbers in the Parliament, that statements soon came back to us from Japan that the delegates from that country had reported on their return that Buddhism had triumphed over Christianity on its own soil.

The *New York Independent* published a letter reporting the proceedings of a meeting held under the auspices of the Buddhist Young Men's Association of Yokohama, and which was addressed by yourself, Mr. Yatsubuchi, and others.

From one of these addresses these words are quoted: "The Parliament was called because the Western nations have come to realise the weakness and folly of Christianity, and they really wished to hear from us of our religions and to learn what the best religion is. The meeting showed the great superiority of Buddhism over Christianity, and the mere fact of calling the meetings showed that the Americans and other Western peoples had lost their faith in Christianity and were ready to accept the teachings of our superior religion."

If such were the impressions which you received from the courtesy of Dr. Barrows and others, it is not strange that you were disappointed when you read his real estimate of Buddhism in the published address to which your letter refers.

Turning to what seems to be the chief point of difference between you and Dr. Barrows,—viz., the meaning of Nirvâna as taught by Buddhist philosophy,—I may say that I should as a rule be inclined to accept every intelligent man's statement of his own belief and the belief of his countrymen, or at least of his particular

sect. But when we come to speak of a system which has undergone many and radical changes in the course of the ages, and a system which has presented important modifications in different lands even in the same age, we can hardly make any one broad assertion which shall cover the whole ground.

Buddhism is one thing in Ceylon, quite another in Thibet, and still another in China and Japan, where we find at least a dozen more or less divergent sects. Buddhism in its beginnings is generally supposed by Western scholars to have been atheistic or at least agnostic; in Nepaul it became theistic, holding, according to Hodgson's Sanskrit translations, that *Adi Buddha* is "self-existent," "the source of all existence in the three worlds," the "omnipresent who is one and sole in the universe," the "Creator of all the Buddhas." "He is the essence of all the essences." "He is the author of virtue, the destroyer of all things." Those types of Buddhism which pay divine worship to *Gautama*, or *Amitâbha*, or *Quanyin*, I should call quasi theistic or demi-theistic, while some of the Japanese sects, as described by Rev. Bunyiu Nanjio, Oxon, seem to be pantheistic. The promised joys in *Amitâbha's Paradise*, as described in Max Müller's translation of a Sanskrit manuscript, part of which had been sent him from Japan, would indicate an immortal blessedness of a real soul and without further rebirth, while *Subhadra's Catechism of Buddhism*, "compiled from the sacred writings of the Southern Buddhists for the use of Europeans," declares that "Buddhism teaches the reign of perfect goodness and wisdom without a personal god, continuance of individuality without an immortal soul, eternal happiness without a local heaven," etc.

It would be difficult, therefore, to give one all embracing characterisation of Buddhism, and when one speaks of the meaning of *Nirvâna* we must first ascertain his point of view. There are as many different conceptions of *Nirvâna* as there are *Buddhisms*.

I agree with you entirely in your definition of *Nirvâna* as the "eradication of all evil desires, of all passions, of all egotism, so that the flame of envy, hatred, and lust will have nothing to feed upon." All scholars are agreed, I believe, that the word *Nirvâna* properly means an attainment to be realised in this life. I grant you also that "the positive side of *Nirvâna*," speaking from the Buddhist standpoint, "consists in the recognition of truth." *Buddha* is supposed to have attained *Nirvâna* at the time of his illumination under the *Bo-tree*, and for forty-five years thereafter he illustrated this positive side of it in his efforts for the good of men. I think

that Dr. Barrows would agree with you so far. But the real question between you lies farther on. It is this: What becomes of the possessor of Nirvâna when he dies? If Nirvâna cuts off rebirth in this world or any other, what follows the final dissolution of body and mind? And what did Buddha mean when he said to his followers: "Mendicants, that which binds the teacher to existence is cut off (he has attained Nirvâna), but his body still remains. While his body shall remain, he will be seen by gods and men; but after the termination of life, upon the dissolution of the body, neither gods nor men shall see him"?

And what, accordingly, is meant by the Pâli term *parinibbana*, or in Sanskrit *parinirvâna*? I find no other meaning for this word than total extinction. It follows the Nirvâna as a natural consequence of the cutting off of Karma and rebirth. Professor Rhys Davids expresses the distinction exactly when he says: "Death, utter death, with nothing to follow, is a result of, but is not Nirvâna." It is *parinirvâna*.

If I am asked concerning the meaning commonly given to Nirvâna in the Mahayana literatures of Northern Buddhism, I must declare my belief that it means a state of blessedness here and hereafter, but if by Buddhism is meant the system which Buddha taught and which is preserved in the earlier and canonical literature of Ceylon, then I must give a very different answer.

Professor Rhys Davids has illustrated very fully the great change which came over the Buddhism of the canonical Pitakas of the South as it was gradually developed into the "Great Vehicle" of the North. The whole emphasis of the system was changed from the ideal of Arhatship to that of Bodisatship. Even in the South, and before Buddha's death, the real logic of the Tathâgata's teachings was felt to be depressing. "Existence in the eye of Buddhism," says d'Alwis, "was nothing but misery. . . . Nothing remained then to be devised as a deliverance from this evil, but the destruction of existence itself." It was an impracticable doctrine, and Davids declares that "though laymen could attain Nirvâna, we are told of only one or two instances of their having done so: and though it was more possible for the members of the Buddhist order of Mendicants, we only hear after the time of Gautama of one or two who did so. No one now hears of such an occurrence." The more practical races of the North desired something more available and more hopeful. A Bodisat submitting to successive rebirths for the sake of service to mortals, came to be more highly appreciated than an extinct Arhat. The Northern litera-

ture came at length to even disparage Arhatship, while Bodisats like Avolokitesvara, and Amitâbha rose high in popular esteem. Davids tells us that the *Lotus of the True Law*, one of the Sanskrit books of Nepal, and widely accepted in China and the North, openly disparages Arhatship and presents Bodisatship "as the goal at which every true Buddhist has to aim; and the whole exposition of this theory, so subversive of the original Buddhism, is actually placed in the mouth of Gautama himself."

Professor Davids, in alluding to the accounts given of Nirvâna by Rev. Zitsuzen Ashitzu at the Chicago Parliament, says: "It shows how astounding is the gulf on all sides between popular beliefs and the conclusion of science." (American Lectures, p. 208.) He states that two forms of Nirvâna which Ashitzu ascribes to the Southern literature cannot there be found, and that the two which he ascribes to the Mahayana school are (strangely) ascribed to the immediate disciples of Buddha. The Nichiren sect of Japan, according to Nanjio, get around this chronological difficulty by the theory that Nichiren, living far on in the Christian era, was an incarnation of an ancient Bodisat who was instructed by Buddha in a "Sky Assembly" on a certain celestial mountain.

This change from Arhatship to Bodisatship was unconsciously promoted by the introduction of fanciful Jatakas or stories of Buddha's pre-existent lives as a Bodisat. The claim that Buddha, though inconsistently with the whole drift of his teaching concerning the one supreme end,—had waived Nirvâna and submitted to rebirth hundreds of times for the salvation of all beings, changed the emphasis of his whole system. It showed from his own example that to be reborn again and again as a Bodisat was far better than to end a useful existence in Parinirvâna. The practical nations of the North espoused this new doctrine warmly, and both Beal and Edkins have described the luxuriant development of this tendency in the Mahayana School. Bodisats, past, present, and to come, were multiplied. Even before Asanga of Peshawar had introduced his ruinous compromise between Buddhism and Hindu Saktism, Hindu deities had begun to be admitted as Bodisats into the Buddhist pantheon. The bounds of the universe were enlarged to furnish an adequate field for their divine energies. At least five world systems, each with a trinity of Bodisats were recognised, each trinity embracing a Dhyana or Celestial Buddha, of whom Amitâbha seems to have been the most popular.

The old theories of a real and conscious soul for which Buddha had substituted the doctrine of an impersonal Karma, had

again crept into Buddhism with these and other Hindu elements, and with them the notion of continued and conscious existence and a changed Nirvâna or Moksha. In Nepaul a positive doctrine of absorption into Adi Buddha (following the Hindu theories) is plainly taught.

"The Buddhism of Thibet," says Davids, "is the very reverse of the old Arhatship." It is a form of Bodisatship which renders very substantial every-day service as a semi-political force. The practical and helpful ministry of Quanyin in China and Japan is also an illustration of Bodisatship.

But altogether the most striking departure from the original Arhat doctrines of the South is seen in the teachings of the Shin Shu sect of Japan. As described in Rev. Nanjio's little volume, also in Max Müller's translation above referred to, and still more clearly in a *Shin Shu* tract, a translated copy of which may be found in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XIV., Part 1, June, 1888, this sect comes nearer to the doctrines of the Apostle Paul than to those of Shakyâ Muni. It presents a mediator between Karma and the sinner, a salvation not by the "eightfold path," but by faith, a righteousness not by personal merit, but by imputation, a renunciation of all trust in works as being "useless as furs worn in summer," and, like Christianity, it enjoins a consecrated service, not as compensation but from love. The heaven promised is called "Nirvâna," but it is something exceedingly attractive to the Buddhist masses. The tract approves of the marriage of priests and of all rational ways of living, and condemns the asceticism of the other sects as not only uncalled for but as a dismal failure in point of fact.

If, then, we are to decide upon the meaning of Nirvâna, or Parinirvâna as taught by Buddha, we must turn back from all these Northern developments to the older canonical teachings.

Burnouf maintained that the canon of Ashoka's Council must be the final authority, just as the four Gospels must be accepted as the doctrines of Christ. If the preponderating verdict there given is not decisive, then why might we not adopt any theory concerning Buddha's teachings which our presuppositions might require? There was indeed in Ashoka's time an endless variety and chaos of traditions and theories. The two intervening centuries had been prolific. Tissa, a prominent member of the Council, arraigned and refuted no less than two hundred and fifty heresies. (See Rhys Davids's American lectures.) But if after all this careful sifting the Pitakas are not authoritative then we are at sea concerning the

original doctrines of Buddhism. Moreover, these Pâli scriptures are buttressed, so to speak, by Cingalese versions which are said to have been translated from the Pâli two centuries B. C. by Mahendra, the devout son of King Ashoka. These were at a much later day retranslated into Pâli by Buddhagosha. The Pâli and Cingalese have therefore corroborated each other for centuries and rendered modification doubly difficult.

If we may believe Prince Chudhadharn of Siam, who presented a paper in the Parliament of Religions, the Siamese Buddhism (also of the Southern school) corroborates the testimonies of Ceylon. He said: "The true Buddhist does not mar the purity of his self-denial by lusting after a positive happiness which he himself shall enjoy here or hereafter. . . . What is to be hoped for is the absolute repose of Nirvâna, the extinction of our being, nothingness."

Professor Max Müller, in an article published in the *London Times* and republished in his *Science of Religion*, takes the ground with Burnouf, Bigandet, Saint Hilaire, Rhys Davids, Childers, Spence Hardy, and others, that the philosophic teaching of the Pitakas represents Nibbana or Parinibbana as equivalent to extinction. He declares that "no careful reader of the metaphysical speculations in the canon (on Nirvâna) can reach any other conclusion than that of Burnouf," though in his *Buddhist Nihilism* he seems inclined to think that the canon may have done injustice to the real teachings of Gautama. He finds inconsistencies in the statements of the canon, and he gives Buddha the benefit of the doubt. And on general principles he concludes that the great teacher could not have maintained "that Nirvâna, instead of being a bridge from the finite to the infinite, is only a trap-bridge hurling man into an abyss at the very moment when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the eternal." This seems to me, however, a clear case of special pleading. On the same principle we may go back of the New Testament history and build up any modified theory of the doctrine of Christ. Professor Oldenberg, an acknowledged Pâli scholar, after a careful study of the alleged dialogues of Buddha with his more thoughtful disciples, as to whether his own ego would survive after death, reaches the conclusion that he left no decisive answer on one side or the other. "The question was treated as of no practical importance to one seeking deliverance now and here." Neither the Hindu philosophers who cross-questioned him as the Pharisees questioned Christ, nor even his faithful but perplexed disciple, Mâlukya, obtained any but an evasive

answer, coupled with exhortations to gain deliverance now and here.

Personally I believe that Gautama had taught Parinirvâna in the sense of extinction (he was so understood by his followers and by the opposing Hindus, who nicknamed the Buddhists "nastakas," i. e., "believers in destruction or nihilism), but that after seeing the perplexity and depression which the doctrine produced, he became reticent and refused to commit himself. Nevertheless, his more thoughtful disciples in carrying out the general drift of his teaching to its logical conclusions, established the doctrine of Parinibbana as Burnouf, Saint Hilaire, Childers, Spence Hardy, and d'Alwis, have found it expressed in the canonical Pitakas.

But altogether the most decided position taken by any Pâli scholar in reference to Parinibbana is that of Rhys Davids, partially quoted above. He says: "Stars long ago extinct may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn, but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses; and where the light was will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man (Arhat) is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act: but it will soon decay and die and pass away, and, as no new body will be formed, where life was will be *nothing*. Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, *is then a result of, but is not, Nirvâna*. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not *on* death, but on a virtuous life here and now, that the Pitakas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvâna as the fruit of the fourth path of Arhatship."

This statement occurs in his small volume entitled *Buddhism*, and is fully corroborated in the lectures delivered in America 1894-5. Those passages in the Dharmapada which are supposed to indicate a continued and blessed existence after death, he regards as figurative expressions, applicable to the state of Nirvâna in this life, and he quotes from the Parinibbanti Anasaba this clear statement: "Some people (at death) are reborn as men: evil doers in hell; the well-conducted go to heaven, but the Arhats go out altogether." There is nothing figurative here, nothing could be plainer. He adds that in the later Sanskrit books the notices of Nirvâna "are so meagre that no conclusion can be drawn as to the views of their authors, but it is clear that they use Parinibbana in the sense of death, with no life to follow."

Aside from these opinions of the highest authorities, I think that the Buddhist metaphysics, carried out logically, militate

against any theory which supposes a continued and conscious blessedness to follow the extinction of Karma and the end of rebirth. It is difficult to see how there can be any conscious enjoyment of any kind where there is really no soul. Buddhism recognises no transition of a soul from one state of being to another. There are instead five skandas, partly physical, partly intellectual, and these produce the phenomena which others than Buddhists ascribe to an abiding, personal, conscious, and responsible soul. But according to Buddhist philosophy there is only a succession of thoughts and emotions proceeding from the interaction of the skandas, just as a flame proceeds from the combustion of the chemical elements in a candle. The flame is not the same in two consecutive moments, neither is the soul. The only permanent element remaining when the body with its skandas dies is the Karma. But if, as in the case of the Arhat, even the Karma is cut off, what can be left but extinction? Professor Oldenberg, with his metaphysical acuteness, and with a more than willingness to find something in the Buddhist philosophy less doleful than extinction, seems to suppose a sort of substrate of being which antedates this world of form and change, and therefore may survive it. He finds a passage in the Pâli scriptures, and Max Müller makes reference to the same, which reads as follows: "There is an unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed. But for this unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed, there would be no way out of the world of the born, the become, the created, the formed. . . . The wise ones who do no harm to any being, who keep their body ever bridled, they go to the eternal place. He who arrives there knows nothing of pain; but the monk, penetrated by goodness, who holds to the Buddhist doctrine, let him turn to the land of peace, where the transitory find rest." Of this passage Oldenberg says: "One who clearly and decidedly rejected an eternal future would not speak in this way." But this comes far short of a positive doctrine of conscious Nirvâna. And besides, what is that essence of being which antedates and follows conscious existence here?

The *raison d'être* of the doctrine here expressed is the supposed metaphysical necessity for some antithesis for the born, the become, etc. This can be found only in the unborn and the unbecome. Therefore the unborn and the unbecome must actually exist as the only way of getting out of the world of the born, etc. But I do not see how anything can be predicated of a state of existence only arrived at by such a process. I think it fair to Buddha to as-

sume that this fine piece of dialectics was due not to his practical mind, but to some one of his speculative followers.

In the paper which you read in the Chicago Parliament of Religions you stated that the world is governed by one universal law of cause and effect, that "there is no cause which is not an effect and no effect which has not also a cause." This theory, of course, excludes the idea of a Great First Cause. This is to Western minds unthinkable, as was illustrated in the same Parliament by Father Hewitt of the Paulist Brothers of New York in his paper on the Being of God. He used the illustration of a train of cars in which the last car is drawn by the one before it and that by another. In his view such transmitted motion would be impossible unless there could be found at the head of the train, an engine having power in itself. Your theory seemed to involve the supposition that an infinite number of cars on an infinite circular track might move without an engine. But the point which I would make just here is that your theory appears in itself to exclude the idea of a conscious and blessed Nirvāna beyond this life. It deals with such causes as we find in this world, which in your view includes all things past, present, and future; and it ought to note only such effects as are seen in this world as Buddhism conceives it. Everything must move in the circle of being if it moves at all. Men and gods are born and die and are reincarnated either on the earth or in heaven or in hell, where also they will die again: all is change; but according to the idea of Nirvāna as a changeless future existence, it is a breaking out of the circle. It belongs to the world of being, and yet it does not so belong. It is an eternal standstill, a rest, not of a soul, not of the skandas, not of Karma, but of a something which produces no longer the old effects, and which therefore does not belong to your world of invariable causality. Perhaps you can remove my difficulty.

I shall welcome any further light which may be thrown upon this subject, and I assure you of my belief that good will come from a full and fair elucidation of all those facts and principles which belong to Buddhism or any other religious system. I have a profound respect for the searchings of earnest men of all ages in reference to the great things which concern our highest destiny.

There are two or three things in your letter in regard to which I will add a single word. Referring to the life of Christ, you speak of the miraculous draft of fishes as an indication of a lack of proper regard for animal life on his part. I do not propose to enter into a defence of Christianity, but I would only say that you seem to me

to miss the true import of the passage when you assume that Christ and his disciples went away and left the fishes to decay upon the shore. We might as well suppose that they left their boat to drift about on the waves. The true meaning is simply that three men, mentioned by name, etc., left the business of fishermen and became disciples. The narrative states that there was another boat in partnership. Even though there had been no partners or servants to look after the fish, there was never lacking a crowd in the footsteps of Jesus, to whom they could have been given. A multitude is here mentioned. A general Gospel injunction was,—sell all thou hast and give to the poor and follow me.

With regard to animal life, I know that it is often claimed that Buddha was more compassionate than Jesus. I think he was less discriminating. Jesus had a tender regard for all animal life, and taught that even the sparrows were the subjects of his Father's care; but nevertheless he believed that men were in God's sight of "more value than many sparrows." He rebuked the stiff conservatism of the Pharisees, which would have forbidden the finding of a lost sheep on the Sabbath, or the rescuing of a dumb beast from suffering. Buddhism is perhaps much more particular in avoiding the destruction of insect life than Christianity, but on that score I think Buddhism has yet to reckon with the modern science of Bacteriology, and the question whether the living germs of disease shall destroy or be destroyed, and whether it is less merciful on the whole that animals and fishes shall be food for each other and for man than that myriads of living microbes shall destroy them by the slow torture of disease. Life and death are shown by science to be so balanced that in the total of existence death is as beneficent as life. The economy of the sea is one of constant carnage and so also with the earth; but for this the sea would soon become a solid mass of suffering, living forms, and the earth would be uninhabitable by men. Christian precept is humane but it is discriminating. It would destroy the wolves and serpents of India rather than allow them every year to destroy thousands of the people, and it would allow the Esquimaux to feed on fish rather than suffer the extinction of their race.

The other reference in your letter was to Christ's anger and violence in driving men as well as oxen from the temple. Two kinds of argument are used in such a case, one is a whip or a cane, which even without actual blows is the common persuasive used with dumb beasts, and the other, adapted to men, is remonstrance; and Christ used both of these. There were probably two occasions

on which this thing occurred, and all the evangelists speak of such an incident. Only in the passage in the Gospel of John is there any reference to a whip of small cords, and in this there is no indication that the whip was designed for any but the beasts. In the New Version, translated by the most able Greek scholars in this country and Great Britain, the conjunctives, there more properly used, are "both—and,"—"And he drove them all out, both the sheep and the oxen, and poured out the changers' money and overthrew the tables, and he said unto them that sold doves, etc."

You speak of the miracles of Jesus. From a materialist this would not be surprising, but Buddhism like Christianity has opened to men the world of the spiritual and the supernatural. The greatest miracle in the New Testament is the Incarnation, but that is no greater departure from the common law of heredity than the incarnation of an old Karma in a new being wholly distinct from his predecessor.

And if we are to speak of the miraculous in Buddhism—passing in silence the marvellous legends—I should ask whether any mere human being, sitting under a tree, could without a miracle raise himself *per saltum* into intellectual omniscience,—and also into an absolute freedom from all the appetites and passions of our common humanity? That Buddha gained a victory over them I can well believe, but if you leave out the miracle—I speak of course from your standpoint—you must suppose that like the equally consecrated Paul of Tarsus, he found that when he would do good evil was present with him and that the warfare had to be waged to the end.

This accords with the universal experience of mankind, and it is the teaching of the *Shin Shu* tract which I have quoted above. I have never seen the moral disability of sinful men and their need of a Divine and therefore supernatural salvation more strongly set forth in any Christian treatise than in this tract where it speaks of those "who attempt the holy path as failing in every particular" and of their perishing need therefore of relying upon what Nanjio calls "the vicarious Power of the Original Prayer" of Amitâbha.

In closing I should like to express my appreciation of some of those high ethical teachings of Buddhism of which Rev. Dharma-pâla spoke so intelligently and eloquently in the Parliament, but that my paper is already too long.

Let me add that practically the millions of Buddhists are not so helpless of the future as many have supposed, and simply for the reason that they disregard Nirvâna and look forward to a happy

transmigration, and many of them, in earth or in heaven. Even the devout pilgrim, Hioun Zsang, prayed on his death-bed that he might be born in a Buddhist heaven.

Assuring you that I aim to be an earnest student of whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, wheresoever they may be found,

I remain sincerely yours,

F. F. ELLINWOOD.

NEW YORK CITY.

NOTES AND BOOK REVIEWS.

DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS.

Every period of transition is a time of struggle, and it is natural that the leading spirits who seek to be pathfinders of new truths or perhaps also of old truths in a new light, have to pass through many errors which sometimes lead them to the very verge of despair. As an instance of such tragic experiences we may cite David Friedrich Strauss, the author of *The Life of Jesus* and *The Old and New Faith*. Finding the old faith self-contradictory and full of problems revealing the untenableness of the old interpretation of church dogmas, Strauss's life was devoted to a clarification of the writings of the New Testament, and there can be no question but the higher criticism of the present day owes more to him than perhaps to anybody else. Spinoza was the originator of Bible criticism; and after Spinoza "The Wolfenbüttler Fragments," published by Lessing, made the greatest stir in the theological world; but David Friedrich Strauss dashed the idol of literal inspiration to pieces. His work of rescission was formidable, but he was unable to put anything in its place. He was a negative spirit, and heavily was his sensitive mind weighed down by the curse that attaches to the desolation of destruction. Unhappily his family relations were very sad, and he saw himself in the name of honor and self-respect necessitated to seek a divorce from his wife. It was as if the dreariness of his religious agnosticism had intruded itself upon the sacredness of his matrimonial life, and, at the close of his career, this unusually gifted man sank into the grave almost without a comfort, for to him there seemed to be no purpose in life, and all he could say of his aspirations was that he did not know whether they had been genuine ideals or the flickerings of an *ignis fatuus*. Was there any reality in his ideal of truth to which he had devoted his life unflinchingly and against the most sacred illusions of his youth? He had sternly obeyed the call of duty, but his domestic experiences, his doubtful relation to his children, and his religious piety which had indignantly shattered the idol of his early faith, left his heart cold, and he felt as if his days had been a dream oppressed by a nightmare.

His life-experiences are condensed in a little *Sinnegedicht*, whose constant refrain "I know it not" characterises the disposition of his mind. It was published not long ago by Edward Zeller in a volume containing selected letters of David Friedrich Strauss, and reads in an English translation as follows:

"I started on a journey, but I did not leave.
And whether I shall stay, I know it not.
That I am here a stranger, this is certain;
But where my home is, O, I know it not.

I thought, I had once two beloved children,
 But whether 'twas a dream, I know it not.
 A wife discarded I. If love to hatred,
 If hatred turned to love, I know it not.
 'Tis said I've written books, but whether
 'Tis truth or mockery, I know it not.
 An infidel, I'm told, the people call me;
 I'm rather pious, but I know it not.
 Of death I never was afraid, but whether
 I'm living still, truly, I know it not."

What a terrible desolation in the soul of a man who in many respects was victor in the battles of science! He certainly conquered that old conception of traditional religion which is now abandoned even by the most reactionary representatives of dogmatism, but he did not enjoy his victory. The end of his life exhibits a terrible dissatisfaction. His strength was exhausted, and he bleeds to death from the wounds received in the battle of life. He was one of the St. Johns of the religious reformation that is now preparing itself. He was one of the Moseses who led the children of Israel out of the bondage of Egypt, but he was not permitted to see the promised land. His life's work was in the desert, and 't was in the desert, too, that he found his grave.

P. C.

Too late for the Christmas market, but not too late for those readers who are interested in the most important religious movement that has stirred mankind since the foundation of Christianity, Gustav Freytag's historical sketch of Martin Luther will be published simultaneously with the first number of the monthly *Open Court*, or at the latest two or three days after its appearance. The articles constituting the book were translated for the first time by H. E. O. Heinemann and appeared in *The Open Court* during the last year. Judging from letters received from our readers, they were greatly appreciated, and we can, without fear of contradiction, say that no better and more condensed statement of Luther's life has ever been written than that of Freytag. The Open Court Publishing Co. has published the book in handsome form, large octavo, gilt top, and bearing Luther's coat of arms in gold on the cover. A great number of choice illustrations will help to make this book popular.

Mr. Frederick A. Noble, the enterprising pastor of the Union Park Church, Ashland and Washington Boulevards, Chicago, has arranged for a series of discourses on current religious questions, to be delivered at his church on Sunday evenings instead of the traditional sermons. The value and character of these discourses may be gathered from the following list, beginning with February 14 and concluding on May 9. (1) "Philosophical Basis of Theology," by James Lewis Hobson; (2) "Evidences of a Personal God," by George B. Foster; (3) "Higher Criticism and the Pentateuch," by Edward Thompson Harper; (4) "Credibility of the Historical Books of the Old Testament," by Augustus Stiles Carrier; (5) "Prophecy: Object, Scope, and Use," by Samuel Ives Curtiss; (6) "Inspiration: How to Be Defined and Accepted," by Andrew C. Zenos; (7) "Place of Christ in Modern Thought," by Charles Joseph Little; (8) "How Far Apostolic Interpretation of Christ Is Authoritative," by Milton Spencer Terry; (9) "New Testament Interpretation as Affected by Recent Studies and Investigations," by Clyde Weber Votaw; (10) "Evolution Theories and Christian Doctrine," by William Douglas Mackenzie; (11) "Systematic Theology: Is There Still Need of It?" (12) "The Teaching of Jesus in Regard to the Hereafter," by George Holley Gilbert.

Three important works in the domain of psychology and ethics have been recently issued from the press of Félix Alcan of Paris. The first is by M. Th. Ribot, the acknowledged leader of the modern psychological school in France, and is entitled *La Psychologie des Sentiments*, which means "The Psychology of the Emotions and Passions." M. Ribot's careful psychological methods, his keen vision for facts, his horror of metaphysical theories, combined with rare lucidity and conciseness of expression, have united in making his works the most satisfactory existing compendiums of the subjects of which they treat, and the same qualities are displayed in his present work on the Psychology of the Emotions, different as opinions may be regarding the tenability of certain theories advanced in it. M. Ribot contests the doctrine that emotional states are functions of consciousness and has adopted the physiological theory agreeably to which they are primitive and autonomous, the direct expression of the vegetative life of the organism. M. Ribot's art is always most tellingly displayed in his analysis of psychological problems by the methods offered in Nature's own laboratory, namely, by the methods of degeneration and disease, and these methods he also employs with success in the present work.

The second work is *L'Education intellectuelle dès le Berceau*, by Bernard Pérez, one of the pioneers in the study of child psychology and the author of many works upon the subject. That his book should contain much of value was to have been expected, and both the professional educator and parent will find ingenious observations and wise counsels for the instruction of children in M. Pérez's work. The subjects treated are the education of the senses, of memory, attention, the logical, intellectual, and æsthetical faculties, etc.

The last work is on ethics, *Le Bien et le Mal*, by E. de Roberty, Professor in the New University of Brussels, a profound philosopher and indefatigable author. M. de Roberty's work is not light reading, except to persons thoroughly acquainted with French and philosophy, and we can do no more here than to refer to it as an able discussion of its subject and as occupying an important place in M. de Roberty's system.

μκκ.

THE MODERN READER'S BIBLE. A Series of Works From the Sacred Scriptures Presented in Modern Literary Form. Edited, With an Introduction and Notes, by *Richard G. Moulton*, M. A. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1896. Price, each, 50 cents.

We have already referred to some of the numbers of this Series in the weekly *Open Court*, and to some also in *The Monist*, but its importance renders repeated reference to it desirable. Apart from his introductory criticism, Professor Moulton has simply sought to remodel the outward literary shape of the books of the Bible exactly as the Hebrew writers themselves might have remodelled them had they written their books to-day with our knowledge of literary morphology. There has been no attempt at a reconstruction of the literature of the Old Testament according to the methods of the higher critics. For example, in the historical books, consisting of Genesis, Exodus, Judges, Kings, and Chronicles, Professor Moulton has given us the history of the people of Israel exactly as it was presented by themselves; for to "appreciate the history of a great people as they themselves understand it, is an interest of universal literature," and literature here is our chief concern. The rehabilitation of the preceding historical books, therefore, has touched but three main points. What we nowadays should throw into footnotes and appendices, the Hebrew writers threw indiscriminately into the text. This material consists of gene-

alogy, statistics, documents, etc., all of which greatly bores the modern reader, and has contributed more than anything else to making the Bible a comparatively unread book. This matter Professor Moulton has distinguished by using different-sized type. The second point is that of the separation of epic narrative from historical narrative. To the former has been given, consonantly with its character, a poetical form. The third point is the adjustment of Scripture to the outer form of modern books, which has been done by division into chapters, sections, etc., so that the reader may gain at once a synoptic, analytic, and mnemonic view of the whole.

One of the most beautiful of the recent numbers is that of *Biblical Idylls*, containing the Song of Songs, Ruth, Esther, and Tobit. We should specially like to call attention to Professor Moulton's Introduction to the *Idylls*, where he has advanced certain critical and literary considerations that heighten considerably our appreciation of Solomon's Song. We refer especially to the distinction between imagery and symbolism. Such criticism quite deadens the blow to our æsthetic sense which we experience on reading much of Hebrew poetry. We cannot, in fact, quit this subject without referring to the high character and value generally of Professor Moulton's introductions, which evince not only a grasp of literature, but also a broad comprehension of philosophy and history.

The Wisdom Series, containing the ethical and philosophical tetralogy Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Ecclesiastes, and the Book of Job, is now complete. Besides the numbers already mentioned in this notice, Exodus and Deuteronomy in the History Series have already appeared, Judges, Kings, and Chronicles are rapidly to follow. The Prophecy Series, containing Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the minor prophets, still remains. The volumes themselves are in small 18 mo. pocket form, printed on good paper, and serviceably and tastefully bound. T. J. McC.

THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT. The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1896. By Henry Van Dyke. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pages, 457. Price, \$1.75.

Dr. Van Dyke has departed in the present work from the custom which has hitherto prevailed in the preparation of the "Yale Lectures on Preaching," and waiving his privilege of instructing the Yale students of divinity in homiletics, or in the art of how to preach, has substituted for that theme a discussion of the deeper and broader question of what to preach. The word of spiritual life and power for the present age must, he contends, be a "real gospel, a word of gladness and a word of God." Traditions and dry systems of dogma are powerless. The preacher's message must come from a heavenly source, it must be fresh, vivid, and *new*, and yet be *old* and not out of touch with the past. "An altogether new religion can hardly be an altogether true religion." The solution of the apparent difficulty involved in this reconciliation of the old and the new, lies, according to the author, in a personal view of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Christianity is not a complex system of doctrine, it is a spiritual life. Christ is Christianity. "To preach Him, in the language of to-day, to the men of to-day, for the needs of to-day, is to preach a gospel as new and as old as life itself." Christianity has a *Person* at the heart of it—this is its distinctive trait wherein it differs from all other religions. Recognising this, we have no need of the confusions of theology. "Our central message is not the gospel of a system but the gospel of a Person."

We may gather from the foregoing abstract of Dr. Van Dyke's Preface, the prevailing trend of his thought. His book is an eloquent one and breathes the buoyancy and fervor of a deeply religious mind, while his aspirations are distinctly

such as spring from an enlightened culture. Nevertheless, we cannot help thinking that in many cases his revivifications of the dogmas which he would reject for the living Christ, differ from the old only in being more suffused with ardor and sentiment, and not in being more rational. For example, it is the impassioned plea of a preacher, poet, and lover that we have in Lecture VI, in behalf of absolute personality, and in Lecture VII, in behalf of God as creator and ruler of the world—not the arguments of a philosopher. Correct though we may regard Dr. Van Dyke's conclusions to be, if not taken too literally, they are yet the imaginative fruit of associations woven in the Christian mind by the religious longings, literature, and æstheticism of centuries, and not the reasoned verifiable results of methodically conducted thought. But it has not been Dr. Van Dyke's aim to produce a bald, rational apology of Christianity. On the contrary, he has rather designedly sought to touch emotional chords. It is on this side—as a religious tonic quickening the imaginative and emotional associations of the Christian mind—that the main value of the book is to be sought, although we should be far from denying to it sterling intellectual qualities in the discussion of subsidiary points. Significant as the abrupt recent reaction from materialism to religion has been, the significance of the opposite forward movement of orthodox religion towards science has been as momentous and will bear lasting fruits. μκρκ.

L'ARITHMÉTIQUE AMUSANTE. By *Edouard Lucas*. Paris: Gauthier-Villars et fils. 1895. Pages, 266.

It is rare to meet with so entertaining a work as the present little *Arithmétique Amusante* of the late Edouard Lucas, which has been very tastefully printed by the old and famous mathematical publishing house of Gauthier-Villars et fils of Paris. Lucas was Professor of mathematics at the Lycée Saint-Louis and author of perhaps the completest series of works on mathematical recreations to be found. The present volume which has been compiled from manuscripts left unpublished at the author's death, is intended as a sort of introduction to the *Récréations*, and has the eminently practical aim of teaching young children and grown up persons the art of arithmetic by unconscious and pleasurable forms of acquisition. The book is fragmentary, yet none the less fascinating on that account. In all its features it is one of the good fruits of that practical reform in education which proceeded from the founding of the *École polytechnique*.

"Permit me to offer to you," says the author, "a bit of advice dictated by a ripe experience. Develop in your child from the start a taste for drawing and arithmetic. Children should learn to count at least as high as twenty when quite young, to play with dominos, lotto counters, pebbles and sticks of wood, or better, with small cubes of wood or stone of the same size; for it is imperative above all things to develop along with writing and reading a quick facility in mental arithmetic. In no case, however, should the scholar learn tables of addition and multiplication by rote, or any results whatever in this manner without having first obtained them directly. The child should be taught to find them himself, for his mind is a latent power on which it is merely necessary to impress the right movement." And again upon the propriety of attaining this end by means of recreation, he says: "Instruction in science should be joyous, lively, pleasing, and full of entertainment, and not cold, majestic, or funereal. Keep your solemnities for your university festivals."

The first chapter is devoted to entertaining problems in elementary arithmetic culled from all times and nations, and interspersed with a good deal of information

on the history of arithmetic. We have instructions even as to how children should be taught to write figures.

The second chapter is devoted to the mastery of rapidity in calculation. We have first a few anecdotes of great arithmeticians and lightning calculators. There is one incident of the author's own son who had been taught, when quite a baby, to construct his own multiplication tables, and who having been forgotten continued his constructions as far as thirty times thirty and one day quite astonished his father by proposing to him a difficult sum in multiplication of two figures. His progress was so rapid that his father had soon to stop his little mathematical games lest he should become what he wittily calls a megaloccephalic arithmetical machine (*une machine arithmétique à grosse tête*). The remainder of the chapter gives a number of abbreviated methods of multiplication and division which have been known to mathematicians for a long time but do not seem to have yet found a general footing in practical mental life.

Chapter III. is on the subject of arithmetical progressions, Chapter IV. on geometrical progressions. All these important subjects are inculcated by curious and entertaining examples taken from history, literature, folklore, and games of all kinds. Lucas devoted a life-time to examining and simplifying arithmetical combinations and to the invention of practical mechanical devices for automatically recording arithmetical results. He has been long an acknowledged master in this domain, and his labors in the field of mathematical recreations have not had in view intellectual entertainment alone but also the rapid and sound acquisition of elementary mathematical methods, and especially the utilising of the plays and games of children towards the attainment of solid knowledge and intellectual power. He speaks of the common methods of inculcating arithmetic as nothing less than an "interment" of the mathematical faculties. His idea is that the ways of learning science should be so far as possible ways of joyous progress and not of solemn and dismal difficulties. His simple, practical views on learning arithmetic cannot be too widely diffused.

T. J. McC.

The aim of *The Open Court* has been from the beginning the propagation of the immortality idea, as characterised in the following quotations:

"Mind, or Soul, is not a mystical something, a bodiless essence, a spiritual hobgoblin: It is the form-structure of our brain produced by our education, in the widest sense in which that term is used. This structure of form is not mere nothingness. The idiot does not possess it. The special form is here a more important part of reality than the substance that has taken the form. In the Sistine Madonna of Raphael, the form in which the colors have been distributed upon the canvas is the principal thing and not the color taken from the painter's palette. In a ball of lead that which we call the ball is as real as the lead.

"The form-structure of the human brain, the soul of man, is the result of the work and struggle of the living world on earth for millions of years. To preserve this work-of-art of nature's making, and to develop it to a higher form in the rising generation, constitutes the main duty of our life. It is the content of all morals. And the mightiest instigation to such a preservation of the soul is the conviction that we thereby again build up ourselves."

"It is of the utmost importance to retain of the belief in the immortality of the soul or the mind, and to guide into the right channels, that thereof which is true. The true belief in the immortality of the soul is the highest of the ideas that jointly constitute the soul, and the strongest factor in its struggle for existence."—*The Open Court*, Vol. III., No. 127, p. 2068.

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The author writes as a motto for the American edition :

"A noble human life does not end on earth with death. It continues in the minds and the deeds of friends, as well as in the thought and activity of the nation."

Gustav Freytag did not write his novel with the intention of teaching psychology or preaching ethics. But the impartial description of life does teach ethics, and every poet is a psychologist in the sense that he portrays human souls. This is pre-eminently true of Gustav Freytag and his novel "*The Lost Manuscript*."

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As an instance of Gustav Freytag's views on the nature of the immortality of the soul, as illustrated by books, we quote the following from his novel :

"The soul of mankind is an immeasurable unity, which comprises every one who ever lived and worked, as well as those who breathe and produce new works at present. The soul, which past generations felt as their own, has been and is daily transmitted to others. What is written to-day may to-morrow become the possession of thousands of strangers. Those who have long ago ceased to exist in the body continue to live in new forms here on earth, and daily revive in thousands of others. . . . There remains attached to every human work something of the soul of the man who has produced it, and a book contains between its covers the actual soul of the man. The real value of a man to others—the best portion of his life—remains in this form for the generations that follow, and perhaps for the farthest future. Moreover, not only those who write a good book, but those whose lives and actions are portrayed in it, continue in fact living among us. We converse with them as with friends and opponents; we admire or contend with, love or hate them, not less than if they dwelt bodily among us. The human soul that is enclosed in such a cover becomes imperishable on earth, and, therefore, we may say that the soul-life of the individual becomes enduring in books, and the soul which is encased in a book has an assured duration on earth. . . . No one who has written a book has of himself become what he is; every one stands on the shoulders of his predecessors; all that was produced before his time has helped to form his life and soul. Again, what he has produced, has in some sort formed other men, and thus his soul has passed to later times. In this way the contents of books form one great soul-empire on earth, and all who now write, live and nourish themselves on the souls of the past generations."

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
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Elisabet Ney, Sculpt.

Frankfurt a. M. d. 12 Dec.
1859.
Arthur Schopenhauer

The signature is from Elisabet Ney's autograph copy of Schopenhauer's works.

THE OPEN COURT, MAY, 1897.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
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NO. 492

THE PROPHET OF PESSIMISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER was born at Dantzic, Feb. 22, 1788, the son of a well-to-do merchant. His father had destined him for a business career, and placed him in the office of a Dantzic broker. The youth, however, had higher ambitions. After his father's death he began the serious study of philosophy, which he pursued at the universities of Göttingen, Jena, and Berlin. He took his degree, in 1813, with a dissertation on causality in which he distinguished four kinds of causes, which he called *principium rationis sufficientis*, (1) *fiendi*, (2) *cognoscendi*, (3) *essendi*, and (4) *agendi*; i. e., the principle of a sufficient reason for (1) becoming, (2) for comprehending, (3) for being, and (4) for acting. His main work *The World as Will and Representation* was completed in 1818, in the same year the fundamental work of his great rival Hegel was given to the public. Schopenhauer settled in Berlin as a *Privatdocent* of the university, but failing both in attracting disciples and in obtaining a professorship, he withdrew from university circles and led from 1831 on, a retired life in Frankfort on the Main, where he wrote his second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, in the form of additions to the various chapters of the first volume, and several other books among which the best known are *On the Will in Nature* (1836), *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841), and *Parerga and Paralipomena*, a collection of popular articles on realism and idealism, religion, university philosophers, the vanity of existence, the indestructibility of our being, women, worldly wisdom, etc., etc., all of them full of bitterness and disdain of the world and everything in general, especially the philosophy professors of the German universities, Hegel at their head, in particular.

Hegel was the man of the day during Schopenhauer's life-time,

and when Hegel's fame began to wane Schopenhauer's came to the front. His influence increased until he became the most popular philosopher in Germany, and it is only of late that his philosophy begins to lose its hold on the people in the Fatherland. But his star is now rising among the English speaking races, and his works are being made accessible to the public in good translations.

Schopenhauer's merit consists in having called attention to the main problem of philosophy, "Is life worth living?" And he will perhaps for all time to come remain the classical representative of that philosophy which answers this question in the negative. There can be no doubt about it that Schopenhauer exercises upon immature minds a baneful influence, but we must at the same time recognise that he raised a problem which demands a solution. It is the great religious problem, it is the *Œdipus* question as to the purpose of man's life.

* * *

Schopenhauer's philosophy is characterised by two words, Idealism and Pessimism. The objective reality of the world is will, which appears in the stone as gravity, in the chemical elements as affinity, in man as a desire to be, manifesting itself in his various intentions and actions. The reverse of the medal is the realm of subjective existence, which is the world as we intuit it, as we picture it in representations or ideas. It is, in appearance, extending outside of us in space; this world, such as it lives in our conception, Schopenhauer calls the world as it is represented, *die Welt als Vorstellung*, and it is mere representation, not reality. Space is a function of the conceiving mind, and with it the whole material universe is nothing but thought, idea, imagination, a heavy dream. The sole difference between objective existence and dreams consists, according to Schopenhauer, in the continuity of the former and the discontinuity of the latter.

We do not intend here to criticise the weak points in Schopenhauer's system; they become more apparent to those who are not personally interested in his peculiar dislikes and can therefore judge his denunciations with impartiality. The notion that causation has a fourfold root is on the very face erroneous, for there is only one kind of causation, which is the law of change, and every change is a transformation that produces a new arrangement, leaving in the whole system the same amount of matter and energy as before. While there are not several causes, there is a difference between the *cause* which is the *primum movens* in a process of transformation, and the *reason why* this cause takes effect. The cause

is one definite fact, an event, an act that happens; the reason why it happens is a natural law, a description and explanation concerning the interconnexion of things. The reason why, is not a single fact but a universal truth. Further, while there are not several roots of causation, there are several kinds or species, according to the various reasons that condition the effectiveness of the cause. In mechanics the cause takes effect according to mechanical laws, in chemistry according to the affinity of the elements, in the lower domain of physiology, in plants, and in unconscious animal movements according to the nature of a physiological irritation, and in psychology according to the significance of representative signs, according to ideas and the meaning that ensouls words. These kinds of causation, however, are not comparable to so many roots but to branches.

The popularity of Schopenhauer is certainly not due to his idealism which is quite unintelligible to average readers, who constitute his most zealous disciples. It is based upon unproved declamations as to the non-existence of space and time and of the whole material universe in their objective reality, which are declared to be mere representations. This proposition is mixed with a belief in the genuineness of various phenomena of mysticism, such as telepathy, second sight, magic, etc.; for Schopenhauer's Will is, like the Creator, omnipotent and omnipresent; the Will can at pleasure produce worlds out of nothing; it can produce effects at the most distant places, and its vision is not veiled by the illusion of time. In spite of the spiritualistic tendencies of this view, Schopenhauer advocates an almost crude materialism which regards matter as the thing-in-itself, the bearer of the metaphysical will, and the source of all life. It is quite natural that a philosopher who himself lacks all system and consistency should exhibit a sovereign contempt for everybody who tries to treat philosophical problems in a methodical way. Yet, with all his faults, Schopenhauer is great in his incidental remarks, and even in his worst and most undignified aberrations when he rails like an old scold at the school-philosophers, impugning their honesty, he remains fascinating and becomes sometimes even refreshing.

By far of greater importance than his theoretical philosophy is Schopenhauer's pessimism which draws its power from the misery of life, such as it actually exists, pointing out that its presence is an intrinsic and unavoidable feature of existence. What a fund of truth, one-sided though it may be, lies in the following description of human fate (*Die W. u. W. u. V.*, Vol. II., Chap. 46):

"Having awakened to life from the night of unconsciousness, the will finds itself as an individual in an endless and boundless world among innumerable individuals, all striving, suffering, erring; and as though passing through an ominous, uneasy dream, it hurries back to the old unconsciousness. Until then, however, its desires are boundless, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied wish begets a new one. No satisfaction possible in the world could suffice to still its longings, put a final end to its cravings, and fill the bottomless abyss of its heart. Consider, too, what gratifications of every kind man generally receives: they are usually nothing more than the meagre preservation of this existence itself, daily gained by incessant toil and constant care, in battle against want, with death forever in the van. Everything in life indicates that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated or to be recognised as an illusion. The conditions of this lie deep in the nature of things. Accordingly, the life of most of us proves sad and short. The comparatively happy are usually only apparently so, or are, like long-lived persons rare exceptions—left as a bait for the rest.

"Life proves a continued deception, in great as well as in small matters. If it makes a promise, it does not keep it, unless to show that the coveted object was little desirable. Thus sometimes hope, sometimes the fulfilment of hope, deludes us. Whenever it gives, it is but to take away. The fascination of distance presents a paradise, vanishing like an optic illusion when we have allowed ourselves to be enticed thither. Happiness accordingly lies always in the future or in the past; and the present is to be compared to a small dark cloud which the wind drives over a sunny plain. Before it and behind it all is bright, it alone casts a shadow. The present therefore is forever unsatisfactory; the future uncertain; the past irrecoverable. Life with its hourly, daily, weekly, and yearly small, greater, and great adversities, with its disappointed hopes and mishaps foiling all calculation, bears so plainly the character of something we should become disgusted with, that it is difficult to comprehend how any one could have mistaken this and been persuaded that life was to be thankfully enjoyed, and man was destined to be happy. On the contrary the everlasting delusion and disappointment as well as the constitution of life throughout, appear as though they were intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing whatever is worthy of our striving, driving, and wrestling, that all goods are naught, the world bankrupt at all ends, and life a business that does not pay expenses,—so that our will may turn away from it.

"The manner in which this vanity of all the aims and objects of the will reveals itself, is, in the first place, time. Time is the form by means of which the vanity of things appears as transitoriness; since through time all our enjoyments and pleasures come to naught; and we afterward ask in astonishment what has become of them. Accordingly our life resembles a payment which we receive in copper pence, and which at last we must receipt. The pence are the days, death the receipt. For at last, time proclaims the sentence of nature's judgment upon the worth of all beings by destroying them.

And justly so; for all things from the void
Called forth, deserve to be destroyed.
'T were better, then, were naught created.'—*Goethe*.

"Age and death, to which every life necessarily hurries, are the sentence of condemnation upon the will to live, passed by nature herself, which declares that this will is a striving that must frustrate itself. 'What thou hast willed,' it says, 'ends thus; will something better!'

"The lessons which each one learns from life consist, on the whole, in this, that the objects of his wishes constantly delude, shake, and fall; consequently



SCHOPENHAUER IN 1852.

From two daguerreotypes, highly prized by Schopenhauer, now in the possession of Elisabet Ney. They represent the sitting when Schopenhauer drank the historical bottle of wine to remove his wonted lugubrious and pessimistic cast of countenance.



From two photographs in the possession of Dr. Lindorme, of Chicago. Date unknown.

they bring more torment than pleasure, until at length even the whole ground upon which they all stand gives way, inasmuch as life itself is annihilated. Thus he receives the last confirmation that all his striving and willing were a blunder and an error.

'Then old age and experience, hand in hand,
Lead him to death, and make him understand,
After a search so painful and so long
That all his life he has been in the wrong.'

"Whatever may be said to the contrary, the happiest moment of the happiest mortal is still the moment he falls asleep, as the unhappiest moment of the unhappiest mortal the moment he awakens. Lord Byron says:

'Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free,
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better not to be.'"

"It is indeed incredible how stale and empty are the fates of most people, how dull and heedless are all their feelings and thoughts. Their lives consist of flabby longing, and pining, of dreamy reeling through the seven ages to death, and this is accompanied with a number of trivial thoughts. They are like clocks wound up to go and do not know why. Each time when a man is born the clock is wound up again to play off the same hackneyed tune, bar for bar, measure for measure, with unimportant variations." (*Ibid.*, *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. I., p. 379.)

Or, take the following on the misery of life:

"Nobody is exactly to be envied, but those who are to be pitied are innumerable. . . . Animals are more satisfied in their mere existence than we; the plant is quite satisfied; but man only in the degree of his obtuseness. . . . A happy life is impossible; the highest that a man can attain to is the fate of a hero."

Schopenhauer the idealist will be forgotten, but Schopenhauer the pessimist will survive for all time to come. The misery of life has never before found a more eloquent prophet, and here he finds himself in touch with the two great religions of the world, Buddhism and Christianity. Schopenhauer is an enemy of religion. His article on religion is perhaps the severest and keenest criticism that has ever been made. He hates priests and hierarchical institutions as much as, if not more than, womankind. And yet when he comes to speak of Buddhism and Christianity he does not conceal his profound admiration for the spirit that pervades these two creeds. He regards Buddhism as the purer faith of the two, but Christianity, too, ranges according to his philosophy high above the noblest humanity of the Greek civilisation. The Greeks, he says, were mere children when compared to the age that revealed the truths of Christianity whose symbol is the cross, an instrument of torture and ignominy, employed by the ancients only for putting to death the most contemptible criminals and slaves. Schopenhauer says of Christianity:

"The centre and core of Christianity is the doctrine of the fall of man, of original sin, of the perdition of our natural state, and the corruption of the natural

man, which is connected with the vicarious atonement through the Saviour which is gained by faith. But this characterises Christianity as pessimism. It is therefore opposed to the optimism of the Jewish religion and to Islam, the oldest child of Judaism; but kin to Brahmanism and Buddhism.

"That all have sinned and are condemned in Adam, and that all have been saved in the Saviour, expresses the truth that the real being of man and the root of his existence does not lie in the individual but in the species which as the Platonic idea of man is laid out in its temporal appearance in individuals."—*Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. II., § 181.

"Human existence, far from being a boon, is like a debt which we have contracted . . . our life is the payment of the interest of this debt, the payment of the sum itself is made in death. . . . That Christianity regards life in the same light appears from a passage of Luther's comments on the Epistle to the Galatians. 'We all are however in our bodies and possessions subject to the Devil, and are guests only in the world whose lord and god he is. Thus the bread which we eat, the drink which we drink, the garments which we wear, even the air and everything on which we live in the flesh, is under his government.' So far Luther. People complain about the dreariness of my philosophy. The reason is this: instead of proclaiming a future hell as the result of sin, I claim that in this world here, wherever there is guilt, there must be something like hell."—*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. II., pp. 665-666.

Schopenhauer is one of the most notable characters among the philosophers of the world. His faults are gross and obvious; his vanity (it is most obtrusively displayed in his letters) is ridiculous; his practical hedonism forms a strong contrast to his theoretical contempt of pleasure. Nonetheless, he is great and deserves fully the attention which he receives. His sentiments are deep, and he has experienced in his own bosom the shallowness of joy in every form. Read Schopenhauer, and you will no longer be able to adhere to the traditional optimism which found its best representative in no less a man than Leibnitz. If pleasure is the purpose of life, the goal that must be striven for, then indeed the world is a failure, and life is not worth living.

Schopenhauer appreciates Buddhism and Christianity, because these religions recognise the existence of misery and the need of salvation; but Schopenhauer, the pessimist, has opened his eyes to the first part of the truth only proclaimed by the Buddha and the Christ; he overlooks the other and more important part. Schopenhauer agrees with Buddha that there is misery in the world, and that there is a cause for misery, which is our thirst for individualisation, our desire, our lust. These are the first and second of the four noble truths. But he blinds himself to the third and the fourth, which proclaims there is salvation from misery and that the eightfold noble path of righteousness unfailingly leads to the attainment of salvation. Schopenhauer believes in the cross

only as a symbol of martyrdom, not as the token in which sin is conquered and death trodden under foot; he knows nothing of the higher life that is gained by him who surrenders the vanity fair of the world and all selfishness, for the sake of laying up spiritual treasures that are incorruptible and not subject to decay. There is a glimpse of this realm of the higher life in his discussion of art and Platonic ideas, but he fails to recognise in it the consummation of life and the aim of evolution. There is no evolution, according to Schopenhauer; Lamarck and Darwin are in his opinion two queer ignoramuses, and everything that is great or noble is, if we abide by Schopenhauer's verdict, abnormal and out of place. Genius and virtue are not qualities that adorn man with some special and rare perfections, but render him unfit for life and change him into a lunatic who deserves both admiration and pity. The world, according to Schopenhauer, is a place for brutal people, for fools, and knaves; it leaves no room for beauty, wisdom, and morality.

* * *

In fine: we do not agree with Schopenhauer, but we appreciate the importance of his philosophy. A study of his works is the best cure for the old optimism so common among large masses of the unthinking who go through life without ever reflecting upon the significance of the duties that it imposes, believing that pleasure is the highest good, and that ethics is nothing but a calculation of how to secure for the greatest number the maximum amount of happiness. We reject optimism, but for that reason we do not accept pessimism. Pessimism is right only in the face of optimism. If life's purpose be the realisation of pleasure, then life is a failure. But for that reason, it is still wrong to proclaim that life is not worth living. Meliorism denies the premise of both optimism and pessimism, that the purpose of life is pleasure. Meliorism looks upon life as an opportunity for realising the higher spiritual life of moral ideals, of scientific aspirations, of the attainment of art. What is all the misery of life in comparison to that bliss which is perceived by those who are instruments in the actualisation of the good, the true, the beautiful, a bliss unattainable to those who brutelike cling to their particular egoity, and become at last the spoil of death.

Pessimism is deeper than optimism, it is a higher and more advanced stage in the recognition of truth. But Pessimism is only a state of transition which opens our eyes to a better, a truer, and nobler conception of life: it leads to meliorism.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JEWS SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM BABYLON.

BY THE REV. BERNHARD PICK, PH. D., D. D.


WITH THE RETURN from Babylon, the history of Israel becomes the history of the Jews. "The name Jew," as Josephus observes, "was born on the day when they came out from Babylon," and their history thenceforth is the history not of Israel but of Judaism.

After the overthrow of the Babylonian Empire by the Persians, Cyrus permitted the Jews (536 B. C.) to return to their own land and to rebuild Jerusalem and the temple. About 42,000 exiles returned under the guidance of Zerubbabel and Joshua the high priest. A second colony followed under Ezra (458 B. C.), who with Nehemiah restored the law and transformed the theocracy into a nomocracy, which finally degenerated into that scribism which reached its climax in the Talmud and similar works. In the twelfth year of his administration, Nehemiah returned to the Persian court (433 B. C.). During his absence of many years affairs fell into disorder; but on his return, after a long residence in Persia, Nehemiah reformed all these disorders and even expelled a grandson of the high priest Eliashib on account of his unlawful marriage with the daughter of Sanballat (Neh. xiii, 28). This expelled priest, undoubtedly one and the same person with Manasseh, withdrew to Samaria and built a rival temple on the mountain of Gerizim.

Palestine was ruled as Syrian satrapy by the then high priest, but afterwards became subject to the Macedonian rule. On the death of Alexander, Judea came into the possession of Laomedon. After the defeat of Laomedon (B. C. 320) Ptolemy, king of Egypt, attempted to seize the whole of Syria. He advanced against Jerusalem on the Sabbath, and carried a great many Jews away as captives, whom he settled in Egypt, Cyrene, and Libya. Under the

Ptolemies the Jews enjoyed great liberties and prosperity. In the time of Antioch the Great (223-187) Palestine was again the seat of war between Syria and Egypt, till at last, under Seleucus IV. (187-175), it came under Syrian sway.


The plan of Alexander to imbue the nations of the East with Greek culture was continued under his successors, and by degrees Grecian influence was felt in Palestine. Thus Antigonus of Socho, one of the earlier scribes, the first who has a Grecian name, is said to have been a student of Greek literature. In opposition to these Hellenists, whose Judaism was of a very lax nature, there devel-



THE GREAT TALITH.
The mantle worn by Jews at prayer.

oped in a quiet manner, the party of the pious or Hasidim, which rigidly adhered to the laws of the fathers and afterwards openly declared itself in the struggle of the Maccabees. Under Seleucus, IV., as has been said, the Jews had come under the Syrian sway. The people were governed by the high priest, and thus their condition was tolerable. When, however, the effort was made to hasten the process of Hellenising the people and destroy altogether the Jewish nationality, new troubles began, which resulted in the rise of the Maccabees. Seleucus was succeeded by Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (175-164 B. C.). When he ascended the throne there

were at Jerusalem two parties,—a national one, adhering to the laws of the fathers, and the Greek, which endeavored to introduce Greek manners, vices, and idolatry. At the head of the national party stood the high priest Onias III., afterwards supplanted by his brother Jason, who offered four hundred and forty talents (or about five hundred and thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty dollars) annually as tribute to Antiochus, besides a hundred and fifty more for permission to build a gymnasium. Jason was dislodged by Menelaus, who offered a higher tribute to Antiochus (172 B. C.). While the latter was absent on his second expedition against Egypt (170 B. C.) Jason took possession of Jerusalem for a time. Antiochus, who looked upon this act as rebellion, after his return from Egypt took fearful vengeance on the Jews and the temple (1 Macc.




THE SMALL TALITH.
Worn continually by the orthodox Jew.

1, 16-28; 2 Macc. 15, 11-23; comp. Dan. 11, 28). In the year 168 a royal edict was issued, according to which the exercise of the Jewish religion and circumcision was interdicted, and a statue of Jupiter Olympus was erected in the temple (1 Macc. 1, 43 et seq.; 2 Macc. 6, 1 et seq.; Dan. 11, 30). At last the patience of the people was exhausted, and the Maccabean struggle arose, which ended in the independence of Judea. The Maccabean successors of Judas, the son of Mattathias, united in their own persons the offices of king and high priest (1 Macc. 14, 28 et seq.); but though they proved valiant defenders of the country against foreign enemies, they could not prevent Palestine from being torn by internal factions. At that time the two religious factions known as Pharisees and Sadducees opposed each other. Hitherto the Maccabees had

sided with the Pharisees, the successors of the Hasidim. . But the third successor of Judas Maccabæus, named John Hyrcanus (135-106), being offended by the Pharisees, went over to the Sadducees, thus making the Pharisees his opponents. His eldest son's reign (Aristobulus) was short; but when his second son (Alexander Jan-næus) ascended the throne, in 104 B. C., he was so annoyed by the popular party of the Pharisees that, before his death, he felt obliged to advise his wife, Alexandra, to join the Pharisees and abandon the Sadducees entirely. Through this policy peace was restored, and Hyrcanus II. was made high priest while Alexandra occupied the throne. After the latter's death (70 B. C.) a deadly strife began between the two sons, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, for the sovereignty. In the course of this struggle both parties ap-



SMALL PHYLACTERY FOR THE HEAD.
Used by ordinary Jews.



LARGE PHYLACTERY FOR THE HEAD.
Used by the Pharisaic Jews.

The phylactery was a memorial amulet consisting of a strip or strips of parchment inscribed with certain texts from the Old Testament and enclosed within a small leather case, which was either fastened on the forehead or on the left arm (see the upper part of the cut which follows).

pealed to Pompey, who at once invaded Palestine, and after having taken Jerusalem and its temple, appointed Hyrcanus high priest, limiting his dominion, however, to Judea alone, and taking his brother, Aristobulus, with his two sons, as captives to Rome. Alexander, one of the sons of Aristobulus, managed to escape (57 B. C.) and tried to raise the standard of revolt against Hyrcanus, but with no success. He was put down by Gabinius, the Roman proconsul, who divided Judea into five districts. Hyrcanus was recognised as high priest by Cæsar, who also permitted the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem; and Antipater, for services rendered to Cæsar, was appointed procurator over Judea (47 B. C.), who again made his son, Phasael, governor of Jerusalem, while he placed his son Herod over Galilee. The latter soon succeeded, by


the help of the Romans, in becoming king of the Jews (39 B. C.). Under him Aristobulus, the last of the Maccabeans, acted as high priest, but he was put to death (35 B. C.).

Herod was followed by his son, Archelaus, who, after a few years' reign, was deposed by the Emperor Augustus (A. D. 6), and Judea became part of a Roman province with Syria, but with its own procurator residing at Cæsarea. When Quirinius took the census he succeeded in quelling a general revolt; but the fiercer spirits found a leader in Judas, the Galilean, who, fighting for the theocratic principle (according to the notions of the Pharisees) against the Roman yoke, kindled a fire in the people which, though often quenched, was not extinguished.

The high priests followed in quick succession with the exception of Caiaphas, who retained his office during the long reign of Pontius Pilate (28-36). The principle of interfering as little as possible with the religious liberty of the Jews was rudely assailed by the Emperor Caligula, who gave orders to have his image set up in the temple of Jerusalem. It was entirely through the courage and tact of the Syrian governor, Petronius, that the execution of these orders was temporarily postponed until the emperor was induced by Herod

Agrippa I. to withdraw them. Caligula soon afterwards died, and under the rule of Agrippa (41-44), to whom the government of the entire kingdom of his grandfather, Herod, was committed by Claudius, the Jews enjoyed much prosperity. In every respect the king was all they could wish. At the time of his death his son, Agrippa, being too young, Judea was again ruled by Roman governors, viz., Cuspius Fadus (44-46, under whom Theudas [Acts 5, 36] played his part); Tiberius Alexander (46-48, nephew of Philo of Alexandria); Ventidius Cumanus (48-52), and Felix (52-60), magnificent in his profligacy and despotic as a ruler (Acts, xxiii, 24). He was followed by Porcius Festus (60-62), a well-meaning man. With his successor, Albinus (62-64), everything became venal; and, bad as his government was, yet it was by far preferred to that of Gessius Florus

PHYLACTERIES.



For the arm.

For the head.

Showing straps with which they are fastened.

(64-66), the last but also worst procurator, who made an ostentatious display of his oppressions. Disturbances in the streets of Jerusalem and Cæsarea were now of frequent occurrence, and massacre followed upon massacre. All attempts at peace-making on the part of Agrippa I. and of the peace party were in vain. The patience of the people had been taxed too much, and Judea was at open war with the Emperor Nero, who sent his first general of the

empire, Vespasian, to subjugate Palestine. Under Titus, Vespasian's general, fortress after fortress surrendered until at last Jerusalem was taken and the temple burned to the ground, August 10, 70 A. D.

Judea was now a waste, Jerusalem a heap of ruins, and there was no Jeremiah to sing the funeral dirge of the city of David and Solomon. Directly after the triumph of Titus the Sanhedrin met at Jamnia or Jabneh, and in the hands of this council the work of transforming and adapting Judaism to the altered political circumstances, proved a task of little difficulty. Jamnia had only to be substituted for Jerusalem, a few ordinances to be discontinued or slightly altered, and certain prayers or good works to be substituted for the sacrifices, and the change was effected without leaving any trace




POLISH JEW AT PRAYER IN THE
SYNAGOGUE.
Showing the manner in which the
talith and the phylacteries for head
and arm are worn.

of violent revolution. The spiritual head of the Jamnian commonwealth was Gamaliel II.¹ National fanaticism, indeed, was not yet extinguished; but it burnt itself completely out in the vigorous insurrection led by Bar-Cocheba, the pseudo-messiah, in which nearly six million Jews lost their lives, together with the

¹ See McClintock and Strong's *Cyclopædia*. We are largely indebted to this work for the details of the present article. All readers desirous of pursuing the subject further should use it for constant reference.

famous Rabbi Akiba, one of the pseudo-messiah's most ardent adherents (135 A. D.). Titus, to annihilate forever all hopes of the restoration of the Jewish kingdom, accomplished his plan by establishing a new city on the site of Jerusalem, which he called *Ælia Capitolina*. An edict prohibited any Jew from entering the new city on pain of death. More effectually to keep them away, the image of a swine was placed over the gate leading to Bethlehem. The seat of the spiritual head, or patriarch, also called *nasi*, was now transferred from Jamnia to Tiberias, where Judah the Holy completed in A. D. 190 the collection of all the oral or traditional laws, called the *Mishna*. When in the fifth century (429) Palestine ceased to be the centre of Judaism, Babylonia took her place. From the period of the exile a numerous and coherent body of Jews had continued to subsist there. The Parthians and Sassanides granted them self-government. At their head was a native



MEZUZA, OR SIGN UPON THE DOOR-POST.

A cylinder containing a piece of parchment inscribed on one side with certain words from Deuteronomy, and on the other with the name of the "Almighty," so placed as to be visible through an opening covered by glass. The cylinder is affixed to the right-hand door-post in Jewish houses; the mezuzah is believed to have the virtue of an amulet and is saluted by pious Jews both on entering and leaving the house.

prince, the *Resh Galutha*, i. e., prince of the captivity, who, when the Palestinian patriarchate came to an end, was left without a rival. The schools there at Pumbeditha, Sora, and Nahardea prospered greatly, developed rabbinism, vied with those of Palestine, and continued to exist after the cessation of the latter, when the patriarchate became extinct; thus they had the last word in the settlement of doctrine, which was embodied in the celebrated Babylonian Talmud, compiled about the year 500. When the schools at Pumbeditha and Sora were closed Jewish learning was transferred to Spain.

Returning to the Jews in the Roman Empire, we find that after the reign of Vespasian and Hadrian the condition of the Jews was not only tolerable, but in many respects prosperous. But the complete reverse took place after the conversion of Constantine. The Jews, who formerly had taken a great share in the persecution of the Christians by pagan Rome, now became a condemned and

persecuted sect. With the triumph of Christianity over paganism began the period of cruel oppression of the Jews in the Roman Empire. A gleam of hope shone upon them in the days of Julian the Apostate, but they were more illy-treated under his Christian successors. Till the reign of Theodosius, in the fourth century, however, their position in the empire was tolerable. Different, however, it was in the fifth century. The Roman Empire had, from the year 395, been divided into the Eastern or Greek Empire, of which Constantinople was the capital, and the Western Empire, of which Rome and Italy still formed the centre. In both these divisions the position and treatment of the Jews became worse and worse. In the west,




MODERN JEWISH SYNAGOGUE.

even under Honorius, its first emperor, oppressive laws began to be enacted against the Jews. In the east, i. e., in the eastern part of the Roman Empire, soon after called the Empire of Greece, or Byzantium, the position of the Jews became particularly unfavorable. The government of the Emperor Justin, and the code of Justinian, soon permanently fixed the social relations of the Jews in the Byzantine Empire. Justin (A. D. 523) excluded all non-Christians from holding any office or dignity in the state. In the reign of Justinian the enactments

against the Jews were made more onerous. No wonder that during his reign many rebellions broke out among the Jews. From the reign of Justinian the position of the Jews in the Greek Empire became such as to prevent their possessing any vestige of political importance. True, they carried on theological studies in the country of their fathers, especially at Tiberias. But even here the last surviving gleam of their ancient glory was soon extinguished. The dignity of the patriarch had ceased to exist with the year 429, and the link connecting the different synagogues of the Eastern Empire was broken. Many Jews quitted Palestine and the Byzantine Empire to seek refuge in Persia and Babylonia, where they were more favored. When, in 1455, Constantinople was taken by the Turks,

some of the Jewish exiles from Spain and Portugal took refuge in the ancient capital of the Eastern Empire, where the number of their descendants is now considerable.

In the peninsula of Arabia the Jews had dwelt from time immemorial. Before the time of Mohammed the Jews were very prosperous there, and even a Jewish kingdom under Jewish kings is said to have existed there. When the prophet of Mecca made his appearance he found the Jews in general favorably disposed toward him. Several of the Jewish tribes became even his open parti-



THE FEAST OF DEDICATION AS CELEBRATED IN AN ENGLISH SYNAGOGUE.

sans. But when his principles and plans became more thoroughly known and the Jews rejected him, Mohammed at once commenced a war of extermination against them. His first attack was against the clan of the Beni-Kinouka, who dwelt in Media, and was overcome by the warrior-prophet. The same fate awaited the other tribes, one after the other. From the moment that the Jews declared themselves against Mohammed they became the special object of his hatred, and since that time a feeling of enmity has ever existed between the Musselman and the Jew. Crescent and cross shared equally in their contempt and hatred of the Jews, and, as

in Christian Europe, so in Mohammedan Asia and Africa the Jew was compelled to bear a distinctive mark in his garments—*here* the yellow hat, *there* the black turban.

Beyond the boundaries of either the old Roman or the Byzantine Empire Jews have, in early times, been met with, both in the most remote parts of the interior of Asia and upon the coast of Malabar. In the latter place they probably arrived in the fifth century in consequence of a persecution raised in Persia. In the sev-

enth century a Jewish colony was met with in China. When the Jews emigrated there is difficult to ascertain.

But to return to the West.

It has already been stated that with the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity evil days came upon the Jews. In the Western Empire this unfavorable change commenced in the days of Honorius, and would have continued so; but the storm that burst over Rome toward the end of the fifth century changed in a degree the condition of the Jews. The northern nations, as long as they professed Arianism in preference to the Catholic faith, showed themselves merciful to their Jewish subjects.

This was especially the case with



THE HIGH PRIEST, IN LINEN VESTMENTS.
Sprinkling the blood in the holy of holies.

the Goths. When the dominion of the Ostrogoths, under their king Theodoric, succeeded that of Odoacer and the Heruli in Italy and the west, the Jews had every reason to be satisfied with their new sovereign. The consequence was that the Goths in the west, like the Persians in the east, found faithful allies in the Jews of that period. When Justinian, by his general, Narses, conquered Italy from the Ostrogoths (A. D. 555), the Jews, especially those at Naples, assisted him, only to be heavily punished afterwards.

The Visigoths also, in their defence of Arles, in Provence, against the Franks, under Clovis, were assisted by the Jews. In Spain the kings of the Visigoths treated them with favor till about the year 600, their king, Reccared, having embraced the Catholic

faith, inaugurated that peculiar system of conduct toward the Jews which finally resulted in their total expulsion from the peninsula.

The Franks were at first less merciful to the Jews than the Goths. The Merovingian line treated them with peculiar rigor. Thus in 540 King Childebert forbade the Jews to appear in the streets of Paris during the Easter week. Clotaire I. deprived them of the power of holding office. King Dagobert (629) compelled them either to receive baptism or to leave the country.

Under the Carolingians in France the Jews of the eighth and ninth centuries enjoyed so great a degree of prosperity, that the



THE FAST OF JERUSALEM IN JERUSALEM.

Romish bishops took alarm. Under Pépin le Bref, son of Charles Martel, they enjoyed many privileges, and so likewise under his son Charlemagne and under his successor and son, Louis le Débonnaire. The latter even freed them from the grinding taxes imposed upon them, and confirmed them in their immunities in 830. And all exertions of the priesthood, especially of Ogobard, bishop of Lyons, to injure the Jews, were futile.

The position of the Jews underwent an entire change at the downfall of the Carolingian dynasty, which began to decay after the death of Louis le Débonnaire. The invasion of the Normans

was partly the cause and partly the signal for a complete change of kings in Europe. An age of barbarism spread over the whole face of Christianity, the feudal system developed itself in every way injurious to the Jews. But one of the greatest evils which they were compelled to endure was the prevalence of the crusading spirit. During the first crusade (1096-1099) Treves, Speyer, Worms, Mayence, Cologne, and Ratisbon were the seat of oppression, murders, and bodily tortures, inflicted upon the Jews. During the second crusade (1147-1149), Ru-

dolph, a fanatical monk, travelling through central Europe, stirred up the populace to take vengeance on all unbelievers. The cry, "Hep! Hep!" was sufficient to bring terror to the heart of every Jew. But King Conrad III. and such men as Bernard of Clairvaux protected them, and thus the sufferings of the Jews were less, compared with the intemperate zeal of Rudolph. During the Middle Ages the Jews were not only persecuted, but, where they were tolerated, they became also the Pariahs of the west. But to resume the thread of events.

In France, formerly so signally patronised by the Carlovingians, the Jews experienced a different treatment after the extinction of that dynasty. Toward the end of the eleventh century



JEW OF BAGDAD.

they were banished and afterward recalled by Philip I. In 1182 they were at first banished by Philip Augustus, but readmitted upon certain conditions, one of which was the obligation to wear a little wheel upon their dress as a mark. Louis VII. (A. D. 1223) treated them as his serfs, and with one stroke of his pen remitted to his Christian subjects all their debts to Jews. Louis IX. (St. Louis), being anxious to convert them, commanded that the Talmud be destroyed by fire, and twenty-four cartfuls of the Talmud

were publicly burned in Paris (1244). Philip the Fair, after robbing them repeatedly, expelled the Jews from France in 1306. Under Louis X. they were treated unfavorably, while Philip V., the Long, favored and protected them. In 1341 the usual accusations of treason, poisoning of the wells, etc., were brought against them, and many were burned, massacred, banished, or condemned to heavy fines. Under John I. they enjoyed a little rest, and so also under Charles V. But in 1370 they were again banished, but soon recalled under Charles VI. In spite of the many vicissitudes, Jewish learning flourished in France, especially in the south. Men like David Kimchi and Rashi have become household names in Jewish as well as in Christian theology.


In England the Jews date their first residence from the time of the Heptarchy. In the twelfth century, under Henry II. and his son, the cruel treatment and plundering of the Jews reached its height. On the coronation day of King Richard I. (1189), when they came to pay their homage, the population plundered and murdered them a whole day and night in London. This bad example of London was followed at Stamford, Norwich, and more especially at York. Under King John (1199) all kinds of liberties and privileges were granted to the Jews, but he soon showed he cared more for their money than for their persons. Henry III. (1217-1272) followed the same policy, and when the Jews petitioned the king to allow them to leave the country their request was not granted. Under Edward I. they were banished in 1290, and only in 1635 Cromwell permitted them again to settle in England.

In Germany, Jews were found as early as the fourth century, especially at Cologne, where they soon became numerous and prosperous. But the commencement of the Middle Ages in Germany, as elsewhere, put an end to their favorable position. It is true that



JERUSALEM JEWS.

the Emperor of Germany regarded the Jews as his *Kammerknechte*, or "servants of the imperial chamber," and as such they enjoyed the emperor's protection, but the scores of violent deeds, which are recorded, show that even the protection of the emperor could not prevent the popular rage from breaking out and marking its course by bloodshed and desolation. The least cause was sufficient to massacre the Jews. When in 1348 an epidemic malady, known as the *black death*, visited half of Europe, the Jews were blamed for it because they were said to have poisoned the wells and rivers. A general massacre took place, in spite of the remon-



NEW YEAR'S DAY IN TIBERIAS AND SAFET.

stances of princes, magistrates, bishops, and the Pope himself. In the south of Germany and in Switzerland the persecution raged with most violence. From Switzerland to Silesia the land was drenched with innocent blood, and in some places their residence was forbidden.

In the Netherlands the history of the Jews during the Middle Ages was much like that of Germany and the north of France. In Flanders they were already living at the time of the Crusaders. In the twelfth century they were driven out, but were found there again in the fourteenth. In 1370 they were accused of having

pierced the holy wafer, an accusation which brought many to the stake. In Utrecht the Jews resided till the year 1444. In Holland, Zealand, and Friesland many Jews had sought refuge after their banishment from France by Philip the Fair.

Before the end of the tenth century Jews were already found at Prague. Boleslaus I. favored them and permitted them to build a synagogue. In Poland they existed very early. Under Boleslaus V., Duke of Poland (1264), they enjoyed many privileges. His great-grandson, King Casimir, showed them still greater favor, out



THE BLOWING OF THE TRUMPET ON NEW YEAR'S DAY.

of love, it is said, for Esther, a beautiful Jewess. Synagogues, academies, and rabbinical schools have always abounded in Poland.

In Italy, where Jews have resided from early times in their ghettos, the popes generally appeared kindly toward them. Gregory I., the Great, in the seventh century, proved himself the friend of the Jews, but Gregory VII., in the tenth century, was their enemy. In other great towns in Italy the position of the Jews varied. At Leghorn and Venice they met with favor, and so also in a less degree at Florence, but in Genoa they were looked upon with enmity. In the Kingdom of Naples, where they settled about the year 1200, persecutions took place from time to time.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS¹

BY ANTONIO LLANO.

[CONCLUDED.]

V.

IF, passing from the general principles of the doctrine to its practical applications, we endeavor to harmonise our ordinary moral judgments (whose validity is accepted by Dr. Carus, as by every one else) with that law of evolution (whether of "soul" or other) from which alone all ethical conceptions can derive their authority and legitimacy, we again find ourselves in a labyrinth of perplexities, escape from which can only be secured by surrendering all morality. The evolution of man is not a simple process, a simple motion governed by one single force: it is a very complex process, a motion whose propelling force is the resultant of many different, although concurrent, forces, some acting in one direction, some in another, and many of them opposed to one another. From such combination human development in general, and "soul development" in particular, arise; nor could mankind move as it does if the combination were not what it is, or if any of the constituent components of the resultant force were lacking. Of these components some present themselves in the form of human actions accompanied by consciousness; and, since they all have their share in the general movement, they must all be regarded as necessary factors of development; i. e., all human actions must, whatever their nature, be considered, according to the developmental standard of goodness, morally good. And to this it will be no scientific or logical answer to say, that development would take place faster and follow a better path (whatever may be meant by "better"), if some modes of conduct were omitted, and replaced by opposite modes of conduct; for this is to abandon the position that evolu-

¹For the first part of Mr. Llano's article see *The Open Court* for March 1897.

tion, at every moment, can take place only in one direction and at one rate of speed, and that it must so take place; and to frame an imaginary, subjective standard of what *ought* to be, instead of preserving the scientific and objective standard of what *is* and *must* be. We cannot escape from the logical consequences of universal determinism: in whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Necessity rises before us, proclaiming, with his very silence, that he is the eternal and, therefore, the irrevocable. He cannot be moved, for he has no heart; nor convinced, for he has no brain; he is an automaton made of inflexible material; and if we recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch in submissive resignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful and awful mechanism.

The process of evolution itself presupposes the conflict between antagonistic forces and tendencies. In the moral world, as in the physical world, there is a struggle for existence, if not among individuals, at least among what have been termed moral ideals. The higher ideals have not been realised except through, and by the agency of, the lower ideals; the lower ideals are, therefore, indispensable, if there is to be any development at all. But by this I do not mean to repeat the truism that what was morally good yesterday is to-day morally bad: the idea I intend to convey is, that, *at any given period*, the morally good (I now use the word in its ordinary sense) cannot usually become better, that is, progress (either by gaining in intensity, or by being propagated), unless helped in its course by the morally bad; the consequence being that the morally bad, viewed now as a necessary factor of the morally good, ceases to be really bad: our judgment must be reversed, and we must say that in such cases every action is morally good. An illustration will, I hope, make my position perfectly clear.

The teachings of Jesus of Nazareth are by many, Dr. Carus among them, considered as the starting point and the root of all modern morality. After the legendary element has been strained in the capacious filter of "Christian scholarship," and the moral residue treated with the powerful chemicals of "interpretation," the New Testament is found to contain the highest truths and principles of ethics; and thus the revolution worked by Jesus in the whole life of mankind is likened, both for its legitimacy and its importance, to the astronomical revolution of Copernicus. But it is, I believe, allowed by all students of Christian morals that the bare precepts of Jesus would have made little impression upon the old Romans and their barbarian conquerors, had they not been accom-

panied by those narratives appealing to the imaginational and emotional parts of our nature,—the stories of his struggling life and his patiently borne passion, crowned by his awful death. The best credential of his moral code was the seal of martyrdom stamped upon it by the heroic sacrifice of Calvary; and had this tragedy never been related to the Western World, the precepts of Jesus might to-day be slumbering among the utopic vagaries of what the greatest of Roman historians described as a superstitious people, who distinguished themselves by the odious characteristic of being the enemies of human kind.

What judgment, then, are we to pass upon the persecutors, the betrayers, and the executioners of Jesus? He was not an independent, self-existing, extra-cosmical personality: but for his surroundings and the state of the world at the time of his advent, his work would have been impossible. His work was not a simple nor an isolated event: it was, scientifically considered, a complex phenomenon, of which his moral teachings were only a factor, some of the other factors being the actions of his enemies, his denunciators, and his crucifiers. From a naturalistic point of view, Pontius Pilate, and Judas Iscariot himself, were component elements of the great compound whole, which, operating upon the minds of men, was to revolutionise the moral world; their actions were really not theirs: they were, so to speak, the instruments of nature, even as Jesus himself was the instrument of nature; and in those actions we must see, not the acts of free and independent wills, but the necessary operations of the eternal laws of the cosmos, which, for the carrying on of the evolutionary process, must make use of the martyr and the assassin alike, each being as indispensable as the other; they both conform to the laws of the cosmos,—they are the laws of the cosmos themselves; they both further the evolution of the race,—they are but terms of the sum total of progress; given the actual constitution of the universe, progress would be as impossible without the one or the other, as the existence of a whole without its parts. Judged, then, by the standard of development, are they not both equally moral, both equally good? It will, perhaps, be argued that Jesus himself had reached a higher stage of development, while his enemies were yet in a state of relative undevelopment. But in this case the question is only one of degree; Jesus, we may grant, was *better*, but they also were *good*. By what criterion can we trace the line of demarcation between the good and the bad? Nor can the question be evaded by taking into consideration the feelings, the *intentions* of the actors that took part in the momentous

tragedy ; for, apart from the fact that the persecutors of Jesus were probably acting in good faith and in obedience to the dictates of their "categoric imperative," it must be remembered that our criterion is entirely objective ; or, if we take account of the subjective element, it must be from an objective point of view ; from the point of view, namely, of what the consequences of that subjective element must be upon the development of the race. Nor, again, can it be said that the objectiveness of our criterion consists, not in judging actions by their consequences, but in taking in the objective world the necessary data for the direction of *our* conduct ; for this would be an ethics of egoism, not of development : the ethics of development is an "ethics of eternity," embracing the past, the present, and the future of the race.¹ The immediate causes of voluntary human actions are human feelings ; and feelings from which the evolution of the race results cannot, according to the "ethics of eternity," be declared bad or immoral. The feelings of Judas Iscariot, from which resulted the sacrifice of Calvary, from which resulted the adoption of Christianity, from which resulted the elevation of mankind, have to be accepted as necessary antecedents of the alleged redemption, i. e., as necessary factors of moral evolution ; or, to place the subject on its true bearings, as necessary factors of cosmical evolution in general ; and, as such, those feelings must be declared good.

It may, perhaps, be thought that the foregoing remarks are too far-fetched, and that they come from a misapprehension, or even a perversion, of the theory I am criticising ; for it is repeatedly stated by Dr. Carus that the elevation of the soul is the test of progress, and he says very distinctly that the "nature of moral goodness" "must be sought in the quality of our ideas and motives."² I shall, therefore, endeavor to present with all candor the reply that can be made, from his point of view, to the objections I have just adduced.

Human conduct, it will be said, consists in voluntary movements made in response to impressions received, directly or indirectly, from the outer world, and aiming at an adaptation of the organism to his environment, especially the social environment. The interpretation of those impressions and of the necessary conditions of adaptation are forms of consciousness we term judgments. Judgments, then, are the subjective regulators of conduct ; and it is therefore obvious that our actions will be better adapted to their ends in proportion as our judgments are more correct, or, as Dr. Carus

¹ *Ethical Problem*, p. 42.

² *The Monist*, I., 4, p. 564.

says, in proportion as we approach nearer to truth. It follows that the first condition, for a scientific direction of conduct is knowledge of the objective laws of nature ; and the first thing to be inquired into, when a line of conduct is proposed, is, how it will tally with those laws, or what its consequences will be, according to those laws, as they have been revealed to us by the attentive examination of natural phenomena. In this sense, then, it may be said that the standard of ethics must be objective : it must be, and cannot but be, found in the immutable order of the outer world. The law of evolution being a well ascertained fact, we may take it as an ethical guide : of conduct which is moulded so as to conform to that law, we may say that it is moral ; and of the man whose motives correspond with that law, we may say that he is good. By doing this we have not exchanged our objective criterion for a subjective criterion ; for, although we judge a man by his motives, those motives themselves are judged by the higher standard—the law of evolution, which, when applied to man, and viewed on its “spiritual” side, may with propriety be called the moral law. The consideration of motives is an indispensable element of moral judgments, for the simple reason that morality is only predicable of thinking beings, the causes of whose actions are motives : were we to judge merely by consequences, we should have to speak of brutes, trees, and stones, as of moral creatures. Nor is it sufficient that a man’s motive should be what is ordinarily called a “good intention” ; for herein comes our objective criterion to inquire whether that intention, when carried out, will further the evolution of the race ; and, unless his intention comply with this condition, it cannot be called good. Such examples, then, as that of Jesus’s persecutors, cannot be justified ; for, although these men may have acted in good faith, they were ignorant of the true course of human development ; they were immoral through their ignorance, or at least they were not good men ; they may be excusable, but this does not make them moral. Furthermore, it has to be admitted that we ourselves are liable to form erroneous judgments as to the laws of nature, and that some of our actions may be viewed by our descendants as we now view the proceedings of the Inquisitors ; but this is a necessary, although unfortunate, consequence of the limitations of human knowledge : all we can say is that, *for us*, those actions are morally good to which we are prompted by motives that, according to the facts known to us, and to the interpretation we can give them, we believe to be faithful responses to the requirements of the law of human progress.

The main objection to this reasoning is the same general objection I conceive to be applicable to the whole system—inconsistency. Development is here presented as the end, the ideal, of ethics; as an object whose realisation must be the purpose of moral conduct. It must, then, be accepted as the most desirable condition, or, in the language of other moralists, the *summum bonum*. If we ask why this is a desirable good, we are answered that “we *have to* be pleased with the development of our race according to the laws of nature,” and that “those who are displeased might just as well commit suicide at once, for they will go to the wall, they will disappear from the stage of life. Those alone will survive who are pleased with what the laws of nature demand.” Ethics, it is added, formulates general rules, based on facts, to “assist us in doing what we shall after all *have to* do.”¹

Leaving aside the hedonistic spirit of these statements, we find them inadequate to explain what they are intended to explain; for, while it is true that science teaches us what we “*have to*” do under certain circumstances, this “*have to*” refers to an end determined in advance; it is what we “*have to*” do *in order to attain an object in view*. The ethical *ought* is a conditional *must*; the *if* is the *sine qua non* of ethics, and for this reason all ethical structures have to be erected on an assumption of some kind—on an *if*. The foregoing propositions, therefore, are to be understood in the sense that we must adapt our means to human development, considered *beforehand* as a desirable end: *beforehand*, for experience teaches us that we can follow a different line, whether we “go to the wall” or not; and, consequently, we *have to* follow the line of development *if* we have accepted the idea of development as our guide. As the choice between the two apparently possible modes of conduct is a subjective operation—a matter of desire—our objective criterion only applies, as I have said above, *in the hypothesis that we have already chosen one form of conduct or the other*. This criterion, then, does not tell us why one conduct is more desirable than the other; for, although it assures us that by following the wrong line we shall “go to the wall,” this is simply the statement of a possible fact, which leaves us in absolute ignorance as to what is meant by “going to the wall,” seeing that in many cases the immoral man attains *his* end. As to the highly praised and so oft repeated criterion of facts and laws of nature and the development of the soul in the direction of truth, it may be said that it amounts to but a useful and necessary tool, as use-

¹ *The Monist*, I., 4, pp. 553, 554, and VI., 4, p. 589.

ful to the malefactor as to the saint—indeed, more useful to the malefactor.

Development, then, is to be accepted as an end in and by itself, to be striven after for its own sake, and for its sake alone. Its desirability cannot be established (even if this were logical) by an absolute *must*, for experience shows that we can, and often do, move counter to development; nor justified by reference to any other end or standard, for, in this case, that other end would be *the* standard. Such efforts at justification as that immoral conduct "will lead to certain ruin,"¹ and the like, are either a begging of the question or a surrender of the criterion. We arrive thus at an ultimate postulate, which must be assumed as a fact not susceptible of demonstration; the postulate, namely, that development is the most desirable object, and, as such, the *summum bonum*. And here we are confronted by a notorious contradiction; for, while Dr. Carus declares that "ethics should not start from any assumptions,"² his system cannot be built except on the assumption (assumption, as being a matter of subjectivity) that development is desirable in and by itself. To say that development consists in agreement with facts, or in an approximation to truth, may be a definition of what development is, but its desirability remains an ultimate postulate—an ultimate assumption. Even the reduction of progress to "soul-development" is an implicit substitution of subjectivism for objectivism, an unconscious return to the judging of nature by the standard of our feelings.

Admitting, then, that development is desirable in and by itself, and that, besides being desirable, it is actually desired, I shall leave other difficulties aside, and pass to the immediate consequences of the developmental theory, as thus understood (I almost said *mis*-understood). I shall endeavor to show how the objective sub-standard and the ideal standard can be combined, and what the results of the combination must be.

The first condition of our ideal of development is that it should be conceived as something possible or capable, of being realised by a due application of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted; and when, on the application of these laws, we find that our end is not attained, we must at once recognise that our ideal was such only in the popular sense of the word—that it was a dream; or, scientifically expressed, that we were in error, and that the object of our pursuit was only a logical possibility, conceived by us

¹ *Fundamental Problems*, p. 198; *Ethical Problem*, pp. 31-32.

² *The Monist*, I., 4, p. 555.

as such through ignorance of some unexpected circumstances which make the realisation of the desired end an actual impossibility; in other words, we have to remodel our ideal so as to make it conform to the actual facts of reality, thus constantly modifying our subjective standard by our objective sub-standard, the former being mostly formal, the latter experimental. A consequence of this is that we cannot judge actions or individuals by their motives; at least, that we are not justified in passing any judgment of moral disapprobation. For, motives being themselves a part of our ideal, we may conceive and desire a special form of development where certain motives exist; but if, by actual observation, we discover that those motives do not exist, or that the contrary motives exist, and that, furthermore, these are not capable of being changed by any means at our disposal, we must conclude that we were reckoning without the host; that development does *not*, as a matter of actual fact, take account of our supposed motives; and, as we "*have to be pleased*" with what really exists, we cannot disapprove of any existing motives, whatever they may be. The only feeling we can consistently experience is one of disappointment at the erroneous-ness of our judgments and the frustration of our expectations; but all verdict of immorality is out of the question, as the form of development with which we finally "*have to be pleased*" is that form which actually takes place, not the form we have in our minds.¹ We may, no doubt, cling to our definition, and say that a moral man is one whose motives correspond to our ideal of development; but this definition is nothing but the statement of a logically possible fact, and, being stripped of all feeling of praise and blame, entirely loses its ethical importance. And it is further evident that, with regard to the realisation of our ideal, although we think that the ideal can (that is, *may*) be realised in a certain manner, yet if the event—the actual fact—prove that the ideal is realised in a different manner, we must again confess that our conception of the means was inadequate, that the means that nature has employed are the *only* possible means, and that, unless we give up the realisation of the ideal, those means must be regarded with approba-

¹ The words of Antoninus the Philosopher (quoted by Dr. Carus himself) are a very clear statement of the monistic and determinist views (although the Stoics were not determinists in the modern sense of the term): "All is suitable to me, O Cosmos, that is suitable to thee! Nothing that for thee is in due time is for me too early or too late." And again: "There is hardly anything foreign to any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form one and the same cosmos." Remember also the words of Epictetus: "If any one go to the bath too early, say not that he does wrong, but that he bathes before time. If any one drinks too much wine, say not that he does wrong to drink, but that he drinks too much. For, before thou knowest what moves him to act, how knowest thou whether he do wrong?"

tion, or, at least, not with disapprobation. Thus I do not believe I have been illogical in my application of the developmental principles (even in the above distorted form) to the actions and men connected with the life and death of Jesus. To say that we can further or retard the progress of mankind are metaphorical expressions,¹ and, if literally taken, they betray an absolute ignorance of the difference between the logically possible, based on *assumptions*, and the actually possible, based on reality. There is only one process of evolution, only one direction and one speed of progress, all predetermined from eternity, i. e., contained in the universe as potentialities that are actualised at definite times and in definite places. This is scientific and philosophical fatalism, but not practical fatalism; for we are never *absolutely* certain of what will take place, and, in that uncertainty, we act as if to accomplish what we believe may happen; but, should the event disappoint our expectation, all we can say is that the event could not be what we believed it would be.

Before closing this part of my discussion, I would call attention to some features of the law of development, which, I think, will farther strengthen my position.

The universe, mechanically considered, is an immense (probably infinite) system, the fundamental law of whose operations is the law of action and reaction. Whatever our ideas of force may be, every phenomenon can be described as a reaction, in the sense that it is the response of a mode of existence to the action of another mode of existence. This law, also known as the law of causation, operates with equal rigidity (at least we believe so) in the region of the intellect and of the emotions,—in the world of knowledge and in the world of morality; and, just as in the physical world it would be unreasonable, nay irrational, to expect an effect where the cause was wanting, it would be in the same degree unreasonable and irrational to expect, in the moral world, the rise of higher conditions, which can only originate as reactions on lower conditions, without the existence of those lower conditions. The features of our civilisation of which we so often boast as our glorious achievements have originated in the antagonism between opposite social forces, opposite tendencies and ideals: liberty has been born in oppression, toleration in political and religious despotism; and, while we may deplore that such should be the law of

¹ Thus Dr. Carus says that, although the soul-development of the race "is of a spontaneous nature, man can, to a great extent, make or mar his own fate and that of his race." (*Ethical Problems*, p. 41.) Such expressions, however, coming from so strong a necessitarian as Dr. Carus, must be taken in a figurative sense.

nature, we must either "be pleased" with it, or blame nature for being what it is. Are we, then, to brand the Russian autocrat as a perverse fiend, the enemy of his subjects and of mankind? Leaving aside the fact that his actions *are* the immutable laws of the cosmos, we must remember that from his tyranny the freedom of the Russians will probably be the inevitable consequence, and that, without the action of despotism, the reaction of liberty could not take effect. And, should it be said that he would be a better man if he, of his own free will, granted more rights and gave more security to his subjects, and that freedom may exist without previous oppression, the answer simply is, that this could *not* be so, for the all-convincing and unanswerable reason that it *is not* so; and that, as said before, we must not confuse in our judgments the logically possible with the actually possible, the actually possible being what exists, and what does not exist being impossible.¹

VI.

Having presented and discussed what I conceive to be the most salient inconsistencies of the ethics of development, I shall now attempt to trace them to their main psychological sources; sources from which, as will be apparent, all ethical systems have sprung, and from which they draw their very life.

The first source is to be found in the law of conflict between feeling and judgment. The nature of this law will be readily seen by an illustration. A nervous woman may take the five cartridges out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them and hold them in her hand; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will scream with fright, and not improbably faint away. Her judgment, it is evident, tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any harm should come to her from the unloaded weapon; but her deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity, or by association, or both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct judgment. This is a very simple, and, I think, a very plain instance of the law of conflict. In the higher and more complicated forms of conduct a similar phenomenon takes place, which, although of a more complex character, is yet of the same identical nature. Through the combined agencies of heredity and educa-

¹ This view of the possible and impossible was very strongly held by Wyckliffe. According to him "that only is possible which is actual, though men may conceive of many things as possible which in fact are not possible." "Whatever is possible is actual," and therefore God's power and God's action are identical. This doctrine, as can be easily seen, logically leads, as in fact it led Wyckliffe, to absolute fatalism and predestination. (See Neander's *History of the Church*, Vol. V., pp. 166-8, Torrey's translation, Boston, 1871.)

tion we find ourselves possessed of certain feelings (what the original source of those feelings was matters not for our present purpose), which, invariably aroused whenever certain circumstances concur, prompt us to follow, or at least approve, certain lines of conduct, and to shun, or at least disapprove, certain other lines of conduct. When, however, we endeavor to rationalise our conduct, to give a reason for our actions, one of two things will happen:—either we take our feelings as our starting-point and criterion, in which case our theory may finally come in conflict with ascertained truths or other accepted theories, but not, if logically developed, with the given feelings themselves; or we may start from other phenomena, both objective and subjective, and in this case it may happen that the logical consequences of our theory will come in conflict with the feelings in question, by establishing facts which, according to our experience, must give rise to opposite feelings. In the latter case we find ourselves involved in the perplexities of contradiction; for, while it was our purpose to give a reason for our conduct, which we take for granted is reasonable (not being able, owing to the complexity of the case, to detect our error as easily as in the example of the woman given above), we arrive at the opposite conduct, or at the opposite feeling, as the only one that is really reasonable, or rational; and as we still persist in believing that our habitual feelings are defensible on rational grounds, simply because we cannot help feeling and obeying them, we undertake to frame a theory of reconciliation, which cannot fail to be characterised by its inconsistency,

This, I should venture to say, accounts for the lack of logic discoverable in naturalistic systems of ethics. For, so long as the so-called moral ideals are adhered to, and the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are held to be justifiable on scientific principles, the determinist element of monism, and of naturalism generally, must be partially surrendered; the necessary result being a crippled and vulnerable system, easily accessible through the breaches made by the admissions of its own advocates. There is only one logic consistent with determinism—the inflexible and implacable logic of Spinoza;¹ and the only conclusion that that logic warrants is, that there are no such things as right and wrong; or, if the word right be permissible, that everything is right. The antagonism between this conclusion and our inherited feelings ac-

¹ I am not, however, ignorant of the fact that in Spinoza himself we may often detect serious inconsistencies, traceable, I think, to the general source of error in these matters—the law of conflict. But, as a rule, he accepts the consequences of his thoroughgoing necessitarianism.

counts, as I have said, for the conciliatory theory of ethics I have been analysing in the course of this essay. The antagonism is so great, and even so shocking, that we recoil in horror when confronted by the bare corollaries of our fundamental propositions; we naturally and unconsciously distort the rules of logic, and finally convince ourselves that there is no such antagonism, but that, on the contrary, the postulates of determinism are the most solid foundation on which the current, subjective morality can rest. Of our feelings, which are only one part of our general interests, it may be said what Bentham says of personal interest in general: they do not "attack men's integrity in front, but undermine it," by strongly directing attention to whatever conforms to them, and diverting it from whatever conflicts with them. They form an unconscious bias (unconscious, as it is not apprehended as such) which it is difficult to eradicate.¹

The second source of error is of kindred nature with the first, and consists in the habit (due, no doubt, to the limitations of the human understanding) of conceiving phenomena as related to their *immediate* causes only; whereby we disconnect these causes from their necessary accompaniments and antecedents, and regard them, in a certain measure, as independent facts and first causes, instead of secondary and component causes, in themselves dependent upon other causes and determinant circumstances. This mode of conception is indeed valid, under certain limitations, and even unavoidable for practical purposes, provided we do not fall into the error of extending it beyond its proper boundaries. Thus Spinoza says that we may with propriety speak of some things as depending upon man's pleasure, although man's will is not free; because, in the first place, man is a part of nature, and whatever he does is done by nature *through* him; and, in the second place, because "we must define and explain things by their immediate causes."² In the impossibility of embracing in consciousness, by an intellectual act, the infinite series of causes and effects constituting cosmical existence, we are compelled to abstract the subjects of our inquiry from the total integral of which they are but differential

¹ Bentham, *Deontology*, Vol. II., Chap. iii., p. 139 (Bowring's edit., 1834). It is a well-known fact that, as Mr. Lecky remarks, we always gravitate towards that intellectual system which is more in accordance with our emotional nature. "Every moral disposition brings with it an intellectual bias which exercises a great and often a controlling influence upon the most earnest inquirer." (*European Morals*, Vol. II., Chap. iv., p. 192, Appleton, 1889). I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer to an essay in *The Philosophical Review* (V., 4, July, 1896), where I have discussed this subject at somewhat greater length.

² Spinoza, *Traité théologico-politique*, Chap. vi, (in *Œuvres*, translated by Saisset, t. II., pp. 71-72).

terms ; and by thus breaking the continuity of nature, or rather, by thus studying nature in a discontinuous manner (what we inevitably have to do), we are liable to commit the error, unfortunately so common, of objectifying our subjective states, and believing that discontinuity exists not in our conceptions only, but in nature as well. Moreover, where the connexion between one of the secondary or immediate causes with which we have to deal and the rest of natural phenomena is not easily or accurately discoverable, the tendency to make of the disconnexion an objective reality grows in proportion, and this again engenders the belief (we might say the *feeling*) that those immediate causes are independent causes, which may either agree or disagree with the rest of reality we designate by the name of nature. For obvious reasons, this erroneous habit is particularly exhibited in our judgments relating to human conduct, whose springs are to us generally unknown (an ignorance lying, as showed by Spinoza, at the root of the illusory belief in the freedom and autonomy of the will) ; and, although we may correct our judgments and plainly recognise our error, the error, having been organised as a habit, continues, as in the case of the moral feelings, to be our unconscious guide, and to vitiate our arguments ; it makes us forget, in our usual ratiocinations, that we have changed our premises, our fundamental principles, and leads us into the belief that the old conclusions and ideas are still legitimate. It is, indeed, a curious fact to notice that, as a general rule, it does not occur to our philosophers that, the whole foundation of philosophy having been relaid, all human conceptions must be radically changed : they prefer to accept the current conceptions, accusing our predecessors of having been poor logicians, who had the most wonderful gift of deriving right conclusions from wrong premises.

A very striking illustration of the habit referred to in the preceding paragraph is presented by the writings of Dr. Carus. I have already called attention (indeed, attention has been called to this for several hundred years) to the inconsistency and incongruity in saying that we are natural phenomena, and affirming, at the same time, that we can, or may, oppose or follow, disagree with or conform to, natural phenomena. Expressions of this kind may, no doubt, be used metaphorically ; but Dr. Carus seems to take them in a literal sense, and make of such propositions the very foundations of his ethics. One of the most important definitions with which he sets forth ; one which he constantly reasserts, in one form or another, is, as I have had occasion to notice, that "individuals

are moral in so far as they conform with the cosmos, in so far as they *become* one with the All," and immoral in so far "as their conduct does *not* agree" with the laws of the universe.¹ And, in order to exculpate his "God" (i. e., the "cosmos") from the everlasting accusation of being responsible for the evil existing in the world, Dr. Carus (although he might have given an irrefutable answer by saying that an unconscious cosmos can be neither responsible nor irresponsible) says: "The constitution of the universe is such that we reap as we have sown. When we say 'we' it is understood that it means not our present individualised existence only, but our entire Karma, past, present, and future. It includes all the causes of our being. . . . Thus it becomes apparent that not God is guilty of the evil conditions of our state of being, but we ourselves."²

I need not insist on the contradictory nature of such statements, when compared with the first principles of the monistic philosophy; on the presentation of man as different from nature, or, in the words of Spinoza, as an empire within another empire. The contradiction itself is, I think, sufficiently obvious; while the cause of it, its psychological source, I hope to have made clear. I cannot, however, abstain from referring to the candid answer given to the embarrassing question of the origin of evil by one of the greatest exponents of monism—Spinoza himself.

Good and evil, perfection and imperfection, he says, are not external conditions inhering in the objects of nature: they are modes of thought, abstractions used for the purpose of comparison. Of a work of human art we say it is more or less perfect according as it is more or less adapted to the purposes for which it was *designed* by man. Through our repeated experiences we arrive at the conception of certain conditions that must be fulfilled in order to accomplish a proposed end in the best possible manner; and this end, as represented in consciousness before it is realised, is an ideal to which the object to be attained must conform, and a deviation from which we consider an imperfection. This, however, always presupposes an *end* in view, a purpose; but of an object which is made for no end or purpose we cannot say that it is either perfect or imperfect, there being no term of comparison. Once, therefore, we have discarded the idea that there is an intelligent design in universal phenomena, the problem of whether things be perfect or imperfect, in their relations to the whole cosmos, becomes entirely unmeaning; and our endeavors to give it a meaning are based

¹ *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 208, 315, 327. The italics are mine.

² *The Monist*, Vol. IV., 3, p. 413: "Ethics and Cosmic Order."

"rather on a prejudice than on a true knowledge of nature"; on the prejudice, namely, that nature aims at the attainment of special ends.¹ As to the origin of good and evil, they have, no doubt, as all else, their source, their cause, in the very essence of God; they are, however, subjective states existing only in our minds, but which, considered in relation to God, have no significance, in the sense of antagonistic realities. Right and wrong are equally indifferent to God, since they represent emotional conditions of joy and grief, of which God is not capable; and it is only in a figurative sense that we can say we disagree with God or sin against God.²

Among the causes to which the inconsistency of developmental ethics is traceable might also be mentioned the belief in the freedom of the will, which, although rejected in principle, has left profound marks even in the minds of the most thorough-going determinists. This important subject, however, would compel me to extend this article beyond the space at my command. The reader, I think, will have no difficulty in applying the principles of the last paragraphs to the unconscious survival of the free-will philosophy.

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Pt. IV., Introduction; also, *Lettre à Blyenbergh* (in *Œuvres*, t. III., pp. 402-404).

² *Lettre à Blyenbergh* (in *Œuvres*, t. III., pp. 395-397).

IS ETHICS POSSIBLE?

IN REPLY TO MR. ANTONIO LLANO.

BY THE EDITOR.

ANTONIO LLANO, a philosopher of very outspoken views, has made his mark both as an author and an editor. His monthly magazine, *El Pensamiento Contemporáneo*, which was devoted to philosophy, history, and science, contained Spanish translations of articles by the most noted men of our time, Tyndall, Maudsley, Huxley, Sayce, Wallace, G. J. Romanes, Spencer, Crispi, Andrew D. White, John Stallo, F. Max Müller, Mivart, Prince Kropotkin, Ingersoll, and others; and Mr. Llano's own books deal with philosophical, ethical, and religio-philosophical problems.¹ I am glad that a man of Mr. Llano's calibre takes an interest in the philosophy of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*, but regret to see that in his attempts at being consistent, he becomes one-sided, and that through following his one-sided line of thought he is not aware of the inconsistencies to which his aspiration of being rigidly logical leads him.

Mr. Llano claims to be a consistent Spinozist, and his Spinozism is more Spinozistic than that of Spinoza himself. He believes in absolute determinism which, in his opinion, is identical with fatalism, involving a surrender of both the freedom of will and of morality. In his philosophy there is no room for "the possible." Logical possibility is based upon assumptions and actual possibility is limited to reality. Everything not real is impossible, for the course of the world's evolution is predetermined in its minutest details. Ethics is therefore built upon a fallacy: the *ought* presupposes the *can*, but there is only the *must*. "A scoundrel is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse." From

¹ *El Cristianismo ante La Filosofía, La Moral y La Historia.*

this standpoint, which is a most rigid fatalism, Mr. Llano charges me with inconsistency, which, as he declares, is due to a conflict between feeling and judgment. If I were not biassed by heredity and tradition, I should see that there are no such things as right and wrong and that my system of ethics is built upon an assumption. In reply I shall briefly state my reasons for believing in ethics and in the reality of the moral ought.

Let us first recapitulate the problem of free will, for here the root of our difference lies.

Freedom of will is a condition in which a man can do as he pleases, and it is a matter of course that in such a case he will necessarily act according to his character. Is that incompatible with determinism? Not at all! If the wills of certain people are free, an honest man will unhesitatingly resist temptation, while a thief under the very same conditions will steal. All actions, which result from the specific character of a man, are actions of his own and of his free will; and yet they are performed with necessity according to the irrefragable law of cause and effect.

It may be that Mr. Llano will object to this definition of free will, because he defines free will as a will that is not determined at all. To which objection I reply that I, too, reject that kind of free will; but I submit that a will which is not determined at all, not even by its own nature, is not a free will, but pure haphazard. Such a conception of free will is nonsensical; and, in addition, such a kind of free will, if it existed, far from being an indispensable condition of ethics, would make all ethics futile. What would be the use of trying to influence men by preaching ethics and by building up character if a man's decisions were not determined by his character?

Mr. Llano has the right to propose for his own philosophy any definition of free will he likes; but if he wishes to understand me, he must at least for the time being accept my definition, which regards that will as free which enjoys the liberty of acting according to its own nature.

If this definition of free will be granted, it will be readily seen that freedom permeates nature in all its domains. When zinc is dissolved in hydrochloric acid (HCl), the acid is decomposed, its chlorine unites with the zinc, forming chloride of zinc (ZnCl), whilst its hydrogen escapes in a gaseous form. The elements act in strict agreement with their nature, but not because there is a power that forces them to combine and separate. If the zinc were endowed with consciousness and speech, it would say, "I like

to join the chlorine"; and the chlorine would avow, "Zinc is preferable to hydrogen." It is possible that the hydrogen would feel the smart of a jilted lover; but, then, it mixes with the air and is quickly comforted, for it will soon find another consort.

While it is a stretch of imagination to impute human sentiments to the chemical elements, there are, nevertheless, certain analogies between psychical and non-psychical phenomena, and the most obvious resemblance consists in the difference of primary and secondary movements. Primary movements have their ground in a quality of the moving thing, as the falling stone and the combination of oxygen with carbon into carbonic acid in the flame, etc. Secondary movements are due to push or pull, which is an external influence or impulse, as the stone thrown up and the cart drawn by a horse. Primary movements are acts of liberty, secondary movements are acts performed under constraint against the nature of the moving bodies. The needle of a magnet points toward the north spontaneously, for it is the nature of magnetised iron to adjust its position in conformity to the magnetic currents of the earth; but if the needle be pushed aside and is turned toward the south it suffers violence; and if it could feel its condition and express it in words, it would complain of compulsion.

So long as the character of a thing remains the same its primary motions will be the same under the same conditions; and if the character be changed, as for instance by magnetising a piece of iron, its behavior will change accordingly.

Mr. Llano is apparently under the illusion, which is very common among philosophers, that the laws of nature are metaphysical entities, and he believes that to them is given dominion over all things in heaven and on earth. Thus the cosmic order which is constituted by their harmony does not appear to him grand and beautiful, but awful and oppressive. He says:

"In whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Necessity rises before us, proclaiming, by his very silence, that he is the eternal and, therefore, the irrevocable. He cannot be moved, for he has no heart; nor convinced, for he has no brain; he is an automaton made of inflexible material; and if we recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch in submissive resignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful and awful mechanism."

Natural laws are not tyrants; they are not powers which dominate over things and creatures; the laws of nature are formulas which describe the actions of objects according to their nature so as to make it possible to foredetermine the results of given conditions. Determinism does not mean that the various things are com-

pelled by an external force ; it means that there is stability and regularity in nature. Thus the law of gravitation is only a comprehensive statement of the actions of gravitating bodies. The stone does not fall to the ground at the bidding of Newton's formula, but on account of its own gravity.

Mr. Llano's monster of Necessity is the child of an antiquated metaphysicism ; it is bred in the close air of the philosopher's study, and will never be believed by those who feel the thrill of real life in their hearts. But suppose he could infuse this idea into the artist, the inventor, the poet, the man who dares to do and to achieve, would it not quench the fire of their youth ? Would they not turn away in submissive resignation from their own aspirations at the thought that whatever happens takes place according to irrevocable laws : that Moloch Necessity is everything ; we are nothing but tools in his hands ?

Necessity has two meanings : (1) inevitableness or determinableness, meaning that which unfailingly will be,¹ and (2) compulsion, a condition by which something is forced or compelled to act in a certain way by some external power. If necessity is to be identified with compulsion we had better abandon determinism as a superstition which is as untrue in theory as it is baneful in practical life, and speak simply of the describableness of the course of future events in the measure of our knowledge of the nature of things.

That every single particle of the world is ensouled with freedom, that it acts differently under different conditions, but always according to its nature, is an important truth which we should never lose sight of ; but its true significance increases with the unfoldment of organised life. With the appearance of consciousness the powers of nature reach a higher stage of freedom having new potentialities ; and, choice having been made possible, right and wrong, goodness and badness, virtue and vice are introduced. That indifference of all actions of which Mr. Llano speaks does not exist in the world of conscious life. With cognition, necessarily the possibility of error originates, and thus when the blind impulses of inorganic nature rise into the realm of conscious aspiration we have sin and righteousness.

Mr. Llano is under a radical misapprehension of facts when he claims that between the action of Jesus and Judas Iscariot there is no difference of kind but "only of degree," because the immoral is

¹ The word is composed of *ne*, the negation, and of a derivative from *cedere*, to go away, signifying that which will not disappear, that which will stay.

in his opinion merely "a state of relative undevelopment." We might as well say that there is no error in the world, for error is merely a state of less developed truth; that there is no missing an aim, for missing is simply a state of not yet having reached a place. Failures and mistakes, however, do not originate by mere differences of degree; they are instances of following a wrong direction. Evil, error, vice, sin, are not merely negative quantities; they are positive factors as much as virtues, knowledge, and noble achievements. If I say $2+2=5$ and act accordingly, it is not merely a not-yet-completed but a wrong computation.

While it is quite true that a criminal is the product of conditions and can to that extent as little help being a criminal as a horse can help being a horse, it is not true that for that reason the distinction between badness and goodness ceases. A diamond can help being a diamond as little as glass can help being glass, but for that reason a piece of glass is not of the same value as a diamond.

To understand how a criminal has become a criminal will no doubt make those who judge his deeds considerate and compassionate, but it will be no argument for looking upon him as a saint or letting his crimes go unrebuked. On the other hand, a genius has no reason for boasting. He, too, is the product of conditions. The doctrine that we are by God's grace what we are has acquired a new sense in the light of scientific considerations.¹

The scientific view taken of crime and virtue is the beginning of a new era in mankind, which was anticipated in the East by Buddha and in the West by Christ. Our judiciary is not as yet administered from the Buddhist-Christian point of view, but follows the principle of retaliation. Instead of treating crime as a disease, we punish crime. Instead of educating the criminal and creating conditions under which the disease of immorality will be cured we torture him, well knowing that this method has the tendency of ruining him altogether. The times, however, are changing now. Our penal code is slowly being adapted to the new world-conception, and the criminal condemned to die is no longer tortured as in former centuries, but executed with as little pain as possible.

¹ Buddhism speaks of the time of grace in somewhat the same sense as Christianity. When we receive instruction that is beneficial and leads us on the path of salvation to Nirvāna it is no merit of ours, but a grace that is offered us, as we read in the Jataka tales:

"If in this present time of Grace
You fail to reach the happy state,
Long will you suffer deep remorse."

—Trans. by T. W. Rhys Davids, p. 157.

It is true, as Mr. Llano says, that "we are natural phenomena"; but we are not blind or unconscious things; we are sentient beings. Sentiency and corporeal objectivity are two abstractions representing different qualities of the same reality. As such they are radically distinct but not separate. Every subjective feeling is the psychical aspect of a cerebral commotion; and as every cerebral commotion possesses a definite form, so every feeling is distinct in kind. The objectivity of the world can thus, according to the varying forms of objects, be impressed upon the subjectivity of sentient organisms, and a sight-sensation of a definite form grows by repetition to represent the object that causes it. The subjectivity of the human soul is practically a comprehensive inventory of the surrounding world and its relations, serving as a guide through life or as a means of adaptation to conditions. In other words, the form of subjectivity is the product of objective influences.

The things of the inorganic world act according to their nature and so do living animal organisms. But the nature of living animal organisms does not consist of purely mechanical or chemical properties; they exhibit a new feature, which is called mentality or the representative value of feelings. The animal mind is determined in its actions by ideas and not by pull or push or chemical affinity.

Now it is the appearance of consciousness in the cosmic evolution which renders ethics possible. A thinking being is not like a stone; it does not follow the first impulse; a thinking being deliberates before it acts, and comes at last to a decision which is executed. This is a higher phase of freedom, for it adds the possibility of choice, and man, the animal of abstract thought, can form ideals of a state of things, not as it is, but as it ought to be.

Mr. Llano will make an objection here. He will say that in the realm of the soul the same determinism obtains that rules in the domain of purely physical phenomena. Now I grant that psychical phenomena are as much determined as physical phenomena; but here as there we are confronted with freedom. There is only this difference, that that which determines the decision of a man is his character. Ideas are the factors and the responsiveness of ideas consists of other qualities than mechanical push and chemical affinity. It is true that the strongest idea will prevail over weaker ideas, but the strength of ideas cannot be measured in foot-pounds. The strength of ideas depends upon various other factors, among which the conviction of their truth is perhaps the most important one.

The appearance of the soul is not a break in nature, but the

product of a natural evolution. That the continuity from the formation of crystals to the aspirations of human beings is uninterrupted is not an evidence of man's degradation, but on the contrary it proves that the world as a whole is more than a haphazard conglomeration of matter in motion. There is a teleoarchy¹ of some kind—a cosmic order which prompts aspirations in a definite direction. This teleoarchy works blindly in the lower spheres of nature and acquires consciousness in man. Man is himself a natural phenomenon; but he is a phenomenon in which the eternal conditions of being can be reflected. Thus the transient can become a mirror that pictures the immutable; the particular can comprehend the universal; that which is conditional can grasp its own conditions and trace them back to the unconditioned order of existence.

The old supernaturalism which assumes that some extramundane personality, power, or entity enters into the natural world by a break of the cosmic order, has become untenable; but for that reason we need not deny the existence of the moral tendencies that manifest themselves in the world-process. We propose a new supernaturalism, which believes that the potentialities of a *sursum*, of an aspiration to rise higher, are contained in the natural. Man forms a higher empire in nature which is above the physical. It is true that obedience to the law that conditions man's evolution constitutes morality, but the highest morality imaginable is a state of mind in which man's sentiments have become an incarnation of the world-order. The man who is obedient to the laws of morality still feels himself the subject or slave of a power which he apprehends to be stronger than himself. But he can so love justice, righteousness, kindness, charity, that his whole nature is determined by these qualities. He can become an incarnation of these aspirations, so as to be identified with them. That is the state of heart which characterised the Buddha ideal of the Buddhists, and that is the gist of the ethics preached by Christ. There is no longer any need of requesting obedience to the moral law of a man whose sentiments are aglow with it and whose will is bent on realising it.

According to Mr. Llano, every man is the product of conditions, and we are what we are by necessity; therefore, the must governs us, and there is no sense in speaking of the ought. The premise is true, the conclusion is wrong. Mr. Llano forgets that

¹ The old teleology, whose workings are extraneous, is wrong; the world has not been designed like a watch; there is not a demiurge who in the fashion of a human artificer constructed the universe. But there is an intrinsic teleoarchy, an orderly arrangement of the actions that take place in the world, the nature of which is most obviously apparent in the harmony of mathematics.

the ought, the ideal, by which a man allows himself to be guided, is also a factor and, indeed, a most important factor among the determining causes. One of the conditions that make a man is his own thought. A man who cherishes the idea of his responsibility will act differently from the man who imagines that he is irresponsible. The idea that we are unfree, that we are products of chance and helplessly doomed to be determined by conditions, is oppressive (as Mr. Llano's case proves), while the thought of our responsibility gives strength and rouses us to vigorous action. The man inspired with the idea of responsibility will investigate and try to learn, the man who thinks he is unfree will be indifferent and passive. Considering the importance of ideas, as the determining factors of man's actions, is it not necessary to devote a special study to the subject for the sake of distinguishing between wholesome and injurious ideas?

In ethics we ask which ideas are wholesome and which injurious, and the answer in brief is that the truth is wholesome and untruth injurious. There is no need here of entering into details, for the question has been discussed repeatedly, and we shall emphasise the fact only that truth does not mean mere correctness of knowledge but also and mainly truthfulness of heart.

Ethics would be futile if man's action did not depend upon his beliefs and habits. Since his beliefs and habits are the main determinant factors of his fate for his own personal good as well as that of the whole race, ethics is as necessary for human conduct in general as mechanics is indispensable for mechanical engineering. Indeed, ethics belongs to the necessities of life, it is the bread of life, and a wrong ethics is not less injurious than poison that is used for food.

Mr. Llano declares that "the ethical ought is erected on an assumption of some kind,—on an *if*." Ethics has sense only for him who desires to attain the aim and end of ethical aspirations, not for him who has other ends, or no end at all.

This same objection was made to ethics as a science years ago from another standpoint. Mr. Salter in defence of intuitionist ethics granted that a scientific inquiry into facts may teach morality to him who longs for truth and for a life of truth, "but," says he, "the fact is that we may desire other things."

My answer to Mr. Llano is the same as it was to Mr. Salter. "The ultimate question of ethics is not, what *we desire* but what *is desired of us*."

When we want to have truth, we must drop our personal likes

and dislikes. Exact science eliminates the subjective and aims at a purely objective statement of facts. He who wants to think correctly must leave aside the *I*'s and the *me*'s. It is no exaggeration to say that the intrusion of self is always the main source of error.

While it is wise to drop all *I*'s and *me*'s, we grant that the world is full of them, and we must take their presence into consideration. And who can deny that the thwarted endeavors of self-willed men teach us a most impressive lesson?

The man who desires pleasures and does not stop to think what is desired of him, may have, for a time at least, pleasures; but then he must take all the consequences of his actions. The man who delights in crime may actually commit crime, but the evils that result from crime will come not only upon those against whom he trespasses, but finally upon himself also. A truly scientific ethics knows of no assumptions; it gives information as to the consequences of deeds; and the sufferings of life, including the final dissolution of ourselves in death, set us to thinking how we can escape evil. Here the answers may be many, but there is one only which I deem to be right, it is the answer of Buddha and of Christ, both being practically the same, and these injunctions are substantially the same that are taught by the ethics of science. According to Buddha it is the eightfold noble path of righteousness that leads to salvation, implying an extermination of all selfishness, hatred, and passion, which are the three roots of all evil. And Christ says:

"A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another" (John, 13, 34), and, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you" (Matth., 5, 44, and Luke, 6, 35).

There is a time in the cosmic evolution when consciousness originates; and there is again a time when the idea of self in its full contrast to the not-self dawns upon consciousness. But then again comes a time when the relation of the self to the whole begins to be understood. That is the origin of ethics, and that is the meaning when people become anxious about themselves, about their soul, about their fate and the destiny of their lifework after death. Then such questions are asked, What shall I do to enter life eternal? These aspirations are a transition which lead from the question, "What do I desire?" to the other question, "What is desired of me?" There is no assumption whatever in scientific ethics. He who does not ask the question, "What is desired of me?" will remain stagnant at a certain phase of his evolution and will reap the consequences of his thoughtlessness. He is comparable to the anthropoid who does not want to become man. He will

either remain what he is, if that be possible, or share the fate of the unprogressive anthropoid: his name will be blotted out from the book of life.

There is this peculiarity about ethics, that there are many roads leading to it. The man who longs for happiness will find that there is no absolute happiness possible, and the best thing he can do is to drop altogether his hankering after pleasures and lead a moral life. On this basis a hedonistic ethics is possible. A man who is egotistic and ambitious will find that there is no success in life possible except he surrender his vanity. And on this basis an ethics of egotism can be erected. All these different methods, insufficient though they may be, lead practically to the same conclusion, pointing beyond the self of man and teaching him to seek a purpose higher than his limited life and individuality.

The new solution of the problem of self (which in detail has been explained elsewhere) brings about a radical change of attitude, for upon the proper solution of the psychological problem all other problems of philosophy, religion, and ethics depend. The new conception of self destroys the illusion of the limitedness and narrowness of self as held by the psychologists of the old school, and shows us the human soul as the divine incarnation of the eternal prototype of rationality and moral endeavor, revealing both its whence in the past and its whither in the future.

The self in the old sense is destroyed and with it the vanity of all selfishness. But there is a new self which takes the place of the old limited self; and the new self is infinite in its potentiality, for the new self identifies itself with the eternal conditions of existence. Our eyes are opened, and we discern those subtle influences which build up the structure of our soul and are as invisible to the uninitiated as for instance the geometrical proportions of the barn or the meadow are nonentities to the sheep.

If it is true, as Master Eckhart says, that man is what he loveth, the new self is truth incarnate, for it loveth truth above everything, and consists in the endeavor of living out the truth, realising it more and more in comprehension as well as in practical application. The old Adam must go, and the new Adam is a higher man, no longer a particular ego but divinity incarnate, no longer an isolated individual but the universal realised, the ideal that has become flesh.

The main ideas underlying the ethics of Christianity are true, but the commonly accepted church-dogmas and their interpretations are wrong. As useful inventions generally precede scientific

comprehension, so the precepts of practical morality were discovered long before our sages could explain the psychological basis of these apparent paradoxes. The Religion of Science is needed because science is sufficiently advanced to-day to catch up with religion. Religion (practically applied religion, as taught by Lao-Tsze, the Buddha, the Prophets, and Christ) was in advance of science by more than two millenniums, and it is the science of religion or theology that is unprogressive. Not that theology is wrong in principle, but it is slow in accomplishing its task. Not that we must have less theology or science in religion, but more. Not that we must abolish science in religion, but we must perfect it. For science (i. e., genuine science, not the one-sided productions of the average sciolist) is the comforter that illumines the world and brings about the fulfilment, the *πληρωσις*, so dearly longed for by St. John and the early Christians.

* * *

Mr. Llano discovers the source of what he is pleased to call the inconsistencies of Developmental Ethics in "the law of the conflict between feeling and judgment." He says:

"The nature of this law will be readily seen by an illustration. A nervous woman may take the five cartridges out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them and hold them in her hand; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will scream with fright, and not improbably faint away. Her judgment, it is evident, tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any harm should come to her from the unloaded weapon; but her deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity or by association, or both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct judgment."

Mr. Llano forgets that sentiments are very important factors in the makeup of man's soul. To disregard our feelings for the sake of some logical argument would be as wrong as to be swayed by feelings alone without subjecting them to a careful analysis and revision. Man's sentiments are the sediment of an immeasurably long chain of experiences, partly inherited, partly personal, and are of too great importance to be neglected or to be regarded as utterly without foundation. Our sentiments are sometimes more reliable than our logical deductions in which we are too apt to omit an important factor. Thus, for instance, in the illustration which Mr. Llano proposes, we should decidedly object to a behavior such as he mentions, and far from blaming the woman who screams when an unloaded revolver is pointed at her, we blame the man who handles the revolver carelessly. Almost all the accidents that happen are due to toying with weapons which were supposed not

to be loaded. I know of a case in which two brothers, who have great experience with guns, had unloaded a revolver the construction of which they investigated, and one pointed it at the other, when all of a sudden the revolver went off, and the ball went right through the head of the other boy, entering near the nose and coming out near the ear. The young man, an officer of the militia, assured me that he could conscientiously declare on oath that to his knowledge there could not have been a shot in the revolver. He added, "It was a lesson that I shall never forget." Fortunately, the bullet did not kill his brother, and after several weeks of suffering he recovered without any serious injury, leaving only a small mark on his face. But not all cases end so happily, and it is advisable for every one to mind sentiments, because they sometimes represent the influence of factors overlooked in so-called scientific expositions which are seemingly faultless, and, so far as pure logic is concerned, unquestionably correct.

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And now in conclusion I may be allowed to discuss briefly a point not mentioned by Mr. Llano, which, however, is closely connected with the subject.

We understand that ethics as a science is the product of a continuous evolution; we know that the religious leaders in the world have found the right solution instinctively. As a genius makes an important invention, or as a poet finds by inspiration the word that thrills thousands of hearts, so the moral teachers of mankind taught lessons of highest morality at a time when their truth was so far from being scientifically comprehensible that it appeared paradoxical—naturally so, for it is paradoxical from the old standpoint.

The great unknown inventor of the wheel was not familiar with the science of applied mechanics as it is developed in our time, but he is one of those that laid the basis of it, and his invention is still the corner-stone in that grand edifice. The same is true in ethics of him who first proclaimed the law of love and charity. The souls of these men are with us to-day, constituting the kingdom that is within us. We are the continuance of aspirations that began long before we were born.

Considering the close connexion of the present with the past, we prefer reform to rescission and deem a purification of the traditional religious conceptions better than abandoning them. It is true that the words God, soul, immortality, and religion have become new; they have become more definite, more exact and less mythological, but that is exactly what must be expected. History

is a change and a growth. He that sat upon the throne said: ". . . . But behold, I make all things new!"

I know that at present both the conservatives and the liberals look with suspicion upon this method of pouring new wine into old bottles, but the time will come when they will understand it. The situation may be briefly explained by a simile. There were in former times people who believed in mathematics as if it consisted of lines and circles and other figures that were living in heaven and came down from time to time upon earth in a miraculous way for the sake of helping poor mortal man, calculating distances, erecting buildings, constructing bridges, tunnelling mountains, and other feats of engineering. But a schism arose: there were men who declared that mathematics did not exist at all and that every belief in mathematics was a superstition. There was one among them who said that mathematical truths (if they deserve the name at all), so far from being true, are actually wrong; they are "purely mental" and refer to "purely imaginary objects." He claimed "there exist no points without magnitudes; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." Believing that "the points, lines, circles, and squares" which the mathematician "has in his mind are simple copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience," he claimed that the science of mathematics consists of "assumptions" which are not only faulty but even "inconceivable." This view was actually defended by Mr. John Stuart Mill,¹ and it characterises most drastically and consistently the attitude of all negativism, drawing the ultimate conclusions of the main tenets of the nominalistic philosophy.

Such is also the contrast between the parties of the conservatives and freethinkers. The conservatives believe that God is a being; some freethinkers declare that God does not exist at all. There is on the one hand a literal belief in a traditional mythology, and on the other hand a flat denial of the truths of religion. Now I take the liberty to differ from Mr. John Stuart Mill. I believe in mathematics, and I believe that the definitions of and theorems concerning mathematical lines designate truths which are not only real but super-real. I do not believe that they are beings of any kind who lead a life of bliss somewhere in heaven; they are not corporeal, nor do they possess astral bodies; still less can they be said to be metaphysical entities. Nevertheless they are not non-existent, for they are the eternal relations that apply to any possi-

¹ See John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, 8th edition, Chapter V., pp. 168, et seq.

ble world ; they are absolute truths whose being is indestructible and whose existence is the law that conditions the formation of every particular existence.

The same is true of God. The believer in the letter of his mythology looks upon the views editorially upheld in *The Open Court*, as atheistic ; and the freethinker criticises them for making compromises with superstition. Nevertheless, we are serious in saying that the average atheist is wrong in flatly denying the existence of God, while the old-fashioned believer is a pagan—that is to say, a man who believes in the letter of a myth and has no idea of its significance ; he surrenders the substance for the vessel in which it is contained ; he loses the reality by holding on to its shadow.

This position is a reconciliation of two contrasts, but it is not a compromise. It gives to science what belongs to science, and to ethics what belongs to ethics. By making ethics a science applied to practical life, it shows us the truth of the old religious ideals in a new light ; it renders it possible for us to grasp with scientific comprehension what our fathers were feeling after, groping in the dark for. And this is what we call The Religion of Science.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ELISABET NEY.

We publish in this number, as our frontispiece, a photogravure of Schopenhauer's bust made by Elisabet Ney, a disciple of Rauch, and one of our most prominent American artists, who, before she came to the United States, acquired an enviable European fame. She has modelled from life the busts of many famous men of science, among whom were Humboldt, Jacob Grimm, and Liebig; of statesmen and heroes, among them Bismarck and Garibaldi; of artists, among these Kaulbach and Joachim; of kings, among these George of Hanover, and a statue of Ludwig II. of Bavaria, now at the celebrated castle of Linderhoff, etc., etc. While she lived at Frankfort in 1859, Schopenhauer had not yet attained to the fame of his later years, but Elisabet Ney was interested in the great prophet of pessimism. She was well acquainted with his works, and foresaw the influence which the grumbling misanthrope would wield over all generations to come. She knew very well that he was a woman hater who thought that women could never accomplish anything either in science or in the arts. But this only made her find it the more attractive and humorous to converse with him and prove to him what women could do. Schopenhauer was very much impressed with the young sculptress, and confessed to friends of his, as seen in many of his printed letters, that she was an exception to the rule. While he was sitting to have his bust taken, he was as a rule animated and full of interesting gossip, mostly of a philosophical nature. In a copy of his works presented to Elisabet Ney he wrote: "To my most talented and amiable young friend, Miss Elisabet Ney, I donate this copy of a profound and serious work." The signature which he attached to these words has been photographically reproduced, and appears under the frontispiece to this number of *The Open Court*. The great pessimist was more vain than might be suspected in such an old grumbler, and he did not care to appear before posterity with a sullen countenance. Once when a photographer took his picture, it seemed to him a failure on account of its grim expression. This might have been very appropriate for a man who proclaimed the philosophy of the miserableness of all life, but he objected to going down to posterity in that shape. He at once called for a bottle of wine and drank it all before having his picture taken a second time. Elisabet Ney is still in possession of both these photographs, which are in the shape of daguerreotypes. They have faded and are on the verge of disappearing, but Mr. Copelin, and the Franklin Engraving Company of Chicago, have, by enlarging and retouching them, succeeded in restoring the original forms, from which they have been reduced again to their original size. They appear on page 261.

The two other pictures on page 261 are taken from photographs in the possession of Dr. Lindorme, of Chicago.

Schopenhauer writes to Assessor von Doss, Munich, March 1, 1860:

"The sculptress, Elisabet Ney, a grand-niece of Marshal Ney, arrived here from Berlin during October, in order to make my bust. She is twenty-four years old, very beautiful, and indescribably amiable. She works by herself in a room that belongs to my present residence, which is much larger and prettier than the old one. Almost every day for several weeks she had her dinner ordered from a restaurant which is situated in my house, and joined me in the afternoon at my coffee when I returned home. Several times she has gone with me on a walk along the Main. We harmonise wonderfully. My bust has been exhibited for fourteen days, and everybody thinks that it is extremely like me and beautifully chiselled. It is intended to be taken to Berlin, where copies of it are to be made and sold. At Christmas Miss Ney intended to be in Berlin, whither she goes *via* Hanover, where she is engaged to make the king's bust in marble. My bust has been ordered sent to her, and I have heard nothing of it since. She has been seen in Münster, where her father lives. The bust will probably be heard of."

Schopenhauer frequently mentions Elisabet Ney's name in his correspondence, and, in a letter to Dr. Ernst Otto Lindner, of Berlin, dated November 21, 1859, he says:

"Are you acquainted with the artist Miss Ney? If not, you have lost much. I did not believe that such an amiable girl could exist."

Elisabet Ney is now living in Austin, Texas, where she has a beautiful studio at Hyde Park. She is president of the Texas Art Academy, and has been repeatedly engaged by the State of Texas to model busts and statues of Texas governors.

PROF. EDWARD DRINKER COPE.—DIED APRIL 12, 1897.

It is with profound regret that we record the death of Prof. E. D. Cope of Philadelphia. In him we not only mourn with the world at large the loss of an accomplished scientist from whom great and valuable achievements were yet expected, but we also experience the personal bereavement of a valued contributor who has from the first greatly aided in the promotion of the work of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*. Prof. Edward Drinker Cope was born in Philadelphia, July 28, 1840, and received his education at the University of Pennsylvania, the Smithsonian Institute, and in Europe. He held the chair of Natural Sciences at Haverford College from 1864-1867, and subsequently became paleontologist to the United States Geological Survey. He was for many years Professor of Zoölogy and Comparative Anatomy in the University of Pennsylvania, a post which he occupied with signal success to the day of his death. Professor Cope was an indefatigable worker; he was the editor-in-chief of the *American Naturalist*, to which he constantly contributed, and a prolific writer in the other scientific journals. His chief work was in the paleontology of the United States, with which his name as an organiser and original investigator is indissolubly associated. Besides his systematic treatises, he is the author of not less than three hundred and fifty memoirs and scientific papers on zoölogy, anatomy, and paleontology. At the time of his death he was President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Professor Cope's contributions to *The Open Court* began early and were extremely varied, showing him to be a man who was interested not only in the special problems of science, but in their application to the graver questions of philosophy and life. His article on "Evolution and Idealism" in Volume I. of *The Open Court*, his later articles on "What is Mind," and on "Ethical Evolution," his discussions of vexed social questions, such as marriage and divorce, the negro-question, strikes, etc., and the instance which is perhaps freshest in the minds of recent readers, his discussion of the Monroe Doctrine during the late Venezuelan troubles, prove his breadth of interest. He was determined in his convictions and bold and impulsive in their expression, qualities which gave vigor and cogency to his expositions and which rarely failed to involve him in controversies which displayed to the best his polemical abilities. His articles in *The Monist* as well as his book on *The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*, which we recently published, show, for a special scientist, unusual philosophical endowment and are of permanent value. The work on *Organic Evolution* is an extremely concise yet lucid and complete exposition of the theory of development as drawn from the evidence of paleontology and based on the Lamarckian factors, and is designed to supply the *lacuna* which the failure to consider the *causes* of variations had left in the theories of Darwin and Weismann. Professor Cope has gathered in this book the results of all his own researches and those of the American Neo-Lamarckian school generally on the subject of evolution, and has raised points which will stimulate not only evolutionists but psychologists and philosophers for some time to come. His work is on a level with that of the foremost European inquirers, and his name is a brilliant refutation of the idea which is quite current in some circles that America cannot produce scientists of the first rank.

COUNT HOENBROECHT.

In a recently published pamphlet Count Hoenbroecht states his reasons for severing his connexion with the Jesuit order, in whose service he had been for sixteen years, defending its position and policy and wielding a pen that was not without great influence within the circles for which he wrote.

Count Hoenbroecht's statements have excited a great sensation in Germany, and sixteen or more editions of the pamphlet were quickly exhausted. Yet the person who expects to find in it revelations of slander that would throw discredit on the order or support popular prejudices of a lower kind, will be greatly disappointed. In fact, the self-vindications of Count Hoenbroecht, which reveal him to be a man of upright character and earnest Christian endeavor, are in some respects a vindication of the Jesuit order.

Count Hoenbroecht exhibits in his very complaints, which are mainly directed against the suppression of personality, a peculiar respect for the moral earnestness of the order which we cannot help thinking is in many respects nothing but the principle of Catholic Christianity carried to its extreme. He still stands upon the ground of his Roman Catholic faith. He regards confession, in all the rigor in which it is maintained by strict Catholics, as a divine institution, but he resents the slavery to which the Jesuitic mode of confession reduces its members, without at the same time imposing upon the father-confessor the restrictions of inviolable privacy which the Church imposes upon him. At the same time his liberty-loving mind rebels against the straitjacket of Jesuitic education, which, far from fos-

tering an independent spirit, impresses upon every one of its members the peculiar type of Ignatius Loyola's piety, showing an unconcealed contempt for other forms of religious devotion, such as find expression in other Roman Catholic orders. According to the side-lights which incidentally his expressions throw upon the order, the main tendency of Jesuitic institutions is to prevent by well-calculated methods that which American institutions wish to favor most—character-building and self-reliance.

We believe that the ethical maxims of the order, especially of its liberty-destroying tendency, are radically wrong, but at the same time we cannot join in the denunciations which are so commonly held as to be accepted by many as gospel truth. The movement which was inaugurated by Ignatius Loyola may be briefly characterised as a counter-reformation. Its tendency is, as a matter of principle, directed against the spirit of independence that pervaded the Reformation and found expression in the civilisation of the Protestant nations, especially Germany, England, and North America. But while Ignatius Loyola's counter-reformation sets itself against all free development of character that would venture outside or beyond the narrow lines prescribed by Roman Catholic Christianity, it is pure in its motive, honest in its aim, ascetically rigid in its ethics. In a word, the Jesuit system is wrong, but it is not dishonest.

AN EVENING PRAYER.

We received a poem from one of our readers entitled "An Evening Prayer" which is accompanied by a letter expressing the sentiment through which it originated. Our correspondent (who is otherwise unknown to us) writes:

"All the world is looking for a short creed that shall yet contain all essentials and I think that "Trust in Truth" is the best, perhaps the only, formula to satisfy the demand.

"The harmony between Science and Religion will become apparent to the world through the lives and teachings of those who have first reconciled scientific thinking with religious feeling in their own personal experience, and I rejoice as the number of such increases.

"But I also sympathise with those who feel the inevitable pangs of transition from one mode of religious thought to another, for I have suffered them all.

"There are many who doubt that the Religion of Science can be truly a religion at all, and afford consolation in trial; I can testify that it not only satisfies my reason but it has given me—in the words of a Christian hymn—'peace I never knew before.'

"I enclose some lines which record a recent experience of the comfort derived from trusting in truth.

"I send them, not as deserving your attention for poetic merit, but as a tribute to the devotional side of the Religion of Science.

"I hardly suppose you would care to publish them, still you are at liberty to do so if you think they might be of any help to others."

The enclosed evening prayer reads as follows:

"Thou Highest Good confessed,
I hail thee, blessed Truth!
The while my heart oppressed
Doth healing crave and ruth,

"Oh! may I clearly see,
As day by day I strive,
What laws must honored be,
Would I at joy arrive.

"Why need I sadly miss
The blessings close at hand,
Unsharing others' bliss,
Exiled in native land?

"*Three guides*, already mine,
I'll trust to lead me on
Where sun of peace doth shine,
A cloudless benison.

"And one is Faith—that trust
In Nature's tireless power,
That can in darkness thrust
A seed—then wait its flower.

"And next there doth abide
Sweet Hope—of Life the twin.
It cannot be denied;
It dwells the heart within.

"The trio is complete
With Love—the force divine
That melts our dross with heat,
Till hearts like gold are fine.

"O good and loyal guides!
My wayward footsteps turn.
Where'er the path divides,
Let me the right discern.

"Behold! my prayer hath wings
To lift my soul from pain.
Self-answering, joy it brings.
None worship Truth in vain."

EMILIE H. DARROW.

ANIMAL SYMBOLISM IN ECCLESIASTICAL ARCHITECTURE. By *E. P. Evans*. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1896. Pages, xii, 315. Price, \$2.00.

Students of the architecture of the Middle Ages are often puzzled to know the meaning of the sculptural figures which are found in such profusion in almost all the ecclesiastical structures of that period. The angels which hover about the altar, the saints peering out from the corners, the Apostles ranged about the arched doorway, the figure of the crucified Christ held aloft,—all these are comprehensible. But what shall be said of the "Execution of the Cat" which is pictured on a column of the cathedral of Tarragona, Spain, or of the "Burial of the Fox" as delineated in the choir of the Strassburg Minster, or of the "Lay of Aristotle" depicted in the church of Saint-Jean in Lyons?

The present volume, entitled *Animal Symbolism in Ecclesiastical Architecture*, is an attempt to explain some of these apparent absurdities. Indeed, its scope is much larger, for it extends to the work of the missal painter and even to that of the theologian. It is the work of an American long resident in Europe, where he

has had the best of opportunities for studying the subject. As a contribution to American scholarship it will take high rank; and for most Americans it will be an introduction to a new field of study and thought. Heretofore knowledge of this subject must be sought in many a ponderous tome difficult to find and even more difficult to understand. This handsome volume, amply illustrated, will save much wearisome research, and will add materially to the interest already felt in the sculptural figures adorning the cathedrals.

The key to the whole matter lies in the fact that, according to the patristic conception, the visible world was the image or symbol of the invisible world. This applied especially to the animal creation. In the words of Origen, "As God made man in His own image and after His own likeness, so He created the lower animals after the likeness of heavenly prototypes." It is natural, therefore, to find ecclesiastical structures adorned with the figures of those animals to which some spiritual significance was attached. The oldest, most systematic, and most complete treatise on the spiritual significance of the animal and vegetable world is the *Physiologus*. This was probably the work of an Alexandrian Greek, and embodies much of the priestly lore of ancient Egypt. Its popularity led to its translation into many tongues, and there is evidence of the existence of versions of it in Latin, Ethiopic, Arabic, Armenian, Syriac, Icelandic, German, Saxon, Spanish, and Provençal. "Perhaps no book, except the Bible," says Professor Evans, "has ever been so widely diffused among so many peoples and for so many centuries as the *Physiologus*." It served as a convenient manual of instruction in zoölogy and botany, but in the hands of Christian teachers it became merely a treatise on theology interspersed with pious exhortation. At an early period in the history of the Church, the book fell into disfavor and was condemned as heretical; but it was not long until it found a powerful patron in Gregory the Great, who used it freely in expounding the Scriptures. From the seventh century to the twelfth it was highly esteemed as an orthodox compendium of natural history, and it was during this period that most of the translations of it were made. The invention of printing diffused it even more widely, and its translation into the vulgar tongues embodied it in the general literature of Christendom, where it has become the source of many quaint and striking, though often forced, figures of speech. Its scientific value as well as the pious use to which it was put by the theologians are well illustrated by the account which it gives of the lion. "First, when he perceives that the hunters are pursuing him, he erases his foot-prints with his tail, so that he cannot be traced to his lair. In like manner, our Saviour, the lion of the tribe of Judah, concealed all traces of His Godhead, when he descended to the earth and entered into the womb of the Virgin Mary. Secondly, the lion always sleeps with his eyes open; so our Lord slept with His body on the Cross, but awoke at the right hand of His Father. Thirdly, the lioness brings forth her whelps dead and watches over them until, after three days, the lion comes and howls over them and vivifies them by his breath; so the Almighty Father recalled to life His only begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who on the third day was thus raised from the dead, and will likewise raise us all up to eternal life."

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries animal symbolism was carried to excess, and the opposition of many ecclesiastics was aroused. About the year 1125 St. Bernard of Clairvaux wrote a letter to William, Abbot of St. Thierry, sharply censuring the practice. "What business," he says, "have those ridiculous monstrosities, those creatures of wonderfully deformed beauty and beautiful deformity before the eyes of studious friars in the courts of cloisters? . . . O God! if one is not

ashamed of these puerilities, why does not one at least spare the expense?" His protest was unavailing. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the transfer of building operations from the hands of the monks to secular companies of masons led to the introduction of a new element. Beast-symbolism was replaced by beast-satire, and as the spirit which resulted in the Reformation grew more aggressive, this satirical tendency increased. A good example of this sort of ornamentation is found in a wood-carving in Ely Cathedral which represents a fox arrayed in a bishop's vestments, preaching to an audience of geese from the text, "God is my witness how I long for you all in my bowels." In the next scene he exemplifies his text by throwing off his holy vestments and hurrying away with a goose. The obscenity of many of these delineations was the natural and inevitable result of the obscenity of the subjects which they satirised.

The final chapter of this work, entitled *Whimseys of Ecclesiology and Symbology*, throws much light upon mediæval ideas and modes of thought. At the same time the extracts from the paper on *Vestiges of the Blessed Trinity in the Material Creation*, published by the Rev. John S. Vaughn in the *Dublin Review* for January, 1893, suggest that we are not yet entirely out of the woods. When it is sought to maintain the truth of a dogma, because every object has three dimensions; because every plant consists of seed, stalk, and flower; because life is "vegetative, sensitive, and rational;" because matter is solid, fluid, and gaseous, and time is past, present, and future:—when all this is seriously attempted by a learned ecclesiastic, it may be questioned whether some of our thinking is not as mediæval as that which lay back of Tertullian's famous criterion, *Credo quia absurdum*.

The value of this volume is much enhanced by the illustrations which accompany the text, and by the appended bibliography which will serve as a guide for those who wish to pursue the subject further.

CARL EVANS BOYD.

HEGEL AS EDUCATOR. By *Frederic Ludlow Luqueer, Ph. D.* Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education. New York: Macmillan & Co. May, 1896. Pages, 185. Price, \$1.00.

The Hegelian cult is steadily on the increase in this and other countries proportionately to its wane in Germany. The fascination which circles about Hegel's indefinite and dazzling profundity, and the wideness of interpretation which may be placed upon his thoughts, are destined to insure his popularity and power even more than the nucleus of truth which resides in his works. In one of the most eloquent passages of the present work, we have a brilliant testimony of the spell which he has cast:

"It needs but little faith to believe that, in the parts [of his thought] not as yet understood, riches are hidden which will repay search. The parts comprehended are but messengers telling of the sleeping princess that lies within, waiting for the kiss of him who loves and dares aright. The strange words and broken brain passages are but the thorny hedge and rough entrance-ways to the beauty, which here as elsewhere answers but to the brave."

And from the experience of one of the students closest to Hegel, the young Russian Baron Boris d'Yxkull, we joyfully learn that Hegel was as difficult to understand when alive as he is now when dead. The Baron writes:

"After the Professor's lecture, I went to the nearest book store, bought all the works of Hegel that had been printed, and in the evening settled myself comfortably in my sofa-corner to read them. But the more I read, and the more attention I tried to fasten on the reading, the less I understood of it; so that after

"struggling for two hours with a proposition without nearing its comprehension, I laid aside the book. But out of curiosity I kept on attending the lectures. I must confess, however, that I did not understand my own notes, and that I was lacking in needed prefatory knowledge for this science."

Having acquired this prefatory knowledge the Baron mastered the great philosopher, and never afterwards travelled without a copy of his *Logic* in his pocket.

And again, we have the following vivid description of Hegel's oral delivery from the pen of Hotho:

"He began haltingly, struggled on, began once more, paused, spoke, reflected—the fitting word seemed ever lacking, but in a moment was given unerringly; it seemed too common, but was inimitably adequate. . . . Now one had seized the clear meaning of a proposition, and hoped for a further step—in vain. The thought, instead of proceeding, circled with similar wording about the same point. But if the attention strayed for a moment and was then duteously turned back, it was punished by seeing that it had lost the connexion. For imperceptibly almost, proceeding by apparently insignificant steps, the full thought had been shown to be limited, to be one-sided; its differences had been developed into contradictions, the victorious solution of which was seen only in the final reunement [reconciliation on nobler terms] of what before had been opposed. And so, ever carefully taking up the preceding, in order to unfold its implicate antitheses and then to blend them in richer harmony, the wonderful thought-stream pressed and fought its way along, now dividing, now uniting, hesitating sometimes, then leaping on, and always advancing. But he who could follow with complete understanding, without swerving right or left, felt himself thrilled with adventurous excitement. To what depths were his thoughts taken—ever at the point of losing all that had been won, the toil all in vain, the utmost might of the intellect forced to halt. But in just these depths that powerful spirit moved and worked with calm confidence. Then only did the voice raise itself, the eye sent a gleam over what had been gathered together, and glowed with the still fire of assurance, while with never-lacking words he touched all the heights and depths of the soul. His speech in these moments was so clear and full, so simply truthful, that every one who could grasp it felt as if he himself had been discovering the thought it unfolded."

Throughout the whole of the book of Luqueer, we obtain such delightful glimpses into Hegel's life. The first part of the work is in fact a biography, quite sufficient for the general reader's purpose, although giving an eulogistic as distinguished from a critical, sketch of Hegel's career, and mainly seeking to portray the interests of his life not identified with his philosophy. As its title indicates, it studies Hegel as a student and teacher. The second part contains the thoughts of Hegel on Education systematically arranged. This part is mainly a translation from Thaulow.

μκκκ.

LA TEORIA SOCIOLOGICA DEI PARTITI POLITICI. Reprinted from the *Rassegna di Scienza Sociali e Politici*. By Lorenzo Ratto. Florence, 1893. Pages, 31.

RAPPORTO TRA I PARTITI POLITICI E LA RAPPRESENTANZA. Reprinted from *Antologia Giuridica*. By Lorenzo Ratto. Catania, 1894. Pages, 24.

LA RESPONSABILITÀ DEI PADRONI PER GLI INFORTUNI DEL LAVORO. Reprinted from *Legge*, 1896, Vol. II., p. 603. By Lorenzo Ratto. Rome. Pages, 30.

In these pamphlets we have an illustration of what is going on over the whole field of the social sciences, namely, the examination of old questions from the so-

biological point of view. Much light has thus been shed upon a great variety of subjects, among which are those usually treated under political science and constitutional law. Such a subject is that of political parties, their origin, development, function, etc., and its sociological discussion by the eminent Italian, Dr. Ratto, affords a successful example of this method of treatment.

According to Dr. Ratto neither political science nor constitutional law is able to give us a true theory of the nature, genesis and functions of political parties. This is a task, he thinks, which belongs essentially to sociology (p. 3). He proceeds, therefore, to develop and establish a sociological theory which may be briefly indicated as follows: Modern parties are quite different from parties in ancient times. Then there was a struggle for equality, but now, the typical constitutional state being based upon juridico-political equality, the struggle is for the determination of the social will. Then the conflict was between superior and inferior classes, now it is between conservatives and progressionists, between order and progress, between *natura fatta* and *natura si fa*. Again, parties are not a social manifestation of the struggle which is going on in all the fields of individual activity; they are a sociological phenomenon. The theory of Gumplowicz and others that the struggle for power is the fundamental law of social life is, therefore, denied. The social group has its own laws which neutralise the action of biological laws to which the individuals were originally subject (p. 11). Finally, and as a result of the preceding, we have the proposition that government ought never to be in the hands of political parties (p. 8). They represent public sentiment only in part. They are to assist in the determination of the social will; its execution should be left to an independent authority above them.

Having expounded his theory of political parties, Dr. Ratto considers their relation to representation, or, rather, the relation of representation to government on the one hand and to parties on the other. The representative, he maintains, is neither the agent of a single party nor a counsellor of the government, but a person chosen to represent public opinion and to assist in synthetising its various currents into practical programmes. He represents not a party, but the nation. The legislative body, therefore, is not the field on which should be fought out the battles of the parties, but the council chamber in which the ideas contended for by the various parties outside should be combined into the best possible scheme of action. As to the relation of representation to the government, it has already been indicated. Government, which should never be actuated by party spirit, should receive from the hands of the representatives the programmes which it is to carry out for the well-being of all.

It is obvious that this theory of political parties and their relation to representation is not fully illustrated in any modern state. Germany, Dr. Ratto thinks, approaches most nearly the sociological ideal (second pamphlet, p. 23). Here there is a strong government distinct from representation, a cabinet which does not attempt to realise the desires of a single party, but which is supported by all those who are favorable to its programme. This condition of things, it is maintained (p. 24), better than any other existing example, corresponds to the sociocratic ideal, because the government, being above parties, is transformed in accordance with the exigencies of the state, and is spontaneously inclined to regard all the movements of public opinion and all the aspirations of the country.

It is to be feared that this selected illustration of Dr. Ratto's theory will militate against its acceptance. Many are indisposed to look to Germany for ideals in regard to government, and this is especially true in America. We in this country

are firmly convinced that we are at least on the right track, and we cannot agree with Dr. Ratto that the kingdom is the most excellent form of government in the constitutional state (p. 14). Although we must admit that there is a measure of truth in his characterisation of American government as personal and very corrupt, and of our citizens as animated solely by the mercantile spirit, it does not follow that our condition would be bettered by the rule of a sovereign whose programmes would more likely be drawn from his own consciousness than accepted from the hands of the legislative body. We cannot see that more is to be hoped for from government by a wilful emperor than by a president who takes his cue from the party representing the majority.

Although we cannot agree with some of his conclusions, we take pleasure in acknowledging the ability and learning with which Dr. Ratto has carried on his investigation. It would be difficult to find in any language a better short treatment of the subject considered.

In the third pamphlet mentioned above Dr. Ratto considers the question whether an action for damages against an employer engaged in trade has a commercial character, and also the question whether the obligation of compensation for damages due to misfortunes are contractual or legal. In discussing these important questions he brings to bear an apparently wide knowledge of Italian jurisprudence, but his conclusions are of local rather than general interest.

I. W. HOWERTH.

A NOTE ON THE ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY OF ASIA. Compiled from Valmiki-Ramayana. With Map and Index. By *Nobin Chandra Das*, M. A. Price, 1 rupee. Buddhist Text Society of India. 1896. Pages, 68.

Sir Nobin Chandra Das, of Chittagong, Bengal, a prominent Sanskrit scholar, and brother of Sarat Chandra Das, of Darjeeling, is the only traveller who has been in the interior of Tibet. Many Europeans and Hindoos have been in little Tibet, which is the Western Tibet, and not Tibet proper, but none except Sarat Chandra Das was admitted to the inaccessible Eastern Tibet, which is the real Tibet, the country of Lamanistic Buddhism.

The Tibetans object to the intrusion of any foreign influence, and are more secluded than the Chinese ever have been, but no objection was raised against Mr. Das because he is a Buddhist and his fame as a pandit has spread over Tibet.

The present pamphlet and map are an important contribution to the literature of the Ramayana, the ancient epic of the Aryan Hindus. Mr. Das has located all the geographical sites, and thus renders it possible for us to have a better comprehension of Rama's wanderings in search of his faithful wife, Sita, who has been captured by the island king Ravana.

We need not call attention to the importance of the Ramayana, which to the Hindu, even to-day, is scarcely less than the Iliad and the Odyssey were to the Greek, or the Nibelungen saga and Gudrun to the Teutons. Says Mr. Das: "The names of Rama and his faithful Sita are still bywords for the model king and the model wife, the two most important factors in the social and domestic life of a nation throughout the length and breadth of this country." (Preface, vii.)

Mr. Das accepts (against Professor Weber¹) Signor Gorresio's opinion that the Ramayana is based upon historical facts; and he may be right, for there are reasons to believe that both the Greek and Teutonic sagas, too, are based upon real events which once took place in prehistoric times. But the more remarkable are

¹ See Weber, *Ueber das Ramayanam*. 1870.

the similarities among the ancient legends of the three nations. Sita, (Like Gudrun) is abducted, and Rama (like Herasig) pursues the robber and regains his faithful wife. In his search Rama (like Odysseus) wanders about and visits almost all the places of the earth known to the poet. Like Helena, Sita is well treated by her abductor while Rama wages war for her recovery. The allies of Rama are enumerated as minutely in the Ramayana as the allies of Menelaus in Homer; and there are several other noteworthy similarities which caused Professor Weber to think that Valmiki, the author of the best version of the Ramayana, must have been familiar with the epics of Homer—a view which is not very probable. The problem of these coincidences has not as yet found its solution, but we believe that the epics of all the nations are a mixture of myth and history. There are events which actually happen again and again. An Indian chief sent the same reply to the President of the United States that Aristovus sent to Cæsar. Both declared, "If I want something of you, I will go to you, but as you want something of me, you may please come to me!" Must we conclude that the American Indian had read Cæsar? In an early stage of civilisation the abduction of wives was probably an event that happened in the north, in Greece and in India, and the search for a lost wife was probably compared to the wanderings of the sun over the whole earth by more than one poet.

But we cannot discuss the subject in a book review and conclude our remarks by mentioning that Nobin Chandra Das endeavors to explain the mythological elements of the story, the *vânar* or monkey chiefs, "the dwellers of the forest," who assist Rama in his warfare as the aboriginal non-Aryan tribes, whom the Aryans call *vâ-nara* (*vâ*-like; and *nara*-man), i. e., those creatures who are only similar to, but not of, the kind and race of the real men or Aryans.

F. C.

Mr. H. Dharmapâla, the Buddhist monk now traveling and lecturing in America, writes us from Cambridge that the anniversary of the Buddha's birth will fall on the 16th of May, the day of the full moon. In the *Maha-Bodhi Journal* for March will be found an article on the discovery of the birthplace of Prince Siddhartha Buddha Gautama. The discovery was made by Dr. Führer and its details first announced by the distinguished Vienna scholar, Dr. G. Bühler. In the place that now bears the name of Konagamma is a monument called Buddha's Nirvâna stupa, which is supposed to mark the place where Buddha died. About fifteen miles northeast of Konagamma the archæologists discovered another stupa. Here they found fourteen feet deep in the ground an inscription which, as is stated, declares itself to be made by Emperor Ashoka in the twentieth year of his reign (that is to say, in the year 229 B. C.). It declares that the Emperor had been in the garden of Lumbini to do homage to the Buddha, and that, having erected various other stupas, he built also this stupa for the purpose of honoring the birthplace of Buddha. About eighteen miles northwest of this stupa, marking the site of the garden of Lumbini, are ruins of monasteries and other buildings, which are now densely covered with forest trees. They must have been an important centre of religious life, for they form quite a large city, extending over about five miles in length between the villages Amuli and Tilaura Kot. They are supposed to be the site of Kapilavastu, the capital of the Shakyas, which is at present in the same neglected condition in which the pilgrims Fa-Hian and Hinen-T'sang found it when they visited India between the years 629-645 A. D. The excavations are continued and great results are expected, which will either corroborate or correct the tradition of the sacred literature of the Buddhists; and we have good reasons to

hope that we shall within one or two years know much more about the history of early Buddhism.

Readers of *The Monist* and *The Open Court* will remember the Triangular Debate on Christian Missions, which took place in the fall of 1894 before the Nineteenth Century Club of New York, under the chairmanship of its President, who, at the time, was Walter H. Page, the former editor of the *New York Forum*.

The Rt. Rev. J. M. Thoburn, missionary bishop to India and Malaysia, on that occasion was challenged by Mr. Gandhi's bitter denunciation of Christian missions for inventing a story of the prevalence of infanticide in India. The latter even denied that the criminal law of India contained a prohibition against throwing babies into the Ganges, while the Bishop contended for its truth. Bishop Thoburn announces in a letter to the *Christian Advocate* that Dr. K. S. McDonald, a missionary of the Free Church of Scotland, has taken up the question and published a statement in the *Indian Evangelical Review* in which he offers overwhelming proof to justify Bishop Thoburn's statement. In his letter to the *Christian Advocate* Bishop Thoburn quotes enough of it to leave no doubt about it. While it is true that infanticide from religious motives does not prevail now in India, it evidently existed in the years 1798-1820, and Brahmins of higher education—such men as the Pundit Hara Prasad Shastri—rejoice at the abolition of this terrible superstition, saying: "This cruel custom (of vowing to cast the first born child into the Ganges) was a frightful source of infanticide among the Hindus, and Lord Wellesley put a stop to it." No one will deny that there is in India, and always has been, a Brahmanism of philosophical depth and moral purity, but at the same time it must be conceded by the most ardent admirer of Indian wisdom that there are many various forms of idolatry prevalent in India, and it would be strange if here alone a custom which was all but universal all over the whole world should never have existed.

MODERN FRENCH LITERATURE. By *Benjamin W. Wells*, Ph. D. (Harvard University.) Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1896. Pp., xii, 510.

This book is more fully up to date than the present notice. Ten of the thirteen chapters are given to the nineteenth century; two of the ten pay well deserved honor and with due discrimination, to Victor Hugo; Taine, Renan, Sardou, Zola, and Daudet are criticised at some length; and mention is made of many recent writers not yet generally known, for instance of Verlaine, Barrès, and Margueritte. Dr. Wells shows intimate personal acquaintance with the authors taken up, and his work may be very useful to those who wish to know what to choose, either among famous old books, or among very new ones. He can at least do his readers the good service of proving that there really are French poets. There is no truth any longer, if there ever was any, in Emerson's line about

"France, where poet never grew,"

F. M. H

The German edition of Professor Mach's *Popular Scientific Lectures*, which was not published until after the American edition, and which appeared only in last January, is now in its second edition. A third edition of the *Mechanics* is also announced. The success with which Professor Mach's ideas are meeting in Germany is encouraging for the philosophy of science.

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MUNICIPAL LIFE IN NEW ZEALAND.

BY THE HON. SIR ROBERT STOUT, K. C. M. G.

WE ARE APT to overlook the fact that municipal government is more important than what is called general government. The social life of the people is more deeply influenced by the government of the township and the city than even by a federal constitution. The New England town meeting has probably more deeply affected the New England life than the form of the State or Federal Government. If we are to know a people we must know not only their external constitution but their internal government. And if all government is on its trial—if no one admits that the ideally perfect government has yet been discovered—comparisons of municipal life in other countries may not be uninteresting to American citizens. I read with profound interest the sketch of "Chicago and Its Administration" by the Hon. Lyman J. Gage, appearing in *The Open Court* of April this year, and I thought it might be worth while detailing to the readers of that journal how municipal affairs are managed in far-away New Zealand.

A few general remarks about New Zealand's population may not be out of place. At the census taken in April, 1896, there were 703,360 people in New Zealand, mainly Europeans or of European descent, and 39,854 Maoris or aboriginals. The colored people included in the 703,360 people were 3,719 Chinese, 124 negroes, and 15 Japanese, and perhaps 100 others of all kinds. Our population is therefore mainly white. There were 441,661 born in New Zealand, 118,689 in England and Wales, 50,435 in Scotland, 46,037 in Ireland, 21,681 in the Australian colonies, 1,749 in the United States, 1,412 in Canada, 4,595 in Germany, 4,900 in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 881 in Austria-Hungary, 698 in France, and a few hundreds each for other European countries. Those born in

New Zealand are descended mainly from the people of the United Kingdom. This will be seen if the census of 1867 be taken. In 1867 the number of the population was, exclusive of Maories, 218,668, and their birthplaces were: New Zealand, 64,052; England and Wales, 66,933; Scotland, 34,826; Ireland, 27,955; Australian colonies, 11,313; foreign countries, 271; unspecified, 769. We are sprung then from a people long used to self-government.

We have three kinds of local government—the borough and city, the road district, and the county. The borough and city system is for centres of population; the county for country districts, and road districts are part of counties, and only in force in some special districts. For practical purposes we may look at the former alone, as the road district is only a branch of the county system. There are two main statutes dealing with the borough and city system and county system, both passed in 1886. They were consolidating statutes which put under one act multifarious laws that were on the statute book regulating local government.

There are ninety-six boroughs in all; six of these are called cities. The name city is a mere name, for except in the name there is no difference in management between an ordinary borough and a city. Each borough may be divided into wards. The lowest number of wards in a borough, where a borough is divided into wards, is two, and the highest number six. There are eighty-one counties, and each county may be divided into ridings. The number of ridings may vary from two to nine. The population of the four chief cities is as follows: Auckland, 31,424; Wellington, 37,441; Christchurch, 16,964; Dunedin, 22,815. There are, however, suburban boroughs adjoining the chief cities, and if the population of these be added, and they should be added to get an accurate idea of the urban population at the four centres, then the figures will be as follows: Auckland, 57,616; Wellington, 41,758; Christchurch, 51,330; Dunedin, 47,280.

If the parts of Christchurch and Dunedin within a radius of eight miles be added then the population would be: Christchurch, 55,288, and Dunedin 49,181. Before leaving the question of population; one may judge of the kinds of people we have by the religions we profess and trace our descent through our creeds. They are:

Church of England (Episcopalians).....	282,809	Wesleyan Methodists (non-Episcopal).....	73,367
Presbyterians.....	159,952	Small sects, Freethinkers, etc..	37,351
Roman Catholics.....	98,804	Object to state	15,967

Congregational Independents...	6,777	Hebrews	1,549
Baptists	5,538	Unitarians	375
Buddhists and Confucians (Chinese).....	3,391	Society of Friends.....	321
		Unspecified.....	1,122

The "freethinkers," so-called, and "no denominations" are 7,487; "agnostics," 562; "no-religion," 1,490; atheists, 117. The Presbyterians have the largest church accommodation and the largest number attending church. In Southern New Zealand the Scotch Presbyterians predominate.

I now come to the way in which our cities are managed. The franchise is uniform throughout all the boroughs and cities. All occupiers of land or houses are, if they are owners, and if tenants, if their tenancy is at least a six months tenancy, entitled to be enrolled as burgesses or citizens, and they alone of the inhabitants have the right to vote. Every borough, and hereafter I include in a borough the cities, has a council consisting of a mayor and councillors. The number of councillors varies from six to eighteen.

When the borough is divided into wards, three councillors sit for each ward. The term of office is three years, one-third of the council retiring each year, one from every ward. The mayor is elected annually by the entire borough at a general vote of the burgesses, each burgess having one vote only. In the election of councillors, however, plural voting is permitted and is thus regulated:

One vote up to £50 yearly value of holding, two votes if over £50 and under £100, three votes if over £100 and under £150, four votes if over £150 and under £350, five votes if over £350.

A person who has not paid his rates is not entitled to be enrolled; women have the same right to vote as men.

The duties a borough has to perform are the following: (1) Construction of roads and streets, (2) lighting the streets, (3) providing water for the people, (4) general municipal improvements (including sewage, etc., sanitary arrangements), (5) management of recreation and other reserves, (6) fire brigades. Neither the boroughs nor counties have any control of the police. They are under the central, general, or colonial government. Education also is not under the boroughs or counties. It is managed by boards and committees. There are thirteen education boards, and almost every district in which there is a public school has a committee. The maintenance of hospitals and the dispensing of aid to the poor are under separate boards. The boroughs and counties have, however, to pay part of the expenditures of these hospital

and charitable aid boards, and the councils of the boroughs and counties have the right to elect a certain number of members to such boards. Harbors are also controlled by separate boards. Counties have, however, the control of irrigation, and in the dry region of Canterbury in the South Island one county has thousands of miles of water races.

The revenues of the boroughs are first rates. A borough may levy a general rate not exceeding one shilling in the pound on the annual value per annum. It may levy a small special rate for hospitals and charitable aid, and rates called special rates to pay interest and sinking fund on loans, which have been borrowed either with the express sanction of the colonial legislature or by the vote of the people at a poll. The rule as to borrowing is that a borough council can borrow if a vote of the burgesses is polled and a majority in number vote for the loan, provided that the majority must be at least one-half in number of the votes which can be exercised by the whole number of burgesses.

The ratable value of property means the value at which any property would be let from year to year, deducting therefrom twenty per cent. in cases of houses and buildings and other perishable property, and ten per cent. in case of land and hereditaments, but shall in no case be less than five per centum of the value of the fee simple thereof. A small subsidy is paid by the colonial government to the boroughs. License fees are also part of their revenues. The license fees are obtained from the licensing of hotels or public houses and other places licensed to sell alcohol, the licensing of public conveyances, the licensing or permits for building, etc., etc. Some boroughs have considerable revenue from the rents of reserves owned by them. Then some boroughs own gasworks and make a profit in selling gas to the citizens. Others own the waterworks that supply the borough with water, and for that supply a special rate is charged. The boroughs own the cemeteries and there is a profit made out of the sale of burial lots.

To show the practical outcome of the local government system we may take two of the cities—Dunedin and Wellington—and state what they do.

Dunedin has an area of 1,420 acres, and is bounded on three sides by a reserve called the "Town Belt," 500 acres in extent, and which is set apart for recreation purposes. The city is divided into four wards, and its council therefore consists of a mayor and twelve councillors. It is well endowed, and its rent roll from its reserves that are let is £9,600 per year. The capital value of the reserves

is at least twenty years' purchase of the rents. It has forty miles of finished streets with asphalted footpaths, all supplied with drainage, underground and surface, with gas and water. It has 525 gas lamps to light the city, the cost of which is £3 each per annum. The lighting, extinguishing, and cleaning cost £821.10s. more. The total cost of lighting is therefore £2,396.10s. The city is well lit. The ordinary general rates are about £12,000 a year. The only other rates are the water rates. Its general rates cover lighting, hospital, and charitable aid and interest on loans. The water rates—which include rates for the use of water—are about £13,000 per annum. The total revenue annually in the general account is about £42,000, in the water account £20,000, gas account £27,000. There are other separate accounts kept, such as cemeteries, recreation reserves, abattoirs, etc. The debt of the city is £611,125, but £157,637 sinking fund has accrued, so the net debt is £453,488. There are assets against that of reserves worth close on £200,000—gas-works, £100,000; water-works and credits, £246,000, and there are town hall, fire brigade buildings, plant, etc., etc. The rates including all rates but water rates generally average $\frac{1}{3}$ in the pound on the annual value. The water rates are charged by a percentage on houses and about one $\frac{1}{3}$ on the rates on land. The total rates are $2:8\frac{1}{2}$ on the rateable annual value.

In Wellington the rates are higher, but the rents from reserves are lower, and Wellington has not gas-works. The profits from gas in Dunedin are about £3,000 a year. The rate per 1,000 cubic feet to consumers is about 7s. In Wellington the rates were, general and special, $2:5\frac{1}{4}$, and water 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. Wellington has water-works, public library, public baths, recreation grounds, etc. The general rates, rents from endowments, licenses, etc., amounted to about £37,000 annually. In addition there are water rates, about £20,000, special rates for interest on loans, charitable aid, and library £19,000. The total gross debt of Wellington is £620,000. Against this there is a small sinking fund. Wellington is lighted by electricity. There are two large arc lamps and 630 lamps of twenty-candle power. The cost of lighting is £4.10s per year for each twenty-candle power lamp. There are forty-eight miles of streets properly formed and metalled, and ninety miles of made footpaths. A sewerage and drainage scheme costing about £185,000 is nearly completed. The sewerage will be taken right out to sea. Forty-five and one-half miles of sewers have already been laid, and about 4,000 houses connected with the public sewers.

The boroughs are managed as I have said by a mayor and councillors. At the beginning of each year committees are appointed, such as finance, reserves, fire brigades, library, building, etc., and these committees meet weekly, the council generally meeting every fortnight. The mayor is paid. In Dunedin the mayor gets £400 a year, in Wellington £200, but none of the councillors are paid. The officers of the borough are appointed by the borough, and though removable at the pleasure of the council are never disturbed in their offices so long as they remain efficient. Some of them have been in office for twenty years. The total salaries of officers in Dunedin are: General department, £2,450; water, £342; gas, £1,106—in all, £3,898.

It may be asked, What is the citizen's life? The colony is exceedingly healthy. The death rate for 1896 was only 8.6 per 1,000 people. I doubt if any place can show a lower death rate. The cities are healthy. In Wellington in 1896 there were only four deaths from typhoid fever. Typhus, smallpox, and cholera have never yet found a lodgment in New Zealand. The death rate of cities and suburbs was, including deaths in the hospitals, about ten per thousand. The mildness, and equableness of the climate no doubt have their effect on the death rate. In Wellington, for example, frost is unknown. The heliotrope blooms in winter, and in summer there is no extreme heat, the thermometer rarely registering in the shade 80°. Nights are always cool.

The intellectual life is cared for. Dunedin is the seat of a university. It has an art faculty, a medical school, and a mining school. There is a museum, an art gallery, and a large and valuable reference library connected with the university. It has also a high school for girls and a high school for boys, and six large public primary schools and a training college for teachers. There are also church and private schools besides. There is a public athenæum and mechanics institute having large reading-rooms and a lending library. There are many literary societies, an Otago institute dealing with science. Musical societies, art clubs, camera club, etc. The games of football, cricket, lawn tennis, have numerous societies and clubs for their votaries. Rowing, yachting, cycling, bowling, chess, draughts, etc., etc., all have their societies. The colonists are noted for their fondness of athletic and out-of-door amusements. There is no lack of church accommodation. In Dunedin proper the Presbyterians have five large churches, the Episcopalians have three, the Roman Catholics one, Congregational Independents two, Baptists three, Wesleyan Methodists and Primitive

Methodists three. There is one Jewish synagogue and there are also meeting places of other smaller sects.

In Dunedin there is one theatre and several halls that are used for concerts and plays. In Wellington there are two theatres and several small halls. Both have substantial municipal buildings.

As to literature, we have not only in our libraries and in our book shops the books and magazines that are published in the United Kingdom, but American literature is common with us. We read the *North American Review*, the *Atlantic*, the *Forum*, the *Arena*, *Harper's*, *McClure's*, *Cosmopolitan*, the *Century*, *Scribner's*, *The Monist*, *The Open Court*, etc., etc. And the literary men of the States are perhaps as well known to us as to the residents in the States. We have read Lowell, James, Hay, Clemens, Holmes, Craddock, Howells, etc., etc., not to mention the older writers, Longfellow, Prescott, Emerson, Theodore Parker, Hawthorne, etc., etc. And will not reading the same literature do much to weld us together in sympathy as partakers of the same high destiny?

As has been said, there are eighty-one counties in the colony. Every borough is distinct in government from a county, though geographically it may appear within its area. Counties are divided into ridings, not exceeding nine. There must be at least six councillors, but there must not be more than nine. The council annually elects its own chairman from out of the councillors. The councillors hold office for three years, and the electors are the rate-payers of the county. There is plural voting as in boroughs, the votes being from one to five. In counties the rates are levied on the capital values—that is, the selling value free from incumbrances, and the rates cannot exceed six farthings in the pound on the capital value. Counties cannot borrow beyond four times the amount of a year's general rates, and then only after a poll and by a majority, as in a borough.

The duties of counties are mainly confined to road construction, drainage, and water races. As a centre or village gets populous it becomes a borough and ceases to belong to a county.

This short sketch will show that we have a system of local government in New Zealand, and this can be said that hitherto it has not been the scene of party conflicts and there has never been charged against any of the local bodies or any of their members any corruption. Whether this has been because of the smallness of the revenues, the control of the rate-payers, or the restricted franchise, will be answered no doubt in accordance with the view

of those who venture to give an opinion. The fact that separate bodies control education, harbors, hospitals, and charitable aid, rivers, etc., may, by the very specialisation of functions, have promoted both efficiency and purity of administration. Like our brothers and sisters in race and language in Europe and America and Australia, we too, in our humble way, are playing our part in the world, and who knows but that they may even learn of us as well as we of them?

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

IV. Solomon.—The Division of the Kingdom.—The Early Years of the Divided Kingdoms.

TO BE THE SUCCESSOR of David was a great inheritance, but a much greater responsibility. Will Solomon, upon whose youthful shoulders the dying father laid the heavy burden, be equal to it? There is perhaps no other personage of Israelitish history of whose true character and its historical significance it is so difficult to get a clear conception and give a correct picture, as Solomon; for what we know of him is scant and self-contradictory. It is possible to represent him as an oriental despot of the most common stamp and support every trait of the picture thus drawn with Bible references, and to take credit into the bargain for one's objectivity and freedom from prejudice. But such a judgment would be absolutely unhistorical: Solomon cannot have been an ordinary and insignificant man,—on this point history speaks loud and clear.

He was the acknowledged favorite of his father. This may have been due solely to the fact that he was a late offspring, considerably younger than David's other sons, and born in his father's old age. Now it is deeply rooted in the nature of a man that his desire for children and his fondness for them grows with advancing age. A grandson is usually loved more fondly than a son, and Solomon might have been David's grandson as far as years were

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

concerned. But this is not the whole explanation of their relation. Solomon was plainly made of different clay from his brothers. The elder sons of David, so far as we know them, were mere caricatures of their father, rude, wild fellows, who had inherited their father's strength and beauty indeed, but not his lofty mind and noble spirit.

Moreover, in estimating Solomon, his mother is a factor to be considered. Bathsheba, this demoniac creature, must have been a quite unusual and extraordinary woman; for to attach to herself such a man as David not merely in the fleeting intoxication of a criminal passion but permanently, and to be indispensable to his heart for twenty years, required more than simply a beautiful face, especially when one considers how quickly physical charms decay in oriental women. From this extraordinary mother also Solomon had received a rich endowment for his career. Thus we can easily comprehend how the aged king took into his heart of hearts this highly gifted, clever and animated boy who played about him, growing under his very eyes into the image of his fondly cherished mother, and how he came to the honest conviction that this son was the fittest and worthiest to sit upon the throne after himself. And in diverting the succession to him he committed no wrong according to Israelitish ideas. In ancient times custom seems really to have conceded to the father unrestricted disposal of the right of primogeniture: the Hebrew language devised a regular formal expression for the transference of the right of primogeniture to a son who was not the first born, and this right was expressly taken from the father only with the giving of the Second Law (Deuteronomy). Solomon was eighteen years old when he ascended the throne, at least no older than this. The fact that in spite of this he maintained his dominion for forty years under the most trying conditions is of itself sufficient evidence of his great qualities, and that his father had not been deceived in him.

The new king's tasks were given in his conditions. David himself had really not been a conqueror. To extend the realm further would have been folly; rather could the loss of provinces be endured if only domestic conditions were strengthened and consolidated. The kingdom of David was the creation of enthusiasm, an achievement of a mighty national tendency which his masterful personality had released and guided: if this creation was to be permanent it was necessary that institutions should take the place of persons.

David had in the main left domestic conditions unaltered. He

was satisfied if Israel always responded to his summons, and the tribute of conquered peoples sufficed to meet the expenses of the still comparatively simple court. True, David does seem to have contemplated some measures of taxation—the great census of which we are told can have had no other end in view—but when a severe pestilence broke out he saw in it a divine hint and gave the matter up. What united the Israelites under David was free obedience and voluntary subjection; it was not forgotten, and he himself did not deny that his rule was the outcome of popular choice. In comparison with the neighboring peoples having long-established monarchical forms of government, conditions in Israel were still thoroughly patriarchal and primitive, and David was only a sheikh on a large scale. Now it was Solomon's accomplishment and merit to have rid the Israelites of the last trace of their Bedouin character, and to have trained them in a severe and even harsh school into national citizenship. Tradition sees in him pre-eminently the judge and the ruler who establishes everywhere solid order and strictest discipline. And in this respect his activity was unquestionably beneficent and laid the foundation for all after time. If David created an Israelitish nation, Solomon created an Israelitish state.

But,—and now we come to the reverse of the medallion—Solomon was thoroughly imbued with the sentiment: *L'état c'est moi*. His government has a decidedly personal character, and all that he did was done not for the benefit of his people, but for his own glorification. Love of splendor and desire for display are the most prominent traits of his picture. He looked for the essence of dominion in outward show: extensive buildings, an extravagant court with innumerable servants and concubines,—that was his taste. But for this he needed most of all money, and so his whole reign has a marked financial character. This necessity grew more imperative in so much as the tributes from foreign peoples soon ceased.

Right at the beginning of his reign Edom secured its independence. Hadad, a descendant of the Edomite royal family, had escaped the catastrophe that came upon Edom at the hands of Joab and David by fleeing to Egypt and had there formed an alliance of marriage with the Pharaoh. When he heard that David and Joab were dead Hadad returned to his country. He despised Israel and became king in Edom, as the Book of Kings briefly and dryly reports. The commercial highway by way of the Arabah valley to the Red Sea must, indeed, have remained in Solomon's

possession, otherwise he would not have been able to make his famous trips to Ophir; but Hadad evidently ruled without molestation in the Edomite mountain-land proper.

Moab, too, seems to have shaken off the Israelitish yoke. At any rate, it was necessary soon after to subdue it anew. But a matter of much more moment was that Solomon did not, or could not, prevent the secession from Israel of the Aramæans whom David had conquered. They established a new kingdom with Damascus as centre, which was destined to become the mortal enemy of Israel.

Thus the conquests of David were quickly lost, and Solomon was left dependent on the resources of his own land and people alone. He divided the land into twelve districts for fiscal purposes, each of which had to meet the expenses of the court for one month. In conjunction with the Phœnicians he undertook from his seaport of Eziongeber expeditions to South Arabia and East Africa, which brought him abundant profit. From the caravans which crossed his territory he collected high tolls, and monopolised the Egyptian horse trade with Asia. And when these resources failed he borrowed of his friend and neighbor, Hiram of Tyre. The Tyrian loan had finally reached the amount of 12,000 pounds of gold: that is, according to current value of the metal, about \$2,880,000, but taking into consideration the purchasing power of money at that time it would in fact correspond to \$48,000,000; and as Solomon could not pay back this immense sum he had to cede to Hiram a border district with twenty towns.

But Solomon's chief need was workers. To supply it he robbed the Canaanites who still dwelt among the Israelites of all their rights and liberties, making them state slaves, just as Pharaoh Rameses II. had done to the Israelites in Goshen in his day. This was not exactly commendable, but it was an enormous advance in the centralisation of the state. Saul had planned something of the sort, but had not been able to carry it out. But this was still insufficient, and accordingly Solomon had levies made of 30,000 Israelite citizens, who were compelled to work in sections of 10,000 every fourth month.

Among the buildings of Solomon none became of such importance to succeeding generations as the Temple. Yet the Temple was originally planned merely as a chapel—only a part, and by no means the largest and most important, of Solomon's palace. The royal residence of David had long ceased to satisfy the increased

requirements. Solomon worked for thirteen years on his palace at Jerusalem.

Solomon's activity in building and his development in splendor were doubtless increased by the fact that he had won for a wife the daughter of his powerful neighbor, Pharaoh Pasheban II., and had to supply her in some measure with what she was used to at home, as indeed he did build her a palace for herself with quite exceptional splendor. The Pharaoh had furnished Egyptian troops to conquer the ancient Canaanite city of Gezer which was evidently indisposed to submit to forced annexation by Solomon, and surrendered it to Solomon as dowry for his daughter.

This is a symptom of great military weakness or at least of indolence, and it is in keeping with the fact that Solomon's buildings were chiefly of the nature of fortifications. He endeavored to protect by fortresses all the strategic or otherwise important points of his country, and especially to make his capital of Jerusalem impregnable. We see that Solomon places himself wholly on the defensive and desires only to put his country into condition to maintain and defend itself within his own borders. Here the difference from David becomes most conspicuous, but here also the question may be asked whether Solomon's policy was not the more correct and suited to the situation. If he succeeded in securing his own country against attack and strengthening it within, that was enough.

That these new conditions seemed very strange to the Israelites, who were accustomed to the most unrestricted freedom, and were very distasteful to them, we can easily imagine. So much the more significant is the fact that there was only one revolt against Solomon's authority, and that easily suppressed. A young Ephraimite named Jeroboam had attracted Solomon's attention and Solomon had made him overseer of the laborers of the house of Joseph, who were working on the fortifications of Jerusalem. Jeroboam induced those who were under him to rebel, though they probably followed unwillingly, but was obliged to flee to Egypt. There the throne was no longer occupied by Solomon's father-in-law, but a new dynasty had arisen, the founder of which, Sheshenk I. (Shishack), of course received with open arms the enemy of his neighbor who was allied to the previous dynasty.

Otherwise Solomon's reign seems to have passed off altogether peacefully and without disturbance within the country itself. And in one respect it bore the most important results for

Israel. Solomon was what one might almost call a cosmopolitan nature: he extended immensely the intellectual horizon of Israel, and opened his country in all directions to intercourse with the world. He placed Israel in the ranks of the great nations. Not only gold and ivory, sandalwood and peacocks came to Jerusalem; but also the art of the Phœnicians and Egyptians, the wisdom and the fairy-lore of the East found their way into Israel, giving everywhere the most powerful impulses, and rousing to new life.

Solomon was just as striking and winning a person as his father David, only in a different way: what is told of his wisdom and his wit, his artistic and scientific tastes and interests is certainly to be regarded as historical. The epigram has come down to us which he uttered on the occasion of the dedication of the Temple, and it is among the most profound and original in all Israelite literature. It runs:

" God hath set the sun in the tent of heaven,
But He Himself hath chosen to dwell in the thick darkness.
And yet I have dared to build Thee an house
As habitation and a dwelling-place for ever."

It is quite conceivable that about the person of just such a ruler a whole circle of legends and anecdotes was woven, and his portrait was especially ornamented by poetry. Judah never had occasion to regret that it remained faithful to its son and preserved the solid structure of the state founded by Solomon.

After a reign of forty years Solomon died and thereupon a serious crisis came upon his realm. The imposing personality of Solomon had restrained opposing forces; now they were determined to bear the heavy burdens no longer. In Jerusalem, it is true, Rehoboam, the oldest son of the deceased king, was promptly recognised; but in northern Israel they had not forgotten that David was not a member of their tribes, but that the house of Joseph had submitted to him as an electoral king and on the terms of a solemn electoral compact.

And so all Israel gathered at Shechem to set terms for the new king: "Make thou the heavy yoke which thy father put upon us lighter, and we will serve thee," so ran their demand. Rehoboam was clearly disposed to consent, but his advisers succeeded in changing his purpose. Legally considered, the men assembled at Shechem were rebels; he was urged to make no concessions to the revolution, but to suppress it by an appearance of energetic firmness. When on the third day the people came to get the royal re-

sponse Rehoboam answered: "My father did lade you with a heavy yoke, but I will add to your yoke; my father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions."

After these fateful words the rebellion was openly declared. The terrified king sent Solomon's overseer, Adoniram, to negotiate, but he could not have chosen a less acceptable negotiator; the people stoned the odious officer to death before the eyes of the king, and the latter hastily sought his chariot and barely escaped to Jerusalem. But those who were at Shechem proclaimed Jeroboam, who meanwhile had returned from Egypt, king over Israel.

And thus the work of David was destroyed; what he had united through the pains and labors of a beneficent life was divided forever by the imprudence of his grandson. Of course the might of the nation was broken by this division, and it is a real wonder and an astonishing evidence of its toughness and vitality that it maintained itself, divided as it was, for centuries.

We have very scanty information regarding the next two centuries. The Hebrew sources themselves run low, and we receive nothing worth speaking of from without. Even the kings of this period are known to us by little more than their names. Only a few, here and there, are for us concrete figures with individual features.

In the beginning the two hostile brothers made war upon each other for life and death. At first the advantage seems to have been upon the side of Judah, where Rehoboam had at his disposal the well-filled arsenals and garnered treasures of his father, and lived amid established conditions, while Jeroboam had to create everything from the beginning. Thus Jeroboam considered it advisable to transfer his residence from Shechem, where he had at first dwelt, to Penuel on the east bank of the Jordan.

But at this point a severe storm broke over Rehoboam. The Egyptian Pharaoh, Shishak (Sheshenk), marched against his country and plundered Jerusalem, carrying off all the treasures accumulated by Solomon. As Shishak is the former host and protector of Jeroboam one might be led by the account of the Old Testament to suspect that Jeroboam had called him in to relieve him of his neighbor and enemy; but from the report of his victory made by Shishak himself in the great temple of Ammon at Karnak we learn that he conquered and plundered north Israelitish cities also, and accordingly that his expedition was directed against both kingdoms alike. So we see that it was just an ordinary marauding ex-

pedition on which Shishak expected to secure easy booty and cheap laurels, and succeeded.

This is all that is told us of the seventeen years reign of Rehoboam,—this and the fact that there was constant war between him and Jeroboam. It is the same with Rehoboam's son and successor Abijah, though it appears that he entered into alliance with the kingdom of Damascus, in order, of course, to make with it common cause against Israel. Abijah reigned but three years; he was followed by his son Asa, of whom we learn that he was obliged to take measures against his own mother, because she had devoted herself to the worship of an unclean idol.

Meanwhile Jeroboam had died after a reign of twenty-two years, having transferred his residence back to the west side of the Jordan at Tirzah. He was followed by his son Nadab. But the latter was murdered in the second year of his reign. While engaged in the siege of the Philistine border fortress of Gibbethon—for we learn thus that war had again broken out between the people of northern Israel and the Philistines—he was slain by a certain Baasha and the whole house of Jeroboam destroyed.

This performance is typical of the whole history of the northern kingdom. Israel had rebelled against the heavy yoke of Solomon, and now it was never rid of revolutions and anarchy; the throne was regarded as derelict, and every bold robber took possession of it only to be dispossessed by the next more lucky comer. Baasha who was perhaps Nadab's general (the usurpers are generally officers and the revolutions military revolutions), and who must have been an efficient soldier, turned his whole force against Asa of Judah. At Ramah, about six miles north of Jerusalem, on the border of his country, he established a close blockade, and as the Book of Kings says, "suffered no one to go out or come in to Asa, king of Judah." Asa was thus brought into such straits that he gave all his remaining gold and silver to purchase the aid of the king of Damascus. The latter immediately invaded and devastated the whole north of Israel, whereupon Baasha was obliged to hasten to the aid of his hard-pressed north-border. Now Asa summoned all Judah to arms, had the fortifications at Ramah taken down and the material transported across the border where with Baasha's stone and timber he strongly fortified Geba and Mizpah on his own territory. The Book of Kings also attributes to him the fortification of other cities.

Baasha ruled for twenty-four years. But fate overtook his son Elah. Once more the Israelites were in the field against the Philis-

tines and besieging Gibbethon; but the king, as it is said, lay drunken at Tirzah in the house of his minister, Arza. Here a cavalry officer named Zimri murdered him and exterminated the whole house of Baasha and all his relatives and friends. But the glory of Zimri was to last but seven days. Scarcely had the army which lay encamped before Gibbethon, learned of the palace-revolution when it proclaimed its tried leader Omri as king. In forced marches Omri moved against Tirzah; Zimri realised that all resistance was in vain, but was resolved at least to die like a king: he set fire to the palace and perished in the flames. Omri, however, was not destined to receive general recognition; a certain Tibni was set up as opposition king. But after several years of civil war Omri succeeded in overcoming his rival; Tibni fell, and now Omri was the undisputed monarch.

Omri's very first deed after attaining the sole rule bears testimony to his statesmanship. Zimri had burned the palace at Tirzah, and there was need of building another. Omri may himself have learned with dismay what an easy game the capture of the capital had been; therefore he moved the royal residence to another place and founded Samaria. The very name, which we may translate with watch tower (*Wartburg*), is significant enough. Proud and free the hill of Samaria rises from the surrounding valley, sloping gently only to the east, but falling off steeply on the other sides. A gigantic circle of higher mountains surrounds it with a protecting sweep. Moreover this particular region is extraordinarily fertile and comparatively well watered. From a strategic point of view especially the choice of the site is a strikingly fortunate one; that the kingdom of Israel survived for a century and a half the lamentable times that soon came upon it is due first of all to its almost impregnable capital, which resisted even the Assyrians for three years. Through the foundation of Samaria Omri became the real founder of the kingdom of Israel, and it has its good reason that the Assyrians always designated the kingdom of Israel as Omri-land.

Further than this we know only a few facts regarding Omri's reign, and these only indirectly. He made successful war against Moab, colonised the northern parts of Moab with Israelites, and made the king Kemosgad pay tribute. On the other hand, he was not successful against Damascus: he had to cede several border districts and acknowledge a sort of feudal overlordship. Therefore he sought the support of his powerful neighbor on the west, and married his son Ahab to Jezebel, the daughter of the Tyrian king

Ethibaal. With Judah, where king Asa still reigned, he seems to have maintained peace and to have taken steps toward closer relations with the brother kingdom. On the other hand, the first conflict with Assyria occurs in his reign.

Under Assurnasirapal, who ascended the Assyrian throne in 884 B. C., the power of Assur experienced a mighty revival after a long period of decrepitude; Assurnasirapal is the first of the great conquerors who lived wholly in war and by war and carried the terror of the Assyrian arms everywhere. In the year 876 he marched as far as the Mediterranean and Mount Libanon, and Omri among others hastened to lay his offering at the feet of the mighty monarch; but Assurnasirapal never came again.

Omri was succeeded by his son Ahab. We know relatively the most of him, because the great prophet Elijah was his contemporary, and his career throws also important light on the king. True, this light is not favorable for Ahab, and his conflict with Elijah was fateful for him. He is one of the most ill reputed personages in Israelitish history. But if we examine carefully and with the searching eye of criticism the reports preserved regarding him, the result is a materially different picture. His religious conflict with Elijah, as reported in the Book of Kings, is pure legend; the historical residue turns out to be quite innocent, leaving no occasion for any just reproach to Ahab, and the only actual crime that is laid to his door, the judicial murder of the Israelite Naboth, was the work of Jezebel, which he simply did not interfere with; when Elijah openly and frankly reproached him with the wretched deed, he bitterly repented it and did heavy public penance for it.

What remains of the reports concerning Ahab shows him to have been a worthy son of Omri and one of the best kings and most powerful rulers that Israel ever had. The situation of his kingdom was very critical, and to this were added exterior misfortunes, crop-failure, and shortage, famine and drouth, so as to shake the state to its foundations. But Ahab was equal to the situation, and managed to win the respect and admiration of friend and foe. First of all, he took steps for a peaceful and friendly relation with Judah. Under him we find again for the first time Israel and Judah fighting shoulder to shoulder; the old feud is forgotten, and to seal their friendship the two reigning houses ally themselves by marriage: Jehoshaphat of Judah, who meanwhile had succeeded his father Asa, married his heir, Jehoram, to Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab.

It is notable, although Jehoshaphat reigned twenty-five years,

and is praised by the Book of Kings as one of the best kings of Judah, that we really know nothing about him save his relations to the ruling family of Israel. When we find express mention that under him there was no king in Edom, but that a governor from Judah ruled the land, we may indeed infer that Jehoshaphat again subdued the land and deposed the dynasty of Hadad, but the conclusion is not inevitable. He attempted to resume the Ophir expeditions of Solomon from Ezion-geber, but characteristically refused to let his Israelitish friend and neighbor take part in them. However, he did not in the end carry out his purpose, for the ships, though constructed with much pains, were wrecked, probably because they were not managed by the skilled seafarers of Phœnicia, who in Solomon's undertakings had been the leaders.

The most important matter in the reign of Ahab is his wars with the kingdom of Damascus. Omri had been obliged to recognise its overlordship in a certain fashion, and evidently Ahab did the same for some time; but he could not suffer this state of things to continue. After he had increased the power of resistance of his country by fortifying the most important cities, he made an attempt to secure his independence. At first fortune did not favor him, and Ahab found himself shut up in Samaria. King Ben-hadad sends word to him: "Thy gold and thy silver are mine." And with truly royal mind Ahab does not hesitate to take upon himself the misfortune of his people, and consents.

Now Ben-hadad, who had evidently not expected such prompt yielding, demands further that his people shall also plunder Samaria. But Ahab cannot consent to this; he says: "All that thou didst send for of thy servant at the first I will do; but this thing I may not do." Then Ben-hadad answers: "The dust of Samaria will not suffice for handfuls for all the people that follow me;" and to this brutal boast Ahab replies with dignity and decision: "Let not him that girdeth on his armor boast himself as he that putteth it off." While Ben-hadad and his officers lie in their drunken mid-day sleep Ahab makes a desperate sortie with the seven thousand two hundred and twenty-three men whom he had in Samaria; the Syrians are taken wholly by surprise and defeated, and hasten back to Damascus in confusion with additional heavy losses on the way.

The following day they again measure strength in open battle at Aphek, and again, despite greatly inferior numbers, Ahab wins a complete victory; the army of Damascus is destroyed, and Ben-hadad himself, with the remnants of his forces, shut up in Aphek.

But Ahab nobly and magnanimously spares his defenceless opponent, and makes peace and friendship with him on condition of the surrender of all the territories that had been taken from Israel.

This performance on the part of Ahab is only explained by a very surprising piece of information which we receive from the Assyrians. Salmanasar II., son and successor of Assurnasirapal, takes up his father's plans, and in 854 leads all the forces of his empire against Cōlesyria. At Karkar on the river Crontes there is a battle. Here Salmanasar meets a coalition of many kings and tribes, at the head of which Ben-hadad of Syria and Ahab of Israel are fighting shoulder to shoulder. True, the Assyrian king claims a complete victory, but this victory results in his beginning a very hasty retreat, and it is five years before he attempts to come again.

If Ahab had been a king of common mould he would certainly have used the opportunity to fall upon the rear of this his mortal foe of many years' standing and the natural enemy of his people ; but he looked further and recognised the greater danger ; and as he had put an end to the fraternal dissension with Judah, it was plainly his intention here by conciliation and magnanimity to put an end to the quarrel with Damascus and conquer his opponent by moral force ; and he steadily and faithfully carried out this noble and magnificent policy.

But Ahab had made the mistake of judging others by himself, and in his nobility and large-heartedness overlooked a factor with which the practical statesman unfortunately must deal, and that is human meanness. When the danger was past Ben-hadad never dreamed of keeping his plighted word, and Ahab is compelled to demand the rightful possessions of his people at the point of the sword.

One year after the battle at Karkar the allies of that occasion are facing each other in open battle. Ahab was supported by Jehoshaphat of Judah ; for the first time since the days of David we see all Israel united against a foreign foe. The campaign is to secure the important border fortress of Ramoth in Gilead. How high Ben-hadad rated his opponent may be learned from the order he gave his captains: "Fight neither with small nor great, save only with the king of Israel."

Ahab may have known or suspected this ; he does not wear his usual armor in the battle, but his fate was sealed. By chance a man shot an arrow into a joint of his breastplate which was to put a premature end to his precious life. But Ahab proposed to

die as he had lived, a king and a hero. Although he immediately recognised the wound as mortal he held himself by gigantic efforts upright in his chariot until evening, in order not to discourage his troops; then his strength gives way and he falls down dead. At this dreadful tidings a wild panic seizes the Israelite ranks; they think only of saving the king's body; battle and campaign are lost. This is the historical Ahab of Israel.

The consequences of the death of Ahab are seen forthwith. Now that his strong hand was cold, the Moabites again became aggressive. Their king, Mesha, reconquered the parts of his country that had been taken by Omri, and massacred the Israelites that had settled there without respect to age or sex, "as a delight for the eyes in Kemosh and Moab," as he himself says. There was no opposition, for Ahab's eldest son and successor, Ahaziah, seems to have been an incapable and insignificant man. Fortunately for Israel, one is inclined to say, he died in the second year of his reign in consequence of a fall from the window of his palace, and as he had no children he was succeeded by his much abler brother Jehoram. The latter immediately undertook a campaign of revenge against Moab. In conjunction with Jehoshaphat of Judah they advanced from the south by way of Edom into that country and wasted it terribly; but Mesha succeeded in holding his own in the fortress of Kir-hareseth, and the allied kings were obliged to depart finally with their purpose unaccomplished.

Soon after this Jehoshaphat died and was succeeded by his son Jehoram, husband of Athaliah. The Book of Kings reports from his eight years' reign nothing but these two misfortunes: the Edomites freed themselves from their subjection to Judah, while an attempt on the part of Jehoram to subject them again failed utterly, and the king himself barely escaped; furthermore the city of Libbah revolted from Judah and allied itself with the Philistines. Jehoram was followed by his son Ahaziah who reigned but one year, for then a terrible catastrophe broke upon the royal houses of both kingdoms.

In the years 849, 848, and 845 Salmanassar was again in Cœlesyria, and thus we can understand how Jehoram of Israel succeeded in recovering from the power of Damascus the city of Ramoth, before the walls of which his father Ahab had fallen. Besides there had been a violent change of dynasty in Damascus, Ben-hadad having been murdered by one of his courtiers, Hazael, who himself mounted the throne. Jehoram was wounded and withdrew to

Jezreel to be healed of his wound. And then the calamity which had long been creeping in the darkness suddenly burst forth.

The great prophet Elijah had died ; his pure and sacred work was carried on in a very impure and unholy spirit. The impression grew up that the whole house of Ahab must be exterminated root and branch for the honor of God. And now the favorable moment seemed to have come. Elisha sent into the camp at Ramoth a disciple of the prophets to anoint as king the man whom he had selected to execute the judgment against the house of Ahab. This was Jehu, a dashing cavalry officer, as we would describe him : no match for him in madness rode horse in Israel.

Jehu had been an eye-witness of the memorable scene when Elijah, after that judicial murder executed against Naboth, had denounced upon Ahab the divine judgment which would demand of him and his children the blood of Naboth and his children. Ambitious and full of restless energy, he seemed to be the most suitable instrument. The anointing takes place, and his comrades do homage to him. Jehu immediately forbids any one to leave the camp, and himself with a troop of cavalry takes the road for Jezreel where lay the wounded king, and where meanwhile Ahaziah of Judah had arrived to visit his sick uncle. The guard sees a troop of cavalry approaching ; after two messengers sent out to meet them fail to return, the two kings themselves mount their chariots and ride out to meet this mysterious troop. Jehoram recognises Jehu and calls out to him : "Is it peace, Jehu?" and Jehu answered : "What peace, so long as the whoredoms of thy mother Jezebel are so many?" Then Jehoram turned his chariot and cried : "There is treachery, Ahaziah!" But with fatal accuracy Jehu shoots an arrow into his back, piercing his heart ; the body of the king he orders thrown into Naboth's vineyard. Ahaziah had fled, but is pursued by Jehu's command and likewise fatally wounded ; he dies in Megiddo, not far away, and his servants bring the corpse to Jerusalem.

Meanwhile the red-handed murderer has reached the royal palace in Jezreel. The aged Jezebel is minded at least to die like a queen : in full royal attire she looks from the window and receives the ruthless Jehu with the haughty greeting : "Goes all well, Zimri, thou murderer of thy master?" Jehu has her thrown out of the window, her blood spattering his horse. Then he coolly rides over the quivering corpse, leaving it lying on the street, and enters the palace to proceed to a royal meal ; when he is through

he says: "See now to this cursed woman and bury her; for she is a king's daughter."

But there were still many royal princes in the capital Samaria. Therefore Jehu writes to the chief officials there: "Ye have arsenals and fenced cities; look ye out the best and meetest of your master's sons, and set him on his father's throne and fight for him!" For reply the intimidated people ask his orders. Thereupon he wrote: "If ye be on my side, take ye the heads of your master's sons and bring them to me to Jezreel." The horrible order is executed, seventy royal princes are murdered, and their severed heads packed in baskets and sent to Jezreel. There Jehu has them piled in two pyramids beside the city gate and feasts his eyes on the terrible sight, casting to the people that stood about a cynical witticism.

Now he starts for the capital of the kingdom, having first caused all the friends, supporters and officials of the overthrown dynasty remaining in Jezreel to be slain. On the way there is more bloody work. At Beth-ekeb he meets a party of forty-two persons of distinction. They profess themselves royal princes from Jerusalem, coming to visit Ahaziah and Jehoram in Jezreel. Jehu has them seized, and the forty-two princes of the house of David follow the seventy of the house of Omri. Thus he enters Samaria.

A supposedly religious movement had brought him to the throne; he now paid in his own fashion those who had elevated him. He makes proclamation: "Ahab served Baal a little; but Jehu shall serve him much." He makes pretence as though he would offer his coronation-sacrifice in the temple of Baal erected by Ahab, and summons thither on pain of death all worshippers of Baal. When they were all in the trap, he had them cut down by the guards and desecrated the temple in the most brutal manner. Of course, the boards were now swept clean in Samaria also, and all the relatives, friends, supporters, and officials of the exterminated royal house were slaughtered. The peace of the grave dwelt in Samaria.

The fanatical prophets could not have chosen for the execution of their purpose a more unholy instrument than this bloodhound; even a century later, almost, Israel still stands aghast at the memory of this horror, and the prophet Hosea sees in the bloody deeds of Jehu an unatoned guilt which rests upon the kingdom and its royal house, and can be atoned for only by the destruction of both. And if ever in history God himself has clearly spoken and pronounced condemnation upon human delusions, it

was here : by the fall of the house of Omri Israel itself was brought to the brink of destruction, and the reign of Jehu and of his son, Jehoahaz, is the most miserable period that Israel ever experienced.

It is one of the most remarkable ironies of fate that these murders which were alleged to have been done to the honor of God, and which actually did completely root out the worship of Baal in Samaria, led in Jerusalem to exactly the opposite result. King Ahaziah and forty-two princes of the royal house had succumbed to the murderous steel of Jehu ; how will the future of Judah fare ? A wholly unexpected turn of affairs ensues. When the queen-mother, Athaliah, learns that her son is dead, she proceeds to finish Jehu's work, and has the whole royal family put to death. Only one little grandson, Ahaziah's one-year-old son, Joash, escaped her frenzy ; a sister of Ahaziah, Jehosheba, who was married to the priest Jehoiada, saved her little nephew and concealed him in the temple from his grandmother.

Athaliah now assumes the reigns of government as sovereign queen. She seems to have met no opposition ; Judah submitted with just as much resignation to Athaliah and her wickedness as had Israel to Jehu and his monstrous deeds. Athaliah now erected at Jerusalem a temple of Baal, and, if we may credit the report which even gives us the name of the priest appointed by her, celebrated the worship of Baal officially. It is asked, What can have moved Athaliah to turn thus sadly against her own flesh and blood ? How is it possible that a grandmother would have her own grandchildren exterminated ? On this very point an explanation is not far to seek. Conditions in the Orient are such that the first lady of the land is not the wife but the mother of the king ; she is the only person to whom the king himself, the sovereign lord of all, shows reverence and even submission—whom he recognises as superior to himself ; he goes to meet her, does obeisance to her, seats her at his right hand. So we see that the position of the queen-mother was actually a court office, and the highest of all ; King Asa formally deposed his wicked mother from this dignity. The moment her grandson ascended the throne Athaliah would have been compelled to vacate this first position in the kingdom in favor of her daughter-in-law, and her proud heart could not bear this. Lust of power and the gift for ruling,—generally, alas ! combined,—must have impelled her and made a fury of her ; it is possible also that the thought arose that the ruling house in the little land of Judah should not fare better than that in her own mighty

Israel,—if she could have had her way the house of David would have perished from the earth. But God held his hand over it; He cared too much for it to let the family be destroyed by an inhuman woman.

The destruction of the house of Omri and the catastrophe in the house of David constitute a milestone in the history of the people of Israel at which we may tarry and turn away overcome. Unspeakable horrors at Samaria, unspeakable horrors at Jerusalem, and the curtain falls on blood and corpses. Is this terrible picture an omen for the future? Yes, and no. In the next chapter we shall see both kingdoms fall, but their fall is not a blood-curdling melodrama, rather a genuine tragedy; they fall like heroes, after a manful struggle with destiny, and there is a mitigating feature: they fall, indeed, but they do not perish: new life will spring from the ruins.

THE MISSION RUINS OF CALIFORNIA.

BY J. M. SCANLAND.

THE MISSION church buildings of California, the crumbling monuments of a mistaken policy, are picturesque in their decay. In a few years all will have disappeared, as will, also, the last of the aboriginal tribes found here by the missionary padres. At the end of the first quarter of the present century, when the twenty-one missions of California were in the height of prosperity, the friars estimated the number of Indians to be about 100,000, of which about 25,000 were mission Indians—that is, under the subjection of the Church. The others were styled “Gentiles.”

The coast line of the territory comprising California extended from San Francisco to San Diego—at least, that was as far north as the missions extended—a distance of 600 miles.

The jurisdiction of each mission extended half the distance to the other, each way, and thus they controlled the entire coast line. Their jurisdiction inland extended only about twenty miles—beyond were the mountains and the savage Indians.

These deserted buildings now serve as a reminder of the enslavement of a people who may have become civilised had the priests pursued a different policy and not degenerated from spiritual advisers to managers of vast estates. The spiritual welfare of the Indian was neglected in the enslavement of his body.

About the beginning of the eighteenth century the Jesuits planted a chain of fifteen missions in Lower California. Spain had, about that time, lost considerable of her territory, and shrewdly adopted the plan of invading and colonising the Californias through her mission policy and under the cloak of Christianity. The prime motive was to acquire territory—which is the underlying principle of all governments, just as the acquisition of property is inherent in mankind. With the extension of her do-

minions, the power was to civilise the Indians, make of them good citizens, and award to them a due proportion of the lands they already occupied, which ownership Spain never denied, and so recognised in the laws of the Indies.

The Jesuits were eager to extend their scheme of salvation to this western wilderness, and their services were accepted by the government. Donations were made by wealthy Spaniards for the cause of the "Holy Faith," the Government furnished the friars with a half-dozen or dozen soldiers as a guard for each of the missions as they were established, also giving to each church ornaments, vestments, etc. Unfortunately, the soldiers were placed under the command of the priests, and thus they had full temporal authority, and looked only to the prosperity of their mission property.

It may be argued that the friars were actuated only by the best of motives. True, no doubt; but, after an experiment of seventy years, only about one-fourth of the 50,000 Indians in Lower California had been "reduced to the missions," as they termed it. None of them had been educated, and the Spanish Government concluded that either they or the system were at fault. Some of these friars deserve great credit for their self-sacrifice in spending a lifetime in such a barren country; while some, very likely, preferred to rule in a savage land than to serve in civilisation. However, the interference of the order with political matters in France and Spain at this time, resulted in their expulsion from those countries and their provinces. The missions in California were transferred to the care of the Franciscan friars, who after having landed at La Paz and taken possession of them, found that the property, together with the "Pious Fund," did not exceed in value \$100,000.

Spain now began to pursue a "vigorous foreign policy," and her energetic rulers decided to colonise "Alta" or Upper California, which Cabrillo had discovered in 1540, and Viscaino had "rediscovered" in 1602, and which had remained undiscovered for more than one hundred and fifty years afterwards. Accordingly, the Franciscans were given permission to accompany the colonising expeditions of 1769, and from that time dates the "mission era" of the present California.

The Franciscans were anxious to leave Lower California, as they soon found that it was a very uninviting field—for worldly prosperity, and besides, the Dominicans, or Black Friars, had asked for a division of the field of labor, and spoils, perhaps.

Spain did not change the policy in reference to the powers of

the friars, but, as before, allowed to each mission a number of soldiers, who were under the command of the priest in charge, who thus became commander, priest, law-maker, executive officer. He could punish a crime in any manner that he chose, and could prescribe what constituted a crime.

Spain considered that this territory north of the Peninsula of Lower California was a portion of that peninsula, and that as it was inhabited by the same class of people, it was called Upper California, though according to an ancient Latin publication, dated 1579, it was called Quivera.

By the aid of the confiscated "Pious Fund" of the Jesuits, the Franciscans were soon established in their new field, and dotted the coast line of Alta (upper) California with missions. The friars selected the most fertile spots in the watered valleys, the missions being located on the sea coast. Their jurisdiction extended only a few miles into the interior, or to the foothills, where the wild or "Gentile" Indians held sway.

Spain never intended that the Indians should be dispossessed of their lands, or that the Church should own any lands other than necessary for buildings, gardens, etc. The expressed policy of the Government was that each mission should be converted into a pueblo (town) after it had been in existence for ten years, believing that period was sufficient for the civilisation and Christianising of the Indian. But, the Franciscan Friars, following the policy of the Jesuits whom they had succeeded, ignored these instructions, and settled down into the possession of the country.

The friars seemed to believe that it was necessary to separate themselves and their "children" from the world in order to be successful. They reasoned that civilisation came from within and not from without.

Had it not been for this mistaken policy the deserted mission church buildings of to-day would not be in ruins, and the 100,000 Indians the friars found here would not have decreased to the remnant of five per cent., who are neither civilised nor savage, having the vices of both with the virtues of neither.

For sixty years the missionaries had absolute control of California—temporal and spiritual. Had they sought to educate the Indian he would have become an industrious citizen. But, when the missions were abandoned, he became a vagabond.

The priests set themselves up in defiance of the expressed will of the Government in claiming the lands for their order, which they well knew to be the property of the Indians, and held to be

so by Spain. The priests argued that the Indians were "children," and constituted themselves as the guardians of the neophytes. Each mission in time became a feudal principality; the priest was lord of all he surveyed, and he surveyed everything to the line of the next mission. They had possession of the entire country, and united to exclude settlers, fearing for their absolute power.

In those early days it would seem that the settlers would have been welcomed, and they would have been under any other system than this, which perhaps is the main cause of Spain eventually losing this territory. When a settler made application to the Government for land, it was granted to him provided the grant did "not interfere with the existing rights of others." As the chain of missions claimed the entire coast line of six hundred miles, the coveted grant did "interfere" with the "existing rights" of some one of the missions. This was the report generally made by the priests, to whom the petitions were usually referred. As the settlers could not well locate lands in the mountain districts, which were occupied by hostile Indians, the country was practically withheld from settlement, or colonisation, by the priests for more than half a century. The few people who did settle in the country when it was ruled by the friars, held their lands subject to the Church, receiving their titles from the priests, who took upon themselves the high-handed authority of deeding away the lands of the country.

Under a genial clime, and with the advantages of a highly productive soil, the missionaries cultivated the vine, the olive and the fig, and enjoyed all the conveniences and luxuries that slave labor could produce. Stock multiplied with amazing rapidity on the virgin pastures and rich valleys, and the exports of hides, tallow, and wine and other produce, swelled the coffers of the missions, for nothing was paid for labor—the Indian received only food and the coarsest of raiment. As an illustration, the Mission of San Gabriel, one of the wealthiest, made from five hundred to six hundred barrels of wine yearly, and the others were not far behind in this product. Each mission averaged from 50,000 to 75,000 head of cattle, about the same relative number of sheep, and from 2,000 to 3,000 head of horses. And yet an Indian was not permitted to ride on horseback, unless first getting permission from the priest, and when he slaughtered cattle he was given a small allowance, the friars holding that too much food tended to make them rebellious.

As the missions waxed rich, they abandoned the Indians in the interior to their fate, and made no effort whatever to reclaim them to civilisation or Christianity. They made no effort at any time to explore the interior, so far as the establishment of missions was concerned. But, as the neophytes became lessened in numbers in consequence of the remarkable number of deaths, incursions were made to capture the Gentile or hostile Indians, as much for laborers as for Christianising purposes. They were hunted down by soldiers with lances and *reatas*, and were lassoed as animals, brought to the missions, flogged into subjection, and then baptised. As evidence of this inactivity of the friars, no mission was established north of San Francisco, the territory inhabited by wild Indians, until after the independence of Mexico. The friars never visited the interior to ascertain whether the Indian inhabitants were worthy or willing to be civilised.

The beginning of the present century saw California missions wealthy and prosperous to an enormous degree. For about twenty-five years the priests experienced the most halcyon days of a system which seemed to prosper the greatest only as they succeeded in benumbing the intellect of their spirit-broken subjects. They lived in patriarchal state, with almost royal revenues, and with no one to account to. But they neglected the mind of the untutored Indian, looked after their flocks, herds, produce, and lands, and beyond their routine religious offices they had degenerated from priests into managers of vast estates. Had they devoted their time to the education of the Indian, an empire and civilisation unexcelled awaited them, but they would not release their grasp upon the Indian's body, and they lost, perhaps, the grandest opportunity ever offered a religious order.

Settlers made numerous complaints to the "Supreme Government" at Madrid of the cruelty to the Indians at the missions and of the opposition of the priests to the settlement of the country. This led to the secularisation act of 1813, but its execution was delayed by the Mexican revolution against Spain. Very soon after the independence of Mexico, that country changed the colonisation system which had not colonised California. Under a general law, grants of land were given to colonists, and the secularisation act of Spain was re-enacted. The "Pious Fund," which now amounted to about a half-million dollars, was confiscated to the treasury of the republic.

The act was not enforced until several years after its passage, but the mission system began gradually to decay, and it was found

that it was a miserable failure, in that the Indians were not fitted for citizenship, and were too much broken in spirit to again become savages. They had been taught to depend upon the priests for everything, and when liberated, they were like the slaves of the South at the close of the Civil War, unfit for freedom. The Indians were permitted to remain upon the mission lands which they had so long cultivated, but the friars, having been devastated of their authority and revenues, refused to remain as mere parish curates, which shows that they had in view their own self aggrandisement above the welfare of the neophytes. Shorn of their temporal power, the friars left the Indians to their fate, rather than to labor in a depleted vineyard, merely to save savage souls.

Finally, seeing that the mission policy was a failure, and as many of the priests were royalists and refused to take the oath of allegiance, the Mexican government abolished the missions entirely, and gave the priests their passports. The majority of them left the country, and most of these did not leave empty handed. The vessels that carried them also carried leathern sacks of tallow and barrels of olives, ostensibly. These sacks and casks were filled with silver and gold, the contents of each mission treasure-room. The shipments had been going on from the time the friars read the "handwriting on the wall," and it is stated on good authority that a very energetic friar at San Louis Obispo succeeded in shipping out of the country about \$100,000, and when the administrators took possession they found no gold to tempt their cupidity. This money, sent to—no one knows where—was the result of the Indians' labor. They had toiled for more than half a century, and not only their lands, but the accumulations of their labor, was taken from them.

Under the secularisation act, however, the Indians were entitled to one half of the accumulations of the missions, including seeds, vines, trees, orchards, etc., and half of the lands. They were made to believe that all had been taken from them, and, in some instances, the vineyards were torn up, fruit trees cut down, flowers uprooted, horses and cattle turned loose to stray into the mountains, and all of the available cattle were slaughtered at the command of the priests, who at once exported the hides and tallow. If this vandalism of the vineyards and orchards was not instigated by the revengeful priests, it was not prevented by them, and could not have been done without their knowledge.

A great deal has been written about the robbery of the missions by the *mayor-domos* and administrators in charge, but justice

should be done even at this late day to these Mexican officials. The missions were but skeletons when they took charge. True, the administrators wasted considerable of the remaining property, and dispossessed the Indians of the lands, which were theirs by right of occupancy, long before the missionaries came. But, had the priests remained in charge as curates, there would have been no despoliation. Instead, the priests set the example, and what they left behind the officials appropriated or wasted, and the Government received only a pittance for the buildings.

Seeing at last that the Indians were becoming even more degraded by the mission system, which had deprived them of the instincts that nature had implanted, and left them no independence but the will of the priests, the Mexican Government decided to change its policy of colonisation. Or rather, it decided to carry out the liberal policy of Spain, which granted to the Indians lands for cultivation and lots in the pueblos for homes. Much of the land on which San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, and other pueblos and presidios, now stand, was granted to partly civilised Indians by the Spanish Government, but they were dispossessed by either Mexican or American settlers.

In 1834 Mexico inaugurated her new colonisation system. About three hundred colonists arrived from the City of Mexico in the brigs *Moreles* and *Natalia*, the latter being one of the vessels in which Napoleon and his battalion escaped from Elba. This should have been the policy from the beginning, but the friars strived to prevent colonisation even now, and when the first band of settlers arrived they were not permitted to settle in this immense country as a colony. The Church party held that they would in time become too powerful. In consequence the colony disbanded and the emigrants, after drifting around for several months, settled at various points, the majority of them at Los Angeles. The Governor, who was one of the Church party, actually refused the emigrants the necessary food when their supply became exhausted, and exiled the leaders from the country. As an evidence of the priestly opposition, the *Natalia* was scuttled one "dark, stormy night" at Monterey, by which the emigrants lost most of their household effects. This was charged to the Church party. It was certainly done by persons inimical to the colonists, who had become unpopular in consequence of the stories set afloat that they had come to take possession of the mission property.

The missions were secularised, or confiscated, by the Mexican Government in 1835, and in a few years all of the property of the



SAN JUAN CAGISTRANO MISSION.

vast estates was wasted by the administrators. The Government received little or nothing.

Then followed a series of revolutions: A Governor who attempted to enforce the degree of secularisation was deposed, and a "Church Governor" installed, to be in turn deposed. No sooner would a Governor arrive from Mexico than he found a revolution on foot to depose him. The "year of revolutions," 1836, witnessed five such changes in the gubernatorial office. The friars, who were loyal to Spain, and refused to take the oath of allegiance to Mexico, sided with the revolutionists when they happened to be "pronouncing" against an enemy of the Church. Finally, the priests were sent out of the country, and the decay of the missions, which had outlived their doubtful usefulness, soon sank into that decay and ruin which overtakes all institutions founded upon ignorance and slavery.

Prior to the arrival of this colony there were not more than about 7,000 settlers in California—about one-third of that number being Spanish and Mexican, exclusive of the soldiers, who were mainly convicts sent into exile and servitude. Within five years after the secularisation of the missions the population had increased about 100 per cent. Had Spain adopted this policy of colonisation half a century earlier, or before the Mexican revolution, she would no doubt have reared a magnificent and rich empire in the west. But her statesmen made the mistake when they permitted the friars to accompany the first colonising expedition under Portalla in 1769. Even had the expressed policy of Spain been carried out, which was that each settler should have lands, that the inherent rights of the Indians should not be disturbed, and that the missions should be reduced to towns after ten years' existence, the country would have become thickly populated within a comparatively short time, and might be now the home of Spanish-speaking people.

Gold and silver was found in the dry beds of streams and in the foothills as early as 1836, but the friars warned the people against digging for the precious metal, telling the simple-minded Mexicans that adventurers would flock into the country and dispossess them of both gold and their lands. This is exactly what did happen a decade later.

There are left only about 5,000 Indians now. They live on their ranches, in brush huts, near the missions, having been dispossessed of their lands. A small number cultivate crops, but the



PALA MISSION, UPPER SAN LUIS REY VALLEY. Photographed by Turner and Judd.

majority move from place to place, working on the farms of the paleface.

There are several schools for Indians in this State, Government and private, and the Indian pupils show a remarkable aptitude in study and a high degree of intelligence, capable of further development.

In order to defend their own conduct in holding the Indians in slavery for so many years the priests have misrepresented the physical and mental condition of the aborigines. They uniformly report that the California Indians, when the missions were established, were the lowest in the scale of humanity—inferior to the Australian Bushmen. Because the California Indian eats herbs and wild fruits, which his native land furnished in abundance, it does not follow that he was irredeemably sunk in sloth and idleness. He built huts of tules, because the mild climate did not demand anything more substantial, and he wore very little clothing because it was the fashion of his race, and furthermore the climate permitted it. Life was not with him a continual struggle for existence, and with no hopes or ambition, he got along with the least amount of work possible, just as the Spaniard and Mexican who took his lands did when they came, and just as they do to-day. The California Indian was not continually at war with neighboring tribes, as were other Indians, and for this reason they are stigmatised as cowardly. Living mainly upon farinaceous food, these Indians were less warlike than any other tribes in the West, but they were not cowardly, as their frequent rebellions and uprisings against mission authority attests. When the *conquistadores* came early in the seventeenth century they did not find weapons of warfare among the California Indians, and no indications have been found among the numerous relics excavated to show that they were a warlike people. Circumstances indicate that they were half-civilised when the missionaries arrived, and their complete civilisation could have undoubtedly been brought about just as our European ancestors were civilised. But education should have preceded the attempt to Christianise. The Indian should have been advanced to that mental condition by which he could be made to understand why it was better to adore the cross than his fetish. The friars reasoned with the lash, the dungeon, and when subjected physically he was baptised without knowing whether it was intended for a religious ceremony or for personal cleanliness.

No country in the world was so well supplied by nature with the wants of man as was California in the aboriginal days. The



OLD SAN DIEGO MISSION, FOUNDED 1769. Elite Studio.

hills, *mesas*, valleys, and streams were filled with abundance of game and fish, and the forests were full of trees, plants, and vines, bearing seeds, nuts, and berries that grew in profusion and luxuriance in this tropical clime. Being a child of nature, the Indian enjoyed the fruits of this ideal world of his in the most natural manner. He was not lazy, for it was his work that built the massive mission buildings and created the wealth of the missions. He was not so stupid as the friars paint him to be, for he became expert in mechanics, readily learned to till the soil, cultivate fruits, construct irrigating ditches, manufacture cloth, and even to make wine for the priests. Minds capable of receiving such instruction were not "incapable of being instructed," and all of their handiwork goes to prove that the California Indian was capable of civilisation, at least in two generations. They constructed irrigating ditches, the remains of some of which are still in existence, and they were skilful in the manufacture of various articles. True, they did this under instruction, but a mind susceptible of being so instructed is also capable of being educated to a point of civilisation.

These Indians had a religion and worshipped a supreme being. Their priests wore long robes of human hair, but these the missionaries burned, and finally drove their rivals out of the field. Their finely wrought ornaments of gold and silver showed that they were artisans and possessed inventive skill not excelled by the subsequent teachings of the missionaries who enslaved them.

The fact that they navigated the ocean for some distance in canoes, rudely constructed of bark (according to the statements of the Spanish conquerors) is proof that they were skilful and enterprising.

Navigators and scientists from France, Russia, the United States and other foreign countries who visited this coast in the early part of this century, all unite in stating that the Indians were held in bondage mental as well as physical, and that the methods used by the priests in obtaining converts was "little better than kidnapping," and that their treatment was worse than that accorded to the serfs of Russia, or the negroes of the Southern States.

Ethnologists and philologists who have made an exhaustive study of the Hindu, Chinese, and Japanese races, have discovered convincing testimony that the Indians found in Mexico and the Californias are descended from the Mongolian. Protius holds that the Peruvians are descended from the Chinese, and states that





SAN LUIS REY MISSION. Photographed by Judd.



MISSION SAN LUIS REY DE FRANCIA AS IT APPEARED IN 1837.
After a model by Mr. and Mrs. A. F. Coronel. Copyrighted. Reproduced with the permission of the modellers.

the "Spaniards found wrecks of Chinese vessels in the Straits of Magellan."

The customs of the aborigines go toward proving their Asiatic origin. They had no written language, but kept their records by means of bundles of strings with knots of various colors, as did the Chinese many centuries ago. Their system of notation, calculation of time, and ornaments are similar.

The Chinese now in California bear a striking resemblance to the California aborigines, where the type is found in its purity. And there is a similarity in their language, both in gesture and intonation.

Had not the Spanish priests destroyed all of the records at the conquest of Peru, and later of the Californias, there would have been more evidence, and of a conclusive nature, as to the origin of the native races. But enough is known, however, to establish the fact that the native Californians were a people susceptible of civilisation, even if they were not already partly civilised and educated.

The large stone houses, or *casa grandes*, found in New Mexico, Arizona, and California have their counterpart in Thibet, and they were built by Mongolians. History states that many of the Tartar invaders of this country were of the Christian faith. That much is certain, that the conquering Spaniards found the cross in Peru and among the aborigines in California.

The California aborigines did not offer human sacrifice, and were not savages. They were a peaceful and agricultural people, and had the missionaries educated them, Christianity would have followed. They had a grand opportunity, but failed to grasp it.

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PÈRE HYACINTHE LOYSON
AND THE EDITOR OF THE OPEN COURT.

NEUILLY PRÈS PARIS, 22 July, 1894.

Dr. Paul Carus.

MY DEAR SIR:— The parts of your *Primer of Philosophy* which I have had translated for my perusal have struck me very forcibly by reason of the emphasis with which you have expounded the necessity of the great philosophical principles which should be established in the human soul as the basis of all certitude and all religion, and which no revelation coming from without, however excellent it may be, can supplant.

I do not know to what degree you are a Christian. As for myself, I worship the Word which is incarnate in Jesus Christ. But I do not forget that before having been manifested in a man and in having thus opened up a new epoch in the history of mankind, the Word was eternal and universal, and, according to the beautiful words of the Evangelist, "the true light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world."

In their manner of understanding the religion of the incarnate Word, Christians too often miscomprehend the Eternal Word, the uncreated reason which proceeded from the Father before all time and from which proceedeth in time the reason and the conscience of men.

Believe me, dear sir, sincerely yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

20 April, 1895.

MY DEAR SIR:—My slight knowledge of English has hitherto enabled me to grasp only very imperfectly your philosophical point of view, but I now comprehend it, thanks to the French transla-

tions of your works, *L'Idée de Dieu* and *Conscience du Moi*. I have found in these two works many good and beautiful things worthy of a philosopher and a man. But on one fundamental point I differ radically from you.

Not only as a Christian but as a thinker I believe absolutely in God, living and personal,—though not necessarily anthropomorphic,—and in the like personal immortality of the human ego. I say with Maine de Biran, "Science has two poles: infinite personality, which is God, and finite personality, which is the ego."

I could not live, I should be overwhelmed with intellectual and moral asphyxia, if I were to lose this double and profound conviction.

Truth is not for me an abstract ideal without a living support. It is the direct, unmediated radiation of the divine reason in human reason, and, as the fourth gospel excellently has it, "the light of the Word which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

I remain, dear sir, sincerely yours,

H. L.

The Rev. Hyacinthe Loyson.

DEAR SIR:—Thanks for your letter. I am sorry that on the two most important points, the problems of God and the soul, you find yourself in disagreement with my position; but I am always delighted to meet an adversary of your type, a man of warm convictions and unusual intellectual ability, for you are not loath to give your reasons, and I am sure that they are worthy of consideration. If you point out to me my errors I shall be glad to change my views. I should be glad to have from your pen for publication in either *The Monist* or *The Open Court* an exposition of your standpoint, and if possible a refutation of that view which we, the editors of *The Monist*, call the Religion of Science.

You write that you absolutely believe in a personal God and in a personal immortality of the human ego. These two ideas are to you as they were to Maine de Biran, the two poles of science, and you would be struck with intellectual and moral asphyxia if you ever lost this conviction; and as you understand by personal immortality the continuance of a human ego, so by personal God, you understand plainly an individual being, an ego personality, a concrete though spiritual existence. I can feel with you and I can sympathise with you, for I have been in the same predicament as you. But I cannot follow you. Nor can I approve of the fervor

with which you emphasise your belief as the sole condition for the welfare of your soul. For in doing so you endanger the future of those whom you impress with your powerful personality.

When I was young I was taught as you believe. I was taught that there was no God unless God was a personal God, and a personal God means a God who is possessed of an ego; God was characterised as a self, endowed with a consciousness of self. At the same time I was taught that immortality must be the ensured continuance of our personal consciousness in its idiosyncrasy with all individual recollections and relations. Many struggles would have been spared me if my parents and teachers had not written on the guide-post that leads to a higher and purer religion the words "atheism and nihilism." Thus I was prevented for a long time from attaining a scientifically tenable conception of God and soul. But man cannot help growing, and I had, nevertheless, to march onward, though I could not avoid passing through atheism and nihilism, losing both my God and my soul; for after a most careful examination of these two problems, which, however, at bottom are one and the same problem in two applications, I came, against my own inclination, to the conclusion that there was no God and there no soul. Science has as little room for the huge world-ego of a God-individual as for the puny ego-entity of man, supposed to exist in addition to the psychic elements of which the human soul in the course of a long evolution has been built up. We might as well assume the existence of a metaphysical watch-essence as a distinct entity residing in the watch and representing the unity of its motions. I would gladly have believed in a personal God and in the reality of an ego soul, if I had not plainly recognised the desolate superfluity of these two postulates. It is possible indeed that the world might have been built by a rational being according to a rational plan. But who, in that case, made the rationality of the Creator? Is not reason, which you will readily recognise as intrinsically necessary, eternal, and universal, superior to any individual God-being? Thus Reason would be an authority above God: it would be the God of God.

Here is the problem in a nutshell:

Take the simplest mathematical theorems, such as $2 \times 2 = 4$, or $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$. There are two possibilities for the anthropotheistic theologian: either these theorems have been shaped by God to hold good in the plan of his creation, or God has cleverly adjusted his creation according to the laws of arithmetic and geometry. If God shaped these laws, they could not be independent

of Him; but they *are* independent of Him, of an individual God, for we cannot help recognising them to be true whether we believe in the existence of God or not. These rules, as all other rules of mathematics, arithmetic and logic, have not been created; they are intrinsically necessary, unconditionally true, absolute, universal, and eternal. Thus the second possibility remains only. God must have adjusted his creation to the laws of pure Reason, viz., to the eternal conditions of the cosmic order. And if God adjusted His creation to these eternal conditions of the cosmic order they are superior to Him, as being a power to which He must conform. Such, indeed, is Plato's conception of God. Plato, when speaking of "the absolutely necessary," calls it "a necessity against which God himself is unable to contend."¹

In reply to Plato's God-conception, which places necessity above God, we say that a God who is subject to a higher power does not deserve the name of God. Call him a divine spirit, an archangel, the demiurge, the world-fashioner, but not God; for God, as I conceive him, is the highest authority, the ultimate *raison d'être* of existence, and the final standard of truth and righteousness.

On moral grounds the belief in an individual God is not less untenable. An anthropomorphic view of God would inevitably make the Creator responsible for all the untold misery in the world. If we accept traditional Christianity, no compensation is promised to the brute animal world, and for the majority of mankind misery is perpetuated in the sufferings of eternal damnation. And is it not sad that here the human heart that knows nothing of the sternness of scientific proof can take shelter only in agnosticism (the very enemy of any gnosis, scientific as well as religious,) by assuming that we can never comprehend the truth and had better trust in God's mysterious dispensation?

Only after a period of deep despair in which I felt myself forsaken by God and struck with a moral asphyxia such as you prophesy for yourself, did I regain my mental equilibrium.

Now let me tell you that when, after the bankruptcy of my belief in God, I began to calm down; I opened my eyes again and was astonished that I could still see. I applied my mental abilities, and lo! I could still think. I had not lost my moral aspirations; and though I had utterly surrendered my self, such as it appeared to me in my personality, I had not abandoned my ideals, my appreciation of nobility of character, my admiration for beauty

¹ *Laws*, 818. Cf. *Laws*, 741, and *Protag.*, 345.

in conduct as well as in art, and above all my love of truth. God had died to me, and I myself had become as dead. The world was so empty that death appeared rather as a redemption than an annihilation. But while I continued to live, I soon felt that the wellsprings of my religious life had not dried up; the realities of life remained as they had been before, and these functions of my soul that, according to the traditional terminology, I had accustomed myself to call a belief in God, continued to operate. I learned through experience that that which in the traditions of Christianity is called God symbolises actual facts. If God, as science unmistakably teaches, is not an individual being, He is after all a living presence, and if the soul is not an immortal ego, we cannot deny the actuality of the soul's pursuits, such as the treasures of science and art and the grand aims of moral endeavor. The main argument that refutes the existence of an individual God-entity affords incontrovertible proof of the omnipresence of an intangible God who, being the rationality of reason, the life of the living, and the ultimate norm of moral aspirations, is alone the true God. Therefore I should not say that the laws of mathematics are superior to God, I should say that they are part and parcel of Him, viz., of the superpersonal God. They are the most important features of His nature. God cannot alter them, because He cannot alter Himself. But if God were an individual being, a person such a one as we are, a deliberating, thinking ego-consciousness, only infinitely greater, wiser, and better than we, the laws of mathematics and all other formal laws of logic and arithmetic would indeed be superior to Him; for mathematical and logical truths are intrinsically necessary and eternal, and a God-individual would have to conform to them in order to be wise and good and great.

The problem of the ego, both in God and in man, commands a wider interest among both professional thinkers and people in the practical walks of life, and justly so, for here lies the root of all difficulties. Man's personality is the most important fact of life. Says Goethe:

"Fürst und Volk und Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehen zu jeder Zeit,
Höchstes Glück der Menschenkinder
Ist doch die Persönlichkeit."

[Prince and people, and those who conquer,
Mankind in totality,
All agree, the bliss they hanker
For is 'personality.']

Personality asserts itself in conscious aspiration, in endeavor, in purposed action. Hence the importance of consciousness and of design. Both together constitute the functions of the soul. There would be no sense in life unless there were personality changing indifferent nature into a field of planned activity. The highest we can think of is that which creates and conditions personality. That is God; and the question is only whether or not God is a personality himself.

Our answer is, that the conditions of human personality are the same eternal laws, or necessary relations, or universal verities, or whatever you may call them, which constitute the entire cosmic order, for man's personality is nothing but a concentrated reflexion of the cosmic order, a kind of quintessence of the divinity that is omnipresent in nature. These conditions are not an indifferent anything, but possess a definite character. Nor are they scattered, isolated facts; they constitute a harmonious unity. Considering their unity, we call them in their religious significance in one word "God." The characteristic feature of personality is rational will, consisting in the realisation of purpose; and purpose is design pursued with consciousness.

The cosmic order which reveals itself in the rationality of man, being inalterable and intrinsically necessary, does not only govern this actual world of ours, but, as an investigation of the nature of pure reason teaches, holds good universally for any possible kind of world, and may, therefore, very appropriately be called "supernatural." It is the purely relational, not the material; it is the formal, not the substantial; it comprises not the physical properties of nature, but the hyperphysical order of things which is applicable to any kind of world. It is what St. John calls the Logos that was in the beginning, not as a first-created being, but as part and parcel of God himself. Being the rationality of our thought and the endeavor in our noblest actions, God is nearer to us than any ego-God who is a distinct individuality can be, for God constitutes the very essence of our being.

We may call this conception of God Nomotheism.¹ The order of the universe, the irrefragable law that permeates nature, conditioning the tiny molecular crystallisation of metals as well as the grand course of planets, and appearing in its highest manifestations as the rational will of man where it shows itself as moral endeavor, is God Himself. The uncreated and immutable laws of nature are themselves parts and parcels of God; they are features

¹ From *nómos* law.

of His being; they are the characteristic aspects of His nature. They are the God whom science teaches. In their oneness we may call them the logic of facts, the world-reason, or Logos. Science teaches that the Logos is uncreated; the Logos is the divinity of God.

Now, God (as I understand him to be), if he be God at all, is not conscious design, but, being the condition of organised unity of any kind, of law and cosmic order, he is also the condition of design, of man's rationality, of purposive action. As such God is also the condition of consciousness, for consciousness is organised sentiency; it is the irritability that prevails among the lower forms of nature, raised to the high level of self-apprehension. Having originated through organisation, consciousness is the product of the order-producing cosmic laws that are intrinsically necessary and eternal.

But should we not admit the hypothesis of a God-consciousness, by conceiving the universe as a great organised unity, as an ego, endowed with the quality of self-apprehension, as a huge being in which the planets play a part analogous to the blood-corpuscles of the human brain? We reject this view of the universe as pantheistic, for it will be difficult for us to believe that the planetary motions are accompanied with consciousness; nor do we see any need of this assumption, as our God-idea is complete without it.

Mr. W. E. A. Wilkinson, of Rasra, a reader of *The Open Court* and one of my friendly critics in far-away India, objects to this superpersonal conception of God as follows:

"Evolution is an infinite process and consciousness is manifest at both ends of it. God is a conscious being whose purpose is to develop out of Himself a number of smaller beings like Himself. The process of their development is evolution. The process is somewhat analogous to the birth of a child from its parents. The parent as a whole is a conscious being. The parts of it by themselves are not conscious. There is no consciousness in a man's big toe, as such, but there is consciousness in a perfect child born from the man and containing all the elements that are in him. So also, as you say, there is no consciousness in the planets as such. But there is a consciousness in the whole universe; and there is consciousness in that complete reproduction of the parent called man.

"I maintain that my conception of God as a loving and all-wise father is far more satisfying than yours; that it is warranted by human aspirations, and that it is not inconsistent with any known scientific facts.

"I require something more than *definite character* in this whole universe; I require consciousness. I believe that there is a consciousness in the whole universe as such. Otherwise I do not see how it can be manifested in the limited parts of the universe called human individuals. There cannot be any 'conditions of sen-

tiency' without sentiency. It is absurd. Consciousness either is, or is not. *We cannot conceive of any elementary state from which it can be evolved."*

In reply to Mr. Wilkinson's objections I would grant the possibility of the animation of the universe with an ego-consciousness, such as is assumed in his proposition, and I would for argument's sake also grant that man's soul is a part of this world-soul, developing from elements of the world-soul into an independent being like unto its parent soul. But if this were so, would not the God, whom science reveals, that superpersonal presence of law, be still superior to this world-soul?

If Mr. Wilkinson's God existed, I should not call him God, but Brahma, or world-soul, or the great spirit of the universe, and he would be subject to God no less than I am myself or any other person is. If you, however, insist on calling such a being with a world-wide consciousness, God, I would insist that there is something higher than God, and I would deem the belief in God a matter of small concern.

God (viz., the God of science) is truly like a father, but he is not a father. If we speak of him as a father, it is a mere allegory. Take the allegory in its literal sense, as does Mr. Wilkinson, and you change God into a creature such as we are. A child develops from a part of his parents and grows into a being like them; there is no constitutional difference between parent and child, except that if the parent be faithful in the fulfilment of his duties, the son should become superior to his father in mental and moral equipment and start life under better conditions and with wider possibilities than did his ancestors.

While I reject the letter of the belief that God is a loving father, I gladly accept the significance of the allegory, and I would go so far as to recommend belief in the letter of the allegory where its meaning cannot as yet be understood. In a certain phase of human development the belief in the letter is natural for the broad masses of the people who are not yet matured in philosophical thought and will not be able to realise the fact that God is much nearer and dearer to us than any human father can be to his child; if they believe that there is a benevolent father in heaven who guides their lives and watches over them with loving care, they have a truer conception of the world than if they say, "There is no God, let us eat and drink and be merry, for to-morrow we shall be no more."

The allegory of a loving father in heaven is true enough in its significance. The order of cosmic laws, which prescribes the

paths of the planets and arranges the wonderful combinations of atoms into molecules, is not only sternly just but also most beneficent and dear. It not only begets us; it also cherishes us and surrounds us with unceasing blessings, infinitely greater not only in amount and proportion but also in kind, than any father or mother could bestow on their children.

If God were an individual being, even though he were conceived to be eternal and infinitely great, he would after all be one of us; he would be the first of all beings, the most powerful of living things, the monarch of creatures, the demiurge or world-builder, the progenitor of life, the father of all, but he would be in the same predicament as other beings are.

The father of a family is as much an individual and a mortal as are his children. Therefore God is comparable to a father, but he is not our father. He is infinitely dearer to us than a father. God's relation to his creatures is incomparably more intimate and at the same time more authoritative than the relation of a father is to his children.

Nor is God's relation to the world that of a king. We may compare him to a king; but God's majesty is radically different from any ruler or monarch of any description. God is not a legislator, not an individual being that issues ukases, he is not a deity who creates laws, but he is the eternal order of all natural laws itself.

Supposing there were a God-individual who rules the world after the fashion of a king, he might surpass all other beings as much as a noble-minded sovereign, a King Arthur, or a Charlemagne, is greater than the beggars in the streets of his capital; but after all he would not be their absolute superior. For he would not be the ultimate standard of truth and morality.

According to the letter of the law in monarchical institutions, the sovereign of a country is above the law; but that is nominal and means simply that he should not be judged in court for any offense he may give; practically he is as much a subject to the law as are all his subjects. He is the first citizen of the country but not the measure of justice. The law is practically above him, and, if he be wise, he knows it and will act accordingly.

A God-individual would not condition the cosmic order but would only conform to it. The eternal norms of reason, of rightness, and of righteousness would be as absolutely above him as they are above us. In a word, being a particular being, he would

not possess the marks of Godhood, intrinsic necessity, intrinsic eternality, intrinsic universality, intrinsic omnipresence.

Man naturally fashions his views of God after the pattern of his own personality, because he regards God as the mould from which his manhood has been shaped. But we must learn to understand what is the divine and what the human in man's personality. The divinity of man does not consist in his being an individual; for every crystal, every plant, every brute, is also an individual; the divinity of man consists in that feature which raises individuality into the higher domain of personality, and the distinctive feature of personality is the faculty of rational thought and rational action. In rational beings, feelings develop into self-consciousness, and self-consciousness finds expression in the notion of egoity.

The egoity of man is a very important feature, but it is not that feature which constitutes his divinity. Man's reason is divine, his conscience is divine, his comprehension of the truth is divine, but his ego-consciousness is simply the psychical expression of his selfhood, it is the awareness of his being a distinct individual, and this distinct individual can become divine only when its sentiments are guided by reason, conscience, and truth.

Our ego-consciousness is like a flickering flame now rising to bright clearness, now sinking into sleep's darkness, finally to be extinguished in death.

What is consciousness?

Consciousness is a function, and the peculiar nature of each conscious state, of every sentiment, every sensation, every idea, every word we think, every volition we have, depends upon the form of the nervous structure that is in commotion. The function of consciousness is a process of oxydation; it constantly feeds on new material and discards the old waste products. Thus the consciousness of every moment in life is a new consciousness. Nevertheless, there is an uninterrupted continuity, and, according to the laws of organised life, the form is preserved in the metabolism of the tissue by a constant renewal of the material used. The renewal is an assimilation, that is to say, it preserves the form of the wasted structure. The preservation of the form of nervous tissue is the condition of the continuity of consciousness, rendering the main bulk of our past experiences accessible in the shape of memories.

Memory, accordingly, is the salient feature of man's personality.

I have come to the conclusion that Maine de Biran's compari-

son is in a certain sense both forcible and true: God and the ego are indeed like unto the north and the south poles of our starry heavens. They are the direction of astronomical lines, but if we were to go out in search of them among the stars, we should not be able to discover them. They are useful for certain practical purposes of astronomy from a terrestrial standpoint, and represent, as such, real and indeed very important relations of the earth to the surrounding universe; but they are no entities, no things in themselves, no tangible or concrete objects, no individual things.

I am not a Pantheist. I do not identify God and the universe, for God and nature are different. God is the omnipresent law, and not the sum total of all existences. Nor is the term God (as I use it) an empty abstraction, but a word of intensest significance, for indeed God is that which gives significance to the world.

I do not say that God is impersonal, for God is not a vague generality but possesses a distinct suchness. He is not indefinite, but exceedingly definite in character. We can positively say what God is and what God is not, as we can distinguish between truth and untruth, between right and wrong, between good and evil. If you understand by personality definiteness of character, God is personal; but God's is not a human personality, his is a divine personality. His personality is not confined to the limits of individual concreteness; that is, His will is not a particular aspiration, but the eternal rightness that constitutes the condition of the cosmic order, the physical aspect of which can be stated in a body of formulas,¹ called laws of nature.

While in one sense God is personal, being possessed of a definite character, we must insist on the truth that in another sense God is not personal. God is not personal in the sense that an individual being is called personal. God is not an individual being; he is not a particular existence; he is not a concrete ego-self; in a word, he is not a creature; but if he is God, he is truly God, i. e., He is that which is omnipresent, absolute, intrinsically necessary, universal, eternal, the reality of all truth, and the norm of all righteousness. Being the condition of everything conditioned, he determines the suchness of all creatures and is especially also the condition of all personality in rational beings. For what is personality but individuality developed into the domain of rationality and

¹ The unity of a system of truths is frequently compared to an organised body, and it is in this sense that Buddhists speak of the three bodies or Kāyas of Buddha, the Nirmāṇa Kāya or body of transformation, Sambhōga Kāya, the body of bliss and eternal rest, and Dharma Kāya, the body of the law or the revelation of the truth as developing in the evolution of the Buddhist religion.

endowed with moral aspiration. Being the condition of personality, God is superpersonal.

Since I understand that God is superpersonal, I cannot help looking upon the belief in a God who is a concrete and individual being, endowed with an ego-consciousness, as a pagan notion. It is a belief that takes an allegory literally. Paganism, in my opinion, is nothing but a literal acceptance of a symbol or a myth, where we ought to seek for the truth that is conveyed to us in the form of a parable.

The superpersonal God as I conceive him is neither vague nor illusory, but definite and actual. As Newton's formula of gravitation is not an unmeaning phrase but a description of actualities, so the word God (in the sense in which I use the term) defines a reality of omnipresent effectiveness. The reality is not material but incorporeal; not bodily but spiritual,¹ not individual or concrete, but universal, yet at the same time definite.

This conception of God, far from being atheistical, obviates the objections of atheism and shows the old truths of religion in a new light; it is in harmony with the most stringent critique, and is not only tenable on scientific grounds, but will be recognised as the sole philosophical basis of science formulated as a religious term.

The God of science, it is true, is not an individual being, but he is after all a reality as much as the law of gravitation; He is not an ego-entity with a limited range of consciousness, but is for that reason not a nondescript generality; he is definite in character and his qualifications are unmistakable. When we take the attributes of God—eternality, omnipresence—seriously, we shall understand that God cannot be personal, but for all that He is superpersonal. He is the condition of all personality, the prototype of man's reason, the norm of all moral purpose, the inspiration of ideals. He is the determinedness of the universe and the intrinsic necessity of the cosmic order itself. God cannot be an individual; He is not a man, He is God; He is not *a* God, but God.

God's thoughts are not acts of thinking, they are verities such as mathematical laws. God does not think in syllogisms as we do; His ideas are not a chain of arguments; he does not deliberate, ar-

¹ But please do not interpret "spiritual" in the sense that spiritualists represent ghosts. It is here used in the sense of the Platonic term *αιωδης*, i. e., the causal, viz., that which is the determinative in causation; frequently translated by "formal," because form is the feature that gives character to a thing and is the decisive element in the processes of transformation.

living finally at a conclusion and coming to a decision. In Him the problem and its solution are one. His thoughts are not representations of the conditions of being, but the laws of pure being themselves.

Man's thoughts are representations. God's thoughts are eternal verities.

When we find a proposition that is intrinsically necessary and universal, a law that is uncreated and uncreatable, we must know that it is a thought of God. While thinking it, our thoughts are on holy ground, they are face to face with the Eternal.

It seems that glimpses of this higher God-conception are not foreign to the Gospel-writers. According to St. John, Christ did not say God is a spirit; he said *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός* (God is spirit). And again he did not say God is a loving personality, but "God is love." And when He was asked, "Where is thy father?" He replied, "I and the Father are one." The two poles of science which you seek, viz., God and man, are not special spots in the universe. The two poles of science are a direction which is laid down in one line of "definite direction," in the God man, Christ, the Logos incarnate; here, if anywhere in our aspiring hearts, must we seek for God.

Here I agree with you that the Logos doctrine contains a great truth. The Logos, or World-Reason, takes shape in him who is perfect, in the God-man, the realised ideal of manhood, the paragon of mankind.

The Logos is incarnated not only in Christ, but in every rational being. The perfection of the Logos is not mere rationality, but moral endeavor, purity, holiness, charity, love; and the incarnate Logos is in its perfection as much divine as the eternal world order, God the Father. Nor is it less divine in the various ideals of mankind as they appear to-day in the advance of civilisation, in science, art, invention, and social progress, all of which in a word may be comprised under the name of the spirit manifesting itself—the holy spirit of the New Testament.

Allow me to add here that the trinity doctrine of the Church and the conception of the Logos or World reason as an aspect of God Himself is quite tenable upon philosophical grounds, provided we do not believe in the letter of the dogma but comprehend its sense. There are not three God-individuals who are one, but there is a superpersonal God who has three aspects which are allegorised in three personalities. As soon as the personality of God is construed to mean an individual God-being, the trinity doc-

trine becomes absurd. Hence the various rationalistic¹ reactions against this most fundamental dogma of traditional Christianity, and hence probably your own deep-felt sympathy with the deistic teachings of Islam.

Our reason, our life, and our moral ideas are not human inventions; they are intrinsically necessary and cannot in their fundamental nature be other than they are according to the unalterable conditions of existence. The cosmic prototype of our existence, that something through the agency of which we have become intelligent and morally aspiring beings, is what I call God, and, thus, I recognise God as the ultimate norm of reason, the all-quickenng wellspring of life and the obedience-enforcing authority of moral conduct, acting with the never-failing certainty of natural law.

The immortality of the soul remains a mystery so long as we still believe in an ego-entity, for we fail to understand the possibility of a continuance of our ego-personality, but when we learn that our thoughts and aspirations are our soul, that *they* constitute our personality, we see at once that we shall continue beyond our grave. Our thoughts will be thought again. The examples we set will be imitated, and our life will remain a factor in the evolution of mankind, not otherwise than every act of ours remains during our entire life with us as a living presence shaping our fate for good or evil. When we are gathered to our fathers, we shall remain active realities in the spirit life of our race; we are and remain citizens of the Kingdom of God which is not beyond the clouds but in the hearts of men.

Although the whole combination of a man, his bodily frame, and the energy that manifested itself in the discharges of his nervous activity breaks utterly down in death, all the personal features of his soul remain according to the actions which he performed during life. Man's life is transient, but his deeds are immortal, and deeds are soul activity; deeds constitute the soul, indeed, they are the most characteristic features of personality. Our deeds are not extraneous or foreign to us, they are we ourselves; and our deeds continue according to the law of causation, for the same reason that every event which takes place continues in its effects and that every thought of ours lingers with us as a memory. Effects may be modified and offset by other effects, but they can

¹ "Rationalistic," not "rational." By "rationalistic" I understand the theories of the rationalistic school. Such rationalists are Arius, Pelagius, Mohammed, the Deists, the Unitarians, etc.

never be annihilated; they remain for ever and aye modifying the universe in exact proportion to the range and nature of their causes.

Here again we must understand that the soul is spiritual, not material, nor kinematic. The soul does not consist of substance, nor is it an energy or a force; the soul is the significant form of life, and thus it constitutes the essential and determinative feature of a being.

Here is an illustration: A poet writes a verse to a friend, and it so happens that in the course of time the ink fades and the paper crumbles into dust. Is the verse itself thereby destroyed? No, not at all. The verse (that is to say, that peculiar sentiment expressed in definite words) cannot be destroyed, for it is not of the earth earthy; it is spiritual. Previous to the destruction of the writing the verse was received and read; it was copied and printed; and its sentiments are now repeated by hundreds and thousands of people. The copy which the poet wrote is transient, but the life of the verse is not limited to the single copy. By being read it impresses itself upon other minds and thus acquires the faculty of resurrection. It will reappear, according to the power of its intrinsic worth in combination with external conditions that may favor or obliterate its reappearance. But be it ever so neglected, it will remain forever and aye an indelible modification of the constitution of the universe.

The immortality of the soul is of the same kind. It is spiritual, not corporeal. But it is real, and among all the realities of the world, it is the most important, the most essential, the most vital reality; and the recognition of this reality is the most paramount religious truth. Thus it appears that the pantheistic notion of the soul as being dissolved in death into the All is from this standpoint a gross error. First, because the soul is not a fluid that could be absorbed by or resolved into a large reservoir of a kindred fluid, as a river loses its identity in the ocean; and, secondly, because the deeds of a man, that is to say, his spiritual existence, or his soul, retain all their peculiar and characteristic features, just as the verses of the poet preserve their identity throughout all the time to come even after the destruction of the original copy.

We may compare man's life to the writing and type-setting of a book. Life is labor, and death is the consummation of our labor. While the bookmaker toils there is life in his efforts. After the distribution of the type his labors cease, but his book does not cease to exist; it enters a higher career of existence. Thus, if a

man of science passes out of this life, the truth he has found is not lost; when a mother sinks into the grave, the fruits of her maternal care and of the example she gave to her children are not buried with her; when a hero dies for a great cause, his ideal remains with us. The body dies, but the soul lives; and the soul is purely spiritual, not an essence, not a sense-function, not a force. It is the significance of man's life-work in all its definiteness and in all its personal identity.

Thus death is not a curse, nor is it an annihilation, but merely a going to rest. It is the consummation of life's labor, but not an end of its usefulness and its significance. The dead are blessed, for "they rest from their labors," but their works do not cease; they continue to be a living influence in the world.

I sum up: Traditional religion is based upon belief, and I do not deny that a belief in what children are told to believe, a trust in their spiritual fathers, is, within certain limits, beneficial, but let me add, belief is not as essential to religion as is commonly thought. Belief characterises a stage of religious immaturity. The highest religion is a trust in truth. The facts of life, of our own experience in addition to that of the human race, are, if they are carefully weighed and rightly interpreted, the safest basis to build upon. They are a divine revelation which teaches us the solidarity of all existence, demanding of us to suppress passions and to seek comfort for affliction in charity and good will. Such a religion (a religion based on facts) is possible, and as it is purified in the furnace of scientific criticism it may be called "the religion of science."

Science and religion will both gain by their alliance. Science is not profane (as many think): science and its sternness in searching for the truth is holy. And religion is neither irrational nor anti-scientific; religion is nothing but obedience to the truth; it is man's enthusiasm to be one with truth and to lead a life of truth.

I conclude my already too long letter:

Try to understand the position which I have laid down before you and show me its errors. Years ago I thought as you do but have been compelled to surrender my position. Can you persuade me to return to yours? The question does not concern you and me alone, but mankind; for there are thousands who share your views but are beset with doubts, and I venture to say that there are not a few (unchurched people as well as members of various denominations and religions) who have progressed on the same road with me. If the new path of the religion of science is the narrow path

of life, as I trust that it is, this conception of religion will become in time the religion of mankind.

If we would understand that growth is the plan of life, we would see that intellectual, moral, and religious growth is as necessary as the progress of science and invention; we would comprehend that God's revelation is not as yet a closed book, and that we are here to decipher its writings. And the duty of the hour is to make scientifically definite what has come down to us in the shape of prophetic symbols.

With kind regards and profound respects

I remain, dear sir, yours very truly,

PAUL CARUS.

MY DEAR SIR:—I have read with deep attention the remarkable letter which you have been so kind as to write me on the doctrinal points wherein we two differ. Nevertheless, it has not convinced me.

At the present moment I have absolutely no time at my disposal for discussing your arguments with the thoroughness which they deserve, but I hope to be able to do so later.

For the present, therefore, I shall restrict myself to saying that your reasoning simply proves, so far as I can see, the profound and infinite difference there is between the personality of God and that of man or of any creature whatsoever. With this understanding I am quite willing to say with you, that God is not personal but superpersonal.

I admit also that in the future life, or at least in the definitive state of the future life, the only one which we can call eternal, our personality, without ever being of the same nature with that of God, will yet be so stripped of its present infirmities that it will exhibit a character far superior to that which it possesses now. Nothing will be destroyed. All will be transformed. "Man shall end where God commences."

What I affirm is that the immortality of the personal ego of the intelligent, moral, and religious agent is not a purely ideal and abstract thing but a living and real one. "Because I live, ye shall live also," saith the God of Christians.

As to your statement that the laws of mathematics and ethics are not dependent on the *free will* of God, I have always believed that they were. But it does not follow from this that they are a power superior to him and of the nature of an impersonal God set above and dominating over the personal God. These laws depend

on the very constitution of the eternal and necessary being of God, and as that being is conscious and intelligent he sees them eternally and necessarily in his own proper bosom. It is what the Christian theologian, who perfected the doctrine which he inherited from Plato, admirably says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God . . . and the Word was the Light."

I must beg your pardon for these hurriedly written lines, but if you believe them of any value you may publish them in your magazine with my preceding letter and the answer which you made to it.

If later I can send you a more complete discussion of the subject, I shall do so with pleasure. But to-day I am just on the eve of starting for a tour through Constantinople, Cairo, and Jerusalem.

With sympathetic regards, I remain,

Very truly yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

MISCELLANEOUS.

JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE.

Goethe the Darwinist before Darwin, the positivist before August Comte, the naturalist among bards, and the bard among naturalists, is perhaps the clearest of all the prophets of the Religion of Science. There may be others as great as he in other fields, as in the natural sciences, in special philosophy, in the practical arts, or in sociology, but there is certainly none greater than he as a poet and a sage. His religion is as broad as the whole cosmos, not excluding Christianity, but including it and all other religions, accepting their truths from a higher plane, from the cosmopolitan standpoint of the scientific inquirer. The narrow pulpitist looked upon Goethe as an infidel and a negative spirit, but Goethe replied that he had a faith too. He said :

"Ye faithful, do not claim that your confession
Be truth alone : for we have faith like you.
Science can't be deprived of the possession
Belonging to the world, and to me too."

[Ihr Gläubigen! rühmt nur nicht euern Glauben
Als einzigen : wir glauben auch wie ihr ;
Der Forscher lässt sich keineswegs berauben
Des Erbtheils, aller Welt gegönt—und mir.]

Goethe's *Faust* with all its shortcomings is one of the grandest poems of mankind, not inferior to the *Mahabharata*, *Hesiod*, *Homer*, or the *Divina Comedia*. And it is as much religious poetry as the book of *Job*. It teaches a lesson, pointing out the way of salvation, which is not obtained by a belief in the word, not by the theories of thought, not by reliance on a power, but solely by courageous, self-done deeds. In translating the New Testament *Faust* says :

" 'Tis written : 'In the Beginning was the *Word*.'
Here am I balked : who, now, can help afford ?
The *Word* !—impossible so high to rate it ;
And otherwise must I translate it,
If by the Spirit I am truly taught.
Then thus : 'In the Beginning was the *Thought*.
The first line let me weigh completely,
Lest my impatient pen proceed too fleetly.
Is it the *Thought* which works, creates, indeed ?
'In the Beginning was the *Power*,' I read.
Yet, as I write, a warning is suggested,
That I the sense may not have fairly tested.

The Spirit aids me : now I see the light !
 ' In the Beginning was the Deed,' I write."

—*Trans. by Bayard Taylor.*

Goethe's God, it is true, is not the God of the masses, he is not an individual, but more than any possible individual, however great. Goethe said in reply to those who accused him of pantheism :

" Why do you scoff and scout,
 About the All and One,
 The professor 's a person, no doubt,
 God is none."

[Was soll mir euer Hohn
 Ueber das All und Eine?
 Der Professor ist eine Person,
 Gott ist keine.]

Goethe's God is the eternal rest of law in the unrest of the eternal changes of the world's life ; the sameness in the apparent irregularity, the necessity in haphazard happenings, the cosmic order of the universal in the evolution of infinite particulars. He says :

" When in the infinite appeareth
 The same eternal repetition,
 When in harmonious coalition
 A mighty dome its structure rearth ;
 A rapture thrills through all existence
 All stars, or great or small, are blessed,
 Yet all the strife and all resistance
 In God, the Lord's eternal rest."

[Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe
 Sich wiederholend ewig fließt,
 Das tausendfältige Gewölbe
 Sich kräftig in einander schließt,
 Strömt Lebenslust aus allen Dingen,
 Dem kleinsten wie dem größten Stern,
 Und alles Drängen, alles Ringen
 Ist ewige Ruh in Gott dem Herrn.]

Goethe's psychology, which anticipates all the main practical results of modern investigation, has been the subject of a special article,¹ and we need only add that Goethe while denying the ego-soul, recognised the importance of immortality both as a factor in the world which explains the evolution of life as the product of treasured up souls and as an ideal whose influence upon practical ethics is paramount. Life is transient, but it is our duty to overcome the transiency of life. He says :

" Drop all transiency
 What'er be its claim.
 Ourselves to immortalise,
 That is our aim."

[Nichts vom Vergänglichlichen,
 Wie's auch geschah !
 Uns zu verewigen
 Sind wir ja da.]

Goethe was one of those rare exceptions on whom fate had bestowed almost all the blessings that ever fall to the lot of mortals. He walked on the heights of life

¹ "Goethe a Buddhist," *The Open Court*, No. 445.

and yet saw enough of its tribulations and anxieties to prevent him from falling a prey to shallowness. He was as great as he was happy, and as gifted as successful. He added treasures to the spiritual heirloom of our ancestors that will remain valuable possessions of mankind for all time to come.

P. C.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

GRAINS OF SENSE. By *V. Welby*. London: J. M. Dent & Co. 1897. Pp. 146.

The distinguished authoress of this pretty little volume has devoted much thought to that department of philosophy which deals with the significance of words, and been instrumental in many ways in the furthering of research designed to lead to the clarification of language. The students of correct expression will welcome therefore the appearance of the booklet, which we may say contains in a popular but exact form the philosophical confession of faith of Lady Welby. The great spiritual and practical need of the times, according to the authoress, is to develop immensely the power of significant communication between mind and mind, as distinguished from the physical mechanisms of communication. 'We encourage geographical explorers; let us extend the conception and encourage explorers of the expression-world, sending out well-equipped expeditions into the polar regions of meaning. Let us have laboratories of experimental language. We have already shorthand; let us have short-tongue and short-mind—a larger proportion of meaning to expression, more economy in words, more fulness of thought. To this end, the further application of the principle of the alphabet is suggested, the aid of indicative symbols, typographic or pen gesture on the analogy of mouth-gesture, symbolic art-words composed of art-letters, etc., etc. The enormous time which we spend on learning the spelling of the English language is contrasted with the little time or no time which we spend on acquiring the meanings of the language and in giving precision to these meanings. The way to a rational spelling-reform is pointed out and the potency of the English language as a world-speech after appropriate modification is emphasised. *Apropos* of the wranglings of purists and cranks over reforms in orthography we have the following sense-laden words: "So rigid about the letter and so lax about the spirit: so careful of the petty points of fashion, so careless of the greater points of import: so jealous for the sanctities of convention, so tolerant of the desecration of the inner shrines of speech: so fastidious on what signifies less, and so indifferent on what most of all signifies,—Significance."

We agree perfectly with the general opinions advanced by the authoress. Surely the present development of civilised language is "arbitrary in the bad sense, and capricious, casual, incoherent, chaotic," but considering the invention of printing, the advantages of popular education, and the tremendous increase in the speaking and writing population of modern times, it is hardly more so than it was in the past. The authoress is too hard on "bulls." All living language is built on the corpses of dead bulls. The bulls of the past are the classic expressions of the present. It is not likely that the rustic clowns of ages gone by, from whose speech the creators of literary language must have drawn their material, were less prolific in the delivery of bulls than the unthinking and superficially educated public of to-day. That colossal bull of the French language, the double negative,

which doubtless originated in a loose grammatical solecism similar to a very common slip among vulgar English-speaking people to-day, illogical as it may appear on the face of it, is still absolutely harmless in its present usage, never gives rise to obscurity, and is even cited by logicians as a piece of natural testimony that a double negative is not necessarily an affirmative. Bulls should not be permitted to make language, but the fact is, if we can judge from present data, that language was as much bovine in its origin as it is in its more conscious making to-day.

Most of that which Lady Welby has to say upon this subject, and some of the examples which she gives, are pertinent and should be heeded. But some of them are strained and we cannot regard the criticism of the title of "The Descent of Man" as anything else than a piece of quibbling. The word "descent" is not a metaphor but the description of an actual fact, and should not be contrasted with "ascent," which has a moral and teleological connotation quite foreign to the objective spirit and purpose of Darwin's inquiry. Much that Lady Welby suggests would lead to the gradual banishing of analogy and metaphor altogether from language, a consummation which, seeing that mathematical abstraction and that concise description without analogy which science demands as its ideal is beyond the reach of the ordinary mind, can be considered as scarcely less than chimerical. "Invisible light" may be paradoxical, but to the child studying physics, far from being confusing, it is luminously suggestive and instructive. It is far easier to extend and correct or contradict an old view than to manufacture a new one, valuable as the last process may be for perfected science. It is contradictory to speak of a flattened sphere, yet it is the method of knowledge and conveys far more to the mind of a child than the correct mathematical expression. The method of scientific discovery is the method of *continuity*, consisting in the adaptation of old concepts to new needs, and it is not until perfect familiarity with a given province of thought has been gained that we can invest it with that high abstract and mathematical form which is the ideal of the Universal Real Character that philosophers so ardently long for.

The book of Lady Welby is full of sententious and aphoristic utterances which fully justify its title *Grains of Sense*. We can recommend it unqualifiedly as containing matter which every thinking person should heed, and in view of the present state of linguistic anarchy in our own country, where all expression is running riot and the popular language achieves developments in a decade that formerly would have required centuries, Lady Welby's advice and admonitions are very timely and will afford parmaceti to many an inward linguistic bruise. T. J. McC.

The *Psychologie des Saints* is the interesting theme to which HENRI JOLY has devoted one of the volumes of the novel series *Les Saints*, of which he is the editor. This unique series is published by Victor Lecoffre, Rue Bonaparte, 90, Paris, and already comprises in small, neat, 12mo. volumes, at the low price of two francs each, the following subjects: *Saint Augustin*, by Ad. Hatzfeld; *Sainte Clotilde*, by G. Kurth; *St. Augustin de Cantorbéry et ses compagnons*, by R. P. Brou, S. J.; and *Le Bienheureux Bernardin de Feltre*, by M. E. Flornoy. The remaining volumes are to be written by other well known Catholic professors and scholars of France; the spirit of their composition is to be that of loving admiration and faith both for their subject and for the truth. M. Joly himself has already studied the psychology of Lower Organisms, of Genius and Crime, so that he brings to his task considerable training. He is opposed to the view which

reduces all the manifestations of the human mind, the lowest as well as the highest, to the action of aimless and determined forces, and which sees in crime only a disease and in genius and sainthood only marked and erratic expressions of the spiritual organisation. He believes that we are all made of the same clay, that we all have our places on different rungs of the same ladder, which issues from the same fundamental nature and rises ever nearer to God. It will be seen that his *Psychology of the Saints* is not a study in pathological psychology as the same would be treated by many of his French contemporaries. He rejects the current definitions of mysticism as being the inverted pole of rationalism, despair at achieving anything like reason, and defines it as the pure love of God. This mysticism is the first step to sainthood. While the book contains much good analysis, the real *Psychology of the Saints* still remains to be written.

We and many of the readers of *The Open Court* owe our deep sympathy to Mr. G. J. Harney, who is now lying extremely ill at his home at Richmond-on-Thames, England. Mr. Harney is the last surviving leader of the great Chartist movement and was a warm personal friend of the late Gen. M. M. Trumbull. A man of sterling character and exceptional intellectual ability, he has through a long lifetime been the champion of liberty and progress, and much that has been done in this direction in England during the last half century, has been due to his and his co-workers' labors. Mr. Harney has always been a friend and great admirer of *The Open Court*, and in his brilliant and witty reviews in the *Newcastle Chronicle* has frequently commented on its work with appreciation and interest. He contributed some time ago a fascinating article to *The Open Court* on Abbé Lamennais the Roman Catholic clergyman who was bold enough to take Christianity seriously. We have not failed to urge Mr. Harney to write again for *The Open Court*, but his health failing, he was unable to accede to our solicitations. We print the following extract from a letter from Mrs. Marie Harney, which tells of her husband's sad condition :

"Mr. Harney bids me thank you for your kind sympathy for him. As you are aware, he has been, and still is, very ill. He was slowly getting better ; a sudden relapse occurred from which, however, he seemed recovering when another set-back from which he is now suffering, reduced him to the verge of the grave. For the past ten days he has been in great pain, living simply on liquid food, in small quantities. The doctors seem unable to do him any good. If able to take solid food, there is good hope of recovery ; if unable, he bids me tell you his days are numbered. He furthermore desires me to add, that he wishes he could live in order to show his gratitude to his kind friends. He regrets also that he can do nothing now for *The Monist* and *The Open Court*. If spared he will make amends for his silence at present."

Mr. Harney has a great number of friends on both sides of the Atlantic, and if good wishes could cure his disease he certainly would most speedily recover and rise from his bed to a life of renewed activity and usefulness.

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ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE, the most recent branch of the science of law, so richly elaborated by every method of research, has still to battle for its existence. Wide circles in the world of juridical learning utterly ignore it, or assume a hostile and at best sceptical attitude towards it. Neither the history of law nor the philosophy of jurisprudence has accorded it scientific recognition, and even the tenability of the principles upon which it is based has been characterised as highly questionable.

It is universally true that every new departure in science at first meets with opposition, and that it cannot aspire to recognition until it is in a position to present results that are incontrovertible. Only by presenting such results can it acquire recognised standing in the roll of the sciences, and only by the elaboration of these results can it repel definitively the attacks directed against it. But this process may be expedited by giving in the clearest and most explicit terms possible a sketch of its underlying principles, and so in the present case, while ethnological jurisprudence is still in the initial stages of its development, it will not be amiss, in the interests of our study, to attempt a substantiation of its scientific pretensions. We shall, by so doing, at least throw obstacles in the way of superficial criticism from the traditional standpoint.

Ethnological jurisprudence stands in marked contrast with the tendencies that at present dominate the science of law. Its method of procedure is fundamentally inductive, and has for its starting-

¹ Translated from the German by Thomas J. McCormack

point the customs and jural¹ concepts of all the nations of the earth. Its method furthermore is specifically comparative-ethnological; that is to say, it is on the one hand socio-psychological and on the other hand comparative in the sense that it proceeds by comparison even where the historical connexion between the facts of the jural life is lacking.

It is thus opposed to—

1. Every philosophy of jurisprudence which is essentially deductive in its methods.
2. Every system of jurisprudence founded upon the law of a single nation or a single group of nations.
3. Every system of jurisprudence which is individuo-psychological in its origin.
4. All investigations of historical jurisprudence which on principle do not quit the ground of historical connexion in the treatment of the facts of jural life.

These innovations have given to ethnological jurisprudence its peculiar impress, and it is this peculiarity that demands scientific vindication.

The first point of view that presents itself for the examination of the jural order is unquestionably the individuo-psychological. For the domain of jural life comprehends the action of the forces that emanate from individuals, and the law finds its most immediate expression in the jural sense of the individual. It is daily born anew in the depths of the human soul. Here it appears in the form of passion and desire, so soon as a misdeed is committed, and urges to vengeance and expiation. The written law of statute-books and the courts, however, is but the mediate expression of the jural life.

The first point of view presenting itself is therefore the following: to regard all jural order as the product of the differences and coincidences of the jural sense of human individuals, and to endeavor to explain the same from the nature of man, that is, from the nature of the individual.

This idea still rules supreme in modern jurisprudence. We meet on all sides with arguments explanatory of state and law, which are derived from the nature of the human individual. And seeing that the individuo-psychological method of investigation derives its materials directly from the living source of life, while

¹ "By the adjective *jural* we shall denote that which has reference to the doctrine of rights and obligations; as by the adjective "moral" we denote that which has reference to the doctrine of duties."—*Whewell*. (Quoted by Translator.)

the socio-psychological starts from the jural phenomena of the life of all nations, deriving thence its inductions as to the causes which underlie the same, certainly, if it were possible to explain jural life adequately from the nature of the human individual, the individuo-psychological method would have the preference.

But this latter method does not lead far towards the understanding of jural life.* The sequence of causes soon vanishes in so inaccessible a sphere as the personality of the individual, and true scientific inquiry is displaced by ingenuity and sophistry.

Viewed from the individuo-psychological standpoint, the facts of jural life are partly matter of our subjective and partly matter of our objective experience.

Matter of subjective experience is merely our own individual jural sense, that is our individual consciousness as bearing upon right and wrong. This individual jural sense is made up of a sum-total of psychical activities, of which we become conscious when from inward or outward excitation we are confronted with the question as to whether something is right or wrong. These psychical activities are partly feelings and desires, and partly judgments, the former tending towards action and the latter tending towards expression by word or sign. Jural feelings are principally feelings of indignation as when an injustice is experienced by an individual, a feeling of fear as when the individual is affected by an inclination to do wrong, a feeling of penitence as when the individual has committed a wrong. With the feeling of indignation is joined a desire for vengeance, with the feeling of penitence a desire of atonement, the former tending towards an act of vengeance and the latter towards an act of expiation. The jural judgments of individuals are not complete judgments; they are based upon an undefined sense of right and wrong. In the consciousness of the individual there exists no standard of right and wrong under which every single circumstance giving rise to the formation of a jural judgment can be subsumed. A simple instinct impels the individual to declare an action right or wrong.

It thus becomes evident that the individuo-psychological analysis of the individual jural sense, in so far as it rests upon subjective experience, can afford only meagre results. All psychical phenomena of the jural sense are, so far as regards our subjective experience, ready-made products. The psychological development of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, is not accessible to our inner experience. The psychological processes whereby we be-

come conscious of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, lie without the reach of consciousness.

Further, subjective observation of the psychical processes from which the jural sense springs, bears the same character as subjective observation of psychical processes generally. Systematic self-observation is impossible, inasmuch as the observing subject and the observed object are one and the same, and the very act of observing thus modifies the object observed.¹ It is likewise impossible to evoke, arbitrarily or artificially, a jural desire or an instinctive jural judgment; they always appear instantaneously and unbidden in consciousness. As material for observation, accordingly, there remains only the recollection of such occurrences in the mind of the individual.

Still another drawback to the employment of subjective observation for scientific inquiry is the fact, that it is almost utterly impossible to distinguish in general between jural feelings, desires, and judgments, and moral feelings, desires, and judgments.

Scientific inquiry attains more favorable results when it adopts as the subject of investigation the expressions of the individual jural conscience in the external world of sense—that is, the phenomena of the individual jural sense as appearing in acts on the one hand and in words and signs on the other. Here self-observation discovers facts which are represented as events in the outward world of sense, and which are consequently subject to external observation. True, the observation of the outward expressions of the individual jural conscience in acts, words, and signs affords scarcely more material for the psychological analysis of the individual jural sense than the direct inward observation of the same. The material for observation increases, however, if the observer, not confining himself to the expressions of his own jural sense, compares with these the expressions of the jural sense of other people, or even compares the expressions of the jural sense of other people with each other.

From this method dissimilarities in the phenomena of the jural consciousness appear at once, and these are in a high degree adapted to throw light upon its nature. In the first place it is possible to distinguish differences in the jural sense of individuals according to their ages. It is possible to follow the jural sense of children in its development. We are also able to fix degrees of jural sense in youth and manhood, perhaps too in old age.

¹ Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, abridged by Rig; German translation by Kirchmann, 1883, I. p. 13 ff. Wundt, *Logik*, 1883, II., p. 482.

It will be possible, furthermore, to point out variations of jural sense between the male and female sexes. Then further, there are to be noted marked irregularities of jural sense resulting from derangement; which derangement may rest on biological as well as sociological causes. Mental diseases, affecting the whole consciousness of the individual, affect the jural sense also. Besides these, there are a great number of persons whose jural sense, though not disturbed by any psychical disarrangement, is far below the normal state; namely, criminals. Such persons, endowed with a jural sense of a socio-pathological kind, furnish the material for a separate branch of psychology; viz., criminal psychology. Marked irregularities in the individual jural sense may be further distinguished according to the social circle in which the individual moves. Even in a single nation these irregularities are quite considerable; according to caste, culture, occupation, politics, religion, and the like. Yet the most considerable deviations are to be found between the jural consciences of different peoples, and they are more considerable according as the difference in civilisation is greater, or as the development of the same has been more unique.

In all these ways it would be possible to observe the expressions of the individual jural sense and by a process of individual-psychological comparison to arrive at scientific results. It is evident, though, that it would be difficult to collect the material for observation, and that the observations of individuals themselves to this end would be subject to innumerable sources of error.

These observations could not acquire scientific value unless made upon the most extensive plan, and with persons of different ages, different sex, different intellectual ability, different social standing, and different nationality; and unless the material accumulated were so considerable that all the sources of error in individual observation could be eliminated. To limit the observations to a narrow field, would necessarily yield incorrect results; for it is now beyond question that the jural sense of individuals is subject to the most varied differentiations. The most distorted presentation of all, however, is produced when the inquirer confines himself mainly to his own individual jural sense, and persuades himself that this should determine the conduct of humanity. He has here merely systematised his own jural consciousness; manifestly a doleful scientific result.

How is it possible to observe the manifestations of the individual jural sense, which appear only instinctively and occasion-

ally, exhaustively enough to obtain really valuable scientific material for a causal analysis of the jural order? It is unquestionably hopeless.

And even were it possible to proceed thus, we should be far from exhausting in this way the *data* of jural life. Jural life, as a social province, is by no means made up of immediate expressions of the individual jural sense only; there are also mediate and indirect expressions of the same in it. The positive laws of nations with their statutes and provisions, have, it is true, their first origin in the expressions of the jural sense of individuals. But after these have become positive laws they are no longer the immediate expressions of the individual jural sense, but the objective products of the jural sense of whole spheres of social development, of countless individuals with variously formed jural consciences—individuals of existing generations as well as individuals that have long passed away.

It would be a manifestly precarious attempt to seek the explanation of these phenomena in the nature of the human individual itself. Unlimited scope would be given to caprice and imagination.

And yet, in the face of all, this method of studying the Science of Jurisprudence is still greatly in vogue, and meets with unqualified approval from contemporary students. They endow the human individual with certain instincts, the social instinct and the instinct of self-preservation: or they will have it pursue different ends according to its constitutional bent, happiness, liberty, etc., and upon these phantasms they build their structure as becomes the kindly heart and academic culture of the philosopher. These artistic productions are often charming reading, often teem with clever conceits, and give us a pretty picture of how blissful all would be, were it not so different in the world. If these works did not claim to be more than light and entertaining reading, we might joyfully welcome them. But they pretend to be more; they assert that they are scientific, and would actually influence the practical mechanism of the jural order. Herein is their danger. Ethnological Jurisprudence, in my opinion, must stand aloof from all attempts to define State and Law on the basis of individual psychology. And now to the discussion and proof.

* * *

It is not only in the province of Jurisprudence that we find attempts to explain the phenomena of social life on the basis of individual psychology. This method is common to all the other so-

cial sciences. It rests upon a broad and fundamental psychological principle, which at the present day shows signs of instability and will sooner or later be completely overthrown.

All human science takes on a different form, according to whether we assume that the nature of man can be determined from his *ego* alone, or that the soul and *ego* of man are not identical but that man is conscious of a portion only of his psychical activity. In the first instance, the psychology of the individual is the irreversible basis of human science; in the second, we have to look about us for broader foundations. Ethnology, and likewise ethnological jurisprudence, is founded upon the second view. It assumes that, in the individual consciousness, only a small portion of his psychical activity is manifest to the individual and that the greater part is lost to his consciousness. It regards individual psychology, therefore, as no proper basis of science.

That which we call our consciousness is in any case but an infinitesimally small portion of the totality of psychic life active within us. It hovers like a tenuous and shimmering cloud above an unfathomable ocean. All manner of images rise from the depths of our soul, yet few assume such sharpness of contour as to be recognised. By far the greater portion of our spiritual life remains unknown to us. By far the greatest portion of the spiritual life of which we are conscious, is known to us only as the resultant product of unconscious psychical processes, and not as something in process of production. We remain totally unconscious of those spiritual activities which touch most nearly the vital centre of our being, the activities which create on the one side an *ego* and on the other a world. At the instant a child first becomes conscious of itself, the *ego* and the world are already existent: their birth is concomitant with the act of consciousness. The unconscious activities of the soul have shaped them, until, appearing as ready-formed products, they give rise to that radical contrariety by which man becomes conscious of himself and a world. We remain utterly unconscious, too, of those psychical workings which give to the world its sensible character and to the *ego* its spiritual. Our world, in every phase in which it is accessible to us, is virtually a product of psychical activities acting unconsciously within us. Light, heat, color, sound, taste, smell, pressure, weight, even space and time, do not belong to the world as such: on the contrary they are creations of mental activities, corresponding to the psychological activities of our sensory and central organs, and project without a world created within.

Rokitansky¹ expresses himself upon this subject as follows :

"We see the world that surrounds us by means of light ; but it is now known that light does not exist as such apart from us ; on the contrary it is vibrations of ether, which we transpose into light, and recognise as such, by means of mechanisms of specific irritability located beyond the sensory organs proper. Thus we ourselves illuminate space and come to know things therein through their relation to light ; we acquire knowledge not only as to their surface and outlines, but also as to their inner constitution. It is likewise the vibrations of sounding bodies of different magnitude and velocity, taken up and communicated to us by the air, that we convert into sound and tone. And so, too, the things which we perceive through impressions upon the other senses, are, apart from our conception of them, quite different, and undoubtedly consist of the molecular or molar motions of matter. It must strike every impartial person as strange that we recognise as external objects things of which the conception is really formed within us. How does this come ? There is undoubtedly a subjective organic activity present here.

"This much is known : that the impelling power in obedience to which we project objects conceived, outside the subject conceiving them, must lie in the inward organisation of the mind ; that the conception of things in space is a function of the organs of our cognitive faculty which even in dreams creates in our imagination an external world.

"The perceptible world about us is essentially a creation of our personality ; it is by the functioning of inner organs that objects appear as things outside of us, as things of definite quality and form, of definite size and greatness. Further, when we behold in the genesis of things and in their different stages and mutations a succession and a connexion, we say that the succession takes place in *time* and that the connexion between the changes is a *causal* one. But when we ask ourselves how we arrive at these conclusions, it turns out that we do so by virtue of subjective forms which must lie in our organisation and by means of which we are in fact enabled to apprehend successions and connexions."

Even the world that remains after we remove the mantle of sensible phenomena, the world of ether and matter vibrations, is still not the world proper ; it is the world only as it appears to human cognitive activity.

¹ *Der selbst. Werth des Wissens*, 1869, p. 6, et seq.

The psychical operations, too, that create our ego are totally hidden from us.

And even the greater part of those psychical operations of which we *are* conscious, are presented to consciousness as finished products, the genesis of which took place in unconsciousness. Ratiocination alone is effected wholly in consciousness. Feelings and desires come to consciousness as results only, and many judgments are not logical judgments, but incompleted ones, lying, with the principle upon which they were formed, in the province of the unconscious.

If all this be correct, it is evident that our consciousness is in no wise fitted for the thorough comprehension of human nature; for only an insignificant portion of our spiritual life ever becomes immediately conscious. What we are able to fathom by self-contemplation is soon exhausted. Yet unlimited is the province of knowledge that opens before us, if to the inward observation of self we add outward observation by the senses; in other words, if, from the phenomena of unconscious psychic life as expressed in the outward world of sense, we draw inferences as to the unconscious activities at work within us.

To this end the whole sensible world presents itself. Our sensible world is not the real world-in-itself. It is merely a world-image, made by man, created by human psychical activities. From this, therefore, we shall be able to gather a great part of our unconscious psychical life, and thus come infinitely nearer the essence of our being than would be possible through the introspective observation of our own psychical activities.

In this way we arrive, not at the psychology of the past, which attempted to unfold the nature of man from the ego, but at a psychology which will endeavor to disclose the same from the world-image created by man.

* * *

Among the phenomena of our sensible world which admit of inferences as to unconscious psychical activities, the phenomena of social life assume a prominent place.

And social life, though made up of the activities of individuals, supposably in possession of free will, is also essentially instinctive, resting upon the more or less unconscious impulses of the individual. Whosoever has had to do with the more intricate problems of ethnology, will entertain no doubt whatever of this fact.

Turn where we will in the domain of social life, we shall every-

where see fixed social laws at work, everywhere meet with a tendency of development, which leading through centuries and centuries, makes towards some definite end, and of whose aims the individuals comprehended in the movement have no idea. Contemplate the history of the growth of language, the development of forms of divinity, of art, of legal institutions, even of fashions and utensils; they come, grow, and go, like things of life. There is but little here that is the product of individual reflexion; almost everything is of organic growth. The individual follows blind impulses and coercive social conditions; the individual most frequently intends the very opposite of what he produces by his work, and all that he does accomplish, unless fitting in with the course of organic development, will soon come to naught.

That the individual in social life acts for the most part instinctively, we may ascertain by self-observation and by the observation of other individuals. A man, in speaking to another, employs the words he needs quite instinctively; they come to him, as a rule, without further reflexion. He need not know anything of the grammar of the language he speaks, and yet may employ the language with the greatest ease. A man who is confronted with the question whether he is acting advantageously or not, whether he is committing an act of justice or injustice, generally decides from pure instinct, occasionally from feeling, but seldom through clear reasoning, and then always liable to the danger of mistake. A poem, a melody, a picture, a statue, arises before the mind's eye of an artist: something comes to him. Not until something comes to him, can he elaborate it further by thought. Creations that are not unconsciously born in the artist are not works of art, although every artifice of æsthetic manipulation have been employed. Every original and powerful idea in science is born of unconsciousness like a stroke of lightning.

We need but glance at every-day life to become convinced of how instinctive in its workings the whole mechanism of human existence is. Take the habits and customs of ordinary social life. When do we ever hear of reasons for acting in this manner or in that. We act so because things are not otherwise than they are, because we must, because others do so. We all know how impossible it is to convince a person who can advance no reasons for his conduct, that his way of thinking is wrong. If there were a possible prospect of being able to do this in the case of a man, it would certainly fail with a woman, whose springs of life are pre-eminently more instinctive than man's. In fact, a man who does not act and

live instinctively is ridiculed and despised : he is no longer capable of inspiration and enthusiasm for any cause.

The deposits, therefore, of the unconscious workings of the human mind in the customs and conceptions of nations, are a source of incalculable importance to the understanding of the human soul ; and the history of social activity furnishes an infinitely more copious material to this end than could be obtained by introspection and observation of the psychical life of a single human individual. An important part of our psychical life, which for the most part does not directly appear in consciousness, can thus be gathered from the customs and conceptions of the peoples of the earth.

Our statements as to consciousness in general are likewise true of the jural sense. The jural sense by no means exhausts the totality of psychical processes which constitute the jural life of a man. More properly, the majority of these processes come into the jural consciousness as results, as feelings and desires, or as instinctive jural judgments ; while the genesis of these psychical formations are hidden in unconsciousness. But in the jural institutions and conceptions of nations a great deal of jural life comes to light that remains unknown to the individual, and so it is possible to penetrate much farther by this method into the cognition of the human mind in its jural aspects than was possible by the observation of one's own jural sense or by observing the expressions of the jural sense of single individuals.

But apart from this broad psychological standpoint, the very nature of Law itself indicates that the individuo-psychological method can lead to nothing, and that only the socio-psychological method can produce satisfactory results. It will appear on closer observation that the individual jural sense is not the creator of the jural order, but on the contrary, that the individual jural sense is a product of law as a sphere of social life. Only in so far as the jural sense is *consciousness per se* are we concerned with a biological basis ; in so far, however, as it is a *jural* consciousness, the foundation is sociological. The human consciousness has a physical basis in the central organs of the body, but we should search in vain in the human body for an organ that is the seat of the moral or jural sense. A human being, reared in a state of perfect isolation, would think because he possessed a brain and had to use it in the struggle with nature. But we should find no trace of a moral sense or a jural sense in such a person. They are both the exclusive product of life in human society. They first arise through

adaptation to the social relations in which men live, and not until this adaptation is perfected does human consciousness acquire, among innumerable other notions, conceptions of right and wrong, of rights and obligations.

The jural order, therefore, is not to be explained from the nature of the human individual, but from the nature of the social bodies in which it has been evolved. And it is only from this source that the individual jural sense also becomes intelligible.

Although the jural sense acts purely from instinct within us, it is nevertheless the creation of social and not of individual factors. This will appear from the fact that it acts in opposition to individual inclination. How are we to find one biological basis for the two psychical forces that come into conflict when the individual becomes possessed of an inclination to commit a crime and his jural sense restrains him from it? And if there be no biological basis, then the psychological theory that a person can control his sensuous inclinations by the innate rational faculty rests upon imagination. In reality the controlling element here is not a biological or an individuo-psychological factor, it is a socio-psychological one.

The most telling proof that the individual jural sense is not a biological but a sociological product is found in the circumstance that, apart from the changes it suffers as consciousness proper (through age, insanity, etc.), its content is determined by the character of the social community in which the individual lives or has grown up. Were this not the case the jural sense of Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, and Chinese, who had attained the same degree of intellectual culture, would be one and the same. But this is obviously not the case. Identity of jural sense means identity of social organisation.

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The individuo-psychological standpoint, accordingly, is inadequate for the explanation of the facts of jural life and we must expect really valuable scientific results only from a socio-psychological analysis of jural phenomena.

The socio-psychological method proceeds, in its investigation of the causes of jural life, not from the human individual, but from the forms which Law assumes in society, from jural customs, jural conceptions, and jural institutions as they are met with in the life of nations themselves. All these forms arose originally from expressions of the individual jural sense, and these expressions are in their turn founded upon social instincts developed by life in hu-

man society. By frequent repetition and the elimination of concrete notions, these expressions gradually lose their individual character. They become expressions of the corporate jural sense of a concrete sphere of social development. In this way a nation acquires a set of jural customs and jural conceptions, which regulate its acts and judgments, and whose conservation is entrusted to the government of the social sphere in which they were evolved. In this so-called positive law, the organic law of a nation assumes an objective form. It is a precipitate, in a social shape, of the jural sense, just as religious rites, forms of divinity, and doctrinal faith are the precipitates of the religious sense, or human language of human thought. In the positive law of a definite epoch lies, essentially, the normal jural sense of the totality of individuals embraced within a single sphere of social development, as founded upon the jural order transmitted from previous generations.

These positive laws constitute the combined data of the socio-psychological investigations of jural life; and they are full of promise. In the evolution of positive laws the creative national genius has instinctively accomplished a scientific work, such as could only be obtained by thoroughly analysing the utterances of the jural sense of all the individuals that now live or ever have lived within the social sphere governed by the positive law in question.

The study of the individual jural sense is thus in reality unnecessary, and the science of jurisprudence may begin at once with the analysis of positive laws.

The question now arises as to what method of conducting the analysis of jural life, as a field of social activity, will be most productive of results. And this question we shall answer in our second and concluding article.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

V. To the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans.

OUR MINDS still bear the fresh impression of the terrible events in Samaria and Jerusalem. What will be the fate of the blood-stained usurper of the throne?

It was but six years until righteous retribution overtook Athaliah. Jehoiada the priest, who had taken his nephew, the crown-prince Joash, into the temple for safety and there kept him hidden, established relations with the captains of the royal body-guard and managed to win them for his plan. We learn in this connexion that the whole royal body-guard did duty in the temple on the Sabbath, and that only one-third of them returned to the palace for service there, while two-thirds remained in the temple as a sort of guard of honor. One Sabbath when there was a numerous concourse in the temple Jehoiada detained the whole body-guard in the temple, so that the royal palace was without any military protection whatever and Athaliah had no troops of any kind at her command. Now Jehoiada brings the seven-year-old crown-prince to what we would call the royal box in the temple, and there anoints and crowns him, whereupon a thundering "Hurrah" from the guards and the whole people greets the legitimate ruler. At the sound Athaliah goes to the temple to learn the cause of it; at the command of Jehoiada she is seized and taken out and slain at the entrance to the temple; the temple she had erected to Baal is destroyed and the priest appointed by her likewise slain.

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

From the forty years' reign of Joash only one occurrence is reported in detail, which however throws a peculiar and glaring light upon the conditions of the time. As a matter of course the priest Johoiada at first conducted the government as guardian for his nephew, and the authority and influence of the priesthood was greatly increased by this relationship; but unfortunately the priesthood made a very material use of this. In the twenty-third year of Joash there was a sharp accounting between him and his uncle the priest. The priests were in the habit of receiving from the people voluntary offerings for the service and the temple, but were evidently allowing these gifts to find their way to their private coffers; therefore the king deprived them of this office of trust, and a contribution-box was placed in the temple, into which thereafter all offerings were to be put. When this "chest with a hole in the lid," as the Bible account briefly but clearly describes it, was full, royal officials came and emptied it, and carried the money away; and this arrangement became permanent, being expressly mentioned as late as the time of King Josiah.

Jehu died without having been molested, and bequeathed the usurped throne to his descendants even to the fourth generation; but then an even more fearful fate than in the case of Athaliah overtook the ruler.

From this point on, Assyria is the determining factor, and the whole history of Israel is intelligible only when we know the history of Assyria. This may also be maintained in a certain sense for earlier times. The pan-Israelitish kingdom of David would not have been possible save for the fact that Assyria, which had already prepared under Tiglath-pileser I., 1110, to establish itself in Coele-syria, was in David's time in such a condition of weakness and impotence that we do not even know the names of its kings for a century and a half.

From the time of Salmanasar II. on, Assyrian and Hebrew history are, as it were, two connected vessels, where the height of the water in the one is always governed by that in the other: if Assyria was powerful, Israel was prosperous; but if the power of Assyria was declining, Israel suffered accordingly.

In the year 842, probably the date of the two violent usurpations in Samaria and Jerusalem, Salmanasar marched for the fifth time against Damascus. This time he succeeded in inflicting upon King Hazael a decisive defeat. He besieged him in his capital, but could not take Damascus. Under the circumstances it was a correct and reasonable policy, humanly considered, for Jehu to throw

himself into the arms of the Assyrians, the mighty enemies of his hostile neighbor: he sent a considerable tribute to Salmanasar, which the latter caused to be depicted among other things upon his famous black obelisk.

And yet, Jehu had reckoned without his host, as the saying goes. Salmanasar came again, indeed, in 839; but then there followed a period of thirty-eight years in which no Assyrian made his appearance in that region. Now the people of Damascus threw themselves with all the force of hatred and revenge upon Israel,—with what result we will let the Book of Kings tell: “In the days of Jehu the Lord began to cut Israel short, and Hazael smote them in all the coasts of Israel.” He seems to have taken from Israel the whole of the territory east of the Jordan, and he carried his warlike and victorious incursions even to the country of the Philistines: he took and destroyed Gath, and Joash of Judah was enabled to ransom Jerusalem from siege only by the delivery of all the treasures in temple and palace.

While the situation under Jehu was sad, it became absolutely hopeless under his son and successor, Jehoahaz.” “At that time,” says the Book of Kings, “the anger of the Lord was kindled “against Israel, and He delivered them into the hand of Hazael “king of Aram (Syria) and into the hand of Ben-hadad, the son of “Hazael, continually. He left to Jehoahaz but ten chariots and “fifty horsemen and ten thousand foot soldiers, for the king of “Aram (Syria) had destroyed them and ground them to dust.”

By the most probable assumption, Jehoahaz is the unnamed king in whose reign occurred the siege of Samaria reported in the story of the prophet Elisha, when famine raged so frightfully that mothers slew and devoured their own children, and when one of these wretched women appealed to the king because she had shared her son the day before with another woman and the latter now refused to reciprocate in kind. But this siege was suddenly raised because Ben Hadad received tidings that his own land was threatened by an invading foe. This foe must have been the Assyrians.

In fact the Assyrians are again found in Coelesyria in the years 805, 804, and 803, and strange to say it is a woman who begins the mighty advance of the Assyrian arms. The nominal ruler in Nineveh was King Rammannirari III., but being yet a boy, his mother, the Babylonian princess Sammuramat, wielded the sceptre for him, and with a strong hand: she resumed the policy of her father-in-law, Salmanasar, and sent out her generals and troops

into all quarters of the world to announce to astonished humanity that a woman was preparing to renew the glory of Assur.

There can be no doubt that we must recognise in this vigorous and energetic Babylonian princess and Assyrian queen-mother the Semiramis of the Greeks. And among other places she sent her troops three years in succession into Coelesyria, and thus Israel had a breathing spell; Joash, the brave and vigorous successor of Jehoahaz, succeeded in defeating Ben-hadad three times decisively, and in giving Israel relief from this tormentor. But Joash must needs turn his victorious arms against Judah also. There King Joash, after a reign of forty years, had been murdered by two high officials and succeeded by his son Amaziah, who avenged the death of his father upon the murderers, but had only the murderers executed and not their families. He also succeeded in defeating the Edomites and in again subjecting this old province.

What follows must be told in the very language of the Bible account: "Then Amaziah sent messengers to Jehoash (Joash) king of Israel, saying: 'Come, let us look one another in the face!' And Jehoash answered Amaziah, saying: 'The thistle that was in Lebanon sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying: "Give thy daughter to my son to wife." And there passed by a wild beast that was in Lebanon, and trode down the thistle. "Thou hast indeed smitten Edom, and thy heart hath lifted thee up; glory thereof, and abide at home; for why shouldst thou fall to thy hurt and Judah with thee?" But Amaziah would not hear. And so they looked one another in the face at Beth-shemesh. And Judah was put to the worse before Israel; and they fled every man to his tent. And Jehoash took Amaziah prisoner at Beth-shemesh, and brought him to Jerusalem, and brake down the wall of Jerusalem a space of four hundred cubits, and took away all the gold and silver in the temple and in the palace, and hostages also, and returned to Samaria." Indeed the conjecture has been put forth, and the attempt made to support it, that Jehoash put a complete end to the kingdom of Judah for the time being and formally incorporated it with the kingdom of Israel.

Amaziah came to a like end with his father Joash. The people grew weary of the rule of the indiscreet and thoughtless monarch and murdered him. They took his sixteen-year-old son, Azariah or Uzziah—he has both names—and seated him upon his father's throne. Uzziah was evidently not the eldest son and heir-apparent, but this time the popular choice had hit upon the right man. His reign of fifty-two years must have been powerful and prosperous.

ous and a period of new progress for Judah, although we know surely from this whole long time only the one fact that Uzziah reconquered the Edomite seaport Elath and fortified it. But the descriptions by the prophet Isaiah, who was consecrated prophet in the year of Uzziah's death, declare loudly and clearly that outward conditions in Judah at that time were prosperous and even flourishing.

But we must now return to Israel. In the year 797 the Assyrians had finally taken Damascus, though they did not immediately dethrone King Mari, son of Ben-hadad, but allowed the country to continue its existence. But in the following fifty years they returned five times, so that a lasting restoration of the kingdom was impossible. Thus Israel was left free, and the son of Jehoash, Jereboam II., succeeded not only in regaining the former possessions, but in taking from Damascus a part of its territory and subduing all Moab, and thus in restoring the kingdom of Israel to the same compass as in the time of David. He ruled over the whole country from Edom to Damascus, and seems to have been on friendly terms with Uzziah of Judah; at least we hear of no dissension between them.

Unfortunately we know no details of the forty-one years' reign of Jeroboam II. But the light which Jeroboam caused once more to illumine Israel was only the glow of evening, a last flickering of the dying taper. Under Jeroboam's son, Zachariah, Nemesis overtook the house of Jehu: after a rule of six months he was murdered by a certain Shallum, who in his turn was overthrown after one month by Menahem and slain in a war waged with barbarous cruelty. And now destiny came upon Israel with giant strides.

In the year 745 a usurper named Pul had mounted the Assyrian throne, and as a sort of declaration of his purposes he adopted the name of the first great Assyrian conqueror, Tiglath-pileser. And he carried out his programme with brilliant success. As early as 745 he had begun systematically to conquer Coelesyria. Menahem took pains to purchase his friendship and protection by means of a tribute of a thousand talents of silver. This tribute was raised by a poll tax, and Menahem demanded of every man of means in Israel fifty shekels of silver. This is an interesting item for the student of national economy, as it proves that there were at that time in Israel 60,000 men of means. And Menahem did manage to die a peaceful death and was able to bequeath the kingdom to his son Pekahiah, who, however, was soon slain by an adjutant

named Pekah, who mounted the throne destined to be the next to the last king of Samaria.

And now begins an almost incredible spectacle. The doves over which the hawk is already hovering ready for his mortal swoop, begin pecking and fighting one another. In Jerusalem the crown had just been assumed by Ahaz, the grandson of Azariah, evidently still very young and of very youthful character. Israel and Damascus profit by his weak and unpopular rule. They combine against Judah in order to drive the house of David from the throne and make the king a vassal dependent on them. First they expel the Judeans from Elath, which they give back to the Edomites, and invade Judah itself, bringing it into direst distress. The capital, Jerusalem, was besieged and hard beset, and this situation probably brought about that resort to the last remedy of despair, reported of Ahaz by the Book of Kings: he sacrificed his own son, just as King Mesha of Moab in extreme distress made a burnt offering upon the walls of his beleaguered city of the son who was to succeed him as king.

Finally Ahaz knew no other way out of the difficulty but to send a message to Tiglath-pileser, saying: "I am thy servant and thy son; come up and save me out of the hand of the king of Syria (Aram) and of the king of Israel." That this petition was supported by jingling arguments is a matter of course. Under the circumstances Tiglath-pileser would perhaps have interfered of his own accord; at any rate he did not wait for a second invitation, but came straightway. Damascus was besieged and a part of the army sent against Israel. Pekah's life was ended by the murderous steel of a certain Hoshea, who was recognised as an Assyrian vassal but was compelled to resign the country east of the Jordan and the entire North to Assyria. After a siege of three years Damascus was taken, King Rezin was executed, and his country appropriated as an Assyrian province.

Thus the kingdom of Damascus had vanished and Judah and the decimated remainder of Israel had become dependencies of Assyria. Ahaz understood the situation, and was shrewd enough to keep quiet, but in Israel the old, defiant spirit of independence flashed forth mightily.

In the year 727 the powerful Tiglath-pileser had died, and at about the same time Egypt had received an energetic and enterprising ruler in the forceful Ethiopian prince Shabakah (also Sabe, Sebech, Sewe), the Biblical So. For Egypt it was a vital matter that the Assyrians should not establish themselves on her border; self-

preservation compelled her to interpose. Therefore Shabakah entered into negotiations with the rulers in Palestine, and Hoshea allowed himself to be deluded by the voice of the siren, and broke his allegiance to the Assyrians. Forthwith the son of Tiglath-pileser, Shalmaneser IV., marched against him. Hoshea indeed surrendered and was imprisoned; but Samaria itself, even without a king, made desperate resistance; only after three years did the Assyrians succeed in overcoming the creation of Omri. It was taken in the year 722, while the Egyptians and Ethiopians never lifted a hand for its relief.

This is the end of the Kingdom of Israel. The Assyrians seized the country as a province and put it under the immediate rule of Assyria. But they did not destroy Samaria itself. On the contrary it became the seat of the Assyrian prefect, after 27,280 persons, that is, certainly the whole population which had survived the siege, had been carried away from it into exile.

The opinion is very prevalent that the whole population of Israel was carried away to Assyria, but this is decidedly an error. On the other hand, the Assyrians flooded the land with foreign colonists, thus entirely destroying its nationality; in Judea it soon became the custom to regard the Samaritans as half heathen. The fact that the race, surrounded by powerful enemies and in the midst of domestic anarchy and constant revolutions, nevertheless maintained itself with honor for over two hundred years and finally perished honorably, is a shining proof of its inherent worth and of its indestructible vitality. Yet even after its destruction the kingdom of Israel was pursued by misfortune: an undeserved reproach clings to its memory.

Later Judean historiography, which fixed the picture of Israelitish history for all following times, and whose views have entered into our very flesh and blood as Bible history, sees in the House of David the legitimate and divinely appointed dynasty for all Israel, and in the Temple of Solomon the only legitimate sanctuary for all Israel, and accordingly regards the ten tribes as rebels and heretics, who have renounced through wicked arrogance and sinful defiance the legitimate dynasty and the true religion. The final consequence of this view appears in the latest historical book of the Bible, the Book of Chronicles, to which only Judah is Israel, and which consequently ignores entirely the kingdom of the ten tribes and tells after the division in the kingdom only of the kingdom of Judah. Indeed, some have gone so far as to regard the claim of the kingdom of the ten tribes to the name of the Promise, the name

Israel, as boundless presumption and an utterly unjustified pretension. But this whole point of view is unhistorical. The centre of gravity of the race, materially as well as intellectually, was in fact with the kingdom of the ten tribes: it was really the people of Israel, beside which Judah can only be regarded as a part which had separated from the whole body. That the kingdom of Judah was only an appendix to the more powerful neighbor kingdom until after the destruction of Samaria is shown as plainly as possible by the accounts of the Book of Kings itself.

The religious judgment of later times has been influenced by the bull-cult, which was practised officially in the kingdom of the ten tribes. But in this connexion the fact is highly noteworthy, and yet is not generally given a clear explanation, that we do not hear a single word of rebuke on this subject from the prophet Elijah. When he denounces Baal in Samaria and Israel, he is simply advocating the "calves of Dan and Bethel" as the only customary form of worship in the kingdom of Israel, which he himself did not attack. The view that this whole species of worship was pure heathenism, and the worship of God in an image folly and absurdity, is first found in the prophet Hosea, and is an outgrowth of literary prophecy.

In the pre-prophetic times according to the express testimony of the Book of Kings itself, religious conditions in Judah were not a whit better than in Israel, indeed we have documentary evidence of the worst distortions and perversions only in Judah. And especially let us not forget that the greatest spiritual power that ever arose in Israel, prophecy, is, if I may use the expression, an exclusive growth of North Israel, which bloomed and developed on the soil of the kingdom of the ten tribes: Joseph, and not Judah, gave this divine blessing to mankind. Samuel, Elijah, and Hosea were North Israelites, and even the native Judean Amos worked exclusively in and for Israel.

With the loss of national and political independence this relation changes immediately: Samaria is thenceforth only an Assyrian province, and Judah receives the inheritance. After 722 Judah really became Israel, and the spiritual life too is centred in Jerusalem: the prophet Nahum, for instance, although a native of Galilee, regards himself altogether as a Judean, and does not even connect with the destruction of the universal empire of Assyria the hope of a restoration of the kingdom of the ten tribes.

True, Judah was also an Assyrian dependency, and remained so a whole century; but if it dispatched its annual tribute duti-

fully and conscientiously to Nineveh, that was all the Assyrian government cared for. In domestic affairs it was still wholly its own master, and could develop unchecked and unhindered; indeed, the question may fairly be raised whether the dependency on Assyria was not actually a blessing for its interior development, inasmuch as it guaranteed a positive security and permanence of conditions and relieved it of the necessity of cultivating international politics, for which the petty state of Judah, about the size of the English county of Kent, or half again as large as Rhode Island, had neither the power nor the means, and in which it would inevitably have worn itself out. Hence we can fully comprehend how a man like the prophet Isaiah, who was certainly a genuine patriot and did not underestimate the destiny of his people, could actually regard it as the object of his life to keep Judah in peaceful subjection to Assyria and preserve it from unwise adventures.

The conquest of Samaria was not achieved under Shalmaneser IV., but belongs to the beginning of the reign of Sargon. This Assyrian ruler, perhaps the mightiest of all, was, as it seems, a descendant of the old Assyrian royal family overthrown by Tiglath-pileser. He was obliged to continue warfare in Palestine. In the year 720 there occurred a general revolt of the countries from Hamath to the Egyptian border, which had but shortly before been subjected by Assyria.

And now Shabakah finally prepared for armed intervention. But the whole coalition was dispersed by Sargon, the Egyptians were defeated at Raphiah southward from Gaza, and when, five years later, Sargon returned to these regions the Egyptians hastened to lay tribute at his feet,—the decadent empire of the Pharaohs was no match for the rising power of Assyria, and the time was past for Egypt to pursue an international policy. Its only resort was to plot and instigate in order if possible to derive some questionable advantage from the dissensions of others. These conditions were characterised most drastically by Isaiah in the names he applies to Egypt, "blusterer and laggard," that is, making a mighty clanking with the sword and finally when matters become serious refusing to draw.

In the year 715 King Ahaz died and was followed by his son Hezekiah. Ahaz had persisted steadfastly until the end in his voluntary subordination to Assyria, and thus secured for his country twenty years of unbroken peace. Hezekiah was differently constituted. Even from the descriptions of the tradition which greatly favors and glorifies him we derive the impression that he was an un-

decided, vacillating character, easily influenced and partial to great plans, but just as easily discouraged and dispirited. Under him the national party again came to the surface regarding the dependency upon Assyria as a disgrace and disposed to use the first opportunity to regain their former independence. The danger became so great that Isaiah went about for three years in the humiliating garb of a military captive, as a standing warning that such would be the fate of all enemies of Assyria.

In the year 711 especially the situation became critical. In Ashdod a certain Yaman had expelled the Assyrian vassal king, Achimiz, and raised the standard of rebellion; according to the report of Sargon he had entered into the plots with Judah, Edom, and Moab. But the Assyrian army made a swift end of this war of liberation. When he recognised that his cause was lost Yaman fled to Egypt, but was delivered to Sargon in chains by the Pharaoh,—with this disgraceful act Egypt with her own hand effaced her name from the list of first-class powers.

During the life of Sargon we hear no more of disturbances in Palestine. But in 705 the great king died suddenly a violent death, murdered, it appears, by his son and successor, Sennacherib. This was the signal for revolt and rebellion in the whole extent of the great empire, for it was not to be expected that a second Sargon would follow the murdered king, and fear and submission had been due alone to the person of Sargon. The threads of conspiracy run from Babylon to the Nile. The Book of Kings informs us that there came to Hezekiah an embassy from the Babylonian king, Merodach-baladan, to whom Hezekiah showed all his armories and treasures: this embassy must have come in the first year of the reign of Sennacherib (704), in order to win Hezekiah as an ally, for in the very beginning of the year 703 Sennacherib threw himself with all his might upon Babylon and expelled Merodach-baladan.

Furthermore Isaiah gives us a vivid description of an embassy of tall, bronzed Ethiopians, who also came to Jerusalem with the evident purpose of forming an alliance against Assyria. In the year 704 the young and vigorous Tirhakah had become king of the Ethiopians and had succeeded in carrying Egypt with him. Now with two such great powers as support there was no stopping the movement. All the Phœnician and Philistine rulers, Edom, Moab, Ammon, and Judah were in outspoken rebellion. King Padi of Ekron, who remained loyal to the Assyrians, was taken prisoner by his own people and brought in chains to Hezekiah at Jerusa-

lem, in order that the latter might hold him in safe keeping. This shows how general was the confidence in the impregnable position of Jerusalem.

In one of his most powerful and most stirring appeals Isaiah describes half in fierce mockery, half with bleeding heart, the delirium of heroism and warlike enthusiasm that seized upon Judah on this occasion: he sees these holiday troops already dispersed and scattered to the winds, captured without the firing of an arrow. And all too soon it became manifest how justly Isaiah had judged his people.

In the year 701 Sennacherib moved with the whole force of his kingdom against the rebels, and the petty kingdoms sank one after the other like barley blades before the sickle. The very beginning of the attack brought the whole coast of Phœnicia and Philistia to terms. Then Hezekiah too lost courage. "And Hezekiah," so the Book of Kings reports, "sent to the king of Assyria to Lachish, saying: I have offended! Return from me; that which thou puttest on me will I bear. And the king of Assyria appointed unto Hezekiah three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold. And Hezekiah gave him all the silver that was found in the house of the Lord and in the treasures of the king's house. And he even had all the gold stripped from the doors and pillars of the temple, and gave it to the king of Assyria."

Further King Sennacherib informs us that Hezekiah set free King Padi of Ekron, whom he held captive, and delivered over to him his daughters and the women of his household. Gladly we would doubt this statement. But it is not possible; we are really obliged to believe that Hezekiah made a contribution of his own flesh and blood to the harem of the mighty Assyrian monarch. It was not possible to humble himself more deeply before Sennacherib. But the situation soon changed. The combined Ethiopian and Egyptian forces actually began to advance, and now it appeared to Sennacherib hazardous to leave in his rear an unreliable vassal like Hezekiah in such an important strategic position as Jerusalem. Therefore he now demanded the surrender of the capital and the acceptance of an Assyrian garrison.

But now Hezekiah remained firm: he could not consent to this. According to the account of the Book of Kings it was chiefly the prophet Isaiah who urged him to hold out, promising him most positively that the Assyrian would not send a single arrow into Jerusalem, but would return again the way he had come. And contrary to all expectation this bold prophecy was fulfilled.

The immediate results of Hezekiah's refusal were indeed terrible for the land. The Assyrian captured forty-six walled cities, and countless fortresses and smaller places, devastated the land systematically, and took two hundred thousand one hundred and fifty persons and all the cattle as booty to Assyria. He himself reports that he at least undertook the siege of Jerusalem, and there is no reason to doubt this. But he did not accomplish his object. The final result of this undertaking is veiled in obscurity.

At El Tekeh on the border between Judah and Philistia Sennacherib came upon the combined Egyptian and Ethiopian armies, and defeated them completely. Several Egyptian princes and a considerable number of the enemy's highest officers were made captives by the Assyrians. Sennacherib pursued the retreating hosts and had doubtless already determined upon an advance into Egypt, but was compelled to turn back on the Egyptian border. Herodotus was told by the Egyptians that an army of mice attacked the Assyrian army in the night, destroying all the leather of their equipment and weapons, thus disabling the army of Sennacherib.

The Bible account also tells of a great catastrophe that befell Sennacherib: "The angel of the Lord went forth in the night and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred four-score and five thousand." At any rate the great expedition came to naught. It is possible that a threatening turn of affairs in Babylon urgently demanded Sennacherib's presence at home and hastened his return. Before going he assigned all the cities of Judah to his loyal Philistine vassals and returned to Nineveh. He never saw Palestine again. Jerusalem was indeed saved, but in what a condition? The prophet Isaiah shall tell us:

"Your country is desolate;
Your cities are burned with fire;
Your land,—strangers devour it in your presence,
And the daughter of Zion is left as a booth in a vineyard,
As a lodge in a garden of cucumbers,
As a besieged city.
Except the Lord of Hosts had left unto us a very small remnant,
We should have been as Sodom,
We should have been like unto Gomorrah."

Of the next hundred years we know almost nothing. For the history of Israelitish religion, it is true, scarcely any other period is so significant and important as this very seventh century: yet concerning the secular history we know but little. The Book of

Kings goes on to tell that Hezekiah drove the Philistines beyond Gaza : so he evidently succeeded in regaining those portions of his territory which had been separated from Judah by Sennacherib and promised to the neighboring Philistine kings. But we are obliged to infer that he returned to his former dependence upon Assyria and sent his yearly tribute to Nineveh afterwards as before, for his son and successor, Manasseh, appears always and everywhere in the ranks of the tributary vassals of Assyria.

Of Manasseh we know only that he was twelve years old when he ascended the throne, that he ruled fifty-five years, that he persecuted the prophets with fire and sword, and filled Jerusalem with the blood of the innocent. His son and successor, Amon, was murdered in the second year of his reign by a conspiracy in his own household, but the people slew the conspirators and placed upon the throne Josiah, the eight-year-old son of the murdered king. And here a ray of light falls upon the history of Israel : Josiah, from all that we know of him, must have been a good and noble character, who took his duties as regent seriously, ruled with justice and mildness, and was a father to his subjects. His contemporary, the prophet Jeremiah, bears the best of testimony for him, and the Book of Kings praises him as a second David ; but unfortunately we have no details regarding his reign.

The ninety years which we have just hastily covered include the greatest splendor and the greatest power of the Assyrian Empire as well as its sudden end. The wild and barbarous Sennacherib was murdered, 681, by two of his sons, who thus avenged his act of parricide, but the throne was not their reward. Another son, Esarhaddon, who had evidently been selected by Sennacherib for the succession, marched against his brothers and was generally recognised as king. He was destined to attain the utmost goal of Assyrian ambition and conquer Egypt.

Tirhakah still kept up his interference in Palestine in order to stir up revolts. Therefore Esarhaddon determined to put an end to the matter : he entered Egypt in 670, defeated Tirhakah completely and subdued the whole country, and Tirhakah withdrew into his native Ethiopia. Thus Egypt also became an Assyrian province, and remained so a considerable length of time. Under Assurbanipal, who ascended the Assyrian throne, 668, came the turning-point. Outwardly, indeed, the empire is more brilliant and more powerful than before, but within are seen already unequivocal signs of dissolution. Assurbanipal continued, indeed, to wage wars, more cruel and bloody than any of his predecessors ; but he

himself no longer appears in the field. On the contrary he has the captive enemies and rebels brought to Nineveh, there to feast his eyes upon their torture and death, pursuing in the intervals the pleasures of the chase and the harem—he is the Sardanapalus of the Greeks—and incidentally showing an active interest in art and science. In his palace he founds an immense library, into which he gathers all that could be found of Babylonian and Assyrian literature.

It deserves attention, and is the evidence of a very unusual personality, that no one throughout his reign of forty-two years ventured to contest the throne with this unwarlike monarch. Nevertheless the beginning of the end was at hand. Egypt seems to have freed itself soon from Assyrian domination, and enters upon a new period of political and national progress in the long and prosperous reign of Psammeticus I. In the Aryan mountaineers, the Medes, a dangerous enemy arises in the rear of Nineveh, and at the same time another fearful storm sweeps over all Asia. From the north, the countries about the Black Sea, hordes of predatory horsemen, similar in nature to the later Huns and Mongolians, invade the civilised countries of Asia, marching through and plundering them for about thirty years: Herodotus calls them Cimmerians. As a matter of course all political ties were loosened by this, and the Assyrian Empire was shaken to its foundation.

Now Phraortes, king of the Medes, considered the time come to venture an attack upon Nineveh; but he was utterly defeated and met his own death in the undertaking. His son, Cyaxares, proposed to avenge his father, and already had assailed and besieged Nineveh when an invasion of the Cimmerians into his own country recalled him and relieved Nineveh. But this was only a stay of execution. About fifteen years later Cyaxares united with Nabopolassar, king of Babylon, for a final blow at the Assyrian Empire, of whose last two kings we do not even know the exact names. After a siege of three years Nineveh was taken and razed to the ground, and the whole nation obliterated. This took place 606, just twenty years after the death of the mighty Assurbanipal.

The whole history of the world shows no catastrophe equal to the destruction of the Assyrian Empire; no nation was ever so completely destroyed as the Assyrian,—a just retribution for the abominations which it had perpetrated for centuries. The two victors divided the spoil, the lion's share falling to Media.

But meanwhile a third rival had arisen. In Egypt Necho, son

of Psammeticus, had ascended the throne of the Pharaohs in 610. This enterprising and restless monarch also wanted to secure his share of the Assyrian spoil, and set out for the Euphrates with a mighty army in 608. King Josiah of Judah tried to arrest him but was utterly defeated at Megiddo and himself mortally wounded. The people, who knew well what they had to expect of the crown-prince Jehoiakim, made Jehoahaz, the younger son of the deceased, king in his father's stead. But only three months had passed when Necho summoned the young man before his tribunal at Riblah and sent him in bonds to Egypt. He punished the people for their arbitrary action by a heavy tax, and put Jehoiakim upon the throne at Jerusalem as an Egyptian vassal.

But the Egyptian glory was not to last long ; a year after the destruction of Nineveh the Babylonian crown prince, Nebuchadnezzâr, met the Egyptians at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and Necho was so completely defeated that he sought safety in wild flight. Nebuchadnezzar followed closely after him, but was overtaken by the news of the death of his father, Nabopolassar, so that his presence at home became absolutely necessary. Accordingly he made peace with Necho, who ceded to Babylon all his conquests in Asia as far as the Egyptian border in consideration of being allowed to return to his country unmolested.

Thus Jehoiakim of Judah had been transformed from an Egyptian vassal into a Babylonian. His policy was prescribed by his circumstances : unconditioned submission to Babylon. But he would none of this, and rebelled against his feudal lord. At first Nebuchadnezzar did not consider it worth the while to go himself, but stirred up the neighboring peoples against the unhappy land. In the midst of this situation Jehoiakim died. His eighteen-year-old son, Jehoiachin, entered upon an evil inheritance, and had to atone for his father's sins. After a reign of three months he was forced to capitulate and surrender to the Chaldeans without conditions. Nebuchadnezzar took the treasures of the temple and the palace with him and led the young king and ten thousand of the best inhabitants, the whole aristocracy of birth and intellect, into exile in Babylon, where Jehoiachin himself was kept in close confinement. But Nebuchadnezzar made one more attempt with a native ruler and placed Zedekiah, the full brother of Jehoahaz, who had formerly been chosen by the people, and an uncle of the captive Jehoiachin, upon the throne in Jerusalem as a Babylonian vassal prince. This took place in 597. Before four years of Zedekiah's reign had passed Jerusalem was again filled with discon-

tent, and there were plots which however finally came to nothing. Of course the matter could not remain concealed from the Babylonian government, and the seriously compromised Zedekiah went in person to Babylon, but came off cheap and conducted himself discreetly for the next five years. Then misfortune brought it about that the restless and aggressive Nahabrah (Apries) ascended the throne of the Pharaohs and immediately resumed the policy of his grandfather, Necho. So all eyes were turned longingly toward the Nile, whence the liberator from Babylonian subjection was expected. Nahabrah promised assistance, and Zedekiah could no longer resist the pressure: he actually rebelled, and thus the fate of Judah and Jerusalem was sealed.

On the 10th of January, 587, the Chaldeans began to besiege Jerusalem; but Nahabrah kept his word, and a mighty Egyptian army started for Palestiue and the Chaldeans withdrew. The rejoicing in Jerusalem knew no bounds. But the prophets of evil were justified: the Chaldeans returned, and after a resistance conducted with the heroism of despair, when the most terrible famine was already raging in Jerusalem, such that women were devouring their own children, the city fell into the hands of the Chaldeans, on the 9th of July, 586. In the first confusion Zedekiah escaped with a few attendants, but was overtaken and brought before the tribunal of Nebuchadnezzar at Riblah. But now Nebuchadnezzar knew no such word as mercy. All the captive nobles were executed and Zedekiah's children were all butchered before the eyes of the wretched father. That was the last thing he was ever to see, for he himself was blinded and taken to Babylon in chains, where he declined and perished miserably in prison. Thus ended the last descendant of David that had ruled in Jerusalem.

The city itself was looted and then given over to the flames; the whole people that had escaped the executioner and the sword was led into exile at Babylon. "Only of the poorest of the land did they leave some in Judah as vinedressers and husbandmen." Over this miserable remnant was set a certain Gedaliah as Babylonian prefect; but when Gedaliah perished soon after by the hand of a murderer, those who had remained in Judah fled to Egypt from fear of the vengeance of the Chaldeans, and there they vanished and left no trace. Edomites and other neighbors spread over the unclaimed land—Judah had ceased to be.

If Israel had been merely a race like others it would never have survived this fearful catastrophe and would have disappeared in the Babylonian exile. But Israel was the bearer of an idea; this

was not to be annihilated with the state, and its eternal destiny was not closed with its political life. On the contrary. It seems as though only now, when the body was dashed to pieces, was the spirit really able to develop unhampered. The death that Judah died was a death suffused with dawn. While its sun seemed set in eternal night, already in the east a new day was breaking, destined in the fulness of time to illumine the whole world with its light. Israel went down to the grave with the hope of early resurrection, and this hope was not disappointed. Forty-nine years after Nebuzaradan, the Babylonian captain of the guard, set fire to city and temple, a burnt offering from those who had returned to the fatherland was again smoking to the God of Israel on the spot where the brazen altar of Solomon had stood. The flame that had consumed Jerusalem was for Judah a purifying fire ; from the seed-field of the exile sown in tears was to spring up a precious and immortal harvest.

THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE: THE WORSHIP OF BENEFICENCE.

BY JAMES ODGERS.

AUGUSTE COMTE wrote his *Positive Philosophy* and *Positive Polity* before the doctrine of Evolution had been presented in systematic form. In his time a general idea of development was entertained by many thinkers and a "nebular" hypothesis to account for the formation of the solar system had been worked out. But before Darwin and Wallace had contributed the results of their observations and thought upon the "Origin of Species," a correct general view of evolution was unattainable. Hence, although Comte actually used the term "evolution" to indicate the course of human development, it remained for Mr. Herbert Spencer to formulate the law of evolution.

But Comte's philosophic grasp of the history of civilisation enabled him to give to the world a brilliant illustration of the law which Mr. Spencer afterwards enunciated. He showed that the process of theological evolution was a progress from what he termed fetishism to monotheism: it was a progressive integration of beings and differentiation of functions—confusion giving place to coherence of thought.

Primitive men deemed themselves the slaves of a multitude of supra-human powers actuated by passions like their own. Their religious ideas, if we may call them religious, represented a superstitious and confused perception of the powers of their ancestors and of nature: a confusion of ancestor-worship and nature-worship. But they regarded these powers with fear rather than with reverence, being in constant terror of superior force—the awe-inspiring and terrific in nature, the fierce and cruel in man.

In the struggles between families and tribes the inferior, with their beliefs, were overthrown and sometimes exterminated; with

the result that the fetishes of the conquering tribes were held in supreme regard by increasing numbers. The objects of superstitious regard were gradually reduced in number. Instead of each natural operation being referred to a separate power, phenomena were gradually grouped, and each department of nature was regarded as under the presidency of a distinct being. In this way, and by the survival of those tribes whose beliefs and conduct were best adjusted to conditions within the tribe and outside it, the original incoherent superstition gave place to polytheism. Whilst the Asiatic and Egyptian polytheisms were coercive, that of Rome—tolerant of the gods of conquered peoples—promoted order and permitted progress; and Greek polytheism, accompanying a large amount of independence, developed a worship of freedom, strength and beauty. With the growth of a free exercise of intelligence, differences of power amongst the traditional gods were recognised. The inferior were disregarded, and in course of time all others were subordinated to a supreme One. But Greek development was arrested by the Roman conquest. Some of the gods of Greece had already been appropriated by the Romans, who, in their political and social decay, increasingly subordinated ethics to pleasure.

In the meantime the Hebrew god of battles came to be regarded as a righteous judge, and later, by Jesus of Nazareth, was revealed as a god of love, the father of all men.

Some of the disciples of Jesus visited Rome, whose people were perishing for want of a new ethical inspiration, and introduced Christianity, which subordinated the present life and happiness of each worshipper to a future and greater happiness.

Christianity was gradually established amidst the ruins of the Roman Empire. It exercised a restraining and purifying influence, and even aspired to international authority. It was most effective for good when it exerted least direct political power, and when it appealed most exclusively to the hearts and consciences of its worshippers. But its doctrines, brought together from different sources in prescientific times, were confused and incapable of retaining intellectual authority in the presence of free criticism and the advance of knowledge. Group after group of earnest religious people protested against dogmas which, from time to time, had become untenable. Sect after sect arose with a modified form of religious belief: and many a sect, whose difference from others was not of permanent value, disappeared.

Until within recent times the religious evolution had not proceeded beyond an imperfect monotheism; a stage of belief in

which all good was referred to the action of a good spirit, God, all pain and misery were referred to the action of an evil spirit, the Devil, and in which nature was regarded as the arena for the exercise of the powers of God and the Devil and their subordinates. But with the growth of a more scientific habit of thought, an increasing number of people now perceive that pain and misery are unavoidable consequences of certain modes of natural operation ; that ignorance and selfishness account for a great deal ; and that to personify evil is no more logical than to personify color or sound. Hence few people (who think) now believe in a personal devil.

Although people are apt, for a time, to rest satisfied with the step in advance made by the displacement of a belief in a personal devil, yet "the logical necessities of the understanding" require us to treat in identical ways the causes of both good and evil. We soon learn that good also is a result of perfectly regular modes of operation of natural forces within us and without. "The Reign of Law," one of the chief discoveries of modern observation and thought, accounts for the production of love, truth, and duty, as well as of hate, superstition, and crime. Hence, under the light of modern scientific philosophy, the imperfect monotheism of the past—in which God, Nature, and the Devil were regarded as three distinct beings—gives place to "Monism," or a faith in "one existence of which all phenomena are modes."¹

By a scientific use of the imagination we are able to form a clear general idea of the evolution of the world and man : we are led to regard the whole process—the cooling and rotation of the nebula, its shrinkage and the detachment of its revolving rings, their break-up and concentration into rotating globes revolving around the centre of the system, the cooling of our globe, the precipitation of the heavier matters from its gaseous envelope, the crumpling of the crust and subsidence of the waters into the hollows, the beginnings of life, the growth of vegetal and animal organisms, their differentiation, struggles, and survival of the fittest, and the whole course of human development—as the varied workings of one power possessing within itself the potency and motive of all that has been or shall be.

Professor Fiske, in his address on the "Destiny of Man," has shown that although strength and courage enabled brutes to conquer, yet in the course of evolution intelligence and loyalty became increasingly important : that eventually mental characteristics counted for more in the battle of life than physical force. Though

¹ The terms in which the late Charles Bradlaugh summarily defined his philosophic belief.

practical efficiency has always conquered, this efficiency has been, to an increasing extent, the result of loyalty to the whole community, guided by a progressively clearer appreciation of relevant facts. War and industry, conflict and competition, are always weeding out the incapable; and it is found, in the long run, that good-will, regard for facts, and loyalty survive.

Auguste Comte looked forward to a time when the dominant human motive will be love, and when the chief practical purpose will be human welfare.

Both Spencer and Comte, in their philosophical writings, show that war is being displaced more and more by industry, and that sympathy expands with peaceful intercourse. The ideal of "Peace on earth, good will to men," is not a mere dream, but a prevision justified by observation of the course of human development. We may hasten the advent of this noble future by working systematically for it; or we may retard it by subordinating the public good to our own ease and pleasure; but if the world lasts only a small part of the time we may reasonably hope it will, we cannot prevent this consummation.

Though we have to refer not only all good but also all evil to the operations of the one power whose modes of working are described in scientific laws, we cannot regard this power as non-ethical even if we continue to judge the world-process from an anthropocentric point of view. But as soon as we conceive of Nature as a unity, man's pleasure and the contingencies of his evolution can no longer be the final ethical standard. If the universe be one, then universal good—whatever that may be—must be regarded as superior to man's good; and man must be resigned to find his welfare in conforming to the conditions of universal good.

Sir Edwin Arnold, in his *Light of Asia*, presents the Buddhist idea that:

" Before beginning, and without an end,
As space eternal and as surety sure,
Is fixed a power divine which moves to good,
Only its laws endure."

If we find, and we do find, in the world-process, that pain and evil, though always with us, are subordinate to a growing fulness of life; that not only strength and beauty, but love, truth, and duty are surely though slowly rising in the scale of efficiency; and that the reign of peace and good-will is a certainty for our successors though not for us; then we are justified in attributing a character of general beneficence to the universal power. And this quality of beneficence, which means so much to us, has undergone

noteworthy changes of meaning corresponding to the stages of human development. A god of battles was worshipped because he gave to his people the victory : success in battle being, in the opinion of a fighting people, the greatest good. The Olympian gods of freedom, strength, beauty, and enjoyment were worshipped because these qualities seemed to the Greeks most desirable. The Christian God of Love, who offered joy unspeakable in a future life in exchange for faithfulness for a few years on earth, was worshipped by people oppressed by tyrants and without escape from trouble in this world. Men have always worshipped beneficence, though they have meant different things by it.

Comte, the first to propose a scientific religion, offered as an object of worship "The Great Being" (chiefly humanity), which, in his *Positive Polity*, he defined as "the whole constituted by the beings, past, future, and present, which co-operate willingly in perfecting the order of the world." Here he distinguishes beneficence, chiefly beneficent human lives, from conduct which has impeded or opposed human development. The beneficent results of natural activity are as clearly distinguishable from those to which, for the time being, we cannot ascribe this character, as are the beneficent results of selected human activity ; and if the Great Being, or Humanity, be a proper object of worship, still more worthy is the character of the power represented by the evolution of all natural usefulness and beauty and all human excellence.

The new positivism of *The Open Court*, or the Religion of Science, presents to us the idea of one universal power whose character is represented by the modes of its working, which are definable in scientific laws : and which Dr. Carus regards as a plexus of laws with ethical consequences. Avoiding the mistake made by Comte, who, in eliminating the idea of God from scientific religion, broke away from the past ; and avoiding also the error of Mr. Herbert Spencer in regarding the "Unknowable" as the basis of religion ; Dr. Carus maintains the religious continuity by regarding God as our conception of the everlasting and universal power whose modes of working, around us and within, condition the whole life of man and are the final ethical authority. God, in this sense, is the representation in feeling and thought of the only reality, and with the growth of knowledge and increased loyalty to a scientific and progressive ethical standard, the god-idea approximates more and more to this reality.

The Religion of Science cannot admit any confusion of quantity and quality : cannot sanction the worship of mere power as

such. Of absolute perfection and almightiness science knows nothing; but beneficence is a demonstrable quality, though when regarded from the point of view of human welfare it does not appear to be coextensive with all natural activity. But we are obliged to abandon the anthropocentric point of view; and yet to satisfy "the ethical demands of the soul as well as the logical necessities of the understanding" we seek a coherent idea of existence as a unity. As our powers of observation and reasoning enlarge, we have increasing ground for faith in the evolution of peace and goodwill in human affairs, in the continuous growth of love and understanding and righteousness. And we have increasing justification for the belief that a large amount of pain and unhappiness is a consequence of partial development, and that it will be progressively reduced as knowledge and social sympathy increase. Thus we have growing evidence of the beneficence of the One Existence of which all phenomena are modes; and towards this beneficence worship is the inevitable emotional attitude. Combining the ideas of continuity, unity, and ethical value, we may conceive of God as *everlasting power working for universal good.*

The Religion of Science and the worship of beneficence are the logical and ethical aspects of religion as modified by modern knowledge and criticism. The religious revelation must be read in natural law, especially in the evolution of society and morals; and it is the business of religion so to use the history of the past as to throw a clear light upon the paths of human improvement.

Comte taught that the evolution of humanity depends on the extension of sympathy, the adoption of a demonstrable faith, and the substitution of peaceful industry for war. He proposed the concert of the West for the preservation of peace, for the suppression of war and aggression, and for the development of all the powers of humanity. He trusted in the main to moral improvement, and initiated an ethical organisation to promote it.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown that, to a large extent, human development has depended on a progressive political incorporation: on the compounding and recompounding of groups in more stable and more effective political and industrial organisation.

Dr. Fiske, foreseeing the consequences of the progressive political incorporation and growth of sympathy, and relying on the law of evolution, prophesies the final union of all states in one world-wide federation and "the parliament of man."

It seems inevitable that, sooner or later,—sooner, if we under-

stand the laws of human development and systematically work for it,—humanity will be one complex organisation animated by one aim, working under the impulse of love or good-will and the guidance of science for the greatest good of all.

As all existence is one, though working in the various ways described in scientific laws, each one of us, being a part of this existence, should express in his life the character which gives ethical value to science. Nature, or God, works by regular methods towards beneficence; hence the final character of force is beneficent. It is difficult, perhaps beyond our power, to discover to what extent each natural movement conduces to good. But we know that our surviving needs and ideals which, except in degree of development, are the same now as they have been throughout historic time, are certain guides to the welfare of the race. Each one of us, in his own life, should consider himself a function of the everlasting power that impels man towards organised efficiency, beauty, love, truth, and duty. No one of us is without the potential beneficence, which is the most general ethical characteristic of universal power. Beneficence, therefore, should be our watchword and our standard of conduct. This character is needed in every walk of life: not mere ignorant sentimentalism—which often weakly does harm with the best intentions—but well-considered helpfulness which looks beyond immediate results to future consequences. The preservation of peace, the suppression of war, the promotion of international concert for progressive purposes, the cultivation of sympathy, truth, and duty, the appreciation of worth and scorn of wrong-doing and greed; all these enter into the character of beneficence, which each one of us should strive to exemplify. The Religion of Science implies that as there is only one existence, of which all phenomena are modes, so there should be only one character—Beneficence—dominating all activity.

DEATH IN RELIGIOUS ART.

BY THE EDITOR.

DEATH appears to the imagination of mankind as the climax of all the evils in the world; for death is feared as annihilation, and death seems to destroy our entire life-work as well as ourselves.

Death is the main problem of life. If there were no death, there would be no need of religion, for religion originates as a so-



THANATOS AND HYPNOS LAYING A WARRIOR TO REST.
From an Attic vase. (After Hermann Göll.)

lution of the problem of death. Every religion proposes its own peculiar solution than which there is nothing more characteristic in its doctrines and moral teachings. Salvation means an escape from death and the attainment of life everlasting. If we want to comprehend the spirit of a religion, we must learn what, according to its teachings, is the significance of death.

Death in Pre-Christian Art.

Demonolatry, the religion of savages, is based on the fear of death. Death is supposed to be a monster-deity that is thirsty for blood and takes delight in sufferings. For the sake of escaping



RELIEF ON A SARCOPHAGUS, REPRESENTING THE BATTLE WITH THE AMAZONS.
(After Hermann Göll.)

his wrath, savage tribes feed him with such sacrifices, both animal and human, as are expected to pacify him.

Death in Brahmanism is not an annihilation of the soul but a mere transmigration. The soul which is conceived to be a being or an entity that can move about without a body, is supposed to assume a new shape and to reappear in a new incarnation. The




OKNOS AND THE DAUGHTERS OF DANAOS IN HADES. (After Hermann Göll.)

religious Hindu, therefore, exhibits a strange indifference to his worldly fate and submits unflinchingly even to death.

In Buddhism, Māra, the Evil One, is the demon of death (the word *mdio* meaning "slayer"). Buddha enjoins his followers to surrender to death what belongs to death, and to live in the realm of moral aspirations; for the body is subject to decay, but deeds

do not die. Mara, the Evil One, presides over that which is transient, the realm of birth and death. He is both sensuality and the perdition which all flesh is heir to, and this world is a world of death.

It appears that to the ancient Hebrews death was the end of life, for there is no mention of any kind of immortality in the canonical books of the Old Testament. This is the more strange as both the Assyrians and the Egyptians who have powerfully influenced the religious development of Israel, clearly taught that




RELIEF ON A SARCOPHAGUS, REPRESENTING THE DEATH OF HIPPLYTUS.
(After Hermann Göll.)

man's soul does not die but survives death and enters other regions, either for being rewarded or punished in the life to come, according to his deeds. They believed that evil-doers have reason to fear death, while the righteous may face it courageously, as the innocent man need not tremble before a judge who is absolutely just.

The Greeks are strongly influenced by their artistic sense. Homer¹ speaks of Death as the twin-brother of Sleep, and Pausa-

¹*Iliad*, XVI, 682.



ORESTES PURSUED BY THE FURIES.


From an ancient vase. (After Hermann Göll.)



A SPHINX CARRYING OFF A VICTIM.

Terra Cotta relief from Melos. (After Hermann Göll.)

nias¹ describes a box of cedar wood in the temple of Juno at Elis on which Death and Sleep are represented as two boys resting in the arms of Night. Both have their legs crossed, as sleepers naturally would lie, and there is this difference only between the twin



SISYPHUS, IXION, AND TANTALUS IN HADES. Relief on a Sarcophagus.

brothers, that Death is black while Sleep is white. The box described by Pausanias is lost of course, but there are a great number of artistic representations of Death as the twin-brother of sleep. There is, for instance, an Attic vase which depicts Thanatos and Hypnos, Death and Sleep, laying a warrior to rest.

The Greek sarcophagi represent scenes of Greek mythology such as the battle with the Amazons, the Death of Hippolytus, and similar subjects.

There is a tendency prevalent among the artists of ancient Greece to hide everything that is ugly, or, if it could not be hidden, to transfigure it with beauty. In this way the pangs of a bad conscience, represented in the furies, the Harpies and Sphinxes



THE COFFIN OF THE SON OF VALERIUS. (From Lessing.)

representing fatal diseases, the petrifying dread depicted in Medusa's face, and even the torments of Hell have assumed quite an æsthetical appearance in Greek art. It is in accord with the whole Hellenic world-conception that the Greeks covered their graves with flowers in order to conceal the terrors of death, which were

Paus. Eliac, cap. XVIII p. 422.



HEGESO'S TOMBSTONE. In the ancient cemetery on the Dypylon in Athens.

felt as a disturbance in the enjoyment of life. The æsthetic sense of Greek artists shrunk from picturing death in its ugly features, and death is depicted on the tombstone of an Athenian cemetery as a parting.



THE TOMBSTONE OF AMEMPTUS, A FREEDMAN.

According to Lessing's interpretation probably a musician. (From Lessing.)



DEATH AS A GENIUS HOLDING AN URN AND TURNING DOWN THE TORCH.

The soul is represented as a butterfly. (After an ancient gem, reproduced from Lessing.)



THE TOMBSTONE OF CAECILIUS FEROX.

Representing Death as a youth standing with crossed legs and down-turned torch. (From Lessing.)



DEATH AS A GENIUS WITH A WREATH, BUTTERFLY, AND DOWN-TURNED TORCH. (From Lessing.)

Lessing¹ has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the ancient Greek artist did not represent death as a skeleton, but that they always followed the Homeric idea of death as the twin brother of sleep. He proved his case by reproducing and explain-

¹Lessing (*Wie die Alten den Tod personifizierten*), written in reply to a criticism of Herr Klotz.

ing a number of antique works of art, mostly tombstones and sarcophagi, on which a youth with down-turned torch can represent nothing else but Death. At the same time he showed that the few skeletons that are actually antique, must be *larvæ*, i. e., the departed souls of the wicked who are described by Seneca as consisting of bare bones.¹

Schiller, who is himself one of the foremost representatives of classical taste, criticises the Greek habit of shrinking from that which is unpleasant in the following Xenion :

" Beautiful, truly, is he, the youth with his torch turning downward :
But 'tis apparent that Death lacks this æsthetical charm."

The idea of immortality was not missing in Hellas ; but the notions of a beyond were very indefinite. The hope of an after-life was indicated by the butterfly which is frequently found on tombstones and sarcophagi. The hope of a reawakening to new life found a symbolical expression in the Eleusinian mysteries as ears of wheat which were handed to the neophytes and worn in crowns by the initiated.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

¹ Nemo tam puer est, ut Cerberum timeat, et tenebras, et Larvarum habitum nudis coherentium ossibus. *Æp.* XXIV.

VIVISECTION FROM AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW.

THE EVILS OF VIVISECTION.

From personal experience and a near relationship with hospitals, schools, biological laboratories, and experimental work-rooms, I know that I am right in believing that my scientific brethren ought to be supervised, cautioned, and restrained by a firm hand. Alas, I know full well, as myself a worker, that our work called Science, as now pursued, is not an end in itself, fails as yet to point out the solution of all life, and in the case of many of its votaries has produced a narrowing scholastic result. So thought in large degree, so lived in the inspiration of his research, so often taught by his action, my departed friend Professor Cope. To my mind the enthusiastic advocates of humanity and mercy, often weak of mind, hardly ever logical, are after all in the deepest sense right, because of no self-indulgent weakness have some of us encouraged them as far as reason permits, in the attempt to restrain and supervise the whole thing. Let them take it out of the hands of the conceited doctor, or the smart biological assistant. You know what I mean. With us your voice should speak. To shrink from cruelty, from the sight of torture as we shrink from a vile smell, from the ravages of disease, or an act of barbarism, as a thing to shudder at, as a thing that runs through you, and changes the heart-beat whether or no. This, to my mind, is an unfolding of the deeper meaning of that struggle to which you allude. How shall science solve it without the heart's help?

HENRY C. MERCER.

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THE ETHICS OF ANTI-VIVISECTION.—A REPLY TO DR. CARUS.

"There are scientists, and among them some of great name and fame, who after a life-time of long and laborious study did not arrive at the ethical truths that the moral commands will preserve, and that they do preserve, both the individual who keeps them and the society to which that individual belongs.

*Dr. Paul Carus.*¹

The unique position occupied by Dr. Carus as the ardent and principal exponent of the "Science of Religion and the Religion of Science" and his distinction in the regions of culture and ethics entitle his speculations to the gravest considerations of those who think and aspire. Dr. Carus often writes with a positive conscience but never with papal assumption, and it needs no apology in the pages of

¹ *Homilies of Science*, p. 53.

The Open Court to question his conclusions when controversial. Probably many of his admirers read with concern the definite denunciation of "The Immorality of the Anti-Vivisection Movement" in the June issue of this magazine. I venture to submit some reasons to Dr. Carus for reversing that denunciation. Precisely because (as he is aware) I greet him as a protagonist of the higher ethics and the harvester for this wistful modern age of all that was eternally and beautifully true in the God-ward guesses of every religion,—so in proportion I confess some sorrow for his vindication of the identical and unscrupulous materialism in science which is opposed to his noblest teaching.

Dr. Carus affirms that while the anti-vivisectionists are "ensouled with the noblest of all virtues, compassion for the suffering . . . they lack upon the whole the most essential of all virtues, which are thought, discrimination, discretion, consideration of consequences, a surveying of the situation, and a weighing of the implications of the question as well as the results to which it leads." If all the counts on this indictment were true, it would undoubtedly discount the currency of opposition to, but would not affect in the least the final appeal against, scientific torture.

"Consideration of consequences,"—who are the sinners? Take we that text for awhile. Listen we first to another accent of the same voice:—"Morality is 'not the increase of the happiness of our fleeting individuality, of our self, the 'temporary abode of our soul; but it is the extension of our good will to all that 'is good, based upon the acquisition of a clearer and ever clearer insight—a heart-felt insight—into the nature of the interrelations of all things, especially of all 'living beings.' True,—most true. Proceed we now to the 'consideration of consequences.'"

Dr. W. B. Carpenter once asked Canon Wilberforce "whether he would not vivisect a dog to save the life of his wife?" The Canon ironically answered, "Vivisect a dog? Why, Dr. Carpenter, I would vivisect *you!*" In like manner Dr. Carus queries: "But should we not be ready to kill a million rabbits if we can thereby save the life of one child attacked with diphtheria?" But here is a subtle distinction. Torture and slaughter are two different things. The first is totally indefensible,—the second is inevitable. The tortures of the Spanish Inquisition and the modern system of capital punishment convey no association of ideas. The brutal maltreatment of animals by the depraved or violent obtains no precedent from the killing of animals for human food or the necessary extinction of what is obnoxious or dangerous to human life. If it were conceivable that the mere slaughter of a million rabbits would save the life of a beloved child, probably few parents would hesitate. Affection—like hunger—would plead expediency. But if it be meant that the scientific torture of rabbits precede sacrifice,—then we pause. I will not disfigure these pages with the ghastly details of physiological research but simply refer Dr. Carus to Professor Mantegazza's experiments with his "Tormentatore,"—an ingenious device for creating the most intense pain, yet keeping the animal motionless in an attitude that shall not interfere with respiration. "Thus," says Mantegazza in the pride of his invention, "I can take an ear, a paw, or a piece of skin of the animal, and by turning the handle squeeze it beneath the teeth of the pincers; I can lift the animal by the suffering part, I can tear it or crush it in all sorts of ways." "These my experiments were conducted with much delight and extreme patience for the space of a year."¹

Dr. Carus alleges of vivisection that "we all know it is not a pleasant duty of

¹ *Fisiologia del Dolore.*

the physiologist." Mantegazza thought differently. So did Cyon:—"The true vivisector must approach a difficult vivisection with the same joyful ardor and the same delight wherewith a surgeon undertakes a difficult operation from which he expects extraordinary consequences. He who shrinks from cutting into a living animal, he who approaches vivisection as a disagreeable necessity, may very likely be able to repeat one or two vivisections, but will never become an artist in vivisection. The sensations of a physiologist, when from a gruesome wound, full of blood and mangled tissue, he draws forth some delicate nerve-branch . . . has much in common with that which inspires a sculptor."¹ And Claude Bernard wrote in similar terms.

"Consideration of consequences!"—Let it ever be remembered that the consequences of vivisection are not limited to the pain inflicted. Vivisection means not merely agony and mutilation,—it involves the deliberate suppression of intelligence,—the determined concentration of accumulated ingenuities against affectionate but intellectually inferior organisations,—and the effect more evil than physical curiosity is to murder mind. The subject *was* joyous, frolicsome, sensitive, and faithful,—it *shall* be terrified, palsied, blinded and shorn of the perceptions and volitions that linked it to our own humanity in the love of life, the faith of gratitude, and the unconquerable fear of death.

"Give us this day our daily bread!—which is a vivisection!" was Carl Vogt's revision of the human cry of Jesus.

Do the opponents of vivisection neglect "consideration of consequences?" Surely not. Not any "who consider pleasure and pain . . . from the higher standpoint of ethics, where the individual as such disappears . . . where life is valued not according to the pleasures it affords, but according as it contains more or less of those treasures that 'neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.'"² Not any who remember that while the individual vivisector may disappear to find pleasure in pain and only to value life "according as it contains more or less of those treasures" of organic intricacies for living dissection,—yet must emerge into the world to share again its influences for good or evil. For if within the walls of his laboratory the vivisector violates the principal sanctions on which the security and well-being of society depends, it must follow as the night the day that however conventional his conduct in the outer world, he does but mask a dangerous revolt against the supreme contract of the social order. That contract insists that powerful aggression shall not plead "expediency" against the liberties, the lives, and the rights of the most defenceless if involuntary assentors to that contract. Given a starving mass and a minority of prosperous people in any community a revolution against the eighth commandment does not establish stealing as moral. Given a single millionaire and a starving mass. Undoubtedly the mass would temporarily benefit through the murder of the millionaire and the appropriation of his wealth. But murder in alliance with theft could not be affirmed after the tempest of passion was over as other than rebellion against the infinite conscience of humanity. The plea for vivisection is precisely analogous and apart from the scientific fiction would equally justify rape and cannibalism. Those of us who oppose the torture chambers of the Inquisition of Science do consider consequences, for we know that every thought, and word, and action of good and evil are impulses that extend in widening circles throughout the universe for everlasting time.

Dr. Carus alleges that "innumerable discoveries of the most beneficent kind have been made through experiments on animals." It would be more effective to

¹ *Methodik*, p. 15.

² *Homilies of Science*, p. 219.

describe say, three, which have so benefited mankind and for which experiments on animals were unavoidable. When it is further alleged that "many publications of the anti-vivisectionists are guilty of gross exaggerations as to the number of the victims of vivisection and the cruelties to which the dissected animals are exposed," it need only be said that—at least so far as England is concerned—the details are invariably quoted from the official confessions of experimenting physiologists. Here we meet on ground which needs no word of argument. These details are accepted from physiologists—who scarcely exaggerate except in condemning or contradicting each other—and alleged against themselves in propaganda. These details are true or false. If false, the case against vivisection collapses; if true, the appeal is to the tribunal of conscience which admits no plea of "expediency" for experiments that blunder through swamps of mangled tissue into deliberate crime. To-day it is the outrage on animals, to-morrow it may be the surrender to exultant researches of the pauper and the criminal. Why not? With ten-fold force that curious apostrophe of Peter Rosegger to the "dear fortunate dead man!" in the dissecting-room would apply to any dear fortunate living man "chosen to contribute to the welfare of humanity."

"The pedigree of two-thirds of our virtues is far longer than the human race," as Professor Woods Hutchinson finely wrote. "They are backed by the inheritance, not merely of our whole human lineage, but by that of our infinitely longer pre-human ancestry. Their strength is drawn from the life of all the ages."¹

These words are worthy of Dr. Carus himself who upholds the banner of spiritual evolution and pleads like a prophet against the tendencies of modern materialism. Shall we descend into the gulf of materialism and with scientific ferocity and sleepless ingenuity rend without remorse whatever is helpless?—apply the gas-engines of the physiologist to the fainting heart of nature and probe with fierce impatience through her bleeding organs for secrets she only whispers into the souls of guiltless investigators? The marsh-lights of materialism are alluring procuresses to the "Lords of Hell." But the star of conscience, however tremulous when feet may falter or purpose tremble in times of temptation, is the guide of the individual to a grander immortality than dreams ever fabled or dogmas ever foreshadowed.

NOTTINGHAM, ENG.

AMOS WATERS.

VIVISECTION AND MORALITY.

The Open Court is a journal devoted to the Religion of Science. In its June issue is a thoughtful article devoted to the cause of vivisection, for which it endeavors to establish a valid plea. Now although vivisection is as yet a matter in which the thinking world takes but little interest, it is, in its cause, course, and consequence, one of the most serious problems that can confront the thinker and the legislator. Religion, morality, and philosophy, are as deeply involved as science in this question of vivisection. Some even think that if we could have a religion and a philosophy founded upon vivisection, humanity itself would be doomed. And certainly we may assert that if the Religion of Science is about to ally itself with vivisection as an indispensable element of its ritual and ceremonial, then will that religion be confronted by the execration of mankind, speedily and righteously.

The Open Court may draw the line as carefully and as tenderly as it will between cruelty and the necessary infliction of the least possible pain, the enthusiastic vivisectioners, young and old, bad and good, will not be much moved by such gentle admonitions.

¹ *The Mondak*, July, 1896.

There is no question as to man's duty to learn the truth, especially the highest truths, those which show his relation to God and his fellows. But there is a question as to the methods by which he may seek to learn. There is a question also as to the truths which he ought *first* to seek. He may not justify any means whatsoever of acquiring knowledge. One can acquire knowledge by torturing his neighbor, or his own wife or child, but he is not at liberty morally so to do.

Freedom of inquiry may be of great value, but this too has its limits. Freedom of religious action founded the Inquisition of the Catholic Church. Freedom of scientific inquiry founded vivisection, the inquisition of the Religion of Science. One has the same ground as the other. Both are alike revolting and diabolical. It was accounted "immoral" to oppose the Inquisition. It is now becoming immoral to resist the progress of vivisection.

Happily for them, the majority of mankind know nothing about the horrors of vivisection. I do not believe that the writer in *The Open Court* knows anything about them or he could never have written such a statement as this:

"The truth is that all the great scientists who are famous as clever vivisectioners are as considerate as possible and avoid all unnecessary suffering."

Only by attaching a curious meaning to the word "unnecessary" in that sentence can it be comprehended at all by one who knows what the actual history of vivisection has been.

When a man constructs an oven with a glass window in it, imprisons a living animal therein, and then bakes it, roasts it slowly to death that he may, in its behavior, behold the effects of increasing high temperature on the animal organism, is that suffering "necessary"? Has the knowledge so acquired been of even the smallest service to any living creature, human or less than human?

When this man's successors and students repeated the experiment, and varied it, and verified it, and learned from it how to make further and more searching experiments, was it "necessary"?

When at Alfort now for many years several poor horses, worn out in the service of man, are to be found, any hour of all these years, subjected to the same disheartening, dreadful round of operations—sixty and more operations to each horse—is this frightful atrocity "necessary" for the knowledge of truth that shall be of service to mankind? These horses survive six days the awful ordeal. I dare not detail to your readers what they suffer. Let it be enough to say that the hoofs are dissected off from the feet, the eyes cut to pieces, the ears carefully dissected, the brain laid bare and pierced, and burned, and shocked with electricity, the spinal canal opened and the spinal cord tortured to exhibit "motor reaction to sensory impressions"; the intestines, the lungs, the heart, the kidneys, every part without exception, is tortured by laceration, cutting, bruising, burning, until at the end of about six days the quivering mass, still alive, is dragged to the bone-yard to breathe its last without further torture. How many readers of *The Open Court* could sleep well to-night after a half-hour's thinking on such unspeakable cruelty? Is this not "unnecessary suffering"? How can we justify the torture of one animal in this manner and not justify equally the torture of others in the same way? First experiments are crude and tentative and the results unsatisfactory. Men must be trained by repeated experience and careful study to be enabled to elicit the profoundest verities from such sources. In this, as in all other departments of research, a little knowledge only creates a thirst for more; therefore we must have more torture, more exhaustive, more vivid, more crucial. Otherwise we intrench

upon the domain of free inquiry, freedom of research, freedom of thought, besides leaving our work unfinished.

Does the editor of *The Open Court* mean to say that this poor and feeble detail is a "gross exaggeration" of the cruelty of vivisection? We mean to say that it is not one drop in the bucket of the indisputable truth that is known perfectly by every man who has fairly studied the subject, "Gross exaggeration," indeed! Why? What need is there of any exaggeration whatever? Thousands of horses have been dissected alive as described, by thousands of medical students, at Alfort and in Paris, where the work has been systematically pursued for many years. Let us say that ten thousand horses only have been subjected to this torture. Let us not flinch from the figures, but say that forty thousand living hoofs have been cut alive, piecemeal, from as many mangled feet, and then ask if this is necessary or "unnecessary suffering." Not one syllable of useful truth has thereby been wrung from the helpless and agonised animal. Not a single hoof has been saved as a result. All that is useful to know in the matter can be learned from dissections of the dead foot. If a tithe of the energy that has been wasted in this shocking and fruitless work had been spent in studying the hygiene of the foot in the living horse, some good results would assuredly have been achieved. As a matter of fact, all the useful knowledge that we now possess on that subject has been acquired in this natural, humane, and divine way of studying the subject. The same remark applies with equal or greater force to the entire field of vivisection. There is a right way and there is a wrong way of searching after the truths of physiology; there is a moral way, and there is an immoral way; and the right way is the only way of attaining real truth and right results. The very instinct of humanity revolts at the idea that the way to health is through the horrible torture-house at Alfort and through others of its kind established all over the civilised world. On the other hand all hearts rejoice at the thought that nature, in her most perfect and in her least perfect forms, freely offers herself as a study, pure, sane, and natural, full of beauty, charm, and beneficence. Why should we teach our young men, pardonably ambitious for knowledge, to desert these methods and opportunities for the unnatural, violent, and most cruel revelations of vivisection? For we cannot follow both methods. The time spent in one is lost to the other.

This awful method of eliciting truth has even been applied to psychology, and I have heard one of the foremost teachers of America announcing to a vast audience of children and teachers certain educational principles which had been drawn from the laboratory of the vivisectionist. Fortunately hardly one of his hearers, much less the happy children, knew anything of the hideous background of his information.

If a man wishes to make a special and profound study of psychology, why not go at once to the divine psychology which is presented in its purest forms in the world's great literature? Here is mind communicating itself to mind as such, in the most perfect and natural way; and every intelligence is lighted up anew at every touch, and has received a new revelation of real mind. Every moment spent in converse with intelligent men and women, is a revelation of mind to mind. And this is psychological growth of a beautiful and legitimate character. One hour's converse with Shakespeare, Paul, or Plato, reveals more of the true nature of mind than could be ascertained by all the world in a century by slicing off the feet of a million living horses, or putting to perpetual torture the whole animal kingdom. In fact, this latter process obscures psychology. All that we get by such torture is a series of motor reactions frightfully expressive of the agonies possible to a sentient

creature—the groan of a horse for a lucid utterance of Plato! No wonder the psychologists assure us that it will take a thousand years of such study, lengthened, deepened, broadened, intensified, in order to enable them to say what mind is.

Furthermore there is such a thing as perverting and destroying any faculty. Every desire, appetite, and passion of man is good and necessary in right relation and in proper exercise. And every one may be perverted, abused, and destroyed by unnatural exercise. The desire for knowledge is a spiritual desire that exalts man at one bound above all animality, and is the means for his continuous spiritual development—that is, for creating him as man. Nevertheless this faculty, like the lower desires, is capable of abuse. It may become morbid by being wrongly directed or governed by inferior motives; or it may seek its gratification without due respect to moral, social, physical, or religious principles, in alliance with which only can it be normally developed. There is a whole science of sociology in the inter-relation of the faculties. Finally the desire for knowledge may be unnaturally excited and exercised, and may so be rendered first erratic, then reckless, then morbid, and so may pass, step by step, into states of incurable disease, which finally end in intellectual blindness, disgust, and misery. The end of this unnatural exercise is intellectual impotency. If there is a possibility of creating in man a depraved desire for unnatural knowledge, as he may acquire a depraved taste for unnatural and destructive food or drink, then must we scrutinise most closely this matter of our intellectual hygiene. We must not prescribe recklessly all kinds of diet, and all kinds of intellectual indulgence, not even on the plea of the necessity of liberty. And if there is possible an unwholesome regimen for human thought, in the scientific realm, that possibility is fully realised in vivisection. Of course we cheerfully admit that actual and historical vivisection is not the vivisection which *The Open Court* advocates. But on the other hand it must be affirmed that the kind of vivisection suggested by *The Open Court* is not the kind which the anti-vivisectionists have been "immorally" opposing. These latter have been in determined antagonism to the vivisection that was, is, and will be (so long as there is any), not to the vivisection that might be—say in some quite different world.

The Open Court advocates a vivisection which makes "innumerable discoveries of the most beneficent kind," and which, by sacrificing "a few hundred rabbits," saves "many millions of children." The opponents of the practice object to the continual torture for centuries of thousands of creatures of many kinds for no good purpose whatever, and with no good results. Where are the results to be found anywhere in hygiene or medicine—where has a single life been saved or benefited by the cruel experiments made at Alfort, above described?

Magendie starved, mutilated, and otherwise destroyed several thousand dogs in the course of his physiological experiments, and where has been saved a single human life as a consequence? In all our text-books of hygiene and therapeutics no reference of practical value is ever made to them. The results and theories of one year are contradicted by those of the next year, and clearly nothing has been learned. Meanwhile something might have been learned by a rational and humane study of the subject in other ways. Dr. Edward Berdoe, M. R. C. S., says: "I have been trying for many years to find out what the blessings are which vivisection has conferred upon the race, but I have not succeeded."

Prof. Lawson Tait, F. R. C. S. E., a man known the world over for his unexampled skill in surgery, says: "In the art of surgery, vivisection has done nothing but wrong."

Prof. Henry J. Bigelow, M. D., late professor of surgery in Harvard Univer-

sity, says: "How few facts of immediate considerable value have of late years been extorted from the dreadful sufferings of dumb animals, the cold-blooded cruelties now more and more practised under the authority of science."

Dr. Charles Bell Taylor, F. R. C. S., says: "No good ever came out of vivisection since the world began: and, in my humble opinion, no good ever can. . . . If there are any discoveries either made or to be made, for which vivisection was indispensable, I must candidly confess I do not know them."

Sir Charles Bell says: "The opening of living animals has done more to perpetuate error than to confirm the just views taken from anatomy and the natural motions."

Volumes of such testimony, which is valuable because it is the testimony of men who have seen, and known, and studied, and practised, and know just the exact value of vivisection to the physician, can be furnished if desired.

But lest these men should be deemed prejudiced or incompetent witnesses, let us turn to those whose competency and freedom from prejudice cannot be questioned. And first we will call Dr. L. Hermann, professor of physiology, Zurich, and he says:

"The advancement of our knowledge, and not utility to medicine, is the true and straightforward object of all vivisection. No true investigator in his researches thinks of their practical utilisation. Science can afford to despise this justification with which vivisection has been defended in England."

And Professor Charles Richet, M. D., professor of physiology, Paris, says: "I do not believe that a single experimenter says to himself when he gives curare 'to a rabbit or cuts the spinal cord of a dog, 'Here is an experiment which will 'relieve or cure the disease of some men.' No, he does not think of that. He 'says to himself, 'I will clear up an obscure point; I will seek out a new fact.'"

Prof. E. E. Slosson, of the University of Wyoming, says: "A human life is 'nothing compared with a new fact in science. The most curious misapprehension 'is that the Humane Society seems to think that the aim of science is the cure of 'disease, the saving of human life. Quite the contrary, the aim of science is the 'advancement of human knowledge at any sacrifice of human life." "If cats and 'guinea pigs can be put to any higher use than to advance science, we do not 'know what it is."

This ought to be enough for the present. Does *The Open Court* still believe that vivisection and vivisectionists, the real kind, are moral, and that those who oppose them are immoral?

What vivisectionists are in themselves we cannot say, and have not the right to judge; but that their theory and practice and results are utterly unscientific, unspeakably cruel, wholly irreligious, and morally damnable, we do not hesitate to declare.

R. N. FOSTER.

THE BRUTALITY OF VIVISECTORS.

I see you claim we anti-vivisectionists call too hard names, and, generally, overdo the thing. May I respectfully ask, is *any* epithet too severe to apply to a set of men who inflict, without a pang, upon sentient (ofttimes affectionate) creatures, torments before the contemplation of which, the human mind stands aghast! I have been fighting vivisection about twenty-five years, and I positively assure you that a humane vivisector is a *rara avis*.

The same cause which operated, in England, to frame and pass the measure which made butchers ineligible as jurors, rapidly obliterates the last traces of hu-

mane sentiment from the vivisector's heart; then they but see in the animal, in their power, so much "material" (the term they, themselves, invented and employ for this purpose). Neither has vivisection made great discoveries in medicine or surgery. I brand all such claims as absolutely false, and, if you will accord me space, I engage to disprove any and every such claim which may be advanced.

"Come one, come all!"

ELLIOTT PRESTON, M. D.

Vice-President "New England Anti-vivisection Society."

FURTHER PROTESTS AGAINST VIVISECTION.

From other replies lately received from the defenders of the anti-vivisection movement we extract the following quotations:

Captain C. Pfoundes of Kobe, Japan, writes:

"The main point contended for is this: the vulgarising of the practices of the dissecting-room, and the vivisection laboratory, by the admission of junior students and candidates, indiscriminately, tends to harden and injure the character and to numb the finer sensibilities, weakening the ability to succeed in the art of healing, and vitiate the judgement so necessary in all cases. There are also other obvious considerations."

And Mrs. Fairchild-Allen, editor of *Anti-vivisection*, protests against the term "immorality of the anti-vivisection movement." Having quoted Webster's definition of immorality she adds that the writer of the article "can scarcely assume to apply such terms as these to the very long and eminent list of anti-vivisectionists embracing in its leadership such names as those of Anthony Ashley Cooper, seventh Earl of Shaftesbury; Lord Coleridge, the Lord Chief Justice of England; Basil Wilberforce, Canon of Westminster; Lord Alfred Tennyson, the late Poet-Laureate of England; the Bishops of Bath and Manchester; Robert Browning and a very large company of others who were the confrères of Miss Frances Power Cobbe in the early history of the movement the sentiments of which remain unchanged—except to grow stronger—from its first inception. From the modest beginning of a solitary society, in 1874, for the total suppression of vivisection there has now arisen ninety-four societies, all working to the same end, and these societies comprise a host of adherents whom the world delights to honor."

EDITORIAL REJOINDER.

Having perused with great care a number of replies to my article on anti-vivisection, some of which are published in full here, I find that the main point at issue has not been touched by any one of my critics. When I wrote against anti-vivisection I did not attempt to sing the praise of vivisection, for indeed I hate vivisection as much as any one of my critics. Only I cannot join the anti-vivisectionists, and seeing the dangers of their propaganda I deemed it appropriate to point out the difference between stern morality and weak-hearted sentimentalism. I do not use the word "hate" frequently, but I can say that I truly hate vivisection. I hate it as much as war, as operations, amputations, and other cures that remove evils. Although fully conscious of all the horrors of war, I would not recommend a policy of peace-at-any-price. There are causes for which we have to go to war and I understand that war, although an evil, is a necessity in the world. The patient who would not allow the physician to cut into the living flesh of his body if thereby his life might be saved, is not a man of high moral sentiment, but a weakling. And the surgeon who decides in favor of the operation is not a hard-hearted rascal,

but a man who attends to his duty. And bear in mind that the lower nerve-centres of the human body range as high in physiological psychology as frogs and other animals upon whom vivisectors experiment.

It is not my intention to go over the whole field; nor do I wish to repeat myself. Therefore I shall in reply to my critics proffer one consideration only which characterises the issue:

We are surrounded in life by forces which in themselves are neither hostile nor friendly. They now promote our welfare, now impede and even destroy it. Frequently we become the victims of diseases the causes of which are unknown. Under these circumstances our sole salvation consists in comprehending nature and directing the course of events instead of remaining at the mercy of chance. This can be done only by inquiry which must be conducted fearlessly and with utmost circumspection. Truth is needed, for truth is more than life; truth is the condition of the comprehension of life; and as the soldier in battle gladly gives up his life for the sake of victory, so the true scientist gladly devotes his life to the search for truth, and would be willing even to die for truth if truth could be had at that price only.

Now the fact is that the inquiry into truth demands sacrifices. How many noble heroes have died, for instance, in the attempt at reaching the North Pole and collecting facts concerning the nature of the arctic regions. How many animals, especially dogs, have died with them! How many soldiers must be sent into a sure death so that the liberty and honor of a country may be preserved! And truth is more even than liberty.

Life is not the highest good, neither is pleasure, nor the absence of pain. And if progress and truth can be bought only with human lives, by the surrender of human pleasures, by undergoing hardships and suffering, we must unhesitatingly pursue the narrow and thorny path. The animal sacrifices that become necessary for the sake of solving various important physiological problems are only a trivial part of the sufferings that all life has to undergo in its struggle for maintaining itself and advancing to nobler heights of being.

Suppose that scientists had been prevented from making systematic inquiries on lower animals into the nature and cure of diseases, such as the small-pox, cholera, diphtheria, the plague, etc., what would have been the result? We should at present still be at the mercy of the terrible epidemics that sometimes swept over the world and devastated whole countries. If our scientists do not make the experiments, nature will make them for us; but while scientists can make them on lower forms of life and on a small scale with well-calculated economy, nature makes them in wholesale slaughters, on the highest forms of life with an appalling wastefulness, and even then it is doubtful whether she reveals the true cause of the disaster.

There is no need of entering into the details of the question, for we mean to limit ourselves to its moral aspect only. Tenderness of heart showing itself in compassion with the suffering is a noble sentiment, but unflinching courage in a well directed pursuit of truth is the greater virtue. And mind you, tenderness of heart must be well distinguished from that sentimental softness which shrinks from using the knife when needed. I do not deny that there are abuses of vivisection, but I do deny that all vivisectors are unfeeling and blood-thirsty scoundrels. There are men among them who are more considerate than all the members of the anti-vivisection societies together. It is nothing uncommon for the rude butcher-boy to faint at the sight of blood, while the tender-hearted sister of mercy with apparent indifference to the pain she cannot help causing, dresses the wound firmly and safely.

As for our own person we avoid all unnecessary pain, so it is every one's duty to avoid causing any unnecessary pain to others, even to the lowest creatures possessed of sentience; nay, it is wrong to inflict some ruthless harm even on shrubs and plants. But as it would be cowardice to shirk pain where, for some reason or other, duty demands of us to suffer it, so it would be flabby sentimentality if for fear of causing pain to a frog or a rabbit, we should abandon the investigation of important truths that are indispensable for the comprehension of life.

Happily, the terrors of vivisection are grossly exaggerated by the advocates of anti-vivisection and the invention of new anæsthetics will more and more reduce the pain of the victims of science.

EDITOR.

MISCELLANEOUS.

LEONHARD EULER.

Leonhard Euler, one of the greatest and most prolific mathematicians that ever graced the annals of science, was born at Basle, Switzerland, on the 15th of April, 1707. His life fell thus in the period just succeeding the invention of the Calculus by Newton and Leibnitz, the period of the greatest glory of mathematics, which was destined through his hands to be pushed to an unparalleled pitch of perfection. Perhaps the life of no man offers an example of such long and unremitting creative production, nor any science so great a single legacy as that bequeathed by this God-graced inquirer. He fell short of his great compeer and successor Lagrange in the elegance, generality, and high abstractedness of his results, but certainly not in the magnificent plenitude of his achievements.

Euler showed early his mathematical bent. He received in his youth at Basle the instruction of the greatest living mathematician of Europe, John Bernoulli, and at nineteen competed for a prize offered by the French Academy on the masting of ships, which was taken by the veteran hydrographer M. Bouguer, Euler receiving second honors. In 1733, when twenty-six years old, he succeeded his great friend Daniel Bernoulli as professor of mathematics at the Academy of St. Petersburg. His productiveness was astounding, and in a few years his reputation was one of the highest in Europe. There was no branch of existing mathematics that he left unaugmented, and few branches of analysis that arose in the years succeeding his death that he did not partly lay the foundations of. Mechanics, astronomy, music, navigation, gunnery, optics received his attention equally with the purely theoretical parts of arithmetic, algebra, analytical geometry, the Integral Calculus, the Isoperimetrical Problems, etc. He labored incessantly. His very recreations were mathematical, and to them we owe the origin and solution of many important problems. Here fall, for instance, the knight's move in chess and the problem of the crossing of the Königsberg bridges, which gave rise to the "geometry of situation." In consequence of his unceasing application he lost in 1735 the sight of his right eye, and in 1766 that of his left. Thereafter he was compelled to use an amanuensis, but his productivity continued unabated. By virtue of his tenacious memory he was able to carry on the most complicated calculations in his head, and it is related of him that he once formed a table of the first six powers of all numbers from 1 to 100 and recollected them ever afterward with perfect accuracy. He could repeat the *Æneid* from beginning to end and remember the place of every line on every page.

In 1741 he was called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, but returned in 1766

to St. Petersburg where he worked till his death. He left enough posthumous MSS. to supply memoirs for the *Acta Petropolitana* for twenty years after his death, and it is said his complete works would fill from sixty to eighty quarto volumes.

But Euler was not only an investigator; he was also an unusually gifted expositor and teacher, such as few great inquirers have been. Even his works of discovery were frequently systematic didactic treatises, as witness his "Introduction to the Infinitesimal Calculus" wherein he incorporated researches revolutionising analytical mathematics and which in its first part, as recently published in a German translation by Springer of Berlin, can be read with profit and satisfaction to-day. Mention must also be made of his *Introduction to Algebra*—the only instance of an elementary text-book, if we except the lectures of his successors Lagrange and Laplace, ever written by a mathematician of really first creative rank. It is clear, simple, and copious in style, so much so that it can be used by beginners without the least aid from a teacher; its occasional shortcomings¹ being plain and self-apparent to the intelligent reader. This book, the translation of which is rare in English, can be had in the original, perspicuous German for a mere pittance (Reclam: Leipsic), and might profitably be used in the teaching of scientific German in our colleges as an easy and familiar introduction to the language of German mathematics.

Euler's signal fault in thought and exposition was his diffuseness which formed so marked a contrast to the elegant conciseness of Lagrange. It is said that this was due to the same elements which created in him his theological bias. His father was a preacher. He was himself pious, and a rigid Calvinist, often battling manfully for his faith. With Newton, with Pascal, and so many others of the inquirers of the century preceding him, he offers a most conspicuous example of the two warring elements of religion and science standing side by side in one and the same head unreconciled, each triumphant and victorious in its field. He busied himself much with religious and philosophical problems, as his famous *Letters to a German Princess* (1760-1762) show, wrestling with the problems of evil and prayer, foreknowledge and freedom, preferring "the divine truth to the reveries of men" and the pride of unyielding philosophers. We give but one example, his apology of prayer. He says:

"I remark, first, that when God established the course of the universe, and arranged all the events which must come to pass in it, he paid attention to all the circumstances which should accompany each event; and particularly to the dispositions, to the desires, and prayers of every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was disposed in perfect harmony with all these circumstances. When, therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy of being heard, it must not be imagined that such a prayer came not to the knowledge of God till the moment it was formed. That prayer was already heard from all eternity; and if the Father of Mercies deemed it worthy of being answered, he arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events. It is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a miracle."

The philosopher here unconsciously employs the atheistic weapon of Deism in support of his Christian faith, and gives proof that if he could not escape his an-

¹ For instance, in the elementary treatment of infinite series, where it is said that $\frac{1}{2} = 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + 1$ etc. *ad infinitum*, because since we are not allowed to stop at any member neither 1 nor 0 can be the result, but something between these two, which is $\frac{1}{2}$!

cestral theologic bias, he could also not resist the spirit of the age, which had imperceptibly infiltrated his religious thought.

Euler was gentle, simple, and unaffected in character, and distinguished by an exemplary love for his numerous family. His single and unselfish devotion to the truth, his joy at the discoveries of science, which was as sincere when these discoveries were made by others as by himself, is beautifully evidenced in his letter to the youthful Lagrange when the latter generalised the branch afterwards known as the Calculus of Variations: "Your analytical solution of the isoperimetrical "problem," he writes, "leaves nothing to be desired in this department of inquiry, "and I am delighted beyond measure that it has been your lot to carry to the "highest pitch of perfection a theory which I have been almost the only one to "cultivate since its inception."

Euler died in St. Petersburg in 1783 crowned with the emoluments and distinctions of a princely scientific career which he never forsook for the allurements of the world. In the Academy of the city which had witnessed most of his silent triumphs was placed an allegorical picture representing Geometry standing upon a basement covered with mathematical calculations—the formulæ of his theory of lunar motions.

T. J. McCORMACK.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE BUDDHISTS.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE KING OF SIAM.

SIRE: In the spring of 1896, I learnt from the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* that you had presented forty copies of the Buddhist Scriptures in Pāli to the libraries of the United States. A list of the favored libraries was given, and I found that two copies were in the city where I reside. Though I have been a librarian since 1881, and was in the habit of using both these libraries, I was not aware that they had received so royal a present; for our newspapers, which recorded the fact, contain daily more than any one could read in a week; so that it is not astonishing when we miss information therein. As I was already a student of Pāli, and had spent much money in buying Pāli Texts in Roman letters, I was anxious to make use of your edition, because I knew it contained books which are not to be had in Roman letters, and which have never been printed before in the history of the world, except in translations by that nation who invented printing some eight hundred years before we did—I mean your neighbors the Chinese. But your volumes were in the canonical Pāli, an Aryan language closely allied to Sanskrit, and containing words like *pita*, father, and *mātā*, mother, which we recognise at once to belong to our own European family. I was also pleased at Your Majesty's critical ability in omitting from your edition of the Scriptures those ancient fairy-tales called Birth-Stories, which we know were disputed at the Second Council of the Order in the fourth century before Christ. These books are therefore on the same footing with certain books in the New Testament, which we Christians call *Antilegomena*, that is, disputed by the ancients, such as the Second Epistle of Peter, together with six others.

Upon my asking at the library, the thirty-nine volumes, bound in yellow, the ancient color of the Buddhist robe, were placed before me. The first thing I had to do was to master the Siamese alphabet, for I had only read Pāli in Roman letters. I therefore borrowed a volume from the library, and, by the aid of your valuable and necessary table of transliteration at the beginning, I soon learnt to read

and write the simple and elegant characters which your scholars have devised. Our own letters are barbarous in comparison, and this for the reason that we have borrowed those of the Romans, without adding to them such newly invented ones as are absolutely necessary to express our greater number of sounds. You Asiatics have a much more scientific idea of constructing an alphabet than we have, and therefore you take care to have one letter for every sound, that there be no confusion. The Armenians invented their alphabet on this rational principle in the fourth century, and it is evident that you have done the same in Siam when adapting Siamese letters to Pāli. You had not enough in your Siamese alphabet; so you invented new ones,—all very elegant and shapely,—until you had enough for every sound in Pāli. If the English and the Americans would only do the same, "our commercial and conquering tongue," as Emerson calls it, would be a still greater conqueror. As it is, its absurd orthography acts as a barrier to foreigners, second only in difficulty to the ideographic systems of the Chinese and the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians.

I have since derived much spiritual profit and intellectual enjoyment from the use of your gift, especially from Vol. 25. This is because the Dhammapada and the Sutta Nipāta are out of print in the Roman letters, and are not to be had by an ordinary student. I have copied out many pages from these grand old books, turning your characters into Roman letters as I do so. Not only so, but I know many verses in both these collections by heart, and their rich music rings through my head day and night. I have read portions of Homer, Virgil, and Horace in the originals, but neither hexameter, Sapphic, nor alcaic is one whit the richer in musical effect than the varied measures of these ancient poems. The softness of the language rivals Italian; and when one begins the Dhammapada, one launches upon a sea of melody:

"Mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā,

[Character has its mainspring in the mind.]

Of the fifty ways in which we may translate these immortal words, none can ever have the music of the Pāli.

Christian as I am, and believing that the Lord Jesus was the Deity in person, I can yet admire what is true, and therefore Divine, in your religion. The great fact which Gotama has taught us is that our present personality is not worth preserving. It is a husk, a scaffolding, whose beginning is in the world of sense and flesh, and which, after forming a basis for a higher development in realms unknown, is fit only for extinction. "Blessed shall be the cessation thereof." Though this doctrine finds full expression in our own New Testament, yet it is in the rapture of Hebrew gnomes; while in your Three Baskets, especially in the Second, it is elucidated with an intellectual clearness which we cannot find in the concentrated utterances of our Divine Master. Your generosity has given our nation the opportunity of learning all this from the fountain-head.

I now come to the real object of my letter: to thank Your Majesty for the treat you have given me. You have already received the thanks of universities, of libraries, and of famous scholars. I wish you now to accept the thanks of an obscure and unknown student, that you may feel assured of having done a benefit beyond what you have already been thanked for.

I therefore subscribe myself,

Gratefully yours,

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS.

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, May 7, 1897.

BRIEF NOTES ON SOME RECENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.

We may fitly preface our remarks on the main philosophical works which have appeared in France during the last year with a mention of the *Année Philosophique*¹ which is published under the able editorship of M. F. Pillon and has for its task the review of everything in French philosophy for the year 1896. The *Année* is now in its seventh year, and its possession is indispensable for those who would survey within a brief compass the annual course of Gallic thought. The original articles are contributed by M. Renouvier who writes on "The Categories of Reason and the Metaphysics of the Absolute," F. Pillon who discusses "The Evolution of Idealism in the Eighteenth Century," and L. Dauriac who offers a criticism of the doctrines and methods of Lachelier. Particularly the essay of M. Renouvier is distinguished for the clearness with which it treats a difficult subject, while that of M. Pillon is remarkable for the philosophic culture which it discovers. The bibliography also is the work of M. Pillon, who was the editor of the old *Critique Philosophique*, a philosophical magazine of high worth and standing.

We have a very useful treatise in M. PAUL RENAUD's *Précis de logique évolutionniste. L'entendement dans ses rapports avec le langage*,² which aims to present the elements of natural logic in a concise and simple form, by the use of the material and data which the modern science of language offers. M. Renaud, who is Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Grammar in the University of Lyons, and is hence eminently fitted for such a task, regards language as the living record of the development of thought in the past and consequently as the principal document to be studied in treating the evolutionary psychology of the race. His readers will find his reflexions simple and suggestive.

We have in *Le Psychisme Social*³ of M. E. DE ROBERTY a work of a different type. M. de Roberty is Professor in the new University of Brussels, which by its high and liberal aims and its recently broadened plan of instruction is one of the most exemplary educational institutions in the world. He is the author of a systematic series of philosophical works which when completed will cover the whole ground of philosophic inquiry, and which began with his *Sociology*, was continued with one or two historical works, with formal discussions of the reigning movements in philosophy, and is now engaged with the subject of ethics. Ethics will be treated in three volumes of which the present is the second. Ethics, according to M. de Roberty, is explained by the bio-sociological development, which is predominantly intellectual in character and significance. He regards social life as beginning with ideation and constituting thus an absolutely new power in the universe; hence the name *social psychism*. M. Roberty is a hard and profound thinker, and for a foreigner his works are not all easy reading.

Under the pseudonym of Jules Rig, M. ÉMILE RIGOLAGE embarked as early as 1876 upon the praiseworthy task of epitomising Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy*. The work met with some favor and was translated into various languages. It was well done and could be relied upon, and M. Rigolage had made it possible for one to get the gist of Comte's philosophy without reading everything he had written. He now publishes the second volume of his *résumé* in a second edition, under the title of *La sociologie*,⁴ which, inasmuch as the first part was the *résumé*

¹ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 5.

² Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 2.50.

³ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 2.50.

⁴ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 7.50.

of Comte's survey of the state of science in his time and is now of course antiquated, really gives his philosophy proper. M. Rigolage has added a valuable preface to his book, where he treats of the application of the positive philosophy to education which had not been considered by Comte.

In the "Historical Collection of the Great Philosophers" which Alcan is publishing in Paris and which now contains excellent translations of Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc., besides large critical works on Socrates, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Malebranche, Maine de Biran, etc., M. Victor Basch has now given us a ponderous work of 622 large octavo pages entitled *Essai critique sur l'esthétique de Kant*.¹ The work is certainly exhaustive, and M. Basch has subjected the Kantian æsthetics to a microscopic and severe examination in the light of contemporary psychology, endeavoring to draw profit from it for modern uses. He reviews Kant's method, his theories of feeling, of logical and æsthetical reflective judgment, of the æsthetic sense itself, etc., etc. He proposes to study in a sequel to this work the æsthetic of Kant in its historical development, origins, and results. As, judging from its scope, that volume is likely to be larger than the present one, M. Basch will certainly have said much upon this subject. We gladly call attention to this series of works, as the translations and criticisms have been made and written by men of the stamp of Barthélemy Saint Hilaire, M. Fouillet, and M. Paul Janet.

The most recent of the sociological works of ÉMILE DURKHEIM, Professor of Sociology in the University of Bordeaux, is his treatise on *Suicide*,² which he studies as a social phenomenon, observing that every nation has a penchant for suicide of a definite intensity measured by the ratio between the annual number of cases and the population, which the author calls the social rate of suicidal mortality. To seek the conditions which cause this rate to vary is the object of his work. He also considers the means by which the enormous increase in the number of suicides in all large European countries can be retarded. The work is accompanied with numerous charts and tables of statistics.

In *Les origines du socialisme d'État en Allemagne* M. CHARLES ANDLER, Lecturer at the École normale, reviews the causes which have led to the establishment in Germany of a socialistic monarchy, one of the most significant and curious developments of modern government and society. He finds that this development has its cause in the intellectual ferment which was brought about by the great and powerful philosophical works of Hegel, Savigny, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Rodbertus. A noteworthy feature of the book is the author's insistence on the power of ideas over facts. He studies the fundamental conditions of the ownership of property, of the production and distribution of wealth, of the organisation of social labor, the question of revenue and wages generally. He lays much weight upon the influence exerted by the early German philosophers, and shows that they were more concerned with the relations which the individual holds to the state than the relations which individuals hold to each other. Thence proceeded the ideas which led in Germany to state socialism.

We have further to refer to a book on *Nature et moralité*³ by Charles Chabot, wherein the author discusses the question of free-will, the content of morality, etc., while we must also not omit to mention a work in two volumes by M. J. Strada which has the same title as that of the task to which *The Open Court* is devoted, namely *The Religion of Science*.⁴ M. Strada understands by "religion of science"

¹Fel can, publisher. Price, fr. 20.
²F can, publisher. Price, fr. 5.

³Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 7.50.
⁴Two volumes. Alcan. Price, 7 fr. each.

something similar to the meaning given to it by *The Open Court*, insisting upon an impersonal criterion of truth which he finds in the Fact, identifying the basis of religion with science, etc. We may have occasion to return to this work independently later. It is difficult reading and extremely rugged in style.

Mention should finally be made of the excellent work which *La Revue Philosophique*¹ under the editorship of M. Ribot, and the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*,² under that of M. Xavier Léon, are doing. The former review is devoted mainly to psychology and to the related philosophical questions, while the review of M. Léon is concerned with the more formal problems which compose the science of metaphysics in its best sense. Its contributors are eminent thinkers in all departments. Science is especially considered, and in every number a certain amount of space is devoted to the consideration of practical questions, it being a theory of the editor that the power of philosophy also belongs to life. T. J. McC.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

AN OUTLINE INTRODUCTORY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." By R. M. Wenley, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1897.

Prof. R. M. Wenley of the University of Michigan with his publishers, Messrs. Henry Holt & Co. of New York, have made a laudable experiment in the publication of this *Outline Introductory to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. The little book, which is only ninety-five pages in length, is written in a concise, lively style and gives a very adequate digest of Kant's monumental and epoch-making work. Professor Wenley has supplied an able introduction on the genesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* showing its connexion with the preceding development of philosophy, and he has evinced throughout the whole of his opusculum a clear grasp of the main trend and significance of Kant's thought. The little book might be read before or collaterally with the *Prolegomena*, a study of which should always be made introductory to that of the *Critique* itself. If the present work is favorably received by teachers and students, it is the intention of the author and publisher to issue a series of works of like character, giving digests of the other leading philosophical masterpieces, to which end the services of prominent teachers in America and Great Britain are to be enlisted. Such a general conspectus as Professor Wenley has given is in Kant's case perhaps more necessary than in that of any other philosopher. But the outcome of each attempt must be judged upon its own merits. We can cordially recommend the present little book and would certainly encourage the author and publisher to continue their plan. T. J. McC.

A MATHEMATICAL SOLUTION BOOK CONTAINING SYSTEMATIC SOLUTIONS TO MANY OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. With Notes and Explanations. By B. F. Finkel. Kibler, Cokely & Co.: Kidder, Mo. Pages, 352.

Prof. B. F. Finkel has supplied a useful work in his *Mathematical Solution Book*. His purpose has been to give systematic as opposed to routine solutions of the commonest difficult problems of elementary mathematics, and he has searched all the leading works and periodical literature on the subject for the material which he has offered, not omitting the contributions which he has himself made to the art of solving mathematical problems. All the operations of elementary arithmetic

¹ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, 33 fr. per annum.

² Armand Colin & Cie., publisher. Price, 15 fr. a year.

are considered, the processes explained, and a large number of exercises added. Fully half of the work is devoted to mensuration, and in this part not only the common surfaces and solids are treated, but a large number of unusual figures, rarely used in practical thought, are dealt with. For the latter purposes the calculus is employed, the results and rules only being intelligible to the elementary student. The book is rich in definitions, graphical illustrations, and in information which cannot be obtained in the ordinary school-books. A human interest has been infused into the work by the addition of the biographies of three mathematical teachers, but we cannot help thinking that the praise which is accorded to their achievements has been slightly overdrawn. We have two remarks to make, regarding the operations of subtraction and multiplication which might be incorporated in elementary books.

Since adding is a simpler operation than subtracting, it follows that if the latter process can be reduced to the first, the subtraction of large sums from one another can be greatly facilitated. One knows intuitively the complement of every number with respect to 10 and with respect to 9, and consequently to convert any given example of subtraction into addition we have simply to take the complement of the last right hand number of the subtrahend with respect to ten and add that complement to the corresponding number of the minuend, and then take the complements of all the following numbers of the subtrahend with respect to 9 and add these to the minuend, carrying if necessary and rejecting 10 at the close of the process. The reason of the operation is apparent. Its facilitation lies in the fact that it does entirely away with borrowing, and in long subtractions it is almost impossible to commit an error through this source. For example, in the subjoined subtraction,

$$\begin{array}{r} 83452 \\ 35616 \\ \hline 47836 \end{array}$$

instead of following the common method we may say: 4 (the complement of 6 with respect to 10) plus 2 gives 6—write down 6; 8, the complement of 1 to 9, plus 5 gives 13—write down 3 and carry 1; 3, complement of 6 to 9, plus 5 (because of the one carried) gives 8—write down 8; 4, complement of 5 to 9, plus 3 gives 7—write down 7; 6, complement of 3 to 9, plus 8 gives 14—write down 4, and since the operation is completed, reject the 10 which represents the 100,000 originally borrowed. For what we have virtually done is to add 100,000 to the subtrahend and subtracted the minuend from the whole total.

Further, Professor Finkel says that it is more convenient in multiplying to begin at the right. Since the most important numbers of the result are usually the numbers to the left, it would seem logical that we should attempt to reach these first, rejecting, if it suits our purpose, the numbers to the right. In the multiplication of large decimal fractions this is nearly always desirable, and it is one of the great advantages of the use of logarithms. It can be done in the following manner, where we have to multiply 437.25 by 27.34:

$$\begin{array}{r} 437.25 \\ 27.34 \\ \hline 87450 \\ 306075 \\ 131175 \\ 174900 \\ \hline 119544150 \end{array}$$

We have put here the units' place of the multiplier under the last number of

the multiplicand and we begin multiplying with the last number of the multiplier to the left, going successively through the multiplicand from the right, and placing the first number of the product underneath the number of the multiplier. We continue in this way always placing the first number of each partial product under the number we multiply by. The decimal point will, in the partial products as well as in the total product, always be exactly where it is in the multiplicand, as the vertical line purposely placed in the example shows. Evidently, in any large example, we can neglect as many decimal places as we see fit.

The above is due to Lagrange. Oughtred (1574-1660) suggested the reversing of the order of the digits of the multiplier, but the same result can also be accomplished by writing the first left-hand digit of the multiplier under the last right-hand digit of the multiplicand, in both cases allowing the partial products their proper inverse order of places. Where the multiplier is put to the left under the multiplicand, of course it is absurd and inconvenient to attempt to imitate the common method.

T. J. MCCORMACK.

The Messrs. Ginn & Co. of Boston have just issued a translation, made by Professors Beman and Smith, of Prof. Felix Klein's *Vorträge über ausgewählte Fragen der Elementargeometrie*. The English title is *Famous Problems of Elementary Geometry*, being those of the Duplication of the Cube, the Trisection of an Angle, the Quadrature of the Circle. It will be seen that the contents do not exactly justify the title. They are rather an attempt of the well-known Göttingen geometer to show the applicability of the more refined and more generalised methods of modern mathematics to elementary geometry, and to indicate the improved and broader points of view so obtainable. The little book (80 pages) deals therefore with the possibilities of elementary geometric construction generally, with the nature of transcendental numbers, and with the transcendence of e and π . The expositions are lucid and interspersed with valuable historical and bibliographical references. Though, as the translators say, the Calculus is nowhere employed, and the whole is intended to bring certain higher, abstruse results of modern mathematics within the reach of the ordinary mathematical devotees, still a good knowledge of the theory of equations, series, etc., is absolutely necessary to the understanding of the book. Both translators and publishers deserve the thanks of students for the reproduction of this delightful little book in English. The translation is good (might not *potency* for *Mächtigkeit* be better than *power*, on page 51?). By a strange blunder the bookbinder has put the names of the translators instead of that of Professor Klein, the author, on the cover. (Price, 55 cents.) μрк.

DR. HENRY F. OSBORNE, Professor of Biology in Columbia University, and Curator of the Museum of Natural History of New York City, has contributed to the November *Century* an admirable appreciation of the late Prof. Edward D. Cope, the most distinguished of American Naturalists. Cope has not been rated by the non-scientific world at his just merits, and it is well that his importance is now so strongly emphasised. The article following Professor Osborne's is devoted to the gigantic and curious monsters of palæontologic times, with handsome illustrations by Knight, based on the material of Cope. The *Century*, in all such occasional articles, is doing good work for science, if only by softening the minds of the people to a moment's attentive consideration of the claims of research.

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
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ANIMAL WORSHIP.¹

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY.

BY DR. TH. ACHELIS.

IN ORDER to understand the important part played by the worship of animals in the lower stages of religious development,—and some survivals remain even in a higher stage,—it is necessary, as in so many studies in ethnology, to rid oneself entirely of all current prejudices and assumptions with reference to the history of civilisation. Our feelings are still dominated by the cheap disdain with which Christian Wolff, in the eighteenth century, regarded such discussions, saying: “The question whether animals ‘have souls or not is of no particular value; wherefore it would ‘be great folly to quarrel much about it; as far as I am concerned ‘it may be disputed or not, I leave every one to his own views.” Whenever this comfortable repose is disturbed by any disagreeable problems, appeal is made to all-powerful instinct, and thus everything is easily settled: men and animals are separated by a yawning and impassable gulf.² But this is by no means the case with uncivilised races; even the lower stages of civilised society often deviate considerably from this position in their estimate and views of the animal world. To them animals, being endowed plainly enough with souls,—in the strictest sense of the word the primitive man knows nothing inorganic and lifeless,—are just as much persons as are men, with sensual perceptions and intellectual pow-

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Th. Achelis by W. H. Carruth, of the University of Kansas.

² The fact that a school of natural science dominated by a one-sided Darwinian influence goes to the other extreme and endeavors to obliterate this distinction as far as possible, and, in a fashion quite perilous for psychology, to judge animals entirely from the human point of view (cf. Wundt, *Essays*, p. 182 ff) does not affect the average standpoint, of course.

ers, including speech,¹ only that no ordinary mortal, but the medicine-man alone, understands it. A distinguished ethnographer and traveller remarks that we must conceive the boundaries between man and beast as wholly obliterated. A given animal may be wiser or stupider, stronger or weaker than the Indian, it may have entirely different habits, but in his eyes it is a person just as he himself is; animals, like men, are united into families and tribes, they have various languages like the human tribes, but man, jaguar, deer, bird, fish, they are all only persons of various aspect and qualities. One only need be a medicine-man, who is omnipotent, and he can change himself from one person into another, and understand all the languages that are spoken in wood, air, and water.

The deeper basis of this conception lies in the fact that mankind at this stage is not yet ethical; goodness and badness exist only in the crude sense of doing to others what is agreeable or disagreeable, but the moral consciousness, and the ideal initiative, influenced neither by prospect of reward nor fear of punishment, are entirely lacking. Under these conditions how should the assumption arise of an impassable chasm between man and beast? The outward observation of the life-habits of animals, to which the Indian is restricted, can at most result in assigning man the position of *primus inter pares*. Furthermore, the Indian lacks our delimitation of species, in so far as they do not cross. This distinction, which is easily taught by experience, is entirely wiped out for the Indian because he lacks the knowledge of the hindrance based with us on knowledge of anatomy. If the Indian can explain anything by the crossing of various species of animals with each other, or of man and beast, nothing prevents his asserting it; on the contrary he sees it proven, and concludes at most that such things no longer happen when it is no longer necessary. To-day, our scholars tell us, there is no longer any *generatio equivoca*, but once there surely was such a thing (V. d. Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens*, p. 351; cf. my *Moderne Völkerkunde*, Stuttgart, 1896, p. 373 ff).

If we go back to these rudiments of primitive psychology, we shall not be surprised when we are informed that the savages talk with their horses, that the Indians beg pardon of the bear when they are preparing to hunt him, or in the case of the rattlesnake—

¹ Even as late as the *Märchen*—as instance bird-language—this conception remained, and accordingly is not solely a product of the imagination, as has been supposed, but rests upon the deeper foundation of primitive animism.

which, as we shall see later, is considered a peculiarly sacred animal—offer sacrifices to it and sprinkle a pinch of tobacco on its head (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, third American Edition, I., 467). Neither can it be surprising if animals are regarded as incarnations of the souls of the departed.

Ancestor-worship, this primary factor of primitive religion, demanded equally by filial duty and social considerations, continued to thrive upon this fertile soil. After their physical death powerful chiefs continue to live and act in the form of animals. Here, too, the psychological train of thought which led to this idea is plain and unmistakable, for as primitive man was impressed by the mysterious speed and the irresistible strength of certain animals, the same respectful awe necessarily led him to keep the spirit of the departed favorable to himself by appropriate worship. It is also notable that this worship is directed especially to large and dangerous animals, probably with the deliberate intention of preventing their depredations. True, in a higher stage of religious development this utilitarian consideration vanishes, as we shall presently see, and is succeeded by what one may almost call an abstract thought. In this case, a given species of animal is regarded as the dwelling of the ancestor, the tribal deity, for one is merged imperceptibly into the other, and the whole tribe takes the name of this heraldic animal, which thus at the same time gains social importance as being a member of the tribal family.

This is the significance of totemism, which is so widespread in Africa, Australia, and America.¹ The mythical tribal ancestor is worshipped in the form of some animal in which his soul has taken up its abode, so that thenceforth the flesh of this animal may not be eaten, or at least the eating must be preceded by all sorts of conciliatory ceremonies. This belief in a common origin from such a tribal ancestor very strikingly illustrates the inviolability of the social bond guaranteed by blood relationship. Among some races (for instance, many Indian tribes, some Malays and Polynesians) this relation is still more emphasised by the belief that the dead are changed into their totem-animal, and thus united with their mythical ancestor. It will be readily seen that in this way there occurred frequent confusions of identity which are of the utmost importance in the development of the *Märchen*,² as we shall see later, and, further, that we are here meeting the first elements of

¹ For details cf. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, I., 117 ff., where the legal consequences (property rights, blood-revenge, etc.) are discussed.

² Cf. J. Kohler, *Ursprung der Melusinen Sage*, Leipzig, 1895, especially p. 39 ff.

the doctrine, later so philosophically refined, of the transmigration of souls (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I., 469 ff).

But while in totemism legal and religious interests are mingled, and while it is often only a matter of an especial guardian-spirit, whether of an individual or of a tribe, the worship of a divinity in an animal symbol shows a purely animistic religious character which sometimes reveals a profoundly philosophical conception of the universe. This transition, hitherto generally overlooked, is to be seen in the Egyptian deification of animals, which has been misunderstood so frequently from the days of the Greek philosophers down to the present. Here, too, at first, we find the universal disposition to fetishism manifested in the care and consideration for certain species of animals widely different in different sections, so, for instance, that one "nomos" or district, used as food the animal worshipped in a neighboring district (cf. A. Wiedmann, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, München, 1890, p. 99). Just as, in a very striking scene described by Bastian, the negroes cudgel a fetish unmercifully to make it thoroughly submissive (*San Salvador*, Bremen, 1859, p. 61), so, too, the ancient Egyptians did not hesitate to resort at times to such brutal means, which, moreover, are even now employed in the case of obstinate and inefficient images of saints in some remote mountain villages of Tyrol and Bavaria.

From such a beginning the speculative priesthood developed the myth into a grand, half-pantheistic idea: the bull was the corporeal representative of Osiris, who was constantly renewed in him, just as, for instance, Buddha is renewed in the individual Dalai-Lamas in Lhassa. The very same process can be traced among the Hindoos, where the modern Brahmins worship in the sacred cow the direct incorporation of divine power, which for this very reason is imperishable and undergoes ever new incarnations. To cite a remote parallel, one might compare the great hare¹ Michabo of the Algonquins in North America, the powerful and kind creator, the discoverer of medicine and of all the arts that lead to civilisation (Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, third edition, Philadelphia, 1896, p. 194 ff, and his *American Hero-Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 37 ff). In the same way the god of the Aztecs, Quetzalcoatl, or Huitzilopochtli, worshipped in the form of a hum-

¹ The god is worshipped also as a rabbit, which fact Brinton explains from a confusion of the word *wabos* (rabbit) with *waban* (daylight), for Michabo is the light-bringer, and the native American idea of god is contained in this meaning (cf. *Hero-Myths*, p. 41 ff). We shall return to this point.

ming-bird or a serpent, rose far above this connexion with fetishism to the rank of a pure symbol of divine power; he, too, was a god of light, who issues victorious from a contest with his father, Tezcatlipoca, the god of night and darkness (cf. Brinton, *Hero-Myths*, p. 68 ff). Indeed, even Christianity was not able to rid itself entirely of this primitive characteristic, as is sufficiently proven by the representation of the Holy Ghost as a dove, by the familiar symbolic beasts of the apostles, and the various animals connected with the saints, which were borrowed from German heathendom, and, despite the zealous exertions of the missionaries, only slightly altered. The saints on horseback, those primitive figures of Middle Age Catholicism, are simply inconceivable apart from the deeper connexion with the fetish-idea associated with the dragons and serpents which these Christian heroes combat (cf. Lippert, *Christenthum, Volksglaube u. Volksbrauch*, p. 499).

The attempt has sometimes been made to find in the religious ideas of savage races an ethical dualism, such as is familiar to us in the Christian conception of the contest between God and the Devil, or as it is expressed in the conflict between Ormuzd and Ahriman in the Zend Avesta.¹

It requires but little reflexion to see that it is contrary to all psychological probability to assume, as early as this, such speculative ideas, which presume a certain maturity of moral perception. But since, on the other hand, the mythological religion of primitive races is a direct reflexion of their mode of thought and their conception of the universe, it would be strange if the common experiences of joyful or of painful nature had found no corresponding expression in their projection in mythology. Such an expression may be most keenly felt in the familiar answer of a Bushman to the question of a missionary as to what good and bad were: "Good is when I take away my neighbor's cow; bad when he steals her back." Then there is the further consideration that the savage in his helplessness and inexperience sees himself everywhere threatened with hostile attacks and surprises, wherefore it was an organic necessity that the thought and conviction of the fatal activity of evil spirits should reach a rank development in his superstitious imagination. Therefore it is by no means an accident, but rests on a mythological necessity, that the religious precepts of lower races have relatively a gloomy, demonological character, and

¹ So, too, in the myths of the Quichas, we are told of a battle between the gods of the upper and of the lower world which led the Spanish priests into a fatal error.

that most prayers deal with the prevention of impending misfortunes and protection from malicious powers of evil.¹

Even animals are drawn by the irresistible momentum of animism into this unhappy sphere, and so we find arising from these conceptions those terrible creatures of popular belief: werewolves and man-tigers. That certain exceptionally fierce wolves or tigers are man-eaters, says Tylor, is explained by the belief that the souls of depraved men enter the bodies of wild animals at night in order to prey upon their fellow-men. These are the man-tigers or werewolves, that is, man-wolves, whose existence is still believed in by the superstitious people in India and Russia.

The circumstance of a person's growing pale, bloodless, and haggard is explained in Slavic legends by the belief in the existence of blood-sucking spirits, who haunt the patient at night, and whose terrible visits enter his consciousness during sleep. These creatures are declared to be demon-souls, living in corpses, whose veins still flow with blood for a long time after death. These are the so-called vampires (Tylor, *Anthropology*, German edition, Braunschweig, 1883, p. 429; cf. Lippert, *Religion der europäischen Culturvölker*, Berlin, 1881, p. 45 ff; *Christenthum*, etc., p. 410 ff). The essential point is again the original fetishistic idea of an object possessed by some divine power,—both the English and the German languages still show the persistence of this thought in the words *possession* and *Besessenheit*. The particular animal varies, of course, according to location; for the Germanic and Slavonic wolf the African substitutes the hyena or leopard.

We cannot here enter into the details of the cult, of the means used for warding off evil, and of the horrible psychological ideas of the people. It must suffice to establish here, too, the early connexion of psychic life in men and animals. Neither can we take up the peculiar variations of the idea of transmigration. In accordance with the original presumption which we expounded earlier, we shall not be surprised if in certain conditions such exchange takes place, for is it not between beings of essentially the same nature? But in a higher stage of philosophical development there occurs imperceptibly a change in favor of man. The incarnation in an animal's body is regarded as a direct punishment for sins committed in this life; or a tyrannical priesthood, as the Brahmans in India, set such impassable barriers between the various classes that the man of

¹Characteristic in this connexion is the remark of an African, that their God, Niankupon, was too far from them and dwelt too high for a prayer to reach him; they were satisfied with the house-spirit, who cares for the common needs of life. (Cf. Bastian, *Controversen in der Ethnologie*, Berlin, 1893, III., 2.)

lower caste simply had nothing to be born into but an animal, while on the other hand the soul of the pious, by way of ever-recurring rebirths rises to the height of divine nature and perfection (cf. Lippert, *Culturgeschichte*, II., 418).

After such general explanations, which are intended to prepare for the understanding of these problems, already vague to the majority of living men, and misapprehended by them, it now becomes our task to illustrate this outline of the theory by certain concrete examples. It would, indeed, be a hopeless undertaking to try to exhaust the abundance of ethnological material. We can only present a few definite and especially characteristic examples, animals which have attained a typical significance for large race-groups, perhaps even for a considerable fraction of the human race, in a certain stage of religio-mythical development.

This is the case above all with the serpent, and next with the bull and the eagle. Before ethnology opened up the correct perspective, the worship of the serpent was often interpreted in a purely fanciful way, and confused in arbitrary speculation with alleged philosophical doctrines and druidistic priestly lore. Here, too, the initiative influences are evident: on the one hand the totemistic idea of ancestor-worship, on the other a series of material observations on the nature and habits of these animals. These are summed up by Lubbock as follows: The serpent occupies first rank among the animals worshipped; not only is it a maleficent and mysterious creature, but by its outwardly insignificant yet fatal bite, it produces the most dreadful effects in an inconceivably short time with means seemingly so inadequate, and forces the savage almost irresistibly to the assumption that he is dealing with what he regards as a divine being; there are some other less important, yet no less direct influences which have aided in a marked degree the development of this cult; the serpent is long-lived and easily kept in captivity, and thus the same individual can be preserved for a considerable period and shown to the multitude again and again at certain intervals (cf. *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 221). To these points we may add: Its rapid speed without the aid of feet, its dwelling in clefts and caves (the first burial-places), its brilliant, shimmering color, its peculiar sloughing of its skin, its sudden disappearance in subterranean depths, and again its frequenting of human dwellings, especially of that important place, the hearth-stone.

We find serpent worship, therefore, in almost every stage of social development in which mythologic ideas are manifested with

any degree of power: in Central Africa and among the reflectively inclined East Indians, among the red-skins of America¹ as well as among our own ancestors² and among the Semitic races.

Now while we can trace among primitive peoples at least the germs of the idea of eternal life through rejuvenation (as in the legend of the phoenix and in the later version of the Scandinavian midgard-serpent) they know nothing of the serpent as a symbol of evil, as it is familiar to us and particularly to the Iranians of Zoroaster's time. The only connexion with this idea to be assumed here is a slight one. The word serpent among the Dakotas, for instance, signifies the supernatural, just as in Arabic and Hebrew the corresponding word is associated with synonyms for spirit and demon (cf. Brinton, *Myths*, p. 132). Here, too, as Brinton justly suspects (*ib.*, p. 143), the ignorance and the religious bigotry of Christian missionaries have to be taken into account, as is so often the case. Wherever they found images of this animal they fancied they saw the work of the Devil, representations of the principle of evil, which of course was not their purport in any such degree.

Not so universal, yet diffused throughout extended regions of the earth, is the worship of the bull. It seems to be limited to certain fields of civilisation, as India, Irania, and Egypt. Lippert says that the bull must once have served extensively as a fetish animal in the early stage of civilisation in Asia, and among the occidental races related in culture to Asia. It is preserved to us in this capacity for the Assyrio-Babylonian Empire by later sculptures, and in Parseeism by the easily comprehended myth that the primal bull, Kajomort, was also the first man, the progenitor of their kings and the primitive ancestor of the whole human race. In India the bull Nandi was associated with Çiva. On the other hand, the origin of the sacred character of the sacerdotal cow is somewhat different. Throughout Egypt the cow, in connexion with Hathor and other divinities, was treated as a fetish, and was therefore not butchered. But among bulls it was only an individual with certain peculiar markings which received worship at Memphis as the living image of Ptah Sokari (*Culturgeschichte*, II., 408). It is well known that the Egyptian people, who were strictly trained in religion from beggar up to king, were profuse in all imaginable tokens of honor to the visible god to whom King Psammeticus built the splendid court in the Ptah temple at Memphis. His ora-

¹ Cf. Brinton, *Myths*, etc., p. 129, ff., who correctly emphasises the significant symbolism of rejuvenation in the sloughing of the serpent's skin.

² Cf. Schwartz, *Der Ursprung der Mythologie, dargelegt an griechischer u. deutscher Sage*, Berlin, 1860, who expounds especially the significance of the storm-dragon, p. 26 ff.

cles commanded the utmost regard, and later monarchs, such as Alexander the Great and Emperor Titus, paid homage to him. (Cf. Wiedemann, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, p. 100 ff.)

Finally, among birds the chief place was given to the eagle because of his strength and swiftness and his soaring flight. Birds in general are representatives of storm and tempest,¹ and most of the Algonquins on the northwest coast of America tell of a gigantic bird the flap of whose wings produces the thunder, and the flash of his eyes the lightning. (Cf. Brinton, *Myths*, p. 126.) It is presumed to be familiar to all that among Germans and Greeks the highest god was accompanied by an eagle.

It happens, moreover, that the birds that live on the flesh of serpents are regarded as the enemies of the serpent-gods, who attack and generally overcome them, as in the Indian legend. Moreover in this point also there are variations of the original fetishistic principle of soul-transference and possession in the various mythologies, multiplied in the case of the individual animals. Thus we find in the first Christian community the dove, among the Polynesians the soul-transferring moa-birds² (cf. Bastian, *Heilige Sage der Polynesier*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 149), among the Mexicans the humming-bird, half serpent and half bird, of the god Huitzilopochtli, and among the East Indians the hawk, Garuda, representative of Vishnu.

For lack of space we must pass over other animals, such as the elephant, so revered by Buddhism, the rabbit among the Algonquins, the dog among the Persians; neither can we discuss in detail the various forms of the cult, which, of course, differed considerably in the different stages of the people's development. Whether it is a simple child of nature, who sees in some animal his guardian spirit, and seeks to propitiate it by every possible gift, or whether it is an Egyptian priest bringing a sacrifice to the Apis-bull, which represents the divinity in bodily form, the psychological connexion is the same in both cases, even though in the latter case knowledge has advanced so far that the physical form is regarded as an unessential feature compared with spiritual power and efficiency.

And yet we must throw more light upon a point hitherto fre-

¹ Cf. Schwartz, *Ursprung*, p. 180 ff; Odhin also changes according to the Edda into an eagle.

² They proclaim the arrival after a great, all-devouring flood of a king, Waken, who should come to their coast from foreign parts; they are the seat of the highest god, Tangaloa, or Tangaroa, who in this form often approaches his temples. (Cf. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, II., 191.)

quently slighted; this is the significance of animal worship as it appears in the *Märchen* and the animal fable.

Owing to insufficient investigation, there has been a disposition, prompted by illustrations from classical antiquity and certain Middle-Age subjects, to find in the fable a direct moralising value, a didactic tendency, to which it is supposed to owe its origin, whereas ethnology has proven beyond all controversy that the real soil from which sprung this fanciful growth was the primitive relation and intimacy of man with his neighbor animals—an intimacy now wholly lost to civilised man.

The astonishment expressed one day at Oxford by Prof. F. Max Müller, when he found among the Zulu tales the very same ones that we know in such abundance in our *Märchen*, is very significant. In this case, according to the assertion of the best judges, such as the missionary and linguist Bleek, no outward connexion was possible; and yet, with slight local alterations befitting the changed scene, there appeared the same type and the same elements of treatment,—another proof of the psycho-social endowment of the genus *homo sapiens*, whose mental capacity, as Peschel justly observed, is uniform even to its most curious caprices and vagaries. (*Völkerkunde*, p. 27.)

Not until later, when the simple consciousness, the unreservedly animistic conception of the world, had given way to a critical philosophical reflexion, do we meet the familiar parables which are concentrated into the phrase, *Haec fabula docet*. Traces of this rationalising treatment may be recognised, as Tylor has correctly shown, even in the rich wreath of legends that twines about the person of the North American god, Manabodzho. (*Primitive Culture*, I., 409.)¹

The social background of the *Märchen*, which our historians of literature, filled with dumb admiration of poetic power, have too much neglected, is emphasised by Kohler in connexion with the legend of Melusina. He says: In the interpretation of this, as of other myths, the relations of the *Märchen* to the ethnological phenomena of national life have been too much overlooked. The *Märchen* is of mythological origin, but it is the myth incorporating itself in national life which comes to light in highly poetic reminiscences in the legend. It will not suffice to try to explain the Mär-

¹ The resemblance here is undeniable to the Polynesian god, Maui, the civilising hero of the Polynesians, who, however, like Til Eulenspiegel, is full of cunning schemes and burlesque tricks. (Cf. Bastian, *Zur Kenntnis Hawaiis*, p. 73.) But on the other hand it is certainly possible, as Brinton suspects, that in this case there have been later changes and corruptions of the original character. (Cf. *Myths*, p. 194 ff.)

chen by natural phenomena alone; it must be explained by the manner in which the natural phenomena are reflected in the spirit of the people, and this manner is characterised by the fact that the people feel themselves to be wholly identified with nature. Therefore modernised interpretations, like those of Max Müller, in which *Puruvavas* is interpreted as the sun, and *Urvaci* as the dawn which flees at the sight of the unveiled sun, are to be rejected to begin with, however much they may appeal to our sentiments.

The origin of the Melusina legend leads us back into the remotest antiquity. It dates back to the period when mankind still clung to totemism. A totem is, as generally known, the sign of a family, usually taken from some animal; and the clans, ranked in the main according to the matriarchal system, wore such a family sign, and were thereby distinguished from one another. Moreover, this animal sign has a deeper significance: the family wearing it bears a mystic relation to the animal; it must not kill such an animal or harm it, often not even touch it. The animal is the spirit of the family; even more, the animal is regarded as the family ancestor,—the family sprang from the animal. (*Ursprung der Melusinensage*, p. 37.)

Only on this assumption of an essential identity can the many variations of the *Märchen* and the fable be explained. Although in a more mature civilisation the world-wide gap between men and animals is undeniable, and manifests itself with a peculiarly tragic effect in the Melusina legend just referred to, yet to the childish simplicity of the Bushmen (those rare virtuosi in animal-fables!) the world of animals is the direct and faithful copy of human life and deeds. (Cf. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, I., 690 ff). The discord which so often with harsh clash disturbs this harmonious fellowship of men and animals is especially heard when the higher being which for a time had assumed human form and appearance is recognised, or its origin recognised; then it is obliged to go away, while jealousy and curiosity play a fateful part, perhaps also the irresistible longing for the old supernatural life that was not restricted to the narrow limits of human existence.

Sometimes, but by no means always, there follows a reunion of the parted pair in the other world, and as a result we have the romantic wanderings across mysterious waters, to sun and moon, or to the dark under-world, in order to find the lost loved one. All these traits and variations of this prolific theme are simply inexplicable without the deeper totemistic background. And so Kohler is quite right in concluding thus: The Melusina theme is a *Mär-*

chen theme that was later attached to historical persons and families, and thus became a legend. The conclusion of the *Märchen* is mythical, but it is not a nature-myth in the sense of a cosmic philosophy which constitutes the various factors of nature's activity into specific divinities, but a myth in the sense of an animism filling the universe with vague spiritual activity, and the myth has its roots in the animistic conception of social relations which, as totemism and Manitou-worship, dominates the childhood of nations.

The mythical element, therefore, has a closer relationship than was formerly thought to the whole social conception of life, for the social fabric is permeated with the spirit of animism, and the belief in animism is most intimately related to social as well as to individual life and its manifestations. And it is very true that the physiological and pathological phenomena of dreams, hallucinations, and nightmare have contributed much to the origin of myths, no less than the phenomena of the outer world reflected upon the imagination of races.

But it is also true that the social manifestations of the collective life-instinct, with its loving, hating, and fearing, and the strong centripetal instincts have influenced the formation of myths. And especially is it true that the love and the aversion particularly strong in man in a state of nature with regard to certain animate beings, certain animals and plants,—feelings which were intensified to the point of a sense of kinship, of passionate desire to persecute, or again, of dumb worship,—appear in popular myths. These social and ante-social manifestations of the human *psyche* must not be lost sight of in the study of myths and their transition into the charming form of *Märchen*. (*Ib.*, p. 63.)¹

If we recall in closing the outline of our investigation, the conclusion is irresistible that the close connexion of men and animals was, to the simple mind of the primitive man, a fact established beyond all question. Hence any further religio-mythical exposition had inevitably to begin at this point, and, apply to this its theory of the soul, which of course had been obtained already as the result of another process. Social forces, especially primitive ancestor-worship enjoined by filial respect, added their influence to make this connexion still closer and firmer, and make it a moral obligation. Not until much later did a metaphysical priesthood take hold of this fruitful subject, expanding it in all directions, but with-

¹ As the Melusina legend shows the primitive animistic features very plainly, Kohler prefers it to the Lohengrin type, in which the original force is already relaxed (*loc. cit.*, p. 61).

out destroying in the minds of the common people, at least, the primitive conception of a mystic, fetishistic incarnation, as seen in Egypt and India. This dualism may be traced among primitive peoples, according to Brinton, as in the peculiar myth of the great rabbit of the Algonquins. Michabo, who is worshipped in the form of this animal by the red-skins as supreme god, creator of heaven and earth, and giver of all the blessings of civilisation, has etymologically another meaning, that of "white," and from it are derived the words for east, dawn, light, day, and morning. (*Myths*, p. 198.) To the simple, natural sense the animals are themselves divinities, or at least their direct and authoritative representatives, and the savage believes in their genuineness and power just as firmly as the sincere Christian in the miracles of the New Testament.

It is, therefore, a false standpoint, resulting only from our critical reflexion, to hold to the current assumption of conscious anthropomorphising in the *Märchen*. These animals of the fable are just as much real creatures, endowed with psychic impulses and instincts, as the animals in the constellations, whose real substances have, to be sure, faded in the course of time into the symbolic and shadowy signs of the zodiac. (V. d. Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens*, p. 351 ff.) Only a purer interpretation, further removed from the sensual concept, and striving for a deeper understanding, departs from this almost unintelligible, mythological realism, and, piercing through the glittering show of the outer veil to the essence and reality of the phenomenon, endeavors to add to the manifestation the moral element hitherto wholly lacking. A fine illustration of the invincible power of truth in the human mind is given by Brinton in his account of the Inca, Yupangui, who prohibited in his realm all image-worship of the supreme god, Viracocha, declaring it to be wrong to worship the almighty creator of all things in the former manner by means of sacrifices and presents, since only spiritual service was befitting the highest of all gods. (*Hero-Myths*, p. 236.) But in the presence of this lofty and luminous conception of the universe, which reminds us of Christian ideas, we must not, in attempting to secure a socio-psychologic perspective, lose sight of the humbler stages of development, in which the chief part is played on the one hand by inorganic nature, with its mighty elemental forces, and on the other by animals like man in their nature and bound to him by multifarious mystic ties.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.¹

BY THE LATE JUSTICE ALBERT HERMANN POST.

[CONCLUDED.]

WE NOW COME to the task of analysing the jural order of society, as that was indicated in our last article (*The Open Court*, for November). It is obvious that in the first place the jural customs and jural notions of all the nations of the earth must be carefully collated and accurately described. For only the aggregate of all the expressions of the jural sense of mankind can afford material warranting inferences as to the nature of the human jural sense in general.

And since the mass of jural customs and jural notions necessary to this task lies scattered among very many different peoples, it follows that the natural classification of the material will be according to the nationalities in which the notions in question prevail.

Such a collection of the jural customs and notions of all mankind arranged according to nations, would afford a highly useful basis for juridical research. It would be possible to carry out, within this framework, a uniform and systematic arrangement of the material. There are numerous customs and conceptions which repeat themselves among different peoples, and these would serve as the leading divisions of the systematised arrangement we have in mind. The following, for instance, might properly be regarded as divisions: the relations of kinship as derived from mother-right, father-right, and parental rights generally, with the stages of transition between the same, the subsequent development of the bonds of consanguinity (clan-fraternity, milk-tie, foster-tie, etc.), endogamy and exogamy, wedlock in its various phases (restrained and

¹ Translated from the German by Thomas J. McCormack.

unrestrained promiscuity, wedlock by groups, polyandrous, polygynous and monogamous wedlock, leviratical marriages) the capture of wives, the acquisition of the bride by service, the purchase of brides, betrothal-rights, obligation of abstinence before and after marriage, suitors, disqualifications to wedlock, forms of marrying, divorce, second marriage, mourning-time, the status of women and children, age of arming, age of majority, child-bed of the husband, the status of the old and the sick, forbiddance of intercourse between persons near of kin, guardianship, federal and monarchical forms of organisation, community of house and farms, systems of joint responsibility and solidarity, blood-feud, rights of refuge, ordeals, forms of oaths, *et cetera*. This list might be continued for pages. In this material are to be found legal conceptions and customs of the most widely different nations of the earth which partly agree and partly vary. We could arrange all customs and conceptions under these headings, and the classification so reached would be a preparatory work of great value for the causal analysis of legal customs and conceptions generally. It would then appear in how far given legal customs and conceptions varied among themselves and among different peoples.

One foundation for such a causal analysis is afforded by the historical connexion between the legal customs and conceptions of different periods within the same social organisation. But this analysis is only possible where traditions are at hand relating to corresponding legal customs and conceptions taken from the different periods of the same people's development. As a rule this is only the case with peoples having a history. With peoples having no history these traditions are wanting, unless perchance observations relating to their law be made during different epochs by travellers from civilised nations.

The historical method, therefore, in so far as it presents the history of the development of a given legal custom or conception in a given society, is restricted to provinces comparatively limited. So far, we only know of a history of Roman and Germanic law with the beginnings of the history of Slavonic, Celtic, Indian, Mosaic, and Islamic law. The history of all the other systems of the earth has not been treated, or at least what has been accomplished is confined to the beginnings. Here and there historical treatment would be possible. But with the majority of the peoples of the earth material for such a treatment is wanting altogether, and will, in all probability, never be accessible.

The question arises now whether a really causal analysis of le-

gal customs and conceptions is still everywhere possible. The only aid at the disposal of science here is, as with every such analysis, the method of comparison. But this is possible only when there is an external similarity between legal customs and conceptions. The use of a chronological connexion is here altogether out of the question. Can such a comparison yield scientific results of any value whatever, or are we here at the end of our science? That is the question, the answer to which will determine whether Ethnological Jurisprudence is a science at all, or whether it is a will-o'-the-wisp the pursuit of which is to be given up as soon as possible.

The question cannot be answered *a priori*: it depends entirely upon our successfulness in arriving at definite results. If we are successful, the method is warranted; if not, the attempt goes for naught. The scientific possibility of a purely comparative method depends upon facts, the existence or non-existence of which can only be determined by the application of the method itself. The question is whether in the development of human law definite legal customs and conceptions exist and regularly occur even among unrelated peoples, or whether the law of every people, at least of every kindred group of peoples, is an isolated product standing in no relation whatever to the law of other peoples. If there be rules of legal conduct which recur everywhere on the globe and which pass through a stated course of development, the method by comparison is applicable: to explain a given legal custom of one nation we may avail ourselves of the corresponding legal customs of another. If such be not the case, a purely comparative method is a scientific chimera.

For instance, if a table of the legal customs of all the nations of the earth were to present such a picture as the languages of all the nations of the earth (e. g. in Franz Müller's *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*), a purely comparative method such as I have employed in my works upon ethnological jurisprudence, would be out of the question. A comparison of non-cognate tongues is impossible, for these are isolated formations. It may be that certain results for the general evolution of human thought could be obtained only from a conspectus of all the languages of the earth; but generally languages are isolated products of certain ethnic groups. With other creations of social life this is not the case. The evolution of the religious sense affords phenomena of manifold similarities, which extend far beyond the boundaries of philological races; and so the jural life of mankind affords a succession of phenomena which are not the especial creations of certain peoples or

of a certain congeries of peoples, but which recur on the contrary in wide domains, among unrelated nations, and extend over such broad fields that they may be regarded as the common and universal property of the whole race.

When such analogous legal customs and conceptions are discovered among unrelated peoples of the earth, it then becomes a question whether they owe their origin to analogous causes; for phenomena of jural life which are outwardly alike may rest upon quite dissimilar causes. Yet we may attempt to explain one by the other, and whether this is possible, we shall soon discover. When we meet with the same or a similar legal custom among many peoples, we usually find a sphere of ideas which readily explains it. Whilst certain legal customs and conceptions occur only within extremely limited domains, and do not lend themselves at all to the comparative method, on the other hand we meet with such as recur among all possible peoples and races in infinite variations, and the divergences are such that we are often unavoidably led to assume that these isolated customs represent different stages in the development of a jural institution which in its fundamental features is everywhere uniform. This can be shown only by illustrations, and it remains for me to explain what I mean by a definite example.

Thus under the rubric of *leviratical marriages* we may include a group of phenomena regarding which we possess accounts from the most diverse peoples of the earth, varying greatly in compass and credibility. Such accounts are for instance the following:

1. *North American Indians.*

Among the Kolushes the brother or sister's son receives the widow of the deceased in marriage. Among the Ojibways and the Omahas the widow became the wife of her brother-in-law after the mourning period was over, and the latter had to care for the children of his deceased brother.

2. *Astec and Toltec Nations.*

In the States of Anahuac a man was only allowed to marry the widow of his deceased brother when children were still living whose education had to be cared for.

3. *South American Indians.*

Among the Arawaks a second marriage is not left to the will of the widow, for the nearest relative of the deceased husband has

the right to marry her, and the latter may thereby often become the second or third wife unless sold to a third party. If she marry any one without the consent of the lawful heir, the deadliest feuds may result. Among the Calchaquis in the interior of Brazil, the brother marries the widow of his brother, to beget descendants for the deceased. According to Von Martius, it is a custom rigorously practised among all Brazilian Indians, that upon the death of a husband the eldest brother, or in case there be none, the nearest male relative of the deceased marries the widow, and the widow's brother marries her daughter; which is the case with the Mundrucús, Uainumas, Juris, Maubés, Passés, and Coërunas.

4. Oceanic Peoples.

In Australia when the husband or affianced dies, his brother on his mother's side inherits his wife and children; the widow repairs to him with her children after the interval of three days. In Western Australia the brother of the deceased has a right to the widow, and, if he choose, may take her for himself. On the Flinders Islands, near Australia, if the husband die his brother marries his wife.

Among the Polynesians the brother of the deceased is regarded as the husband of the widow and the father of the deceased's children.

5. Semitic and Cognate Peoples.

Among the Bedouins, if a young husband leave a widow, his brother as a rule offers to marry her; but it is not in his power to force her to marry him. With the Beni Amer, if the brothers of a deceased husband do not wish to marry his widow, she can, after the expiration of the mourning period, marry at her own will, and she may not be forced into marriage by the brother of her deceased husband. With the Barea and Kunama, if a man die, his widow is married without further ado by his brother of the same mother, or ultimately by the son of the deceased's man's sister. With several Berber tribes of the Atlas region, the male relative who after the death of her first spouse first throws his shawl (Haik) over the widow, becomes her husband and has to care for her children and manage her property. Among the Bogos, when a married man dies, his sons by a previous marriage, his brothers or next of kin, succeed to his wife, that is, marry her, without further consultation with her father. Among the Hebrews leviratical marriages occur in the following form: If brethren live together and one of them

die and have no child, the wife of the deceased shall not marry without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her and take her to him to wife. And it shall be that the first born which she beareth shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name shall be not put out of Israel. With the Galla, the brother must marry the widow of his deceased brother. With the Somali, the widow may marry again only with one of her husband's nearest relatives, who has to pay her half of her first dowry; if the latter die too, his wife is married to one of the same family for a compensation of one-fourth of the first sum. If the wife die, the husband has the right to demand in marriage an unmarried sister of his dead wife for one-half of the marriage dowry.

6. *Negro and Congo Peoples.*

In the interior of western equatorial Africa, the nephew marries the relicts of his maternal uncle, and with the Bakalai the son marries the widows of his father, with the exception of his own mother. With the Bechuana the son succeeds to all his father's wives, and if an older brother die, the younger brother comes by his wives.

7. *Indo-Germanic Peoples.*

With the Afghans the brother is bound to marry the widow of a deceased brother if she wish it. In the laws of Manu, leviratical marriage occurs only in case a virgin widow be left. In the latter case, the same custom prevails among the Ideyars in South India, among the Jat families in the Punjab, and with some of the Rajput classes of Central India. It occurred in the old German law, that the heir to whom the guardianship of the widow came with the inheritance, particularly the brother of the deceased or indeed her own stepson, took the widow to himself as though part of the inheritance.

* * *

From such a collection of ethnological facts, embracing the whole earth and including the customs of nations in no ways related, no one, unless starting from a prejudiced point of view, could entertain the supposition that it were possible for such strange phenomena, agreeing in so many particulars, to rest everywhere upon causes different in character and place. There can be no doubt that broader foundations to these exist; they must repose upon universal forms of social organisation,—forms which in individual instances find diversified expression only.

These universal forms of organisation are not to be discovered directly from the facts themselves: to determine them a person must possess a knowledge of the general jural status of the nations in question, and this knowledge can be obtained only from accounts of the legal customs of the said peoples. With the aid of information thus obtained, no doubt can be entertained that all the above mentioned customs belong to a form of organisation which extends over the whole earth, and which is exhibited exclusively among peoples living in a state of nature—viz., the clan. Thence arises characteristic conceptions of law which are repeated in all the customs above mentioned. It is a universal principle of the clan-system that women are not independent subjects of jural relations, that they are, so to speak, pieces of property belonging to the clan. They stand under the guardianship of the clan, which disposes of them at will, but which likewise provides for their maintenance. These rights and duties of guardianship are lodged by preference in the hands of a definite person, the head of the family, and after the latter's decease fall to the person who succeeds him. And so the women of the family chief pass to the new family-chief by way of inheritance, and the same rights and duties that the former chief possessed, arise in the person of his successor. With the gradual disintegration of the clan-system women acquire more and more recognised legal status, while the right and duty of guardianship becomes more and more invalidated.

This is the fundamental principle upon which all the above-mentioned customs rest. If the guardian of a woman die, the latter passes by inheritance to the person to whom the guardianship now falls. According to the strict interpretation of tribal institutions, there lies in the idea of guardianship the right of absolute disposal on the one hand, and on the other the obligation to provide for the woman in question.

A great number of other conceptions of clan-law might be adduced in explanation of the customs mentioned.

1. First, two systems of relationship exist in the clan: the system of mother-right, agreeably to which relationship is determined solely through the female line, and the system of father-right agreeably to which relationship is determined solely through the male line. Descent and guardianship conform to these systems. The third system that occurs, the system of parent-right generally whereby the relationship is determined through the male as well as the female line, first appears after the dissolution of the clan-system.

It appears from the instances cited, that leviratical marriages and inheritance of women occur as well under the system of mother-right as under that of father-right. Under mother-right, women are transferred among the North American Indians, Australians, Barea, Kunama, and among the tribes of equatorial Africa, according to the systems respectively prevailing among these peoples. Under father-right, women are transferred among the peoples of the Malay peninsula, the Himalaya and Caucasus districts, among the Mongolic-Tartaric, most of the Semitic, most of the Negro, Congo, and Indo-Germanic peoples, according to the systems respectively prevailing among them. Here and there the accounts fail in establishing whether inheritance takes place according to mother-right or father-right, and since both systems often exist side by side, these instances demand more detailed investigation. With the Brazilian tribes mentioned a complication of father and mother-right is found. The widow is married by the nearest relative according to the patriarchal system, while the daughter is married by her mother's brother on the maternal side according to the matriarchal system.

With the Dyaks, who live according to parent-right, leviratical marriages are in a state of total decadence. The widow may be freed from marriage with the nearest relative of her husband by surrendering her property to the family of such relative.

2. In strict conformity to clan-law, the nearest male-relation of the deceased husband is empowered and obligated to take the widow in marriage, while the consent of the widow is not asked. After the dissolution of the clan the heir generally continues to enjoy the right of marrying the widow, although no longer obliged to do so; on the other hand, he is still obliged to provide for her, although he may become absolved from this duty by giving her in marriage to another person—a procedure empowered by his guardian-right of disposition. The widow acquires the privilege of no longer being forced to marry without her consent the person that inherits her; but on the other hand she is not allowed to enter into another marriage without his approval. If a third person should marry her without the consent of the heir, he would be guilty of an infraction of the heir's guardian rights, and according to clan-law this leads to blood-feud.

Here belong the customs of the Arawaks, the Australians, the Malaysians, and most of the others mentioned.

3. All male relatives are entitled to such inheritance who, according to the system of kinship prevailing, are next of kin.

Thus the sister's son or mother's brother, according to mother-right, and according to father-right the son or the brother on the father's side, inherit the wives as well as the property and enter into marriage with the former by inheritance. The brothers of the deceased figure in almost all the customs mentioned. The sister's son figures as heir, for example, among the Kolushes, the Barea, and Kunamas, in equatorial Africa; the son, among the Tunguses, the Bakalai, the Bechuana, the Kaffirs. The only exception to the inheritance of the son is his natural mother, who falls to a brother of the father.

In accordance with the notion that the right of guardianship resides in the whole clan, all members thereof are in a mediate way supposed to be entitled to the inheritance, as is the case among the Alfurs.

4. A legal custom prevailing among all clan-organisations is the purchase of the bride. The family of the female, or its clan-head, sells the future wife for a certain sum to the family of the future husband, or to the latter in person. By this sale the family of the female either renounces all claims to the wife, or certain defined rights still remain with them. When the wife is transferred by marriage to the family of her husband, she remains there even after his death. The family of her husband has to dispose of and care for her: she stands under the guardianship of her husband's family. Without the consent of the latter she is not allowed to enter into marriage with a third person, and in case of such a marriage her deceased husband's family receives the amount paid for her as bride.

If a kinsman of the deceased husband marry the widow, no bridal price is paid the family of the female, provided all rights have passed to the family of the husband through the original bridal purchase. Otherwise, a smaller payment is made at remarriage.

If the guardian-rights of the female's family are not totally abolished by the bridal purchase, the relations between the family of the female and the family of the husband may take various shapes.

Thus among the Benget-Igorrots the wife belongs to the family of the deceased husband, and among the Papuas of Geelvink Bay and on the Aru islands the family of the husband gets the bridal sum for the widow who enters into an alien marriage. No bridal sum is paid among the Alfures of Buru and on the Aru

islands in case of leviratical marriages. The law of the Somali is also to be compared here.

The rights of the wife's family still appear in the custom of pre-emption, which is mentioned among the Usbeks, in the law of Timor, where the next of kin to the deceased can absolve himself from the obligation of providing for the widow by the payment of a certain sum to her family.

5. To the clan-guardianship already noticed, belongs the custom of the Karo-Karo according to which, if there be no near relative of the deceased to take the widow, the family chief assigns the latter a spouse from the Marga of the deceased husband. And similarly among the Circassians, the widow and her children pass to another member of the clan. The provision here is quite characteristic that the clan has no obligations in this line if the widow be too old for marriage. With the Bechuana also the whole kindred determines which among the kinsmen has to marry the widow.

6. The provisions of the Batak-law of Angola and Sipirong are to be taken into consideration here according to which the widow of the elder brother always falls to the younger brother, while the marriage of the elder brother with the widow of the younger is regarded as incest. On the other hand, with the Alfures of Buru the eldest brother of the deceased inherits the widow of the deceased, whereas a brother younger than the deceased husband may not marry the latter's widow. This last provision appears to owe its existence to entirely specific causes. With the Malagasy the brother next succeeding marries the widow. With the Khatties the widow of the elder brother falls to the younger, while the widow of the younger brother may do as she pleases. It thus appears that also in this instance the elder brother can make no claim to the widow of the younger. With the Chassaks the women pass from one brother to another in the line of succession, apparently thus: the widow of the elder brother, always to the next younger. With the Bechuana also the younger brother succeeds to the widow of the elder. And so it appears to be the rule in general, that the next younger brother is in every case authorised and obligated to contract leviratical marriages.

7. A peculiar group is formed by the leviratical marriages of the Calchaquis in the interior of Brazil, of the Malagasy, and of the Hebrews. In these instances the object of leviratical marriage is to perpetuate the family of the deceased—an object which is aimed at by many other features of the clan system. Children begotten in leviratical marriage are considered the children of the de-

ceased husband. The law of the Malagasy recognise all children as such; that of the Hebrews only the first son. With the Ossetes the same thing reappears as with the Malagasy: only in this instance the widow's children which are subsequently born out of wedlock, also pass for the children of the deceased husband, just as among the Kaffirs natural children of widows pass as the children of the deceased husband and consequently fall to the latter's heirs.

8. To the decadence of the clan-system belong those customs according to which the obligation to marry the widow is only a duty of propriety, and according to which the woman must consent to the marriage; in the first place, however, the provision of the law of Anahuac whereby a leviratical marriage is permissible only when the education of the deceased brother's children has to be provided for.

9. To an entirely different group belongs the custom of Ponapi, according to which, upon the death of a wife, the widower marries her sister. This custom is also found among the North American Indians, the Knistineaux and the Selish, and in many other districts besides. It is found among the Somali together with the customs above noticed. There may be a close relation between this and the legal principle so widely diffused that the wife's family stands security to the man in bridal purchase that he shall keep his wife, and that if she die, a new one shall be substituted. Yet the matter might be considered from other points of view, and more thorough investigation is demanded for an adequate explanation of this phenomenon.

Numerous groups of facts similar to those just discussed may be discovered in the jural life of the peoples of the earth, and this being the case, it will no longer be possible to deny that the purely comparative method is allowable in the province of jurisprudence; and this holds true, whatever individual opinions may be as to the value of the facts reported and the inferences drawn from them.

That the inferences are unsafe, is at once evident. This comes from the fact that sufficient material is not yet at hand and has not yet been properly assorted. But it is just as perfectly evident that inferences have to be drawn and will have to be drawn still. The material would never be procured, if it could not be shown from such inferences that a collection of facts in the direction indicated would lead to solid scientific results. Furthermore it is only through inferences of this sort that points of view can be won from

which further work may be directed with intelligence. For all material is certainly not of equal value to science, and the tendency to delve into irrelevant details is widely prevalent in learned circles, and especially in Germany. On the other hand, one must be on one's guard against pronouncing a discovered fact irrelevant because we do not happen to know at the time of any analogous phenomenon. It is impossible to prescribe a detailed method of procedure for the field of ethnological jurisprudence. Such a method must first result from the very material to which it is applied.

At present we can offer but a few general points for consideration :

1. Although the collection of material must take place with separate races and nations (and the most detailed observations are here of the highest value), nevertheless in the causal analysis of the jural customs of a single nation, it is highly expedient always to adduce the corresponding jural facts of cognate as well as of non-cognate peoples : for we may thus avoid such false conclusions as easily arise from insufficient material in treating of a definite custom of a given people. This is but the extension of a view which has already asserted itself in the investigation of the history of law.

An exposition of what is stipulated in the law of a single European municipality would be much more exhaustive if expounded from other sources beside its own and if the laws of kindred municipalities were adduced in explanation. In wider fields, the recent study of Indian Law has aided considerably in perfecting the expositions of Germanic, Roman, Grecian, and Celtic customary law. If legal customs exist which are more universal and which prevail throughout extended ethnic fields, it is certain that an understanding of these is of proportionately more value if the explanation of such a custom in a single nation is under consideration. We do not wish to say by this that no attempt should be made to expound the legal custom first from the more limited sphere in which it appears. On the contrary, this endeavor should be aided as much as possible, and historical investigation in particular should be pushed as far as practicable in the separate provinces. But in any single province of law, historical investigation will always reach a point where original material no longer warrants conclusions of demonstrable certainty. Vagrant hypotheses necessarily arise, where the admission of facts from more extended regions might lead to safe conclusions. It is quite obvious that in considering the laws of peoples having no history, a comprehensive

understanding of the laws of all other peoples of the earth possesses incomparably higher value than in the case of peoples that do possess a history; indeed it is indispensable in the first instance if false conclusions are to be avoided. It must therefore be recommended to those who intend to labor scientifically in the field of ethnological jurisprudence, first to acquire at least a tolerable knowledge of every existing legal system before entering upon more limited fields of research: otherwise they will always be liable to partial judgments. Even for the mere collection of legal customs, this will be expedient, for an investigator with European opinions of law might very easily receive a wrong impression from a legal custom discovered among a people living in a state of nature. The causal analysis will be the more correct, in proportion as the investigator's knowledge of all existing systems of law is the more comprehensive.

2. The history of law deals with historical data in their chronological succession. Ethnology in so far as it treats of peoples having no history does not recognise such a connexion; it has no chronology. Ethnology takes no cognizance of decades or centuries: it has to do with periods and strata only, somewhat like geology. In any epoch you choose ethnology meets with all manner of legal customs, from the lowest and crudest to those of the highest development, existing near each other and among all nations of the earth. The materials whereon it can found its conclusions are like or analogous data, and such data among the different peoples of the earth are separated from one another not by decades but by hundreds and thousands of years. Legal customs which are practised to-day among one people, belong to the most primitive periods of another. The chronology of ethnological jurisprudence is not a computation of years from a point of time arbitrarily adopted. It is the graduated scale of development which any characteristic legal custom or conception has passed through among the different peoples with whom it is found.

This idea can be transferred to historic nations also and with important results. Every living historic nation still rests in its undermost strata upon the primitive society whence it has arisen, and upon this foundation strata upon strata of culture and civilisation are piled. All these strata still lie one above the other in the positive law of a people of any period. Even in the most recent of modern codifications there is an abundance of heirlooms from primitive times, and we may trace in the current law of to-day the history of its development as easily as we can trace in the structure

of the human body the history of the human race. This point, too, may often become of great importance in explaining any single legal custom; for it is often impossible to explain such customs from the times in which they occur, it being necessary to recur to periods long since past.

3. Hitherto, the science of jurisprudence has believed that it possessed the most valuable material for research in the laws of nations which had reached the highest plane of civilisation, and that it could dispense altogether with the study of civil life among the ruder and more uncivilised peoples. It is exactly upon this point that ethnological jurisprudence must lay the greatest emphasis, for only in the laws of uncivilised peoples are the germinal conditions of law to be discovered, and for a universal history of the development of law a knowledge of the latter conditions is indispensable. As the science of physiology is based upon the physiology of the cell, so will the future science of jurisprudence be founded upon the germinal element of civil society—the primitive gens. And this primitive gens as an elementary form is to be found at present only among purely aboriginal peoples.

4. Social customs and conceptions, as we find them among the nations of the earth, are regarded by the ethnologist as organic products. The fact of their existence can no more be subjected to criticism than the fact of the existence of individual plant or animal species, than the fact of the existence of a solar system or of the universe at large. They are regarded as natural growths, and merely the causes that have produced them are made the subject of ethnological research. In the same manner the *legal* customs and conceptions of the various nations of the earth, are regarded by ethnological jurisprudence as irreversible facts. They too are not to be subjected to æsthetical or ethical criticism from the individual standpoint. They are to be investigated objectively in reference to their causes, just as we examine a plant or an animal in search of the laws of its growth and the conditions of its life.

In ethnology, therefore, and particularly in ethnological jurisprudence, the question never arises as to whether a thing be good or bad, right or wrong, true or untrue, beautiful or ugly. The sole question is whether a certain custom or conception really exists in the life of the nations; and if it exist, why? and if not, why? No importance can be attached here to the judgments of individuals regarding such a custom or conception; and if ethnology and ethnological jurisprudence are to acquire a strictly scientific character, this purely objective standpoint is to be rigorously adhered to.

Individual estimation is an extremely inconstant factor, and its recognition would utterly invalidate a strict and scientific treatment of ethnological subjects. An exhibition of indignation on the part of an ethnologist at relatively immoral practices, adds nothing to the solution of ethnological problems. It matters not whether a people live without the institution of marriage, practice cannibalism, offer human sacrifices, impale its wrong-doers or burn its witches and sorcerers; for the sentimental disapproval of such practices, in investigation, tends to disarrange that equipoise of judgment which is requisite to determining the causal relation existing between ethnological phenomena. The ethnologist is called upon to seek this causal relation with the cold indifference of the anatomist. A person who speaks of senseless customs and senseless institutions, is not fitted to engage in ethnological research.

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The above are the principal points of view which at present admit of establishment for ethnological jurisprudence. Others may suggest themselves as the science is further developed.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

VI. From the Return out of the Babylonian Captivity to the Outbreak of the Rebellion of the Maccabees.

THE HISTORY of the people of Israel begins with the migration of Abraham from the Euphrates to the Jordan ; it closes, one may say in a certain sense, with the compulsory migration of the exiles from the Jordan back to the Euphrates. The Babylonian exile constitutes the crisis in the history of the people of Israel from both the political and the religious standpoint. Politically and nationally the Babylonian captivity put an end for ever to the people of Israel. Even when, three hundred and fifty years later, there was once more a Jewish state, those who formed it were not the people of Israel, not even the Jewish nation, but that portion which remained in the mother country of a great religious organisation scattered over all Asia and Egypt. It would on this account be technically correct to entitle the second part of our theme, which is to occupy us in the last five chapters, simply Jewish history, or history of the Jewish people. Yet the change is still more tremendous which the Babylonian exile produced in the religious life of Israel, though indeed the two are most intimately and inherently connected. The very overthrow of the Judean state and the destruction of the national life had the effect of entirely reconstructing the religion of Israel. Even in the last periods of Judean independence there had been evolving a movement which had for its aim to spiritualise religion as much as possible. In order to guard

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

it against growing worldly and to avoid with all care the danger of sullyng its purity, they had aimed at separating religion from its foundation in nature and referring it absolutely to itself and the spirit.

This was a dispensation of Providence; for thus it became possible for the religion of Israel to survive the fall of the state and the destruction of the nation, and yet to preserve them both by reconstructing them. If the destruction of the body had freed the spirit and given it an unhampered career, this spirit must needs shape for itself a new body. And Israel could constitute this new body only if it developed in accordance with the demands of this spirit. No one felt this more clearly and no one expressed it more distinctly than the Great Unknown of the last years of the Babylonian exile, whom we are accustomed to call Deutero-Isaiah because his writings are transmitted to us as the second portion of the book of Isaiah. This Deutero-Isaiah announced the universal mission of the religion of Israel more grandly than any one else: Israel is set for a light of the heathen; it is called to carry the revelation of God to the whole world even to the ultimate islands, the house of the God of Israel shall become a house of prayer for all nations; but in order to be able to fulfil this mission God must first make of Israel itself a covenant. Israel must become a covenant nation; that is, after Israel had broken the covenant and therefore perished as a nation, it must become a new people which will identify itself with the covenant, or league with God, and which is resurrected and remains alive only for and through it. Quite literally the ground had been snatched from beneath the feet of the nation, and it was therefore obliged to seek another ground and foundation, and this was necessarily religious. Thus religion became one with this nationality which completely subordinated itself to religion and proposed to be nothing but its body and mouthpiece.

With correct instinct, guided by the prophet Ezekiel, the religious genius of Israel laid its universal mission upon God for the time being, and took up the immediately more urgent task of getting the mastery in its own house, of driving ineradicable roots in Israel itself. And accordingly there is accomplished in the Babylonian exile, and as a consequence of it, that remarkable transformation which makes of the Judean state a Jewish church, of the Israelitish people a Jewish religious congregation. For the history of religion there is perhaps no other period in the history of the people of Israel of equal importance and significance with the half century of the Babylonian exile, from 586 to 537.

But from the standpoint of secular history we know nothing of Israel in this period : its destinies are those of the Babylonian Empire. This empire with such a brilliant beginning was not destined to enjoy length of days. It depended on the person of its founder, Nebuchadnezzar. When this mighty monarch died, on the 27th of March, 561, after a reign of forty-three years, the star of Babylon set. The empire maintained itself only twenty-three years longer, under four short-reigned kings, two of whom died by the hands of assassins, and then the Persian king, Cyrus, put a sudden end to it.

After the overthrow of Assyria, the most extensive empire remaining was the Median, to which indeed the lion's share of the spoils of Assyria had fallen. True, the two allies against Assyria had connected themselves by marriage, Nebuchadnezzar marrying Amytis, the daughter of Cyaxares. Nevertheless, Nebuchadnezzar recognised clearly the danger that impended from this neighbor, and the immense fortifications of his capital and of his whole country, constructed by Nebuchadnezzar, could have no other purpose than to protect his empire against Media, as indeed they were called "the Median wall." And when in the year 585 he made every effort to mediate between his father-in-law and Alyattes of Lydia, and thus to maintain the Lydian kingdom, he was guided by the desire not to let Media become too powerful.

But destiny had already provided that the Median tree should not reach the skies. Nebuchadnezzar's brother-in-law, Astyages, who succeeded his father Cyaxares in 584, was not the man to give his realm added glory ; after he had ruled thirty-four years, Cyrus, the Median vassal king of the powerful and vigorous race of the Persians, made himself independent, defeated the Median army and captured the capital, Ecbatana, in the year 550.

In Babylon they probably rejoiced at first over the downfall of Media, but they were to learn only too soon what a bad exchange they had made.

As general, king, and man, Cyrus is the greatest personality and the noblest figure in the ancient history of the Orient. In but twelve years, with his handful of Persians, he destroyed forever three great empires, conquered all Asia, and secured to his race for two centuries the dominion of the world : with him the hegemony over Asia passes from the Semites to the Indo-Germanic races.

The formidableness of the new rival was soon recognised, and in the year 547 a great coalition was formed between Lydia, Baby-

lonia, and Egypt, which was also joined by Sparta, for the purpose of stifling in its beginnings the ambitious and growing empire of Cyrus. Cræsus of Lydia began operations in the spring of 546 and made a hostile demonstration toward Persia ; but Cyrus fell upon him at the first approach, followed on his heels as he retreated, and captured Sardis, the Lydian capital, in the autumn of the same year and took Cræsus captive : the kingdom of Lydia had ceased to be.

Why Babylon was then given a respite of eight years, and how the quarrel finally broke forth, we do not know ; but on the 3rd of November, 538, Cyrus held his triumphal entry into Babylon, and therewith the empire of Nebuchadnezzar also had ceased to be.

With what enthusiasm the Jewish exiles greeted the victorious Persian king as avenger and liberator the contemporary Hebrew literature gives the clearest evidence. And in fact, it was one of the first official acts of the new ruler in Babylon to give the Jewish exiles permission to return to their home, and to encourage in every way the restoration of the Jewish commonwealth.

Cyrus could have had in this only political motives. A clash with Egypt was inevitable, and so it was to the interest of the Persians to have on the Egyptian border a commonwealth that was bound to their ruling family by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which they could absolutely rely.

In the spring of 537, forty-nine years after the destruction of Jerusalem, the exiles set out, about fifty thousand souls all told. And evidently members of all the families and groups participated in the migration. They felt that they were representatives of all Israel, as is shown by the fact that the returning emigrants were under the authority of a council of twelve responsible men, the repeatedly mentioned "elders of the Jews," a number which can have been chosen only with reference to the number of the tribes in the nation. This council evidently had the whole internal control and the guidance of the affairs of the community, for which the Persian government did not concern itself. First among the twelve are named Zerubbabel, grandson of King Jehoiachin, and Jeshua, grandson of Seraiah, the last priest of Solomon's temple, who had been executed by Nebuchadnezzar. Sheshbazzar, who is repeatedly mentioned as Persian Governor-General of Judæa, was, by the likeliest supposition, a son of King Jehoiachin born in Babylon, and hence most probably the oldest, to whom the Persians, as was their custom, entrusted the viceroyalty of his people.

On the site of the great brazen altar in Solomon's temple

they forthwith set up a new altar, and had it ready to celebrate the feast of tabernacles in 537 with an offering to the God of Israel. Voluntary gifts were also received for the expenses of the religious service and for proper clothing of the priests, but according to the express testimony of contemporary accounts the restoration of the temple was not immediately undertaken. They had indeed enough to do to make the desolate land habitable again and to restore Jerusalem as far as necessity commanded. About one-tenth of the returned immigrants settled in Jerusalem, the remainder in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem,—the report that the whole territory of the former Kingdom of Judah was occupied at the very beginning, is in itself improbable to a high degree, and is entirely contradictory to the impression made upon us by accredited tradition.

The returned exiles held themselves strictly and haughtily aloof from the remnants of the former population that had remained in the country; we read frequently of the value that was put upon pedigrees and the proof of pure stock.

Of the next seventeen years we have no positive knowledge, but must conclude that important events occurred within the priesthood in this period. For in the year 520 there appears all at once a "high priest" in the person of the before-mentioned Jeshua. Even Ezekiel knows absolutely nothing of a high priest; now on a sudden, he is present and very soon becomes the first personage among the people, crowding into the background even the house of David. We know beyond all doubt that certain things did happen within the priestly class during these years: several families which could not prove their pedigrees were excluded from the priesthood for the time being, and yet we find the descendants of these families mentioned as in important positions in the priesthood eighty years later, whence it appears that they must have secured admission after all. This gives us a significant hint. According to the regulations of Ezekiel only the descendants of Zadok, members of the family of the priests of the temple in Jerusalem, were to have priestly rights after the restoration of the commonwealth and to exercise priestly functions; but it was not possible to carry this out. The very number of the immigrant priests, four thousand two hundred and eighty-nine, that is, one out of every ten free men, puzzles us. These cannot all have been of the family of Zadok, or even in the main so. Whence it appears that they had been obliged to establish the new priesthood on a broader foundation: not the sons of Zadok, but the sons of Aaron are its

representatives, and in order to satisfy the claims of the house of Zadok it is probable that the high priesthood was established and reserved exclusively to this house.

Finally in the year 520 the construction of the temple was begun. Harvest failures and famine burdened the country: the prophet Haggai declared this to be a punishment from God because the people were dwelling in ceiled houses while the house of God lay in ruins. He was supported by another prophet, the priest Zechariah, who worked in the same spirit. So the work was actually begun on the 24th of September, 520, and on the 24th of December the corner-stone was laid with due solemnities,—laid by the Davidite Zerubbabel, who had succeeded his deceased uncle Sheshbazzar as governor. This was an assumption of privilege on the part of the congregation: but the Persian authority was at the time on a weak footing; almost the whole empire was in revolt against the new king, Darius. The satrap Tattenai, who was Zerubbabel's superior, saw the structure while on a tour of inspection, and demanded an explanation. He reported the circumstance to Darius, but Darius sent reply that the building was really supported by a permit from Cyrus, and that he was therefore desirous to see the work aided in every way. And in fact it was possible on the 3d of March, 515, after four and a half years' work, to celebrate the completion of the temple and solemnly dedicate the new house of God.

We know nothing about the next fifty-seven years. Only from the descriptions of the book of Malachi we can infer that conditions took a very critical turn. Lukewarmness and indifference, and even frivolous mockery, had taken the place of earnest enthusiasm: a painful disappointment had taken possession of men's minds, and they tried to make life as comfortable and agreeable as possible for themselves and to compromise with their religious duties in the easiest and cheapest way. There was, indeed, a little band of the genuinely pious, who labored only the more seriously for their own and the people's spiritual salvation; but they could accomplish nothing. At this crisis aid came to them from Babylon.

The closest connexion and the most lively intercourse was maintained between the exiles who had returned to Jerusalem and those who remained in Babylon, so that these received reliable information regarding all occurrences in the old home. The development had proceeded differently in Babylon: the Jews there, without anxiety for their existence and not compelled to wage a severe struggle for sustenance, had devoted themselves with all zeal

and undivided interest to the religious problem; and they, who still lived in a heathen land, were called upon to keep their identity as Jews, and to cultivate consciously and to manifest their Judaism.

Thus there had developed in Babylon of all places a regular theological school, which pursued the study of the law and showed also a marked literary activity: the expansion and completion of the law was the work of these circles. One of the most prominent among them was Ezra, likewise a descendant of Zadok and a near relative of the high priest's family in Jerusalem. He determined to take an active interest in this portentous crisis. He succeeded, how we do not know, in interesting King Artaxerxes Longhand in his plans and in securing an autocratic firman which named him as royal commissioner with unlimited authority to reform conditions in Jerusalem.

On the 1st of April, 458, the caravan assembled: there were seven hundred and seventy-two men, the number of women and children not being given. Ezra had refused a Persian escort. After preparing themselves by fasting and prayer, the train set out on the 12th of April and arrived safely in Jerusalem on the 1st of August. There they celebrated a great thank-offering to God for the happily completed journey.

Ezra proceeded immediately to his work. The most important point was that of the mixed marriages already contracted. In the revival of religion and nationality these presented a great difficulty: if the national identity was dimmed or entirely blotted out the religion also would inevitably perish; then indeed Israel would be swallowed up by the heathen. Therefore it was necessary to apply the knife right here, and to show the most merciless energy. According to what Ezra was told conditions were much more discouraging than he had imagined: even the priests and the Levites turned out to be involved in the abuse and deeply compromised.

And now a scene is played which has been compared not unfairly with the so-called "revivals" of the English Methodists: a deep religious excitement is aroused, and under the pressure of this temporary excitement the participants are led into resolutions which otherwise they would have refused to make. Ezra rends his garments, tears his hair and beard, and as though paralysed by what he has heard, sits stiff and silent until evening. A great circle of people gathers about him, and finally toward evening he arises, throws himself upon his knees, and speaks in tears a long,

loud confession which paints the corruption of the people in the blackest colors.

An even greater circle of men, women, and children gathers about him, who all break out into loud weeping. At this point one of Ezra's sympathisers speaks in the name of the assembly: "Yea, we have all sinned grievously! Let us make a solemn vow 'to put away all our foreign wives and their offspring! Ezra, take 'thou the matter in hand; we will be with thee.'" Ezra strikes the iron while it is hot, and puts all those present under a solemn oath straightway. But this did not settle the matter: only when they began to enforce the plan did the whole difficulty of it appear. It is true, every man had by the law the right to put away his wife, and we must take great care not to judge these occurrences from our point of view. But in the case of a marriage prompted by love and blessed with fondly cherished children, it could not but be regarded as a monstrous proposal to put away wife and children absolutely and without condition. And the most serious obstacle was found in the most respected circles of the community. These had formed many alliances with the neighboring aristocracy and with the Persian officials, and to send back to such fathers-in-law their daughters and their children was not to be thought of without hesitation.

And so it is almost five months after that prayer-meeting before there is summoned to Jerusalem, on the 20th of December, 458, a popular assembly at which every male member of the families returned from the captivity was ordered to appear under penalty of excommunication. There sat the whole assembly in the open square before the temple, trembling with excitement, cold, and rain, and when Ezra repeated his demand the matter was treated in dilatory fashion; they said it was too important and weighty a matter to be settled in haste, and asked that a commission under the leadership of Ezra should first ascertain the exact condition of affairs and then deal with the offenders individually. Four adherents of Ezra protested, it is true, against this delay, but the proposal was accepted: the assembly goes home, and Ezra is left to see what he can accomplish with his commission.

Any one who has had the questionable fortune to be chairman of a commission or of a directory can easily imagine himself in Ezra's place. The commission is organised on the 1st of January, 457, and in three months has so far accomplished its task as to have ascertained and officially identified all the men who are living in mixed marriage. At this point our report breaks off suddenly

and we have no direct account of the next thirteen years, until April, 444. Of course the reports of the period were intentionally suppressed because they were too sad and too humiliating. Plainly Ezra accomplished nothing, and an attempt to strengthen his position was a woful failure.

In April, 444, we suddenly learn that the walls of Jerusalem are torn down and its gates burned with fire. Ezra had probably recognised that he must first of all be master in his own house before he could take any energetic measures. Jerusalem was an exposed and thinly populated city, defenceless against any sudden attack, open to any surprise. Relying, therefore, upon his royal authority, Ezra had proceeded to build city walls and fortify the place.

The neighbors, suspicious and offended most deeply by the recent occurrences in Jerusalem, now publicly denounced this last proceeding to the Persian Government, attributing to Ezra's action a political motive.

We must recall that Egypt had shortly before freed itself from Persian rule. True it had been again subjected, but not by any means pacified; there are still commotions in Egypt as late as 449 and 443. Accordingly the Persians were naturally very anxious regarding the neighboring countries, and therefore a command actually arrived from Artaxerxes to desist forthwith from the building of the wall. The enemies of the Jews translated this royal command into action and destroyed the work that had been begun. This probably happened in the year 445.

But just at the moment when Ezra's cause seemed hopelessly lost there came to him unexpected assistance. A Babylonian Jew named Nehemiah had won the favor of King Artaxerxes and his wife, Damaspia, and had become royal cup-bearer. He heard of the depressing occurrences in Jerusalem and could not conceal his distress. The king whom he was serving at the time made sympathetic inquiries, and when Nehemiah is directed to ask a royal favor he applies for and receives the position of governor in Jerusalem, which was evidently vacant at the time. The king gave him leave of absence for twelve years and actually appointed him Persian governor in Judea.

Well provided with royal privileges and credentials, he sets out in order to assume his new office forthwith. Now the civil arm is at the disposal of the work of reform, and Nehemiah is the man to make use with all energy of the authority given him.

In Nehemiah we have one of the most characteristic and at-

tractive figures in the whole of Israelitish history. He owes his success above all things to the moral nobility of his personality. Entirely unselfish, inspired only by consecrated zeal for the cause, he has the power of carrying all along with him, of encouraging the timid and unenthusiastic by his own belief and confidence, and of lifting plodding and lukewarm souls out of and above themselves by his own idealism and enthusiasm. He is at the same time the soul and the arm of the whole work, taking hold everywhere himself and leading. But he proceeds in this openly and honorably, scorning all petty means and evasions: friends and foes alike know where to find him. Even where he uses force he does not cloak his purpose, but meets his man with lifted visor, everywhere throwing his whole personality into the undertaking. And since his energy was coupled with practical force and equally great shrewdness and knowledge of the world—he had not gone through the school of diplomacy at the Persian court for nothing—he was the man of destiny for this difficult task, which demanded a peculiar combination of religious enthusiasm and worldly wisdom, and he accomplished it. What Ezra attempted, Nehemiah achieved; the establishment and consolidation of the Jewish community is essentially his work and his merit.

The new governor had been but three days in Jerusalem when he undertook, with but a few companions, a night ride about the ruined walls in order to get by the pale light of the moon a complete survey of the damage. He had not proceeded far when his animal was checked by rubbish and ruins, and he was obliged to turn back.

Now he called together the whole people and the priests and elders, painted for them in vivid words the shameful condition of Jerusalem, and presented to them the authority and the privileges which he had received from the king. They proceed to work forthwith and the task is apportioned in an extremely practical way. To each family was assigned a certain part of the wall, which it was to construct, and thus the whole wall rose from the ground at once.

The whole time Nehemiah did not have his clothes off. Day and night he was on the ground, taking hold everywhere himself like the commonest laborer, supervising all and carrying great and small with him by his example and pattern.

The enemies of the Jews, among whom Sanballat the Horonite, Tobiah the Ammonite, and Geshem the Arabian are especially mentioned, behold with wrath and dismay what is going on in Jerusalem, and try in every way to hinder the work. When their

ridicule and mockery prove of no avail they try to use force ; but Nehemiah makes his arrangements so that the work need not be interrupted, and yet the whole force is at any moment ready for defence. Now the enemy try cunning : they undertake to lure Nehemiah away from the work under pretext of a conference ; but Nehemiah, who immediately sees through the clumsy plan, answers with delicate irony that he unfortunately could not leave Jerusalem at the moment, being occupied with an important task which urgently demanded his personal presence.

Then the enemy hit upon the plan of causing him difficulty in his own camp. There were certainly many who had but half a heart in the matter, and to whom any pretext for withdrawing in good order was welcome. And now Nehemiah's enemies hire the pitiful remnants of the prophetic class in Jerusalem, who actually sell themselves for money and work against Nehemiah by means of alleged prophetic oracles, and try to mislead and alienate the people ; but Nehemiah overcomes these difficulties also.

But now he is met by the most dangerous obstacle. By reason of the work upon the wall the common man has been deprived of the opportunity to follow his regular business ; moreover the taxes have to be collected afterwards as before, and there seem to have been in addition crop failures and dearth. Thus the poor had become deeply in debt: they had been obliged to mortgage their fields, vineyards, and houses, and even in some cases sell their children into serfdom. Now they bring their complaints before the governor, who forthwith calls a general assembly and with all the pathos of virtuous indignation rebukes the rich usurers for their unfraternal behavior. By referring to his own unselfishness in resigning all the income that belonged to the office of governor, in order not to oppress the people, but instead paying for everything out of his own pocket and besides keeping open table daily for a hundred and fifty persons, he brings such a moral pressure to bear upon the rich that they swear solemnly to cancel all their claims and return all property held in pledge.

Now the work advances with giant strides : on the 25th of September, 444, after fifty-two days' labor, the wall was finished and the gates set in place. A solemn procession which marched about with psalm-singing and music upon the top of the newly erected wall, expressed thanks to God for the success of the work and proclaimed to all the world its completion.

Thus protected against interference from without, they now proceed to the greater and more important task which Ezra had

been obliged to drop. For the very next 1st of October, 444, the whole people is summoned to Jerusalem. From the midst of the assembly itself comes the proposal that Ezra shall read from the book of the law of Moses. Ezra mounts a pulpit already erected for this purpose ; on either side of it stand seven of the most prominent men, and a number of Levites are on hand to explain to the people what Ezra has read. Again the people break out into loud weeping ; but Ezra says they are not to weep, but sit down to a joyous meal and give a share to those who have brought nothing, for this day is a sacred jubilee for Israel.

The following day Ezra continues the reading of the law, but only to the heads of families. Then the feast of tabernacles is celebrated on the 15th of October according to the directions of the law, and on the 24th of October a great and general day of repentance and prayer is held, and there the whole people takes a solemn oath to support the book of the law as read by Ezra ; the heads of families sign and seal this obligation with due solemnity : strict observation of the Sabbath, absolute prohibition of mixed marriages, observance of the sabbatical year and the remission of debts, and above all faithful payment of the dues to the temple, are the most important single points of this compact.

The 24th of October is the real birthday of Judaism, one of the most important days in the history of humanity. At last the religion of revelation had succeeded in getting a home of its own, if I may use the expression ; it had created for itself a body in and through which it could act and fulfil its lofty mission to the world.

True, not all was accomplished by this one popular assembly. Many had allowed themselves to be carried away by the mass, to whom it now came hard when obligations there assumed were taken in bitter earnest. And the very ones upon whom Nehemiah should have been able to depend, and who were the born tutors and guardians of his people, the priests, stood aside resentful or at least lukewarm. They had by this time developed into a sort of temple nobility, who were now concerned only for the privileges of their position, who fraternised with the civil nobility, but who were not disposed to accept into the bargain heavy obligations. So long as Nehemiah was governor, indeed, he was able with iron hand to suppress all opposition ; but at the end of twelve years his leave expired, and in 432 he was obliged to return to the Persian court. But with a true perception of the needs of the sit-

uation he managed to secure the governorship anew and was permitted soon to return to Jerusalem.

How far the whole work depended on him personally became evident immediately. Even this brief absence had sufficed to let everything get at odds and ends. The Sabbath was desecrated boldly, the temple tribute was not paid, mixed marriages began to recur. But the most serious offence had been committed by the high priest, Eliashib. He had given a chamber in the temple to his kinsman, Tobiah the Ammonite, whom we know as an enemy of Nehemiah, and his grandson, Manasseh, had even married Nicaso, the daughter of Sanballat, Nehemiah's chief adversary.

And now Nehemiah adopted rigorous measures. He went about the whole country to hunt out mixed marriages and appeal to the consciences of the guilty parties; he punished severely violations of the command of Sabbath rest; he had the gates of Jerusalem closed on Friday evening and kept closed the whole Sabbath, and when heathen traders tried to set up their market without the walls of Jerusalem on the Sabbath, he had them warned and threatened with violent punishment. The temple tithes, likewise, were systematised carefully and provision made for their correct payment. But Nehemiah took the most energetic measures against Eliashib, the high priest. If he might defy his authority with impunity, it would amount to nothing. Without ceremony Nehemiah had Tobiah's household stuff cast out of the chamber in the temple and had the chamber itself reconsecrated; and when Manasseh refused to put away Nicaso, he expelled him from the people and the congregation.

We have a vague hint that a considerable number of priests, who were dissatisfied with the new conditions, joined Manasseh and left Jerusalem. Manasseh went to the home of his father-in-law, Sanballat, and founded there an Israelitish worship according to the old style, which was adopted by all who were dissatisfied with the reforms. This became the religious community of the Samaritans.

This secession was a decided advantage for the reform in Jerusalem: all the hesitating elements withdrew from the city and only those remained who had firm convictions. Now the Jewish community became an harmonious and homogeneous society in which the strict tendency of the reform party prevailed; whoever was dissatisfied had simply to join the Samaritans. Thus there was a clean division on one side as well as on the other, which however was not accomplished amicably, but planted on both sides a rap-

idly growing harvest of passionate hatred. For the further history of the development of religion the Samaritans are without consequence; for a second time, and now for all times, Judah had become Israel, Israel was limited to Judah.

Regarding the length of Nehemiah's second term as governor and his further destinies we know nothing; but the after time shows plainly that he accomplished the work of his life. He impressed the stamp of his spirit upon Judaism for all time and forced it to follow the course he had marked out.

It is one of the greatest ironies of fate known to universal history, or, to speak more correctly, it is one of the most striking evidences of the wonderful ways which divine Providence takes for the attainment of its most important and most significant ends, that the final completion and the permanent consolidation of the exclusive Judaism, which sealed itself hermetically against everything non-Jewish and rejected sternly everything heathen, was accomplished and made possible only under the protection and by the aid of a heathen government, that the reformation of Ezra and Nehemiah, to use a modern phrase, hung on the sword-belt of the Persian *gens d'armes*. And yet the work was of God, and only thus could the religion of revelation be preserved. But for the energy of Nehemiah the whole history of humanity would have run an entirely different course. And therefore we too must look up to this man with gratitude and reverence to this day.

[— For the next two hundred and fifty years only a few scattered dates are transmitted to us. For universal history they are the most important and portentous of all—I need only name the one name, Alexander the Great. Let us examine what we know of this period and sketch the events of the history of the world only in roughest outline, so far as they are indispensable to the understanding of the history of the people of Israel.

Johanan, the grandson of the high priest Eliashib whom we know, had a brother Joshua, who was a friend of Bagoses, the Persian governor. Bagoses wanted to secure the high priesthood for Joshua; Johanan learns this and murders his brother in the temple during the service. At the news of the crime Bagoses hastens to the temple; when they beg him not to pollute the temple by his presence he answers scornfully: "Do I, perchance, pollute the temple more than the corpse of the slain man?" So he goes in, and for atonement fifty silver shekels have to be paid him for every lamb sacrificed throughout a period of seven years,—at least he made a fine stroke of business out of the death of his friend.

Further, we have the wholly disconnected remark that King Ochus destroyed Jericho and deported a great number of Jews to Hyrcania. In the reign of Ochus it is a fact that all Egypt, Phœnicia, and Coelesyria was in rebellion against the Persians: it is possible that some scattered Jews took part in this, and so there is at least every inner probability for this report.

But the days of the Persian dominion were numbered. Alexander the Great began his marvellous career of victory in 334, and the battle of Issos delivered all Syria and Egypt into his hands. Alexander hastens immediately thither in order to make sure of these countries. What Josephus tells of a visit of Alexander in Jerusalem and his meeting with the high priest Jadduah is pure legend; on the other hand it is quite probable that Alexander, who showed all possible consideration for the religious views of the people whom he subdued, may have granted the Jews exemption from tribute in the sabbatical year and permitted to those going with him to war the observance of their own religious customs. When the Samaritans rebelled against him he added a part of Samaria to Judea.

And so the Jews had been transferred from the Persian rule to that of the Greeks.

We pass over the events and confusion of the succeeding years, remembering only that the battle of Ipsus, in the year 301, put an end to the contentions of the immediate successors of Alexander: Palestine and Coelesyria fell to Ptolemy of Egypt, and until 198 Judea remained an Egyptian province.

This century is the happiest period that Judea experienced after the loss of her independence. The very first Ptolemy favored the Jews in every way. Not only was the Egyptian administration in Judea exceedingly mild and kindly disposed, but Ptolemy endeavored also to persuade the Jews to settle in Egypt proper. It is even reported that Alexander colonised Jews in his newly founded city of Alexandria. Ptolemy pursued this policy with all energy, because, as Josephus informs us, the Jews were the only ones among all his subjects upon whose oath he could absolutely depend; therefore he preferred to appoint Jews to positions of trust, and granted them in Alexandria complete equality with the Macedonians themselves, "isopolity," as it was called. As the immediate successors of Ptolemy favored the Jews in the same way, Alexandria soon became the second Jewish city in the world, and in Egypt they were numbered by millions.

That this favoring of the Jews by the Ptolemies was based

largely on policy, and that the endeavor to attach to themselves and their family the population of an important and exposed boundary province, is evident from the very fact that Seleucas Nicator, ruler of Syria, the neighbor and rival of Egypt, hastened to grant them in his country and his cities the same privileges : he, too, gave them "isopolity" with Macedonians and Greeks. In the new capital founded by him, Antiochia, this right of citizenship even paid something : there were allowances of oil connected with it ; but since the Jews would not accept this heathen oil, as being polluted, Seleucas issued an order that it should be made up to them in money at the prevailing market price.

As Palestine belongs geographically to Asia, nature herself had assigned it to Syria ; so long as this province was in possession of Egypt, and the Egyptian boundary was thus advanced to the very gates of the capital, Antiochia, the Seleucidæ could not rest nor regard their realm as rounded out and complete. And so, as the result of the inner momentum of circumstances, there soon begin the struggles of the Seleucidæ with the Ptolemies in order to take from them this province which was indispensable to Syria.

It is not our office to pursue these fluctuant events in detail. At first the advantage was decidedly on the side of Egypt. There a series of excellent and highly gifted rulers ruled, while the first Seleucidæ after the mighty Seleucas Nicator present a mournful and lamentable picture.

But soon the leaf is turned. The fourth Ptolemy, a Louis XV. on the Egyptian throne, wholly degenerated in the most shameless excesses, allowed everything to decay and rot, while at the same time in Antiochus III., incorrectly called the Great, the throne of the Seleucidæ had received at least an enterprising and energetic ruler. True, the first attack of Antiochus upon Egypt was repelled ; but when in 204 Ptolemy IV. suddenly died and the kingdom was left to his five-year-old son, the confusion in Egypt was great. Now Antiochus took swift measures. In their helplessness the Egyptian regents offered the guardianship of their youthful king to the Romans ; but the Romans were still occupied with Hannibal, and soon after had Phillip V. of Macedon to look after, and accordingly could not at the time give any attention to their Egyptian ward.

After various chances of war Antiochus succeeded in defeating decisively the Egyptian general, Scopas, at Paneas, and in forcing him to capitulate in Sidon, whither he had retreated with

his troops. Thus in the year 198 Palestine and Coelesyria became a Syrian province.

The Jews who had felt the change in condition of the Egyptian state, and who could have no sympathy for such a man as that fourth Ptolemy, received the Syrians with open arms and gave them active support in expelling the Egyptian garrisons, and Antiochus showed his appreciation of their willingness: the whole service in the temple in Jerusalem was put upon the charge of the state treasury, exemption from taxation was granted to everything intended for the temple as well as to the priesthood and all *attachés* of the temple, the entrance into the temple was forbidden to every non-Jew as well as the introduction of unclean animals into Jerusalem, under heavy fines to be paid to the priests of the temple, and all Jews were secured in unconditional religious freedom. Those who had fallen into military captivity and slavery were to be released forthwith. To the population of Jerusalem, and to all who should settle in Jerusalem within a certain period, complete freedom from taxation for three years was granted and after that exemption of one-third.

We see, the new government spares no pains to win the hearts of its Jewish subjects, and these probably looked forward to the future with joyous confidence. But how soon the picture was to be changed! When thirty years had passed over the country Judea was engaged in a desperate struggle with Syria for life and death; and with this we are once more at a turning point in the history of the Jewish people.

SOCIALISM AND BIRTHS.

BY AUSTIN BIERBOWER.

THOSE proposing social remedies commonly ignore one factor which threatens to defeat all their measures, and that is the law of births. The labor question is not merely how the poor may be made more comfortable, and the rich required to divide their possessions, but how the people may be maintained in their new equality when attained. If all were rendered comfortable in some socialistic community, and none had to provide for the future of self or family, there would be a thoughtless propagation of human beings which would soon overthrow the community. People are now restrained from the maximum increase by the question of support. Were that removed, the less considerate would win in a race of reproduction. The worthless generally reproduce fastest. The low and idle, being most given to licentiousness, and having least restraint, would, if not controlled by considerations of support, soon crowd out the more intellectual and moral classes. There would be too many children if all could produce them without individual responsibility, and over-population would destroy the prosperity of the community. In improving the condition of the poor, we should consider why there are so many poor, and how far the relief of the poor tends to multiply the poor. The improvement of their condition should go along with expedients to prevent their undue multiplication. The lower classes ought not to disproportionately populate the earth. The better element should perpetuate itself instead of the worst. And while the poor are often morally and physically better than the rich, a large proportion are poor through indolence, drunkenness, or crime, and these do more than their share in reproduction. The question of bettering the condition of the people must, therefore, be considered in connexion with the increase of the people. Removing the present

obstacles to over-population would not permanently benefit the people. To relieve the poor, and by the same measure multiply the poor—to make it easier to get support for their families and to raise still larger families—is not to permanently solve the labor problem. Were all provided for, the most reckless would have the advantage and soon throw the system out of proportion again. One with twenty children would have no more work to support them than one with two; and in a world with too many people it is not a policy of relief to confer on the most worthless the greatest power of increase. Were our country newer, and greater numbers needed to till the soil, the greatest producer of children might be the greatest benefactor; but when laborers are complaining of excessive competition, large families become a burden on the community.

The question is, What shall we do about the production of human beings? Shall the negro, the pauper, the immigrant, the ignorant, and the morally low be permitted to put upon society as many of their kind as they can? And will society undertake to care for them all? Men believe themselves intended for something else than to support other people's children as fast as they can be produced, and they do not like to toil for the benefit of the worthless.

Men get rich, and keep rich, by moderating their desires, and were all equal in children they would be more equal in wealth. But to have one class produce the wealth, and another the consumers of wealth, is to make a condition of necessary conflict.

The question, then, for labor reformers is, What shall be done to regulate the population when all are provided for? A better distribution of wealth would not remedy general poverty, since the number of those who have much is small, and their possessions, however distributed, would not make all comfortable. The poor embrace nearly all the population; and the more people there are, the poorer must be the average. To be well-to-do, men must be few. In some countries, as China, the soil cannot support the entire population. As we learn to live more easily, more come into the world to live, the supply being according to the facility of birth and support, and not according to demand. Men are increasing too fast, and the supply throws our social and business system out of order. The regulation of men is as important as the regulation of any other interest.

THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF DEATH.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN CHRISTIANITY the names Death and Devil are as closely coupled together as in Buddhism. Death is the wages of sin, and it was Satan who brought Death into the world from which the Saviour is expected to rescue mankind.

Christianity of the first and second century was a spiritualistic movement, but the conception of spirit among the early Christians was rather materialistic.



THE LAST MOMENT OF LIFE.
(Representing early Christian views. From ancient manuscripts.¹)




STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL.

However, we must here, as in many other respects, distinguish between Christ and the Christians. According to the synoptic gospels Jesus did not enter into a discussion of any philosophical problem; his religion was practical, not theoretical. Yet the Jesus of St. John, in agreement with the doctrine of the Logos, identifies the life of the soul with language and defines spirit as the words which he speaks. He says: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." (John vi. 63.) If the nature of

¹ See Bastian's *Verbleibs-Ort der Seele*, Plate I. Reproduced from *Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde*, Vol. II., Plate XVII., 5 and 7.

spirit had been understood in this sense, the Church would not have passed in its evolution through a number of grievous errors; it would have avoided the materialism which characterises both its psychology and its dogma of the life to come.

St. Paul taught that Christ had bodily risen from the dead, and he regards Christ's bodily resurrection as a guarantee of the bodily resurrection of all those who believe in Christ. He believed that the bodies of the dead would on their resurrection at the great day of the Lord be transfigured, and the Church formulated the doctrine in the Apostle's Creed in the terse but unmistakable formula of "the resurrection of the flesh."



THE EARLY CHRISTIANS' IDEA OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD. (13th century.)
From the Cathedral of Rheims, France.

Many frescoes and bas-reliefs in the Christian cathedrals prove how very intent the Church at all times has been on the doctrine of a resurrection of the flesh. The most popular hymn of the German Reformed Churches, both Lutheran and Calvinist, which has only of late been altered by a few liberal congregations, enumerates details and emphasises that on the day of resurrection "we shall be covered by this very same skin; these very same eyes shall behold God,¹ and in this very same flesh we shall see Jesus."

¹ "Dann wird eben diese Haut
Mich umgeben wie ich gläube.
Gott wird werden angeschaut
Dann von mir in diesem Leibe.
Und in diesem Fleisch werd' ich
Jesum sehen ewiglich."



CHRISTIAN REPRESENTATION OF THE LAST JUDGMENT.

Sculptures on the main entrance of the Cathedral at Bourges, France. Fourteenth century. (Reproduced from *Klassischer Skulpturenschatz*.)



CHRISTIAN REPRESENTATION OF HELL.

Sculptures on the main entrance of the Cathedral at Bourges, France. Fourteenth century. (Reproduced from *Klassischer Skulpturenschatz*.)

The belief in a bodily resurrection was, in spite of its materialism, the dearest hope of the early Christians; and their materialistic view of immortality is only of late giving way to a nobler, purer, and more spiritual conception.

Christian art naturally originated with the decoration of graves. The Catacombs, where the dead bodies of the early Christians and their martyrs lay became places of worship, and it was customary to celebrate the sacrament over the very tombs of the dead. The sanctity attached to dead bodies is especially apparent in the custom of burying some saint, if possible the patron saint of the church, underneath the altar itself, a practice which now begins to be neglected, but is sometimes still adhered to in the Roman churches even in the United States.




CHRIST AS ORPHEUS.

A painting in the Catacombs. (After F. X. Kraus.)



PERISTERA.

A dove of gilt silver for receiving the Eucharist. From the Catacombs. (After F. X. Kraus.)



LAMP FROM THE CATACOMBS.

Showing the anagram of Christ, (XP) and the AU.

The custom of having a grave underneath the altar gave rise to the establishment of the crypt, which is never missing in any Roman Catholic cathedral of the Middle Ages.

The earliest products of Christian art, such as we find in the Catacombs, are mere imitations of classical *motifs*. Dr. Francis Xavier Kraus, when speaking of early Christian painting, says :

"The ornamental system is, upon the whole, the same as in the contemporaneous pagan paintings. We find wreaths, cornucopias, vines, birds and other animals. In addition we find the seasons represented as youthful virgins and also genii. Even the dolphins and tritons of profane art are not missing. All these things were as natural and conventional in Greco-Roman ornamentation as the letters of the alphabet and the words of the language. Thus, we can understand that Christian artists applied the implements of paganism without hesitation, and no one thought of their pagan religious significance."

The transition from pagan to Christian art is gradual. In the Catacombs, for instance, Christ is represented as Orpheus with the

lyre, or as the good shepherd carrying a sheep after the fashion of a calf-bearing Hermes. The virgin with the child finds its prototypes in various maternal deities, such as the Egyptian Isis, nursing Horus, and the Greek Mother Earth, Gaea Kurotrophos. An independent spirit of Christian art develops first in peculiarly Christian symbols, among which the favorite subjects are the lamb, the fish,¹ and the dove. In addition we find the chrisma, the monogram of Christ, a combination of XP, the two first letters of the word *Χριστός* and the *A* and *Ω*, symbolising God as the Beginning




THE CALF-BEARING HERMES.

(From *Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums*.)

and End of all things. When gradually the better classes of Roman society began to join the Church, the Christian sarcophagi almost rivalled in elegance and beauty of design their ancient classical prototypes. But the further north we come, the rarer are ornamented stone coffins. The sole instance in Germany is the sarcophagus of Treves, representing Noah in the ark. The artist's work is almost crude, but it shows a pious spirit and possesses the charm of naïveté.

¹ The word "fish" (ΙΧΘΥΣ) was anagrammatically interpreted to mean *Ιησους Χριστος Θεου Υιος Σωτης*. "Jesus Christus, God's Son, the Saviour."

The most famous piece of art of this kind is perhaps the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, who died in 359 at Rome. Here pagan subjects are replaced by illustrations of Biblical events, such as Daniel among the lions, Jesus preaching, the Saviour's entry into Jerusalem on an ass, etc. The technique is quite pure in style and as rich in execution as the best pagan work. It shows warmth of sentiment in the disciples and earnestness in the attitude of those



CEILING OF SANTA LUCINA. (After Rossi. Reproduced from F. X. Kraus.)

who teach. But (says Dr. F. X. Kraus, quoting from Schnasse¹) it lacks individuality and strength. The faces of all the apostles are made after the same pattern and the expression of the various persons is monotonous.

The tombstone of Eutropus is of special interest because we learn from the picture that he was a sarcophagus-maker by trade. He is represented at work assisted by his apprentice. The inscrip-

¹ *Geschichte der Ital. Kunst*, I., 58. See Kraus, l. c., p. 117.

tion,¹ which speaks of him as "saintly² and fearing God," as well as the dove with the olive branch, indicates that he was a Christian. The man standing behind the artist is perhaps his son. According



THE TREVES SARCOPHAGUS REPRESENTING NOAH IN THE ARK. (After F. X. Kraus.)



THE SARCOPHAGUS OF JUNIUS BASSUS, Rome. (After F. X. Kraus.)

to Fabretti the vial in his son's hand would indicate that Eutropus died a martyr's death.

¹ The inscription reads: ΑΓΙΟΣ, etc. See Kraus.

² The term ἅγιος, "saint or saintly," is a synonym of Christian. It is a term by which the members of Christian congregations frequently called themselves.

During the Middle Ages people were anxious to have their bodies rest in holy ground where they would be protected until



THE DYING MAN'S TEMPTATION.

(From *Ars Moriendi*; first temptation. Devils try to induce him to seek assistance from false gods, after the manner of the pagans, or to escape suffering by committing suicide.)

doomsday against the evil influence of the Devil. Thus the dead were buried underneath the pavement of the churches or in their

immediate vicinity. And here, too, the materialism of the early Christianity is retained, for almost all the mediæval tombstones identify the deceased person with his remains that lie in the grave. The most common style of their inscriptions reads *Ci-git*, or *Here lies*, or *Hier ruht*, etc., and if it is ornamented with sculpture, the



TOMBSTONE OF SIEGFRIED VON EPPSTEIN.
(Henne am Rhyn.)

stone frequently represents the man as lying in the coffin. It is rather an exception that Siegfried of Eppstein, archbishop of Mayence, is represented as crowning two kings of Germany, Henry Raspe and William of Holland. Apparently these two actions were regarded as the most glorious events of his life. But even here the traditional style is adhered to, for the artist only indicated the coronation scenes, and adapted this idea to the conventional form of tombstones. The archbishop lies in the coffin and the two kings upon whose heads he places the crown, are lying at each side.

The Christian faith has done much to give comfort to mankind in the tribulations of life, but when its purer aspirations were dimmed by a literal interpretation of its doctrines, when the pagan-like symbol was accepted as truth itself, Christianity did its utmost to

bring all the terrors of hell to bear upon every man when on his death-bed. The hour of death was supposed to be the decisive moment which would determine man's fate for all eternity. Therefore the early Christians anointed the dying and prayed over them. The breviary of Cardinal Grimani, now at the St. Marcus Library in Venice, contains a picture by Hans Memling (an artist of May-

ence who lived about 1450-1495) which characterises this conception of the hour of death. The patient is surrounded by praying



DEATH, THE SLAYER. Woodcut of the sixteenth century. (By H. Burckmair.)

monks with candles and crucifix and sees in his imagination the powers of both good and evil hover above him, both anxious to



THE HOUR OF DEATH.

After Hans Memling's picture in the breviary of Cardinal Grimani, at the Library of Venice. (Henne am Rhyn.)

snatch away his soul as soon as it would depart from the body.¹ The sacrament is prepared on an improvised altar. In the background, to the right, the physician stands helpless, while to the left a notary is busy drawing up the last will and testament.

Where there is a great strain, there follows, as a rule, a relaxation. The facts that make up a tragedy will naturally offer sufficient material for a comedy; and thus the seriousness of hell is contrasted by the grim humor with which this gloomy subject is frequently treated. The picture of hell in the *Tragico Comœdia* by



HELL ACCORDING TO DIONYSIUS KLEIN'S *TRAGICO-COMŒDIA*.
(Reproduced from Bastian's *Die Denkschöpfung*.)

Dionysius Klein (published in 1622) is an instance that illustrates this truth. And when we consider that in the days of Klein heretics were still burned, we must admire the courage of the author who dared to show the comical side of the traditional conception of eternal perdition. The moral significance is greater still when, judging from the text of the book, we have reason to assume that the author was not a scoffer but actually believed in the reality of the tortures of hell.

¹ There are even to-day some zealous ministers who have not as yet outgrown the mediæval barbarism of saving the souls of the dying. In a German soldiers' hospital during the Franco-Prussian war, a prominent Protestant clergyman who used to come to pray with the patients had at last to be refused admittance because there was a regular increase of the death rate immediately following his pastoral visits.

MISCELLANEOUS.

JOSEPH LOUIS LAGRANGE.

A great part of the progress of formal human thought, where not hampered by outward causes, has been due to the invention of what we may call *stenophrenic* or *short-mind*, symbols. These, of which all language and scientific notations are examples, dispense the mind from the consideration of ponderous and circuitous mechanical operations and economize its energies for the performance of the new and unaccomplished tasks of thought. And the advancement of those sciences has been most notable which have made the most extensive use of these short-mind symbols. Here mathematics and chemistry stand pre-eminent. The ancient Greeks, with all their mathematical endowment as a race, and even admitting that their powers were more visualistic than analytic, were yet so impeded by their lack of short-mind symbols as to have made scarcely any progress whatever in analysis. Their arithmetic was a species of geometry. They did not possess the sign for zero, and also did not make use of position as an indicator of value. Even later, when the germs of the indeterminate analysis were adumbrated by Diophantus, progress ceased at the birth of the science, doubtless from this very cause. The historical calculations of Archimedes, his approximation to the value of π , etc., owing to this lack of appropriate arithmetical and algebraical symbols, entailed enormous and incredible labors, which, if saved, would, with his genius, indubitably have led to great discoveries.

Subsequently, at the close of the Middle Ages, when the so-called Arabic figures became established throughout Europe with the symbol 0 and the positional principle, immediate progress was made in the art of reckoning. The problems which arose gave rise to questions of increasing complexity and led up to the general solutions of equations of the third and fourth degree by the Italian mathematicians of the sixteenth century. Yet even these discoveries were made in somewhat the same manner as problems in mental arithmetic are now solved in common schools; for the present signs of plus, minus, and equality, the radical and exponential signs, and especially the systematic use of letters for denoting general quantities in algebra, had not yet become at all universal. The last step was due to the French mathematician Vieta (1540-1603), and the mighty advancement of analysis resulting therefrom can scarcely be measured or imagined. The trammels were here removed from algebraic thought, and it ever afterwards pursued its way unincumbered in development as if impelled by some intrinsic and irresistible potency. Then followed the introduction of exponents by Descartes, the representing of geometrical magnitudes by algebraical signs, the extension of the theory of

exponents to fractional and negative numbers by Wallis (1616-1703), and other symbolic artifices, which rendered the language of analysis as economic, unequivocal, and appropriate as the needs of the science seemed to demand. In the famous dispute regarding the invention of the infinitesimal calculus, while not denying and even granting for the nonce the priority of Newton in the matter, some writers go so far as to regard Leibnitz's introduction of the integral symbol \int as alone a sufficient substantiation of his claims to originality and independence, so far as the power of the new science was concerned.

For the *development* of science all such short-mind symbols are of paramount importance, and seem to carry within themselves the germ of a perpetual mental motion which needs no outward power for its unfoldment. Euler's well-known saying that his pencil seemed to surpass him in intelligence finds its explanation here, and will be understood by all who have experienced the uncanny feeling attending the rapid development of algebraical formulæ, where the urned thought of centuries, so to speak, rolls from one's fingers' ends.

But it should never be forgotten that the mighty stenophrenic engine of which we here speak, like all machinery, affords us rather a mastery over nature than an insight into it; and for some, unfortunately, the higher symbols of mathematics are merely brambles that hide the living springs of reality. Many of the greatest discoveries of science,—for example, those of Galileo, Huygens, and Newton,—were made without the mechanism which afterwards becomes so indispensable for their development and applications. Galileo's reasoning ament the summation of the impulses imparted to a falling stone is virtual integration; and Newton's physical discoveries were made by the man who invented, but evidently did not use to that end, the doctrine of fluxions.

We have been following here, briefly and roughly, a line of progressive abstraction and generalisation which even in its beginning was, psychologically speaking, at an exalted height, but in the course of centuries had been carried to points of literally ethereal refinement and altitude. In that long succession of inquirers by whom this result was effected, the process reached, we may say, its culmination and purest expression in JOSEPH LOUIS LAGRANGE, born in Turin, Italy, the 30th of January, 1736, died in Paris, April 10, 1813. Lagrange's power over symbols has, perhaps, never been paralleled either before his day or since. It is amusing to hear his biographers relate that in his early life he evinced no aptitude for mathematics, but seemed to have abandoned himself entirely to the pursuits of pure literature; for at fifteen we find him teaching mathematics in an artillery school in Turin, and at nineteen he had made the greatest discovery in mathematical science since that of the infinitesimal calculus, namely, the creation of the algorism and method of the Calculus of Variations, which drew forth the admiration of the great Euler, and which the latter did not deem it beneath his dignity to write a treatise upon, supplementary to his own researches upon the subject. The exact nature of a variation even Euler did not grasp, and even as late as 1810 in the English treatise of Woodhouse on this subject we read regarding a certain new sign introduced, that M. Lagrange's "power over symbols is so unbounded that the possession of it seems to have made him capricious." Lagrange himself was conscious of his wonderful capabilities in this direction. His was a time when geometry, as he himself phrased it, had become a dead language, the abstractions of analysis were being pushed to their highest pitch, and he felt that with his achievements its possibilities within certain limits were being rapidly exhausted. The saying is attributed to him that chairs of mathematics, so far as creation was concerned, and unless new

fields were opened up, would soon be as rare at universities as chairs of Arabic. In both research and exposition, he totally reversed the methods of his predecessors. They had proceeded in their exposition from special cases by a species of induction; his eye was always directed to the highest and most general points of view; and it was by his suppression of details and neglect of minor, unimportant considerations that he swept the whole field of analysis with a generality of insight and power never excelled, while to his originality and profundity he united a conciseness, elegance, and lucidity which have made him the model of mathematical writers.

Lagrange came of an old French family of Touraine, France, said to have been allied to that of Descartes. At the age of twenty-six he found himself at the zenith of European fame. But his reputation had been purchased at a terrible cost. Although of ordinary height and well proportioned, he had by his ecstatic devotion to study,—periods always accompanied by an irregular pulse and high febrile excitation,—almost totally ruined his health. At this age, accordingly, he was seized with a hypochondriacal affection and with bilious disorders, which attended him throughout his life, and which were only allayed by his great abstemiousness and careful regimen. He was bled twenty-nine times in his life, which would, one would think, have affected the most robust constitution. Through his great care for his health he gave much attention to medicine. He was, in fact, conversant with all the sciences, although knowing his *forte* he rarely expressed an opinion on anything unconnected with mathematics.

When Euler left Berlin for St. Petersburg in 1766 he and D'Alembert induced Frederick the Great to make Lagrange president of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin. Lagrange accepted and lived in Berlin twenty years, where he wrote and published some of his greatest works. He was a great favorite of the Berlin people, and enjoyed the profoundest respect of Frederick the Great, although the latter seems to have preferred the noisy reputation of Maupertuis, Lamettrie, and Voltaire to the unobtrusive fame and personality of the man whose achievements were destined to shed more lasting light on his reign than those of any of his more strident literary predecessors: Lagrange was, as he himself said, *philosophe sans crier*.

The climate of Prussia agreed with the mathematician, as did also the national life of the Germans. He refused the most seductive offers of foreign courts and princes, and it was not until the death of Frederick and the intellectual reaction of the Prussian court that he returned to Paris, where his career broke forth in renewed splendor. He published in 1788 his great *Mécanique analytique*, that "scientific poem" of Sir William Rowan Hamilton, which gave the quietus to mechanics as then conceived, and having been made during the Revolution Professor of Mathematics at the new *Ecole Normale* and the *Ecole Polytechnique*, he entered with Laplace and Monge upon the activity which made these schools for generations to come exemplars of practical scientific education, and by his lectures there, systematised in definitive form the science of mathematical analysis of which he had developed the extremest capacities. Lagrange's activity at Paris was interrupted only once by a brief period of melancholy aversion for mathematics, a lull which he devoted to the adolescent science of chemistry and to philosophical studies; but he afterwards resumed his old love with increased ardor and assiduity. His significance for thought generally is far beyond what we have space here to insist upon. With him, not least of all, theology was forever divorced from a legitimate influence on science.

The honors of the world sat ill upon him ; *la magnificence le gênait*, he said ; but he lived at a time when proffered things were usually accepted, not refused. He was loaded with personal favors and official distinctions by Napoleon, who called him *la haute pyramide des sciences mathématiques*, was made a Senator, a Count of the Empire, a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor, and, just before his death, received the grand cross of the Order of Reunion. He never feared death, which he termed *une dernière fonction, ni pénible ni désagréable*, much less the disapproval of the great. He remained in Paris during the Revolution when *savants* were decidedly at a discount, but was suspected of aspiring to no throne but that of mathematics. When Lavoisier was executed he said : "It took them but a moment to lay low that head, yet a hundred years will not suffice perhaps to produce its like again." Lagrange would never allow his portrait to be painted, maintaining that a man's works and not his personality deserved preservation. The accompanying frontispiece to *The Open Court* is from a steel engraving supposedly based on the sketch obtained by stealth at a meeting of the Institute. His genius was excelled only by the purity and nobleness of his character, in which the world never even sought to find a blot, and by the exalted Pythagorean simplicity of his life. He was twice married, and by his wonderful care of his person lived to the high age of seventy-seven years, not one of which had been misspent. His life was the veriest incarnation of the scientific spirit ; he lived for nothing else. He left his weak body, which retained its intellectual powers to the very last, as an offering upon the altar of science,—happily made when his work had been done. A desiccated liver, a tumored kidney (see the delectable *post mortem* of Monsieur Potel), long since dust, were the sole defects he gave to the grave, but to the world he bequeathed his "ever-living" thoughts now resurgent in a new and monumental edition (Gauthier-Villars, Paris). *Ma vie est là !* he said, pointing to his brain the day before his death.

THOMAS J. MCCORMACK.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL CHEMISTRY. A Graded Course of One Hundred Lectures. By *Gustav Detlef Hinrichs*, M. D., LL.D. With an Atlas of Eighty Plates. Pages, 400. Price, \$4.00. St. Louis, Mo., U. S. Carl Gustav Hinrichs, Publisher.

Since the invention of the kindergarten, education is undergoing a radical reformation which in the end will make teaching more difficult and learning more easy. Instruction, which in former days consisted in mechanical cramming, has of late become an art employing a definite method of presenting the lesson, not to the mind alone, but first to all the senses and then to the mind. Professor Hinrichs's *Introduction to General Chemistry* is a guide for teachers and pupils according to the modern requirements. The book is full of illustrations and diagrams. It opens with pictures of the most famous chemists, Berzelius, Liebig, Bunsen, Faraday, Berthelot, and others. It contains illustrations of coal and gold mining, the process of quarrying salt, plates explaining crystallisation, a table of spectrum analysis (the latter, however, is not colored as it ought to be) ; parabolæ of fusing and boiling points, etc.

The book contains a great deal of information, but it is not a text-book ; it is, as the title indicates, an introduction into the science. It will therefore be welcome to the man of broad culture as well as to the student of chemistry. In the hands of a pupil for the use of home reading it will be a valuable help to the professor's lessons. It is sufficiently elementary to be attractive even to a beginner.

Professor Hinrichs as a scientist has not found the recognition to which his discoveries seem to entitle him. He claims, e. g., to have discovered the Mendeljeff law before Mendeljeff, and proves his priority by communications and statements the dates of which are unequivocal. No doubt he suffered under the disadvantage of living at a distance from the European universities. The recognition, withheld from him by his German colleagues, was, however, freely given him by French chemists, one of whom, M. Friedel, has been honored by the author with the dedication of the present book. Whatever we may think of Hinrichs the scientist, there can be no doubt that Hinrichs the teacher ranks high in both originality of method and in the *Anschaulichkeit* of his lessons. These virtues appear plainly in his *Introduction to General Chemistry*" and render the book a valuable aid to teachers.

There are two points, however, which may be regarded as drawbacks. First, an index is missing, and secondly the book, although its general make-up is good, has been partly printed in the display type which we are accustomed to find in advertisements. It is a fault (if a break of fashion may be called a fault) which is unessential, yet such unessential faults, because they are mere externalities, do sometimes more harm than essential shortcomings, which on account of their being internal are not easily discovered.

We heartily wish the author a genuine success with this book, which appears to contain the quintessence of his life's experiences as a professor of chemistry. P.C.

The flowers of summer are rapidly fading away in the cold December winds, but with the regularity of the seasons our artists offer us a new and indeed a rich harvest of the most delicate blossoms in the form of Christmas cards. Messrs. L. Prang & Co., the leading art publishers of this continent, publish again a choice selection of holiday greetings, all of which show exquisite taste and a rare perfection of technique. The style of art at present quite fashionable, which indulges in a method of outline drawing that is sometimes wrongly regarded as an imitation of the Japanese, appears to advantage in "The Dream Roses Calendar," a series of pictures representing dream-lost maidens surrounded by roses. The extravagance that is habitual in this style of painting has been happily avoided, and thus it appears that the very moderation of the artist has enabled him to transfigure the art *à la mode* and add beauty to fashion. Among other novelties of Messrs. Prang & Co. we notice a large picture by J. L. G. Ferris, "Washington and Sally Fairfax," and the second series of "The Masters of Music."

The Open Court Publishing Company has just received from Japan the new and first Japanese-English edition of Dr. Carus's *Nirvāna: A Story of Buddhist Psychology*. The delicate illustrations, which were made by Mr. Suzuki, one of the most famous artists of Japan, well reproduce the spirit of the tale and afford some fine specimens of Japanese art in its purest form, as unadulterated by foreign extravagances. The book is considerably larger than the *Karma* of Dr. Carus, with which our readers are familiar. The English type is good, the paper a soft, flexible crêpe. (Price, \$1.00.) An exquisite colored *Nirvāna* poster has also been designed for The Open Court Publishing Co. by Mr. Suzuki, and in our judgment far surpasses the examples of this style of art which were recently so much in vogue in European countries. (Price, 25 cents.)

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